Bolivar and the Caudillos Author(s): John Lynch Source: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Feb., 1983), pp. 3-35 Published by: Duke University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2515357 Accessed: 14/10/2008 10:21 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=duke . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Duke University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Hispanic American Historical Review. http://www.jstor.org
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8/3/2019 LYNCH Bolivar and the Caudillos (HAHR 1983)
Bolivar and the CaudillosAuthor(s): John LynchSource: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Feb., 1983), pp. 3-35Published by: Duke University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2515357
Accessed: 14/10/2008 10:21
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
Hispanic AmnericanHistorical Review63(1), 1983, 3-35Copyright ?) 1983 by Duke University Press
Bolivar and the Caudillos
JOHN LYNCH*
1
I NDEPENDENCE imposed many roles upon SimonBolivar.He was a military planner and a field commander, a po-
litical philosopher and a maker of constitutions, a liberator
of peoples and a founder of republics. He had to deal not only with
royalist enemies but with foreign friends and anarchic followers. He also
had to control the caudillos, to tame the guerrillas and their leaders
within the revolutionary ranks. The wars of independence in northern
South America incorporated two processes, the constitutionalism of Bo-
livar and the caudillism of the regions, and they were fought with twoarms, regular forces and local guerrillas. These movements were part
allies, part rivals. To compete and rule in such circumstances a soldier
had to be a politician. Bolivar sought power as well as freedom; he wanted
to rule as well as to liberate.' But power did not come easily to him.
He began with obvious assets. His family, education, and status madehim a natural leader in the society of the time. He was one of the richest
men in Venezuela, the owner of four haciendas, two houses in Caracas,
another in La Guaira, and the master of numerous slaves. His private
property gave him a firm power base, until, of course, it was confiscated.
His losses early in the revolution amounted to 80,000 pesos, the largest
single confiscation made by the royalists. Bolivar's total wealth probably
amounted to at least 200,000 pesos, though at the end of his life he had
little more than the unrealized assets of the Aroa copper mines.2
In the primitive warfare of the llanos and among the mass of the
* The author is Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies and Professor of
Latin American History in the University of London.
1. Gerhard Masur, Simon Bolivar (Albuquerque, 1948), p. 184.2. Vicente Lecuna, Catdlogo de errores y caluinnias en la historia de Bolivar, 3 vols.
(New York, 1956-58), I, 157-159; Stephen K. Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, 1815-1820 (Columbus, 1974), p. 163; Paul Verna, Las minas del Libertador (Caracas, 1977), pp.179-181.
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insurgents, these advantagescounted for little. Bolivar belonged to anotherworld, another culture. The incongruity of his position is illustrated in a
story told by the English observer Richard Vowell. In 1817, after the loss
of Calabozo, the patriot officer Manuel Cedefio reached San Fernandoin disgrace, to be met by mutinous llaneros. Jose Antonio P'aez,caudillo
of the western llanos, "who knew how to make himself feared and re-
spected by the soldiers," ended the tumult with a few words and per-
sonally rescued Cedenio. To show who was in command, he had theringleaders arrested, though they included officers from his personal fol-
lowing. Thus the movement was stifled owing to the "irresistible ascend-
ancy" of P'aezover the llaneros. Bolivar meanwhile had shut himself in
his house with his aides and secretaries, and when night fell, he em-barked discreetly on a boat for Angostura, conscious perhaps that withouthis own troops he was powerless among the llaneros, who only obeyed
their personal chief.3
One of Bolivar's greatest achievements was to overcome his innate
disadvantages, to improve his qualifications for leadership, and to gain
for himself the power necessary to fulfill his task. To do this, he had todominate a series of lesser rivals for leadership. He was not an absolute
enemy of the caudillos; in a sense he took them for granted as inevitable
and even useful. Individually a regional caudillo was probably no morethan a minor irritant. Collectively they were a majorhazard to the cause
and the career of the Liberator.
2
The caudillo was a regional chieftain, deriving his power from control
of local resources, especially of haciendas, which gave him access to men
and supplies. Classical caudillism took the form of armed patron-client
bands, held together by personal ties of dominance and submission andby a common desire to obtain wealth by force of arms. The caudillo'sdomain might grow from local to national dimensions. Here, too, su-
preme power was personal, not institutional; competition for;offices andresources was violent and the achievements were rarely permanent. The
caudillo is recognized in profile by historiansand social scientists, thoughsome of his features remain obscure.4 The structural interpretation is
useful but static and lacks the realism of chronology and prosopography;
nor does it allow sufficiently for distinct stages of development, when
3. Richard Vowell, Cainpaias y cruceros (Caracas, 1973), pp. 65-66.4. Eric R. Wolf and Edward C. Hansen, "Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis,"
ComlparativeStudcliesn Society and History, 9 (1966-67), 168-179.
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caudillism existed in embryo, then in incipient or partial form, before
culminating in the major figures of caudillo history.
The colony was not propitious for caudillism. The Spanish empire wasgoverned by an anonymous bureaucracy, and while personalism may
have been important in patronage, it had little place in government or
policy-making, both of which were highly institutionalized. On the mar-
gin of colonial society, however, caudillo prototypes made their appear-
ance. In Venezuela land concentration in the llanos resulted in the for-
mation of vast hatos ("ranches")owned by powerful proprietors who came
to assert private property rights. The hunting activity of the llaneros,
hitherto regarded as common usage, was now defined as rustling and
condemned as delinquency. In self-defense many llaneros grouped them-selves into bands under chieftains, to live by violence and plunder; the
frontiers of rural life came under the control of bandits, and some areas
were in a permanent state of rebellion. While they were an affront to
colonial law and order, however, bandit leaders did not operate beyond
their locality, nor did they pose a political threat.
The caudillo was essentially a product of the wars of independence,
when the colonial state was disrupted, institutions were destroyed, and
social groups competed to fill the vacuum.5 There was now a progression
from llanero, to vagrant, to bandit, to guerrilla fighter, as local proprietorsor new leaders sought to recruit followers. While such bands might enlist
under one political cause or another, the underlying factors were still
rural conditions and personal leadership. The countryside was soon im-
poverished by destruction, and people were ruined by war taxes and
plunder. As the economy reached breaking point, so men were forced
into bands for subsistence under a chieftain who could lead them to
booty. Thus, banditry was a product of rural distress and a cause of it,
and, in the early years of the war, delinquency was stronger than ide-
ology.
It is not uncommon to observe in these vast territories groups ofbandits who, without any political motivation and with desire ofpillage their only incentive, come together and follow the firstcaudillo who offers them booty taken from anyone with property.This is how Boves and other bandits of the same kind have beenable to recruit hordes of these people, who live by vagrancy, rob-bery, and assassination.
5. Robert L. Gilmore, Cauclillisrnand Militarism in Venezuela, 1810-1910 (Athens,Ohio, 1964), pp. 47, 69-70, 107.
6. "Reflexiones sobre el estado actual de los Ilanos," Dec. 6, 1813, cited in GermanCarrera Dainas, Boves, aspectos socio-econ6micos de su accion historica (Caracas, 1968),
p. 158.
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Pillage was characteristic of the caudillo system, a method of waging
war used by both sides in default of regular revenue. There were varia-
tions of looting-confiscation of enemy property, taking of provisions,
forced loans, donations, and fines.7 The small bands of guerrillas who
harassed the royalist lines of communications lived by looting. The sei-
zure of booty was also authorized or tolerated by the major chieftains,
and by Bolivar himself. At the first battle of Carabobo (1814), it was
reported, "the booty was immense," and soldiers held triumphantly in
their hands not only articles of war, but money, equipment, and personal
property of royalist officers.8 Looting, therefore, while practiced in a
crude form by caudillos, was not exclusive to them. In a disguised, in-
direct, or even direct form, it was the only way of paying an army or ofacquiring resources for the war effort. In the Guayanacampaign of 1817,
the patriot army simply looted the Caroni Missions and traded the pro-
ceeds in the West Indies for war supplies. In justification Bolivar invoked
the imperatives of war, which forced him to take terrible but vital mea-
sures. In effect, a revolutionary state without revenue had to impose an
informal tax system. This was done in other campaigns, too, when ex-
actions, forced loans, and fines were levied with an arbitrarinesshardly
different from that of the caudillos. And some of Bolivar'sown caudillos
used methods just as cruel as those of any royalist. Juan Bautista Aris-mendi offered JuanAndres Marrerothe chance to buy the lives of himself
and his six sons; after taking the ransom, Arismendi had them all killed.9
Plunder and resources were not the only objectives of the guerrillas.
Bolivar was intensely aware of the deep racialdivisions in Venezuela and
of the reckless exploitation of race prejudice by both sides in the conflict.
Jose Francisco Heredia, creole regent of the Audiencia of Caracas, spoke
of the "mortal hatred" between whites and pardos in Valencia during the
First Republic, and commented: "The guerrilla band that later joined
the king's side encouraged this rivalry, and it was commonly said by theEuropean extremists that the pardos were loyalists and the white creoles
were revolutionaries whom it was necessary to destroy." This was the
policy, he added, of Jose Tom'asBoves and other bandit chiefs, nominally
royalists but in fact "insurgents of another kind," who waged war on all
white creoles: "and so he became the idol of the pardos, who followed
him in the hope of seeing the dominant caste destroyed. "'10When Boves
7. Carrera Damas, Boves, pp. 56, 73.
8. Gazeta de Caracas, No. 73, June 6, 1814.9. JtuanVicente Gonzalez, La doctrina conservadora, Juan Vicente Gonzalez, El pen-
sartnientopolitico venezolano del siglo xix, 2 vols. (Caracas, 1961), I, 179.10. Jose Francisco Heredia, Mernorias del Regente Hereclia (Madrid, n.d.), pp. 41-
51, 239.
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occupied and plundered Valencia in June 1814, the Spanish authorities
looked on helplessly; when he took Caracas, he refused to recognize the
captain general or to have his lianero forces incorporated into the royalarmy." His was a personal authority, expressing violence rather thanlegitimacy, and loyal to only a very distant king. Bolivar was acutely
conscious of these developments. He noticed that royalist caudillos in-
cited slaves and pardos to plunder in order to increase their commitment,morale, and group cohesion. 12
But race consciousness also existed among the insurgents. In the
struggle for Maturin in May 1815, the royalist commander Domingo
Monteverde was defeated and his life was saved only by the cover given
him by his zambo servant, "for the insurgents would not fire on thehoinbres de color." 13 The insurgent chieftain in this action was the pardo
Manuel Piar, and Bolivar was to suffer from Piar an insubordination not
dissimilar to that which the royalists experienced from Boves.
3
After the collapse of the First Republic in July 1812, Venezuela under-
went a royalist reaction. This was challenged in the course of 1813 by
two movements, an invasion under Bolivar from the west and the onsetof guerrilla operations in the east. Who were the guerrillas?
The first guerrilla thrust had a social and regional base but also a clear
political objective: to resist the oppressive regime of Monteverde and
fight for a free Venezuela. When, on January 11, 1813, Santiago Mariiio
headed a small expedition, the famous "forty-five" rom Trinidadto Gui-
ria, he led forth his band from his hacienda like a true caudillo, to operate
in territory where he had property, relations, and dependents. Mariiio
was no social bandit. Like Bolivar he came from the colonial elite and he
sought to mobilize social forces, not to change them. 14 At first he was alocal rather than a regional caudillo, but he quickly increased his stature
through military success and reputation. Yet he never acquired the na-
tional, much less the American, vision of Bolivar. He argued that it was
necessary to conquer and hold the east as a precondition of liberating the
11. Jose de Austria, Bosquejo de la historia inilitar de Ventezuela, 2 vols. (Madrid,1960), II, 256.
12. Bolivar to Gaceta Real dejamnaica,Sept. 1815, in Sim6n Bolivar, Obras completas,ed. by Vicente Lecuna an-dEsther Barret de Nazaris, 2d ed., 3 vols. (Havana, 1950), I,
180.13. Heredia, Memnorias, . 172.14. CaIacciolo Parra-P6rez,Marinioy la independencia de Veniezuela,5 vols. (Madrid,
1954-57), I, 134-138. The same is true of many other caudillos, such as Monagas, Valdes,Rojas, and Zaraza.
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west. P'aez, on the other hand, maintained that the western front was
the crucial battlefield; victory there would have enabled the royal army
to defeat the eastern caudillos one by one, and thus "the fate of therepublic was at stake in the llanos of Apure."15 The strength of the cau-
dillos lay in their tactical rather than strategic sense. Without Bolivar,
the various regional fronts could not have joined into a national or con-
tinental liberation movement.
Moreover, this particular asset of the caudillos, a regional base for
raising troops, was also a limitation. These troops, as Bolivar complained,
were reluctant to leave their own province, and the caudillos were un-
willing or unable to compel them. At the beginning of 1818, troops of
Francisco Bermuidezrefused to proceed to Guayana. In December 1818even Mariiio was powerless to persuade his men to follow him out of the
province, and he arrived at Pao not at the head of a division as Bolivar
was expecting, but with an escort of thirty men. 16 Insubordination was a
further constraint. In 1819 Mariiio was styled General-in-Chief of the
Army of the East, and "responsible to the Government for the conser-
vation of all that part of the Republic," but in fact he exercised no com-
mand at all over Bermuidez or other minor caudillos. Insubordination
began directly below Bolivar. In 1820 Marifio refused to obey Bolivar's
summons to headquartersand retired in disgust to his hacienda in Giiiria,where he had resources, security, and a guardof loyal retainers: formerly
his troops, now his peons. 17
Yet the guerrillas kept the cause of independence alive during the
long years of counterrevolution. In the course of 1814-16, a number of
bands emerged under leaders who were to become indispensable to Bo-
livar:Pedro Zaraza n the upper llanos, Jose Antonio P'aez n the western
llanos, Manuel Cedenioin Caicara, Jose Tadeo Monagasin Cuman'a,Jesus
Berreto and Andres Rojas in Maturin. These groups rose from the ruins
of the Second Republic. The surviving patriots fled to the plains, jungles,and forests of the east to escape royalistretribution. They then regroupedunder a leader of their choice, partly for self-preservation, partly for the
revolutionary cause. 18 For a guerrilla to surrender or to be captured was
to walk into execution. In this sense emancipation was the only option
left to them. Groups converged and coalesced, until they found a super-
caudillo. Armed with ptias ("lances"),and taking their horses and cattle
15. Jose Antonio Paez, Autobiografla del General Jose Antonio Paez, 2 vols. (Caracas,
1973), I, 109.16. Parra-Perez, Marinio, III, 40.
17. Ibid., III, 242.18. Daniel Florencio O'Leary, Metnorias del General Daniel Floi-encio O'Leary. Na-
rraci6n, 3 vols. (Caracas, 1952), I, 350.
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from the Ilanos of Barcelona and Cumana, the guerrillas fought success-
fully against regular forces, attacking communications, ambushing de-
tachments, harassing towns, and then disappearing. They pinned downroyalist forces in a number of different places and forced the Spaniards
to maintain immobile garrisons.The guerrillas not only fought the royalists but also competed with
each other. Leader rivalry sometimes obstructed the war effort, as cau-
dillos struggled with each other for that supremacy which only military
success and the attraction of recruits could bring. No caudillo wanted to
submit to another; each fought to remain independent, in a state of nature
without a common power. Out of this internal war emerged the most
powerful leaders: Monagas, Zaraza, Cedenio, Piar. This was in the east.Leadership in the western llanos demanded supreme physical talents,
and it was this challenge which brought P'aezto the fore:
To command these men and dominate the situation was neededa particular superiority and talent in using the lance with bothhands, to fight on wild horses and to break them in during actualbattle, to swim and to fight while swimming in swollen rivers, tolasso and kill wild beasts simply to get food, in short, to have theability to dominate and overcome a thousand and more dangers
which threaten in these conditions.20
Bolivar, too, possessed extraordinary natural talents and learned to
compete with the caudillos on their own terms. He, who decreed war to
the death against Spaniards, was no less ruthless than the caudillos. His
record of active service was in no way inferior to theirs. His aide, General
Daniel Florencio O'Leary, was struck by the contrast between his slight
physique and his powers of endurance: "After a day's march, enough to
exhaust the most robust man, I have seen him work five or six hours, or
dance as long."2'
Bolivar, however, was distinguished above all by themagic of his leadership. He conquered nature as well as men, overcoming
the immense distances of America in marches which were as memorable
as the battles. He conquered, too, his own origins, widening the social
base of the revolution to appeal to slaves and gente de color.
Yet Bolivar was never a caudillo.22 He always sought to institutionalize
the revolution and to lead it to a political conclusion. The solution that
19. Fernando Rivas Vicufia, Las guterrasde Bolivar, 7 vols. (Bogota, 1934-38; Santia-go, 1940), II, 85-95.
20. Austria, Historia tinilitarde Venezuela, II, 454-456.21. O'Leary, Narraci6n, I, 492.22. For other interpretations, see Masur, Simrzon olivar, p. 253, and Jorge I. Do-
minguez, Inisurrection or Loyalty: The Breakdown of the Spanish AmiiericanEmlpire(Cam-bridge, Mass., 1980), pp. 197-198, 226-227.
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never became a caudillo, never acquired partidarios or made compro-
inisos binding him to a certain band. He was the complete professional
soldier, later an official, executing always the orders of the central gov-ernment.26 But the supreme example of the noncaudillo was Antonio Jose
de Sucre. As a young man, Sucre in 1813 accompanied the expedition of
Marifioand fought in a number of important actions; but unlike his col-
leagues Manuel Piar, Jose Francisco Bermudez, and Manuel Valdes, he
did not aspire to be an independent chieftain. He came from a wealthy
Cumanafamily and had received an education in Caracas. He was inter-
ested in the technology of warfare and became an expert in military
engineering. "He reduced everything to a method . .. he was the scourge
of disorder," as Bolivar later wrote of him.27 He served as an officer inthe Army of the East for four years, and came under the influence of
Bolivar in 1817, accepting appointment to the Liberator's staff in pref-
erence to the factions of the east.
Decisions of this kind were a question of mentality and values. Sucre
had a soldier's respect for obedience to authority. In placing his interests
and career in Bolivar's hands, he added, "I am resolved to obey you
blindly and with pleasure."28 Sucre did not love fighting for fighting's
sake, as did so many caudillos. He preferred people to join the patriot
cause out of conviction, and by October 1820 he was satisfied that westernVenezuela was convinced: "This triumph of opinion is more brilliant than
that of force."29 Sucre was aware of the alternatives: caudillism or profes-
sionalism. In 1817, when acting for Bolivar to "bring in" Marinio,he
reported: "I have no doubt that General Marifio will come to heel, as he
has no alternative, except to be a guerrilla in the mountains of Gijiria."30
His obedience to Bolivar never faltered. When Francisco Antonio Zea,
vice-president of Venezuela, promoted him to the rank of brigadier gen-
eral, without Bolivar's cognizance, Sucre explained later "that he had
never intended to accept the promotion without General Bolivar's ap-proval. 31 In Peru he was "the right arm of the Liberatorand the mainstay
of the army. 32 Sucre and Urdaneta were the leading lights of the Boli-
varians, an elite of professional officers devoted to the Liberator in war
and to his government in peace.
26. See Rafael Urdaneta, Metmoriasdel General Rafael Urdaneta (Madrid, n.d.).27. "Resumnenucinto de la vida del General Sucre," 1825, Archivo de Sucre (Caracas,
1973- ), I, xli.
28. Sucre to Bolivar, Oct. 17, 1817, ibid., I, 12.29. Sucre to Santander, Oct. 30, 1820, ibid., I, 186.30. Sucre to Bolivar, Oct. 17, 1817, ibid., I, 12.31. O'Leary, Narraci6n, II, 68.32. Ibid., II, 252.
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anarchy."46Piar represented regionalism, personalism, and Black revo-
lution. Bolivar stood for centralism, constitutionalism, and race harmony.
He later commented:The death of General Piar was a political necessity which savedthe country, for otherwise he would have started a war of pardosagainst whites, leading to the extermination of the latter and thetriumph of the Spaniards. General Marinioalso deserved to diebecause of his dissidence, but he was not so dangerous and there-fore policy could yield to humanity and even to an old friendship. ...never was there a death more useful, more politic, and atthe same time more deserved.47
The claim had a certain justification. Bolivar simultaneously warned andreassured the creole caudillos.
5
Bolivar now took his campaign for supremacy a stage further. With
the authority and resources won from the victory in Guayana, he began
to impose a unified army structure on the caudillos, to institutionalize
the army, and to establish a clear chain of command. The decree of
September 24, 1817, marked the beginning of his campaign against per-
sonalism and for professionalism. This created the General Staff"for the
organization and direction of the armies," a Staff for the whole army, and
one for each division. The Staff was part of a career structure open to
talent; it was also the source of command, instructions, and orders down-
ward to commanders, officers, and troops.48
The caudillos became generals and regional commanders; their hordes
became soldiers and subject to military discipline defined at the center.
Reform extended to recruitment. Commanders were given quotas and
encouraged to seek troops beyond their original constituencies. Bolivar
fought against regionalism and immobility, and projected a Venezuelan
army with a national identity:
The frequent desertion of soldiers from one division to another onthe pretext of being natives of the province where their chosendivision is operating, is a cause of disorder and insubordination inthe army and encourages a spirit of regionalism which we havetried so hard to destroy. All Venezuelans ought to have the same
46. Bolivar, Manifesto to the peoples of Venezuela, Aug. 5, 1817, ibid., X, 337.47. L. Peru de Lacroix, Diario de Bucuramanga, ed. by N. E. Navarro (Caracas, 1949),
p. 108.48. Decree, Sept. 24, 1817, Escritos, XI, 94-95.
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he had so recently recognized. And Bolivar, for his part, was too
shrewd and tactful to exasperate the violent and impetuous Paez.62
Bolivar still understood the limits of his authority and his dependence
on the resources of individual chieftains in his army. O'Leary compared
it to the relation between monarchs and powerful feudal barons in me-
dieval Europe. In preparing to invade New Granada, Bolivar was careful
to avoid trouble from the caudillos, aware of the danger behind him as
well as of the enemy ahead.
Bolivar led a trained army into New Granada, and the victory of
Boyac'a in August 1819 set the seal of success on his authority and his
strategy. Meanwhile, in Venezuela, the caudillos were engaged in smaller
operations, not always successfully and rarely in agreement among them-
selves. P'aez ignored specific instructions from Bolivar to move toward
Cuicuta and cut the enemy communications with Venezuela.63 Marifio
failed to link up with Bermuidez. Urdaneta was obliged to take Arismendi
prisoner for insubordination. And the caudillos now vented their hostility
not directly on Bolivar but on the government in Angostura, especially
the vice-president, Francisco Antonio Zea, who was a civilian, a Grana-
dine, and a political weakling, qualities held in little respect by Vene-
zuelan caudillos.64 They forced Zea to resign, Congress elected Arismendi
in his place, and he in turn appointed Mariiio general-in-chief, based at
Maturin. Thus in the course of September 1819 the caudillos staged a
comeback, expressing and exploiting Venezuelan nationalism in a way
which was a warning for the future. But this victory was only temporary,
for the news of Boyac'a was already undermining the rebellion; Bolivar
was now powerful enough to overlook it and to post Arismendi and Ber-
murdez to military commands in the east. 65 His next task was to end the
war in Venezuela and prepare for a postwar settlement.
6
The Carabobo campaign was important not only for the defeat of the
Spaniards but also for the further integration of the caudillos into a na-
tional army. As divisional commanders, they led their troops out of their
homelands to serve under a commander-in-chief whom they had so often
repudiated in the past. To bring the republican army to its most effective
position at the right time in the course of June 1821-this marked true
62. O'Leary, Narraci6n, I, 461.63. Ibid., I, 552-555.64. Bolivar to Santander, July 22, 1820, Obras comipletas, I, 479.65. Rivas Vicufia, Las guerras de Bolivar, IV, 152-155.
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as this seemed the only realistic way to govern Venezuela, by a systemof power applied from strong personal domains. The professional mllilitary
he kept with him for his campaigns outside Venezuela, for they weremore mobile than the caudillos, more useful as officers, and less moti-
vated by political ambitions. But after the war, their only base was the
professional army, their career was the revolution, while the caudillo had
come to represent basic economic and political interests that were vir-
tually unchallengeable by the Bolivarians. Meanwhile, the civilian leg-islatorshad begun to resent the military, both caudillos and professionals,
and to attacktheir claims upon resources. The House of Representatives
in Bogota sought to remove the military fuero and abolish the right of
soldiers to vote in 1825. O'Leary thought they were going too far andtoo fast, for the soldiers had won the war and the republic still needed
them. In Colombia, he argued, men were everything, institutions noth-
ing:
The government was still sustained through the influence andpower of the caudillos who had made independence: institutionsby themselves had no force at all; the people were a machinewhich had ceased to function, being too ignorant to take action;what is known as public spirit did not exist. It was not politic,
therefore, to provoke so powerful a class [the caudillos] in soci-ety.68
If the war of independence was a struggle for power, it was also a
dispute over resources, and the caudillos fought for land as well as for
liberty. Bolivar was the first to acknowledge this and to provide economic
incentive as well as political access. His decree of September 3, 1817,ordered the confiscation by the state of all property and land of the
enemy, Americans as well as Spaniards, to be sold in public auction to
the highest bidder, or, failing that, to be rented out on behalf of thenational treasury.69The property was used not only as an immediate
income for the patriot government, but also as a source of land grants to
officers and soldiers of the republic according to their rank, promotion
being regarded as a gauge of service. The decree of October 10, 1817,ordered grants ranging from 25,000 pesos for a general-in-chief to 500
for an ordinary soldier.70 The scheme was confined to those who had
68. O'Leary, Narraci6n, II, 557.69. Decree, Sept. 3, 1817, Escritos, XI, 75-77; Universidad Central de Venezuela,
Materiales para el estudio de la cuesti6n agraria en Venezuela. Vol. 1. 1800-1830 (Caracas,1964), pp. 201-202.
70. Decree, Oct. 10, 1817, Escritos, XI, 219-221; La cuesti6n agraria en Venezuela,pp. 204-205.
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fought in the campaigns of 1816-19, and the intention, as Bolivar put it,
was "to make of each soldier a property-owning citizen."7t It was also
necessary to find a substitute for a salary.The caudillos were the first to benefit. One of the earliest grants, by
special request of Bolivar to the National Land Commission, was that to
General Cedeiio, to enable him to establish a hacienda in the sabanas of
Palmar.72 Even those out of favor were among the first recipients. The
Congress of Angostura in December 1819 confirmed the award of cacao
haciendas in Guiria and Yaguarapo to Mariiio and Arismendi.73 These
were properties confiscated from Spaniards. The government also grant-
ed certain old properties belonging to Spaniards to Urdaneta, Bermudez,
and Soublette, most of whom had entered the war of independence with-out any kind of property. From 1821, the caudillos were pressing their
claims for specific haciendas and lands directly on the executive, who
usually preferred to pass the requests to the land tribunals. The most
desirable properties were the commercial plantations in the north, many
of whose owners had, if only nominally, supported the cause of indepen-
dence and now fiercely resisted any attack on their property, even by
the caudillos.
P'aez was the most successful of all the caudillos. Yet P'aez had used
land as a medium of mobilization very early in his campaign.
When General P'aez occupied Apure in 1816 he found himself
alone in enemy territory . . . he was therefore forced to offer his
troops a free share in the properties belonging to the government
of Apure. This was one of the most effective ways of retaining the
support of the troops and attracting new recruits, as they all stood
the same chance of gaining.74
This policy did not materialize, for P'aez proved to be more interested in
his own acquisitions than in those of his men.Even before the end of the war in Venezuela, P'aez was granted "by
the General Congress the right to redistribute national properties as
President of the Republic," though it was confined to the army of Apure
and the territory under his jurisdiction. These special prerogatives were
delegated by Bolivar out of frustration over the failure of previous at-
tempts to redistribute land among the military.75 Before distribution,
71. Bolivar to Zaraza, Oct. 11, 1817, Escritos, XI, 227.
72. Bolivar to Land Commission, Dec. 3, 1817, La cuesti6n agraria en Venezuela, p.211.
73. Parra-Perez, Marinio, III, 225.74. Bricenio Mendez to Gual, July 20, 1821, O'Leary, Meinorias, XVIII, 399-400.75. Decree, Jan. 18, 1821, La cuesti6n agraria en Venezuela, pp. 282-283.
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however, P'aez acquired the best properties for himself. His holdings
were not restricted to the llanos, but extended into the center-north, the
homeland of the traditional oligarchy. He began to appropriate land ona large scale in the valleys of Aragua in October 1821, when he appliedfor ownership of the Hacienda de la Trinidad, one of the largest in the
area and previously the property of an einigrado, Antonio Fern'andezde
Leon, whose family had founded the estate in the eighteenth century.
He was awarded the property in November in exchange for the payment
of wages in arrears. He also succeeded in his bid for the Yagua ranch.76
A few years later, in 1825, he made an overtly generous offer to the vice-
president of Colombia to donate his land to the nation so that the troops
could be granted the land they had been promised in lieu of wages. Butthis gesture was purely demagogic: it enabled him to act as a patron and
retain the loyalty of the troops, while reserving the right to buy back the
debt vouchers, which were the first-and often the only-stage of a land
grant.7 These were the tactics of many caudillos, who offered the troops
sums of money (sometimes 50 or 60 pesos for vouchers worth 1,000) in
exchange for these land certificates, a notorious abuse which extended
throughout Venezuela and New Granada.
Acquisition of land and the formation of estates helped to keep the
caudillos in a state of contentment in the years immediately after inde-pendence and prevented them from turning their menacing gaze upon
the central oligarchy. A new elite of landowners, rewarded from seques-
tered property or from public land, joined the colonial proprietors andin some cases replaced them. According to Santander, under the law of
July 25, 1823, some 4,800,000 acres had been distributed or offered to
claimants in settlement of military pay, and more land was being sought
by Congress for such purposes from the national total of some 640,000,000
acres.78Meanwhile, the military, who had not received their due, com-
plained bitterly over the operations of the land commissions. From eastto west there were accusations of favoritism, inertia, and inefficiency. A
76. Soublette to Minister of Finance, Oct. 5, 1821, La cuesti6n agraria en Venezuela,pp. 311-312, 316-317; Manuel Perez Vila, "El gobierno deliberativo. Hacendados, comer-ciantes y artesanos frente a la crisis 1830-1848" in Fundaci6n John Boulton, Politica yeconoinia en Venezuela 1810-1976 (Caracas, 1976), pp. 44-45.
77. Paez to Santander, Feb.-Mar. 1825, La cuesti6n agraria en Venezuela, pp. 421-
422.78. Santander to Pedro Bricefio Mendez, Jan. 6, 1826, Santander to Montilla, Jan. 7,
1826, in Roberto Cortazar, ed., Cartas y nensajes del General Francisco de Paula Santan-
der and by a faction of shopkeepers at Bogota . . . . My impression is
that there are very few military men in the country that would not cheer-
fully cry out tomorrow, Long live King Bolivar .. 83 Whatever theaccuracy of this impression, it confirmed other indications that military
opinion placed all its hopes in Bolivar.
Bolivar's reaction to the rebellion of Paez was ambivalent. He did not
approve of military rebellion against civil power. Yet in this particular
case he had more sympathy with Paez than with Santander and the leg-
islators, whom he saw as destroying their liberators and causing resent-
ment among the military. He also knew that they were being unrealistic
in trying to deprive a caudillo of his military command. He did not wish
to become personally involved, for, if he failed, he risked his own au-thority. It was in this mood that he wrote his dramatic analysis of the
racial origins and the moral history of Americans and expressed his pref-
erence for an "able despotism." Given the socioracial formation of Amer-
ica, he asked, "Can we place laws above heroes and principles above
men?"84 Bolivar here recognized the force of personalism and the power
of the strongman, and gave it a structural explanation. It was in this
context, too, that he wrote to P'aez, admitting the danger of demoralizing
the army and provoking provinces into taking power unto themselves.
He denounced democrats and fanatics and asked, "Who shall restrain theoppressed classes? Slavery will break its yoke, each shade of complexion
will seek mastery."85 And the answer? In due course, it was his Bolivian
constitution with a life-term president empowered to appoint his succes-
sor. Meanwhile, the government had to maintain law and order "by
means of the press, the pulpit, and the bayonet."86 So Bolivar stood for
the continuation of Colombia under his dictatorship, exercised through
extraordinary powers which the constitution allowed him, and the rec-
onciliation of Venezuela through necessary reforms.
The conflict between centralism and federalism, therefore, containeda racial problem, or so Bolivar believed. He was aware that there were
strong objections to the choice of Bogota as capital, not least the fact of
its remoteness. But he argued that there was no alternative, "for though
Caracas appeared to be the more natural spot, from being more populous
and influential, yet the province was chiefly composed of people of color
who were jealous of and opposed to the white inhabitants, and it was
83. Sutherland to Canning, Maracaibo, Sept. 1, 1826, Sutherland to H. M. Charg6
d'affaires,Oct. 2, 1826, Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office (hereinafter cited asPRO, FO) 18/33.
84. Bolivar to Santander, July 8, 1826, Cartas, VI, 10-12.85. Bolivar to Paez, Aug. 4, 1826, ibid., VI, 32.86. Bolivar to Paez, Aug. 8, 1826, ibid., VI, 49-52.
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desirable consequently for the general tranquility to diminish rather than
augment the influence of Caracas."87 From the same facts the Venezuelan
ruling class drew precisely the opposite conclusion. They wanted proxi-mate power, even home rule, for Venezuela, "a very energetic and con-
centrated system in consequence of its containing a great diversity ofcolor."88Racial tension and pardo ambition required close supervision
and control, and the elite could not but support P'aez,because, like Juan
Manuel de Rosas in Buenos Aires, he was virtually the only leader whocould control the popular classes.
Bolivar moved into Venezuela in late 1826 to confront the rebellion
of P'aez.He warned the caudillo of his previous encounters with person-
alism.
General Castillo opposed me and lost; General Piar opposed meand lost; General Mariiio opposed me and lost; General Riva-Agiiero opposed me and lost; and General Torre Tagle opposedme and lost. It would seem that Providence condemns my per-sonal enemies, whether American or Spanish, to perdition. Butsee how far Generals Sucre, Santander, and Santa Cruz havegone. 89
He also made it clear that he went as president and not in a personal
capacity, pointing out that his was the only legitimate sovereignty in
Venezuela, whereas P'aez's command came from the municipalities and
was born in violence. Although he mobilized his forces, he did not want
further violence. He had come to save P'aez "from the crime of civil
war."90Conciliation was also favored by the majority opinion in both
countries. There was little alternative. Bolivar was aware of the dangerof trying to use force against P'aez,"since almost all the principal military
commands throughout Colombia are filled by natives of Caracas."9tSohe compromised. On January 1, 1827, he received P'aez's submission,
but at a price, namely, total amnesty for all the rebels, guarantees of
security in their offices and property, and promises of constitutional re-
form.
Bolivar governed Venezuela in person from Januaryto June 1827. He
incurred the most scathing criticism of Santander and his supporters for
leniency toward Paez and for unconstitutional tendencies. He confirmed
87. Ricketts to Canning, Lima, Feb. 18, 1826, C. K. Webster, ed., Britain aned heIndependence of Latin Amzerica, 1812-1830. Select Documnents rom the Foreign Office
Archives, 2 vols. (London, 1938), I, 530.88. Ker Porter to Canning, Apr. 9, 1827, PRO, FO 18/47.89. Bolivar to Paez, Dec. 11, 1826, Cartas, VI, 119-120.90. Bolivar to Paez, Dec. 23, 1826, ibid., VI, 133-134.91. Watts to Bidwell, Aug. 5, 1826, PRO, FO 18/31.
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he alone commanded respect, and Colombia needed what O'Learycalled
"the magic of his prestige" to restore government and stability.96Yet
even when he exercised absolute power in 1828-30, Bolivar did not rulelike a caudillo or a despot; his dictatorship responded to no particular
social or regional interest, and his respect for the rule of law did not
desert him. In 1829 he rejected a project to establish a monarchy in
Colombia, presented to him without previous consultation.97He did not
substantially extend his extraordinary powers. There was a decree on
conspiracy(February 20, 1828) already in existence, but it was not effec-
tively applied, and he himself was the victim of an assassinationattempt
on September 25, 1828. This was not a caudillo-type conspiracy, much
less a mass revolt, but an attempted coup designed to overthrow Bolivar.The moving spirit behind it was Santander, and the agents were Grana-
dine army officers. Condemned to death by military tribunal, Santander
was pardoned by Bolivar on the advice of his ministers, advice he bitterly
resented. Piar, Padilla, and others had died for the crime of rebellion,
so why should Santander escape? Bolivar dreaded above all the resent-
ment of the pardos. "Those of the same class as Piar and Padillawill say,
and justifiably, that I have shown weakness only in favorof this infamous
white, whose services do not compare with those of these famous pa-
triots."98
The dictatorship of Bolivar had support from the Bolivariansand the
caudillos alike. In 1828 Sucre advised him that the people were disillu-
sioned with written guarantees and theoretical liberty, and only wanted
security of their persons and property, protected by a strong government.
A year later Sucre added:
I will always be sorry that in order to obtain this internal peaceand stability you have not made use of your dictatorial power to
give Colombia aconstitution, which would have been sustained
by the army, the cause of so many revolts against the laws. Whatthe people want is peace and guarantees; as for the rest, I do notbelieve that they dispute for principles or political theories, whichhave caused so much damage to their right of property and se-curity.99
P'aez recognized the dictatorship promptly and considered it the best
solution against the factionalism of the military and the mischief of the
96. O'Leary, Narraci6n, II, 601.97. Joaquin Posada Gutierrez, Memorias hist6rico-politicas, 4 vols. (Bogota, 1929), I,
283-284, 310-325.98. Bolivar to Bricefio M6ndez, Nov. 16, 1828, Cartas, VIII, 117-118.99. Sucre to Bolivar, Oct. 7, 1829, O'Leary, Mernorias, I, 557.
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16, 1829, the Ministry of the Interior issued Bolivar's celebrated circular
letter (August 31, 1829) authorizing, indeed ordering, that public meet-
ings be held where the citizens could give their opinion on a new formof government and the future organization of Colombia. 103 This was for
Congress to determnine, but the elected deputies were to attend Congress
not as free agents but as delegates mandated by written instructions. So
Bolivar sought the will of the people and undertook to be bound by it,
for good or for ill. 104 But were the people free to express their will? Would
not the caudillos control or intimidate the assemblies? Bolivar's closest
friends and advisers had grave reservations about this procedure. Sucre
advised him to reduce it to the simple right of petition; otherwise, the
right to give binding instructions "will revive local pretensions." 105Indeed, the separatists immediately exploited these meetings to se-
cure the opinions they wanted. Representation could not in itself frustrate
caudillism. In Caracas the meeting of the people on November 25, 1829,
was preceded on the night before by a meeting of 400 leading citizens
in the house of the caudillo Arismendi, and with other generals present,
who pronounced for the independence of Venezuela and against Bolivar.
Another example of pressure was given in a complaint from the town of
Escuque to General Paez against the procedures adopted by the military
commander of the district of Trujillo, Colonel Cegarra.
Even the popular assemblies have been the occasion of his inso-
lence, since he has insisted that the citizens sign not what has
been said and agreed in their meetings, but various papers which
he himself has written in his own home, threatening with violence
those who refused to obey. Is this freedom, Sir? Can a people
speak freely when at the very time of their assembly they see a
squadron of cavalry and a company of fusiliers forming up in the
main square? If the papers which Sr. Cegarra wanted us to sign
had contained fair and reasoned complaints, then our approvalmight have been sought at an opportune moment. But to require
us to subscribe to a lot of insults, abuse, and insolence against
General Bolivar does not seem proper, for we have always be-
lieved that we could reject his authority yet treat him with re-
spect. 106
Most of the towns and districts of Venezuela pronounced for indepen-
103. Jose Gil Fortoul, Historia constitucional de Venezuela, 2d ed., 3 vols. (Caracas,1930), I, 650-663.
104. Bolivar to Paez, Mar. 25, 1829, Obras cotinpletas,III, 157-158.105. Sucre to Bolivar, Sept. 17, 1829, O'Leary, Meinorias, I, 552.106. Francisco A. Labastidato Paez, Feb. 23, 1830, Secretaria del Interioi y Justicia,
TomnoV, Boletini del Archivo Nacional (Caracas),10, 37 (1929), 49-50.
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