M. Fortser, 'Herder and Spinoza'

8/11/2019 M. Fortser, 'Herder and Spinoza'

1/39

Herder and Spinoza

Michael N. Forster

As is well known, a great flowering of Spinozism1occurred in German philosophy in the

late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Lessing, erder,2and Goethe! the German

"omantics Schleiermacher, Friedrich Schlegel, and No#alis! the German $dealists

Schelling and egel % all of them su&scri&ed to one or another #ersion of Spinoza's

monistic, deterministic metaphysics.

(hat was the source of this great flowering) Much of the credit for it has tended to go

to *aco&i and Mendelssohn, who in +- &egan a famous pu&lic dispute concerning the

/uestion whether or not Lessing had &een a Spinozist, as *aco&i alleged Lessing had

admitted to him shortly &efore his death in +-+. 0ut *aco&i and Mendelssohn were &oth

negati#ely disposed towards Spinoza. $n On the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Mr.

Moses Mendelssohn1+-2, *aco&i, a champion of 3hristian fideism, represented

Spinoza's philosophy as the #ery epitome of all that was most wrong with philosophy's

reliance on reason. According to *aco&i, Spinoza's philosophy showed e#en more clearly

14his article cites Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicusfrom the following edition5

0. de Spinoza,A Theologico-Political Treatise; A Political Treatise, tr. "..M. 6lwes.4he article uses the following a&&re#iation for this work7edition5 Tractatus. 4he article

cites Spinoza'sEthicsfrom the edition5 0. de Spinoza, On the Ipro!eent of the"nderstanding; The Ethics; The #orrespondence, tr. "..M. 6lwes.24his article cites erder's works from two German editions, using the first letter of themain editor's surname as an a&&re#iation in each case5 G 8$ohann %ottfried &erder

'er(e, ed. 9. Gaier et al. S 8$ohann %ottfried &erder S)tliche 'er(e, ed. 0. Suphan

et al.

+


2/39

than other cases that such a reliance ine#ita&ly led to atheism and fatalism. Mendelssohn

had admittedly in an early work, hisPhilosophical #on!ersations1+2, tried to sal#age

Spinoza's reputation to a certain e:tent &y representing Spinoza's philosophy as a

significant al&eit inade/uate precursor of the true Lei&nizian;(olffian philosophy. 0ut

&y the time Mendelssohn wrote his more famous and influential replies to *aco&i, the

Morgenstunden1+-2 and To Lessing*s +riends1+- #ersion of it that

would a#oid such #ices, i.e. a #ersion that radically re#ised it in the spirit of Lei&niz and

(olff2.3So, prima facie at least, it seems rather unlikely that *aco&i and Mendelssohn can

deser#e much of the credit for the massi#e wa#e of positi#e appropriations of Spinoza's

philosophy that $ recently mentioned.

4hat wa#e's more likely main source surely lies in its own earliest e:emplars, Lessing,

erder, and Goethe, who, in sharp contrast to *aco&i and Mendelssohn, were all great

enthusiastsfor Spinoza's philosophy.40ut once this fact is recognized, it is only a short

further step towards realizing that the central figure here must ha#e &een &erder. For

Lessing's alleged late pri#ate confession of Spinozism, despite its undenia&le ,clatwhen

*aco&i re#ealed it, was am&iguous and philosophically unde#eloped % in sharp contrast to

erder's statement of Spinozism in %od Soe #on!ersations.5And Goethe's first

3For a helpful treatment of the *aco&i;Mendelssohn contro#ersy and of the twophilosophers' attitudes towards Spinoza, see F.3. 0eiser, The +ate of eason.43f. . Lindner,Das Pro/le des Spinozisus i Schaffen %oethes und &erders, pp.+?, +


3/39

enthusiasm for Spinoza, which pro&a&ly dates &ack to an engagement he had with the

Tractatus Theologico-Politicusin StraC&urg in ++,6and then continued in a &etter

known intensi#e engagement he had with theEthicsin +D7,7was in all likelihood

inspired &y erder, whom he first met in a life;changing encounter in StraC&urg in ++

at a time when erder was already deeply interested in the Tractatus,8and who was

likewise already taking a deep interest in theEthicsand its monistic metaphysics in

+D7.91Accordingly, Goethe would later continue to follow erder's lead in the

interpretation of Spinoza when they re;read Spinoza together in (eimar in the early

+-?'s,10

and he would enthusiastically endorse erder's interpretation of Spinoza in

%od Soe #on!ersationsof +-.112 $n short, erder was the central figure here.

Ea#id 0ell, in his illuminating &ook Spinoza in %eran1 fro 2345 to the Age of

%oethe, arri#es at a similar conclusion 1al&eit #ia a somewhat different route2. erder's

%od Soe #on!ersationsfrom +-, with its defense of a re#ised form of Spinoza's

metaphysical;religious monism and determinism, oiously played a central role in

generating the great wa#e of Spinozism that followed, and accordingly recei#es close

6See 0ollacher, i&id., pp. ? ff.7See i&id., p. --! also Lindner,Das Pro/le des Spinozisus, pp. D ff.83f. 0ollacher,Der 0unge %oethe, esp. pp. +@, +


4/39

attention from 0ell. 0ut, as 0ell shows 1following earlier German scholarship &y Jollrath

and Lindner2,12erder's interest in Spinoza also e:tends much further &ack in time than

that work5 at least as far &ack as +


5/39

especially &i&lical hermeneutics!15second, the political ideals of democracy and

li&eralism! and third, a distincti#e faculty;unifying, anti;dualistic, anti;idealistic, and

deterministic, or in short naturalistic, philosophy of mind. $ also want to suggest that

erder already took o#er Spinoza's metaphysical;religious monism as early as +D;

1around the same time as he took o#er the philosophy of mind ust mentioned2. $ndeed, $

hope to show that these positi#e influences e:ercised &y Spinoza on the young erder

constituted a sort of incremental se/uence that o#er time incorporated increasingly

fundamental le#els of Spinoza's thought5 &eginning with hermeneutics in the late +


6/39

1. Herder and the Tractatus

$t is a fundamental component of my account here that Spinoza's Tractatushad a maor

positi#e impact on erder's thought &efore Spinoza'sEthicsdid % erder drawing on the

former work for central principles of 1&i&lical2 interpretation and politics &efore he

&ecame seriously committed to #ersions of the latter work's philosophy of mind and

metaphysics. 4his is a fairly no#el and contro#ersial thesis. So $ would like to &egin &y

making a few preliminary o&ser#ations in its support.

A first point to note here is that it would &e #ery surprising if the young erder, as an

omni#orously well;read Lutheran clergyman o&sessi#ely concerned with /uestions of

&i&lical, and especially ld 4estament, interpretation, had somehow managed to o#erlook

the Tractatus, gi#en that the work was seminally important for those /uestions, and had

&een a stock fi:ture of disputations on &i&lical hermeneutics in the Lutheran world since

the +


7/39

Tractatus. For there is also a &ody of more direct e#idence that at e:actly the same time

as he was &eginning to take an interest in Spinoza'sEthicsin the way that 0ell has

already demonstrated, namely +


8/39

interpretation of the ld 4estament,+ragents for an Archaeolog1 of the East, erder

e:plicitly cites the Tractatusat one point 1specifically, in support of a certain

interpretation of the ld 4estament e:pression =sons of God>2, there&y cautiously

showing his knowledge of and respect for the work.23

Some additional historical points are rele#ant here as well5 Shortly after this first surge

of interest not only in theEthics&ut also in the Tractatusin +


9/39


10/39

amann from +! his search in +


11/39

or a:ioms.34erder e:plicitly ad#ocates ust the same sort of assimilation of the method

of interpretation to that of natural science in On Thoas A//t*s 'ritings.35Moreo#er, in

works from the rele#ant period he applies such an approach to interpreting the 0i&le in

particular.36

12 $n the TractatusSpinoza had maintained that =words gain their meaning solely

from their usage,>37so that a primary task of the interpreter of ancient te:ts is to

determine what the rele#ant word;usages were.38erder from an early period holds

e:actly the same #iew.39

12 Spinoza had also in the Tractatusemphasized the importance when interpreting an

ancient te:t such as the 0i&le of paying close attention to its distincti#e historical conte:t

1including the distincti#e condition of the language then in use2.40erder does ust the

same in works from the rele#ant period.41

1


12/39

sketches in On Thoas A//t*s 'ritings.43$t also persists as one of the most striking and

important features of his methodology of interpretation in later works, such as On the

#ognition and Sensation of the &uan Soul1+-2.

12 Spinoza had insisted in the Tractatuson the importance of sharply separating the

/uestion of the eaningof &i&lical te:ts from the /uestion of their truth.44Accordingly,

he was prepared to attri&ute false #iews to the prophets on many matters,45and e#en to

find numerous contradictions within the 0i&le 1&oth within the ld 4estament and within

the New2.464he early erder's approach to interpreting the 0i&le is strikingly similar5 he

too insists on distinguishing /uestions of meaning from /uestions of truth!47

attri&utes

many false &eliefs to &i&lical authors!48and e#en ascri&es contradictions to them.49

1-2 Spinoza had, though, in the Tractatusalso drawn a sharp distinction &etween the

oraldoctrines of the 0i&le 1i.e. doctrines that pertain to sal#ation and &lessedness2 %

which he considered to &e true, clear, and the sole proof of the 0i&le's di#ine origin % and

the 0i&le's theoreticalconceptions % which, on the contrary, he considered unrelia&le and

43GB5;


13/39

unclear.50erder in early works such as On the Di!init1 and "se of the 6i/ledraws ust

the same distinction.51

1@2 Spinoza had in the Tractatuse:plained the false &eliefs and e#en contradictions

that occur among the prophets' theoretical con#ictions in terms of God's ha#ing chosen

to adapt re#elation to the low le#el of understanding which they and their audience

possessed.52erder in his early writings on the 0i&le gi#es e:actly the same e:planation.53

1+?2 Spinoza had in the Tractatusemphasized thepoeticcharacter of the ld

4estament.54erder in his early writings on the ld 4estament, such as On the +irst

Docuentsand the+ragents for an Archaeolog1, does the same.55

4his emphasis

continued to &e a central feature of his approach to the ld 4estament in later works as

well, such as the re#ealingly titled On the Spirit of &e/re: Poetr11+-B2.

1++2 A further principle of Spinoza's in the Tractatus#ery closely connected to his

&i&lical hermeneutics was that miracles, in the sense of contra#entions of the natural

order, are not possi&le, and that God cannot &e known from miracles &ut only from the

natural order itself.564he early erder holds e:actly the same position.57

Now, it would certainly &e an e:aggeration to say that erder took o#er all of these

principles from Spinoza eclusi!el1! other sources, including 3hristian 0i&le scholars

whom erder discusses more e:plicitly 1e.g. Lowth, 6rnesti, Semler, and Michaelis2,

50Tractatus, pp. +??, ++D, [email protected] e.g. G@7+5D


14/39

clearly played important roles as well. For e:ample, principle 1B2, the reection of any

reliance on authority when interpreting the 0i&le, was a staple of Hrotestantism! principle

12, that words gain their meaning solely from their usage so that the interpreter needs to

focus on this, had &een strongly championed &y 6rnesti! #ersions of principles 1-2 and

1@2, concerning the 0i&le's moral 1or sal#ific2, rather than theoretical, purpose and its

condescension to the cultural le#el of its human authors and their audience, had already

&een championed &efore Spinoza &y Galileo! and principle 1++2, namely reecting

miracles and seeing God as instead re#ealed in the natural order, was a fa#orite principle

of erder's own teacher, the pre;critical Oant.

Still, gi#en the independent e#idence for erder's preoccupation with Spinoza's

Tractatusat the rele#ant period 1as descri&ed earlier2, the remarka&le e:tent of his

agreement with the work's principles of interpretation ust sketched a&o#e surely does

show that he was strongly influenced &y the work in this area.

Also, one should &ear in mind that in addition to directinfluence &y the Tractatus,

there is also likely to ha#e &een indirectinfluence. For some of the other authors who

influenced erder 1e.g. the 3hristian 0i&le scholars recently mentioned2 were pro&a&ly

themsel#es ultimately inde&ted to the Tractatus.

3. Political Philosophy

(hen one reads through erder's writings from the period +


15/39

+


16/39

of the &uan ace, which appeared contemporaneously with This Too a Philosoph1 of

&istor1in +, he argues more ela&orately that they had originally practiced

repu&licanism and freedom.65

ow is this sudden re#ersal in erder's political philosophy to &e e:plained) e was

certainly e:posed to #arious early influences that might ha#e helped to make him

sympathetic to his new political ideal. ne was his teacher Oant's commitment to

repu&licanism and li&erty. Another was his own positi#e e:perience of the limited form

of repu&licanism and li&erty that he had found practiced in "iga while li#ing there in

+


17/39

+-2. For, of course, classical Athens was the #ery model of democratic repu&licanism

and li&erty. And erder in the early draft of the Plasticfrom +? accordingly writes

with enthusiasm of =Greek freedom.>66

0ut $ want to suggest that another part of the more pro:imate e:planation pro&a&ly lies

in the influence of Spinoza's Tractatus. For among the most striking positions that

Spinoza puts forward in the Tractatusare a strong defense of &oth democracy and li&erty

1especially li&erty of thought and speech2.67Moreo#er, Spinoza had made a case in the

work that a political constitution of ust this sort had already &een practiced &y the

ancient e&rews during Moses' lifetime and for a period after his death 1&efore

e#entually gi#ing way to #irtual monarchy2.68Gi#en that, as we ha#e already seen, erder

&egan to fall under the influence of the Tractatusduring the period +


18/39

Let us now turn to the aspects and phases of erder's de#elopment that were influenced

&y Spinoza'sEthics1rather than &y his Tractatus2.

$t is important to o&ser#e here at the outset that what erder found attracti#e in

Spinoza'sEthicswas more its conclusions than its arguments. For from an early period of

his career erder had &een #ery skeptical a&out the #alue of a priori arguments in

philosophy. Accordingly, one already finds e#idence of his skepticism a&out Spinoza's

apriorism as early as +

1More on this anon.2

4hat /ualification noted, let us now consider how Spinoza's theories in theEthics

influenced erder's own thought. $t seems to me that they decisi#ely influenced &oth his

69See on this Jollrath,Die Auseinandersetzung, pp. +-;[email protected] esp. G5


19/39

metaphysical;religious position and his philosophy of mind, and that they did so at

around the same time in each case5 the mid;+?'s.

As Ea#id 0ell has shown, erder already &egan to take an interest in the metaphysical;

religious monism that Spinoza had propounded in theEthicsas early as + or something similar, and then goes on to say5 =An idea from

which our (est is /uite distant, and which Gleim could e:press so uni/uely5 that hea#en

is e#erywhere, that space and time disappear &efore God, &ut that e can only li#e where

there is thought, and where there is the purest thought, effecti#e lo#eI 4hat this is God,

God in e#ery point or rather in no point. $t is, as it acts, in eternity, raised a&o#e space

und time, em&races e#erything, flows together with e#erything that thinks and lo#es, and

710ell, Spinoza in %eran1, pp. + ff.72GB5+.73$ohann %ottfried &erder 6riefe, D5+?. Similarly, in March of + immermann

thanks erder for sending him the =Eutch Hlato,> which is almost certainly an allusion toSpinoza's work, and incidentally one which again re#eals the sense of danger in

&ecoming associated with Spinoza that pre#ailed at the time 1cf. Lindner,Das Pro/le

des Spinozisus, p.


20/39

so accomplishes all the works that occur in the world, is GodI % 4hese ideas sound

fanatical, &ut are the coldest, most factual metaphysics 1read Spinoza, the Ethics. . .2.>74

$n short, erder had already &ecome an enthusiastic follower of Spinoza's Ethics, and in

particular of its central principle of metaphysical;religious monism, &y the mid;+?'s 1a

full decade &efore the famousPantheisusstreit&etween *aco&i and Mendelssohn2.

$n terms of erder'spu/licphilosophical de#elopment, howe#er, it was actually

Spinoza'sphilosoph1 of indin theEthicsrather than this metaphysical;religious

principle that first impacted erder's writings. So let us consider the impact of Spinoza's

philosophy of mind in detail first.

Shortly after his more general con#ersion to Spinozism in +D;, as ust descri&ed,

erder pu&lished On the #ognition and Sensation of the &uan Soul1+-2, a work in

which he de#eloped a #ery distincti#e philosophy of mind. 4his philosophy of mind was

clearly influenced &y more than one predecessor 1including, for e:ample, Lei&niz and

aller2. 0ut &y no one more strongly than Spinoza. Let me focus on some of the work's

key doctrines in order to illustrate this fact.

4he work actually e:ists in three drafts5 a first from +, a second from +, and the

third, pu&lished draft from +-. ne central doctrine of the work % already present in the

earliest draft from + % is that cognition and #olition are at &ottom one 1erder also

says the same a&out cognition and sensation2. $n another work from +, To Preachers

+ifteen Pro!incial Letters, erder e:presses this doctrine in terms of a unity of

=understanding and will.>75Now this doctrine almost certainly already represents a de&t

74$ohann %ottfried &erder 6riefe, D5++.75G@7+5@@;+??.

B?


21/39

to Spinoza.76For Spinoza had written in theEthicsin a strikingly similar #ein that =will

and understanding are one and the same.>77

0ut Spinoza's influence on erder's work &ecomes e#en more striking in the final

draft from +-, where se#eral further doctrines reflect it as well. 4o &egin with the most

important of these5 Euring the +


22/39

separate them Ksic,> and he insists that =nops1cholog1is possi&le that is not in e#ery

step a determinateph1siolog1.>820ut Spinoza had already argued #ery similarly in the

Ethicsthat =mind and &ody . . . are one and the same indi#idual concei#ed now under the

attri&ute of thought, now under the attri&ute of e:tension.>83

4o &e more e:act a&out the nature of Spinoza's influence on erder here, this seems in

fact to ha#e &een a two;phase process. First, although, as $ recently mentioned, erder

during the +


23/39

&eing.>85Now it seems #irtually certain that the interpretation of the ld 4estament's

conception of spirit that erder is offering and philosophically endorsing here is taken

directly from Spinoza's Tractatus. For erder &ases it on the following more specific

reading of the ld 4estament's position that he gi#es a little earlier in the same passage5

=$s the human &eing dust alone, though) % NoI the earthen creature &lows7&reathes

Khaucht, &reathes Katet, li#es.>860ut in the TractatusSpinoza had gi#en precisely the

same analysis of the ld 4estament concept of ruagh, or spirit5 =(e must determine the

e:act signification of the e&rew word ruagh, commonly translated spirit. 4he word

ruaghliterally means wind, e.g. the south wind, &ut it is fre/uently employed in other

deri#ati#e significations. $t is used as e/ui#alent to, 1+2 0reath . . . 1B2 Life, or

&reathing . . .>87

Second, concerning the period of On the #ognition and Sensationitself5 erder already

en#isaged asort of intimate union &etween mind and &ody in the first draft from +.

0ut at that time his idea was still &asically that it consisted in a reduction of &odies to

minds, or monads, Q la Lei&niz.88owe#er, in the second draft from + erder added a

partly critical &ut partly positi#e e:plicit discussion of Spinoza. $n the course of it he

noted Spinoza's distinction &etween God's two known attri&utes, thought and e:tension

1or as erder calls the latter, =motion>2, made his well;known accusation that Spinoza

had failed to unite these 1an accusation he would later repeat in %od Soe

#on!ersations2, &ut also 1less famously, and here most importantly2 hinted that Spinoza

had nonetheless somehow aspiredto unite them, more specifically in a way that did not

85G5B.86G5BD


24/39

in#ol#e a reduction in either direction5 =0oth are properties of one &eing, which Spinoza

forgot or despairedto &ring closer together since he had remo#ed them so far from

himself.>89erder's own /uasi;physiological account of the mind in the second and third

drafts of On the #ognition and Sensationin terms of aller's phenomenon of =irritation

Keiz> can therefore &e seen as an attempt on erder's part to realize Spinoza*s goal of

esta/lishing an identit1 of ind and /od1 that does not sipl1 reduce one of the to the

other. For erder usually concei#es of =irritation> 1a phenomenon paradigmatically

e:emplified &y muscle fi&ers contracting in response to the application of a physical

stimulus &ut then rela:ing upon its remo#al2 as a phenomenon that com&ines physical

with primiti#e mental traits.90

3oncerning ne:t erder's switch from li&ertarianism to determinism, in the pu&lished

#ersion of On the #ognition and Sensationfrom +- he strikingly reects li&ertarianism

in fa#or of a form of determinism regarding the indi#idual human &eing5 =ne is a serf of

mechanism . . . and imagines oneself free! a sla#e in chains and dreams that they are

wreaths of flowers . . . ere it is truly the first germ of freedom to feel that one is not free

and what &onds hold one.>910ut now, Spinoza had argued #ery similarly in theEthics

that =men are mistaken in thinking themsel#es free! their opinion is made up of

89S-5B90$ actually think that erder's recently /uoted passage from +


25/39

consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the causes &y which they are

conditioned.>92

Moreo#er, in this case erder makes his de&t to Spinoza e:plicit, for immediately after

the passage ust /uoted in which he says that freedom is an illusion &ased on the reality of

a sort of sla#ery, and hints that recognizing this fact constitutes the first step towards a

truer sort of freedom 1=it is truly the first germ of freedom to feel that one is not free>2,

erder goes on to de#elop a more specific #ersion of such a line of thought which

Spinoza had already articulated in theEthics, and to attri&ute it to Spinoza e:plicitly5

=(here the spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. 4he deeper, purer, and more di#ine our

cognition is, the purer, more di#ine, and more uni#ersal is our efficacy, and so the freer

our freedom . . . (e stand on higher ground, and with each thing onitsground, roam in

the great sensorium of God's creation, the flame of all thinking and feeling, lo!e. 4his is

the highest reason, and the purest, most di#ine #olition. $f we do not wish to &elie#e the

holy St. *ohn a&out this, then we may &elie#e the undou&tedly still more di#ine Spinoza,

whose philosophy and ethics re#ol#e entirely around this a:le.>93

Finally, as can also &e seen from this passage, erder's philosophy of mind in On the

#ognition and Sensationowes an additional intellectual de&t to Spinoza'sEthicsas well

1al&eit one that is likely to strike philosophers today as far less attracti#e than the others

discussed a&o#e25 namely, a doctrine that there is an ultimate unity of cognition and lo#e.

4his is, of course, a #ersion of Spinoza's famous doctrine, from near the end of the

Ethics, of an aor dei intellectualis.94

92Ethics, p. +?-.93G5D


26/39

$n short, se#eral of the most central and interesting doctrines in the philosophy of mind

that erder espouses in On the #ognition and Sensationfrom +- are largely due to

Spinoza's influence.

B


27/39

5. Metaphysical-religious Monism and Global eterminism

erder's ne:t and finalpu/licstep in his progressi#e appropriation of Spinoza's

philosophy concerns the e#en more philosophically fundamental le#el of etaph1sics

and religion, especially the doctrines of metaphysical;religious monism and glo&al 1i.e.

unrestricted2 determinism. 4his step is much &etter known than the preceding steps, at

least in general outline. So my discussion of it here can &e somewhat &riefer than would

otherwise &e warranted.

As we ha#e seen, erder already &egan to show an interest in this side of Spinoza's

thought in +


28/39

4hat contro#ersy largely ust ga#e erder the courage to =come out> as a Spinozist

1especially &y re#ealing pu&licly that the highly respected and much mourned Lessing

had also &een a Spinozist2. Accordingly, in a letter to Gleim from +-< erder roundly

declares, =$ch &in ein Spinozist,>97and then in +- he pu&lishes his most e:plicit,

detailed statement and defense of a neo;Spinozistic monism and determinism, the famous

%od Soe #on!ersations.

4he contro#ersy also prompted erder to de#elop and defend his own #ersion of

Spinoza's metaphysical;religious position more fully than &efore, howe#er. So let us

consider the form that this de#elopment and defense took.

As $ ha#e already mentioned, erder pu&lished %od Soe #on!ersationsin the wake

of *aco&i's On the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Mr. Moses Mendelssohn 1+-2 and

Mendelssohn's replies to it,Morgenstunden1+-2 and To Lessing*s +riends1+-


29/39

re;cast in a =purified> form that a#oided the #ices in /uestion. *aco&i's work and

Mendelssohn's response caused a pu&lic furor. $n %od Soe #on!ersationserder

inter#ened. 4here he &roadly supports Lessing's side of the de&ate against *aco&i, and to

some e:tent also against Mendelssohn, &y defending a #ersion of =Spinozism> %98&ut a

#ersion that modifies the original in some significant respects, largely with a #iew to

defusing their o&ections.

A&o#e all5 1+2 erder champions Spinoza's &asic thesis of onisand, like Spinoza,

e/uates the single, all;encompassing principle in /uestion with God 1which of course

immediately challenges the *aco&i;Mendelssohn charge of atheism2. 0ut whereas

Spinoza had characterized this principle assu/stance, erder instead characterizes it as

force, orprial force.99

4his fundamental re#ision is closely connected with se#eral further ones that erder

makes, including the following5 1B2 Spinoza might with at least some plausi&ility &e

accused of ha#ing concei#ed the principle in /uestion as an inacti!e thing1his concept of

=su&stance> and his doctrine that time is somehow merely apparent &oth suggest this,

al&eit that other aspects of his position, e.g. his conception of su&stance as a causa sui

and as natura naturans, tend to contradict it2. 0y contrast, erder's fundamental re#ision

turns the principle more clearly into an acti!it1.

1D2 Spinoza's theory had attri&uted thoughtto the principle in /uestion, &ut had

reected conceptions that it had understanding, :ill, or intentions, or was a ind. 0y

98See esp. G5;-.99$nterestingly enough, erder already prefigures this fundamental mo#e in a semi;

Spinozist, semi;Lei&nizian aphorism from + 1SDB5+@@! cf. G5BD2.

B@


30/39

contrast, erder claims that it doesha#e understanding, will, and intentions.100Moreo#er,

gi#en that his general philosophy of mind identifies the mind with force, his fundamental

identification of the principle in /uestion as primal force also carries an implication that it

isa mind. Accordingly, already in %od Soe #on!ersationsof +- he descri&es God as

=the primal force of all forces, the soul of all souls,>101and a few years later in On the

Spirit of #hristianit1from +@- he characterizes God as a %eist, a mind. $n these ways,

erder in effect re;mentalizes Spinoza's God 1there&y further undermining the *aco&i;

Mendelssohn charge of atheism2.

12 (hereas Spinoza had concei#ed nature mechanistically, in keeping with his

3artesian intellectual heritage 1and had there&y pro#oked the *aco&i;Mendelssohn charge

of fatalism2, erder 1though officially agnostic a&out what force is2 rather tends to

concei#e the forces that are at work in nature as li!ing, or organic 1a conception of them

that he mainly owes to Lei&niz2.

12 erder &elie#es that Spinoza's original theory contained an o&ectiona&le residue

of dualism 1again inherited from Eescartes2, in its conception of the relation &etween

God's two known attri&utes, thought and e:tension, and similarly in its conception of the

relation &etweenfiniteminds and their &odies 1while he also, as we already saw from the

second draft of On the #ognition and Sensation, recognizes that Spinoza aspiredto

o#ercome such dualism2.1020y contrast, erder's own conception of God and is thought

as force, and of finite minds and their mental processes as likewise forces, is designed to

100See esp. G5B;-.101G5+?. 6mphasis added.102For this recognition in %od Soe #on!ersationsitself, see esp. G5?, ?@.

D?


31/39

o#ercome this alleged residual dualism, since erder understands forces to &e of their

#ery nature e:pressed in the &eha#ior of e:tended &odies.103

1


32/39

!. "he #ormation of German $omanticism and German %dealism

4his article has focused on four sets of principles which, $ ha#e suggested, erder largely

took o#er from Spinoza in a sort of progressi#e appropriation of Spinoza's philosophy

that &egan in the late +


33/39

addition to the three forerunners already discussed in this article, namely Lessing, erder,

and erder's follower Goethe, the founders of German "omanticism, Schleiermacher,

Friedrich Schlegel, and No#alis, all adopted it as well, as did the most important later

representati#es of German $dealism, Schelling and egel.1084his was all largely the result

of erder's espousal of neo;Spinozism, especially in %od Soe #on!ersations, and

largely took o#er erder's modifications of Spinoza's position. For e:ample, when

Schleiermacher adopted Spinoza's metaphysical;religious monism in the +@?'s he

incorporated into it erder's conception of the single principle in /uestion as a primal

force. Moreo#er, as $ ha#e argued in detail elsewhere, so too did egel at first, al&eit that

he e#entually arri#ed #ia an immanent criti/ue of such a conception at an e#en more

radical account of the single principle in /uestion 1as well as of thefinitemind2 which

#irtually identifiedit with its manifestations in physical &eha#ior.109egel also took o#er

erder's re#ision of Spinoza's conception of the ontological status of space modeled on

Spinoza's conception of the ontological status of time, namely as a mere appearance of

an eternal God 1idealist acosmism2, as his own interpretation of Spinoza. $n addition,

egel took o#er erder's re;mentalizing of Spinoza's su&stance, like erder re;

concei#ing it as %eist, or mind 1al&eit while making it clearer than erder had that this

was not an interpretation of Spinoza &ut a re#ision2. 4o gi#e yet another e:ample,

Schelling's philosophy of nature % and in its train egel's as well % drew much of its

inspiration from erder's sketch of nature towards the end of %od Soe #on!ersations

as a self;de#eloping hierarchical system of li#ing forces grounded in the primal force,

1084he earlier German $dealists, Oant and Fichte, were also influenced &y Spinoza's

metaphysical position, al&eit in less oious and straightforward ways. See on thisLinder,Das Pro/le des Spinozisus, pp. +

DD


34/39

God, and as proceeding #ia the sort of opposition &etween forces that is paradigmatically

e:emplified in the magnet.110

A similar picture emerges concerning the closely related Spinoza;erder doctrine of

glo&al determinism5 Schleiermacher's #ersion of Spinozism in the +@?'s included this

feature. So too, somewhat later, did egel's mature philosophy, in which not only finite

spirits &ut also A&solute Spirit are concei#ed as su&ect to necessity.

4urning to the philosophy of mind, Scheiermacher, &eginning in his most emphatically

Spinozistic period, the +@?'s, &ut then continuing in his later lectures on psychology,

took o#er all three of the main Spinoza;erder naturalistic principles in the philosophy of

mind that ha#e &een discussed in this article in order to form the core of his own

philosophy of mind5 the denial of any sharp distinction &etween cognition and #olition!

the denial of dualism and of Lei&nizian reductions of the &ody to the mind, in fa#or of a

non;reducti#e mental;physical monism! and the espousal of a form of determinism. 4he

same is true, mutatis mutandis, of egel.

3oncerning the political ideals of democracy and li&erty, the continuity from Spinoza

and erder into German "omanticism and German $dealism is less consistent, &ut still

significant. For e:ample, Friedrich Schlegel was &oth a radical democrat and a li&eral

during the +@?'s 1pu&lishing a short essay championing these political principles in

+@


35/39


36/39

&. "he %ntrinsic 'alue of "hese Principles

4he influence that all these Spinozistic principles taken o#er &y erder e:erted on the

su&se/uent de#elopment of German philosophy is e:traordinary. 0ut their intrinsic #alue

is hardly less so.

4hat intrinsic #alue ought to &e fairly self;e#ident and uncontro#ersial where the

following principles are concerned5 the Spinozistic reection of inspirational, allegorical,

and authority;&ased approaches to interpreting the 0i&le in fa#or of a more rigorous

approach! the rest of the Spinozistic methodology of interpretation! the Spinozistic

championing of democracy and li&erty o#er such contrary political principles as a&solute

monarchy! and the Spinozistic reection of faculty;di#iding, dualistic or idealistic, and

li&ertarian models of the mind in fa#or of their naturalistic opposites. 14he relati#ely self;

e#ident intrinsic #alue of these principles has &een part of my reason for focusing on

them so hea#ily in the present article.2

0ut perhaps a case could e#en &e made for the intrinsic #alue of Spinozistic

metaphysical monism as well. For such a principle is suscepti&le to different #ersions and

#ariants. Spinoza himself identified the single principle in /uestion as God, and

concei#ed it in a way that accorded e/ual status to the attri&utes of thought and e:tension.

$n doing so, he was closely followed &y the early Schelling and the early egel with their

=philosophy of identity.> 0y contrast, the mature egel, while he likewise identified the

single principle in /uestion with God, ele#ated thought 1or mind2 o#er e:tension 1or

nature2 in his reworking of the principle. 4hen, finally, the tradition of Feuer&ach, Mar:,

D


37/39

and su&se/uent naturalistic philosophy dropped the identification of the single principle

in /uestion with God, and recast it with an opposite inflection to egel's, maintaining a

priority of the material o#er the mental rather than con#ersely.111My own philosophical

intuitions, like those of many contemporary philosophers, sympathize most with the last

of these #ersions or #ariants5 atheistic materialism. (hile it would not &e correct to say

that this was Spinoza's own #ersion of his principle,112it does argua&ly still constitute a

descendant and #ariant of his principle. 4o this e:tent at least, his principle could perhaps

&e said to contain an insight that continues to hold philosophical promise today.

(oncluding (omment

Like Lessing &efore him, erder was committed to a profound cosmopolitanism. Again

like Lessing &efore him, he was there&y ena&led to repudiate the anti;semitism that

corrupted so many of his German contemporaries % including his famous teacher Oant

1himself officially a =cosmopolitan,> &ut one whose =cosmopolitanism> was more

hospita&le to some appalling anti;semitic, racist, and misogynist #iews than to all

people2. 0eyond that, he was also there&y ena&led to sympathize deeply with *udaism as

a religious and cultural tradition. "ecall in this connection his early remark concerning

his own approach to the ld 4estament5 =$ read orientally, *ewishly, anciently,

111For a helpful account of Feuer&ach and Mar:'s #ariants of Spinozism, see R. Ro#el,

Spinoza and Other &eretics, chs. D and .112Ea#id 0ell is certainly right to reect materialist interpretations of Spinoza % such as

Lindner's and Adler's % as interpretations.

D


38/39

poetically.>1134his cosmopolitan open;mindedness towards *udaism also ena&led Lessing

and erder to take seriously, and e#entually to em&race, the thought of the greatest

*ewish philosopher of the modern period, Spinoza. 0y doing so, they not only redressed a

great cultural inustice, turning Spinoza from &eing a pariah in Germany into one of the

most cele&rated philosophers of the age, &ut also, in the process, won for German

philosophy a &ody of #itally important ideas that would go on to enrich it for generations

to come.114

)ibliography

0eiser, F.3.Enlightenent< e!olution< and oanticis, 3am&ridge, Mass.5 ar#ard9ni#ersity Hress, +@@B

% The +ate of eason, 3am&ridge, Mass.5 ar#ard 9ni#ersity Hress, +@-

0ell, E. Spinoza in %eran1 fro 2345 to the Age of %oethe, London5 $nstitute ofGermanic Studies, 9ni#ersity of London, +@-

0ollacher, M.Der 0unge %oethe und Spinoza, 4P&ingen5 Ma: Niemeyer, +@&egel-$ahr/uch,

B?++

aym, ".&erder nach seine Le/en und seinen 'er(en, 0erlin5 Gaertner, +--?erder, *.G.$ohann %ottfried &erder S)tliche 'er(e, ed. 0. Suphan et al., 0erlin5

(eidmann, +-%

> $ohann %ottfried &erder 'er(e, ed. 9. Gaier et al., Frankfurt am Main5Eeutscher Olassiker Jerlag, +@-%

%$ohann %ottfried &erder 6riefe, (eimar5 ermann 0hlaus Nachfolger,

+@

1134his approach e#entually reached its finest flowering in his On the Spirit of &e/re:

Poetr11+-B2.114$ would like to thank the organizers and participants from two conferences at which

this article was originally presented for their hospitality, encouragement, /uestions, and

criticisms5 a conference on Spinoza and German philosophy that was organized at *ohnsopkins 9ni#ersity in the spring of B?+? &y 6ckart Frster and Ritzhak Melamed, and a

conference on erder across the disciplines that was organized under the auspices of the

9ni#ersity of slo near 0ergen in the spring of B?+? &y Oristin Gesdal. $n addition tothe aforementioned organizers, $ would also especially like to thank the following

participants5 Fred 0eiser, 0rady 0owman, Michael Eella "occa, Haul Franks, Eon

Garrett, Haul Guyer, "o&ert Norton, Lina Steiner, Allen (oodT, and *ohn ammito.

D-


39/39

$srael, *.$.adical Enlightenent Philosoph1 and the Ma(ing of Modernit1 2395-2495,

:ford5 :ford 9ni#ersity Hress, B??+

Lindner, .Das Pro/le des Spinozisus i Schaffen %oethes und &erders, (eimar5Arion Jerlag, +@

M. Fortser, 'Herder and Spinoza'

Documents