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Addressing the Political Exception: Machiavelli's "Accidents" and the Mixed Regime

Author(s): John P. MccormickSource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 4 (Dec., 1993), pp. 888-900Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938821

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American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 4 December 1993

ADDRESSINGHEPOLITICALXCEPTION:ACHIAVELLI'S"ACCIDENTS"NDTHEMIXED EGIME

JOHN P. MCCORMICK University of Chicago

first, I will demonstrate that Machiavelli's conception of political phenomena is richer and more

varied and conforms to an adequate understanding of political reality more closely than later,

more "systematic," or "regular," conceptions often associated with the Enlightenment.

Second, Ifind in Machiavelli strong grounds for resisting authoritarian claims that the variegated and

unpredictable nature of political phenomena must be managed with unipartite and, especially,

centralized practical political alternatives. Ifocus upon Machiavelli's frequent use of a particular word

by which he refers to politically significant occurrences, accident. I argue that his employment of this

word, especially in the Discourses, serves to accentuate his sensitivity to the irregular, nonsystematic

nature of political reality-to the possibility of "exceptions." But I demonstrate that his practical

response to this reality, is not a perpetually vigilant, all-powerful sovereign but is, rather, a far more

moderate answer, the mixed regime.

O ne of the most prominentcharacteristicsfwhat is, for better or worse, referred to as"postmodernism" is a disenchantment with

the Enlightenment'sview of "nature"broadly speak-ing. Related literatureexhibits what is of more inter-est to political scientists, a dissatisfaction with theEnlightenment'sconception of political ature. Liberalpolitical theory, in particular,has been vilified for itsnaive presumption of the regularityof political phe-nomena and its resulting inattention to "excep-tions."' This call for a more sophisticated under-

standingof politicalphenomena maybe justified.Butis the practicalresponse corresponding to this under-standing necessarily of the potentially authoritariankind associated with particularlycentralizedpoliticalalternatives? No. The recognition of the politicalrealm as one that is characterized by the utmostvariability and unpredictabilityneed not imply thatthe only way to manage such a realityis with unipar-tite and executive-centeredpoliticalfiats. Fora modelof how to combine a nuanced understanding ofpolitical nature and a less narrow or even extremepracticalresponse to it, I suggest we turn not imme-diately to "postmodern" alternativesbut rather to a

writerwho is arguably thoroughly modern-NiccoloMachiavelli.

What is the nature of political phenomena? Arethey consistent or erratic? f the latter, what bearingdoes this have on political change? Whatforcescomeinto play such that once a regime is constituted itdoes not last perpetually? Why should not consoli-dated regimes, at least, be expected to do so? Machi-avelli was obsessed with these questions, and one ofhis many original contributions to political thoughtwas his identificationof the mixedregimeas the mosteffective antidote to those irregularforces that con-front and potentially bring down political entities.

John Pocock goes so far as to name this confron-tation between regime and unpredictable politicalnatureafterthe greatFlorentine, on the grounds that

Machiavelli has so shaped our modern understand-ing of political stability. Hence, the "Machiavellianmoment" is "the moment in conceptualized time inwhich the republicwas seen as confrontingits owntemporal finitude, as attempting to remain. . . stablein a stream of irrationalevents conceived as essen-tially destructive of all systems of secular stability"(1975, viii). Yet Pocock fails to ascertain adequatelyand in detail what constitutes the nature of these"irrationalevents." He is therefore in a somewhatdisadvantaged position to study Machiavelli's re-

sponse to them, namely, mixed government. Pococktoo readily accepts the dichotomy of virtue' ersusfortunaas Machiavelli'ssole paradigmof the humanattempt to manage political nstability (chaps. 6-7). Infact, the fortune-virtue distinction has become a kindof "set piece" in Machiavelli scholarship and, assuch, has come to convey a sense of order thatactually defies the spirit of Machiavelli'sapproach tothe issue of contingency.2

A more fruitful approach, I suggest, is to lookdirectlyat the variegated phenomena that Machiav-elli described as examples of threats to political sta-bilityand to focus precisely upon a word with which

he frequently referred to them, accident.The use of the term accident in the intellectual

world of RenaissanceFlorencewas both a residue ofmedieval scholasticthought and a manifestationof acontemporaryrevival of Aristotelianism.3What was"accidental"was opposed, in AristotelianorThomistthought, to what was "substantial."Hairor eye colorwere "accidental" o the nature of a person; they hadlittle or nothing to do with that person's substance,his or her "essence." In Machiavelli'sday, the wordcontinued to be used in this sense, particularly npolitical discourse. Something that happened to aregime (usually due to some extrinsic, not intrinsic

cause) was generally referred to as an accidente4Accidente,ike ourword accident,was a descriptive notan evaluative term. An accident was not viewed as

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necessarily good or bad. Its defining characteristicwas rather its unexpected quality;it was impossibleor at best very difficult to foresee. To the extent thatan accident could and potentially would detrimen-tally affecta regime, or even cause its collapse, thoseconcerned with politics needed to be alert to it,

though not necessarily to make it theircentralfocus.Machiavelli somewhat altered the traditionalcon-ception of accidenti.By describing political phenom-ena often exclusively in terms of accidentiand byexpanding the use of the term in ways that I willdescribe, Machiavelli made what was by definitionexternal, extrinsic,and insubstantial nto the verycoreof politics and hence the central focus of politicalthought. YetMachiavelli,who is most famous as theauthorof a book entitled ThePrince,actuallyresistedthe temptation to confront the unpredictable natureof politicswith a wholly executive-orientedresponse,instead advocating the mixed regime precisely be-cause he thought it could best withstand the accidentithat inevitably arise from time to time.

In addition, Machiavelli was quite eager to giveexamples of accidenti hat have occurred in historyand to demonstratewhat kind of actions or precau-tions have managed each of them successfully. If nosuccess had been achieved in the particularhistoricalcontext of the accidentin question, Machiavellipro-vided his own proposed solution.5As he explainedinthe Discourses: It is an easy thing to whoever exam-ines past things diligently to foresee future things inevery republicand to takefor them the remedies thatwere used by the ancients, or, if they do not find anythat were used, to think up new ones through the

similarityof the accidents"(1.39) 6

The task of this paper is to explain more fullyMachiavelli's conception of political phenomenathrough an analysis of the variety of accidenti s theyappear in the Discourses,his disquisition on mixedregimesorrepublics,and to decipher why he thoughtthat such a regime was best equipped to deal withthem.

THE NATURE OF ACCIDENTI ANDHOW TO MANAGE THEM

Machiavelli's work is not completely free from theconventional scholasticuse of the termaccident. Theword often connotes for him a simple happenstance,an occurrence, or an external event requiring littlecommentaryon how it should be treatedby a regime.For instance, he refers to floods and pestilence,without much elaboration,as accidenti2.5). He ap-plies the same term elsewhere to a simple expressionof public opinion (1.58). In Discorsi1.46, Machiavellispeaksof some unspecifiedaccident thatmight liftupa government from a position of servitude to one offreedom. While he does not elaborate here, this

example leads us to some of Machiavelli's moreinteresting uses of the word accident.An event that culminates in a political entity's

achievement of freedom is also referred to as anaccident in 1.16, when Machiavelli speaks of someaccidentthat might liberatea people who have beenliving under a prince. But here he has a particularhistorical nstance in mind-Rome's expulsion of theTarquin kings. This is no ad hoc occurrence like a

flood or a plaque, which would owe its appearanceonly to a freak of nature, or an "incident"narrowlydefined. It is, on the contrary,an act of will carriedout by a political body. And along with giving acomplicated example of an accident, Machiavellide-scribes the means of dealingwith it-in this particularcase, not how to prevent it or ward it off, but ratherthe means to put it to good use. To takeadvantage ofthe timely event of the Tarquins'demise, Machiavelliadvises that regimes that find themselves in similarpostprincely situations do as the Romans did and"kill the sons of Brutus"-in other words, eliminatethose who sympathize with the old regime and whomight seek to reinstate it.

This advice is reminiscent of Machiavelli's treat-ment of the same situationin chapter 5 of IIPrincipe.Machiavelli again refers specifically to an accidentthat will change a position of submission into one ofliberty-in this case, the newly won freedom of aformerlyconqueredstate. Here the historicalexampleis Pisa's liberation from Florence. But the adviceproffered is not how to transform such an accidentinto a long-term good, but rather how a conqueringregime can guarantee that such an accident nevercomes about in the first place. If a territoryacquiredthrough conquest was originallya republic, Machia-velli advises that its inhabitantsbe scatteredand their

civic bonds severed so as to make the republic'sreconstitution impossible. This, however, is difficultto achieve, he says. If the territorywas originallyaprincipalitythen the task is easier. All that is neces-sary is to wipe out the family of the hereditaryruler.Even though the advice given here (concerning acci-denti hat bring liberty to a subjugated state) is differ-ent from that set forthin the Discorsin being officiallyaddressed to a prince, it is still useful to mixedregimes. For Machiavelli, mixed regimes must beexpansionistandimperialist n orderto last (2.19)andso will be just as interested as princes in preventingsubjugated territories,whether formermonarchiesor

republics, from gaining their freedom through someaccident.

From these examples of accidenti hat bring free-dom, we may begin to infer a general pattern gov-erning Machiavelli'streatment of the term and thepolitical realitywith which it corresponds.Machiav-elli relates a historical instance, identifying it as anaccident, then proceeds to explain how such anoccurrence was dealt with, correctlyor incorrectly,within its own specifichistoricalcontext.He does thisin order to demonstrate to the reader how to avoidsuch a situation, if dangerous, or profit by it, iffortuitous. If no recourse was taken or the wrong

method was employed in history, Machiavellipro-poses a correct one.But there is also another ever-importantelement to

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be considered: the element of time, which Pocockiscorrect n emphasizing repeatedly. It is just as crucialto know whento act as to know what to do in theattempt to manage accidenti.Machiavellistresses timeand again in the Discorsi the necessity for govern-ments, with future unforeseen events in mind, to

apply due measures at an appropriate time. Heexpresses this most concisely however in a passagefrom chapter 3 of IIPrincipe: They not only have tohave regard forpresent troubles but also futureones,and they have to avoid these with all their industrybecause, when one foresees from afar, one can easilyfind a remedy for them but when you wait until theycome close to you the medicine is not in time becausethe disease has become incurable."7The accidentthatprompts this particular nsight is the potentialinvad-ing or influencing of a weaker territory ying adjacentto one's regime, by a rivalregime at least as powerfulas one's own. The historical precedent of this isestablished, according to Machiavelli,by the Greeks,who allowed the Aetolians to be conquered by theRomans and were themselves subsequently con-quered by the Romans. The "remedy"forthis partic-ular accidente-the precaution informed by "fore-sight" thatwould prevent it from arising-is to makeone's regime "head and defender of the neighboringlesser powers" (chap. 3). The Romans always fore-stalled the arrivalof the accident just described byfightingrivalpowers in the territoryof their satellitesand rarelyin the area of Rome itself: "The Romans,seeing inconveniences from afar, always found rem-edies for them and never allowed them to continuetoescape war, because they knew that war may not be

avoidedbut is deferredto the advantage of others. Sothey decided to make war . .. in Greece in order notto have to do so in Italy" (chap. 3).8

Thus, merely to recognizen accident s not enoughto .guard against its danger or profit from what itbrings. Nor is it sufficient to know what steps are tobe taken. A response of either type must occurat anappropriate imein order to be effective. Forexample,in the passage about the Tarquins cited earlier,Ma-chiavelli emphasizes that the reason the Romanswere able to benefit from their expulsion is the factthat the city was still young and uncorrupted. Hadthe terminationof the monarchy come at a laterdate,

either Rome would have been too corrupt to takemeasures to preserve libertyor such measures wouldhave been ineffectualif applied.

But if accidenti an be managed only if seen fromafar, then they are almost impossible to combatbecause, by definition, it is almost always impossibleto foresee them. As Machiavellihimself ratherpessi-mistically points out: "Ifhow human things proceedis considered well, it will be seen that often thingsarise and accidents come about which the heavensaltogether have not wished to be provided against.And if what I say happened at Rome (where therewas so much virtue, so much religion, and so much

order), it is no marvel that it should happen muchmore often in a city or a province that lacks thethings said above" (2.29). Most of the time, however,

Machiavelli presumes that accidentican indeed beseen before their development. In fact, the method ofdealing with them that I have elucidated as Machia-velli's fully depends upon such foreseeability.9

The solution to the foresight problem is crucial, forMachiavelli describes quite dramaticallythe conse-

quences of not addressing problemsin an early ash-ion as well as with a proper emedy. In the Discorsi,Machiavelli treats the accident of Florence's loss ofPisa in more detail than in the example from IIPrincipeust described. Machiavelliexplains, in termsof what mightbe calleda chainreaction,the courseofevents triggered by Florence'smistake of allowing agreat power to gain influence in its neighboringterritory.Whatis described as an accidentin the titleof 1.39-France's role in Pisa's rebellion-obligedFlorence to make war, which in turn forced it tospend a lot of money, which increased taxes, whichupset the populace, who overturnedthe city govern-ment, which thus could no longer prosecutethe war,which finally led to Florence's loss of additionalterritory ibid). The breathless prose and assumptionof rigid causalitywith which he presents this courseof events give the reader the impression that thesuccessive occurrenceswere inevitable once the ini-tial accident came to be. The only alternativeofferedthat might "break the chain," so to speak, is thepossibility that the people might realize that theirresponse to the government was counterproductive.They might give the government the requisite lee-way-which in factthey eventually did, albeit too lateto salvage the war and save the territories.

Although he does not mention the word accident

when discussing the events surroundingthe Agrar-ian Laws in Rome, Machiavellidoes emphasize fore-sight and speaks with an airof inevitabilityabout theconsequences. In 3.24, Machiavellirelates how in thewake of the AgrarianLaw controversy, the habit ofcalling for the prolongation of offices-for the tri-bunes by the people and for the consulate by theSenate-led to the prolongation of military com-mands, and to the creation of proconsuls (whichbecame more necessary as Rome's armies traveledfartherabroad).As a result, only a few men gainedmilitary expertiseand these very few, because of thelength of their terms, held more sway with the army

than did the Senate. This was the precedent thatCaesar was to follow. This chain of events, whichstretches over centuries, seemingly could have beenavoided only had the originalincident over the issueof officesbeen dealt with more appropriately.In thisregard, Machiavelli laments, "If these things hadbeen known well from the beginning, and properremedies producedforthem, a freeway of life wouldhave been longer" (ibid.).'0

Thechainsof events thatseem to follow specificallyfrom ill-prepared-foraccidentiare also described interms that make them sound inevitable, successive,and nearly irreversible. Unless a republic has laws

that prevent a rich citizen from gaining undue polit-ical influence and friends through money or protec-tion, that citizen will be feared by the common

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citizens and treateddeferentiallyby officials until heis virtuallyunassailable. The only choices that remainfor those uncomfortablewith such a situationare, onthe one hand, the use of violence to bring such afigure down or, on the other, the suffering of servi-tude in silence. Suchis "the order of these accidents"

(l'ordinedi questiaccidenti) 1.46). The implication ofthis statement is that without the establishment, atthe very beginning, of the specificlaw that Machiav-elli advocates to prevent the ascent of such a citizen,ill events will follow in the orderdescribedwith littlechance of interruption. (The only possible escapefromthe chain entailsviolence and hence a new set ofdangers.) The law could not be instituted at somelaterpoint in the scheme, after the initialappearanceof the accident of a rich person's rise to prominence,because he will then hold so much weight with thepolitical institutions as to forestallsuch legislation.

This dire course of events is akin to an accidentdiscussed earlier n book 1. There the advice given isphrased somewhat differently, however. Certaindangers result from a republic'sbestowing excessivehonors upon its young nobles (1.33). The results aresimilar to the scenariojust described, in that exem-plary citizens rise to the ranks of petty tyrants.Machiavellidoes not say that such actions should beprevented from the start, for he implies that it isalmost inevitable-and perhaps good, to some ex-tent-that a regime should tend to treat its mosttalentedyouth accordingly,occasionallybending therules for them. Nor does he maintain that ruin isinevitable once this accident has been set in motionbecause the accidentwill be mistaken for something

good and not dangerous. This exampleis interestingbecause Machiavelli, who is famous for favoringimpetuosity over inaction," uncharacteristicallyad-vocates doing nothing in this situation:"Since it isdifficult o recognizethese evils when they arise-thedifficultycaused by a deception that things make foryou in [the] beginning-it is a wiser policy to tempo-rize with them after they are recognized than tooppose them;forif one temporizeswith them, eitherthey are eliminatedby themselves or at least the evilis deferred for a longer time" (ibid). In the previousexample, action was deemed impossible due to thefurtherdanger it might engender; but outright inac-

tionwas not expressly advocated as it is here.As with the previous two, this episode is charac-

terizedby Machiavellias an accident that arises fromcauses internal to a regime. The accident is notinternal n any essential r substantialense but merelyin the sense that it arises within the domestic realm,rather than from the external realm, as do thoseassociatedwith foreign affairs or naturaldisasters.

Yet Machiavelli does speak elsewhere of accidentithat develop as a result of a regime'sintrinsic nature.In book 3 he declares that "because in every-thing ... is hidden some evil of its own that makesnew accidentsemerge, it is necessary to provide for

this with new orders"(3.11). Yet this use of accidentiseems significantlydifferent from what I have estab-lished as the usage common in RenaissanceFlorence

and even with the separate use thatI have associatedwith Machiavelliso far. This use is not Aristotelian(as were those in the earliest examples); nor is it"Machiavellian"n the same sense as are the bulk ofthe examples I have been presenting. It is insteadPolybian.

Machiavellihas taken this traditionallyAristotelianword and given it here a use derived from Polybius'analysis of the mixed regime. As Polybius wrote inbook 6 of his Histories,"Justas rust eats away iron,and wood-worms or ship worms eat away timber,and these substances even if they escape danger aredestroyed by the processes which are generatedwithin themselves, so each [simple] constitution pos-sesses its own inherent and inseparablevice" (1979,310). Rather than something externalto the regime,like a foreign invasion or a flood, or even somethinginternal to a regime but not necessarily related to itssubstance as such, like the Roman expulsion of theTarquins, the vice spoken of by Polybius and theaccidentspoken of in this instance by Machiavelliaregenerated by the very core of a regime, spawned byits very essence.'2 As I will demonstrate in myanalysis of Machiavelli's heory of the mixed regime,such use of the term accident is rare in the Discorsi,and the question of just how a mixed regime shouldmanageaccidentin generalmust wait forthe analysisthat lies ahead. Before embarking upon that discus-sion, however, a summation is in order.

I have by no means provided an exhaustive list ofMachiavelli's accidenti.There are more exampleswithin the Discorsi,as well as more to be consideredin the following sections. What can be concluded at

this juncture is that Machiavelli applied the termaccidenti o many different occurrences. The crucialsimilarityamong these lies in Machiavelli'sbelief thatfor the sake of the longevity of a regime, all suchaccidenti eed to be managed. In a very simple way,Machiavelli is quite radical. He speaks of politicsextensively-almost exclusively-in terms of thatwhich is conventionallyconsidered remote. And hespeaks of preventing, forestalling,or putting to gooduse that which is normally thought to be unpredict-able oruncontrollable.These areindeed peculiarusesof the word accidenti-uses that must have seemedstrange to minds that had been psychologicallyand

philosophicallyconditionedby the works of Aristotleand St. Thomasto consider whatever was referredtoby such a word as, if not insignificant,than certainlynot fundamental.

To be more specific, except in those cases wherethey appear as authorless occurrences(floods, etc.)and despite some ambiguity regardingthe full extentto which he thought they could be handled, Machi-avelli generally describes the appropriatemeasuresneeded to be undertaken to manage accidentiandemphasizes the necessity of applying them at acrucial ime. Accidenti ppearas actions on the partofone's regime or as actions on the part of someone

else's regime. They can be an event brought uponone's regime from without or from within, and theycan win freedom or ensure enslavement. If ignored,

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they may lead to a chain of uncontrollableevents; ifproperly temporized, they may fade away. Accidentimay bring good as well as ill. Indeed, the destructivequality of accidenti an be overemphasized, resultingin the neglect of the full range of Machiavelli's em-ployment of the termand of the conceptualapparatus

thataccompaniesit. In 2.29 Machiavelligives a list ofdangerousaccidentihat fortune inflictedupon Rome:it caused Rome to send inappropriateambassadors othe Gauls, ordained that Rome do nothing about theoncoming invasion of the Gauls, exiled Camillus,didnot let Romeappointa dictatorwhen needed, and soon. Yet (orso Machiavelliclaims)these afflictionsdidnot ruin Rome. On the contrary, they made Romestronger and allowed it to attain the greatness forwhich it was destined. It is this idea that accidenti,even dangerousones, aregood forregimes that leadsus to Machiavelli'smost peculiar use of the word.Specifically,I want to ask how the theory of accidentirelates to the subjectof the mixed regime and Machi-avelli's preference for it.13

ACCIDENTI AND THE MIXED REGIME

Machiavelli shares with his predecessors who fa-vored the mixed regime (most notably, of course,Aristotle and Polybius) the belief that stabilityandlongevity are reliable measures of such a regime'ssuccess.'4 In a famous passage from the Politics hatwe have seen Machiavelliecho, Aristotle claims that"to know the causes which destroy constitutions isalso to know the causes which ensure theirpreserva-

tion" (5.8.1).15Furtheron, he states: "The mainte-nance of a constitution is the thing which reallymatters.A statemay last for two or three days underany kind of constitution; Legislatorsshould thereforedirect their attention to the causes which lead to thepreservation and the destruction of constitutions ...and on that basis they should devote their effort tothe construction of stability. They must be on theirguardagainstall the elements of destruction"(6.5.1).The primacyof stabilityand longevity is expressed inPolybius as well: "The test of true virtue in a mansurely resides in his capacityto bear with spirit andwith dignity the most complete transformations of

fortune, and the same principleshould apply to ourjudgment of states" (1979, 302). Machiavelli, as iswidely known, incorporates he respectivetheories ofthe mixed regime from these two authors. But heundertakes a more extensive treatment than they doof "the causes that destroy constitutions," or "thetransformationsof fortune"-here specifically denti-fied as accidenti-and the means to address them.Machiavellidoes not confine the subjectto abook 5 orbook 6 of his study of mixed regimes but, rather,makes it central to the whole of his Discorsi.Defyingchronology, let us turn first to Polybius' account ofthe benefits of mixed governmentregardingstability,

and Machiavelli'streatment of it, before consideringhis treatmentof the Aristotelianmixed regime.As has been well documented,' Polybius puts

forth the theory that the mixed regime was adoptedby Rome and Sparta to break the "natural"cycle ofdegeneration that all simple regimes undergo indefi-nitely.'7 This cycle of political revolutions is "the lawof nature," according to Polybius; it grows "fromnatural causes, and will pass through a natural evo-

lution to its decay" (1979, 309-10). Apropos of thepassage cited earlier from Polybius concerning thevices inherent in all simple substances, the inferiorregimes (tyranny,oligarchy, and mob rule) are inher-ent within the good ones (kingship, aristocracy,anddemocracy).According o Polybius,Lycurgusof Sparta

foresaw this, and accordinglydid not make his constitu-tion simple or uniform,but combined in it all the virtuesand distinctive features of the best governments, so thatno one principleshould become preponderant, and thusbe perverted nto its kindredvice, but that the power ofeach element should be counterbalancedby the others,so that no one of them inclines or sinks unduly to eitherside. In other words the constitution should remain fora

long while in a state of equilibrium hanks to the princi-ple of reciprocityor counteraction. (pp. 310-311)

Lycurgusattained "the best of all existing constitu-tions" through his "powers of reasoning" and his"foresight." For Polybius, there is another way toachieve the same "result" or "goal." Rome became amixedregimethroughthe "lessons which misfortuneteaches." It did this not "by means of abstractrea-soning, but ratherthrough the lessons learned frommany strugglesand difficulties;and finally, by alwayschoosing the better course in the light of experienceacquiredfrom disasters"(p. 311). Polybiusmakes noclear judgment as to whether the Roman or the

Spartan way of attainingthe mixed regime is better.While adopting much of Polybius' account of the

rise of the mixed regimein Spartaand Rome, there isalso much with which Machiavelli dispenses. Forinstance, he generally accepts Polybius' theory ofcycles, except for their cause and ultimate result.Polybius attributesthe genesis of the cycle to nature,Machiavelli to chance 1.2).18 Polybius maintains thatthe cycle would go on indefinitely, Machiavelli thatthe regime would probably become "subject to aneighboring state that is better ordered than it"(ibid.).'9These alterationsdemonstrateMachiavelli'sdissatisfaction with Polybius' overly determinist ex-

planations of political change. If political regimesundergo change in the manner of the cycles becauseof chance, there is less emphasis on a preordainedorder and more room for human action, preparation,and so on than if such change were governed bynature as such. This rejection of Polybius' naturalcauses also illustrates how uncharacteristic f Machi-avelli is the "Polybian" example of an accident at1.33. The idea that a regime will "degenerate"by itsvery "essence," that its downfall will occur "natural-ly," is not usually found in Machiavelli. The seconddeparturefrom Polybius further bears this out. ForMachiavelli, an external force-another regime-is

the last word on the degenerating regime:there is noperpetual spin of the cycle. This shift emphasizes thataccidentare generally external (or at least, if internal,

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then internally nonessential) phenomena and henceparadoxically, both less reliable and more controlla-ble. Thus it is on the issue of the very nature ofpolitical phenomena-accidenti, if you will-that Ma-chiavelli breaks with Polybius.

Accidenti re also the source of Machiavelli's other

major departure from Polybius. Machiavelli at firstappears to accept Polybius' neutrality toward the twoways a political body can become a republic and evenappears to lean in favor of the Spartan model. Hewrites that

eitherin theirbeginning or afternot much time, [somecities]were given laws by one individual alone and at astroke, like those that were given by Lycurgus to theSpartans; ome had them by chance and at many times,and according to accidents, as had Rome. So, thatrepublic can be called [happy] whose lot is to get oneman so prudent that he gives it laws orderedin a modethat without having need to correctthem, it can livesecurely under them. And Spartais seen to have ob-

served them more than eight hundred years withoutcorruptingthem or without any dangerous tumult:andon the contrary hatcityhas some degreeof unhappinesswhich, not having fallen upon one prudent orderer,isnecessitated to reorder tself by itself. (1.2).

But when actually discussing Rome, Machiavellishows how its "infelicitous" transformation into amixed regime is betterhan Sparta's "felicitous" birthas a mixed regime because of Rome's relationship toaccident.Rome was established as a kingdom, soonbecame a tyranny, but through the accident of theTarquin expulsion, it salvaged the element of kinglypower in the consulate, rather than degenerating into

another type of regime. To some extent, the cycle is"absorbed" by the republic:

Having at once ordered two consuls there who stood inthe place of the King, [the Romans]came to expel fromRome the name, and not the kingly power; so, sincethere were the Consuls and the Senatein thatrepublic, tcame to be mixedonly of two qualitiesout of the three[ofmixed government], that is, the Principalityand theAristocrats. It remained only to give a place to thepopular government; hence, when the Roman nobilitybecame insolent, . . . the People rose up against it; so asnot to lose the whole, [the nobility]was constrained toyield to the people its role.... And thus was the crea-tion of the Tribunesof the plebs, afterwhich creation he

stateof thatrepubliccameto be more stabilized,since allthree kindsof government here had its role. (1.2).

Why was Rome's way to a mixed regime betterthan Sparta's? Based on what we have learned so farof Machiavelli's conception of political phenomenaand his proposed methods for dealing with it, theRoman model is more likely to occur in the world ofpolitics. It is also the more likely to last. A regime thatis built by accidentwill be more adept at managingaccident.Lycurgus' Sparta-which sought to escapewhat Pocock calls "contingency" and prosper indef-initely as having been designed by a "timeless agen-cy"-is, in a Machiavellian sense, unreal.

As Pocock observes,The goal defined by Polybius and achieved by Lycurgusmay still be to escape from time and change, but there

are circumstancesin which citizens move toward thisgoal through the efforts of theirown time-bound selves.The interesting case [for Machiavelli] is not that ofSparta, where a formula for timelessness was writtenina single moment by a legislator virtually ndependent oftime; t is that of Rome, where the goal was achieved ...by the disorderlyand chance governed actions of partic-

ular men in the dimension of contingencyand fortune.Men who do this escape from ortuneby the exertion of avirtue' hich is their own and not that of a superhumanlegislator.... The legislator-prophet is an even rarerfigurein the Discorsi han in the Principe. 1975, 190, 192)

Pocock's position here has much to be said in itsfavor. There are, however, severalproblemswith thisinterpretation,of which I shall describeone.20Pocockis indeed correctregarding the reason for Machiavel-li's preference of Rome over Sparta,but he is correcton the basis of the wrong evidence. Machiavellidoesmaintain, paradoxically, that greater stability andlongevity can be achieved by exposing a regime to"the dimension of contingency" than by its seekingrefuge in the realm of timelessness. But this "dimen-sion" is characterized n the passages in question byaccidenti, not by the fortuna-virtui opposition uponwhich Pocock is fixated. Accordingto Machiavelli,aconstitution, though not born perfect,can be made sothrough "the occurence of accidents" espite (or per-haps because of) the fact that such a way is danger-ous: "But it is indeed true that [such regimes] willnever order themselves without danger, becauseenough men never agree to a new law that looks to anew orderin a city unless they are shown by neces-sity that they need to do it. And since this necessity

cannot come without danger, it is an easy thing forthe republic to be ruined before it can be led to aperfectionof order"(1.2).

Machiavelli tells us in the previous chapter thatnecessity inspires people to greater deeds than doeschoice (1.1), thus setting up the paradox:potentiallydangerous accidenti,when properly handled, canimprove a regime by causing it to renovate itself.Exceptionalcircumstancesput a regime in danger,giving it the opportunity for even greater achieve-ments. When we examine Machiavelli'sprescriptionsfor how a mixed regime can maintainitself, we shallagain see the advantage of Rome's constitutional

coming-to-beover Sparta's:accidenti egularly give aregime the occasion to introduce the "new modesand orders" that every mixed regime needs to rein-vigorate itself. As Aristotlepoints out: "The preser-vation of a constitutionmay not only be due to thefact that a state is farremovedfrom the menaceof anydanger:it may also on occasion, be due to the veryopposite. When danger is imminent, men arealarmed, and they therefore keep a firmer grip ontheirconstitution"(Politics5.8.8).

This brings us to Aristotle's theory of the mixedregime and Machiavelli'suse of it. As we have seen,besides the theory of the cycles, what Machiavelli

derives fromthe Polybianmodel of the mixed regimeprimarily concerns institutions. Polybius focuses al-most exclusively on the formally political aspects of

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the Spartanand particularly he Roman government:the consulate, Senate, and tribunes as expressions ofthe monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic ele-ments of political organization.But Machiavelli alsoincorporates the Aristotelian socioeconomic defini-tion of the mixed regime and discusses at length the

relationship between the popolo and the grandi-thecommon people and the nobility, the poor and therich.21

It is not only the institutionallymixed nature of theRoman republic that allows it to confront accidenti(swallow them, so to speak) and improve itself as aresult. According to Machiavelli, the socially mixednature of the regime also allows it to do so. In fact itis the socioeconomic element that is ultimately re-sponsible for precisely the institutional perfectionpreviously noted. According to Machiavelli, "dis-union"between the plebeiansand the Senateactuallycaused "so many accidents" that what an organizerlike Lycurgus had not done was accomplished by"chance"(1.2).

This theme is elaborated in the directly followingchapter, "WhatAccidents Made the Tribunes of thePlebs Be Createdin Rome Which Made the RepublicMore Perfect" (1.3). The accidenti eferred to in thetitle are explained in the body of the chapter. Thenobles initially treated the people well because theyneeded the people's support against the Tarquins.Yet after the Tarquins were expelled, the noblesbegan abusing the people. But again, "necessity"-acondition that is brought about by forces of chancesuch as accidenti-compelledRome to come up with areplacementfor the Tarquins,to keep the nobles at

bay as they had. After"many confusions, noises, anddangersof scandals that arose between the plebs andthe nobility," the tribunes replaced the Tarquinsvis-a-vis the nobles as the consuls had replaced thekings vis-a-vis the people. In a later chapter,Machi-avelli describeshow the tribuneswere in turn checkedwhen they began to abuse theirpower (3.11).

Machiavelliderives fromAristotle the idea that theprincipal class components of regimes ought to bemixed together when constituting republics. In thePolitics,Aristotledeclaresthat simple regimes are notdefined in terms of number (a democracy is notmajority rule, nor oligarchy rule by the few) but,

rather, in terms of the socioeconomic group that isdominant (3.8). The criteriaby which Polybius de-fined regimes-the one, the few, and the many-aredeemed merely "accidental" by Aristotle (3.8.6).They are not the definitive characteristics. Thus,Aristotle's mixed regime, the best and most stableregime-the politeia-blends the rich and the poor,the wealthy and the freeborn(4.8.8).

In the Discorsi 1.4 Machiavelli draws upon thisformulation and seemingly extends it further. Herestates Aristotle's position faithfully:"In every re-public there are two diverse humors, that of thepeople and thatof the great."But he goes on to write,

shockingly,"All the laws made that are made in favorof liberty arise from their disunion" (1.4). This em-phasis on discordmight be read as a repudiation or at

least a departure rom the Aristotelian deal. After all,in book 5 of the Politics,stasis-the ultimatethreat toa regime, accordingto Aristotle-most often arises asstrife over real or perceived economic inequality.Butis Machiavelli really celebrating such strife with hisemphasis on the accidentihatarisefrom discord?No.

Upon closer examination, we see that Machiavellinever abandons Aristotle's criteria or what makes ahealthy relationship between rich and poor, even ifAristotle considered that relationshipa "blend" (Pol-itics 4.8.8) and Machiavelli considered it a "dis-union." Aristotle writes: "A properly mixed polity... should owe its stability to its own intrinsicstrength,and not to externalsupport;and its intrinsicstrength should be derived from the fact, not that amajority are in favor of its continuance (that mightwell be the case even with a poor constitution), butratherthat there is no single section in all the statewhich would favor a change to a differentconstitu-tion" (Politics4.9.10). As long as no group or socialclass is opposed to the regime itself, regardless ofhow it feels toward the other groups within it,accordingto Aristotle,the constitutionis safe and theregime sound. Machiavelli ully adheres to this view,for (as mentioned earlier)he cites the consequencesof the Agrarian Laws as the beginning of the end ofthe mixedregimein Rome.Itwas at this moment thatthe people tried to change the very nature of theconstitution n favor of themselves and at the expenseof the nobles by limitingland holdings and distribut-ing conquered enemy land exclusively among theplebs (1.37). Additionally, Machiavelli makes clearthathealthyRoman disunion rarelyresultedin exiles,

civil bloodshed, executions, or excessive fines (1.4).Machiavelli'scommitmentto the ideal that no groupshould be hostile to the constitution is in evidencewhen he advocateskillingthose who are involved inclan warfare(3.27, 30). Thus the disunion or discordthat Machiavelli credits with causing accidenti hatmade the republic stronger is not a violation but aradicalstepping forward of the Aristotelian theory ofthe mixed regime.

Machiavellihas very specific ideas about how thisdiscord should be facilitated.I will point out only afew examples as they pertain to the topic of acci-denti.2 An important point for Machiavelli is the

citizens' right to bring forth public accusationsagainst even the most powerful figures because it(1) deters acts that mightbe committed against theregime, (2) leads to punishment of acts that areactuallycommitted against the regime, and (3) pro-vides an outlet for partisan discharge within legalboundaries. Machiavelli furnishes two examples ofaccidenti o demonstrate,on the one hand, the disas-ters that did not occur in Rome, which had a proce-dure for accusations,and on the other, the disastersthat did occurin Florencewhere no such safetyvalveexisted. We thus derive some further dea of what thedifference between proper and dangerous discord

might be to Machiavelli.In Rome, when Coriolanus offended the people,had he not been required to answer the charges

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officiallyand publicly,Machiavelliassures us that hewould have been killed by the mob. This accidentwould have had devastating consequences thatwould have taken the form of the chain reactionsillustrated earlier.His death at the hands of the mobwould have signaled a private injury to the nobles,

which in turn would have sparkedfear,which wouldhave called for defense, which would have requiredpartisans, fromwhich would have risen factions,andfrom such factions ruin would have followed (1.7).

In Florence, the very real accident that arose be-cause no means existed for making accusations in-volved the invitation to invade delivered to a foreignpower, Spain, by a party that felt it could not chal-lenge Soderinidomestically.Machiavelliexplains:"Ifsuch modes [of accusation had existed in Florence],either the citizens would have accused [Soderini],ifhe was living badly; and by such means they wouldhave purged their animus without having the Span-ish army come; or, if he were not living badly, theywould not have daredto work againsthim for fear ofbeing accused themselves" (1.7). As a rule, Machia-velli wryly observes, if one partyin a republiccalls ina foreign army, discord has become unhealthy.

Consider again the issue of discord and accident,Machiavelliprefers Rome to Spartaon the Aristote-lian issue of social groups for the same reasons thatwere explained regarding the Polybian question offoundings and institutions. Even though SpartaandVenice were mixed regimes that lasted long withoutdiscord between their classes, the Roman mixedregime, fueled by discord, is superior, for Machiav-elli, because its structure is more conducive and

specificallyadaptiveo politicalreality.As Machiavellidemonstratesin 1.6, healthy civil discord and expan-sion go hand in hand. The energy createdby the onemust be directed toward the other. Roman discord,resultingfrom full inclusion of the people within therepublican government, leads to Roman empire.Sparta,becauseit was small, well-defended,and tran-quil, did not have to expand.23Yet, according o Ma-chiavelli, expansionforces a mixed regimeto face theoptionsof totaldestructionor greater ongevity. Spartaavoids the former only by forsakingthe latter, yetMachiavellintimates that this is not the most reliableexampleto followin order to ensurelongevity.

Domestic discord means greater susceptibility toaccidentinternally, just as expansion means greatersusceptibilityto them from without. This, of course,entailsdangerforthe regime. But, as we have seen, italso implies the possibilityof the regime'sstillgreaterenhancement. RepublicanRome faced accidenti t itsinception-it was born of them-but in incorporatingthem into the regime itself, it became stronger. Thestaid equilibriumthat Polybius ascribes to Spartandomestic politics (1979, 310-11) is not nearly so suit-able to political phenomena, conceived by Machia-velli, as is Rome's dynamic domestic equilibrium.Hence, ironically, Sparta is not as stable as Rome!

Similarly, regarding foreign affairs,by following animperialpolicy, Rome threw itself even more into theface of the unpredictable and became stronger still.

Sparta,by choosing not to expand, hoped to exemptitself from the realm of chance and presumed thatthe necessities of the changing world would not callupon it to do so. Touse the metaphor from chapter25of II Principe, f Fortuneis a woman who favors theactive youth, Sparta sought not her favorsand made

no attempt even to court her, while Rome "struckherdown" and "beat her" in the way of Machiavelli'snotoriousmisogynist fantasy. Spartawas lucky to getby for eight hundred years without succumbing tosome accidentthat would bringit down. Rome thrustitself into the realm of accidentiand thrived. Theconceptionof "stability" s hereby radicallyredefinedby Machiavellias something that is ensured by en-ergy and movement, rather than harmony, in boththe domestic and external realms.

So far, we have seen Machiavelli'stheory of themixed regime: how it marries the institutional con-struction of Polybius with the socioeconomic con-struction of Aristotle and how it is formulated toconformwith the conception of political phenomenaI set forth as Machiavelli's earlier(a conception thatcenters upon accidenti).The evidence seems to sug-gest that in a philologicallyexact sense, Machiavelliformulated his theory of the mixed regime withaccidentin mind.

There are other reasons related to stability forwhich Machiavelli favors the mixed regime. HansBaron points out the advantages the mixed regimeholds over princely rule in Machiavelli's estimation.Republics are superior, in Baron's interpretation,because they better handle emergencies due to the"variety of talents required,"which are available to

mixed regimes and not monarchies(1961, 223). Andindeed, Machiavelliwrites thatin a republicthere is abetter chance of having successive virtuous rulersbecause of elections, unlike the kingdomof Macedon,for instance, which was lucky enough to have onlytwo such rulersin a row (1.20).Relatedly,forBaron,a republic, unlike a monarchy, can more likely pro-duce "a long succession of outstandingmen neededto reforma degenerate people" (1961, 223). But thisinsight, as well as the earlier discussions regardingboth the nature of political phenomena and mixedregimes raises further questions. For example,granted the mixed regime is the answer of Polybius

and Aristotleto the problemsof political stabilityandlongevityand the Roman mixedregimeas it relatestoaccidentis Machiavelli's improved answer to theseproblems, just howlongcan such a regime last, evenwith all the advantages it holds over other types ofregimes?

And it is curious that Baron,who maintains as hisbasicpremisethe incompatibilityof ThePrince nd theDiscourses-one-man rule versus republican rule-should bringup the questionof what role"outstand-ing men" would have in preserving the republic.Attention to this role, in fact,leads to the refutationofhis thesis. If we examine the question of howlonga

mixedregimecan last in Machiavelli'sDiscorsi,we arecompelled to consider his answer-one-person ruleat various possible times in the life of the republic. As

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we shall see, the specter of accidenti ooms over thissubject just as it has over the others.

DEFENDER OF THE CONSTITUTION:

DICTATOR OR WISE LEGISLATOR?Machiavelli is less sanguine at some points than atothersabout a mixedregime's abilityto last. At times,he even seems to question the very project of theDiscorsi:"Because one cannot give a certain remedyforlike disorders that arisein republics,it follows thatit is impossible to order a perpetualrepublic,becausethrough a thousand unexpected ways its ruin iscaused" (3.17). To expect a regime to last foreverwould certainlybe to ask for too much; even Romeeventually collapsed. But the search for "remedies"to dangerous "disorders"-for a way to foresee the"thousand unexpected ways" through which a re-public is destroyed-is precisely one of the centraltasks of the Discorsi. ndeed, Machiavelli s generallymore hopeful than this passage would indicate.

Although he opens book 3 with the statement, "Itis avery true thing thatallworldly things have a limitto their life," Machiavelli goes on to explain theessential preconditions for ensuring a long life tothings such as mixed regimes. All things pass awaybut "generally they go the whole course that isordered for them by heaven, so that they do notdisorder their body but keep it ordered in such amode that eitherit does not change, or, if it changes,it is for safety and not to its harm ... I am speaking

of mixed bodies, as are republics" (3.1). In otherwords, a mixed regimemay live out a healthy life if itdoes not change or if the changes it undergoesimprove it. We know from the analysis of politicalphenomena in Machiavelli hat it is very unlikelythata political entity can remain free of change. A timewill certainly come when it is confronted by someaccident to which it must either react and hencechange to some extentorperishand thereby (toput itmildly)change for the worst. We also know fromtheanalysis of the foundings of mixed constitutionsthata regime that manages to remain relatively un-changed, like Sparta, misses the opportunity to

change for the better, as Rome did.The changes that improved Rome occurred at the

city's beginning, and Machiavelli writes that for amixed regime alreadyunderway to maintainitself, itmust in some way return to that beginning:

Thoseare betterorderedandhavelonger ifewhichbymeans of theirorderscanoften be renewedor indeedthatthrough ome accident utside he said ordercometo saidrenewal.Andit is a thingclearer han ightthatthesebodiesdo not lastwhentheydo not renewthem-selves.Themode of renewing hemis, as was said,tolead them back toward theirbeginnings.For all thebeginnings f sects, republics ndkingdomsmusthave

somegoodnessnthembymeansofwhich heymaygetbacktheirfirstreputation nd theirfirst ncrease.Andbecause in the process of time that goodnessis cor-

rupted, unless somethingintervenes to lead it back to themark,it kills that body of necessity. (3.1)

The causes of this renewal or renovative "returntobeginnings" are referred to by Machiavelli first aseither an "external accident or intrinsic prudence"(3.1). Later in the chapter, however, Machiavelli

refers to the occasions for renewal as either externalor internalaccidenti ibid.), thus again putting them atthe center of the proceedings. An example of anexternalaccident that inspires renewal is the invasionof Rome by the Gauls. That invasion caused Rome toreorganize tself (ibid.).Internalaccidenti, n the otherhand, engender renewal through "law" or the ac-tions of "a good man." Machiavellideclares that it isgood if such accidentiorce the framingof new laws orthe action of a single man every 10 years to stave offcorruption (ibid.). I shall focus upon the internalaccidentinspiring such means of renewal, rather hanthe external ones with which we are by now so

familiar. The tension between the two possible re-sponses to internalaccidenti-law and personal rule-is one of the most confounding and intriguing aspectsof Machiavelli's heoryof preserving a mixed regime.

It is not surprising to find an emphasis on the roleof "one man" in Ii Principe: In affairs of state, . . .when one recognizes from afar the evils that ariseina state (whichs notgivenbutto onewho s prudent), heyare soon healed; but when they are left to growbecause they were not recognized, to the point thateveryone recognizes them there is no longer anyremedy for them" (chap. 3, my emphasis). But therole of one man is also an integral part (Baron's

discomfortand Pocock'sneglect notwithstanding)ofMachiavelli's theory of mixed government in theDiscorsi:

It is of necessity ... that in a great city accidents ariseevery day that have need of a physician, and accordingas they are important,one must find a wiser physician.And if like accidents ever arose in any city they aroseinRomeboth strangeand unhoped for ... And althoughthese diseases produce bad effectsin a republic, they arenot fatalbecause there is almost always time to correctthem . . . [But] if they are not corrected by a prudentindividual, they]ruin a city. (3.49, my emphasis)

In both passages, drawn from two different works,

we find the concernwith politicalphenomena that Ihave presented earlier:accidentmay be dealt withonly if seen from afarand responded to properlyandat an appropriate ime. The new element here, fromthe point of view of this study, is the role of the "onewho is prudent,"the "wise physician,"the "prudentindividual." Throughout the Discorsi, Machiavelliemphasizes the rolethatone person mayneed to playin the maintenanceof a republic.In 1.9, he writesthatone person is necessary not only to found a regimebut also to revive it. This claim is reiterated n chapter55, where he advises that a "kingly hand" is neces-saryto remodel a republic.In chapter 17, he declares

thatthe goodness of one man can save a regimefromcorruption. Yet this emphasis on the role of "oneindividual" is not necessarily as ominous as it

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sounds. After all, such observationseven appear inAristotle:"Ordinarymen cannotsee the beginning oftroubles ahead; it requires the genuine statesman"(Politics .8.9).

If a regime must be renewed to maintainitself andif this renewal can take place within the regimethrough law or through the action of one man, anobvious question poses itself: Are the actions of thisone man to be confined or governed by law, or arethey to be extralegal?Is the "one individual" sup-posed to defend the constitution by constitutionalor extraconstitutionalmeans? Machiavelli'sanswer,seemingly, is both.

Machiavellipromotes the institution of the dictatoras a legal and constitutional means of dealing withaccidentiand preserving a mixed regime: "Thoserepublicswhich in urgent perils do not take refugeeither in the dictator or in similar authorities willalways come to ruin in grave accidents"(1.34).24 ForMachiavelli,a dictatorshipis an alternativeto extra-

legal methods for dealing with accidenti.For if arepublic has no constitutionally recognized way ofestablishinga temporary dictator,it faces the choiceof adhering to the constitution as it is and perishingor violating it and surviving. But if a mixed regimesurvives through extraconstitutionalmeans, a badprecedentis set, and in the future the law may not bebrokenwith such good intentions in mind (1.34).

Consistentwith this interpretationof accidenti,Ma-chiavellisays, with dictatorship n mind, "A republicwill never be perfect unless it has provided foreverything with its laws and has established a rem-edy forevery accident and given a mode to governit"

(1.34).Basing his theory of dictatorship on the Roman

republicanmodel, Machiavellidefines it as: "giv[ing]power to one man who could decide without anyconsultation, and execute his decisions without anyappeal. This remedy, as it was useful then and wasthe cause that [Rome]overcame the impending per-ils, so it was always most useful in all the [accidents]which, in the expansion of their empire arose at anytime against the republic" (1.33). A dictatorshipwaslimited by time and task. It was prescribed for aspecific length of time, duringwhich the constitutioncould not be amended. The dictator could suspend

laws but not change them (1.34). Machiavelli noteshow the Romandictatorcould deprivea person of hisofficebut neverban the office(1.35).The decemviratewere bad dictators, accordingto Machiavelli,becausethey made constitutionalchanges (ibid.).

Yet not allof Machiavelli'sreferences to the impor-tance of "one individual" in preserving a mixedregimemention the need to confine this crucial igureby the "rule of law" (to use that phrase somewhatanachronistically).The emphasis on constitutionallimitations,found in his chapters on dictatorship, islackingelsewhere. In 1.18,Machiavellidescribes howlaws-the other internal device of renewal to ward off

accidenti,besides one-man rule-cannot combat thedangers that arise in a severely corruptregime. If newlaws to check corruption are legislated through cor-

rupt institutions, they will be ineffectual. Corruptinstitutions must then be renovated either little bylittle before corruption s widely known or all at oncewhen noticed by all. Both solutions, according toMachiavelli,are almost impossible. To replace themlittle by little requires a "prudent man" who can seethe corruption from a great distance. Such a manmight not exist at the time, and even if he did hewould have to convince others of the need for reno-vation, which would be difficult. On the other hand,to make corrections all at once, the law must bebroken,resort must be taken to violence and arms,or(possibly)a prince must be enthroned. A good manwould not want to resort to these measures or be-come such a prince; the bad man would but wouldnot relinquish power and restore the republic oncehis job was completed (1.18).

Baron misreads this chapter.He believes that Ma-chiavelli has ruled out the possibility of renewalthrough the means described.For Baron, the chapter

"repudiatesa programof salvation throughthe ruth-less actions of a princely usurper in the mannerrecommendedin the Prince" 1961, 233). But Machi-avelli merely demonstrates the difficulty of suchreform; he does not "repudiate"its possibility. Ma-chiavellisays only thatit is almostmpossibleto renewa regime in this way, and his subsequent discussionof the "kingly hand" of the reformerimplies that a"good man" might indeed undertake the violentmeasuresnecessary to preservethe regimein the faceof emergencies. Further, f one raises the question ofthe "ruthless"mannerof the Prince,one should notignore the potential ruthlessness of the Discorsi.In

the passage aboutthe "returnto beginnings,"Machi-avelli defines the renewal that will accomplishthis intermsof "terror"and "fear"(3.1). Such elements areby no means wholly remote from Machiavelli'sthe-ory of the mixed regime.25But more importantly,there is seemingly no reconciliation of this tensionbetween law and personal rule-this clash betweenincipient theories of Rechtsstaat nd arcanarei publi-cae-concerning constitutionallybound dictatorship,extraconstitutional"prudence,"and accidentihat themixed regime, as such, cannot endure.

So how does Machiavelliview the maintenanceofthe mixed regime in exceptional circumstances?Be-

cause accidenti re not always of the varietythat maybe combated or coopted in the Roman manner andoften strike a mixed regime that has at least to someextent been corrupted, a dictatormay be necessary.But because a dictator's role must be prescribedandthe nature of an accident may not, a mixed regimemay need to have recourse to a person with evenmore power than a dictator and with even fewerrestrictionsrestraininghim.

We need not draw from this outcome conclusionsas sinister as those intimated by Leo Strauss. Butneither should this side of the Discorsibe ignored, asit often is by such other eminent Machiavellischolars

as Baron, Pocock, and Skinner. It would be illegiti-mate to conclude that Machiavelli's ultimate andprimaryanswer to the problem of accidenti nd polit-

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ical stability is something akin to an extraconstitu-tional tyrant. To do such would mean fallinginto theeither/ordilemma associated with Carl Schmitt:theunrestrictednature of political phenomena necessi-tates an unrestrictedpoliticalactor. For Machiavelli,the subterfuge and violence to which a "prudent

man"must sometimesresort outside of constitutionalprescriptionsin order to preserve the regime is onlyone alternativeamong many. The variabilityof polit-ical nature for Machiavelli necessitates various re-sponses by which to deal with it. The complexitiesofthe mixed regime itself are such that it may absorbmany of the kinds of accidentthat the politicalrealmwill thrust upon it. Those that cannot may be dealtwith by the institution of a dictator. Only as a lastalternativedoes Machiavelliintroduce the extracon-stitutional"prudentman."26

CONCLUSIONI have traced the use of the word accidenti hroughMachiavelli'sDiscorsin the hope of bringingto light,perhaps slightly more clearlythan has been done inthe past, Machiavelli's conception of political phe-nomena. Justas CarlSchmitt,supposedly at the endof modernity, focused upon what was generallyconsidered peripheral,or at least subordinate,to therealm of politics-the exception-and thrust it, withstunning effect, to the center of this realm, so too didMachiavelli,at modernity's supposed beginning, fo-cus upon what was by definition nonessential-theaccident. By his consistent use of it, Machiavelli

establishedthe contingentoraccidentalas the centralconcernof politics.Themost important mplicationofhis approachis that one need not adhere to authori-tarian or neoabsolutist positions (as did Schmitt) todemonstratesensitivityto the politicalexception. Onthe contrary,support for the principles of moderateormixed governmentmay itself express this sensitiv-ity. As I noted, Machiavellisuggests that extralegalindividualefforts may be necessaryto save a regime.But the thrust of his overall presentation in theDiscorsis that this is not the only or even the primarymeans of doing so. Machiavelliwillingly devotes thebulk of this work to describingaccidenti nd the more

mundane and legal ways in which regimes may dealwith them; brilliantlyshows how a complex, mixedregime can better adapt to such accident nstitution-allyand socioeconomically hana unitary regime;andforcefullyadvocatesa constitutionallyprescribeddic-tatorship.As a consequence, he stronglyemphasizesthe legal over the extra- or supralegal means ofdefending a regime.

If Strauss is correct that for Machiavelli, contin-gency is the "enemy," and chance something to be"conquered"(1953,178;1958, 167), then Machiavellicould be seen as accomplice n the crimethat Schmittassociates with the modern, particularly liberal

project-the circumscriptionor even elimination ofthe concept of the exception. But while Machiavelliconcentrateson the exceptional-the "accidental"-

in the hopes of providingfor its bettermanagement,there is an awe, a respect for the magnitude andirrepressibilityf accidenthatwould fadein thosewhofollowed in the Florentine's ootsteps. These denigra-tors of the accidentalare the ones whom SchmittandStrauss are perhaps justifiedin criticizing.

Notes

I am deeply indebtedto Stephen Holmes, BernardManin,PasqualePasquino,NathanTarcov,and LeoJ. Walshfor theircareful attention to this essay. An earlierversion was pre-sented at the 1992annual meeting of the AmericanPoliticalScience Association in Chicago. Clifford Orwin, the paneldiscussant at that conference, offered substantive criticismsthat proved quite helpful. Of my many colleagues at theUniversity of Chicago who contributedsignificantlyto thedevelopmentof this paper,specialmentionmust go to Daniel

P. Carpenter,Ann C. Davies, and Gia Pascarelli.They dili-gently read successive drafts and consistently provided in-valuablesuggestions. Theirpatience, generosity,and insightare greatlyappreciated.

1. The most striking expression of such discontent withliberalismoccurs in the recentlyrevived Weimarwork of theGerman constitutional-political heorist, Carl Schmitt. It isSchmitt who declared, in quite dramatic fashion, that thepossibilityof "the exception"and the likelihood of its man-agement were issues absolutely central to the conduct andstudy of politics (1988,5). It is perhapsnot an unrelatedfactthat Schmitt eventuallyendorsed the ThirdReichin 1933.

2. Hanna Pitkin (1984)provides the most comprehensivetreatmentof fortune tself; Leo Strauss (1958)has grappledmost explicitlywith Machiavelli's therexpressions of contin-gency, such as chance (caso)and accidentsaccidentti.As will

become clear,while I do not support Strauss's strategy of

groupingthese words into a particular cheme that suppos-edly reflects Machiavelli's"intention," I do wish to focusupon one of these other expressions of contingency, theaccident, to help broaden the scope of scholarly views ofMachiavelli's onceptionof politicalphenomena.

3. For accountsof the significanceof these schools duringtheRenaissance, ee Skinner1978,esp. vol. 1, chap.3 andpp.144-151.

4. For instance, FrancescoGuicciardini requentlydistin-guishes between that which is "natural"and that which is"accidental": Everything, itherby natureorby accident[peraccidente,ends at some time"; again, "Let no one trust somuchin native intelligence[prudenzaatural] thathe believesit to be sufficientwithout ... experience [l'accidentaleeltaesperienza]"1965,43, 89; 1975, 17, 221).

5. In a certainsense, Machiavelli's"rehabilitation" f the

accidentalis the obvious precursorof Carl Schmitt's moreinfamousproject: he Florentinehadalreadymade that whichis not he normalcase, theexception,the very heartof politicalmatter. Yet there are two importantdifferences,besides theobvious and important historical one, between these two"exceptional" hinkers.First,Schmittwas convinced thatanyform of mixedregime-a governmentwhere sovereignty s tosome extentdivided-could nothope to survive the challengeof an exception. Second, Schmitt was silent regardingwhatform an exception might take and was reluctantto providehistoricalexamples of "exceptions" from the past. Schmittwrote, "Theexception . . . can at best be characterizedas acase of extremeperil, a dangerto the existenceof a state . ..

But it cannotbe circumscribedactually" 1988,6).6. English renderings from the Discorsihave been gener-

ously providedby Harvey C. Mansfieldand Nathan Tarcov

from a recent draft of their new translation, soon to bepublished by the University of Chicago Press. The Italianreferences are from the Rizzoli edition of 1984. Book and

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chapter numbers will appear in parentheses following thequote or reference.

7. All English references to IiPrincipe re to the Mansfieldedition (1985)and all Italianquotationsare from the Rizzoliedition (1950).Again, although the advice given here relatesto principalities nd not mixedregimes, Ibelieve the passageis still pertinent to my concerns here. I would extend Skin-ner's claim that"the underlying politicalmoralityof the two

books [ThePrinceand the Discourses]s the same"(1978, 183)to maintainthat the underlying understandingf political he-nomenan the two books is the same. Inany case, Machiavelliis referring o the foreign policy of the Roman republicn thispassage.

8. Cf. Discorsi .32.9. Some of Machiavelli'sarguments are less convincing

thanothersconcerninghow to foreseeand then deal with anapproachingaccident. In the chapter"BeforeGreatAccidentsOccur n a Cityor a Province,SignsCome ThatForecastThemor Men Who PreachThem," Machiavelliclaims, "No graveaccidentin a city or in a province ever comes unless it hasbeen foretold either by diviners or by revelations or byprodigies or by otherheavenly signs"(1.56).Machiavelligoeson to cite how "everyoneknows" that Savonarolapredictedthe invasion of the

French,how the same occurrence

waspreceded by visions in the sky, how Lorenzo's death waspreordainedby a lightning bolt that struck the highest pointof the cathedral, and how Soderini's downfall was alsosymbolized n advanceby lightning. How seriously are suchexamples to be taken, presented as they are by such arenowned antireligious heorist as Machiavelli?What areweto make of such a passage writtenby one who elsewherehasshown no regardforpiety exceptits politicalusefulness andwho praised the ancient Roman fraudulentuse of auspices(1.14)? And even if Machiavelli is indeed sincere in hisdeclaration,how helpfularesuch instances forreallyforesee-ing politicalphenomena?Leo Strauss nterpretsMachiavelli'ssuggestion that signs may precedeaccidenti o be partof theFlorentine's overall plan to subvert the traditionalunder-standingof the divineand of nature,reducingbothultimatelyto the element of chance.Straussreinforces his interpretationby linking these "foretold"accidenti o those that in anotherchapter,Machiavellidescribes as being manipulatedby Ro-man military eaders (3.14). Strauss'saim is to persuade hisreader that for Machiavelliaccidenti re phenomena that notonly happen to a politicalentity but also can be consciouslycreated and manipulated by a political entity. This secondexample proves, accordingto Strauss, that Machiavellididnotbelieve that the omens or signs thatprecededtheaccidenticited in the previous examplewere anything of the sort butwere rather occasions for manipulationby political agentswho knew how to put chance occurrences o their own use(1958, 210-23). In a recently published work challengingStrauss's interpretationon several grounds, Anthony Parelsuggests that Machiavelli nvokes these signs that precedeaccidentin good faith(1992, 40). Parelbases this claimon hisoverall thesis that "a pre-modern cosmology and a pre-

modernanthropologyunderlie Machiavelli'spolitical heory"(p. 153).He identifies thiscosmology-anthropologyas "Ptole-maic-astrological"p. 67) and insists that this is reflected inthe passage in question. According to Parel, Machiavelli'sbelief in astrologyora cosmologicalorderthat is governedbycelestial bodies would allow for the relationship betweengreatevents and sudden changes in the heavens fromwhichpredictionscould be made. While one mightnot wish to attestto the efficacyof all the evidence in Strauss's "subversion"thesis, it mightcertainlybe arguedagainstParel(as I do hereindirectly)that Machiavelli s attempting to purge politicaldiscourse of just those conceptions of political phenomenathatposit some sort of order,be that orderChristian,Aristo-telian, or even astrological.

10. Otherinstanceswhere Machiavellidiscusses events interms of "chainreactions"but not necessarilyaccidentippear

in 1.7-8, 11. It s interesting hat Machiavelli'suniverse,whichis characterized n general by disorder,has within it pocketsof such rigidcausality.

11. Cf. the famous passage in chapter 25 of Ii Principe,where Machiavelliadvises audacity n action over caution onthe groundsthat "Fortune s a woman" and favors those whobehave in daring fashion.

12. According o Kurtvon Fritz, Polybius' theoryis one ofthe most determinist of the mixed regime. As he explains,even for Aristotle, unlike Polybius, there is no necessity ofdegeneration from one specific kind of regime to another

specifickind in anycycle:an unstable regimeof any sortmaydegenerate ntoone of any other. Polybius, who probablywasnot familiarwith Aristotle, particularlynot the Politics,prob-ably owed such rigidity to a particular eadingof Herodotusor a faulty reading of Plato (Fritz 1954, 67, 49, 74, 67).Machiavelli'suse of accidenti,n this instance, is much closerto his use of the term umori han to the term that is my focushere. Foran intelligentdiscussionof umori n Machiavelli, eeParel 1992, chap. 6.

13. In his criticismsof Strauss's interpretationof Machia-velli, Parel cautions against overlooking "the cosmologicalroots of [Machiavelli's]political theology" s they are mani-fested in astrologyand collapsing (as he claims Straussdoes)Machiavelli'sdistinct notions of nature and chance: "Straussmakes the Machiavelliannotion of chance look like the onlycausal

'agent' operatingin his

(Machiavelli's)universe,and

he makes t look likean immanentcauseat that"(1992,52, 85;my emphasis). But this is precisely hepoint. Strauss,perhapsbecause of the influenceof CarlSchmitton his thought, is ableto recognize that Machiavelli s orderingthe universe-he isfounding it-on the basis of the absence of all order. Theimmanent cause is nocause. ForMachiavelli,as perhapsforSchmitt, here s nothing (except hemonumentally mportantelement of humanaction)beside chance-exemplified herebythe accident.This is the foundationof Machiavelli'scosmol-ogy, his metaphysics;and this is why it is an anticosmology,an antimetaphysics.Thus Strauss s rightto emphasize polit-ical theology, r what he callsMachiavelli's"quasi-theology,"over an astrologicalcosmology, for Machiavelli s nothing ifnot a politicaltheologiann the Schmittian ense of the word:"By substituting accidents' for 'chance', [Machiavelli]delib-erately blurs the distinction between nature and chance inorder o indicate hecommonoriginof bothbeliefin gods andknowledgeof nature" 1958,215, 218-19).Justas Machiavelli,whom Strausselsewhere describes as a philosopher of "ex-tremesituations,"and of "the extremecase"(1953, 162, 179),subvertsthe traditionalnotions of the divine and naturein awork, the Discorsi, n how best to deal with politicalphenom-ena, Schmitt,as Strauss well knew, set forth his theory ofpoliticalphenomenaand the exceptionin a work specificallytitled PoliticalTheology.This is not to suggest that Strauss'sinterpretation f contingencyin Machiavelli s incontestable.Parel s justified n expressingdiscomfortwith what mightbecalled Strauss's "hierarchyof subversion"interpretationofMachiavelli,wherein the Florentine upposedly reduces Godto nature, natureto fortune, and fortuneto accidents(1992,84; cf. Strauss 1958, 216). While accepting Strauss's notionthat Machiavelliattemptsto supplantorder-basednotions of

political phenomena previously groundedin religion or nat-ural law, I do not think Machiavelli'sattempt follows thecoherent and seemingly air-tight strategy that Strauss setsforth. I maintainthat accidenti re not necessarilyreductionsfrom fortune and thereby subversions of it but are ratherfellow phenomenologicalmanifestationsof chance or contin-gencyandperhapsmoreuseful manifestations or studentsofpoliticalscience to examine.

14. Aristotlealso concerned himself with how justice wasintertwinedwith stability,particularlyn book4 of the Politics.

15. All English translationsare fromthe Barkeredition of1958.

16. Cf. Fritz1954;Walbank1972.17. In brief, in small communities that have survived

catastrophes, the strongest or bravest becomes leader andmonarchyis instituted, and with the expansion of families

and social relationships, the idea of kingship is born alongwith the notions of goodness and justice and theiropposites.These ideals, rather than force, subsequently become the

899




supportof his rule.But the honorsandabundance hat accrue

to this personand his heirs cause abuses and, soon, tyranny.Thebest riseup against t to set up anaristocracy,whose heirs

also abuse their positions to become oligarchs. These areoverthrownby a democracy,which in turn is corrupted ntomob rule (Polybius1979, 305-9).

18. This differencewas pointed out almostsimultaneously

by GennaroSasso (1958,306-15)and Leo Strauss(1958,222).19. Harvey Mansfieldmakes this observation,with creditto Nathan Tarcov Mansfield1979,38).

20. Consider one other such problem. Pocock severelyunderestimates he roleof the "legislator"n the Discorsi. t istrue that Machiavellidownplays the role of foresight thatPolybius associateswith Lycurgus he legislator,but as I shall

show, both foresightand the figureof the legislatorbecomeimportant or Machiavelliwhen he deals with the maintenanceof a mixed regimerather than its founding.

21. MytreatmentofMachiavelli's elationship oAristotle'sPolitics,particularly is incorporation f the Aristotelian ocio-economic theoryof the mixed regime, owes much to PasqualePasquinoand his work in progresson Machiavelli,Hobbes,and theoriginsof modernpolitical hought, Politics ndThreat.

22. For several essays related to republicandiscord, seeSkinner, Bock, and Viroli1990.

23. MachiavelliapparentlydisregardsAristotle'sclassifica-tion of Spartaas an imperialand expansiveregimein book 8of the Politics.

24. Cf. Discorsi1.33, para. 1.25. For the most arresting treatment of renovation and

terror n the Discorsi, ee Strauss 1958, esp. 167.26. In his work of the early1920s on dictatorship,Schmitt

(1921),who provedto be a very carefulreaderof the Discorsi,

expresslyadvocatesMachiavelli's epublican-basedheoryoftemporary dictatorship over less constitutionallyrestrictedones in order to manage emergencies. But with his subse-quent "fascination"with the exception, Schmittabandonedthe formerfor the latter, extraconstitutionalype of dictator-

ship, because the sheermysteryandmagnitudeof the excep-tion, accordingto Schmitt, defied any systematictreatment.Machiavelli,as we have seen, is ableto maintaina broad anddiverse theory of exceptions. He does not lump all accidenti

togetherunder an unanalyzableconcept, such as Ausnahme-zustand.As a result, he does not need to resort solely toextraconstitutional lternatives o manage the exception. Be-cause Schmitt never discusses, describes, or suggests justwhat an exception might look like, his supralegalsovereignappearsto be the only logicalalternative n emergencysitua-tions-which may indeed have been his full intention.

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JohnP. McCormicks DoctoralCandidateof PoliticalScience,Universityof Chicago,

Chicago, IL60637.

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Machiavelli McCormick

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