Lyons v. NWTS (WA Supreme Court 2014)

Fl LE INCLERKSOFFICE COURT,STATE OF WASHINGTON OCT3 0 2014

CHiEFJIJsriCEJ Ronald R.t Supreme Coort IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON WINNIE LYONS, a single person,)No.89132-0 ) Appellant,) ) v.) )EnBanc U.S. BANK NATIONAL) ASSOCIATION, astrustee for) Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust Series ) 2012-3, by Carrington Mortgage) Services, LLC; WELLS FARGO) FiledOCT3 0 2014 BANK, N.A., a chartered national) bank;Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as) serv1cer,) ) Defendants,) ) and) ) NORTHWEST TRUSTEE) SERVICES, INC.,as trustee,) ) Respondent.) _________________________) FAIRHURST,J.-WinnieLyonsbroughtsuitagainstNorthwestTrustee Services Inc.(NWTS) based on itsconduct as the trustee during foreclosure.Lyons Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'l Ass 'n,No.89132-0 alleged violations of the deed of trust act (DTA),chapter 61.24 RCW;violations of theConsumerProtectionAct(CPA),chapter19.86RCW;andtheintentional inflictionof emotionaldistress.First,thiscaseaskswhetheraplaintiff caneven bring a cause of action fordamages under the DTA or the CPA in the absence of an actualsaleof theproperty.It thenaskswhetherthetrialcourterredbygranting summary judgment in favor ofNWTS on all three claims. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the DTAand theintentionalinfliction of emotional distress claims, but we reverse and remand the CPA claim to the trial court. I.FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In August 2007, Winnie Lyons signed a promissory note secured by a deed of trustencumberingrealpropertyinBurien,Washington.TheBurienpropertyis Lyons'primaryresidenceandalsothelocationfromwhichsheoperatesanadult familyhome(AFH), 1 hersolesourceofincome.WellsFargoBankNAwas identifiedonthedeedof trustasthelenderandbeneficiary.NorthwestTrustee Services LLC was identified as the trustee. The deed of trust was recorded on August 31,2007inKingCounty.In early2009,Northwest TrusteeServicesLLCbecame 1In her briefing, Lyons saysshe livesat the Burien address,but her declaration to the trial courtsaidshelivedinKent.Inherreplybrief sheclarifiesthatsheinadvertentlysignedthe declaration with thiserror.Reply Br.of Lyonsat2.At alltimessincesheobtained the mortgage she has resided and operated the AFH at the property in Burien. Id. 2 Lyons v.US.BankNat'l Ass'n, No.89132-0 NWTSandWellsFargorecordedanappointmentofsuccessortrusteenaming NWTSasthe successor trustee. InOctober2009,anemployeeofWellsFargoexecutedabeneficiary declarationidentifyingWellsFargoastrusteeforSoundviewHomeLoanTrust 2006. This beneficiary declaration asserted,"Wells Fargo Bank, NA,asTrustee for Soundview Home Loan Trust 2006-WFI isthe actual holder of the promissory note orother obligation evidencing theabove-referencedloanor hasrequisiteauthority under RCW 62A.3-301toenforcesaid obligation."Clerk's Papers(CP)at120.In June2010,another beneficiarydeclaration wasexecuted by anemployeeof Wells Fargo.It read,"Wells Fargo Banl(,NA,istheactual holder of thepromissory note orother obligation evidencing theabove-referencedloan or hasrequisiteauthority under RCW 62A.3-301toenforce said obligation." CPat118. In October 2011, Lyons filed bankruptcy, and in January 2012 she applied for a loan modification with Wells Fargo.On March 30, 2012, while Lyons was waiting fora response regarding her application fora modification,she received a notice of trustee's sale from NWTSinforming her that her property wasscheduled tobesold onJuly6,2012.OnApril5,2012,WellsFargotoldLyons'attorneythatthein-house modification had been approved.On April19, 2012, Lyons received the letter confirming the modification. The terms required her to pay $10,000 by May 1, 2012. 3 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'l Ass 'n,No.89132-0 WellsFargoinformedLyonstheywoulddiscontinuethesaleuponreceiptof this payment.She paid this amount toWells Fargoasrequired. However, on March 29, 2012, Wells Fargo had sold Lyons'loan to U.S. Ban1c NationalAssociationastrusteeforStanwichMortgageLoanTrustSeries2012-3 with Carrington MortgageServices LLCasthenewservicer of theloan.Thiswas tobecome effective on May1,2012.NWTS received notice of thesaleand service release on Apri112, 2012. Lyons received notice of thissale on April 26,2012. On April26,2012,Lyons'attorney spoke with a representativeofNWTS to inform it that Wells Fargo nolonger had any beneficial interest in the loan after the sale, that Carrington was the new servicer of theloan,and that Lyons had received aloanmodificationsoshewasnolongerindefault.OnJune11,2012,Lyons' attorney again called NWTS toinform them of the loan modification and the sale of theloan.ANWTSemployeeinformedherthatCarrington haddirected NWTSto continue with theforeclosuresaleasscheduled.On June14,2012,Lyons'attorney calledCarringtonandanemployeeindicatedthatCarringtondidnotshowthe propertyinforeclosurestatus.Anotheremployeefurtherindicated thatCarrington had not told NWTStogoforwardwith thesale.Lyons'attorney then sent a cease and desist letter toNWTSand Carrington. OnJune18,2012,Lyons'attorneyfollowedupwithNWTS.NWTS acknowledged receipt andinformed her thesale was still on but that the matter had 4 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'! Ass'n, No.89132-0 been referred toanattorneyfor NWTS.OnJune19,2012,theattorneyforNWTS informedLyons'attorneythatheneeded todohisduediligence.Lyons'attorney againspokewithNWTS'attorneyonJune21,2012.NWTS'attorneyrefused to discontinue the sale,and Lyons'attorney filedthecomplaint.At the end of theday onJune21,2012,NWTSexecuted andrecordeda noticeof discontinuanceof the trustee's sale.2 Lyonsallegesthatthissituationhashadseriousemotionalandeconomic impactsonher.InMarch2012,Lyonsarrivedhometobehandedthenoticeof trustee's sale by a family member of one of her fullpay AFH clients.In addition to the sense of humiliation Lyonsfelt,this client moved out approximately two weeks laterbecauseof concern that Lyonswasgoingtoloseher businessandherhome. Before leaving, this client shared her belief that the home was going to be foreclosed on with other AFH clients,some of whom alsomovedshortly thereafter.The AFH businessisher primarysource of income,andthelossof clientsdirectlyimpacted herfinancially.Inherdeclaration,Lyonsassertsthat thereaftershestruggled with day-to-daytasksandfelthopeless.Shebegancounselingwiththepastorof her church.HerpastorsaidthatpreviouslyLyonswasaverypositivewomanwitha drive tosucceed,butsince thependingforeclosureshewasfearfulanddepressed. 2NWTSmaintainsthat it did not discontinue the trustee'ssale because thecomplaint was filed,but that the dates arecoincidental since NWTS was not served with the complaint until June 26,2012. 5 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'! Ass 'n,No.89132-0 Lyons asserts that she experienced constant nausea from the stress and continuously worriedabout losing her businessand thesubsequent homelessnessof herself,her son,and the elderly clients she cared for. NWTSmoved forsummary judgment. After argument, thecourt granted the motion forsummary judgment as to all claims against NWTS.Subsequently, Lyons andtheremainingdefendants(Stanwich,Carrington,andWellsFargo)entereda stipulatedorderof dismissal.Lyons'motionforreconsiderationof theorderof summary judgment was denied.We granted Lyons'petition for direct review. II.ISSUES PRESENTED 1.If a nonjudicial foreclosure sale does not happen, can a plaintiff bring a claim fordamages under the DTA or the CPA? 2.Wasthegrant of summary judgment against Lyonson her CPA claim improper? 3.Was thegrant-of summary judgment against Lyonson her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim improper? III.ANALYSIS Lyons alleges a range of errors by the trial court that resulted fromit granting summary judgment infavorof NWTS.Wereviewquestionsof lawand summary judgment rulings de novo. Dreilingv. Jain,151Wn.2d 900, 908,93 P.3d 861(2004); Reid v.PierceCounty,136 Wn.2d195,201,961P.2d 333(1998)."In reviewing an order of summary judgment, weengage in thesameinquiry asa trialcourt." Reid, 136Wn.2dat201.Weinterpretallthefactsandinferencestherefrominfavorof 6 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'l Ass 'n,No.89132-0 Lyons, the nonmoving party. !d. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the record demonstratesthereisnogenuineissueof materialfactandthemovingpartyis entitled to judgment asa matter of law. !d. Lyons alleges three causes of action against NWTS-one under the DTA, one under the CPA,and oneforintentional infliction of emotional distress.Allof these claimsaresupported by thesame underlying conduct that Lyonsallegesinvolves a violationofRCW61.24.030(7)inrelationtothebeneficiarydeclarationanda breach of thedutyof good faithunder RCW61.24.010(4).The trialcourt focused on theissueof whether Lyonscould bringaclaimfordamagesunder theDTAin the absence of a trustee's sale,and there was almost nodiscussion of the CPA or the intentional infliction of emotional distressclaims during argument on thesummary judgment motion.Yet,the court granted NWTS'motion on allofthese claims.We beginbyaddressingthecausesof actionundertheDTAandtheCPA,including Lyons' particular contentions regarding the beneficiary declaration and breach of the dutyof good faith.Wethenaddress thecauseof action forintentionalinfliction of emotional distress. A.Withoutanonjudicialforeclosuresale,apartymaynotbringaclaimfor damages under the DTA,but they can bring a claim under the CPA RecentlywedecidedFriasv.Asset ForeclosureServices,Inc.,_Wn.2d _, 334P.3d529(2014).Friasinvolved twocertified questionsfromthefederal districtcourtregardingwhetheraplaintiff couldbringaclaimfordamagesunder 7 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'l Ass 'n,No.89132-0 the DT A or the CPA in theabsence of a foreclosuresale and what principles would govern each claim.Thiscourt carefullyconsidered thelanguageof thestatute,the intended beneficiariesof thestatute, theexplicit and implicit legislative intent,and the purposes of the statute.The court concluded: Weholdthat theDTAdoesnotcreateanindependentcauseof actionformonetarydamagesbasedonallegedviolationsofits provisionswherenoforeclosuresalehasbeencompleted....We furtherholdthatunderappropriatefactualcircumstances,DTA violations may be actionable under the CPA, even where no foreclosure salehasbeencompleted .... [T]hesameprinciplesthat governCPA claims generally apply to CPA claims based on alleged DTA violations. 334 P.3d at 531. Without the sale of the property, damages are not recoverable under the DTA, but a CPA claim may be maintained regardless of the status of the property. Friasclearlyresolvesthefirstissueinthiscase.Lyonscannotbringaclaimfor damagesundertheDTAintheabsenceof asale,butshemaybringaclaimfor similar actions under the CPA. B.There were material issues of fact for trial regarding whether NWTS violated provisions of the DTA, which could be used tosupport Lyons' CPA claim, so granting summary judgment to NWTSon Lyons'CPA claim wasimproper ACPAclaimisapreexistingstatutorycauseof actionwithestablished elements.Id.at537.Aclaim under theCPA based on violationsof theDTA must meet the same requirements applicable to any other CPA claim. 3 The availability of 3ThelawregardingCPAcausesof actionisfairlyclearandsettled.Acauseof actionis availableif theclaimsatisfiesfiveelements:"'(1)[an]unfairordeceptiveactorpractice;(2) occurringintradeorcommerce;(3)publicinterestimpact;(4)injurytoplaintiff inhisorher 8 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'l Ass 'n,No.89132-0 redressforwrongsduring nonjudicial foreclosure under the CPA iswell supported in our case law. Id.;Bain v.Metro.Mortg.Grp.,Inc.,175Wn.2d 83,119, 285P.3d 34 (2012) (a plaintiff may bring a claim under the CPA arguing the factsspecific to the case);Walker v.Quality Loan Serv.Corp.of Wash.,176 Wn. App. 294, 320, 308 P.3d716(2013)(actionstakenduringthenonjudicialforeclosureprocesswere sufficient to support all five elements of a CPA claim and survive pretrial dismissal); Vawter v.Quality Loan Serv.Corp.of Wash.,707 F.Supp.2d 1115,1129-30 (W.D. Wash.2010) (court discussed the fiveelements fora CPA claim and considered the factualallegationssupportingVawter'sDTAclaimtosupporttheCPAclaimas well);Klemv.Wash.Mut.Bank,176Wn.2d 771,295P.3d1179(2013)(property was sold in thiscase, but court discussed action amounting toCPA claims in depth, focusing on acts of defendants, not the fact the property was sold). The absence of a completed sale of the property does not affect the availability of this cause of action. Whether a plaintiff will prevail on a CPA claim isa case by case determination of whether the plaintiff can satisfy the requisite elements. The main question raised by the parties surrounds whether the alleged actions of NWTSamounttounfairordeceptivepracticesundertheCP A.4 Theallegedly businessor property;(5)causation."' Klemv.Wash.Mut.Bank,176Wn.2d771,782,295 P.3d 1179 (20 13) (alteration in original) (quoting Hangman Ridge Training Stables,Inc.v.Safe coTitle Ins.Co.,105Wn.2d778,780,719 P.2d531(1986)).The CPA "shall be liberally constmed" to further its purposes. RCW 19.86.920. 4Muchof thebriefingalsoquestionswhetherLyonscanshowaninjurybyNWTS. Althoughemotionaldistress,embarrassment,andinconvenienceareexcluded,businessand 9 Lyons v.U.S.Bank Nat 'lAss 'n,No.89132-0 improperactsofNWTSareintertwinedbutcanbegenerallycategorizedas violationsof twoDTAstatutes-violationof thedutyof goodfaithunderRCW 61.24.01 0( 4)and noncompliance with RCW 61.24.030(7)( a),which instructs that a trusteemusthaveproof thebeneficiaryistheownerpriortoinitiatingatrustee's sale.5 Whether undisputed conduct is unfair or deceptive isa question of law, not a questionof fact.See,e.g.,Panag,166Wn.2dat47("Whetheraparticularactor practiceis'unfair ordeceptive'isaquestion of law."(quoting Leingang v.Pierce County Med.Bureau,Inc.,131Wn.2d133,150, 930 P.2d 288(1997))). CPA jurisprudence iswell settled,and determining what an unfair act iscan be done by looking to precedent. The DTA sets up a three party system for mortgages whereanindependenttrusteeactsastheimpartialpartybetweenalenderanda borrower instead ofthe court. Klem,176 Wn.2d at 790.IfLyons' alleged violations are true, NWTS' actions would likely be considered unfair acts, but questions of fact remainastowhether NWTS'actionsamounted tosuch violations.Thesematerial property injuries compensable under the CPA are relatively expansive. Frias,334 P.3d at 538. The injury element doesnot require that the homeowner losetheir propertyinorder tobring a claim under theCPA.!d."[T]he injuryrequirement ismet upon proof the plaintiffs'property interest ormoneyisdiminishedbecauseof theunlawfulconductevenif theexpensescausedbythe statutoryviolationareminimal."'Panag v.FarmersIns.Co.of Wash.,166Wn.2d27,57,204 P.3d 885(2009)(quoting Masonv.Mortg.Am.,Inc.,114 Wn.2d 842,854,792 P.2d142 (1990)). Lyonshasalleged that her AFHbusiness wasdirectlyimpacted by theactionsofNWTS. These allegations are sufficient to satisfy the injury element of a CPA claim for the purposes of summary judgment. 5InRCW61.24.135,thelegislaturelistedsomeperseviolationsoftheDTAthat automatically satisfy this element of a CPA claim. The acts complained of by Lyons do not violate thissection of the DTA and thus,even though they might violate a different statute,are not per se violations.Lyons must show NWTS'actions were unfair or deceptive. 10 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'l Ass 'n,No.89132-0 questions of fact must be resolved by a fact finder,so the claim should have survived summary judgment. 1.There were material issues of fact regarding whether NWTS did not act in good faith RCW61.24.010(4)imposesadutyof goodfaithonthetrusteetowardthe borrower,beneficiary,andgrantor."[U]nder ourstatutorysystem,atrusteeisnot merely an agent forthelender or thelender's successors.Trustees have obligations toallof the parties tothedeed,including the homeowner." Bain,175Wn.2d at93. Thisduty requires the trustee toremain impartial and protect the interests of allthe parties."[T]hetrusteeinanonjudicialforeclosureactionhasbeenvestedwith incredible power.Concomitant with that power isanobligation toboth sides todo more than merelyfollowan unread statuteand thebeneficiary'sdirections."Klem, 176Wn.2d at791.A foreclosuretrustee must "adequately inform"itself regarding thepurported beneficiary's right toforeclose,including,ata minimum,a "cursory investigation" toadhere toits dutyof good faith.Walker,176Wn.App.at 309-10. Atrusteedoesnotneedtosummarilyacceptaborrower'ssideof thestoryor instantly submit to a borrower's demands. But a trustee must treat both sides equally and investigate possible issues using itsindependent judgment toadhere toitsduty of good faith.See, e.g.,Coxv.Helenius,103Wn.2d 383,388,693 P.3d 683(1985). Atrustee'sfailuretoactimpartiallybetweennoteholdersandmortgagees,in 11 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'! Ass 'n,No.89132-0 violation of theDTA,cansupport a claimfordamagesunder theCPA.Klem,176 Wn.2d at 792. Lyonssays that NWTSviolated itsduty toact ingoodfaithbyfailing toact impartiallytowardher.Lyonspointstovariousindicatorsthatshebelieves demonstrates NWTS'lack of good faith: ( 1)NWTSknewthatMs.Lyonshadfiledbankruptcyin2011(2) NWTSknewthatMs.Lyonshadengagedinareviewforaloan modification(3)Inthebankruptcy[matter],NWTS,sistercompany, RCOrepresentedWellsFargo'sinterest(4)Lyons'counselon numerousoccasionscontactedNWTStodiscusseithertheloan modificationorthefactWellsFargonolongerhadanybeneficial interest(5)NWTSknew that WellsFargorequesteda servicerelease andthatNWTSneededtoprovideWellsFargowithaninvoiceor NWTSwouldnot bepaid(6)NWTSprovidedWellsFargowiththat invoiceonoraboutApril2012(7)NWTSchangedthescheduled foreclosuresale loan number when it knew about the service release to Carrington(8)NWTS,NanciLambert,indicatedthatCarrington instructedNWTStocontinuewiththescheduledforeclosuresale(9) Before a lawsuit was filed, several telephonic phone conversations took place(10)OnoraboutJune14,2012,NWTSreceivedaceaseand desist letter, coupled with proof of theloan modification. Opening Br. ofLyons at 34-35 (footnotes omitted). Put simply, Lyons claims NWTS deferredtothecourseof actionthatWellsFargohadpreviouslyinitiated without givinganycredence towhat she,theborrower,wastellingitabout a change in the situation between the parties. We find that Lyons has presented material issues of fact.The conflict over the actual beneficiary was brought to the attention ofNWTS on April 26, 2012, but there isnoevidenceintherecordthatanyoneatNWTSinvestigatedthisconflictuntil 12 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'! Ass 'n,No.89132-0 theirattorneyinformedLyons'attorneyit woulddosoonJune19,2012.6 It isa materialissueof factwhetherNWTSinvestigatedthestatusof theloanandthe proper beneficiary earlier than when it referred the matter to their attorney. If Lyons' allegationsaretrueandNWTSknewabouttheconflictinginformationregarding theirrighttoinitiateforeclosurebutdidnotlookintothismatter,thereareissues regardingwhetherthisindicatesdeferraltoWellsFargoandthereforelackof impartiality. These issues of fact regarding NWTS'actions must be resolved before a court can determineif they have violated thedutyof goodfaith.Considering the evidenceinthelightmostfavorabletoLyons,thisclaimshouldhavesurvived summary judgment. 2.Therewerematerialissuesof factregardingwhetherthebeneficiary declaration was proper and whether NWTScould rely on it Lyonsallegesmultipleissueswiththebeneficiarydeclaration.Becauseof these issues,Lyonsclaims NWTSdidnot haveproper proof that WellsFargowas the owner of the note and could direct NWTS toforeclose.Thus, Lyons alleges that NWTSviolatedRCW61.24.030(7)(a),whichrequiresthat"beforethenoticeof trustee's sale is recorded, transmitted, or served, the trustee shall have proof that the beneficiary istheowner of anypromissory noteorother obligation secured by the 6Theonly possibleevidence NWTSinvestigated isthat NWTStold Lyonsit hadspoken withCarringtonandCarringtonhaddirectedittocontinuethesale.But,itisunclearwhether NWTSactually did speak toCarrington since Carrington's records indicated that the property was not in foreclosureand Carrington denies ever instructing NWTS tocontinue with the sale. 13 Lyons v.U.S.Bank Nat'! Ass 'n,No.89132-0 deedof trust."The trialcourt determined therewerenoissuesof materialfactand grantedsummaryjudgment.Wedisagreeandfindthatwhenconsideringthe allegationsinfavorof Lyons,somematerialfactualissuesremain that necessitate the denial of summary judgment. Lyonsclaimsthat thesecondbeneficiarydeclarationwasdefectivebecause the language did not prove Wells Fargo, the beneficiary, was the owner,asrequired byRCW61.24.030(7)(a).Bainemphasizedthattheactrequiresatrusteetohave proof that thebeneficiaryistheactualownerof thenotetobeforeclosedon.175 Wn.2dat102(citingRCW61.24.030(7)(a)),111("If theoriginallenderhadsold the loan,[it]would need toestablish ownership of that loan, either by demonstrating thatitactuallyheldthepromissorynoteorbydocumentingthechainof transactions.").Seeking toforeclose without being a holder of the applicable note in violation of the DTA is actionable in a claim for damages under the CPA. I d.at 115-20. Althoughownershipcanbeprovedindifferentways,thestatuteitself suggestsoneway:"Adeclarationbythebeneficiarymadeunderthepenaltyof perjurystatingthat thebeneficiaryistheactualholderof thepromissory note... shallbesufficient proof asrequired under thissubsection."RCW61.24.030(7)(a). Typically, unless the trustee has violated a duty of good faith,it isentitled to rely on thebeneficiary'sdeclarationwheninitiatingatrustee'ssale.SeeRCW 14 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'l Ass 'n,No.89132-0 61.24.030(7)(b ).But if thereisanindication that thebeneficiarydeclaration might be ineffective, a trustee should verify its veracity before initiating a trustee's sale to comply with itsstatutory duty. TheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheWesternDistrictof Washington recentlydecided Beatonv.JPMorganChaseBank N.A.,No.C11-0872 RAJ,2013 WL1282225(Mar.26,2013)(courtorder),whereitinterpretedabeneficiary declaration similar tothe declaration in thiscase.It read,'" JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.successorininteresttoWashingtonMutualBankflmWashingtonMutual Bank, FA is the actual holder of the promissory note or other obligation evidencing theabove-referencedloanorhasrequisiteauthorityunderRCW62A.3-301to enforce said obligation."' ld.at *5.Thecourt held that this provision indicated that "Chasecouldbeanonholderinpossessionorapersonnotinpossessionwhois entitled toenforcetheinstrument neither of whichisproof that'the beneficiaryis the owner of any promissory note or other obligation secured by the deed of trust."' ld.(citationomitted)(quotingRCW61.24.030(7)(a)).BecauseDTAprovisions mustbestrictlycompliedwith,theambiguityregardingwhetherthebeneficiary declarationsatisfiedthestatutoryrequirementcreatedenoughof aquestionof whether there was a violation of the DTA tosurvive summary judgment in that case. I d.Lyons encourages the court toadopt the reasoning in Beaton. 15 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'! Ass 'n,No.89132-0 NWTSarguesthat Beatoniswronglydecidedandthatthelanguageof the beneficiary declaration,inconjunction with thestatutory requirementsof the DTA andcaselaw,isvalid.Notably,NWTSpointsout thata beneficiarydeclarationis nottheexclusivemannerinwhichatrusteecansatisfyRCW61.24.030(7).This declarationusesthephrase"or hasrequisiteauthority,"andonlyaholderhasthe requisiteauthoritytoactasabeneficiaryunderBain.CPat118.Sincerequisite authorityundertheDTAandWashingtoncaselawisstrictlylimitedtoaholder status,NWTSarguesboth clauses in the beneficiary declaration provide proof that Wells Fargo wasa holder for the purposes of RCW 61.24.030(7)( a). Because DT A provisions should be strictly construed, we find,consistent with Beaton,thatthedeclarationatissueheredoesnotcomplywithRCW 61.24.030(7)(a).Onitsface,it isambiguouswhether thedeclaration provesWells Fargoistheholderor whether WellsFargoisa nonholderinpossession or person notinpossession whoisentitled toenforcetheprovision under RCW62A.3-301. But NWTS,astrustee,can still prove that Wells Fargo was the owner of the notein awayotherthanthroughthebeneficiarydeclarationreferencedinRCW 61.24.030(7)(a).Thus,thereremainsamaterialissueof factastowhetherWells Fargo was the owner prior toinitiating the trustee's sale. NWTSwill need tofurnish that proof but may not just rely on this ambiguous declaration. 16 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'! Ass 'n,No.89132-0 Additionally,Lyonsclaimsthesecondbeneficiarydeclarationwasnever properbecauseoftheexistenceofthefirstbeneficiarydeclaration.Thefirst declaration identified Wells Fargo as trustee for Soundview, yet less than a year later Wells Fargo asserts that it is the holder. It is not entirely clear how Wells Fargo could giveitsinteresttoSoundviewandthengiveitbacktoitself eightmonthslater. Materialquestionsof factremainastowhether thesecond beneficiarydeclaration wasvalidandwhetherNWTSshouldhavequestioneditsefficacyinlightof the priorbeneficiarydeclaration.TakingthefactsinalightmostfavorabletoLyons, summary judgment was inappropriate and a cause of action under the CPA could be supported. C.Noissuesof factremainfortheclaimof intentionalinflictionof emotional distress,sosummary judgment was proper Lyonsalsoallegesaclaimforthetortofoutrage,otherwiseknownas intentional infliction of emotional distress. "The tort of outrage requires the proof of threeelements:(1)extremeandoutrageousconduct,(2)intentionalorreckless infliction of emotional distress,and (3)actual result toplaintiff of severe emotional distress." Kloepfel v.Bokor,149 Wn.2d 192,195,66 P.3d 630 (2003). "The question of whether certain conduct issufficiently outrageous isordinarily for the jury, but it isinitially for the court to determine if reasonable minds could differ on whether the conduct was sufficiently extreme to result in liability." Dicomes v.State,113Wn.2d 612, 630, 782 P.2d 1002 (1989); see Robel v.Roundup Corp.,148Wn.2d 35,51,59 17 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'! Ass 'n,No.89132-0 P.3d611(2002)."Thefirstelementrequiresproofthattheconductwas'so outrageousincharacter,andsoextremeindegree,astogobeyondallpossible boundsof decency,andtoberegardedasatrocious,andutterlyintolerableina civilizedcommunity."'Robel,148Wn.2dat51(emphasisomitted)(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dicomes,113Wn.2d at 630). Conduct during foreclosurecould support a claim for intentional infliction of emotionaldistress,butitmustsatisfythehighburdenapplicabletotheseclaims. RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS46,cmt.d(1965);compareMontgomeryv. SOMAFin.Corp.,No.C13-360 RAJ,2014WL2048183,at *7(W.D.Wash.May 19, 2014) (court order) (plaintiffs alleged that the bank induced them to default, then foreclosedonthepropertyusingaperjureddeclaration;thecourtfoundthat reasonable minds could differ asto whether thisegregious conduct wassufficiently outrageous and so the claim survived summary judgment), with Vawter, 707 F. Supp. 2dat1128("Chase'sandMERS 'sactionsinconnectionwiththenonjudicial foreclosureprocess,asallegedbytheVawters,maybeproblematic,troubling,or evendeplorable"butisinsufficientlyoutrageousforanintentionalinflictionof emotional distressclaim),and McGinley v.Am.Home Mortg.Serv.,Inc.,No.2:10-CV-01157 RJB, 2010 WL 4065826, at *11(W.D. Wash. Oct.15, 2010) (court order) (claim resting on alleged nondisclosures associated with loan refinance, terms of the loan,andsubsequentnonjudicialforeclosureproceedingswasinsufficiently 18 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'! Ass 'n,No.89132-0 outrageoustosurvivesummaryjudgment),andCervantesv.CountrywideHome Loans,Inc.,656F.3d1034,1046(2011)("plaintiffsessentiallyallegethatthe lendersoffered themloansthat thelendersknewtheycouldnot repay;thisisnot inherently'extremeandoutrageous"'),andWellsv.ChaseHomeFin.,LLC,No. C10-5001RJB, 2010 WL 4858252, at *8(W.D.Wash. Nov.19, 2010) (court order). Tosupportherclaimforintentionalinflictionof emotionaldistress,Lyons relieson thesamefactualallegationsabove.Sheclaims that theconduct of NWTS innotconfirmingtheproperbeneficiaryandinnotsuspendingthetrustee'ssale when she contacted them wassooutrageous as togobeyond all bounds of decency. But theseallegationsarenotsooutrageousthattheyshocktheconscienceorgo beyond all sense of decency. While perhaps the actions might have violated the DTA and could support a claim under the CPA, the actsare not sufficiently outrageous to support a claim foroutrage.Weaffirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. IV.CONCLUSION If a trustee's sale has not occurred,anallegedly wronged homeowner cannot bringadamagesclaimundertheDTA.Howeverevenif atrustee'ssalehasnot occurred, an allegedly wronged homeowner can bring a claim for damages under the CPA.Materialissuesof fact remainastowhether NWTSviolated the CPA by not actingingoodfaithorbyimproperlyrelyingonaquestionablebeneficiary 19 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'! Ass 'n,No.89132-0 declaration.Weaffirmthecourt'sgrant of summary judgment infavorof NWTS fortheDTAand intentionalinfliction of emotionaldistressclaims.Wereverse the grant of summary judgment on the CPA claim and remand to the trial court. 20 Lyons v.US.Bank Nat'l Ass 'n,No.89132-0 WE CONCUR: 21