m6 Case Digests

8/10/2019 m6 Case Digests

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AGAN v. PIATCOTopic: Proper Party: Taxpayers Suit Reqisites

FACTS:

On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the DOTC/MIAA for thedevelopment of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids andAwards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the project and submitted with its endorsement proposal to theNEDA, which approved the project.

On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for competitiveor comparative proposals on AEDCs unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4 -A of RA 6957, as amended.

On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Airand Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium)submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to Paircargo Consortium. Because of thatit was incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO)

On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the Concession Agreement for the Build -Operate-and-TransferArrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO thefranchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other

charges in accordance with the rates or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreemenprovided that the concession period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date, and may berenewed at the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the concessionperiod, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA.

Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existingconcession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline airport services, such as in-flight cateringpassenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing,and other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA.

On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they would lose their jobupon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition for prohibition. Several employees of MIAAlikewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various agreements.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners and the petitioners-in-intervention have standing.

Held:

Yes. The petitioners are confronted with the prospect of being laid off from their jobs and losing their means of livelihoodwhen their employer-companies are forced to shut down or otherwise retrench and cut back on manpower. Such

development would result from the imminent implementation of certain provisions in the contracts that tend toward thecreation of a monopoly in favor of PIATCO, its subsidiaries and related companies

Petitioners-in-intervention are service providers in the business of furnishing airport-related services to internationaairlines and passengers in the NAIA and are therefore competitors of PIATCO as far as that line of business is concerned.On account of provisions in the PIATCO contracts, petitioners-in-intervention have to enter into a written contract withPIATCO so as not to be shut out of NAIA Terminal III and barred from doing business there. Since there is no provision toensure or safeguard free and fair competition, they are literally at its mercy. They claim injury on account of theirdeprivation of property (business) and of the liberty to contract, without due process of law

By way of background, two monopolies were actually created by the PIATCO contracts. The first and more obviousone refers to the business of operating an international passenger terminal in Luzon, the business end of which involves


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providing international airlines with parking space for their aircraft, and airline passengers with the use of departure andarrival areas, check-in counters, information systems, conveyor systems, security equipment and paraphernalia,immigrations and customs processing areas; and amenities such as comfort rooms, restaurants and shops

In furtherance of the first monopoly, the PIATCO Contracts stipulate that the NAIA Terminal III will be the only facility tobe operated as an international passenger terminal; that NAIA Terminals I and II will no longer be operated as such; andthat no one (including the government) will be allowed to compete with PIATCO in the operation of an internationapassenger terminal in the NAIA Complex.

There is another monopoly within the NAIA created by the subject contracts for PIATCO in the business of providinginternational airlines with the following: groundhandling, in-flight catering, cargo handling, and aircraft repair andmaintenance services. These are lines of business activity in which are engaged many service providers (including thepetitioners-in-intervention), who will be adversely affected upon full implementation of the PIATCO Contracts.

The determination of whether a person may institute an action or become a party to a suit brings to fore the conceptsof real party in interest, capacity to sue and standing to sue. To the legally discerning, these three concepts are differenalthough commonly directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action. As defined in the Rules ofCourt, a real party in interestis the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the partyentitled to the avails of the suit.Capacity to sue deals with a situation where a person who may have a cause of action isdisqualified from bringing a suit under applicable law or is incompetent to bring a suit or is under some legal disability thatwould prevent him from maintaining an action unless represented by a guardian ad litem. Legal standing is relevant in therealm of public law. In certain instances, courts have allowed private parties to institute actions challenging the validity o

governmental action for violation of private rights or constitutional principles.In these cases, courts apply the doctrine oflegal standing by determining whether the party has a direct and personal interest in the controversy and whethersuch party has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of, astandard which is distinct from the concept of real party in interest. Measured by this yardstick, the application of thedoctrine on legal standing necessarily involves a preliminary consideration of the merits of the case and is not purely aprocedural issue.

EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS (ARTS 7-11, LABOR CODE)

& EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitionervs.HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 78742

July 14, 1989

"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource

among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry dramatizing

the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.

Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being andeconomic security of all the people," especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding

specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of private property and

equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." Significantly, there was also the specific injunction to "formulate and

implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil."

Facts:

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not

exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not


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exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.

According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:

No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding

until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in

accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the

Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.

They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.

The public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from

persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential,

commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that

the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the

Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying

Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474),

Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and

Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date forLandowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer

pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the

petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.

The petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven

hectares of agricultural land.

The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and

separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the

uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform

program:

SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farm

workers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive

a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all

agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into

account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In

determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide

incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

Issue:

Whether or not all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained

by him even under R.A. No. 6657.

Whether or not there is a violation on equal protection clause.


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Held:

P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be

deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was

to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers'

cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first,

conformably to the constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:

All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of

Presidential Decree No. 27.

The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt

by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with

an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated

either.

This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have

been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder,further, that original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the

approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."

R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial

provisions.

Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any

public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm,

such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform

Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3)

hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least

fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That

landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally

retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the

original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate

said homestead.

All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. Landowners who

were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No.

6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED,

without pronouncement as to costs.

The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protectionbecause of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too

have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden

of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with

particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid

classification have been violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and

different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;


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(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights

conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a

different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the

burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of

owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event,the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and

respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and

his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were

declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due

process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just

compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is

invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits for smalllandowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.

Case Title: Chavez v. PEA and Amari, GR No. 133250, 7/9/02

Topic: The Const i tu t ion and the Courtsrequisites of judicial review

proper party (locus standi) Taxpayers suitrequisites

Facts:On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PDNo. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire

lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite CoastaRoad and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring toPEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters."Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates ofTitle Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "FreedomIslands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City

PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the Board ofDirectors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos,through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.

The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report No. 560 dated

September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARIunder the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and thereforePEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVAitself is illegal

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating aLegal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. Themembers of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and theGovernment Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusionsreached by the Senate Committees.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition forMandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitionercontends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner


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prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7,Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional andstatutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has locus standi and the requisites for tax payers suit were follows.

Held: Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders ogovernment agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediatelyaffect the social, economic and moral well being of the people.

We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights toinformation and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources matters of transcendental public importance, thepetitioner has the requisite locus standi

PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The lawobligated PEA make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make thispublic disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a publicbidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach ofthis legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or

constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA inview of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule thatthe principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case

The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with itsconstitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information onmatters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitabledistribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino Citizens.The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the publicdomain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.

City of Manila versus Chinese Community40 Phil 349

Facts:The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion intoan extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said

portion of the privatecemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They

further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those

persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question.Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right

to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal

Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise ofeminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of thecase and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipalcorporation or entity attempts to exercise the


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authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the

authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power ofthe

legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the

conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts havethe right to inquire to.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION vs. SAN DIEGOG.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989

FACTS:

The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science inZoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times.

A student shall be allowed only three chances to take the NMAT. After three successive failures, astudent shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.

When he applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went tothe Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test. In his original petition formandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of theparties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of hispetition.

2In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No.

12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protectionAfter hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid andgranting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue amedical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power which is validly exercised if (a) the interests of thepublic generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the meansemployed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressiveupon individuals.

ISSUE: Whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.

HELD:

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and indeed theresponsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents and the three-flunk rule isintended to protect the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the invasion of those not qualified to bedoctors. The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. The Court feelsthat it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution: one must show thathe is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. Thepetition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is REVERSED, with costs againstthe private respondent.

ENRILE, Petitioner VS SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and PIMENTEL, Respondents

Topic: Moot and Academic Questions

FACTS:

On January 20, 1995, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) an election protest againstSen. Juan Ponce Enrile and other senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections.

On June 30, 1995, the petitioner, Sen. Enrile, filed his answer in counter-protest. Issues having joined, the SET requiredthe parties to submit the list of pilot precincts number not more than 25% of the total precincts involved.

On Aug. 21, 1997, SET held a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall announcing the partial and tentativeresults of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts without resolving the protest. In the tabulation presented, thepetitioners name dropped to the 15

thposition in the senatorial race.


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On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Sen. Pimentels Protest and to ConducAnother Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties. Respondent and Sen. Coseteng filed separate commentsalleging petitioners motion is premature considering the SEThas not resolved respondents election protest.

In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET admitted there was an oversight, hence, the tally of votes for Paoay, IlocosNorte should be made. Consequently, the 30,000 votes deducted by the SET from those garnered by petitioner weregiven back to him.

Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioners motion holding no sufficient basis to discard the partial tabulation. The SET alsodenied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

A petition for Certiorari assailed for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion the resolution that deniedpetitioners Motion to Annul/Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentels Protest and to conduct another Appreciation of Ballotsin the Presence of All Parties.

One of the contentions of the Solicitor General is that the present petition has become moot and academic because thetenure of the contested senatorial position subject of respondents protest where the assailed Resolutions originatedexpired on June 30, 1998.

Issue:Whether or not there is still useful purpose that can serve in passing upon merits of said petition.

Ruling:The petition is dismissed. The Court finds the petition becoming moot and academic. The tenure of the contested

senatorial position subject to respondents protest expired on June 30, 1998. The case became moot considering there isno more actual controversy between the parties and has no useful purpose that can serve in passing upon any merit.

Where issues have become moot and academic, justiciable controversies are lost, thereby rendering the resolution of nopractical use or value.

It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not considerquestions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue hasbecome moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical useor value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by thedismissal of the petition.

FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESG.R. NO. 160261NOV. 10, 2003

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules ofProcedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11thCongress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee onJustice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E.Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G.Davide Jr. andseven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust andother high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee onJustice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee onJustice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient inform," but voted to dismiss thesame on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first

complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the secondimpeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against ChiefJustice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned HouseResolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, andmandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitionscontend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 ofArticle XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more thanonce within a period of one year."

Issue:Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.


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Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII ofour present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the differentbranches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts asa necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversiesinvolving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicialreview is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollaryprinciple of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powersare utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in oursystem of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each departmentof the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But itdoes not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended themto be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system ofchecks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. And thejudiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of it spower to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.Themajor difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is thatwhile the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature,thatgranted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just apower but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse ofdiscretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.

Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachmentproceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives withoulimitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachmentcases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), ArticleXI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach,and the one year bar on theimpeachment of one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentionedsafeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to thesole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverable standards" fordetermining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethoraof cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action. Finally, there exists noconstitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset thesystem of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to beallowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence

that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

Case Title:Ichong vs. Hernandez 101 Phil 1155

Topic (based on syllabus):Police Power; Definition, Scope and Characteristic

Facts:

Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was passed. The said law provides for

a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country

This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the

Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was

violated according to him.

Issue:Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.

Court Decision:

According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power cannot be

bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.


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There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its exercisein this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of thelaws. But before proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear inmind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflicbetween police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of policepower, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it?It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. Asit derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope;it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of allgovernmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democraticframework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field andscope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have becomealmost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs anddemands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimitbeforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interestor welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is toset forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.Limitations on police power. The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any personbe denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are no

limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color,or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)The, equal protection clause. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostilediscrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object towhich it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; itmerely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privilegesconferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to thosepersons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds existsfor making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, ConstitutionaLimitations, 824-825.)The due process clause. The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is

there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishmentof the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason inconnection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aimsconceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These arethe questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.The confl ict, therefore, between pol ice pow er and the guarantees of due pro cess and equal protectio n of the laws

is mo re apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the gu arantees are suppo sed to co exist. The

balancing is th e essence or, shal l i t be said, the indisp ensable means for th e attainment o f legi t imate aspirations

of any demo cratic soc iety. There can be no absolute pow er, who ever exercise it, for that would be tyrann y. Yet

there can neither be abso lute l iberty, for that wou ld mean l icense and anarchy . So the State can deprive persons

of l i fe, l iberty and property , prov ided there is due pro cess of law; and person s may be classi f ied into classes and

groups, provided everyone is given the equal protect ion of the law.The test or standard, as always, is reason. Thepolice power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist

between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis forsaid distinction.

The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed byalien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification oramendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.

Topic:B . Amendm ent and Revision (see Artic le XVII, Const i tut ion )

1. Distinctio n


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2. Stages

Proposal stage

IMBONG VS COMELEC

G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No . L-32443; Sept emb er 11, 1970

Ponente: Makasiar, J.

FACTS:

Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as candidates fordelegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that itprejudices their rights as such candidates. On March 16, 1967, the Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,passed Res. No. 2 which called for a Constitutional Convention which shall have two delegates from eachrepresentative district. On June 17, 1969, the Congress passed Resolution No. 4 amending Resolution No. 2 byproviding that the convention shall be composed of 320 delegates with at least two delegates from eachrepresentative district. On August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and expressly repealing R.A 4914 which previously implemented Res. No. 2Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2, 4, 51, and par. 1 of 8(a)2, and the entire law, while Imbong questionsthe constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. 6132.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the parameters of suchconvention?

2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HELD:

1. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly. The Congressalso has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since suchdetails are within the competence of the Congress in exercise of its legislative power.

2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of theConstitution and does not constitute a denial of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely

obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the apportionment of delegates. The challengeddisqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it isreasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid asthe restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic constitutional rights remain substantially intactand inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by thepetitioners.

Note:1Sec. 2, 4 , and 5 (R.A. No. 6132)

Sec. 2 Composition of the Convention; Qualifications of Delegates. The Constitutional Convention authorized byResolution of Both Houses Numbered Two of the Congress of the Philippines, adopted on March sixteen, nineteen

hundred and sixty-seven, as amended by Resolution of Both Houses Numbered Four of the Congress of the Philippines,adopted on June seventeen, nineteen hundred and sixty- nine, shall be composed of three hundred and twenty delegateswho shall have the same qualifications as those required of Members of the House of Representatives.

Section 4. Persons Holding Office. Any person holding a public office or position, whether elective or appointive, includingmembers of the armed forces and officers and employees of corporations or enterprises owned and/or controlled by thegovernment, shall be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That any governmenofficial who resigns in order to run for delegate and who does not yet qualify for retirement under existing laws, may, ifelected, add to his length of service in the government the period from the filing of his certificate of candidacy until the finaadjournment of the Constitutional Convention.


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Section 5. Disqualification to Run. Any person elected as delegate to the Constitutional Convention shall not be qualifiedto run for any public office in any election or to assume any appointive office or position in any branch of the Governmenuntil after the final adjournment of the Constitutional Convention.

2Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:

1. any candidate for delegate to the convention(a) from representing, or(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any political party or any other organization; and

2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional or other organizations or organizedgroup of whatever nature from:(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing of his certificate, or(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election.

Case Title:John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim GR No. 119775

Topic (based on syllabus):Requisites of Judicial Review

Facts:Republic Act 7227, entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into other Productive uses,

Creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefore and for other

purposes," otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," was enacted on 13 March 1992.

The law set out the policy of the government to accelerate the sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive

uses of the former military bases under the 1947 Philippines-United States of America Military Bases Agreement, namely,

the Clark and Subic military reservations as well as their extensions including the John Hay Station (Camp John Hay) in

the City of Baguio. RA 7227 created the Bases Conversion and Development Authority' (BCDA), vesting it with powers

pertaining to the multifarious aspects of carrying out the ultimate objective of utilizing the base areas in accordance with

the declared government policy. RA 7227 likewise created the Subic Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone (Subic SEZ)

the metes and bounds of which were to be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of the Philippines;

and granted the Subic SEZ incentives ranging from tax and duty-free importations, exemption of businesses therein fromlocal and national taxes, to other hall-narks of a liberalized financial and business climate. RA 7227 expressly gave

authority to the President to create through executive proclamation, subject to the concurrence of the local government

units directly affected, other Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered respectively by the Clark military

reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay. On 16 August 1993, BCDA entered

into a Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow Agreement with Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd. (TUNTEX) and Asiaworld

Internationale Group, Inc. (ASIAWORLD), private corporations registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands,

preparatory to the formation of a joint venture for the development of Poro Point in La Union and Camp John Hay as

premier tourist destinations and recreation centers. 4 months later or on 16 December 16, 1993, BCDA, TUNTEX and

ASIAWORLD executed a Joint Venture Agreements whereby they bound themselves to put up a joint venture company

known as the Baguio International Development and Management Corporation which would lease areas within Camp

John Hay and Poro Point for the purpose of turning such places into principal tourist and recreation spots, as originallyenvisioned by the parties under their AZ memorandum of Agreement. The Baguio City government meanwhile passed a

number of resolutions in response to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and administrator of Camp John Hay. By

Resolution of 29 September 1993, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City officially asked BCDA to exclude all the

barangays partly or totally located within Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage of any plan or program for its

development. By a subsequent Resolution dated 19 January 1994, the sanggunian sought from BCDA an abdication

waiver or quitclaim of its ownership over the home lots being occupied by residents of 9 barangays surrounding the

military reservation. Still by another resolution passed on 21 February 1994, the sanggunian adopted and submitted to

BCDA a 15-point concept for the development of Camp John Hay. The sanggunian's vision expressed, among other

things, a kind of development that affords protection to the environment, the making of a family-oriented type of tourist


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destination, priority inemployment opportunities for Baguio residents and free access to the base area, guaranteed

participation of the city government in the management and operation of the camp, exclusion of the previously named

nine barangays from the area for development, and liability for local taxes of businesses to be established within the

camp." BCDA, TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed to some, but rejected or modified the other proposals of the

sanggunian." They stressed the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ as a condition precedent to its full development in

accordance with the mandate of RA 7227. On 11 May 1994, the sanggunian passed a resolution requesting the Mayor to

order the determination of realty taxes which may otherwise be collected from real properties of Camp John Hay. The

resolution was intended to intelligently guide the sanggunian in determining its position on whether Camp John Hay bedeclared a SEZ, the sanggunian being of the view that such declaration would exempt the camp's property and the

economic activity therein from local or national taxation. More than a month later, however, the sanggunian passed

Resolution 255, (Series of 1994)," seeking and supporting, subject to its concurrence, the issuance by then President

Ramos of a presidential proclamation declaring an area of 285.1 hectares of the camp as a SEZ in accordance with the

provisions of RA 7227. Together with this resolution was submitted a draft of the proposed proclamation for consideration

by the President. On 5 July 1994 then President Ramos issued Proclamation 420 (series of 1994), "creating and

designating a portion of the area covered by the former Camp John Hay as the John Hay Special Economic Zone

pursuant to Republic Act 7227."

Issue: Whether or not the court can exercise its power of judicial review to the case at bar having question ofconstitutional significance.

Court Decision:

Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portion, ifseparable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced.

[52]This Court finds that the other provisions in Proclamation No.

420 converting a delineated portion of Camp John Hay into the John Hay SEZ are separable from the invalid secondsentence of Section 3 thereof, hence they stand.

WHEREFORE, the second sentence of Section 3 of Proclamation No. 420 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID andis accordingly declared of no legal force and effect. Public respondents are hereby enjoined from implementing theaforesaid void provision

It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review

only if the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and

substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the

earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case." RA 7227 expressly requires the

concurrence of the affected local government units to the creation of SEZs out of all the base areas in the country.'" The

grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on the bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a

legal standing on them, for it is in effect a recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or surrounding a

particular base area have in its utilization. Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the

legality of Proclamation 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a

result of the government act being challenged." Theirs is a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the

proclamation and not merely an interest in the question involved or an incidental interest," for what is at stake in the

enforcement of Proclamation 420 is the very economic and social existence of the people of Baguio City. Moreover,

Petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged in thelocal governance of Baguio City and whose duties included deciding for and on behalf of their constituents the question of

whether to concur with the declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp John Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then,

Claravall and Yaranon, as city officials who voted against" the sanggunian Resolution No. 255

Topic: C. Eminent Dom ain (Also Read Rule 67 (re Exprop riation) of the Rules of Court )

3. Elements

Just Compensation

- Defini t ion- Who is the owner who shall rece ive the payment?
http://constitutionallaw10809.blogspot.com/2008/12/some-digest-cases-done-by-ms-dianne.htmlhttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/119775.htm#_ftn52http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/119775.htm#_ftn52http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/119775.htm#_ftn52http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/oct2003/119775.htm#_ftn52http://constitutionallaw10809.blogspot.com/2008/12/some-digest-cases-done-by-ms-dianne.html


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Knech t v. CA, 297 SCRA 754

(G.R. No. 109234. May 20, 1998)Ponente: J. Puno

FACTS:

In 1979, the Republic of the Philippines initiated a case for expropriation against the Knechts' property. Thegovernment sought to utilize the land for the completion of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project andthe extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. The CFI issued a writ of possession. This SC, however,held that the choice of area for the extension of EDSA was arbitrary. The SC annulled the writ.

In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the propertyfrom 1980 to 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the property at public auction onMay 27, 1982 for the sum of P63,000.00, the amount of the deficiency taxes. The highest bidders wererespondents Babiera and Sangalang couples.The petitioners failed to redeem the property. Babiera then filed for registration of the land to his name. The trialcourt granted the petition. The Knechts, who were in possession of the property, allegedly learned of the auctionsale only by the time they received the orders of the land registration courts.

The De Knechts also filed Civil Case No. 2961-P to prevent the titles from being given to the contending spousesThey put up lack of notice to the sale as defense. This was dismissed for lack of counsel to appear on the lasthearing.

On March 12, 1985, Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent Salem Investment Corporation (Salem)for P400,000.00.

Meanwhile, on February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the nationalgovernment to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension. The just compensation forthis purpose was docketed by the OSG under civil case 7327. The De Knecht property was covered by theexpropriation. On August 30, seven of the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished and the governmenttook possession of the portion of land on which the houses stood. Salem instituted against them Civil Case No.85-263 for unlawful detainer.

The SC allowed for the expropriation this time. Meanwhile, Salem conveyed 5,611.92 square meters of thesubject property to respondent spouses Mariano and Anacoreta Nocom. Part was left to Salem.

As prayed for by Salem, the trial court issued an order on September 13, 1990 for the release of P5,763,650.00 toSalem by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as partial payment of just compensation.

The De Knechts filed a motion to intervene. On April 23, 1992, as prayed for by Mariano Nocom, the trial courtordered the release of P11,526,000.00 as third installment for his 5,611.92 square meters of the subject land. TheDe Knechts questioned this in the CA.

The CA quashed their motion to intervene due to the lack of legal interest. They filed an original action for theannulment of TC judgments. Therein, the Knechts challenged the validity of the orders of the land registrationcourts in the two petitions of the Sangalangs and Babieras for registration of their names, the reconveyance caseand the just compensation proceedings.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit on November 24, 1992. Hence the filing of G.R. No108015. In a Resolution dated February 1, 1993, the SC denied the petition finding "no reversible error"committed by the Court of Appeals. The De Knechts alleged:1. CA committed a reversible error when it claimed 7327 was not an eminent domain proceeding2. another error when CA upheld res judicata to bar the MFR3. another error when CA refused for respondent judge to rule for the motion for inhibition

ISSUE:

1. Whether the De Knechts were denied due process when they were not sufficiently notified of the taxdelinquency, the auction sale, and the surrender of the owners duplicate for the tax lien? 2. Whether the first civil case (2961-P) is res judicata and was there due process in this dismissal?


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3. Whether 7327 is an expropriation case?

HELD: Petition dismissed.

RATIO:1. No. The De Knechts claimed that they did not receive the notices for tax delinquency and the auction sale. Thatwas why they were unable to claim the property. It has been ruled that the notices and publication, as well as thelegal requirements for a tax delinquency sale, are mandatory; and the failure to comply therewith can invalidatethe sale. The prescribed notices must be sent to comply with the requirements of due process. The De Knechtsclaim was a factual question and not to be answered in the SC. Moreover, the question had already beenanswered in the previous cases in the appellate courts. Res judicata had already set in. Res judicata is a groundfor dismissal of an action. It is a rule that precludes parties from relitigating issues actually litigated anddetermined by a prior and final judgment. It pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is basedupon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law-- one, public policy and necessity, that thereshould be a limit to litigation; and another, the individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause. When aright of fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity forsuch trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusiveupon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.

2. Yes. Petitioners claim it wasnt due to the lack of judgment on the merits in the said case. Moreover, it wasbased by the court on their lack of interest. Court- "Lack of interest" is analogous to "failure to prosecute." (S3, R 17 of ROC) An action may be dismissed for failure to prosecute in any of the following instances: (1) if the

plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial; or (2) if he fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length oftime; or (3) if he fails to comply with the Rules of Court or any order of the court. They also requested forpostponements which prompted Salem to move for dismissal. The court agreed. The order of dismissal wasbased on the following factors: (1) pendency of the complaint for a considerable length of time; (2) failure ofcounsel to appear at the scheduled hearing despite notice; and (3) lack of interest of the petitioners. UnderSection 3, Rule 17, a dismissal order which does not provide that it is without prejudice to the filing of anotheraction is understood to be an adjudication on the merits. The Knechts contend, however, that the facts of thecase do not call for the application of res judicata because this amounts to "a sacrifice of justice to technicality."It must be noted that the Knechts were given the opportunity to assail the tax sale and present their evidence onits validity in Civil Case No. 2961-P, the reconveyance case.

3. Yes.The Court of Appeals erred in declaring that Civil Case No. 7327 was not an expropriation case. It wasprecisely in the exercise of the state's power of eminent domain under B.P. Blg. 340 that expropriation

proceedings were instituted against the owners of the lots sought to be expropriated. B.P. Blg. 340 did not, byitself, lay down the procedure for expropriation. The law merely described the specific properties expropriatedand declared that just compensation was to be determined by the court. It designated the then Ministry of PublicWorks and Highways as the administrator in the "prosecution of the project." Thus, in the absence of aprocedure in the law for expropriation, reference must be made to the provisions on eminent domain in Rule 67of the Revised Rules of Court. The complaint must join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, oroccupying, any part thereof or interest therein. The defendants in an expropriation case are not l imited to theowners of the property condemned. They inc lude all other persons owning, occupying or cla iming to ow n the

property inc lud ing a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession u nder an executory con tract . Every person

having an estate or interest at law or in equity in th e land taken is enti t led to share in the award. The Knechtsinsist that although they were no longer the registered owners of the property at the time Civil Case No. 7327 wasfiled, they still occupied the property and therefore should have been joined as defendants in the expropriationproceedings. They claim that they still occupied the land when it was expropriated and therefore had a share.

Four months earlier, in January 1990, Civil Case No. 2961-P for reconveyance was dismissed with finality by thisCourt and judgment was entered in February 1990. The Knechts lost whatever right or colorable title they had tothe property after we affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the reconveyance case. The Knechts'possession of the land and buildings was based on their claim of ownership not on any juridical title such as alessee, mortgagee, or vendee. Indeed, the Knechts had no legal interest in the property by the time theexpropriation proceedings were instituted. They had no right to intervene and the trial court did not err indenying their " Motion for Intervention and to Implead Addit ion al Parties."Their intervention having been deniedthe Knechts had no personality to move for the inhibition of respondent Judge Sayo from the case.


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ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL.,petitioners, vs.JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL.,respondents.G.R. No. L-1123 March 5, 1947

Political LawAmendment to the Constitution

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended by senate due to election

irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the

House Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required

vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution)* which has been

considered as an **enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of the

respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote.

Petitioners pray that the said resolution be prevented. Respondents argue that the same can no longer be prevented as

entered in the Journals. The Journal of each house is conclusive to the courts.

*this is in contrast to Art 15 of the Constitution as well

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar.

HELD: If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a politicaquestion. The two steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that

the amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution con sists of (only) two distinc

parts: proposal and ratification. There is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character

from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign

legislative capacity and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in dependent

of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to

safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of ratification.

On the other hand, as far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of

the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of

the enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified

in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the

law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do

what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in

order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in

conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and the court did not

say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding

the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due

enactment thereof.

**Enrolled Billthat which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each,

approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.

MMDA v. Garin

Topic: Police Power: Who m ay exerc ise?

Facts:

The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation

receipt (TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila


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on August 1995.

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero

Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction, contending that

in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled

discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of thedeprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of

legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited fines and

other penalties on erring motorists.

Garin alleged that he suffered and continues to suffer great and irreparable damage because of the deprivation of his

license and that, absent any implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his

license have no legal basis.

The MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of

Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, whichpowers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty

imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude admixture of the three powers of

government in administrative agencies.

MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court below and contends that a license to operate a motor vehicle is

neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the

interest of the public safety and welfare. The petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does

not constitute a taking without due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.

Issue:Does the MMDA have the power to exercise police power?

Ruling:

NO. The MMDA is not vested with police power. MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed

with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for

the welfare of the community.

Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make

ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or

without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and

for the subjects of the same.

Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals no

possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president andadministrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once

delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking

body.

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. A local government is a

political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. Loca

government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their

respective legislative bodies.

Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No


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7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the

administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as

the MMDA. Thus:

. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation

preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable

in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has no

been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in

R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds

for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development

authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various nationa

government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and

expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro

Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There

is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the

MMDA the powerto confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactmentsuch is an unauthorized exercise of police power.

Topic: C. The Const i tu t ion and the Courts

3. Declaration of unco nsti tu t ional i ty

Effects

- orthodox view vs. modern view

Nort on v . Shelby, 118 US 425 (1886)

FACTS:

This suit was brought to enforce payment of twenty-nine bonds for $1,000 each issued by the Board ofCommissioners of Shelby County in payment of a subscription by the county to stock in the Mississippi RiverRailroad Company. The form of the bond appears in the opinion of the Court, post, p. 118 U. S. 434.

On the 25th February, 1867, the county court of any county through which that railroad might run was authorizedto subscribe to its capital stock.

On the 7th day of the following March, the legislature reorganized the City of Memphis, and enacted that thepowers theretofore vested in the Quarterly Court should be vested in a Board of Commissioners created by thatact. Acts of 1867-1868, c. 46, 21, 25. [Footnote 3]

This act was subsequently held by the Supreme Court of Tennessee to be unconstitutional and invalid, and theboard created by it to have had no legal existence. The board, however, before it was so held had organized andhad performed the functions of the County Court until November, 1869, and, among other things, had subscribedin the name of the county to stock of the Mississippi River Railroad Company and had issued bonds in paymenttherefor, of which bonds those in suit were part. It had received certificates of stock in exchange for its bonds,and had and has since exercised its rights as a stockholder.

Before the Board of Commissioners abdicated, they ordered taxes to be levied to pay these bonds, and thejustices of the peace, upon resuming functions, received the money collected on the tax and paid the interest onthe bonds and paid the principal bonds maturing. This was continued, and thus a large amount of interest has


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been paid on the bonds, and a large part of the principal has also been paid, since the County Court resumed itsfunctions.

On the 5th May, 1870, a new constitution came into force in Tennessee, which contained the followingprovisions:

"B ut the credi t of no county , c i ty , or town shal l be given or loaned to or in aid of any person, company

associa t ion o r corporat ion, except upo n an elect ion to be f i rs t held by the qual i f ied voters of such c ounty, c i ty , or

tow n, and the assent of three-fourths o f the votes cast at said election, nor shal l any county , ci ty, or tow n

become a stockho lder wi th others in any comp any, associa t ion, or corporat ion except upon a l ike elect ion and

the assent of a l ike majori t y."

"A l l laws and ord inances now in force and in use in th is state not inconsis tent wi th the const i tu t ion shal

con tinue in force and use unti l they expire or be altered or repealed by the legislature. But o rdinanc es contained

in any form er const i tu t ion or schedule thereto are hereby abrogated."

A large part of the payments of principal and interest above referred to was made after this constitution cameinto force.

ISSUE:

Whether the commissioners who were allegedly authorized to sell the bonds were indeed lawfully appointed.

HELD:

The Supreme Court had no contention with the decision made by the highest court of Tennessee.The pointraised to the Supreme Court was that even if the commissioners were not appointed de jure, they were in factworking de facto, and thus this provided lawful authority and should be binding on the county. The SupremeCourt responded, This contention is met by the fact that there can be no officer, either de jure or de facto, ifthere be no office to fill. As the act attempting to create the office of commissioner never became a law, the officenever came into existence. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; itaffords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never beenpassed.

NPC v. Aguirre-Paderanga

Facts:

National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a case for expropriation against Petrona O. Dilao, et al. before Regional Trial

Court of Cebu, involving parcels of land situated in Carmen, Cebu. Expropriation was instituted to implement Leyte-Cebu

Interconnection Project.

A day after the complaint was filed, NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the

lands.

The RTC issued an order granting NPCs motion. It appointed 3 Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation

The board recommended appraisal of parcel of land co-owned by Dilao, et al. at P516.66 per square meter. However

NPC filed an opposition assailing the correctness of the appraisal for failing to take into account Republic Act No. 6395

which provides that the just compensation for right-of-way easement shall be equivalent to ten percent (10%) of themarket value of the property. NPC asserted that Digao, et al. could still use the traversed land for agricultural purposes,

subject only to its easement. It added that the lots were of no use to its operations except for its transmission lines.

The RTC rendered its decision ordering NPC to pay fair market value at P516.66 per square meter. NPC appealed but the

same was denied due to failure to file and perfect its appeal within the prescribed period. A motion for execution of

judgment was subsequently filed by Dilao, et al. which was granted by the lower court. On appeal, the CA affirmed the

lower courts decision.

Issue:


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Whether or not RTC abused its authority by misapplying the rules governing fair valuation by ordering NPC to pay fair

market value of P516.66 per square meter and not applying Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395.

Ruling:

In finding that the trial court did not abuse its authority in evaluating the evidence and the reports placed before it nor did it

misapply the rules governing fair valuation, the Court of Appeals found the majority reports valuation of P500 per square

meter to be fair. Said factual finding of the Court of Appeals, absent any showing that the valuation is exorbitant or

otherwise unjustified, is binding on the parties as well as this Court.

Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-

of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines, as

in the present case, also falls within the ambit of the term expropriation.

From the Commissioners report it cannot be gainsaid that NPCs complaint merely involves a simple case of mere

passage of transmission lines over Dilao et al.s property. Aside from the actual damage done to the property traversed by

the transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on the entire property is unquestionably

restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment is made dangerous to the occupants life and limb.

From the Commissioners Report chronicling the following findings:

The parcel of land owned by the defendant PETRONA O. DILAO, et al. is very fertile, plain, suited for any crops

production, portion of which planted with coco trees and mango trees, portion planted with corn, sometimes planted with

sugar cane, the said land has a distance of about 1 kilometer from the trading center, about 100 meters from an industrial

land (Shemberg Biotech Corp.) adjacent to a Poultry Farm and lies along the Provincial Road.

IMPROVEMENTS AFFECTED

Per ocular inspection made on lot own by PETRONA O. DILAO, et al. traversed by a transmission line of NPC and with

my verification as to the number of improvements, the following trees had been damaged.

1. 55 coco trees productive2. 10 mango trees productive

3. 30 cacao trees productive

4. 110 bananas

5. 400 ipil-ipil trees

The determination of just compensation in expropriation proceedings being a judicial function, the Court finds the

commissioners recommendation of P516.66 per square meter, which was approved by the trial court, to be just and

reasonable compensation for the expropriated property of Dilao and her siblings.

Case Title:Phil. Press Institute v. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272Topic : Eminent Dom ain [Also Read Rule 67 (re Expro priation) of the Rules of Court]Elements

Taking Taking under Police Power

o invalid taking under the police power

FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print space of not less than one

half (1/2) page for use as Comelec Space which shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among al

candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make


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known their qualif

m6 Case Digests

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