Loyalty, Anxiety and Opportunism: Local Elite Activism during the Taiping Rebellion in Zhejiang, 1851-1864

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Loyalty, Anxiety and Opportunism: Local Elite Activism during the Taiping Rebellion in

Eastern Zhejiang, 1851–1864

It was April 1853, the third month of the third year of the Xianfeng reign. Duan

Guangqing knelt in the main hall of the Chen Lineage, Yin County’s wealthiest household.

Duan, the acting prefect of Ningbo and magistrate of Yin County, appealed to the Chen lineage

to contribute funds to defray mounting military expenses incurred in the fight against the Taiping

Rebellion. Several days earlier, the Xianfeng Emperor himself had urged Zhejiang officials in a

letter to work even harder at extracting local financial resources. The emperor apologized,

explaining, “This is because I have no other way” (ciju nai chuyu wanbudeyi).1 Ningbo being

among the richest and most commercialized parts of Zhejiang, the governor of Zhejiang sent a

private letter to Duan ordering him to make sure that the households in his prefecture “donate

generously.”2 Although begging and pleading had never been his way of dealing with local

elites, facing the Taiping threat, Duan Guangqing now decided to kneel. The Chen lineage

contributed 20,000 taels of silver, and other rich Ningbo households followed suit. Ningbo

Prefecture alone sent half a million taels of silver to the Qing court.3

After the shameful loss of the county seat in the winter of 1861, the Qing governmental

officials fled, leaving thousands of Yin County residents behind. At this critical moment,

bagongsheng Chen Zhengyue of the Chen lineage stepped into the political vacuum, took the

risk and the responsibility, and initiated a plan to retake Ningbo.4 He persuaded the Qing troops

1 Duan Guangqing, Jinghu zizhuan nianpu (Duan Guangqing Diary) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1960), 81.

2 Duan Guangqing, 81.

3 Zhejiang bainian dashiji (A chronology of the past one hundred years of Zhejiang) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang

renmin chubanshe, 1986), 24.

4 Zhang Zhongli, Zhongguo shenshi (Chinese Gentry) (Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui kexue chubanshe, 1991),

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to fight for Ningbo, organized an allied action with foreign armies, and gave financial backing to

the recovery plan.5 In doing so, Chen established a new form of collaboration with the

government.

Collaboration between the government and elites in more marginal areas like Zhuji

County was rare. Although situated in the wealthy Shaoxing Prefecture, Zhuji was less

commercialized, being farther from the coast.6 Utterly independent of the government, Zhuji

County’s local elites dominated their own local affairs. In the face of natural disasters and the

rampages of soldiers in early 1860, the head of the powerful He lineage, He Wenqing, formed a

family militia. After the Taipings marched into Zhejiang in May 1861, He’s challenges to the

Qing authorities became increasingly direct and bold. By the summer of 1861, the local

government’s lack of authority was apparent.

When Duan Guangqing inspected Zhuji that July, he wrote: “There were more than

20,000 Qing soldiers in Zhuji; however, the local people regarded them as enemies and burned

28-29. Bagongsheng were the selected gongsheng who had passed the examination presided by the provincial

education official. This examination happened every 12 years. Gongsheng were the excellent students from

various levels of governmental schools (shengyuan). Bagongsheng were considered upper-strata gentry elite

because this title allowed its holders to enter officialdom directly.

5 Guangxu yinxianzhi (Yin gazetteer complied in the Guangxu reign), 1876, vol. 44 Renwu (People) 20:3b.

Chen Zhengyue.

6 Keith Schoppa, Chinese Elites and Political Change: Zhejiang Province in the Early Twentieth Century

(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 13-20. James Cole, Shaohsing: Competition and Cooperation in

Nineteenth-Century China (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1986), 20 on gentry-official relations,

155 on lineage society, and 156-164 Appendix A.

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down the army camp….They [the locals] welcomed the rebels and joined the Taipings.”7

These

“local people” were in fact the He militiamen. In a very short time, the Taipings occupied a

series of Zhejiang counties. He Wenqing relinquished his ostensible alliance with the Qing and

incited strongmen in Cheng, Xinchang, Yuyao, Ciqi, and Zhenhai counties to switch to the

Taiping side. He Wenqing became the guide for the Taipings and came to be regarded by the

British as the main reason for the Taipings’ consistent success in Zhejiang.8

What did the Taiping Rebellion mean to these various Yin and Zhuji county elites? Why

did they make opposite choices? What does this tell us about regional differences and disparate

patterns of dominance? Furthermore, how did the Taiping Rebellion change the local political

structure? This paper explores the local experience under the Taiping Rebellion by sorting out

the details of eastern Zhejiang’s Taiping Rebellion and by analyzing the activities and

interactions of officials and elites in the Ningbo-Shaoxing region of Zhejiang from 1851 to 1864.

Drawing upon literati writings, governmental records, and local gazetteers, this paper explores

how various local people lived and how their practices interacted with, and gradually changed,

the local political structure. It also aims to fathom a deeper historical question: What were the

legacies of the Taiping Rebellion?

The scholarly debate concerning the impact of the Taiping Rebellion has gone on for half

a century. As early as 1957, Mary Wright noted with amazement that a crisis like Taiping, which

would have destroyed a European empire, had no apparent impact on the cohesion of the Chinese

7 Duan Guangqing, 185.

8 Zou Shencheng, “Lianpengdang xiangying Taiping tianguo geming shishi kao” (Historical investigation on

Lianpengdang joining the Taiping Rebellion), in Xing Fenglin and Zou Shencheng, eds. Tianguo shishi shilun

(Explanatory theses on historical events in the Taiping Rebellion) (Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 1984), 310.

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empire.9 The reason, she argued, was Confucianism. The emergency of the Taiping Rebellion

forced the reassertion of Confucian moral values and the revival of Confucian institutions during

the Tongzhi Restoration. In Wright’s view, the rebellion did not shake up the old way of

governance by gentry elite; rather, the successful suppression of the rebellion relied upon

reviving old beliefs. Undeniably, Wright’s study contributed to our understanding of a special

characteristic of China’s educated elite class; indeed, Confucian ethics were sincerely important

to them. But Wright did not explain how the Tongzhi Restoration policies actually operated on

the local level. Because she attributed modernization to the West, she precluded an exploration

of the possible political changes within China itself.

In his groundbreaking work Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China, Philip Kuhn

brings our attention to the ground level. He examines the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion by

looking at concrete activities of local militias. Kuhn challenges Wright, asking “whether western

contact should be assigned the whole credit for setting off China’s changes.”10

He concludes that

the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion owed its success to local elites’ political identification

with the Qing state, using local militias as the example. Local elites decided to side with the state

because it allowed them to access political power to organize militias. Kuhn’s study greatly

deepens our understanding of the state-elite relation. Albeit Philip Kuhn does acknowledge the

fluctuation and ambiguity in the wartime relationship between the state and the local elites and

grants that some elites stood in opposition to the state, his study still leaves us a rather one-sided

9 Mary Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism, T’ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874 (Stanford:

Stanford University Press, 1962), 60-61.

10 Philip Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-

1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 2.

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picture of the cooperative local elites, as epitomized by the Xiang army and Zeng Guofan.11

How,

then, can we comprehend the story of He Wenqing, who never identified himself with the state and

clearly suggested a different relationship between local elites and the state? Moreover, how can we

conceptualize state-elite interaction beyond militias and in “less militarized” regions such as

Zhejiang?

By shifting the focus from state control to the activities of local elites, scholars in the 1980s

developed a more diverse picture. Two excellent studies of this generation focus on elite activism

in Zhejiang: Keith Schoppa on the twentieth-century elites and Mary Rankin on the late Qing

elites.12

Both Schoppa and Rankin see not only the devolution of state power but also the rise of

elite activism, including social mobilization, new local organizations, and fresh political

developments such as the emergence of a public sphere and public opinion. Both scholars

effectively show that elite activities were much broader, less defensive, and more enduring than

the militia organization efforts of the elites stressed by Philip Kuhn. However, both scholars

plainly view the Taiping Rebellion as a big mess that needed to be cleaned up and attribute the

development of elite activism to the post-rebellion reconstruction.13

This study aims to illustrate how the Taiping Rebellion changed Zhejiang communities at

the very local level. Drawing upon Joseph Esherick and Mary Rankin’s definition of local elites as

“any individuals or families that exercised dominance within a local arena,” this study focuses on

the strategies and social resources upon which elites relied in rising to local prominence and

11

Kuhn, 198-200, 210-11.

12 Keith Schoppa, Chinese Elites and Political Change: Zhejiang Province in the Early Twentieth Century

(Harvard University Press, 1982). Mary Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China:

Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986).

13 Rankin, 1-2.

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maintaining their status and examines how their strategies and social resources changed over

time.14

At heart, my questions are these: What was actually going on in eastern Zhejiang’s Taiping

Rebellion? Why did local elites make different choices facing the Taipings? What were the

legacies of this rebellion? To answer these questions, we shall begin by examining the homes of

our main actors, Yin County and Zhuji County.

Yin and Zhuji: The Land, the People, and the Patterns of Dominance

Zhejiang is located on China’s east coast. Although a small province, Zhejiang is

economically and culturally significant.15

In the Qing, the people of Zhejiang were heavily

burdened by land tax (zheng’e), tributary grain (caoliang), and numerous other surcharges.

Remarkably, Zhejiang remained wealthy despite the heavy taxation, thanks to its high-level

commercialization.16

By the early nineteenth century a large number of silk workshops had

14

Joseph Esherick and Mary Rankin eds., Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1990), 11. In conjunction with this definition, they emphasize the concept of

local dominance, which “focuses on the dynamic and processual aspects of elite power and on the dialectical

relationship of elites to subordinate actors in local society.”

15 Qingshilu, 4. “Ever since the Song dynasty Zhejiang has been a vital agricultural province. During the Qing,

the land tax of Zhejiang’s three northern prefectures, Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou, was more than the total

amount of land tax of Sichuan, Hunan and Guizhou combined.” Quoted from Xu Heyong, Zheng Yunshan and

Zhao Shipei, Zhejiang jindaishi (Modern History of Zhejiang) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1982),

2.

16 Qingshilu, 5. “While tax is extremely heavy in wuzhong area [i.e., southern Jiangsu and northern Zhejiang],

its people are not destitute because seven to eight out of every ten households have extra income from

commerce.” Quoted from Zhejiang jindaishi, 2.

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appeared in Zhejiang’s economic cores, including Ningbo and Shaoxing.17

Besides its economic

and commercial importance, Zhejiang was also culturally significant. It was a stronghold of

orthodox Confucian teachings and had long produced enormous numbers of degree holders

during the Ming and the Qing dynasties.

Topographically, Zhejiang was divided into affluent Zhexi (western Zhejiang) and

mountainous Zhedong (eastern Zhejiang).18

As Keith Schoppa persuasively argues, humans act

within a specific spatial context that includes both natural and the artificial environmental

features. And for Zhejiang, the most important elements were commercial exchange patterns,

technological advances, and institutions to facilitate, mediate and direct social changes.19

Schoppa postulated four economic zones in Zhejiang: economic inner core, economic outer core,

economic inner periphery, and economic outer periphery.20

Our story took place in Ningbo and

Shaoxing prefectures, where most counties belonged to the economic inner core. For example,

Ningbo City (the capital both of Yin County and of Ningbo Prefecture) was one of the five ports

opened to the West in the 1842 Treaty of Nanjing, and its ties to Shanghai’s commercial and

banking systems are well documented.21

For Yin County, economic affluence, commercial

mobility, and cultural refinement defined the region. However, there were also less

commercialized places in Ningbo and Shaoxing prefectures. For example, counties with rugged

17

Zhejiang jindaishi, 3.

18 Schoppa, 13.

19 Schoppa, 16.

20 Schoppa, 28.

21 Schoppa, 19.

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terrain, such as Zhuji, did not attain the level of prosperity enjoyed by Yin.22

Commerce spread

to these mountainous areas, but impacted them differently from the core economic cities. Yin

and Zhuji may be regarded as the two extremes in this spectrum, and their structures of local

power depended on geographical conditions, cultural traditions, and level of commercialization.

Yin County

Yin was a large and well-to-do county.23

With five rivers passing through the county and

numerous natural lakes scattered around it, Yin had an effective irrigation system. Its level land

was fertile enough so that Yin enjoyed a flourishing agricultural economy and was a net grain

provider.24

Yin had silk workshops, a famous tea industry, cotton and many other types of

merchandise that were sold throughout the country.25

Various goods passed through Yin, making

it a highly profitable market place. In the 1830s, Ningbo became a trading center for opium.26

In

1842, after Ningbo City was opened, foreign goods poured in and foreigners actively interacted

with local merchants. Local history records that most prestigious households of Yin relied on

commerce as a major source of revenue, leading to a fusion between gentry and merchants. Also

starting in the 1840s, Yin bankers developed a powerful network and soon dominated Shanghai’s

22

Schoppa, 30. Still, because they were close to economic centers or were located near tributaries of important

rivers like Qiantang (for example Zhuji County) and Cao-e (for example Cheng and Xinchang counties), they

enjoyed easy overland travel and were not entirely marginalized.

23 Timothy Brook, “Family Continuity and Cultural Hegemony: The Gentry of Ningbo, 1368-1911,” in

Esherick and Rankin, 29.

24 Zhejiangsheng yinxian difangzhi bianweihui, ed., Yinxianzhi (Yin gazetteer) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju,

1994), 1.

25 Yinxianzhi, 3-4.

26 Zhejiang jindaishi, 10.

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banking system. Yin was culturally advanced too. It had many high-quality county schools and

the largest private library in China, Tianyige. In particular, Yin literati’s success in the civil

service examination had been outstanding ever since the Southern Song.27

In the Ming, 294

jinshi titles were won by Yin natives. During the Qing, despite a diversification of strategies

between mercantile ends and academic degrees, the county still produced 162 jinshis.28

In both the Ming and the Qing dynasties, state-recognized titles helped to confer prestige

on local power brokers. In Yin County, according to Timothy Brook, the cultural hegemony of

the privileged gentry lineages was achieved by their extreme continuity.29

Indeed, lineages had

become the most conspicuous social formation in Yin.30

These gentry households, which had

been settled in Yin for hundreds of years, utilized their resources well and continued to succeed

in examinations. The self-perpetuating dominance lent these households a special social and

symbolic hegemony in their home arena that forced the local government to respect and preserve

their status. They were Yin County’s highest elite. Many of these gentry were also wealthy

merchants and absentee landlords.31

In sum, in Ningbo, a strong social-political integration was

achieved: the elites who gained authority from the state relied on government to protect their

political and social status. In return, these elites helped the state maintain control at the local

level by applying their social, cultural, and economic influence. The local government helped the

27

Brook, 29.

28 Yinxianzhi, 2115-2116.

29 Brook, 32-37.

30 Shiba Yoshinobu, “Ningbo and its Hinterland,” in G.W. Skinner, ed., The City in Late Imperial China, 434.

Quoted from Cole, 156.

31 Duan Guangqing, 60. Almost all the big landowners dwelled in the city of Ningbo.

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elites to collect rent from tenants, and the elites helped the government to build dams and other

irrigation facilities.

This collaboration was well protected in Yin County and Yin gentry enjoyed extensive

prerogatives. When transferred to Yin County in 1852, the forceful official Duan Guangqing was

appalled by the striking degree of unfairness with which the government treated the gentry elite

and the commoners. Although he himself came from an elite household in Anhui, Duan still

found the privileges of Yin County’s elites excessive.32

The famous Yin tax resistance, triggered

by the silver-price crisis, is a good example. From the 1830s, the outflow of silver increased

dramatically, and the price of silver skyrocketed.33

To make matters worse, Zhejiang Province

was assigned to pay a large percentage of the British indemnity of the first Opium War.34

To

gather enough money, starting in 1842, the government stopped extracting the Zhejiang grain

tribute in kind and demanded payment in silver (zhese).35

Counties that provided tribute grain

32

Duan Guangqing, 3 and10.

33 Qingshilu, 115. Xuanzong shilu, vol. 309, 13A-14A, 5533. On June 2, 1838, one memorial stated, “the price

of silver had jumped so much: now one tael of silver can be exchanged for 1,600 copper. This is all because

the silver had gone into the pockets of foreigners. 30 million taels of silver have been lost since the third year

of the Daoguang reign.” Qingshilu, 115. Xuanzong shilu, vol. 309, 28B-29A, 5540-5541. Another memorial

stated: “The outflow of silver had made silver expensive and copper demeaned, simultaneously causing

difficulties of taxation on land tax (diding), tributary grains (caoliang), and salt taxes (keyan).

34 Zhejiang jindaishi, 36. According to the Treaty of Nanjing, Zhejiang Province was assigned to pay for

800,000 silver dollars (yinyuan) of war indemnity.

35 Qingshilu, 119. Xuanzong shilu, vol. 377, 5B-8A, 6745-6746.

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suffered.36

To deal with the increasing silver price, Yin County officials set a special copper-to-

silver conversion rate for large gentry households when they turned in the land tax: 2,000

coppers per tael of silver for them, and over 3,000 for everyone else. 37

In this way, the non-

privileged households paid for most of the inflation. In 1852, when this secret deal was finally

uncovered, a tax riot exploded.

The Yin riot started after the lunar spring festival in 1852, when commoners of Yin

decided to resist the exorbitant rate that had been imposed on them for years. They turned to

Zhou Xiangqian, a respected local gentryman with the jiansheng title (a purchased title of

students in governmental schools), for help.38

Zhou accepted their request and went to negotiate

with the administration.39

Unexpectedly, Yin County authorities detained Zhou Xiangqian. When

news of this spread to Zhou’s home base, the southern suburb, furious rebels swarmed the county

seat. They besieged the county yamen, trying to break their man out. The frightened magistrate

fled. The Ningbo-Shaoxing daotai (circuit intendant) stepped in and ordered the Qing local army

to suppress the riot, but the fuming peasants crushed the army immediately. Faced with rebels,

the Ningbo prefect was forced to reduce the conversion rate and release Zhou Xiangqian.

36

Qingshilu, 129. Wenzong shilu, vol. 65, 4A-B, 834. This document of August 1852 shows that these devices

caused great difficulties in Zhejiang. The price of Zhejiang’s grain dropped dramatically because people had

great trouble selling their grain.

37 Duan Guangqing, 60.

38 Zhang Zhongli, 12. Jiansheng was considered lower-strata gentry elite.

39 Duan Guangqing, 59-60. Also, Minguo yinxian tongzhi (Yin gazetteer compiled in the Republican era),

1933, in Zhongguo difangzhi jicheng: Zhejiang fu xianzhi ji (Chinese local gazetteer compendium: collection

on Zhejiang) no. 16 (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1991), vol. 2, 377.

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However, this success of the rebels was not the end of the story. Humiliated officials

devised a harsh revenge. Quickly, a large cohort of the provincial army was sent in from

Hangzhou, the provincial seat. The troops rushed into the southern suburb of Yin County, but,

astonishingly enough, were ambushed and defeated by the Yin peasants. The rebels also detained

the Ningbo prefect. Things were quickly getting out of control.40

At this moment Duan Guangqing was transferred to Yin County to crack down on the

disturbance. Duan first persuaded the gentry households to accept the uniform copper-to-silver

conversion rate in order to save them from the roving peasants. Then he rushed to the south

suburb without backing, trying to disarm the rioters and win back the detained official. Duan

Guangqing’s meeting with the rebelling peasants was dramatic. He was a master of the “carrot

and stick” tactic. Duan started by threatening the peasants with the charge that they had

committed the enormous crime of killing officials and rebelling against the emperor. Then, he

announced to these frightened peasants that his yamen only wanted the mastermind of the plot

and promised to give the peasants the equal copper-to-silver conversion rate. Very soon, the

peasants let the detained prefect go; they disarmed and returned to ordinary life. But because

several Qing officials had been killed during the riot, the matter could not be concluded unless

Duan Guangqing could find a scapegoat to deliver to the Board of Punishment. As a gentryman

who understood how the system worked, Zhou Xiangqian gave himself up to Duan Guangqing.

He told Duan that he would rather assume the full responsibility than “incriminate the whole

village.”41

Zhou was executed, and the riot at Yin was finally brought to an end.42

From that

moment on, Duan became the most trusted governmental patron for Ningbo’s gentry households.

40

Duan Guangqing, 54-55.

41 Duan Guangqing, 59.

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That same year, small salt merchants led by Zhang Chaoqing organized themselves and

challenged the privileges of the bullying big salt merchants who were backed by the Yin County

government.43

In 1858, another insurrection broke out in Yin, led by angry fisherman Shi Zhifen.

The fishermen challenged the privileged bankers in Ningbo City who, with assistance from the

local government, forced them to pay usurious interest.44

No matter how complicated these riots

were, Duan Guangqing managed to handle them all. Even though the old pattern of dominance in

Ningbo faced ongoing challenges, Duan’s forcefulness in suppressing riots and in upholding

gentry’s status contributed even more strongly to the integration between the state and the

elites.45

42

Minguo yinxian tongzhi, vol. 2,377.

43 Yinxianzhi, 1237. Also, Minguo yinxian tongzhi, vol. 2, 376. Big salt merchants invaded the already few salt

lakes that the small salt dealers had bought from the government. Failing to get any help from the county

government, these small merchants turned to force.

44 Yinxianzhi, 1237. Also, Minguo yinxian tongzhi, vol. 2, 377. Shi Zhifen turned to violence after his peaceful

appeal netted no result from the Ningbo Prefect.

45 Duan Guangqing, 80. Even the Xianfeng Emperor, who personally received Duan Guangqing in 1859, had

heard about the riots Duan had effectively and dramatically suppressed. Under Duan Guangqing’s rule, the

gentry’s dominance was ensured and the Yin elites were tightly bound to the state. Duan Guangqing later was

promoted to the position of Zhejiang provincial judge in 1859. In his past career, many of his transferals were

problem-driven: he was transferred to Haiyan to gather the previously delayed grain tribute, he was ordered to

Jiangshan to solve the deficit in the county treasury, and his appointment to Ningbo was owing to the ineptness

of the former officials in suppressing the long-lasting riots of both peasants and small salt traders. With his

ability and forcefulness, Duan had always maintained authority and enjoyed great respect from the local elites.

In Gazetteer of Ciqi, Gazetteer of Haiyan, Gazetteer of Jiangshan, and Gazetteer of Jiande, Duan Guangqing

was portrayed a capable and a good official. Yin County Gazetteer did not glorify Duan that much, probably

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In Yin County, the dominance of the gentry elite came from their collaboration with the

government; they did not deal in politics directly. But this relationship was about to be

transformed. As the 1853 fundraising shows, during the Taiping Rebellion the government

became increasingly vulnerable and economic capital became more important than the cultural

and social capital gained via state-legitimized examinations. Even though the traditional power

relations remained in Ningbo, as the state’s power waned, the gentry elite and the new merchant

elite gradually shifted from depending on the state to playing a proactive role in politics.

Zhuji County

In sharp contrast to Yin, Zhuji had a very different kind of elites dominating its political

scene. The elites’ relationship with the state was loose and they clearly had a strong

independence. Of them, the best example is He Wenqing. A local literatus described He

Wenqing as coming from a “rich and extremely influential” household of Zhuji and his son He

Songquan as having the jiansheng title.46

He Wenqing was a martial artist, a powerful lineage

leader who drew respect of his countrymen.47

The local jingle was: “He Wenqing of Zhuji, Bell-

sized eyes! Lever-like eyebrows! A ton’s weight doth he raise! Having taken over Sparrow

Mount, He made his name known to the world (tianxia)!”48

Before going into the details of He lineage and its relationship with the local government,

it is important to note the intrinsic differences between Yin and Zhuji. In contrast to the fertile

because of Duan’s cruel suppression of the local riots. Still, Duan enjoyed respect in Yin and Yin local elites

collaborated with Duan willingly when they were ordered by Duan to supervise public works and

philanthropy.

46 Ke Chao, 199, 201.

47 Yuenanzhi, 360.

48 Zhejiang jindaishi, 76.

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and prosperous Yin, Zhuji was a harsh place for living. According to a later land survey, the land

suitable for growing rice covered only 29 percent of the county’s total lands.49

Zhuji relied upon

rice growing, even though it often did not produce enough to sustain its own population.50

As for

commerce, although several tributaries of the Qiantang River passed through Zhuji, Zhuji was

only a transitional stop to big market places and few goods lingered there. With the exception of

tea, Zhuji did not have other merchandise for the provincial market.51

Commercialization was

limited: except for several pawn shops, there was almost no banking system.52

In addition, in

contrast with Yin, Zhuji’s schools and their success in the civil service examination were not

impressive at all.53

Zhuji was marginalized both economically and culturally.

In Zhuji, lineage was the crucial social formation.54

Lineage members tended their own

lands, dealt with their own affairs, and created their own defense organizations.55

Local elites

were predominantly lineage leaders, with power and authority derived from the role they played

49

Ying Yinqiao, ed., Zhuji nongyezhi (Agricultural history of Zhuji county) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2001),

1-2.

50 Zhuji nongyezhi, 2.

51 Zhuji nongyezhi, 2-3.

52 Zhuji difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, ed., Zhuji xianzhi (Zhuji gazetteer) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin

chubanshe, 1993), 461.

53 Zhuji xianzhi, 728.

54 Cole, 156-164. Appendix A.

55 Zhejiang caifang zhongyi ju, ed., Zhejiang zhongyi lu (Records of the loyal and righteous of Zhejiang

province), in Qingdai zhuanji congkan (Biography series of the Qing Dynasty) no. 61 (Taipei: Mingwen

shuju, 1985), vol. 6, 409-439. Zhuji’s militarization usually paralleled lineages. Compared to other places in

Zhejiang, Zhuji’s military tradition was obvious.

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in solving local problems, rather than from symbolic legitimation from the state via its

examinations. As a result, their authority owed nothing to the state, and they dominated local

politics. In contrast, government officials in Zhuji had much less of a role in local power

dynamics than their counterparts in Yin.

Rough conditions forced lineage members to rely upon each other even more. In the

years of the Taiping Rebellion, Zhuji suffered severe natural disasters. In 1852, from spring

through winter, not a single drop of rain fell in Zhuji; shoots of grain withered and died. In May

1853, a terrible drought hit Zhuji; however, in June, rain poured continuously for seven days,

causing a disastrous flood. In 1861, it flooded again. After the flood, it snowed heavily for three

days: the snow piled up as high as five feet, and countless people and animals froze to death.56

To make things worse, the Taipings and the Qing armies passed by ceaselessly.

It was at this time that He Wenqing began to organize his militia. Skilled in Chinese

medicine and martial arts, He collected those who fled natural disasters from neighboring

counties (Xinchang, Cheng and Yuyao) and organized them into a militia called the “Lotus

Seedpods Sect” (Lianpengdang). Lianpengdang acted as much more than just a military

organization. It was an organ for self-governance. According to an anecdotal history, “it set up

punishment facilities, decided on legal affairs, and acted like a little yamen…but because it

helped the poor, people of Qianban village and other neighboring villages decided to follow He

Wenqing. Lianpengdang grew into a force of thousands of people.” 57

56

Zhuji nongyezhi, 556.

57 Zhuji liushinian zhanggu (Anecdotal history of Zhuji in the past 60 years), quoted from Zou Shencheng,

326-327.

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Naturally, for Zhuji County magistrate Xu Yaoguang, such local autonomy caused

enormous discomfort. In the view of Xu Yaoguang, He Wenqing was a major bandit.58

Xu

believed that He was “fomenting rebellions” and decided to go to the He militia to find out its

leader’s real intent; however, Xu was beaten and detained in the He lineage hall for five days.59

The mistrust between the local elites and the state was apparent. Given the urgent situation of the

Taiping advance in 1861, Xu and the local government tolerated He Wenqing.60

In May 1861,

Jinhua County seat was lost to the Taipings. Now the state needed He Wenqing’s lineage army to

prevent the Taipings from entering eastern Zhejiang. “[Xu] Yaoguang was afraid that He would

rebel, so he asked Zhejiang governor Wang Youling to assign He the duty of defending

Shangjiang [i.e., Jinhua and Quzhou prefectures] so as to control He.”61

Even though He now

had an official title, the animosity between He and the Qing was unmistakable:

58

Tan Zhe, 579. Xu wrote: “In Xianfeng tenth year [1861], in the east suburb of Zhuji County seat, there

emerged the huge bandit He Wenqing.”

59 Tan Zhe, 579. Zhuji liushinian zhanggu had a more dramatic version of this incident: “In the winter of

Xianfeng tenth year, Xu went to Zhuji to gather money. With gongs in the front, red shadowing umbrellas in

the back, Xu applied all the fancy rituals. When Xu passed by the He ancestral hall, people from the hall

called: ‘dog official!’ These people grabbed the gongs and threw them on the ground. Xu had to stop and he

was irritated. At this moment, Wenqing’s son He Changling knelt in front of magistrate Xu [to apologize]. But

Xu hit him with a bar (shiban). When a bystander saw this, Changling was embarrassed. Angrily, he pushed

Xu and dragged him into the He ancestral hall. Xu bled and blood dripped down his face. Xu was detained for

five days. The influence of this incident is huge….Finally, only after He Weijun, a muyou in Shanying County

yamen and a He lineage member, safeguarded magistrate Xu into the city and punished two beggars as

scapegoats, the issue was settled.”

60 Tan Zhe, 579.

61 Zhuji liushinian zhanggu, quoted from Zou Shencheng, 326.

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In the fifth month of Xianfeng eleventh year [June 1861], Wenqing was passing by Zhuji

County seat with his army. At this time, officer Wenrui [sent by Governor Wang

Youling] was about to garrison in Jinhua County, but Wenrui left 500 people in Zhuji.

When these people saw Wenqing’s army only had wood poles and ragged uniforms, they

laughed and scorned He Wenqing…A fight started and three people from Wenqing’s

army died from the brawl. When magistrate Xu Yaoguang heard what was going on, he

tried to stop Wenrui’s army. Yet, Wenrui’s army did not listen to Xu, but rather pursued

to attack He Wenqing. As He’s army was coming cross the bridge to enter the city,

cannons fired from Zhuji County seat and hundreds of He Wenqing’s militiamen died.

To alleviate the situation, Xu Yaoguang asked Wang Shao, a yamen runner, to meet

Wenqing. Wang said to Wenqing: “you just started to achieve something big. Now,

without achieving anything yet, you fought. Haven’t you thought about your future?”

Wenqing replied calmly: “It was magistrate Xu who called me in, but he has never given

me warrant or arms. He again killed my people. Magistrate Xu indeed owes me. You go

ahead and ask him to prepare coffins, guns, ammunitions, bullets, 2,000 taels of silver,

and 300 boats. If he himself sends me the warrant and apologizes to me, matters will be

settled between the two of us.”62

62

Zhuji liushinian zhanggu, quoted from Zou Shencheng, 326-327. In Tan Zhe, 580, Zhuji magistrate Xu

Yaoguang also had his version of this story: “On June 8, 1861, Wenrui arrived at Zhuji. His soldiers were not

enough (3,000) and could not even defend themselves. They did not enter the city. On June 11, He Wenqing

brought his 5,000-6,000 people to the county seat and stationed them outside of the city but did not go to see

Wenrui. On June 12, 1861, He Wenqing seized some soldiers from Wenrui and killed one. He Wenqing then

killed three soldiers consecutively to irritate Wenrui. Wenrui was confounded. At this moment, I told him,

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The divorce between the Qing and He Wenqing was so deep as to be irreparable, even though the

government had just offered him an official position. Never in his lifetime was the Qing state

able to fulfill his ambition, and He Wenqing felt no affiliation to the Qing state. As the Taipings

approached, He bided his time.

He Wenqing soon joined up with other local forces in Shaoxing Prefecture. The most

important ally he found was Huang Chunsheng of Yuyao County. Huang had rebelled in 1858,

when Yuyao County suffered from continuous natural disasters—a severe drought, followed by a

flood, and then locusts. Huang, a small landowner in Yuyao, sympathized with the suffering of

tenants and agreed to cut rents. Big gentry households, led by Xie Jing and backed by county

authorities, refused to follow suit and insisted on extracting the full amount. With Huang’s

support, tenants joined together, besieged the county seat, and demanded that the government

draft a regulation reducing rent. Yuyao County’s magistrate stamped the document with a 25

percent reduction.63

But this turned out to be a trick. The magistrate ordered Xie Jing’s militia,

the “yellow turban braves” (huangtou yong), to guard the households of gentry who refused to

reduce the rent. Thus betrayed, tenants in Yuyao established “eighteen bureaus of rent

resistance” (“eighteen ju”) and rose up. They made Huang Chunsheng their leader.

The Yuyao tenants’ uprising demonstrated the bitterness provoked by local elite

dominance before the Taiping Rebellion. The level of integration between Yuyao elites and the

‘they were the local bandits and we should not let them enter the city. Let’s fire at them and they would run

away.’ Thus, Wenrui and Wenqing fought against each other at the bridge near the east gate. Wenrui ran after

He Wenqing and killed 30-40 of He’s people.” To me, Xu’s version is problematic. Xu had a strong motive for

revenge against He Wenqing and would do anything to portray He as the trouble maker and the bad person.

63 Zhejiang jindaishi, 73.

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state was not so extreme as in either Yin County or Zhuji County. On the one hand, Yuyao had a

group of elites who enjoyed support and favors from the government; the grand Xie family

leader, Xie Jing, was such a one. On the other hand, Yuyao also had less integrated, less

dependent elites like Huang Chunsheng, whose power, like He Wenqing’s, was derived from

local affairs. Huang Chunsheng’s force would be one of the most powerful armies to fight

alongside He Wenqing: “in Yuyao, seven or eight out of every ten families of the eighteen ju

joined the Taipings.”64

Xie Jing, on the other hand, was among the controllers of elite militias

that supported the Qing state.

From the above, we see two patterns of local dominance. In Yin County, we see a strong

government in staunch collaboration with wealthy gentry whose elite status was legitimized by

state-authorized degrees; whereas in Zhuji County, the tone was one of distrust between a rather

weak government and local lineage leaders whose authority came from their communal

responsibilities. These old patterns of local dominance before the Taiping Rebellion influenced

elites’ choices in the Taiping era: to fight with the Taipings or to throw their lot in with the Qing.

The Taiping Rebellion worked like a polarizing machine, forcing elites to side with the one side

or the other. Accordingly, Yin County, after a short occupation by the Taipings, became the most

vital base for the Qing counterattack; while Yuyao and Zhuji became the strongest rebel base. He

Wenqing soon got his chance to breeze through eastern Zhejiang.

He Wenqing Sweeping through Eastern Zhejiang and the Deadlock of the Qing Defense

From the fall of 1861 until his death in the early spring of 1863, He Wenqing was the

mainstay in Taipings’ conquest of eastern Zhejiang, and his takeovers were overwhelming and

64

Ke Chao, 193-195.

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damaging to the Qing. He Wenqing started his conquest in the second half of 1861. At that time,

with Zeng Guofan occupying Anhui Province and stationed at Anqing City, central China had

become increasingly difficult for the Taipings to occupy. By the latter half of 1861, Zhejiang

became a major target for both Loyal King (Zhongwang) Li Xiucheng and his younger cousin,

Attendance King (Shiwang) Li Shixian. Determined and efficient, the two entered Zhejiang, with

soldiers mostly recruited in Hubei and Anhui (see map).65

Shaoxing Prefecture went into a panic at the approach of the “long hairs” (the Taipings).

Despite its strategic position at the entrance to eastern Zhejiang, Qing officials in Shaoxing were

ill-prepared. In particular, the relationship between the provincial government and the elites at

Shaoxing City (the county and prefectual capital) worsened, in spite of the Taipings’ approach.

In the spring of 1861, gentryman Wang Lüqian impeached several provincial officials. To fight

back, Zhejiang governor Wang Youling accused four powerful members of gentry from

Shaoxing of fraudulence and disobedience. The impeachment scandal was spiraling out of

control.66

Although Governor Wang finally transferred Liao Zongyuan, the capable Hunan jinshi

who had successfully defeated the Taipings in northern Zhejiang, to supervise Shaoxing

defenses, it was too late. The Shaoxing gentry’s hatred toward the government was violently

unleashed—a group of bodyguards of one Shaoxing local elite member murdered Liao before the

ingress of the Taipings.67

Because of these power struggles, the fortification of Shaoxing never

took place. There were no effective official troops deployed along the vital Shaoxing-Zhuji front,

65

Ke Chao, 191.

66 Chen Zhouqing, Ducheng beikou ji (An account of Shaoxing City under the Taipings), in Nanjing daxue

lishixi, ed., Jiang-Zhe-Yu-Wan Taiping tianguo shiliao xuanbian (Selective sources on the Taiping Rebellion

in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Henan and Anhui provinces) (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1983), 254.

67 Yuenanzhi, 359.

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and the entire Shaoxing Prefecture had only one force, Xie Jing’s yellow turban braves, that

could put up a defense.

As officials and the Shaoxing elites obsessed over their political struggles, He Wenqing’s

activities went unnoticed. After Jinhua County and Yiwu County were lost to the Taipings in

September 1861, He was stationed by Governor Wang Youling at the White Horse Bridge on the

border between Zhuji County and Pujiang County. He Wenqing was careless about this

assignment. One observer wrote:

When another Qing army unit was stationed at White Horse Bridge, its commander, Lou,

feared that his army would be influenced by He Wenqing. Thus, when local people went

to him to complain about Wenqing’s soldiers, Lou decided to punish Wenqing, which

caused severe factional struggles. [Because of what happened], Governor Wang Youling

ordered Wenqing to go to Hangzhou and was ready to discipline him. One officer begged

Wang’s pardon for He. People were hoping that Wenqing would change and become a

new person. However, Wenqing…never trained his army [for the Qing].68

On September 29, 1861, the Taiping troops led by Huang Chengzhong rushed from

Pujiang to the southwestern suburb of Zhuji.69

Huang Chengzhong perceived He Wenqing’s

indifference and persuaded He to turn his spears back against the Qing.70

For He Wenqing, the

time to “make his name known” had finally come. He reshuffled his forces in his home base,

68

Ke Chao, 200.

69 Huang Tong, Yiwu bingshi jilue (Records on military affairs of Yiwu), 1932, in Shen Yunlong, ed., Jindai

Zhongguo shiliao congkan xubian (Continued collection of historical sources of modern China) (Taipei:

Wenhai chubanshe), vol. 76, 262.

70 Ke Chao, 200.

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Zhuji County, and now the ranks of He’s army swelled beyond 8,000 men.71

Local people

recalled, “natives joined He’s army voluntarily, including women…In some places such as

Fengqiao town, an entire village joined He Wenqing.”72

On October 26, the Taiping Coming King (Laiwang) Lu Shunde conquered Zhuji and

made it a key rebel base.73

He Wenqing soon became the ideal guide for the Taipings in eastern

Zhejiang. On October 30, with almost no resistance, the Taipings arrived at Shaoxing City.74

At

this time, members of the He militia had already entered the city. With He’s cooperation, the

long hairs occupied the city after only a few rounds of battle with Xie Jing’s braves.75

The

Taiping armies continued to advance.

In the following 70 days, He Wenqing led a dazzling series of takeovers and guided the

Taipings in plowing through Shaoxing, Ningbo, and Taizhou prefectures. Wherever the Taipings

went, there were allies of He Wenqing leading the rebel troops into the county seat. He’s buddies

were mostly local elites in the lower strata. For example, the “eighteen ju” leader Huang

Chunsheng was a typical man of such kind. Like He Wenqing, Huang was rather antagonistic to

the Qing state. In fact, as early as in August 1861 Huang and He had hatched the plan of

71

Xu Yaoguang, Zhuji tuanlian xunnan shimo (The tragic story of Zhuji militias), quoted from Zou

Shencheng, 330.

72 Zou Shencheng, 313. According to Zou, local people still remembered Wenqing in the 1950s. They

remembered that He Wenqing’s weapon was more than 40 jin and his corselet was gigantic. Local people kept

He’s corselet and the weapon till the land reform.

73 Ke Chao, 200.

74 Ke Chao, 200.

75 Yuenanzhi, 359.

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simultaneously attacking Shangyu County.76

Apparently, leaders like Huang Chunsheng were

everywhere in eastern Zhejiang. As soon as the Taiping troops came to their hometowns, these

leaders quickly seized the opportunity to join He Wenqing and rise up against the Qing. As Xu

Yaoguang noted, “the troops heading east for Ningbo were led by Huang Chengzhong and Fan

Ruzeng. But the liaison of these troops was Lianpengdang, namely, He Wenqing from Zhuji.”77

On November 3, Lianpengdang was ready for the takeover of Cheng County. It first

ushered Huang Chengzhong into Cheng from Shaoxing. On November 8, it led Fan Ruzeng into

Cheng from Dongyang County. With the help of He Wenqing’s liaison Ma A-yuan, Cheng

County seat quickly fell on November 9.78

At the same time, Xinchang County native Yang Zengling had secretly contacted He

Wenqing and together they quickly fomented riots inside the county seat. Hordes of Taiping

rebels from Cheng County converged with He Wenqing on Xinchang County, and Xinchang fell

on November 12.

Next, Fan Ruzeng planned to attack Ningbo from the south by way of Fenghua, while

Huang Chengzhong and He Wenqing decided to sack Ningbo from the north via Shangyu,

Yuyao, Ciqi, and Zhenhai counties (see map). Along the southern route, Fan Ruzeng was

advancing quickly, and on November 26, he seized the Fenghua County seat. Along the northern

route, a local rebel’s guidance helped Huang and He conquer the Shangyu County seat, from

which they quickly moved to Yuyao.79

Huang Laichang, the cousin of tenant rebel leader Huang

76

Tan Zhe, 601.

77 Tan Zhe, 600.

78 Tan Zhe, 601.

79 Tan Zhe, 601.

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Chunsheng, ushered He Wenqing into the city. From November 24, Yuyao was under the

Taipings’ absolute control and became the most important rebel base in eastern Zhejiang.80

The majority of counties in Shaoxing Prefecture had now been occupied by the Taipings

without pitched battles. Clearly, He Wenqing’s network was the silver bullet in the Taiping

advance. Though it is hard to evaluate the intention of every leader of He’s liaisons, He Wenqing

did successfully engage their willingness to side with the Taipings. It is possible that these lower-

strata elites bore a grudge over their unfulfilled ambitions under the Qing and thus decided to

acquiesce to the Taipings. As one literatus noted, there were few real long hairs in the combined

force; rather, “one half of the force was composed of rebels of Zhuji, Cheng and other local

rioters.”81

Having conquered Shaoxing Prefecture, He Wenqing and the Taiping armies continued

moving east along the northern route. Quickly, He established collaborations with some local

leaders of Ningbo Prefecture. For Ciqi County, the liaison was local merchant Lu Xinlan, who

also managed to link up with the rebel leaders Shen Luqin and Fan Weibang.82

On November 26,

80

Yuyao xianzhi (Yuyao gazetteer), 1899, in Zhongguo fangzhi congshu: huazhong difang (Chinese local

gazetteer series: collection on central China) (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1983), vol. 500, 250.

81 Ke Chao, 191.

82 Ke Chao, 200. Also, in Prescott Clarke and J.S. Gregory comp., Western Reports on the Taiping (Honolulu:

University Press of Hawaii, 1982), 388: “Suh [Lu] Xinlan was formerly a trader with foreign merchants; after

amassing considerable wealth, he retired to occupy the declining years of his life, enjoying the fruit of his toils

in his native town, Tzu-ki [Ciqi] in this province…When the rebels captured a neighboring city, Tzu-ki [Ciqi]

was evacuated by the Imperialists. The inhabitants entreated Suh [Lu] to assist them. After due consideration,

it was resolved to forward the allegiance of the town to the Taiping authorities.”

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the Ciqi magistrate went to request military assistance from Ningbo City.83

Grabbing this golden

chance, Lu Xinlan met with He Wenqing and volunteered to be the inside man in He’s attack on

Ciqi. On November 28, Shen Luqin sent 100 people to enter the county seat of Ciqi beforehand.

At noon, according to the plan, He Wenqing brought 2,000 to 3,000 people from Yuyao to Ciqi.

At the fire signals sent by Shen Luqin, He Wenqing waltzed into Ciqi and occupied it.84

To

celebrate, Lu Xinlan invited the rebels for a grand banquet.85

Because of He Wenqing’s grand victory, he was entitled Zhitianyan, a Taiping official

rank.86

But the authority of the Zhejiang native He among the Taiping was constantly subverted

by the old cohort of Guangxi long hairs. When Guangxi rebel leader Zhou Shenyong came to

Ciqi and claimed the county seat, He Wenqing had to leave.87

On December 2, He Wenqing went to Zhenhai. Since Fan Weibang had already been in

Zhenhai and colluded with local bandits who had fled there from Shaoxing and Taizhou, the

takeover was painless.88

According to the Zhenhai Gazetteer, on December 7, 1861, hearing that

the Taipings were approaching the city, Qing officials fled. Again, the people of Zhenhai saw no

83

Tan Zhe, 601.

84 Ke Chao, 200.

85 Western Reports on the Taiping, 388.

86 Yuezhou jilue (Records on Shaoxing under the Taipings), in Xie Raoxing ed., Taiping tianguo congshu

shisan zhong (Thirteen sources on the Taiping Heavenly kingdom) vol. 2, 2. “Yan” is a rather low rank. Below

the kings, there were 6 ranks: Yi, An, Fu, Yan, Yu, and Hou.

87 Ke Chao, 200.

88 Tan Zhe, 602.

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real long hairs, but only the natives led by Fan Weibang, who invited He Wenqing to join his

force.89

On December 9, the Taipings were ready to take Yin County and Ningbo City. This vital

takeover was well planned. The Taipings in Fenghua County started their attack on Ningbo City

from the south, the rebels in Ciqi County followed suit from the north, and He Wenqing in

Zhenhai County offered them support from the east. The next day, Ningbo fell to the Taipings.

The Qing Green Standard commander fled for Dinghai, and the Ningbo-Shaoxing daotai and the

Ningbo prefect escaped by sea to Shanghai.90

Simultaneously, He Wenqing’s son and nephew were on a rampage elsewhere in eastern

Zhejiang. On November 25, with aid from the locals, Tiantai County was lost to Wenqing’s son

He Songquan.91

On December 11, Xiangshan County was conquered by Taipings led by

Wenqing’s nephew He Laitou.92

One cannot help but be amazed at He Wenqing’s victorious blitz and the warm reactions

to him from residents of eastern Zhejiang. He Wenqing’s extensive network greatly facilitated

89

Zhenhai xianzhi (Zhenhai gazetteer), quoted from Zou Shencheng, 332.

90 Tan Zhe, 602. Also, Ke Chao, 182.

91 Ye Zhengyun, Xin ren kou ji (An account of the Taiping rebels from 1861 to 1862) in Taiping tianguo ziliao

xuji (Continuous collection on Taiping tianguo sources) (Xianggang: Chongwen shudian, 1973), 194. This is a

source on the Taiping in Taizhou. It writes: “Among the thousands of people that He Songquan [He Wenqing’s

son] led, only a dozen of them were the real ‘long hairs’.”

92 Tan Zhe, 602. Xin ren cuo lu (A miscellany from 1861 to 1862) in Jindaishi ziliao (Materials on modern

Chinese history) no. 34 (1964). This is a source on the Taipings in Xiangshan. One of He Wenqing’s

acquaintances linked up He with a local strongman. With this local link, He Wenqing’s nephew He Laitou

occupied Xiangshan quickly.

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the entire process. With only a small number of genuine long hairs in eastern Zhejiang, tens of

thousands of native residents joined the rebellion. Facing the arrival of the Taipings, the people

of Zhejiang took sides according to their predispositions.

The flip side of He Wenqing’s blitz was the ineptitude of Qing defense. In his 70 days of

combat, He Wenqing seldom encountered effective resistance, neither official defense of the

Green Standard nor competent militias, despite the fact that Wang Youling, the “very capable”

provincial governor, tried his best to build an effective defense system for Zhejiang.

Zhejiang, which supplied military resources for other provinces, never had its own

defense system and always relied upon outside armies that were assigned to it. Beginning in

1859, Zhejiang not only had to pay 60,000 taels of silver to support the Jiangnan Camp

(Jiangnan daying), but also was committed to pay 500,000 taels for armies in southern Anhui.

As a result, Zhejiang never seriously trained its own army. However, these outside troops were

neither reliable nor obedient. 93

Governor Wang Youling thus had to turn to local militias. To his great disappointment,

militia construction in Zhejiang soon became a huge political scandal. Ironically, challenges to

Wang began with his genuine zeal to militarize and strengthen the Shaoxing-Zhuji-Pujiang

border. Immediately after becoming the provincial governor in the early spring of 1860, Wang

Youling started raising financial and military support from the rich Shaoxing Prefecture. When

one Shaoxing xiaolian (the person nominated by local government as being pious and incorrupt)

recommended himself for the job, Wang agreed. The xiaolian started fundraising with welfare

granaries (yicang), which proved to be a foolish move because “in Shaoxing, welfare granaries

had long been manipulated by the powerful gentry”—a group to which this xiaolian apparently

93

Tan Zhe, 568-570.

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did not belong. To make things worse, this stubborn xiaolian, perhaps with a push from Wang,

confronted those powerful gentry members, engendering in the Shaoxing elites an utter

disobedience of the provincial government.94

After this failure, Wang Youling put a prestigious Shaoxing man, Wang Lüqian, in

charge. Shaoxing elites were overjoyed to have “their man” help them to counteract the

provincial authority. Wang Lüqian put no effort into fundraising from the local elites and

achieved nothing in building defenses for Shaoxing City. Following Wang Lüqian, a former

provincial grain official named Shao Can was assigned the job. Shao was also a Shaoxingese and

was equally disinclined to press his fellows in gathering funds.95

Militia-building in Shaoxing

was a joke.

None of the other available forces—neither the Qing armies nor the local militias—were

working for Wang Youling, so he broached the idea of borrowing Western troops to fight the

Taipings. As early as May 1860, right after the Taipings shattered the Jiangnan Camp and took

the important town of Danyang, Wang wrote several letters to Wu Xu, a Zhejiangese and the

Shanghai daotai, imploring him to “talk with the foreigners (bizu) again and explain to them the

pros and cons.” Conscious of the possible pitfalls, Wang volunteered to take upon himself the

“infamy” and “even the crime” of requesting foreign help, and added, “In such a short time, the

situation has turned this bad. I can only cry to the sky.”96

94

Chen Zhouqing, 253.

95 Chen Zhouqing, 253-254.

96 Wu Xu, 220. Wang Youling’s letter to Wu Xu, May 23, 1860.

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Wu Xu saw the level-headedness of this proposal, as a way not only to resist the Taipings

but also to distract the foreigners from “bothering the north,” and sought to make it work. 97

Unofficially (as described in more detail below), Wu Xu did arrange for foreign troops to help

defend Shanghai. However, with regard to official government involvement, Xue Huan, the

newly appointed Suzhou prefect and the most promising candidate for Jiangsu governor, had

reservations, and refused to forward the idea to the court. 9899

Upon hearing the news, Wang

Youling complained: “We have always been told by Governor-general He Guiqing to follow the

opinion of Xue Huan. However, if we just wait [for Xue to change his mind], we will watch our

cities fall and our people die!”100

Distressed by the disastrous results of inaction, Wu Xu went over Xue Huan’s head and

wrote directly to Liangjiang Governor-general He Guiqing on June 5, asking him to negotiate for

97

Wu Xu, 230. Wu Xu’s letter to Wu Yun, May 31, 1860.

98 Wu Xu, 221- 222. Xue Huan’s two letters to Wu Xu, both on May 25, 1860. Also, Wu Xu, 223. Wu Xu’s

letter to Wang Youling, May 26, 160. In this letter, Wu Xu mentioned the reluctance of Jiangsu officials to

bring up the issue to the court and asked Wang to wait for Xue Huan’s final decision.

99 Stanley Spector, Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army: A Study of Nineteenth-Century Regionalism (Seattle:

Universality of Washington Press, 1964), 29-36, 45-55, 80-82. In fact, a key reason for the Jiangsu officials’

suspicion of Wu Xu and Wang Youling owed to the political struggle between the Jiangsu men and the big

Zhejiang merchants and Zhejiangese Shanghai officials. The Jiangsu officials also had their own battle plans

that they considered more important than immediately relieving Shanghai or liberating Eastern Zhejiang. At

this time, powerful military leaders, especially Li Hongzhang were more sympathetic to the Jiangsu men and

distrusted the Zhejiang people.

100 Wu Xu, 286. Wang Youling’s letter to Wu Xu, July 7, 1860.

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foreign military assistance.101

Wang Youling and Wu Xu anxiously awaited the result of He

Guiqing’s meeting with the foreigners.102

But on July 15, He Guiqing reported that the political

situation had changed dramatically in Beijing: “currently, revising treaties is not the intention of

the foreigners; on the contrary, they want to stir up wars.” 103

In August, the British and French

expeditions disembarked on China’s northern shores and invaded Beijing and Tianjin. The idea

of hiring foreigners to crush the Taipings became increasingly unattainable at the high

governmental level. 104

Despite the foreign invasions in the north, the local zeal for hiring foreign armies never

diminished. In September, Xue Huan, who by then had become Jiangsu governor, changed his

mind and joined Wang Youling and Wu Xu in lobbying for foreign help, perhaps owing to the

urgent situation he had to deal with. In addition, he used foreign merchants’ desire for

intervention to influence Chinese merchants to add their voices to the cause. 105

101

Wu Xu, 236-237. Wu Xu’s letter to He Guiqing, June 5, 1860. Wu wrote: “As soon as Danyang was lost to

the Taipings, Zhejiang governor Wang Youling sent me an urgent letter about borrowing Western armies. I

also received Jiangsu governor Xu Youren’s letter of borrowing Western troops. So far, I have tried very hard

and discussed the issue with foreigners for quite some time. According to them, this plan is indeed possible.

But you, the governor-general of Liangjiang who specializes in dealing with foreigner-related activities, have

not said a word. We need you to discuss with them; then, the plan may be settled.”

102 Wu Xu, 238. Wu Yun’s letter to Wu Xu, June 1860. In this letter Xue Huan was said to have become the

Jiangsu governor after the former governor Xu Youren died in Suzhou.

103 Wu Xu, 303. He Guiqing’s letter to Wu Xu, July 15, 1860.

104 Mao Jiaqi, Taiping tianguo yu lieqiang (The Taiping rebellion and foreign powers) (Nanning, Guangxi

renmin chubanshe, 1992), 327.

105 Wu Xu, 407. Xue Huan’s letter to Wu Xu, September 3, 1860. Xue Huan and Wu Xu found that the best

way to achieve their plan was to make the local foreign consuls influence the rigid ministers in Beijing. In this

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In October, after treaties between the Qing and Western powers had been agreed to in

Beijing, France offered to help exterminate the Taiping rebels, with Russia making a similar

offer the next month. 106

In spite of all these promising signs for collaboration, the plan did not

come through. The Xianfeng Emperor, however, refused their aid, and new proposals by Wang

Youling and Wu Xu were repeatedly held back by the Qing bureaucratic machine.107

With no official Qing or foreign troops and no reliable militias in Zhejiang, the Taiping

took Ningbo in December, and the next month the provincial seat, Hangzhou, fell with a reported

death toll of 100,000 residents. In January 1862, the dedicated governor of Zhejiang, Wang

Youling, committed suicide.

Resolving the Deadlock

Yet, Wang’s plan of borrowing foreign troops to fend off the Taipings had inspired many,

especially the elites who had escaped Zhejiang for Shanghai. Moreover, the Beijing coup d’etat

of 1861, which had given rise to a more foreigner-friendly and flexible Prince Gong, provided a

freer atmosphere for elites to develop connections with foreigners. With the help of both the Yin

letter, it seems that after talking to the British consul in Shanghai, Wu Xu and Xue Huan found some new

hope. Also, Wu Xu, 415. Xue Huan’s letter to Wu Xu, September 9, 1860. Xue Huan again wrote to Wu Xu:

“At this stage, foreign merchants also wish to suppress the rebels; they have a great relationship with the

Chinese merchants. Thus, if the request came from the merchants, I dared to memorialize the proposal of

borrowing foreign armies to the court.”

106 Mao Jiaqi, 327.

107 Wu Xu, 444. Wang Youling’s letter to Wu Xu, November 23, 1860; Wu Xu, 450. Wang Youling’s letter to

Wu Xu, December 15, 1860.

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County elites in the Ningbo foreign concession and the sojourning Zhejiang merchants in

Shanghai, a miraculous turn occurred.

Zhejiang Elites and the Change of Policy

Despite the fact that the governmental plan of borrowing foreign troops was dashed, local

elites and officials from Zhejiang did not relinquish the idea of utilizing foreign armies. The first

defensive use of foreign forces was to protect Shanghai as Daotai Wu Xu (also a Zhejiang

gentryman) made the following announcement to the foreigners on June 4, 1860:

Currently, the Taiping soldiers have tried to ransack Shanghai. Our defense force of

Shanghai is not enough. I have notified the British and French ambassadors and generals

about protecting Shanghai and its suburbs. Armies should be dispatched accordingly to

guard Southern Guild Hall and Siming Guild in Shanghai.108

This action appeared to be conducted without the central government’s acknowledgment or even

awareness. Under this scheme, Yang Fang, originally a comprador from Yin County and a leader

whom Wu Xu praised as “capable, knowledgeable, and reliable,” took charge of the coordination

with the foreign armies.109

Wu Xu and Yang Fang did not stop there. Also in June, they formed the “Foreign Arms

Corps” (later the famous “Ever Victorious Army” [Changshengjun]) with Frederick Townsend

Ward, the testy and ambitious first officer on “Confucius,” the armed river steamer that patrolled

108

Wu Xu, 233. Wu Xu’s instruction to Jiang Jilin on the content of announcement to foreign soldiers.

109 Wu Xu, 235. Wu Xu’s instruction on defense and collaboration with foreign soldiers.

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waterways around Shanghai.110

According to author Caleb Carr, it was Ward who first walked

into Wu Xu’s yamen and put forward the proposal, recommending himself as leader of the corps,

claiming he was experienced in battles and in using modern arms.111

Wu Xu warmly welcomed

Ward’s proposal, again without notifying the central government.112

The corps’s main mission

would be defending Shanghai and its suburbs against the Taipings whenever necessary. The

salary was high: every month, each soldier would receive 50 dollars, each officer 200 dollars,

and Ward 500 dollars. With each city retaken, an extra bonus would be offered.113

Military

provisions and arms supplies were furnished by Yang Fang, with help from other Zhejiang

merchants in Shanghai. In July, Ward attacked Songjiang district and wrested Shanghai from the

Taipings.114

Yang Fang was overjoyed—his plan had finally worked. This Ward-Yang Fang

combination became a model for the Zhejiang local elites and foreigners in organizing an allied

defense force.

However, nothing was easy. This employment of Ward by Wu Xu and Yang Fang was

never authorized by the Qing central government. Moreover, it irritated a number of Western

officers because Ward was taking some British and French sailors away from their navies.115

In

110

Caleb Carr, The Devil Soldier: The Story of Frederick Townsend Ward (New York: Random House, 1992),

30.

111 Carr, 28-29.

112 Carr, 32.

113 Carr, 32. These are U.S. dollars, though paid in Mexican silver dollars.

114 Qingshigao Liezhuan (Standard History of the Qing: Biography) no. 222: Hua’er (Ward).

115 This is the issue of recruiting soldiers and officers. In Shanghai, the supplies of the foreigners were

abundant. Many sailors and even the British and French navy soldiers worked for Ward under the high salary

attraction. Ward even succeeded in persuading some navy officers to work for him.

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February 1861, James Hope of the British Royal Navy was dispatched to the Yangzi delta, and in

May 1861, Hope arrested Ward on the charge of violating the neutrality ordinance that foreign

powers had publicly announced. At this time, even Wu Xu, beginning to doubt the intention of

Ward, withdrew his support.

Yang Fang, though, was resolved that local interests must be protected no matter what the

governments might decide.116

He managed to sneak Ward out in a small boat and hid him until

he was safe.117

Remarkably, even though the Foreign Arms Corps was never supported by the

Qing government or recognized by foreign powers, money and supplies from Chinese merchants

and Yang’s determination sustained Ward’s army, which would later become the most important

force in retaking Zhejiang.

Other Zhejiang elites intended to use foreign armies for defense as well. In the winter of

1861, when the Taipings were again menacing Shanghai, Ying Baoshi, a Zhejiang merchant who

was also a member of Wu Xu’s political circle, got in touch with the British Consul in Shanghai,

Harry Parkes. Parkes had some very heartfelt insights for Ying Baoshi: “It does not make sense

to talk to officials; that is why we only ask you gentry if you can bear the bitterness of losing

Shanghai.”118

Parkes then hinted at the possibility of offering help with foreign soldiers. After

multiple rounds of rejection by Jiangsu military officers, Ying Baoshi turned to other Zhejiang

and Jiangsu gentry and merchants to discuss this stratagem. After Ningbo and Hangzhou fell,

116

Carr, 133. Despite Wu’s attempt to disband the Foreign Arms Corps, Yang Fang was not yet willing to give

up. “Taki [the name that foreigners used to call Yang Fang] is keeping these people though Wu wanted to

disband.”

117 Carr, 153-154.

118 Feng Guifen, Xianzhitang ji, vol. 4, 19. Quoted from Jia Shucun, Taiping tianguo shiqi de dizhu jieji (The

landlord class during the Taiping period) (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1991), 227.

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Zhejiang elites became increasingly anxious to proceed with the plan of borrowing foreign

troops. To Xue Huan, the governor of Jiangsu, these elites pleaded:

The fall of Hangzhou has cut off trade. If it [the Taiping occupation] lasts longer, we will

not be able to offer any more funds. The British consul Parkes always comes to us to

discuss issues with us. We have discussed using his army to help [alleviate the situation].

We have also talked about using his army to safeguard Shanghai and then regain Ningbo,

Suzhou, and Jiangning. Parkes really understands the big picture. He understands the

viciousness of the Taiping villains and the difficult lives of the common people. He says:

“Since [borrowing the foreign armies] concerns a long-term future of China, I need

Governor Xue Huan to memorialize about this possibility to the Qing court, and I will

report to my own country to make it happen.” We, the common populace of Zhejiang and

Jiangsu, are now in deep water and hot fire and we are anxiously hoping for salvation.

Thus, humbly, we beg you to ask the Zongli Yamen to discuss with the British and

French ministers about how to deploy their armies and how to collaborate [with the

Chinese armies] to eliminate the rebels. To discuss it and carry it out, to exterminate the

rebels and pacify the southeast, the time is now.119

Xue Huan was afraid to take responsibility. Xue, remembering the plan being rejected by

the court in 1860, told the elites that their list of influential gentry supporters was not long

enough. With the help of Feng Guifen, Zhejiang and Jiangsu elites managed to get a more

comprehensive list of famous gentry who supported this proposal.120

Thus, after making sure that

119

Dong, 529-530.

120 Jia Shucun, 228.

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he was only a messenger instead of a responsibility bearer, Xue Huan finally sent his memorial

to the court:

According to Wu Yun and Ying Baoshi, Zhejiang and Jiangsu gentry have the following

plea. They proposed the idea of borrowing troops from the British and the French, and

asked me to memorialize this idea to the court. I have asked them to think harder and not

to plan in haste. However, still, as these gentry said, the safety of the entire situation is

dependent on borrowing foreign armies. Thus, I asked Wu Xu, Yang Yunsong, Wu Yun

and Ying Baoshi to broadly seek advice for this plan. They came back to me and said that

borrowing foreign forces would be helpful and in line with popular opinion. In addition, I

now have too few soldiers under my command…I saw that in your secret edict, there was

a sentence: “if they were willing to be employed to help exterminate the rebels, we

should order Chinese and foreign (hua and yi) merchants to manage the situation by

themselves…” Thus, I think I will try and follow this order.121

By emphasizing the popularity of the plea, stressing the dire situation he faced, and using the

opening that the court had once given, Xue Huan finally posed this request.

The first reaction from Beijing was ambivalent. Just as Xue Huan had suspected, the

court had reservations. The edict stated: “In Xianfeng tenth year [1860], there was also the

suggestion of borrowing foreign troops. At that time, [British diplomat] Thomas Francis Wade

was in Beijing…and he said: ‘according to the practice, the British army will occupy the city

after conquering it.’ [Thus], their lack of sincerity is obvious.” At the same time, this new court

presided over by Prince Gong was willing to be flexible and consider the possibility. The edict

121

Dong, 530.

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continued: “Now, because you have talked with Parkes, you must have known his true heart. If

we ask Zongli Yamen to discuss [this plan] with foreign diplomats in Beijing, they may not

follow our suggestion. However, because the foreigners always put their merchants’ interests in

the first place; thus, if you [Xue Huan] ask the Chinese merchants to influence the foreign

merchants and ask them to beg Parkes for help, the foreign armies may help.”122

Responding to Beijing’s hesitation, Xue Huan sent another memorial, trying to persuade

the court that the whole plan was workable. Xue memorialized: “in Shanghai, the British and the

French were indeed helpful in building up the defense work.” Regarding the expenses, Xue

wrote: “Now, all kinds of military expenses, which had been drawn from the commercial tax,

will be borrowed from foreign and Chinese merchants.”123

The court replied, asking Xue Huan to avoid formal diplomatic negotiations through

Zongli Yamen but to do it locally: “If the military affairs are urgent, negotiation through Zongli

Yamen will incur serious delay. For all matters concerning borrowing foreign forces to suppress

rebels, I request you, Xue Huan, together with the gentry who pleaded previously, to discuss

with the British and the French and resolve them promptly. I would not control from afar.”124

While the political change in the Qing court was necessary to make things happen, we

have to keep in mind that this progress was gained in a bottom-up fashion: from the initiation

and financial support of the Zhejiang elites, to the backing of provincial officials, and at last to

the agreement of the court. Zhejiang and Jiangsu gentry elite and even the formerly politically

122

Dong, 531.

123 Dong, 533.

124 Dong, 532.

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marginalized merchant elite like Yang Fang effectively advanced their agendas. In the

subsequent deployment of the plan, these elites would play an even more important role.

The Ningbo Story

Amazingly, even before the Zhejiang sojourners in Shanghai (such as Yang Fang and Wu

Xu) secured recognition from the court, some Ningbo local elites had begun to hire foreign

armies themselves. Chen Zhengyue was the first to manage it. Coming from the influential and

wealthy Chen lineage of Yin County, Chen Zhengyue was renowned for his strong sense of

communal loyalty and righteousness. Chen was always active and dedicated to public affairs,

such as fundraising for the state and philanthropic work.125

The local government therefore

consistently relied upon him. If He Wenqing was the mastermind of the Taipings in their

conquest of eastern Zhejiang, then Chen Zhengyue was the true organizer of the counterattack.

It all began when Chen Zhengyue moved to reside in the British concession of Ningbo

City on the northern bank of the Yong River when fleeing the Taipings. Chen’s first move was to

link up with the Ningbo British Consul’s translator, Zheng Weichun (Zheng A-fu). The entire

interaction was recorded as follows:

The British Consul Harvey had a Chinese translator, named Zheng A-fu. A-fu was young

and talented, and was thus well trusted by Consul Harvey. At first, when the Taipings

lingered in the Yuyao County, Zheng told Harvey: “It would be beneficial if the Taipings

come.” However, when the Taipings sacked Ningbo and Harvey visited the Taiping

leaders, Huang Chengzhong and Fan Ruzeng, Harvey was not treated politely. As a

result, he was irritated, and A-fu felt guilty about his previous comment on the Taipings.

125

Guangxu yinxianzhi, vol. 44. Renwu 20:3b. Chen Zhengyue.

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Chen Zhengyue, who was well-informed about contemporary politics, went to see Zheng

A-fu. Chen said, “You are a Chinese but you serve the foreigners. Even though you have

been able to purchase the title of deputy prefect, there is nothing you can be proud of. If

you can persuade foreigners to help us recover the city of Ningbo, you will be indeed

praised by your neighbors and by the local notables. Why don’t you do so?” Zheng

agreed and he persuaded the foreigners to attack the Taipings. Moreover, Zheng himself

recruited more than 300 soldiers, called “green turban braves” (lütou yong).126

After establishing connections with Consul Harvey, Chen Zhengyue decided to mobilize

and combine all the forces he could. Soon after the Taipings launched into Yin, top civilian and

military officials fled Ningbo, and Chen Zhengyue had to take up the leadership.127

Chen first

sought support from the remaining Qing forces and personally went to Shanghai, begging former

Ningbo officials Zhang Jingqu and Lin Jun to take action. Then, in an incredibly short period of

time, Chen gathered enough funds, hired British and French vessels of war to moor at Dinghai,

and drew up a plan for recovering Ningbo.128

In addition, he managed to reconnect with the

brothers Bu Xingyou and Bu Liangdai, whose navy, also called the Canton fleet, was once

converted into a local militia by Duan Guangqing.129

In March 1862, Qing officers gathered at

126

Tan Zhe, 603.

127 Tan Zhe, 602. Also, Ke Chao, 182.

128 Tan Zhe, 603.

129 Ke Chao, 183. The Bu brothers’ navy, or Canton fleet, was first recruited by Zhejiang governor Luo

Zundian and later maintained by Duan Guangqing. Bu Xingyou and Bu Liangdai were originally pirates from

Guangdong. Duan Guangqing managed to provide enough supplies to these pirates and transformed them into

one of the few local militias in Ningbo.

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Dinghai and met sailors of the Bu brothers. Soon, British Navy Captain Roderick Dew and

French officer Le Brethon arrived at Dinghai too.130

At the same time, Chen Zhengyue was determined to ally with other local militias in

Ningbo. By then, local residents in Yin were organizing their own militias; Wu Fanglin’s “white

cloth braves” (baibu yong) at the Yin-Shangyu border was the most famous of these. Chen met

with Wu and persuaded Wu to rise up on the day of the foreigners’ attack.131

However, owing to

miscommunication, the militia of Wu moved in April, earlier than planned. Despite this flawed

action, Chen was unwavering in his intent to put the white cloth braves back on track and put the

rest of his pieces in place.

On May 5, 1862, the Qing armies, with the support of Zhenhai’s local militia led by Chen

Zhengyue’s two confidants, conquered Zhenhai County seat in one blow; the sound of killing

was heard from everywhere.132

The Taipings led by He Wenqing fought back, but when they saw

the army soldiers and the white cloth braves, they “retreated behind the city gate.” The battle to

take Zhenhai seat’s inner city took only one more day.133

Behind the scenes, however, the secret of this blitz of retaking Zhenhai lay in Chen

Zhengyue’s skills of persuasion—Chen managed to cajole one Taiping general in Zhenhai, Fan

Weibang, into defecting on May 7.134

Xu Yaoguang reminisced: “There was a point when

conquering Zhenhai was almost impossible. However, lucky for us, the two Taiping military

130

Guangxu yinxianzhi, vol. 16:37b. Dashiji (The chorology) part 2.

131 Guangxu yinxianzhi, vol. 16:37b. Dashiji part 2.

132 Guangxu yinxianzhi, vol. 16:38b-39a. Dashiji part 2.

133 Ke Chao, 183.

134 Guangxu yinxianzhi, vol. 16, 37b. Dashiji part 2.

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generals, Fan Weibang and He Wenqing, could not get along well with each other.”135

Furious

and betrayed, He Wenqing, unable to hold Zhenhai city, withdrew.136

With the alliance of British

and French soldiers, the Qing armies, the Bu brothers’ fleet, and the local militia, Zhenhai was

easily reclaimed.

On May 9, the victorious allied force sped toward Ningbo City, a natural next stop after

Zhenhai. The attack on Ningbo was again well organized. Under translator Zheng Weichun

(Zheng A-fu)’s coordination, the allied troops soon moved to the foreign residence on the north

bank of the Yong River, a vantage point from which they could fire upon and break into

Ningbo’s city.137

With Chen’s careful planning, the recovery of Ningbo was a quick win.

On May 10, the Bu brothers started the first round of attack, firing at the Righteous and

Harmonious gate.138

The British forces and Zheng Weichun’s green turban braves followed.

British ships were attacked and responded by firing accurately on the rebel headquarters.139

Zheng Weichun had prepared knotted ladders for climbing the city wall. After his British officer

was shot in the head and died while climbing, Zheng took the lead and climbed into the city. At

the same time, Captain Dew started to fire at the city continuously and soon the wall was

damaged and rebels could not hold the city any more.140

After their recovery of Ningbo, Qing

135

Tan Zhe, 603.

136 Tan Zhe, 603.

137 Guangxu yinxianzhi, vol. 16, 39a-39b. Dashiji part 2.

138 Guangxu yinxianzhi, vol. 16, 39a. Dashiji part 2.

139 Tan Zhe, 603.

140 Guangxu yinxianzhi, vol. 16, 39a-39b. Dashiji part 2.

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officials Chen Shizhang and Zhang Jingqu reinstated themselves to their old positions and Chen

Zhengyue became the leader of the reconstruction bureau (shanhou ju).141

Although Qing officials bragged about their contribution to this victory, they could not

obscure the fact that the true organizer and initiator of this allied action was Chen Zhengyue.

Even the court itself conceded the importance of the local elites. In a later edict to Zhejiang

governor Zuo Zongtang, the court demanded: “Please investigate the whole event of retaking

Ningbo. I heard that there were no officials in the city….but were only local gentrymen and

foreigners trying to solve the problem on their own!”142

Yin merchant Yang Fang also

contributed to the retaking of his hometown. Just when Zheng A-fu and the British armies were

fighting against the Taipings at Ningbo City, the anxious Yang Fang sent Captain Ward, who

had now become his son-in law, to Ningbo to join the battle.143

If this political and military activism demonstrates the power and autonomy these local

elites gained in the political sphere during the Taiping, the particular way in which the action

was carried out alludes to the sources of their power, that is, their business influence. Local

elites’ interests largely overlapped with the interests of the foreign merchant community. For

141

Ke Chao, 183. This local evidence praised the role of the foreigners: “Though the Bu brothers shipped to

Ningbo, they dared not to enter the city. At the north gate, there were foreigners. It was Roderick Dew who

ordered several people to climb up via the ladder and then the Bu brothers could follow them—which made the

rebels flee to the West Gate in the afternoon, 3-5p.m. How great were the foreign armies!” Although official

documents, such as Pingzhe jilue, highly praised the functions of Qing officials in this act, I stick to the local

literatus’ version.

142 Wu Xu, 67. The imperial edict to Zuo Zongtang on investigating the details of Ningbo’s recovery on May

28, 1862.

143 Tan Zhe, 603.

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example, British Captain F. S. Green complained about the cessation of trading and the

diminishment of opium sales after the Taipings took over Ningbo.144

Also, Captain Dew, after

observing the Taiping activities in Ningbo region, was convinced that supporting Chen

Zhengyue was right. Captain Dew wrote:

I had known Ningpo in its palmy days, when it boasted itself one of the first commercial

cities of the empire, but now, on this 11th of May, one might have fancied that an angel

of destruction had been at work in the city as in its suburbs. All the latter, with their

wealthy hongs and thousands of houses, lay leveled; while in the city itself, once the

home of half a million people, no trace or vestige of an inhabitant could be seen. Truly it

was a city of the dead.145

Indeed, the Ningbo recovery was a local decision largely influenced by the interests of the local

trading community, not by foreign governments. In fact, in taking this action, Captain Dew had

144

Western reports on Taiping, archives of Jardine Matheson: reports by Capt. R.S.Green. On January 29

1862: “I hope to see an improvement in our Drug Market after the Chinese holidays if the rebels will allow the

Inland trade to be resumed. Chinese merchants just are willing to pay the same duties as heretofore. The

Rebels still remain in charge of this city and some apprehension is felt that they are not so civil to Foreigners

as they were at first—the disturbances at Shanghai may account for this.” On February 7 1862: “There has not

been a chest of opium sold here during the past fortnight; consequently I can give no quotations. It is now said

amongst the Chinese that the Rebel chiefs will not allow Opium to be carried into the Interior, although they

allow their own people to use it. The Rebels still continue quiet and are civil to all Foreigners.”

145 Carr, 258.

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committed a major act of aggression against the rebels without higher authorization and had to

endure criticisms from both his naval superiors and the British diplomats.146

After the British, the French also wanted to join the action. The French Customs

Commissioner for the Ningbo port, Prosper Giquel, was ready to build a Franco-Chinese army

after Frederic Ward’s model. Giquel soon formed his army, the “colorful turban braves” (huatou

yong), also called the “Ever Winning Army” (Changjiejun). Following Giquel, the British

supported and expanded Zheng Weichun’s green turban braves, and renamed them the “Ever

Peaceful Army” (Chang’anjun) and “Surely Triumphant Army” (Dingshengjun).147

Altogether sixteen armies were stationed in Ningbo City, including Ward’s “Ever

Victorious Army.” 148

Chen Zhengyue and other rich gentry became the provider of financial

support for these new armies: they took the responsibility of supplying provisions, punishing

“traitors,” and restoring local order. With their tight coordination, Ningbo soon became a

stronghold from which the Qing would win back all eastern Zhejiang.149

In Ningbo, because of Chen Zhengyue, foreign involvement was finally realized. When

the Qing officials fled, Chen Zhengyue stepped into the political vacuum, assumed leadership,

and creatively organized the allied comeback. Chen’s devotion, his economic power, his local

connections, and his overlapping interests with those of the foreigners all made him the one to

succeed in this demanding task.

146

Carr, 258-259.

147 Carr, 259.

148 Guangxu yinxianzhi, vol. 16, 40a-40b. Dashiji part 2.

149 Guangxu yinxianzhi, vol. 16, 40b. Dashiji part 2.

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Now, the new Tongzhi court in Beijing had finally given a green light to collaboration

with foreigners, and a forceful army was already gathered in Ningbo, including the British and

French formal forces, the British-Chinese and the Franco-Chinese troops, and Ward’s Ever-

Victorious-Army. But now again, the allied troops met He Wenqing.

The Showdown: The Allies versus He Wenqing

After Zhenhai was recovered by the Qing on May 8, 1862, He Wenqing fled to Ciqi and

sallied back and forth between Ciqi and Yuyao. On May 22, the British and French navies and

the Bu brothers’ Canton fleet set course for Ciqi. With the help of some local militias, they

quickly defeated He Wenqing and garrisoned in Ciqi’s county seat.

However, the poor discipline of the collaborative local militias horrified the foreign

troops. The braves ravaged the nearly ready wheat, which was like “stabbing farmers in their

hearts.”150

In disgust at what the braves had done, the British and French naval officers left Ciqi

on May 31 and the Qing armies followed suit. Vast reaches between Ciqi and Yuyao were

reoccupied by He Wenqing, who had seesaw battles with the local braves throughout July

1862.151

The Qing counterattack seemed to be going nowhere until the foreign armies re-entered

the war. On July 31, the British and French officers allied with the local armies once again and

launched an attack on He Wenqing. This time they focused on Yuyao, the rebellious base for He

150

Ke Chao, 186.

151 Ke Chao, 185-186.

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Wenqing and his tenant followers. After a brief bombardment of the city, the allied troops took

over Yuyao on August 2.152

Again, matters did not progress as smoothly as the Qing officials hoped. In early

September, Qing armies garrisoned at Yuyao fought among themselves: failing to gain

remuneration equal to that of the French trained army, a significant part of the Canton fleet

turned to the Taipings.153

As a result, He Wenqing and his followers seized Ciqi yet again on

September 18.154

Simultaneously, Fenghua County was conquered by rebels from Cheng and

Xinchang counties; they soon looted Yin County. 155

The Taipings seemed to have recovered

their energy and the Qing fell into a standoff all over again.

At this crucial moment, in late September, the newly appointed Ningbo-Shaoxing daotai

Shi Zhi’e rushed to Ningbo. Shi’s task was a daunting one: Ningbo City had only 2,000 soldiers

and they had to be stationed there; Yuyao County was the rebels’ stronghold, but there were

fewer than 1,000 local braves there to fight the rebels after the majority of the Canton fleet

left.156

With connections to the foreigners and powerful backing from Li Hongzhang and Zuo

Zongtang, Shi quickly gathered an impressive force, including the best outfit at that time, Ward’s

Ever Victorious Army. Even though Shi Zhi’e claimed that “Ward had always been a good

friend,” it was most likely Yang Fang who encouraged Ward to join in. Meanwhile, Shi

persuaded the British Captain Dew and the French officer Giquel to offer support and deployed

152

Ke Chao, 187.

153 Shi, 150. Shi Zhi’e’s letter to Zeng Guofan, October 2, 1862.

154 Ke Chao, 188.

155 Shi, 151. Shi Zhi’e’s letter to Zeng Guofan, October 2, 1862. See also Guangxu yinxianzhi, vol. 16, 42a.

Dashiji part 2.

156 Shi, 150. Shi Zhi’e’s letter to Zeng Guofan, October 2, 1862.

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the rest of the Bu brothers’ Canton fleet.157

Shi also managed to raise 30,000 pounds sterling

from Zhejiang merchants in Shanghai.158

Shi Zhi’e was ready to deploy the troops. The foreign armies and foreign-trained Chinese

armies were formidable. On September 21, at Ciqi County seat, Captain Ward personally led the

assault. After Ward was “shot by a musket ball when looking through a telescope,” the provoked

Ever Victorious Army instantly broke into the city. He Wenqing and Huang Chengzhong fled.159

On September 20, He and Huang attacked Ningbo City. The well-prepared Captain Dew and

Commander Giquel drove them out in one blow.160

On October 11, Fenghua County was

reclaimed by the allies, who then pushed west.161

He Wenqing again withdrew to his Yuyao

base, trying to devise a comeback.162

However, even with support from Huang Laichang of

Yuyao, He could not battle against the powerful allied force that had matured in the hands of Shi

Zhi’e. On November 18, Yuyao was conquered by the Qing.163

Inevitably, the never-ending money issue emerged. After gaining Yuyao County, the

French navy, which constituted the majority of the troops, named their price: 30,000 pounds

sterling for Shangyu and 20,000 pounds sterling for Shaoxing City.164

As early as the conquest of

157

Shi, 150. Shi Zhi’e’s letter to Zeng Guofan, October 2, 1862.

158 Shi, 153. Shi Zhi’e’s letter to Zeng Guofan, October 2, 1862.

159 Shi, 151. Shi Zhi’e’s letter to Zeng Guofan, October 2, 1862.

160 Shi, 150-151. Shi Zhi’e’s letter to Zeng Guofan, October 2, 1862.

161 Shi, 156. Shi Zhi’e’s letter to Zeng Guofan, October 2, 1862. “Yinke” refers to 3-5a.m.

162 Ke Chao, 189.

163 Shi, 158-159. Shi Zhi’e’s letter to Zeng Guofan, November 27, 1862.

164 Chen Zhouqing, 258.

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Ciqi, the merchant-donated 30,000 pounds sterling had run out.165

With Chen Zhengyue’s

reconstruction bureau as the only institution that could extract money from Yin County,

resources were limited. Now, the anxious Shi Zhi’e turned to veteran official Duan Guangqing.

Although Duan had been dismissed in 1860 for his abdication of Hangzhou, his strong political

connections and fundraising skills kept him involved in politics. Duan was assigned the crucial

responsibility of gathering 200,000 taels of silver from the Zhejiang elites who were then

displaced in Shanghai.166

When he met with them, according to Duan Guangqing Diary, Duan first shed tears,

which deeply touched the displaced elites. Then Duan said, with sincerity, “The dynasty’s

heavenly mandate is not finished and we will soon enjoy the great peace together!”167

Moved,

perhaps, by his words, Ningbo merchants offered up their funds. Duan might have exaggerated

his role and the amount he was able to raise, though. Local literati also recorded the important

meeting. Their accounts emphasized the role of the sojourning Ningbo and Shaoxing merchant

elites in Shanghai, especially Ningbo’s Yang Fang and Shaoxing’s Chen Zhouqing. According to

Chen Zhouqing:

Duan Guangqing, a veteran Zhejiang official, visited us. He asked Yang Fang and me

how much we could gather. I replied, “If Yang Fang of Yin would be responsible for

two-thirds of the expenses, I…would get you the remaining one-third.” Thus, we

Shaoxing merchants raised 30,000 pounds sterling altogether.168

165

Shi, 153. Shi Zhi’e’s letter to Zeng Guofan, October 2, 1862.

166 Shi, 170. Shi Zhi’e’s letter to Zeng Guofan, January 19, 1863.

167 Duan Guangqing, 190.

168 Chen Zhouqing, 258-259. Chen wrote, “Together, Shaoxing merchants decided on the bonus of gaining the

six counties in Shaoxing Prefecture: for each place, they would send 5,000 pounds sterling for the foreign

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With strong support from Ningbo-Shaoxing merchants, the money issue was smoothed out.

The allied force continued moving west. After Yuyao, Shangyu County naturally became

the next target for the allied armies (see map). Shangyu County was conquered on November 22,

Cheng County on November 25, and Xinchang County on November 26.169

Now that all the

counties east to the Cao’er River were reoccupied by the Qing, He Wenqing fled to the inner city

of Shaoxing. The allied troops followed.

The French commander Le Brethon170

and his successor, Tardif De Moidrey, were killed

while trying to take Shaoxing City from December 1862 to February 1863.171

In response, the

Qing official armies, the green turban braves led by Officer Coker, and the British navy led by

officers Dew and Tinling all rushed to the battlefield of Shaoxing. Finally, in March, there came

French Captain D’Aiguebella, who succeeded Le Brethon and De Moidrey and brought with him

a larger cohort of soldiers.172

Facing powerful opponents, Shaoxing’s Taiping commanders He

Wenqing and Zhou Wenjia abandoned the city on March 15. The reconquest of Shaoxing by the

Qing marked the end of eastern Zhejiang’s Taiping Rebellion; by then, all counties in Ningbo

and Shaoxing prefectures had been recaptured.173

armies.” However, he later also wrote that most of the money was paid by one merchant, who assumed the

responsibility of killing the Shaoxing prefect Liao Zongyuan. Thus, the fundraising in Shaoxing was more like

a penalty payment.

169 Shi, 159-160. Shi Zhi’e’s letter to Zeng Guofan, November 27, 1862.

170 Yuenanzhi, 373.

171 Yuenanzhi, 374.

172 Mao Jiaqi, 299.

173 Yuenanzhi, 375.

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In this eastern Zhejiang saga of the Qing counterattack on the Taipings, foreigners played

a crucial role in advancing the battle lines. But it is the local elites who made the victory feasible

by choosing to back the Qing government, hiring foreign troops, and providing tremendous

financial support. In particular, one gentryman, Chen Zhengyue, and one merchant, Yang Fang,

stepped into the political arena, organized foreign arms corps, promoted the link with foreign

armies, and secured financial support for these armies. Chen, Yang and their likes demonstrated

true ingeniousness and pragmatism. They also revealed a changed political attitude of the Ningbo

elites: no longer were they dependent on the state, rather, they took political initiatives and put

matters into their own hands.

Conclusion: The Aftermath and Legacies of the Taiping Rebellion

After eastern Zhejiang’s Taiping war, Yin gentryman Chen Zhengyue was appointed a

prefect in Zhili Viceroyalty. Chen declined this position, claiming that issues in Zhejiang were

still urgent. Chen focused on the reconstruction of his hometown, Yin, “building up sacrificial

halls, repairing sea dams, dredging rivers, setting up examination halls, and establishing

orphanages.” In times of harsh weather in Yin County, Chen Zhengyue donated clothes to

refugees; every year in the winter, he distributed porridge in the county seat. At the same time,

Chen also raised military funds for Gansu, Yunnan, and Guizhou provinces and managed relief

funds for Zhili Viceroyalty, Fujian and Shanxi provinces. While doing this, Chen Zhengyue

socialized with all kinds of people: military and civil officials, gentry and respectable elders

(qilao), travelers, big merchants, and foreign leaders. People all came to Chen, discussing current

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affairs with him and consulting with him on public and private issues. Even when he was

seriously ill, people still visited him and asked his advice.174

As for Yin merchant Yang Fang, in addition to organizing the Ever Victorious Army, he

established a refugee bureau in Shanghai to take care of those who had fled from Ningbo to

Shanghai. After Zhejiang was pacified and the provincial governor started water dam

construction, Yang Fang donated 30,000 taels of silver and supervised the project himself.

Before his death, Yang Fang contributed the rest of his savings to compile the Yin County

gazetteer, entrusting his in-law Chen Zhengyue with its supervision. Moreover, when Yang Fang

heard that the library of the Lu family had been dismantled and dispersed in the war, he used his

own money to buy back the lost books that were scattered around town. Yang managed to gain

back eight-tenths of the lost books, and without charging a single copper he gave all of them

back to the original owner.175

Undeniably, the international trade in 1840s Ningbo had given

Yang Fang the opportunity to rise to power. Having begun his career as an apprentice in a small

cloth shop in Ningbo City, Yang managed to become acquainted with some foreign merchants.

Yang got into the opium trade, through which he accumulated great wealth. Yang then started his

own bank, and he soon became the most powerful Ningbo merchant in Shanghai. International

trade had given opportunities to these non-degree holders. But it was only in the Taiping era

(1851–1862), when the state needed a great amount of money to deal with the rebels, that Yang

Fang finally had a chance to step into politics. And in doing so, Yang transformed himself into a

member of the local elite. In the post-Taiping era, Yang Fang became a societal leader, again by

means of his generous donations to the reconstruction projects. Even though Yang himself had

174

Guangxu yinxianzhi, vol. 44. Renwu 20:4a. Chen Zhengyue.

175 Guangxu yinxianzhi, vol. 44. Renwu 19:38b. Yang Fang.

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never sat for a single civil service examination and did not possess any of the cultural or social

capital legitimized by the state, his economic prowess allowed him to leave a mark on the local

literary scene, by helping compile the Yin County gazetteer and by rebuilding the Lu family

library. Finally, Yang Fang was able to marry his daughter to the son of the prestigious Chen

Zhengyue of the Chen lineage, which again secured Yang’s elite status.

Yin County recovered quickly with support from people like Chen Zhengyue and Yang

Fang. The collaboration between the Yin elites and the government remained, but the structure of

local power changed. Instead of depending on the government, Chen and Yang had gained

authority and prestige by acting within a significant yet independent space for community affairs,

and an independent, locally-based public sphere was taking shape.

In sharp contrast, Zhuji was a totally different story. As the Franco-Chinese army

attacked Shaoxing, Zuo Zongtang’s Hunan army regained Zhuji. He Wenqing, who had just fled

from Shaoxing, was soon caught in his hometown. With fewer than 1,000 soldiers around him, a

disheartened He Wenqing sighed, “How can my force of 10,000 soldiers have only 1,000

left?!”176

He, this most-wanted warrior of the eastern Zhejiang battlefield, was murdered by Zuo

Zongtang’s subordinates. The Qing officials hated He Wenqing so much that He’s body was left

on the street and local people were forbidden from burying him.177

Xu Yaoguang exacted his

revenge on He Wenqing by killing almost everyone in He’s home village.178

Zhuji never

176

Zhuji liushinian zhanggu, quoted from Zou Shencheng, 346.

177 Yuenanzhi, 375.

178 Zou Shencheng, 319.

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recovered from the Taiping war.179

The Taiping conflict aggravated the divergence between Yin

and Zhuji.

Going back to the questions I raised at the beginning of this article: What was actually

going on in eastern Zhejiang’s Taiping Rebellion? Why did local elites make opposite choices

when facing the rebels? What were the legacies of this rebellion?

The Taiping Rebellion of eastern Zhejiang developed in two stages. The first stage was

marked by the exploits of He Wenqing and his allies. The Qing officials in Zhejiang were not able

to put up an effective defense and were trapped in a deadlock. In the second stage, the deadlock

was resolved by the Yin County local elites who recruited foreign armies to battle for them. This

allied force eventually won Ningbo and Shaoxing prefectures back for the Qing.

In eastern Zhejiang, its Taiping Rebellion was much more than a war against the longhair

invaders, as the Taiping Rebellion was generally portrayed. Quite on the contrary, the whole

eastern Zhejiang conflict was a civil war between two groups of local elites. The first comprised

the local elites who had strong links with the government. They were profoundly integrated into

the state system as typified by the Yin County gentry elite, and they tried to retain the old system

of ruling from which they had benefited. The second group of elites comprised those who did not

have such links and even bore a grudge against the Qing government, like He Wenqing. Being

independent lower-strata elites, they seized the chance to increase their own political power and

prestige, which they could never have achieved in the old system. In a society that inequality and

179

James Cole, The people versus the Taipings: Bao Lisheng’s “Righteous Army of Dongan” (Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1981). In this book, Cole writes in detail of the miserable experience that Zhuji

people suffered at another village, the Bao village of Zhuji.

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unfairness permeated, the Taiping Rebellion acted like a polarizing machine, urging people to

make different choices.

During the rebellion, the way in which people asserted political power fundamentally

influenced the structure of local politics in Zhejiang. When it transpired that the major political

actor, the Qing state, lacked the clout to solve the deadlock, the state’s prior partner, the once-

dependent Yin County-type local elites, engaged in politics themselves. Their way of handling

politics changed: they moved from relying on government to directly shouldering political

responsibility—linking up with foreigners, urging actions by the government army, and

coordinating local militias. By participating in politics with their own means and connections,

these local elites strengthen the managerial sphere in which they themselves dominated.

The actions of these local men to defend their localities during the rebellion provided

significant impetus for local public initiatives. Facing the mass-scale destruction caused by

rebellion, such initiatives remained in the post-war reconstruction age, when local elites

prioritized their home arena and eschewed official posts far from their hometowns, as Chen

Zhengyue did. Even more so, local elites’ authority no longer was derived from legitimization of

the state; rather, local communal activities won them influence and prestige. William Rowe,

Mary Rankin, and Susan Mann have noted that gentry and merchant institutions and their related

public activities had already become institutionalized in places like Ningbo throughout the

nineteenth century.180

Rowe and Rankin have also elaborated the large involvement of the local

180

William Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889 (Stanford: Stanford

university Press, 1992), 259, 268, 318-320. Susan Mann Jones, “The Ningpo Pang and Financial Power at

Shanghai,” in Mark Elvin and William Skinner, The Chinese City Between Two Worlds, (Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 1974), 77-80. Mary Rankin, “The origins of a Chinese public Sphere: Local Elites and

Community affairs in the Late-Imperial Period,” Etudes Chinoises vol. 9 no. 2 (Fall 1990): 13-60.

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elites in the post-Taiping reconstruction.181

What this paper wants to emphasize is that the

Taiping Rebellion offered a key opportunity for people like Yang Fang and Chen Zhengyue to be

even more independent of the state, which gave rise to a more independent managerial public

sphere.

In addition, this separate authority of elites was largely drawn from their economic

capital, as the cases of Yang Fang and Chen Zhengyue have shown. When political recognition

combined with economic contribution, the substantial function cultural capital used to have in

determining a person’s status was impaired. In practice, when buying degrees became prevalent

on a large scale, degrees became an accessory to economic power.182

After the Taiping

Rebellion, economic prowess became increasingly important in local management, and the rise

of economic capital challenged the government’s monopoly in granting social prestige via civil

service examination. These changes not only sabotaged state authority, but also undermined the

basis of the old structure of dominance. In addition, the rise of the independent public sphere to

solve local affairs gradually led to the demise of state authority and the dissociation of elites

from the government. These, then, were the legacies of the Taiping war.

One cannot, therefore, simply interpret the Zhejiang Taiping Rebellion as a dichotomy

between the Guangxi rebels on the one side, and the local elite militia plus Qing government on

the other. Nor can the suppression of the rebellion be attributed simply to the Tongzhi restoration

policies of the new central government. Eastern Zhejiang’s Taiping Rebellion was chiefly a

181

Mary Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986). William Rowe, “Public Sphere in Modern China,” Modern China.

vol. 16 no. 3 (July 1999): 309-329.

182 Zhang Zhongli, Zhongguo Shenshi (Chinese Gentry) (Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui kexue chubanshe, 1991)

152-154.

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struggle between two types of local elites: one seized a chance to advance their dampened

political ambition; the other fought back, trying to maintain their habitual privileges. The Qing

victory in suppressing the Taipings in eastern Zhejiang resulted from the new activism of the Yin

County elites, who applied various resources, including important links with the foreigners, and

made the Qing triumph possible. Even that eastern Zhejiang’s Taiping Rebellion was a special

case, it was not unique. In a number of places throughout the Qing Empire, lower-strata elites

took the opportunity of the Taiping invasion and vented their discontent against the Qing, just

like He Wenqing did. Most of them did not have real plans but were seeking power and

recognition, which had been denied by the Qing state before the rebellion.183

Significant changes did occur in the Taiping war: First, the independent and separate

sphere of local activism emerged, and second, economic capital became an increasingly

important resource of power. All these corroded the foundation of the old way of dominance

under which cultural hegemony authorized by the state was preeminent. These changes gave rise

to the independent authority of the local elites and set in motion for the political transformation

that was soon to come.

183

Shunshin Chin and Joshua Gogel, trans. by Joshua Fogel, “Elegy for the Heavenly Capital,” in The Taiping

Rebellion (East Gate Book: 2001), 695. It is about the “warlord” Miao Peilin. Also, in Jia Shucun, “Liumang

junren Zhan Qilun” (Zhan Qilun the Hooligan Soldier), in Jiangsu shehui kexue (the Social Science magazine

of Jiangsu), no.3 (2000). Electronic version. It is about the local militia leader Zhan Qilun.

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Abbreviations Used in Notes

Tan Zhe

Xu Yaoguang, Tan Zhe (On Zhejiang), 1880, in Zhongguo shixuehui, ed., Zhongguo jindaishi

ziliao congkan: Taiping tianguo (The Taiping Rebellion) vol. 6 (Shanghai: Shengzhou guoguang

she, 1953), 557–615.

Qingshilu

Qingshilu Jiang-Zhe-Hu diqu jingji ziliao xuan (Economic records of Jiangsu, Zhejiang and

Shanghai in Qing Vertical Records) (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1989).

Ke Chao

Ke Chao, Xin ren suo ji (A detailed account from 1861 to 1862), in Jindaishi ziliao bianji zu, ed.,

Taiping tianguo zhiliao xuan (Primary sources on the Taiping Rebellion) (Beijing: Shehui kexue

chubanshe, 1959), 179–201.

Wu Xu

Taiping tianguo lishi bowuguan, ed., Wu Xu dang’an xuanbian (Selected archives of Wu Xu),

vol. 1 (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1983).

Shi

Shi Zhi’e, Shi Zhi’e Dang’an (Shi Zhi’e archives), in Jindaishi ziliao bianji zu, ed., Taiping

tianguo zhiliao xuan (Primary sources on the Taiping Rebellion) (Beijing: Shehui kexue

chubanshe, 1959), 149–177.

Yuenanzhi

Wang Yishou, Yuenanzhi (A record of the sufferings in Shaoxing), 1864, in Zou Shencheng,

“Yuenanzhi kao ba” (Textual investigation on Yuenanzhi), in Xing Fenglin and Zou Shencheng,

eds. Tianguo shishi shilun (Explanatory theses on historical events in the Taiping Rebellion)

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(Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 1984) 347–384. In its appendix, the entire text of Yuenanzhi is

included.

Dong

Dong Xun, “Yangbing jilue” (Records on foreign armies), in Zhongguo shixuehui, ed.,

Zhongguo jindaishi ziliao congkan: Taiping tianguo (The Taiping Rebellion) (Shanghai:

Shengzhou guoguang she, 1953), vol. 4, 529–530.

Chen Zhouqing

Chen Zhouqing, Ducheng beikou ji (An account of Shaoxing City under the Taipings), in

Nanjing daxue lishi xi, ed., Jiang-Zhe-Yu-Wan Taiping tianguo shiliao xuanbian (Selective

sources on the Taiping Rebellion on Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Henan and Anhui Provinces), 252–260.