Lupong Barangay Cases

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G.R. No. 111416 September 26, 1994

FELICIDAD UY, petitioner,vs.

HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court,Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, ProvincialProsecutor of Pasig, Metro Manila; SUSANNA ATAYDE and WINNIEJAVIER, respondents.

Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is

the order dated 2 July 1993 of public respondent Judge Maximo C.

Contreras of Branch 61 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati,

Metro Manila, denying the petitioner's motion to dismiss Criminal Cases

Nos. 145233 and 145234 for slight physical injuries. The motion to dismiss

is based on the failure of the private respondents, as the offended parties

therein, to comply with Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 and Section 18 of the

1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure requiring prior referral of

disputes to the Lupong Tagapamayapaof the proper barangay.

At the outset, it must be stated that were it not for the importance of theissue to be resolved in the light of the revised law on katarungang

pambarangayprovided for in the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.

No. 7160) which took effect on 1 January 1992,1this Court would have

declined to accept the invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue the

extraordinary writ prayed for. We have already ruled that while it is true

that this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have

concurrent original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,

prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, such

concurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of

the court to which application therefor may be directed. There is a

hierarchy of courts determinative of the venue of appeals which shouldalso serve as a general determinant of the proper forum for the application

for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for this judicial hierarchy by

the petitioner and her lawyers ought to have led them to file the petition

with the proper Regional Trial Court.2

The antecedent facts as disclosed by the pleadings of the parties are not

complicated.

Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde

(hereinafterAtayde) the other half of the second floor of a building located

at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets, Makati, Metro Manila. She operatedand maintained therein a beauty parlor.3

The sublease contract expired on 15 April 1993. However, the petitioner

was not able to remove all her movable properties.

On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde

when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her

remaining movable properties such as cabinets, shelves, frames, a mirror,

a shampoo bowl, and an air conditioning casing.4The argument

degenerated into a scuffle between the petitioner, on the one hand, and

Atayde and several of Atayde's employees, including private respondentWinnie Javier (hereinafterJavier), on the other.

On 21 April 1993, the private respondent had themselves medically

examined for the alleged injuries inflicted on them by the petitioner.5

On 23 April 1993, the private respondents filed a complaint with the

barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, which was docketed as Barangay

Cases Nos. 10236and 1024.

7

The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain

for 28 April 1993. On the said date, only the petitioner appeared. The

barangay captain then reset the confrontation to 26 May 1993.8

On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed two

informations for slight physical injuries against the petitioner with the MTC

of Makati, which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and

145234 and assigned to Branch 61 thereof.

On 21 May 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras of Branch 61 ordered

the petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses.

On 14 June 1993, the petitioner submitted the required counter-

affidavits.9In her own counter-affidavit, the petitioner specifically alleged

the prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo

conciliation proceedings as she and the private respondents are residents

of Manila.10

She also attached to it a certification by the barangay captainof Valenzuela, Makati, dated 18 May 1993, that there was an ongoing

conciliation between Atayde and the petitioner in Barangay Case No.

1023.11

On 18 June 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Cases

Nos. 145233 and 145234 for non-compliance with the requirement of P.D.

No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapaand pursuant toSection 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

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On 2 July 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras handed down an order

denying the motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which read:

The court finds the motion to be without sufficient merit.

In the first place, the offense subject of these cases

accussed in Makati, Metro Manila on April 17, 1993; that

Barangay Valenzuela of the Municipality of Makati had

started the conciliation proceedings between the parties

but as of May 18, 1993 nothing has been achieved by thebarangay (Annex "2" of the Counter-Affidavit of the

accused); that the above-entitled cases were filed

directly with this court by the public prosecutor on May

11, 1993; and the accused and her witnesses had already

filed their counter-affidavits and documents. At this

stage of the proceedings, the court believes that the

accused had already waived the right to a reconciliation

proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati

considering that accused and complainant are residents

of different barangays; that the offense charged occurred

in the Municipality of Makati; and finally, this offense isabout to prescribe.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the court believes,

and so holds, that the complainants may go directly to

the court where their complaint is about to prescribe or

barred by statute of limitations pursuant to Section 6 of

PD 1508."12

A motion to reconsider the above order was denied on 5 August 1993.

Hence this special civil action for certiorari. The petitioner contends thatthe respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss considering that

the private respondents failed to comply with the mandatory requirement

of P.D. No. 1508, now embodied in Section 412 of the Local Government

Code of 1991 and further required under the 1991 Revised Rule on

Summary Procedure.

In their Comment, the private respondents contend that the denial of the

motion to dismiss is proper because prior referral of the dispute to

the lupon is not applicable in the case of private respondent Javier since

she and the petitioner are not residents of barangays in the same city or

municipality or of adjoining barangays in different cities or municipalities

and that referral to the lupon is not likewise required if the case may

Otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, even

assumingarguendo that prior referral to the lupon applies to the case of

private respondent Atayde, the latter had, nevertheless, substantially

complied with the requirement.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the

petitioner that Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 should be

dismissed for non-compliance with Sections 408, 409, 410, and 412 of the

Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Section 7, Rule VI of the

Rules Implementing P.D. No. 1508.

The petitioner replied to the comments of the private respondents and of

the Office of the Solicitor General. The private respondents filed a

rejoinder to the petitioner's reply to their comment and a reply to the

comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.

In the Resolution of 16 May 1994, this Court gave due course to the

petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda,

which the petitioner and the private respondents complied with. The

Office of the Solicitor General, in view of its prior submission, moved that it

be excused from filing a memorandum.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The law on the katarungang pambarangaywas originally governed by P.D.

No. 1508 which was enacted on 11 June 1978. However, the Local

Government Code of 1991, specifically Chapter 7, Title I, Book III

thereof, 13revised the law on the katarungang pambarangay. As aconsequence of this revision, P.D. No. 1508 was expressly repealed

pursuant to Section 534(b) of the Code. Pertinent portions of Chapter 7,

Title I, Book III thereof read as follows:

Sec. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement;

Exception Thereto. The lupponof each barangay shall

have authority to bring together the parties actually

residing in the same city or municipality for amicable

settlement of all disputes except:

(a) Where one party is the government or anysubdivision or instrumentality thereof;

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(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and

the dispute relates to the performance of his official

functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one

(1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos

(P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in

different cities or municipalities unless the parties

thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable

settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in

barangays of different cities or municipalities, except

where such barangay units adjoin each other and the

parties thereto agree to submit their differences to

amicable settlement by appropriate lupon;

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President

may determine in the interest of justice or upon the

recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within

the authority of the luponunder this Code are filed may,

at anytime before trial, motu proprio refer the case to

the luponconcerned for amicable settlement.

Sec. 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons

actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought

for amicable settlement before the luponof said

barangay.

(b) Those involving actual residents of different

barangays within the same city or municipality shall be

brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of

the respondents actually resides, at the election of the

complainant.

(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest

therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real

property or the larger portion thereof is situated.

(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending

parties are employed or at the institution where such

parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the

barangay where such workplace or institution is located.

Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation

proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise, the

same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which

may confront the punong barangay in resolving

objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted

to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated

representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding.

Sec. 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. While

the dispute is under mediation, conciliation, or

arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and

cause of action under existing laws shall be interrupted

upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.

The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the

complainant of the complaint or the certificate of

repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by

the luponor pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That

such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days fromthe filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 412. Conciliation. (a) Pre-condition to filing of

complaint in court. No complaint, petition, action, or

proceeding involving any matter within the authority of

the luponshall be filed or instituted directly in court or

any other government office for adjudication, unless

there has been a confrontation between the parties

before the luponchairman or the pangkat, and that noconciliation or settlement has been reached as certified

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by the luponsecretary or pangkat secretary as attested

to by the luponchairman or pangkat chairman or unless

the settlement has been repudiated by the parties

thereto.

(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties

may go directly to court in the following instances:

(1) Where the accused is under

detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been

deprived of personal liberty calling

forhabeas corpus proceedings;

(3) Where actions are coupled with

provisional remedies such as

preliminary injunction, attachment,

delivery of personal property, and

supportpendente lite; and

(4) Where the action may otherwise be

barred by the statute of limitations.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 415.Appearance of Parties in Person. In all

katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must

appear in person without the assistance of counsel or

representative, except for minors and incompetents who

may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers.

Pursuant to the authority vested in him under Section 421 of the Code, the

Secretary of Justice promulgated the Katarungang PambarangayRules to

implement the revised law on katarungang pambarangay. Sections 8 and

11 of Rule VI (Amicable Settlement of Disputes) thereof provide in part as

follows:

SECTION 8. Failure to appear.

a. Sanctions

The complaint may be dismissed when

complainant, after due notice, refuses

or willfully fails to appear without

justifiable reason on the date set for

mediation, conciliation or arbitration.

Such dismissal ordered by the Punong

Barangay/Pangkat Chairman after

giving the complainant an opportunity

to explain his non-appearance shall becertified to by the Luponor Pangkat

Secretary as the case may be, and shall

bar the complainant from seeking

judicial recourse for the same cause of

action as that dismissed.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 11. Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses and

cause of action. The prescriptive periods for offenses

and causes of action under existing laws shall beinterrupted upon filing of the complaint with the Punong

Barangay. The running of the prescriptive periods shall

resume upon receipts by the complainant of the

certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file

action issued by the Luponor Pangkat Secretary:

Provided, however, that such interruption shall not

exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint

with the Punong Barangay. After the expiration of the

aforesaid period of sixty days, the filing of the case in

court or government office for adjudication shall be

subject to the provision of paragraph (b) (4) of Rule VIII

of these Rules.

It may thus be observed that the revised katarungang pambarangaylaw

has at least three new significant features, to wit:

1. It increased the authority of the luponin criminal

offenses from those punishable by imprisonment not

exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in

P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by

imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not

exceeding P5,000.00.

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2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the

workplace where the contending parties are employed or

at the institution where such parties are enrolled for

study, shall be brought in the barangay where such

workplace or institution is located.

3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive

periods of offenses during the pendency of the

mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. Paragraph(c) of Section 410 of the law, however, suffers from some

ambiguity when it provides that the prescriptive periods

"shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of the

complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the

certification to file action issued by the luponor pangkat

secretary." What is referred to as receipt by

the complainant of the complaintis unclear; obviously, it

could have been a drafting oversight. Accordingly, in the

above quoted Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations

issued by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase "the

complaint or" is not found, such that the resumption ofthe running of the prescriptive period shall, properly, be

from receipt by the complainant of the certificate of

repudiation or the certification to file action issued by

the lupon or the pangkat secretary. Such suspension,

however, shall not exceed sixty days.

The first feature has necessarily broadened the jurisdiction of

the luponand if the mediation and conciliation process at that level would

be effectively pursued, few cases would reach the regular courts, justice

would be achieved at less expense to the litigants, cordial relationships

among protagonists in a small community would be restored, and peace

and order therein enhanced.

The second feature, which is covered by paragraph (d), Section 409 of the

Local Government code, also broadens the authority of the lupon in the

sense that appropriate civil and criminal cases arising from incidents

occurring in workplaces or institutions of learning shall be brought in the

barangay where such workplace or institution is located. That barangay

may not be the appropriate venue in either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b)

of the said section. This rule provides convenience to the parties.

Procedural rules including those relating to venue are designed to insure a

fair and convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between

them as a result.14

Elsewise stated, convenience is theraison d'etre of the

rule on venue.

The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the

mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. It discourages any

intentional delay of the referral to a date close to the expiration of the

prescriptive period and then invoking the proximity of such expiration as

the reason for immediate recourse to the courts. It also affords the parties

sufficient time to cool off and face each other with less emotionalism andmore objectivity which are essential ingredients in the resolution of their

dispute. The sixty-day suspension of the prescriptive period could spell the

difference between peace and a full-blown, wearisome, and expensive

litigation between the parties.

While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of

1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to

the luponas a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains

applicable because its provisions on prior referral were substantially

reproduced in the Code.

In Peregrina vs. Panis,15

this Court stated:

Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda. de

Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that

P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the

Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing of a

complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition

precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's

cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to

dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of action or

prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion ofadministrative remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to

compromise suits between family members, lacking

which the case can be dismissed.

The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D.

No. 1508. They are actual residents in the same barangay

and their disputes does not fall under any of the

excepted cases." (Emphasis omitted)

Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This Court said so

in Garces vs. Court of Appeals:

16

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In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to

the conciliation procedure required under P.D. 1508 is

not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with

which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over

the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.

Where, however, the fact of non-compliance with and

non-observance of such procedure has been seasonably

raised as an issue before the court first taking cognizance

of the complaint, dismissal of the action is proper.

xxx xxx xxx

The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the

requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the

same effect produced by non-exhaustion of

administrative remedies; the complaint becomes

afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy

there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The

complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.

(emphasis omitted)

There were, of course, cases where this Court ruled that the failure of the

defendant to seasonably invoke non-referral to the

appropriate luponoperated as a waiver thereof.17

Furthermore, whensuch defect was initially present when the case was first filed in the trial

court, the subsequent issuance of the certification to file action by the

barangay, which constituted substantial compliance with the said

requirement, cured the defect.18

On 15 October 1991, this Court promulgated the Revised Rule on Summary

Procedure.19

Section 18 thereof provides:

Sec. 18. Referral to Lupon. Cases requiring referral to

the Luponfor conciliation under the provisions of

Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing

of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed

without prejudice, and may be revived only after such

requirement shall have been complied with. This

provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the

accused was arrested without a warrant.

In the proceeding before the courta quo, the petitioner and therespondent had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. The petitioner further invoked

the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of the repeal of the decree by the

Local Government Code of 1991. Even in her instant petition, the

petitioner invokes the decree and Section 18 of the Revised Rule on

Summary Procedure. However, the private respondents, realizing the

weakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since they did refer their

grievances to what might be a wrong forum under the decree, changed

tack. In their Comment, they assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a

complaint against petitioner before the barangay council of Barangay

Valenzuela, Makati, in compliance with the requirement of theKatarungang Pambarangay Law under the Local Government Code."

20Yet,

in a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which is condemnable for it

disregards the virtue of candor, they assert that the said law is not

applicable to their cases before the courta quobecause (a) the petitioner

and respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the same city or

municipality; (b) the law does not apply when the action, as in the said

cases, may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and (c) even

assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has

substantially complied with it.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exertedenough diligence to inquire from the private respondents if prior referral

to the lupon was necessary before filing the informations.

Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of the

Local Government Code of 1991, more specifically on the provisions on

the Katarungang pambarangay, is distressing. He should have taken

judicial notice thereof, ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 129 of the

Rules of Court, courts are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of

"the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of

the Philippines." We have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit more

than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural

rules. 21He should have applied the revised katarungangpambarangay law under the Local Government Code of 1991. Had he done

so, this petition would not have reached us and taken valuable attention

and time which could have been devoted to more important cases.

In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first scheduled

mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the mediation was reset to 26 May

1993, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the

MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal

Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was

premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local

Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the

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motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking

refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4)

of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties may

go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is because,

as earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the

prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a maximum period of

sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their

complaints with the luponof Valenzuela Makati.

Moreover, having brought the dispute before the luponof barangay

Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing

the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Their act of

trifling with the authority of the luponby unjustifiably failing to attend the

scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away

with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak

havoc on the barangay conciliation system.

Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged physical

injuries, the offense for which she may be liable would only be slight

physical injuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised PenalCode, considering that per the medical certificates

22the injuries sustained

by the private respondents would "heal" in nine days "in the absence of

complication" and there is no showing that the said injuries incapacitated

them for labor or would require medical attendance for such period. The

penalty therefor would only be "arresto menoror a fine not exceeding 200

pesos and censure." These penalties are light under Article 25 of the

Revised Penal Code and would prescribe in two monthspursuant to Article

90.

Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos.

145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, theprescriptive period therefor would have expired two months thereafter.

Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the private

respondents' complaints with the luponof Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April

1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22

June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said

period of suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is

issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which

to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there

was no basis for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception

provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412 of the Local Government Code.

Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the respondent Judge that

the petitioner "had already waived the right to a reconciliation

proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati, considering that

the accused and the complainant are residents of different barangays."

The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before

the luponof Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the

scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-condition of

referral to the luponin her counter-affidavit.23

Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private respondent that

the parties could not agree on a compromise and that they had to request

the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action.24

The request isdated 23 June 1993,

25or nearly one and a half months after Criminal Cases

Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the courta quo. Evidently, this

was done to support their contention in the said court that, in any event,

there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to

the lupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to

appear at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were

filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action.

The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing

to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234.

Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to emphasize the vital role

which the revised katarungang pambarangaylaw plays in the delivery of

justice at the barangay level, in promoting peace, stability, and progress

therein, and in effectively preventing or reducing expensive and

wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should,

with sincerity, exhaust the remedies provided by that law, government

prosecutors should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with

it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctionsfor non-compliance thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders of respondent

Judge of 2 July 1993 and 5 August 1993 in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and

1452334, both entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Felicidad Uy" are

hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to

DISMISS said cases within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this

decision.

Costs against the private respondents.

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CASE DIGESTS:

FELICIDAD UY,petitioner, vs.

HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court,Branch 61,Makati, Metro Manila; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, ProvincialProsecutor of Pasig, MetroManila; SUSANNA ATAYDE and WINNIEJAVIER,

respondents.

G.R. No. 111416 September 26, 1994

FACTS:Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde the other half of

the second floor of a building located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets,

Makati, Metro Manila. She operated and maintained therein a beauty

parlor.

The sublease contract expired on 15 April1993. However, the petitioner

was not able to remove all her movable properties.

On 17April 1993, an argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde

when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her

remaining movable properties. The argument degenerated into a scuffle

between the petitioner and Atayde and several of Atayde's employees.

On 23 April 1993, the private respondents filed a complaint with the

barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati

.

The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain

for 28 April 1993. On the said date, only the petitioner appeared. The

barangay captain then reset the confrontation to 26 May 1993.

On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed

two informations for slight physical injuries against the petitioner with the

MTC of Makati

.

On 21 May 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras of Branch 61 ordered

the petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses.

On 14 June 1993, the petitioner submitted the required counter-affidavits.

On 18 June 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Cases for

non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508. On 2 July 1993,

public respondent Judge Contreras handed down an order denying the

motion to dismiss. A motion to reconsider the above order was denied as

well. Hence this present special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE:WON THE CASE FILED SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF

FAILURE TOCOMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIRMENT OF P.D. NO.

1508, NOW EMBODIED INSECTION 412 OF THE LGC OF 1991.

HELD:Yes. While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code

of 1991,the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the

lupon as a pre-condition tothe filing of an action in court remains

applicable because its provisions on prior referralwere substantially

reproduced in the Code. The precise technical effect of failure to

complywith the requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable is much the

same effect produced bynon-exhaustion of administrative remedies; the

complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy

there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes

vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Moreover, having brought the dispute

before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents

are stopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they

themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the authority of the

lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings

and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be

countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation

system. Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should, with sincerity,

exhaust the remedies provided by that law, government prosecutors

should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with it, and trial

courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions for non-

compliance thereof.

Ledesma v. Court of Appeals211 SCRA 753

Facts:Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma is the owner-lessor of an apartment building.

Two units were leased (now unlawfully occupied) by respondent Jose T.

Dizon. Said lease was originally covered by written contracts and except for

the rates and duration, the terms and conditions of said contracts were

impliedly renewed on a monthto monthbasis. One of the terms of the

lease, that of monthly payments, was

violated by respondent. Upon failure of respondent to honor the demandletters, petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay for conciliation

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which eventually issued a certification to file action. Petitioner was assisted

by her son, Raymond U. Ledesma (who is not a lawyer) during the

Barangay proceeding as she was suffering from recurring psychological

ailments a scan be seen from prescription and receipts by her psychiatrist.

Due to the stubborn refusal of the respondent to vacate the premises,

petitioner was constrained to retain the services of a lawyer to initiate the

ejectment proceeding. MTC ordered respondent to vacate. RTC affirmed

the MTC. Respondent however found favor in the CA because of lack of

cause of action. CA held that petitioner failed compliance with Sections 6and 9 of PD 1508.Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised

by respondent in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal.

Issue:Whether there is non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of PD 1508.

Held:When respondent stated that he was never summoned or subpoenaed by

the Barangay, he, in effect, was stating that since he was never summoned,

he could not appear in person for the needed confrontation and/oramicable settlement. Without the mandatory confrontation, no complaint

could be filed with the MTC. Moreover, petitioner tries to show that her

failure to appear before the Barangay was because of her recurring

psychological ailments. But for the entire year of 1998, there is no

indication at all that petitioner went to see her psychiatrist. The only

conclusion is that 1998 was a lucid interval. There was therefore no excuse

then for her non-appearance. Therefore, she cannot be represented by

counsel or by attorney-in-fact who is next of kin. Her non-compliance with

PD 1508 legally barred her from pursuing case in the MTC

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The case should have proceeded to its conclusion under

the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and the

regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court

applies to the special cases only in a suppletory capacity

insofar as they are not inconsistent. . . .

The claim of the plaintiff is less than P10,000.00. It

properly falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure. The

only pleadings allowed are complaints, compulsorycounterclaims and cross claims pleaded in the answer,

and the answers thereto. The case could have been

decided based on affidavits of the witnesses and other

evidence on the factual issues defined in the order of the

Court, after the preliminary conference, together with

the position papers setting forth the law and the facts

relied upon by the parties.

The need for a formal offer, identification and cross-

examination on Exhibits "E-1" to "E-15" was not

necessary. The said exhibits were inadmissible (sic). Thereceipts constituted evidence of indebtedness and their

possession by the plaintiff at the commencement of the

suit gives rise to the legal presumption that the debts in

the total amount of P7,862.66 have not been paid.

Where, under the contract of sale, the ownership of the

goods has passed to the buyer and he wrongfully

neglects or refuses to pay for the goods according to the

terms of the contract of sale, the seller may maintain an

action against him for the price of the goods.9

Accordingly, it rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners and

ordered private respondent Patricia Pagba to pay the former the amount

of P7,862.55 plus legal interest from July, 1991, P1,000.00 as attorney fees,

and the costs of suit.

Private respondents then went to the Court of Appeals, raising just two

issues, viz.: (1) whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in not making

a factual finding that herein petitioners did not comply with Presidential

Decree No. 1508; and (2) whether or not said Regional Trial Court erred in

not dismissing the appeal or case for non-compliance with the mandatory

provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508.10

Respondent Court of Appeals set aside the judgment of the Regional Trial

Court, on the ground that there had been no compliance with Presidential

Decree No. 1508, with this ratiocination:

It is, therefore, clear that if efforts of the barangay

captain to settle the dispute fails, the Pangkat ng

Tagapagkasundo shall be constituted with the end in

view of exploring all possibilities of amicable settlement.

If no conciliation or settlement has been reachedpursuant to the aforesaid rules, the matter may then be

brought to the regular courts.

In the case at bar, it has been established that there was

no valid conciliation proceeding between the parties. The

efforts of the barangay captain of Catmon, Naval, Biliran

to mediate the dispute between the parties having failed,

the Pangkat ng Tagapamayapa should have been

constituted for purposes of settling the matter. However,

the Pangkat was not constituted, instead, a Certification

to File Action was issued by the barangay captain in favorof respondent spouses Diu. In the same case of Ramos

vs. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 690, the Supreme Court

ruled that the "Punong Barangay has no right to say that

referral to the Pangkat was no longer necessary merely

because he himself has failed to work out an agreement

between the petitioner and private respondent. Dispute

should not end with the mediation proceeding before

the Punong Barangay because of his failure to effect a

settlement . . . . In Bejer vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA

566, it was held that "failure to avail of conciliation

process under P.D. 1508, . . . renders the complaint

vulnerable to a timely motion to dismiss." Inasmuch as

petitioner has pleaded in his answer the lack of cause of

action of respondent, objection to the complaint has

been timely made.11

The basic issue to be resolved in the instant petition is whether or not the

confrontations before the BarangayChairman of Naval satisfied the

requirement therefor in Presidential Decree No. 1508. This Court finds for

petitioners.

It must be noted that Presidential Decree No. 1508 has been repealed by

codification in the Local Government Code of 199112which took effect on

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January 1, 1992. The basic complaint was filed by petitioners before the

trial court on July 10, 1991 before the effectivity of the Local Government

Code. Nevertheless, Sections 4 and 6 of the former law have been

substantially reproduced in Sections 410 (b) and 412, respectively, of the

latter law. The pertinent provisions read as follows:

Sec. 410. PROCEDURE FOR AMICABLE SETTLEMENT.

(b) . . . . If he (lupon chairman) fails in his mediation

effort within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting ofthe parties before him, he shall forthwith set a date for

the constitution of the pangkat in accordance with the

provisions of this chapter.

Sec. 412. CONCILIATION. (a) Precondition to filing of

Complaint in Court. No complaint . . . shall be filed or

instituted in court . . . unless there has been a

confrontation of the parties before the lupon chairman

or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement

has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or

pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkatchairman . . . .

In the case at bar, it is admitted that the parties did have confrontations

before the Barangay Chairman of Naval although they were not sent to

thepangkat as the same was not constituted. Their meetings with

said barangaychairman were not fruitful as no amicable settlement was

reached. This prompted the issuance of the following Certification to File

Action.13

This is to certify that:

Respondent, Patricia Pagba admitted her indebtedness

with complainant but she refused to pay because

according to her, complainant has also an unsettled

accounts (sic) with her husband. Hence no

settlement/conciliation was reached and therefore the

corresponding complaint for the dispute may now be

filed in court.

Date(d) this 10th day of July 1991.

(Sgd.) JHONY C. JEREZ

Lupon Pangkat Chairman

Attested:

(Sgd.) IRENEO DOCALLOS

Lupon/Pangkat Secretary

According to private respondent, however, the above certification is

"falsified" since nopangkatwas constituted. She, therefore, insists that

petitioners have not complied with the mandatory provision of

Presidential Decree No. 1508 on compulsory arbitration. We disagree.

While nopangkatwas constituted, it is not denied that the parties met at

the office of the barangaychairman for possible settlement.14

The efforts

of the barangay chairman, however, proved futile as no agreement was

reached. Although nopangkatwas formed, we believe that there was

substantial compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under Section

412 of the Local Government Code aforequoted, the confrontation before

the lupon chairman OR thepangkat is sufficient compliance with the pre-

condition for filing the case in court.

This is true notwithstanding the mandate of Section 410 (b) of the same

law that the barangaychairman shall constitute apangkatif he fails in his

mediation efforts. Section 410 (b) should be construed together with

Section 412, as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the

case. On this score, it is significant that thebarangay chairman orpunong

barangayis himself the chairman of the lupon under the Local Government

Code.15

From the foregoing facts, it is undeniable that there was substantialcompliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 which does not require

strict technical compliance with its procedural requirements. Under the

factual antecedents, it cannot be said that the failure of the parties to

appear before thepangkat caused any prejudice to the case for private

respondents considering that they already refused conciliation before

the barangay chairman and, as will hereafter be discussed, their sham

insistence for a meeting before thepangkatis merely a ploy for further

delay. We are thus forced to remind them that technicalities should not be

made to desert their true role in our justice system, and should not be

used as obstructions therein.

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The court a quo was likewise correct in invoking the doctrine in Tijam and,

as indicated by the factual scenario in this case, private respondents are

clearly in estoppel to assail the jurisdiction of the two lower courts. It is

also worth stressing that while the case was filed when Presidential Decree

No. 1508 was still in force, the procedural provisions of the Local

Government Code, which we have earlier noted as being supportive of the

validity of the conciliation proceedings, are also applicable to this case.

Statutes regulating procedure in courts are applicable to actions pending

and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws areretrospective in that sense.

16

To indulge private respondents in their stratagem will not only result in a

circuitous procedure but will necessarily entail undue and further delay

and injustice. This is inevitable if this Court should dismiss the complaint

and require the parties to meet before thepangkat, only to bring the case

all over again through the hierarchy of courts and ultimately back to us for

decision on the merits. Obviously, this is the game plan of private

respondents. For, when private respondents appealed to respondent

court, they did not at all assail the propriety or correctness of the

judgment of the Regional Trial Court holding them liable to petitioners forthe sum of money involved. Such primary substantive issue, therefore, has

been laid to rest, but private respondents would wish to keep the case

alive merely on a conjured procedural issue invoking their supposed right

to confrontation before thepangkat.

However, from the very start of this action, private respondents failed to

show or evince any honest indication that they were willing to settle their

obligations with petitioners, notwithstanding the efforts of the latter to

submit the matter to conciliation. It is, therefore, quite obvious that their

insistence on technical compliance with the requirements of

thebarangay conciliation process is a dilatory maneuver. This is an evident

and inevitable conclusion since the main argument of respondents in this

petition is only the supposed failure of petitioners to comply with

the barangayconciliatory procedure and not the denial or repudiation of

their indebtedness.

We do not agree with the findings of respondent appellate court that

inasmuch as private respondents pleaded in their answer the alleged lack

of cause of action of petitioners, an objection to the complaint had been

timely made. It will be readily observed that said defense was only one of

the six affirmative defenses cryptically alleged in single short sentences in

private respondents' Answer in the court a quo, running the implausible

gamut from supposed defects in parties to res judicataand up to capacity

to sue, without any statement of the facts on which they would rely to

support such drivel. This calculated travesty of the rules on pleadings

betrays the ulterior motives of private respondents and cannot be

countenanced.

The failure of private respondents to specifically allege that there was no

compliance with the barangayconciliation procedure constitutes a waiver

of that defense. All that they alleged in their Answer in the trial court was

that "the complaint states no cause of action" without giving even thesemblance of any reason to support or explain that allegation. On the

other hand, they admitted the confrontations before

the barangay chairman in paragraph 13 of their Answer.17

Since private respondents failed to duly raise that issue, their defense

founded thereon is deemed waived, especially since they actually did not

pursue the issue before the case was set for hearing. Also, the conciliation

procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional

requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction

which the lower courts had already acquired over the subject matter and

private respondents as defendants therein.18

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. The judgment of

respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 30962 is hereby SET ASIDE,

and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, in

Civil Case No. B-0842 is hereby REINSTATED, with costs against private

respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117005. June 19, 1997]

CARLITO D. CORPUZ, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS(SIXTEENTH DIVISION) and JUANITO ALVARADO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO,J.:

Petitioner Carlito Corpuz questions the decision of the Court of

Appeals1affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,

Branch 10, dismissing the petition for review in Civil Case No. 92-62869.

Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against private respondent

Juanito Alvarado with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6,

docketed as Civil Case No. 138532, for recovery of possession of the room

being occupied by the latter, which Corpuz' children allegedly needed for

their own use.

Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants of a certain Lorenzo Barredo

who, in May 1988, decided to sell his property to the tenants. Due to

economic difficulties, however, Alvarado and the other lessees executed

an "Affidavit of Waiver" granting Barredo the right to sell his house to any

person who can afford to purchase the same. Consequently, Barredo sold

his house to Corpuz for P37,500.00. As a result of the sale, a tenancy

relationship was established between Corpuz and Alvarado.

In October 1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado demanding that

he vacate the room which he was occupying because the children of

Corpuz needed it for their own use. Alvarado refused to vacate the room

as demanded, prompting Corpuz to seek his ejectment.

In his answer, Alvarado raised two major defenses, to wit: (1) the alleged

"Affidavit of Waiver" executed between him and Barredo was a forgery;

and (2) the dispute was not referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa.

Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be without merit, the MTC of Manila

handed down on August 11, 1992 a decision ordering Alvarado to vacate

the room.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Feeling aggrieved, Alvarado appealed to the RTC. On March 11, 1993, said

court rendered its decision3which, in effect, reversed the MTC's decision

on the ground that the purported sale between Corpuz and Barredo was

the subject of a controversy pending before the National Housing

Authority (NHA) which must be resolved first by said agency. It also

concluded that the "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Alvarado and Barredo

was a forgery. Consequently, it ordered the dismissal of the case for

unlawful detainer, and ruled that Alvarado cannot be legally expelled from

the subject premises.

His motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied for lack

of merit by the RTC4on July 16, 1993, Corpuz elevated his case to the Court

of Appeals. The appellate court, however, found no reversible error in the

assailed judgment and affirmed the same in its entirety in its assailed

decision dated July 14, 1994.5A subsequent motion for reconsideration

was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated

September 1, 1994.6Hence, this petition.

The main issues presented in this petition is whether Corpuz' unlawful

detainer suit filed before the MTC against Alvarado should be suspendeduntil the resolution of the case lodged in the NHA impugning the sale of

said property, and whether the "Affidavit of Waiver" between Corpuz and

Barredo was authentic. Corpuz maintains that the mere assertion

challenging his ownership over the said property is not a sufficient ground

to divest the MTC of its exclusive jurisdiction.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is elementary that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment

cases.8As the law now stands, the only issue to be resolved in forcible

entry and unlawful detainer cases is the physical or material possessionover the real property, that is,

possessionde facto.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the recent case of Refugia v. Court of Appeals,10

however, we ruled that:

"In the case of De la Santa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court, in making

a distinction between the reception of evidence and the resolution of the

issue of ownership, held that the inferior court may look into the evidence

of title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as said evidence would

indicate or determine the nature of possession. It cannot, however, resolve

the issue of ownership, that is, by declaring who among the parties is thetrue and lawful owner of the subject property, because the resolution of

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said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is not

sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer. With this as a

premise and taking into consideration the amendment introduced by Batas

Pambansa Blg. 129, it may be suggested that inferior courts are now

conditionally vested with adjudicatory power over the issue of title or

ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit."

Consequently, since the present petition involves the issue of possession

intertwined with the issue of ownership (i.e., the controversy pending inthe NHA), the doctrinal pronouncement in Refugia is applicable.

Parenthetically speaking, the issue raised in this petition is far from novel.

The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of sale,

title or document do not abate any ejectment action respecting the same

property.11

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In Wilmor Auto Supply Construction Company Corporations, et

al. v. Court of Appeals,12

Justice (now Chief Justice) Andres Narvasa

outlined the following cases involving the annulment of the title or

document over the property which should not be considered in theabatement of an ejectment suit, to wit:

"Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting

property operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property

(Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of deed of sale with assumption of

mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage], 126 SCRA

167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC [annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA 153

[1987]; Caparros v. CA [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dante v.

Sison [annulment of sale with damages], 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. Benguet

Consolidated,

Inc

. [annulment of document], 177 SCRA 288 [1989]."

Clearly, the underlying reason for the above rulings is for the defendant

not to trifle with the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, by the

simple expedient of asserting ownership thereon. Thus, the controversy

pending before the NHA for the annulment of the Deed of Sale and

assailing the authenticity of the "Affidavit of Joint Waiver" cannot deter

the MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suit merely for the

purpose of determining who has a better possessory right among the

parties.

It may be stressed that Alvarado is not without remedy. We have ruled

that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action

between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall

it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same

parties upon a different cause of action involving

possession.13

chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Furthermore, Alvarado raises the issue in the instant petition that the

ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon Tagapayapa as required byPresidential Decree No. 1508.

We are not persuaded. This defense was only stated in a single general

short sentence in Alvarado's answer. We have held

in Dui v. Court of Appeals14

that failure of a party to specifically allege the

fact that there was no compliance with the Barangay conciliation

procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. A perusal of Alvarado's

answer reveals that no reason or explanation was given to support his

allegation, which is deemed a mere general averment.

In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictionalrequirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction

which the lower court had already acquired over the subject matter and

the parties therein.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision datedJuly 14, 1994, of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET

ASIDE, and the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, Branch 6,

in Civil Case No. 138532-CV dated August 11, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr.,JJ., concur.

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113615. January 25, 1996]BIENVENIDO VELARMA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFINA

PANSACOLA, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Will the lot owners agreement to sell the property to the

government as evidenced by the minutes of a meeting of the Sangguniang

Bayan, absent a formal deed, constitute a sufficient ground to defeat a

forcible entry suit? This was the main question raised in this petition for

review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision dated January

26, 1994 of the Court of Appeals1in CA-G.R. CV No. 33332. By a Resolution

dated October 25, 1995, this case, along with several others, was

transferred from the First Division to the Third. After due deliberation on

the submissions of the parties, it was assigned to undersigned ponente for

the writing of the Courts Resolution.

This case arose from an ejectment suit2

filed by private respondentagainst petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Mauban,

Quezon. Private respondent alleged: (1) that sometime in May 1981,

petitioner surreptitiously built his dwelling on a portion of her land at

Barangay Lual (Poblacion), Mauban, Quezon, registered under Transfer

Certificate of Title No. T-91037 in the name of private respondents

husband Publio (deceased); (2) that the matter was reported to the

Barangay Captain who conducted several conferences during which

petitioner promised to vacate the land and remove his house therefrom,

notwithstanding which he still failed or refused to do so; (3) that she

instituted Criminal Case No. 1068 against petitioner in 1986 for violation of

P.D. No. 772 (the Anti-Squatting Law); (4) that the trial court convictedpetitioner of the offense and imposed a fine of P 1,500.00 on him; (5) that,

despite such judgment, and notwithstanding repeated demands to vacate,

petitioner continued occupying the property, compelling her to bring the

suit.

The trial court in its nine-page judgment rendered on April 2,

1991 found that private respondent had satisfactorily established her

ownership over the parcel of land in question. It also found that petitioner

entered and occupied private respondents land without authority of law

and against the will of the owner x x x through strategy and

stealth.3Furthermore, it declared that the claim of petitioner that by

virtue of an agreement between the former owner (Publio Pansacola) andthe Municipality of Mauban x x x the lot [being occupied by petitioner]

became the property of the government, and therefore, [respondent] has

no cause of action against *petitioner+ was baseless and

unwarranted,4since no deed had ever been executed to perfect the

deal between the municipality and Publio for the exchange of a portion of

the abandoned provincial road with a portion of the lot owned by Publio

(on which was built petitioners dwelling), such that the Pansacola spouses

later demanded that petitioner vacate the land and sought the help of the

barangay council. They eventually instituted the criminal case against

petitioner for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.

The trial court ordered petitioner to vacate the subject land, remove

his house therefrom and pay private respondent exemplary damages and

attorneys fees in the amounts of P2,000.00 and P3,000.00, respectively.

The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner insists that private respondent has no cause of action

against him because the land on which his house stands belongs to the

government. Petitioners dwelling is situated on the shoulder of the new

provincial highway, part of which was constructed on a portion of the land

belonging to and titled in the name of private respondents husband.

According to petitioner, while it is conceded that the premises *occupied

by him+ is still within the area covered by *private respondents+ title,

nonetheless, x x x [the subject premises] x x x already belong to the

government by virtue of its exchange of the abandoned road and bridge.5

Petitioners claim is anchored on a document entitled Minutes of the

Meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban, Quezon

dated November 5, 1974. Therein, Publio Pansacola signified before the

Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban his agreement to the transfer of that

portion of his land traversed by the new provincial highway and its

shoulder in exchange for a corresponding portion of the old abandoned

provincial road.

As found by the trial court, the said minutes of the meeting of the

Sangguniang Bayan do not mention the execution of any deed to perfect

the agreement. An engineer was appointed to survey the old abandoned

road, but this act does not in any manner convey title over the abandoned

road to the Pansacola spouses nor extinguish their ownership over the

land traversed by the new provincial highway. No evidence was introduced

by petitioner to show that the survey was actually undertaken and a

specific portion of the abandoned road partitioned and conveyed to the

Pansacolas. It must be stressed that the agreement to transfer the

property was made in 1974. More than twenty years later, no actualtransfer had yet been made. Unless and until the transfer is consummated,

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or expropriation proceedings instituted by the government, private

respondent continues to retain ownership of the land subject of this case.

We note that the ejectment suit should have been filed before the

Municipal Trial Court, and not the Regional Trial Court. The issue of

ownership, however, had been specifically raised before the Regional Trial

Court by petitioner himself, who at the same time did not move to dismiss

the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Instead, he filed his answer and went

to trial. Estoppel by laches has already set in at this point in time.6

Petitioner also challenges the findings of the respondent Court that

prior referral to the Lupong Barangay had been made before the ejectment

case was filed in the lower court, and that therefore, the trial court

properly acquired jurisdiction over the case. We agree, however, with the

trial courts finding that

The compliance (with) the provision of P.D. No. 1508, Katarungang

Pambarangay Law, can no longer be assailed by the defendant [herein

petitioner], its reference having been admitted (in) his affirmative

allegations and affirmative defenses in the Answer (page 3, par. 3.3 of

defendants answer).

7

(italics supplied)

Other issues raised had already been adequately traversed and

disposed of by the appellate Court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED, with costsagainst petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo,andFrancisco,. JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 96914 July 23, 1992

CECILIA U. LEDESMA, petitioner,vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and JOSE T. DIZON, respondents.

NOCON,J.:

Petitioner Cecilia U. Ledesma prays before this Court for the reversal of the

Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals of August 30, 19901ordering

the dismissal of her ejectment complaint before the Manila Metropolitan

Trial Court for lack of cause of action due to non-compliance with Sections

6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law) as well as the

Resolution of January 7, 19912denying petitioner's Motion for

Reconsideration of said Decision.

The facts of this case as summarized by the petitioner in her Memorandum

are as follows:

Petitioner is the owner-lessor of an apartment building

located at 800-802 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila. Two

(2) units of said apartment building were leased (now

being unlawfully occupied) to private respondent at

monthly rates of P3,450.00 for the unit/apartment

located at 800 Remedios Street, Malate, Manila and

P2,300.00 for the unit/apartment located at 802

Remedios Street, Malate, Manila, respectively. . . .

Said lease was originally covered by written contracts of

lease both dated December 10, 1984 and except for the

rates and duration, the terms and conditions of said

contracts were impliedly renewed on a "month-to-

month" basis pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code.

One of the terms and conditions of the said Contract of

Lease, that of monthly rental payments, was violated by

private respondent and that as of October 31, 1988, said

private respondent has incurred arrears for both units in

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the total sum of P14,039.00 for which letters of demand

were sent to, and received by, private respondent.

Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand

letters, petitioner referred the matter to the Barangay

for conciliation which eventually issued a certification to

file action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond

U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer) during the barangay

proceeding as she was suffering from recurringpsychological and emotional ailment as can be seen from

the receipts and prescriptions issued by her psychiatrist,

copies of which are attached as Annexes "E-E10" of the

said Petition.

Due to the stubborn refusal of the private respondent to

vacate the premises, petitioner was constrained to retain

the services of counsel to initiate this ejectment

proceeding.3

The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 10, Manila, rendered a decision onJune 21, 1989 ordering private respondent to vacate the premises, to pay

rentals falling due after May 1989 and to pay attorney's fees in the amount

of P2,500.00.4The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, on appeal,

affirmed the MTC ruling except for the award of attorney's fees which it

reduced to P1,000.00.5

Private respondent, however, found favor with the respondent Court of

Appeals when he elevated the case in a Petition for Review, when it ruled,

thus:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision dated October 13, 1989of the RTC of Manila, Br. IX in Civil Case No. 89-49672 is

reversed and set aside and the Complaint for Ejectment

against petitioner is dismissed for lack of cause of action.

No costs.6

Thus, this appeal, raising several assignments of error, namely, that the

Court of Appeals erred

1. In holding that private respondent raised the issue of

non-compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 in the

lower court when in fact and in truth his answer and

position paper failed to do so, contrary to evidence on

record;

2. In failing to consider that private respondent had

waived his right to question the lack of cause of action of

the complaint, if there is any, contrary to law, established

jurisprudence, and evidence on record;

3. In giving undue weight and credence to the self-serving allegations of the private respondent that

summons was not served him, contrary to law,

established jurisprudence and evidence on record.

4. In disregarding the well-known principle of law that

barangay authorities are presumed to have performed

their official duties and to have acted regularly in issuing

the certificate to file action and grossly and manifestly

erred in making an opposite conclusion to this effect,

contrary to law, established jurisprudence and evidence

on record.

5. In not holding that the settlement was repudiated,

contrary to law and evidence on record.

6. In not affirming the judgment rendered by the

Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court below.

Petitioner assails private respondent for raising the issue of non-

compliance with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 only in his petition for

review with the appellate court and which mislead the court to

erroneously dismiss her complaint for ejectment.

Section 6 of P.D. 1508 states:

Sec. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.

No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving

any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided

in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or

any other government office for adjudication unless

there has been a confrontation of the parties before the

Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or

settlement has been reached as certified by the LuponSecretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the

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Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has

been repudiated. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

while Section 9 states that:

Sec. 9.Appearance of parties in person. In all

proceedings provided for herein, the parties must appear

in person without the assistance of

counsel/representative, with the exception of minors

and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of

kin who are not lawyers.

Petitioner submits that said issue, not having been raised by private

respondent in the court below, cannot be raised for the first time on

appeal, specially in the Court of Appeals, citing Saludes

vs. Pajarillo.7Private respondent had waived said objection, following the

line of reasoning in Royales vs. Intermediate Appelate Court. 8

Private respondent denies having waived the defenses of non-compliance

with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508. His Answer before the Metropolitan

Trial Court, specifically paragraphs 4, 7, & 8, substantially raised the fact of

non-compliance by petitioner with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 and

consequently, subjected petitioner's complaint to dismissal for lack of

cause of action, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

4. Answering defendant denies the allegations of

paragraph 8, the truth of the matter being that he wasnot duly summoned nor subpoenaed by the Barangay

Chairman, who issued the alluded certification, to appear

for hearing.9

xxx xxx xxx

7. Plaintiff has no cause of action against answering

defendant.

8. The certification to file action (annex D of the

complaint) was improperly or irregularly issued as the

defendant was never summoned nor subpoenaed by the

Barangay Chairman to appear for hearing in connection

with the alleged complaint of the plaintiff. In effect the

mandatory provision of P.D. 1508 was not complied with

warranting the dismissal of the instant complaint.

xxx xxx xxx10

We do not agree with petitioner that the issue of non-compliance withSections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 was raised only for the first time in the Court

of Appeals. When private respondent stated that he was never summoned

or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect, was stating that

since he was never summoned, he could not appear in person for the

needed confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman for

conciliation and/or amicable settlement. Without the mandatory personal

confrontation, no complaint could be filed with the MTC. Private

respondent's allegation in paragraph 4 of his Answer that he was never

summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman; that plaintiff has no

cause of action against him as alleged in paragraph 7 of the Answer; and

that the certification to file action was improperly issued in view of theforegoing allegations thereby resulting in non-compliance with the

mandatory requirements of P.D. No. 1508, as stated in paragraph 8 of the

Answer are in substantial compliance with the raising of said issues and/or

objections in the court below.

Petitioner would like to make it appear to this Court that she appeared

before the Lupon Chairman to confront private respondent. She stated in

her Petition11

and her Memorandum12

that:

Upon failure of private respondent to honor the demand

letters, petitioner referred the matter to the barangayfor conciliation which eventually issued a certification to

file action. Petitioner was assisted by her son, Raymond

U. Ledesma, (who is not a lawyer) during the barangay

proceeding as she was suffering from recurring

psychological and emotional ailment as can be seen from

the receipt and prescriptions issued by her psychiatrist

copies of which are attached herewith as Annexes

"E-E10."

However, as found out by the respondent court:

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We agree with the petitioner that private respondent

Cecile Ledesma failed to comply with section 6 of P.D.

1508. The record of the case is barren showing

compliance by the private respondent. Indeed, the

documentary evidence of the private respondent herself

attached to the complaint buttresses this conclusion.

They show that it is not the private respondent but her

son. Raymund U. Ledesma, and her lawyer, Atty. Epifania

Navarro who dealt with the petitioner regarding theirdispute. Thus, the demand letter dated October 18, 1988

sent to the petitioner for payment of rentals in the sum

of P14,039.00 was signed by Raymund Ledesma. On the

other hand, the demand letter dated November 14, 1988

was signed by Atty. Epifania Navarro. More telling is the

Certification to File Action signed by Barangay Chairman,

Alberto A. Solis where it appears that the complainant is

Raymund U. Ledesma and not the private respondent.13

As stated earlier, Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates personal confrontation

of the parties because:

. . . a personal confrontation between the parties without

the intervention of a counsel or representative would

generate spontaneity and a favorable disposition to

amicable settlement on the part of the disputants. In

other words, the said procedure is deemed conducive to

the successful resolution of the dispute at the barangay

level.14

Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally appear before the

barangay Chairman was because of her recurring psychological ailments.

But for the entire year of 1988 15specifically September to December 6

there is no indication at all that petitioner went to see her psychiatrist

for consultation. The only conclusion is that 1988 was a lucid interval for

petitioner. There was, therefore, no excuse then for her non-appearance

at the Lupon Chairman's office.

Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent, cannot be

represented by counsel or even by attorney-in-fact

who is next of kin.16

As explained by the Minister of Justic with whom We agree:

To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal

confrontation between the parties, and thereby, the

effectiveness of the barangay conciliation proceedings as

a mode of dispute resolution, the above-quoted

provision is couched in mandatory language. Moreover,

pursuant to the familiar maxim in statutory construction

dictating that "expressio unius est exclusio alterius", the

express exceptions made regarding minors and

incompetents must be construed as exclusive of allothers not mentioned.

17

Petitioner's non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 legally barred

her from pursuing the ejectment case in the MTC of Manila.18

Having

arrived at this conclusion, there is no need for Us to discuss the other

issues involved.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision and resolution of the respondent

Court are affirmed in toto with treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 101328. April 7, 1993.

EMILIANA CANDIDO AND FRANCISCA CANDIDO, petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE DEMETRIO MACAPAGAL, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 18,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN AND MILA CONTRERAS,respondents.

Alberto M. Diaz for petitioners.

Luis S. Cuvin for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY (P.D. NO. 1508);

SCOPE OF POWER; RULE. From the provisions of P.D. No. 1508, it is clear

that the barangay court or Lupon has jurisdiction over disput