Lunar Lies: The Impact of Informational Framing and Individual Differences in Shaping Conspiracist Beliefs About the Moon Landings

Lunar Lies: The Impact of Informational Framing and Individual Differences inShaping Conspiracist Beliefs About the Moon Landings

VIREN SWAMI1,2, JAKOB PIETSCHNIG3, ULRICH S. TRAN3, INGO W. NADER3,STEFAN STIEGER3 and MARTIN VORACEK3

1Department of Psychology, University of Westminster, London, UK2Department of Psychology, HELP University College, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia3Department of Basic Psychological Research and Research Methods, School of Psychology, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria

Summary: Two studies examined the role of informational framing and individual differences on acceptance of the moon landingsconspiracy theory (CT). In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups in which they wereexposed to different forms of information about the moon landings CT. Results showed that information critical of the moonlandings CT resulted in attenuated conspiracist beliefs and that information supportive of the CT resulted in stronger conspiracistbeliefs. In addition, stronger belief in the moon landings CT was associated with participants’ belief in other CTs and openness toexperience. In Study 2, participants completed a survey measuring their belief in the moon landings CT and a range of individualdifference factors. Results showed that acceptance of the moon landings CT was associated with the adoption of a conspiracistworldview and schizotypal tendencies. Possibilities for conceptualizing the functional roles played by CTs are discussed. Copyright© 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

INTRODUCTION

Conspiracy theories (CTs) are a subset of false beliefs in whichthe ultimate cause of an event is believed to be due to a malev-olent plot by multiple actors working together, usually unlaw-fully and in secret (Bale, 2007; Barkun, 2003; Goldberg, 2001;Swami & Furnham, 2012). CTs appear to have found fertileground in many contemporary societies, which is an importantcause for concern for several reasons. Although CTs may offerthe potential to generate socio-political change and account-ability (Fenster, 1999; Sasson, 1995), they are more oftenthought to divert attention away from civic issues of realsignificance, undermine democratic debate, and create publicmistrust (Swami, 2012; Swami & Coles, 2010). Recent workhas also suggested that belief in CTs may be associated withmore authoritarian socio-political attitudes, such as supportfor governmental violations of human rights and restrictionson civil liberties (Swami et al., 2012a).It is, therefore, not surprising that scholars are paying

increased attention to the psychology of CTs, particularlyin terms of the nature and roots of such beliefs. Influencedby Hofstadter’s (1966) discussion of ‘paranoid styles’ inAmerican politics, some scholars have viewed CTs as theproducts of individual or collective pathology (e.g. Groh,1987; Wulff, 1987). However, others have pointed out thatthe lens of psychopathology cannot provide a comprehen-sive understanding of CTs, particularly as such beliefs areso widespread that it is implausible that so many membersof society are mentally ill (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009).Rather, more recent research has sought to understand therational basis and functional roles of CTs (e.g. Fenster,1999; Pratt, 2003; Waters, 1997).More specifically, it has been suggested that CTs help

individuals make sense of phenomena that are difficult tocomprehend, lack reliable explanatory frameworks, or are

beyond an individual’s control (Parish & Parker, 2001; Swami& Furnham, 2012). By the reduction and simplification ofthese phenomena and by the identification of a purportedcause, CTs offer a coherent explanation for phenomena thatis not otherwise forthcoming. Moreover, by the identificationof the source of a perceived injustice or tragedy, CTs allowindividuals to reaffirm their ability to shape historical pro-cesses and, thus, mitigate feelings of powerlessness (Miller,2002; Pratt, 2003). Certainly, there is evidence to suggest that,when individuals are experimentally made to feel they have alack of control, they are more likely to believe in CTs (Whitson& Galinsky, 2008; also Sullivan, Landau, & Rothschild,2010).

Viewed from this perspective, CTs are seen as rationalpsychological phenomena that fill a need for certainty, control,or understanding by filling gaps in knowledge (Swami &Furnham, 2012) or by offering a simplified explanation ofdifficult phenomena (Leman, 2007; Swami & Coles, 2010).Consistent with this view, a number of scholars have high-lighted the important role played by external sources of infor-mation in the acceptance of CTs (Sunstein &Vermeule, 2009).For example, in his work on extremism, Hardin (2002) arguedthat individuals often suffer from ‘crippled epistemologies’,that is, they have very little direct or relevant information abouta phenomenon and what little information they do have issupported by their extremist views.

In a similar vein, Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) haveargued that, in relation to CTs, where individuals suffer from‘crippled epistemologies’, they will rely on external sourcesof information that accord with their pre-existing beliefs fordirect information about an event (also McHoskey, 1995;Leman & Cinnirella, 2007). In this view, external sourcesof information play a crucial role in shaping conspiracistideation; in particular, it seems highly likely that the type ofinformation conveyed for a particular event will, in part atleast, shape belief in a CT. There is some evidence in supportof this perspective: one study reported that exposure to the1991 Oliver Stone-directed film JFK, in which it was allegedthat the assassination of John F. Kennedy was a government

*Correspondence to: Dr Viren Swami, Department of Psychology, Universityof Westminster, 309 Regent Street, London W1B 2UW, UK.E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Applied Cognitive Psychology, Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 71–80 (2013)Published online 13 September 2012 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/acp.2873

conspiracy, changed beliefs among participants towardsgreater acceptance of the CT (Butler, Koopman, & Zimbardo,1995). To date, however, the hypothesis that informationalframing will impact on belief in CTs has not been thoroughlyinvestigated.

In addition to informational framing, individual psychologi-cal differences are known to shape the acceptance of CTs(Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig & Gregory, 1999; Goertzel,1994; Swami, 2012; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham,2010). First, there is now ample evidence to suggest that CTsform part of a ‘monological belief system’ (Goertzel, 1994),such that the adoption of a conspiracist worldview eases theassimilation of novel (Swami et al., 2010) and fictional CTs(Swami et al., 2011), even if they contain internal contradictions(Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, in press). Goertzel (1994) proposedthat different CTs support each other and that, over time, aconspiracist explanation becomes the preferred explanationfor any event requiring an explanation (Swami & Furnham, inpress; Swami et al., 2010, 2011; Wood et al., in press).

Related work has indicated that conspiracist ideation isassociated with a range of individual difference traits, suchas distrust in authority, political cynicism, and powerlessness(Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al.,2010, 2011), which is consistent with the suggestion thatCTs are more common among the disenfranchised (Hofstadter,1966). In addition, recent studies have reported reliable asso-ciations between belief in CTs and the Big Five personalitytrait of agreeableness (Swami & Furnham, in press; Swamiet al., 2010, 2011), which has been explained as a function ofdisagreeable individuals being less trusting of others and possi-bly also holding lessmainstream political opinions. Several stud-ies have also indicated an association between belief in CTs andopenness to experience (Swami et al., 2010, 2011), which mayreflect the tendency of open individuals to seek out novel ideas.To date, however, studies examining belief in CTs and individ-ual psychological differences remain in their infancy.

The present studies

As a contribution to the literature on the psychology of CTs,the present work sought to examine the influence of informa-tional framing and individual differences on belief in aspecific CT, namely the moon landings CT. The latter is a setof claims that some or all elements of the Apollo programmewere hoaxes, perpetrated by the National Aeronautical andSpace Administration (NASA) and related organizations(Kaysing, 2002). The most notable of these claims is that theNASAmanned landings were faked and that Apollo astronautshave never landed on the moon. Conspiracy theorists arguethat NASA knowingly misled the general public into believingthat astronauts landed on the moon by manufacturing ortampering with evidence, particularly photographs of themoon landings. On the other hand, there is a good deal ofthird-party evidence for the Apollomoon landings and detailedrebuttals of the CT (e.g. Plait, 2002).

Even so, the moon landings CT appears to be very wide-spread, with up to a quarter of respondents from NorthAmerica and Europe believing that the moon landings didnot occur (e.g. Kruesi, 2009). Although such beliefs mayappear innocuous, they may reflect a more general distrust

in official sources of information, which may in turn feed so-cial and political anomie. As such, understanding the factorsthat shape belief in the moon landings CT, and CTs in gen-eral, remains an important task. To this end, in Study 1, weexamined the impact of informational framing on belief inthe moon landings CT and also examined associations be-tween belief in this CT and psychological individual differ-ences. Study 2 extended the findings of the first study by fo-cusing on the relationships between belief in themoon landing CTs and psychological individual differencesreflecting underlying pathology.

STUDY 1

The main focus of Study 1 was on the impact of informationalframing on belief in the moon landings CT. As noted earlier,conspiracy theorists frequently posit that evidence of the moonlandings was manufactured or manipulated by NASA andother organizations. For example, in some photographs of themoon landings, crosshairs (the net of lines in the eyepiece ofa sighting device) appear to be behind objects, such as flagsand mechanical instruments. Because the cameras were fittedwith reseau plates with crosshairs etched on, conspiracy theor-ists argue that it is impossible for any photographed object toappear in front of the grid, suggesting that the photographswere manipulated (e.g. by having objects pasted over cross-hairs). The counter-argument to this particular CT is that theproblem is caused by over-exposure in copied photographs(not the originals), where bright areas of an image ‘bleed’ overthe thin crosshairs (Moon Base Clauvius, n.d.). Similar argu-ments and counter-arguments exist in relation to many otherphotographs of the moon landings, which we used as the basisfor Study 1.More specifically, in Study 1, participants were randomly

assigned to one of three experimental conditions, in which theywere presented with photographs of the Apollo moon landingsthat are used as evidence of a CT. In a control condition, thephotographs were accompanied by text that simply describedthe scene. In a ‘supportive’ condition, the photographs wereaccompanied by text explaining why the scenes were evidenceof a conspiracy (e.g. crosshairs cannot appear behind objects).In a third, ‘critical’ condition, the photographs were accompa-nied by text explaining the conspiracist viewpoint followed bya rational counter-argument (e.g. bright areas of the image‘bled’ over crosshairs). By asking participants to completemeasures of their belief in the moon landings CT before andafter the experimental manipulation, we were able to examinethe impact of informational framing on belief in the moonlandings CT.The suggestion that informational framing will influence

belief in the moon landings CTs is broadly based on the ‘unim-odel of persuasion’ (e.g. Erb & Kruglanski, 2005; Erb et al.,2003), which suggests that when informational sets areshort and, therefore, requiring less processing effort, themessage argument will be sufficient to cause attitude change,all else being equal (e.g. communicator characteristics; Erb,Pierro, Mannetti, Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2007; Kruglanski &Thompson, 1999). To our knowledge, this proposition hasnot been tested in relation to belief in CTs, although it is

72 V. Swami et al.

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 71–80 (2013)

consistent with the suggestion that informational framing willhave an impact on such beliefs (Butler et al., 1995; Sunstein& Vermeule, 2009). That is, to the extent that attitude forma-tion is rarely based on a systematic and balanced explorationof all relevant issues (e.g. Stasser & Titus, 1985), the natureof information that an individual receives about a given phe-nomenon should have an impact on their attitudes.From this perspective, we expected that information

supportive of the moon landings CT would result in strongerconspiracist ideation, whereas information critical of the moonlandings CT would result in attenuated conspiracist beliefs.In addition, we also conducted a preliminary examination ofthe associations between belief in the moon landings CT and arange of individual difference factors, namely general conspiracistbeliefs, the Big Five personality traits, and extraterrestrial beliefs.The former two measures were included because they have beenshown to be associated with belief in CTs in previous studies(e.g. Swami & Furnham, in press; Swami et al., 2010, 2011).In addition, we also included a measure of extraterres-

trial beliefs, namely the Extraterrestrial Beliefs Scale (EBS;Swami, Furnham, Haubner, Stieger, & Voracek, 2009). TheEBS consists of three subscales, namely a general belief thatlife exists in the universe, beliefs about the scientific searchfor extraterrestrial life, and a belief that extraterrestrial lifehas visited Earth and that this fact is being covered up. Interms of Study 1, the most likely association is a positive onebetween belief in the moon landings CT and belief that theexistence of extraterrestrial life is being covered up, givenconceptual similarities between both sets of beliefs (i.e. beliefin one aspect of a government cover-up, namely extraterrestrialvisitation, should be associated with belief in a slightlydifferent government cover-up, namely the moon landings).

Method

Participants and designParticipants (N= 192, 50% women) were randomly assignedto one of three informational bias conditions: supportive ofthe moon landings CT (n = 64), critical of the CT (n = 64),or control (n = 64). Participants were German-speakingvolunteers from Central Europe and ranged in age from19 to 66 years (M = 27.86, SD= 9.45).

MaterialsStimuli. In each of the three experimental conditions, partici-pants were presented with a series of six greyscale photographsthat depicted scenes from the Apollo moon landings, selectedbecause they have previously been used as evidence of a CTbut have also been debunked (Moon Base Clauvius, n.d.). Ina control condition, the photographs were accompaniedby text that simply described the scene (e.g. ‘This is aphotograph of the lunar lander from the Apollo 14 mission’).In the CT-supportive condition, the photographs wereaccompanied by extended text explaining why the sceneswere evidence of a conspiracy. For example,

This is a photograph of the lunar lander from the Apollo14 mission. If one pays attention to the shadows of therocks in the foreground and the shadow of the lunarlander in the background, it becomes apparent that the

shadows are not parallel. This phenomenon is only seenwhen the light source originates from more than onesource near an object. As such, this image was likelytaken in a studio on Earth, rather than on the moon, sinceartificial lighting was used.

Finally, in the CT-critical condition, the photographs wereaccompanied by text explaining the conspiracist viewpointfollowed by a counter-argument:

This is a photograph of the lunar lander from the Apollo14 mission. The fact that the rocks in the foregroundand the lunar lander in the background do not produceparallel shadows is sometimes used as evidence thatartificial lighting has been used to create the image and,consequently, that the image was produced in a studioon Earth. However, this contention is invalid, as thereare multiple sources of light on the moon (the sun, theEarth, the reflecting lunar surface) and, moreover, theshape of the terrain of the photographed surface canproduce non-parallel shadows.

The remaining five photographs depicted Buzz Aldrinsaluting an apparently flapping flag, Neil Armstrong reflectedin the visor of Buzz Aldrin (apparently misaligned crosshairsand multiple sources of lighting), Buzz Aldrin in front of amoon lander with foreground imposed over a crosshair, aphotograph of the Eagle lunar lander (absence of blast cratersunder the lander), and the lander from the Apollo 14 missionwith no stars in the image. Because message length is knownto influence attitude change (Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999),we kept the messages in the supportive and critical conditionsof a roughly similar length (full stimulus sets are availablefrom the corresponding author).

Belief in themoon landings conspiracy theory. We constructeda novel 18-item scale to measure belief in the moon landingsCT. Beginning with an extensive literature review of the moonlandings CT, we composed items that reflected the suggestionthat the moon landings were a hoax. Redundant items wereexcluded prior to data collection, leaving 18 items that wereincluded in the final design (Table 1). All items were rated ona 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = stronglyagree). Because this scale has not been used previously, weconducted an initial examination of its factor structure in thepresent study (Results and Discussion section).

Conspiracist ideation. To measure general conspiracistideation, we used the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory(Swami et al., 2010, 2011; German translation: Swami et al.,2011), a 15-item measure that describes a range of prominentand internationally recognizable CTs (sample item: ‘A powerfuland secretive group, known as the NewWorld Order, are plan-ning to eventually rule the world through an autonomousworld government, which would replace sovereign govern-ments.’). All items are rated on a 9-point Likert-type scale(1 = completely false, 9 = completely true), and an overall scoreis computed as the mean of all items. Higher scores on thisscale reflect greater belief in CTs. Previous work has shownthat this scale is one-dimensional and has good internal consis-tency. In the present work, Cronbach’s a for this scale was .88.

Conspiracy theories 73

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 71–80 (2013)

Big Five personality traits. We included the Mini-InternationalPersonality Item Pool (Mini-IPIP; Donnellan, Oswald, Baird,& Lucas, 2006; German translation: Swami, et al., 2010a) toassess the Big Five personality traits of extraversion, agree-ableness, neuroticism, conscientiousness, and openness toexperience. The scale consists of 20 items (four items per BigFive trait; sample item: ‘Am not interested in other people’sproblems.’), which are rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale(1 = very inaccurate, 5 = very accurate). Trait scores are com-puted as the mean of relevant items. The Mini-IPIP has beenshown to have acceptable internal consistency, a similar traitcoverage as other Big Five measures, and comparable patternsof convergent, discriminant, and criterion-related validity toother Big Five measures (Donnellan et al., 2006). In the presentstudy, Cronbach’s as for the five traits were as follows: extra-version, .77; agreeableness, .83; conscientiousness, .61; neurot-icism, .70; and openness, .62.

Extraterrestrial beliefs. To measure extraterrestrial beliefs,we used the 23-item EBS (Swami et al., 2009). The scalemeasures extraterrestrial beliefs along three dimensions,namely alien visitation and cover-up (the belief that

extraterrestrial life has visited Earth and that its existence isbeing covered up; 11 items; sample item: ‘The governmentof this country is covering up the existence of extraterrestriallife.’), scientific search (beliefs about, and support for, thescientific search for extraterrestrial life; six items; sample item:‘The search for extraterrestrial life is a serious and importantscientific endeavour.’), and general beliefs (a belief in thehypothesis that life exists elsewhere in the universe; six items;sample item: ‘Given the size and age of the universe, it is verylikely that extraterrestrial life must exist.’). All items arerated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1= strongly disagree,7 = strongly agree), and subscale scores are computed bytaking the mean of items associated with each factor. Previouswork has shown that the EBS has good reliability and patternsof validity (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Shafi, 2010;Swami, Pietschnig, Stieger, & Voracek, 2011). In the presentstudy, Cronbach’s a values for the three subscales were asfollows: alien visitation and cover-up, .88; scientific search,.72; and general beliefs, .76.

Demographics. Participants provided their demographicdetails consisting of sex and age.

Table 1. Factor loadings for the novel belief in the moon landings conspiracy theory following exploratory factor analysis in Study 1

Factor 1 Factor 2

12. The fact that moon landers made no blast craters or any sign of dust scattersuggests that the landings were faked.

0.84 0.15

4. The fact that crosshairs appear in front of some objects in photographs of themoon landings proves that these photographs were faked.

0.79 0.17

17. Conspiracy theories of the moon landings are impossible because of their sizeand complexity: with the number of people that would have had to be involved,someone would have outed the hoax by now. (R)

0.79 0.07

7. The moon landings had to have been faked, as astronauts could not havesurvived the trip because of exposure to galactic radiation.

0.79 0.15

14. The environment of space would quickly render any photographs unusable,which means that photographs of the moon landings must have been faked.

0.78 0.08

3. The moon landings were staged by NASA to achieve a propaganda victoryagainst the USSR during the Cold War.

0.77 0.19

11. The alleged moon landings either used a sound stage or were filmedoutside in a remote desert, with slow-motion photography making it looklike they were on the moon.

0.76 0.23

18. The presence of retroreflectors (mirrors used as targets for earth-based trackinglasers) on the Moon is evidence that there were landings. (R)

0.76 0.16

16. NASA’s portrayal of the moon landings is fundamentally accurate, allowing forsuch common mistakes as mislabelled photos and imperfect personal recollections. (R)

0.76 0.19

9. The Moon’s surface is so hot that camera film would have melted, so film of themoon landings must have been faked.

0.73 0.39

6. The fact that there are no stars in photographs of the moon landings proves thatthey were faked.

0.70 0.39

1. I do not believe that humans have ever landed on the Moon. 0.64 0.352. The moon landings were staged to deflect attention away from the Vietnam War. 0.63 0.388. Film of the moon landings had to have been faked as film in the cameras wouldhave been fogged by galactic radiation.

0.59 0.23

5. The implausibly high quality of photographs of the moon landing is evidencethat they were faked.

0.56 0.27

10. The fact that films of the moon landings show a fluttering flag, despite there being nowind on the moon, proves that it was filmed on Earth.

0.01 0.80

15. In the 1960s and 1970s, the technology did not exist to travel to the Moon, whichmeans that the landings must have been faked.

0.38 0.77

13. The fact that the air-conditioning units that were part of the astronauts’ spacesuits couldnot have worked in an environment of no atmosphere is proof that the landings were faked.

0.18 0.63

Note: Items were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) and presented randomly in the study. Reverse-coded items aredenoted by (R).

74 V. Swami et al.

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 71–80 (2013)

ProcedureSixteen research assistants each recruited four test triplets(three same-sex individuals matched for age and highesteducational qualification) from their personal contacts inreturn for course credit. Within each triplet, participants wereassigned randomly to one of the three experimental condi-tions. Upon arrival at the laboratory, all participants initiallyprovided informed consent and completed the measure ofbelief in the moon landings CT (pre-test), before beingassigned to the experimental conditions. In each experimentalcondition, participants were presented with the six photo-graphs and associated information in a random order. Partici-pants were instructed to examine each photograph and theaccompanying text presented on sheets of A4 paper. Subse-quently, participants completed the measure assessing beliefin the moon landings CT post-test, as well the measures ofconspiracist ideation, personality, and extraterrestrial beliefsnoted earlier. All participants took part on a voluntary basisand were not remunerated for participation.

Results and discussion

To examine the factor structure of beliefs in the moon land-ings CT, we computed exploratory factor analysis (EFA,principal components method) with varimax rotation usingpre-test data. The size of the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measureof sampling adequacy, .93, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity,w2(153) = 2247.68, p< .001, indicated that the items of thisnovel scale had adequate common variance for factor analysis(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). For the EFA, the number offactors to be extracted was determined by factor eigenvalues(l) above 1.0 and was based on the scree-plot criterion (Cattell,1966). In addition, an extraction criterion of 0.30 for itemfactor loadings was used (Kline, 1986), and where items hadmultiple loadings, the most conceptually plausible solutionwas preferred.Results of the EFA indicated a first, dominant factor that

accounted for 44.4% of the variance (l=8.17). There was asteep decline to the second factor, which accounted for14.2% of the variance (l=2.56). Examination of the factorloadings showed that, including cross-loading items, all buttwo of the items (# 10 and 13) loaded onto the first factor.Based on these results, we computed an overall score ofbelief in the moon landings CT as the mean of all 16 itemsthat loaded onto the first factor (Cronbach’s a= .92).Because two items are likely unstable factorially, we dis-carded the two items loading on the second factor fromall further analyses.Participants in the experimental conditions did not differ

either in their pre-test belief in the moon landings CT (control:M=2.73, SD=1.14; supportive: M=2.66, SD=0.98; critical:M=2.57, SD=1.07), F(2, 192) = 0.38, p= .685, Z2

p < 0.01,

nor in age, F(2, 192) = 0.04, p= .960, Z2p < 0.01, or highest

educational qualification, w2(12) = 0.43, p= .906, f=0.05,confirming that randomization was successful, resulting inequivalent groups. We, therefore, conducted a 3� 2 mixedanalysis of variance, with condition (control versus supportiveversus critical) as the between-subjects factor and testingperiod (pre-test versus post-test) as the within-subjects factor.

The results showed no significant main effects of condi-tion, F(2, 189) = 2.44, p = .090, Z2

p = 0.03, or testing period,

F(1, 189) = 0.23, p= .634, Z2p < 0.01. However, there was

a significant condition by testing period interaction,F(2, 189) = 27.62, p< .001, Z2

p = 0.23 (see Figure 1 fordescriptive statistics). Paired t-tests showed that, for partici-pants in the control condition, there was little change in theirconspiracist beliefs about the moon landings, t(63) = 0.01,p= .998, d< 0.01. On the other hand, there was a significantand substantial decrease in conspiracist beliefs among partici-pants in the critical condition, t(63) = 4.57, p< .001, d=1.15,and likewise a significant and substantial increase in con-spiracist beliefs among participants in the supportive condi-tion, t(63) = 4.55, p< .001, d=1.15.

Next, we computed bivariate correlations between belief inthe moon landings CT in the pre-test period, belief in generalconspiracy theories, the Big Five traits, extraterrestrial beliefs,and participant age. As can be seen in Table 2, greater belief inthe moon landings CT was significantly associated withbelief in general CTs, openness to experience, and two of thethree subscales of the EBS. We next entered these variablesinto a multiple linear regression model (forced-entry method),with belief in the moon landings CT as the criterion variable.Although the regression was significant, F(10, 191) = 12.11,p< .001, adj. R2 = 0.37, only belief in general CTs(B=0.47, SE=0.06, b= .59, t=7.90, p< .001) and openness(B=0.35, SE=0.11, b= .20, t=3.23, p< .001) emerged assignificant predictors.

The results of Study 1 indicate that message bias has fairlylarge effects on agreement or disagreement with CTs aboutthe moon landings. That is, the type of information thatrespondents receive can influence their belief in a CT, withinformation supportive of the moon landings CT leading tostronger conspiracist beliefs and information critical of theCT attenuating conspiracist beliefs. Although these findingsmay have been expected (cf. Butler et al., 1995), the verylarge effect size of the change in conspiracist ideation shouldbe noted (d = 1.15). In addition, the present results showed

Figure 1. Graphical depiction of the significant interaction betweenexperimental condition and testing period in Study 1

Conspiracy theories 75

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 71–80 (2013)

that general conspiracist ideation and openness to experiencewere associated with belief in the moon landings CT. Theseresults support previous studies (Swami et al., 2010, 2011)showing that CTs form part of a monological belief systemand that openness is a key antecedent of conspiracist beliefs.

STUDY 2

In Study 2, we sought to extend the results of the previousstudy by examining associations between the moon landingsCT and a range of individual difference traits that may reflectunderlying psychopathology. As noted earlier, althoughmost scholars are in agreement that CTs are unlikely toreflect individual or collective psychopathology (Sunstein& Vermeule, 2009; Swami & Coles, 2010), it is plausiblethat some psychopathological tendencies make acceptanceof CTs more likely. Indeed, there is now some evidence tosupport this prediction: for example, two studies havereported significant and positive associations between beliefin CTs and paranormal beliefs (Darwin, Neave, & Holmes,2011; Swami et al., 2011), that is, a belief in processes forwhich there is currently no supportive empirical evidence.This association has been explained as a function of conspiracytheorists being less likely to think analytically (Swami et al.,2011) or as a function of their greater proclivity to believe thatall orthodoxies are wrong (Ramsay, 2006).

In addition, at least one study has reported a positive asso-ciation between belief in CTs and schizotypy (Darwin et al.,2011), that is, a personality dimension that includes traitssuch as suspicion, magical thinking, paranoia, and unusualbeliefs (Bentall, Claridge, & Slade, 1989). It has beensuggested that these schizotypal traits, by their very nature,make belief in CTs more likely; for example, because theyare more open to unusual experiences, schizotypal indivi-duals may be more receptive to alternative explanations ofa given phenomenon (Darwin et al., 2011). Even so, furtherevidence is necessary before firm conclusions can be drawnon the basis of available data.

For one thing, the study by Darwin et al. (2011) used a briefmeasure of schizotypy, which, although reliable, may obscurelower-order facets of schizotypy that are most directly relatedto belief in CTs. In addition, it is possible to extend earlier workby examining neglected factors. In particular, schizotypy hasbeen previously associated with New Age practices (e.g. Farias,

Claridge& Lalljee, 2006), but the latter’s association with beliefin CTs has not been investigated. In addition, previous studieshave not investigated inter-relationships between schizotypy,New Age orientation, and traits that have been identified asprecursors of belief in CTs in previous studies, such as theBig Five traits and, in relation to the moon landings CT specif-ically, extraterrestrial beliefs. In Study 2, then, we sought to fillthis gap in the literature by concurrently examining the impactof these variables on belief in the moon landings CT utilizingpath analysis.

Method

ParticipantsParticipants of Study 2 were 392 German-speaking volunteersfrom Central Europe who had not taken part in Study 1. Parti-cipants ranged in age from 18 to 80 years (M=32.84,SD=13.52).

MeasuresBelief in the moon landings conspiracy theory. Participantscompleted the 18-item measure of belief in the moon landingsCT, as described in Study 1. From the results of Study 1, wecomputed an overall score as the mean of all 16 items that loadedonto the first factor as reported in Table 1. Cronbach’s a for thisscale in Study 2 was .95.

Conspiracist ideation. Participants completed the Belief inConspiracy Theories Inventory as in Study 1. Cronbach’s afor this scale in Study 2 was .86.

Big Five personality traits. We used the Mini-IPIP, asdescribed in Study 1. In the present study, Cronbach’s afigures for the five traits were as follows: extraversion, .74;agreeableness, .70; conscientiousness, .63; neuroticism, .62;and openness, .59.

Extraterrestrial beliefs. To measure extraterrestrial beliefs,we used all three subscales of the EBS, as described in Study1. In Study 2, Cronbach’s a values for the three subscaleswere as follows: alien visitation and cover-up, .89; scientificsearch, .80; and general beliefs, .83.

Schizotypy. To measure schizotypy and psychosis proneness,we used the full-length 104-item Oxford–Liverpool Inventory

Table 2. Inter-scale correlations between all variables (except CT post-test scores) in Study 1

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)

(1) Pre-test belief in moon landings CT .59** .02 �.03 .05 �.01 .31** .35** �.16* .04 .10(2) Belief in general CTs .11 .04 .06 .15* .25* .60** .28** .12 .07(3) Extraversion .16* .10 .16* .16* .01 �.02 .04 �.03(4) Agreeableness .11 .05 .08 �.01 �.06 �.01 .20**(5) Conscientiousness .09 .06 .22* .13 .14 .01(6) Neuroticism .09 .10 .02 .20* �.10(7) Openness to experience .22* .03 .09 .06(8) EBS alien visitation and cover-up .34** .15* .13(9) EBS scientific search .24* .08(10) EBS general beliefs �.13(11) AgeM 2.65 3.62 2.85 2.86 2.79 3.03 2.55 3.04 3.27 3.84 27.85SD 1.06 1.32 0.39 0.42 0.57 0.47 0.59 0.73 0.74 0.56 9.45

Note.CT, conspiracy theory; EBS, Extraterrestrial Belief Scale. N= 192. *p< .05, **p< .001 (two tailed).

76 V. Swami et al.

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 71–80 (2013)

of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason, Claridge, &Jackson, 1995; German translation: Swami et al., 2011).This scale consists of four subscales, namely the following:(i) unusual experiences (measures cognitive and perceptualeccentricity, with reference tomagical thinking, hallucinations,and paranoid ideation); (ii) introverted anhedonia (measuresthe absence of pleasurable experiences and limited socialnetworks); (iii) cognitive disorganization (measures socialanxiety, attentional difficulties, and distractibility); and(iv) impulsive nonconformity (measures asocial behaviourand mood-related disinhibition). All items are rated on a5-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = stronglyagree), and subscale scores are computed by taking the meanof items associated with each factor. Previous work has shownthat the scale has good patterns of reliability and validity (Ma-son et al., 1995). In the present study, Cronbach’s a values forthe four subscales were as follows: unusual experiences, .90;introverted anhedonia, .80; cognitive disorganization, .91;and impulsive nonconformity, .75.

New Age orientation. To measure New Age orientation, weused the New Age Orientation Scale (Granqvist & Hagekull,2001; German translation: Swami, Stieger, Pietschnig, Nader,& Voracek, 2012). This scale consists of 22 items that measureindividual differences in broad and specific systems of NewAge thoughts, beliefs, interests, and activities (e.g. parapsycho-logical phenomena, astrology, and spiritualism). All items arerated on a 6-point Likert-type scale (1= strongly disagree,6 = strongly agree), and an overall New Age orientation scoreis computed as the mean of all items. Evidence of good conver-gent and divergent validity and internal consistency wasreported by Granqvist and Hagekull (2001). In the presentstudy, Cronbach’s a for this scale was .92.

Demographics. Participants provided their demographicdetails consisting of sex and age.

ProceduresParticipants were recruited opportunistically by researchassistants through their personal contacts. Individual testing

took place in a quiet location and was voluntary and not remu-nerated. Following the administration of the questionnaire,participants were thanked and debriefed personally.

Results and discussion

Descriptive statistics (M and SD) and bivariate correlationsbetween all variables included in Study 2, with the exceptionof agreeableness, neuroticism, extraversion, and conscien-tiousness (which were not significantly correlated with beliefin the moon landings CT, rs = .06–.08) are reported in Table 3.Belief in the moon landings CT was significantly associatedwith belief in general CTs, all three subscales of the EBS, theunusual experience subscale of the O-LIFE, New Age orienta-tion, and participant age. The results of these correlationalanalyses were used to construct a tentative parsimonious pathmodel in MPlus 6.11 (Muthén & Muthén, 2008) regardingthe interrelations between the various predictors and theirassociations with belief in the moon landings CT.

The preliminary model included participant age, openness,NewAge orientation, and the O-LIFE subscale unusual experi-ences as exogenous variables, beliefs in general CTs and beliefin the existence of extraterrestrial life as mediators, and beliefin the moon landings CT as an endogenous variable (Figure 2).We started with a preliminary model, where exogenous vari-ables had only paths to mediators. Model goodness of fit wasassessed via the w2 test statistic, the comparative fit index(CFI), the Tucker–Lewis index (TLI), the root mean squareerror of approximation (RMSEA) with a 90% confidenceinterval (CI), and the standardized root mean square residual(SRMR; Bentler, 1990; Bollen, 1989; Browne & Cudeck,1993; Mulaik et al., 1989).

The hypothesized model had an acceptable fit with the data,w2(5) = 11.75, p= .038, CFI = 0.973, TLI = 0.918, RMSEA=0.061, 90%CI= [0.013, 0.107], SRMR=0.021, that could beimproved, however. We dropped nonsignificant paths fromthe model and added an extra path from age to belief in themoon landings CT, guided by modification indices. The finalmodel fitted well with the data, w2(7) = 9.42, p= .224, CFI =0.990, TLI=0.979, RMSEA=0.031, 90%CI= [0.000, 0.076],SRMR=0.024. The combined predictors accounted for34.8% of the variance in belief in the moon landings CT,

Table 3. Inter-scale correlations between all variables in Study 2

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)

(1) Belief in moon landings CT .54** �.02 .23** �.12* �.21** .16* �.01 .05 .09 .18** �.12*(2) Belief in general CTs .06 .45** .12* �.01 .30** .01 .14* .12* .37** �.02(3) Openness �.05 .07 .15* .18** �.29** .13* .01 .04 �.26**(4) EBS visitation and cover-up .56** .34** .22** .08 .14* .07 .44** .09*(5) EBS scientific search .57** .02 .03 .10* �.03 .15* .09*(6) EBS general beliefs �.15* �.16** .06 �.11* .07 .05(7) Unusual experiences .03 .45** .66** .44** �.15*(8) Introverted anhedonia �.07 .25** �.04 .26**(9) Impulsive nonconformity .40** .11* �.26**(10) Cognitive disorganization .19** �.16**(11) New Age orientation .15*(12) AgeM 2.75 3.94 3.59 2.49 3.41 5.33 2.26 2.50 2.89 2.76 2.55 32.84SD 1.21 1.32 0.70 1.12 1.30 1.37 0.68 0.54 0.40 0.80 0.90 13.52

Note.CT, conspiracy theory; EBS, Extraterrestrial Belief Scale. N = 392. *p< .05, **p< .001.

Conspiracy theories 77

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 71–80 (2013)

15.1% of the variance of beliefs in general CTs, and 10.0% ofthe variance of general beliefs about extraterrestrial life.

As can be seen in Figure 2, stronger New Age orientationled to both stronger general belief in extraterrestrial life andstronger beliefs in CTs. However, stronger general belief inextraterrestrial life also went on par with higher opennessand lower scores on unusual experiences, whereas higherscores on unusual experiences led to stronger beliefs inCTs. Stronger general beliefs in extraterrestrial life had, inturn, a negative effect on the endogenous variable, whereasbeliefs in CTs had a large positive effect. Independent ofthese factors, younger individuals also exhibited slightlystronger tendencies of belief in the moon landings CT.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In two studies, we investigated the impact of informationalframing and individual differences in shaping belief in CTsabout the moon landings. In Study 1, we showed that thetype of information that respondents receive can influencetheir belief in CT, with information supportive of the moonlandings CT leading to stronger conspiracist beliefs andinformation critical of the CT attenuating conspiracist beliefs.Although this finding may seem not unexpected, the largeeffect size of our experimental manipulation was noteworthy,suggesting that the type of information that individuals receivehas a very large impact on their subsequent agreement withCTs. Broadly speaking, our findings fit well with suggestionsthat external sources of information play an important role inthe acceptance of CTs (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). It wouldthus appear that the informational styles adopted by externalsources of information for a given event can be influential inthe transmission of CTs.

In two studies, we also showed that individual psychologi-cal differences shape belief in the moon landings CT. Specifi-cally, our results are consistent with previous work showingthat CTs form part of a monological belief system, such thatindividuals who have already adopted a conspiracist world-view are more likely to endorse individual CTs (Goertzel,1994; Wood et al., in press). In addition, our work is also

consistent with studies showing an important antecedent rolefor openness to experience (Swami et al., 2010, 2011) andschizotypy (Darwin et al., 2011) in relation to conspiracist ide-ation. In terms of the moon landings CT specifically, it appearsthat beliefs about the cover-up of extraterrestrial visitation toEarth are also an important antecedent. In addition, we alsofound significant and negative correlations between belief inthe moon landings CT and beliefs about the scientific searchfor extraterrestrial life in both studies and general beliefs aboutthe existence of extraterrestrial life in Study 2. It is possible thatthese associations reflect a more negative stance toward thescientific establishment among those who strongly believe inCTs. Finally, our results also implicate New Age orientationas an important correlate of not only the moon landings CTbut also belief in CTs more broadly.Generally speaking, the present set of results fits well with

accounts suggesting that CTs should be viewed as meta-explanatory frameworks that fill functional needs (Swami &Coles, 2010). In terms of the moon landings specifically,where information about the same event can be explained fromdifferent points of view, CTs may offer a seemingly coherentsystemic explanation, while also tying together a series ofunrelated events (e.g. CTs about governmental cover-upsof alien visitation). These findings may offer a number ofinteresting starting points for future research. For example, inaddition to informational framing, future studies could alsoexamine the role of emotional valence in the acceptance ofCTs. Indeed, it has been proposed that CTs serve to focusattention on biased information by triggering emotionalresponses (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009), although this possi-bility does not appear to have been experimentally tested.In addition, it will be important for future studies to begin to

put together models of CTs that more comprehensively takeinto account the nature of information and its transmission.For example, future work could examine the impact of factorsthat are exogenous to the message, such as source characteris-tics (e.g. Bohner, Ruder, & Erb, 2002) and recipients’ moodstates (e.g. Bohner, Chaiken, &Hunyadi, 1994), on acceptanceof CTs. Such studies may prove important in identifying thespecific situations and conditions under which individuals aremore likely to accept a conspiracist explanation for a givenphenomenon. In addition, it will be important in future workto more fully examine the concurrent effects of both informa-tional framing and individual psychological differences onbelief in CTs.Limitations of the present work also include the opportu-

nistic sampling approach, which limits the generalizabilityof the present studies. In addition, the use of a brief measureof the Big Five personality trait likely obscures associationsbetween lower-order facets and belief in CTs, which futurework could overcome through the use of a more comprehen-sive measure of the Big Five. In a similar vein, it is also impor-tant to note that Studies 1 and 2 did not produce exactly thesame pattern of results (e.g. the correlation between belief inthe moon landings CT and openness was significant only inStudy 1), which may reflect sampling differences or designlimitations (e.g. the relatively low reliabilities of someBig Fivetraits). These limitations notwithstanding, the present studyadds to our understanding of CTs by showing how informa-tional framing and individual differences both impact on such

NAOS

BCTI

EBS General Beliefs.28***

.19**

-.21***

-.12**

Openness

Age

.21***

.54***

Belief in moon

landings CT-.30***

.17**

O-LIFE Unusual

Experiences

Figure 2. Path model on predictors of belief in the moon landingsconspiracy theory (CT), including standardized path coefficients.Note. NAOS: New Age Orientation Scale; O-LIFE: Oxford–LiverpoolInventory of Feeling and Experiences; EBS: Extraterrestrial BeliefScale; BCTI: Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory. *p< .01,

**p< .001

78 V. Swami et al.

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 71–80 (2013)

beliefs. Future work in understanding the functional rolesplayed by CTs remains an important task for scholars giventhe many detrimental effects of conspiracist ideation (Swami& Coles, 2010).

REFERENCES

Abalakina-Paap, M., Stephan, W. G., Craig, T., & Gregory, W. L. (1999).Beliefs in conspiracies. Political Psychology, 20, 637–647.

Bale, J. M. (2007). Political paranoia v. political realism: On distinguishingbetween bogus conspiracy theories and genuine conspiratorial politics.Patterns of Prejudice, 41, 45–60.

Barkun, M. (2003). A culture of conspiracy. Berkeley, CA: University ofCalifornia Press.

Bentall, R. P., Claridge, G., & Slade, P. D. (1989). The multi dimensionalnature of schizotypal traits: A factor analytic study with normal subjects.British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 28, 363–375.

Bentler, P. M. (1990). Comparative fit indexes in structural models. Psycho-logical Bulletin, 107, 238–246.

Bohner, G., Chaiken, S., & Hunyadi, P. (1994). The role of mood and messageambiguity in the interplay of heuristic and systematic processing. EuropeanJournal of Social Psychology, 24, 207–221.

Bohner, G., Ruder, M., & Erb, H.-P. (2002). When expertise backfires:Contrast and assimilation effects in persuasion. British Journal of SocialPsychology, 41, 495–519.

Bollen, K. A. (1989). Structural equations with latent variables. New York:Wiley.

Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing modelfit. In K. A. Bollen, & J. S. Long (Eds.), Testing structural equationmodels (pp. 136–162). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Butler, L. D., Koopman, C., & Zimbardo, P. G. (1995). The psychologicalimpact of the film JFK. Political Psychology, 16, 237–257.

Cattell, R. B. (1966). The scree plot test for the number of factors.MultivariateBehavioral Research, 1, 140–161.

Darwin, H., Neave, N., & Holmes, J. (2011). Belief in conspiracy theories. Therole of paranormal belief, paranoid ideation, and schizotypy. Personalityand Individual Differences, 50, 1289–1293.

Donnellan, M. B., Oswald, F. L., Baird, B. M., & Lucas, R. E. (2006). TheMini-IPIP scales: Tiny-yet-effective measure of the big five factors ofpersonality. Psychological Assessment, 18, 192–203.

Erb, H.-P., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2005). Persuasion: Ein oder zwei Prozesse?[Persuasion: One or two processes?]. Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie,36, 117–131.

Erb, H.-P., Kruglanski, A. W., Chun, W. Y., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., &Spiegel, S. (2003). Searching for commonalities in human judgement: Theparametric unimodel and its dual mode alternatives. European Review ofSocial Psychology, 14, 1–48.

Erb, H.-P., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., Spiegel, S., & Kruglanski, A. W. (2007).Biased processing of persuasive information: On the functional equivalenceof cues and message arguments. European Journal of Social Psychology,37, 1057–1075.

Farias, M., Claridge, G., & Lalljee, M. (2006). Personality and cognitivepredictors of New Age practices and beliefs. Personality and IndividualDifferences, 39, 979–989.

Fenster, M. (1999). Conspiracy theories: Secrecy and power in Americanculture. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Goertzel, T. (1994). Belief in conspiracy theories. Political Psychology, 15,731–742.

Goldberg, R. A. (2001). Enemies within: The culture of conspiracy inmodern America. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Granqvist, P., & Hagekull, B. (2001). Seeking security in the new age: Onattachment and emotional compensation. Journal for the Scientific Studyof Religion, 40, 529–547.

Groh, D. (1987). The temptation of conspiracy theory, or: Why do bad thingshappen to good people? In C. F. Graumann, & S. Moscovici (Eds.),Changing conceptions of conspiracy (pp. 1–37). New York: Springer.

Hardin, R. (2002). The crippled epistemology of extremism. In A. Breton,G. Galeotti, P. Salmon, & R. Wintrobe (Eds.), Political extremism andrationality (pp. 3–22). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hofstadter, R. (1966). The paranoid style in American politics. In R.Hofstadter (Ed.), The paranoid style in American politics and otheressays (pp. 3–40). New York: Knopf.

Kaysing, B. (2002). We never went to the moon: America’s thirty billiondollar swindle. Pomeroy, WA: Health Research Books.

Kline, P. (1986). Handbook of test construction. London: Routledge andKegan Paul.

Kruesi, L. (2009, December). The cosmic grid. Astronomy Magazine, 62.Kruglanski, A. W., & Thompson, E. P. (1999). Persuasion by a single route:

A view from the unimodel. Psychological Inquiry, 10, 83–109.Leman, P. J. (2007, July 14). The born conspiracy. New Scientist, 35–37.Leman, P. J., & Cinnirella, M. (2007). A major event has a major cause.

Social Psychological Review, 9, 18–28.Mason, O., Claridge, G., & Jackson, M. (1995). New scales for the assessment

of schizotypy. Personality and Individual Differences, 18, 7–13.McHoskey, J. W. (1995). Case closed? On the John F. Kennedy assassination:

Biased assimilation of evidence and attitude polarization. Basic and AppliedSocial Psychology, 17, 395–409.

Miller, S. (2002). Conspiracy theories: Public arguments as coded socialcritiques. Argumentation and Advocacy, 39, 40–56.

Moon Base Clauvius (n.d). Debunking the moon hoax. Online publicationat: http://www.clavius.org/index.html.

Mulaik, S. A., James, L. R., van Alstine, J., Bennet, N., Lind, S., & Stilwell,C. D. (1989). Evaluation of goodness-of-fit indices for structural equationmodels. Psychological Bulletin, 105, 430–445.

Muthén, L. K., & Muthén, B. O. (2008). Mplus user’s guide. Los Angeles,CA: Muthén & Muthén.

Parish, J., & Parker, M. (Eds.) (2001). The age of anxiety: Conspiracy the-ory and the human sciences. Wiley-Blackwell: London.

Plait, P. (2002). Bad astronomy: Misconceptions and misuses revealed, fromastrology to the moon landing ‘hoax’. London: Wiley.

Pratt, R. (2003). Theorizing conspiracy. Theory and Society, 32, 255–271.Ramsay, R. (2006). Conspiracy theories. Harpenden: Pocket Essentials.Sasson, T. (1995). African American conspiracy theories and the social

construction of crime. Sociological Inquiry, 65, 265–285.Stasser, G., & Titus, W. (1985). Pooling of unshared information in group

decision making: Biased information sampling during discussion.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 1448–1467.

Sullivan, D., Landau, M. J., & Rothschild, Z. K. (2010). An existentialfunction of enemyship: Evidence that people attribute influence topersonal and political enemies to compensate for threats to control.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98, 434–449.

Sunstein, S. R., & Vermeule, A. (2009). Conspiracy theories: Causes andcures. The Journal of Political Philosophy, 17, 202–227.

Swami, V. (2012). Social psychological origins of conspiracy theories: Thecase of the Jewish conspiracy theory in Malaysia. Frontiers in Psychology,3, article 280.

Swami, V., Chamorro-Premuzic, T., & Furnham, A. (2010a). Unansweredquestions: A preliminary investigation of personality and individualdifference predictors of 9/11 conspiracist beliefs. Applied CognitivePsychology, 24, 749–761.

Swami, V., Chamorro-Premuzic, T., & Shafi, M. (2010b). Psychology inouter space: Personality, individual difference, and demographic predic-tors of beliefs about extraterrestrial life. European Psychologist, 15,220–228.

Swami, V., & Coles, R. (2010). The truth is out there: Belief in conspiracytheories. The Psychologist, 23, 560–563.

Swami, V., & Furnham, A. (2012). Political paranoia and conspiracytheories. To appear in J.-P. Prooijen, & P. A. M. van Lange (Eds.), Powerpolitics, and paranoia: Why people are suspicious about their leaders.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Swami, V., & Furnham, A. (in press). Examining conspiracist beliefs about thedisappearance of Amelia Earhart. The Journal of General Psychology.

Swami, V., Coles, R., Stieger, S., Pietschnig, J., Furnham, A., Rehim, S., &Voracek, M. (2011a). Conspiracist ideation in Britain and Austria:Evidence of a monological belief system and associations betweenindividual psychological differences and real-world and fictitiousconspiracy theories. British Journal of Psychology, 102, 443–463.

Swami, V., Furnham, A., Haubner, T., Stieger, S., & Voracek, M. (2009). Thetruth is out there: The structure of beliefs about extraterrestrial life amongAus-trian and British respondents. Journal of Social Psychology, 149, 29–43.

Conspiracy theories 79

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 71–80 (2013)

Swami, V., Nader, I. W., Pietschnig, J., Stieger, S., Tran, U., & Voracek,M. (2012a). Personality and individual difference correlates of attitudestoward human rights and civil liberties. Personality and IndividualDifferences, 53, 443–447.

Swami, V., Pietschnig, J., Stieger, S., &Voracek,M. (2011b). Alien psychology:An examination of extraterrestrial beliefs as paranormal thinking and itsassociation with other paranormal beliefs, schizotypy, and the Big Fivepersonality factors. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25, 647–653.

Swami, V., Stieger, S., Pietschnig, J., Nader, I. W., & Voracek, M. (2012b).Using more than 10% of our brains: Examining belief in science-relatedmyths from an individual differences perspective. Learning and IndividualDifferences, 22, 404–408.

Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using multivariate statistics(5th ed). Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.

Waters, A. M. (1997). Conspiracy theories as ethnosociologies. Journal ofBlack Studies, 28, 112–125.

Whitson, J. A., & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). Lacking control increases illusorypattern perception. Science, 322, 115–117.

Wood, M. J., Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (in press). Dead and alive:Beliefs in contradictory conspiracy theories. Social Psychological andPersonality Science.

Wulff, E. (1987). Paranoid conspiratory delusion. In C. F. Graumann, & S.Moscovici (Eds.), Changing conceptions of conspiracy (171–190).New York: Springer.

80 V. Swami et al.

Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 27: 71–80 (2013)