1 Long-Term Energy Outlook Trends, Challenges, and Opportunities in a Rapidly Evolving System Adam Sieminski September 29 th , 2017 Document 2
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Long-Term Energy Outlook Trends, Challenges, and Opportunities in a Rapidly Evolving System
Adam Sieminski
September 29th, 2017
Document 2
Key Takeaways
$
The Global Energy System No major near-term transformation likely
owing to the momentum advantage of
existing energy networks
The Climate Challenge Emission reduction targets agreed at
Paris are not sufficient to meet the
450ppm goal
Behavioral Economics Uncertainty in consumer behavior is a key
component of deployment in renewables
and mobility developments
Cost Structure Uncertainties Forecasts for renewable energy have been
hampered by rapid improvements in
technology and materials
2 Source: CSIS
Economic activity and population growth drive energy demand
relative fuel cost, government policies, and behavior set mix
GDP and population growth drive energy Global GDP rising 3.7% 2015-2030; population up 1.1 billion (90% in non-OECD)
Disruptive technology could upset the consensus Reference case projections are not meant to be forecasts
Electricity demand Fastest-growing form of end-use energy consumption, rising 1.5% per year
Policy can shape fuel mix Efforts to diversify fuel mix favor non-fossil penetration in most key markets
Efficiency & consumer behavior Improving efficiency & shifts in consumer behaviors reducing the energy intensity of
the world economy
?
3 Source: CSIS
Although population and per capita output continue to rise, energy and
carbon intensity are projected to continue to fall in the EIA Reference Case
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
1990 2015 2040
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1990 2015 2040
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 2015 2040
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1990 2015 2040
Population Million people
Per capita gross
domestic product Thousand dollars
Carbon intensity Metric tons CO2 per billion Btu
Energy intensity Thousand Btu per dollar
Non-OECD
OECD
Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2017 4
World primary energy consumption: non-OECD growth dominates
0
200
400
600
800
1990 2000 2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050
Non-OECD
Middle East
Africa
Americas
Europe
and Eurasia
Asia
OECD
Quadrillion Btu
5 Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2017
World energy consumption: Coal not growing and could fall faster;
renewables growing the fastest; electricity is the largest energy user
0
50
100
150
200
250
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040
Petroleum and other liquids
Natural gas
Coal
Renewables
Nuclear
Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2017 6
32% 31%
15% 15%
12% 10% 3%
3% 13%
14%
25%
27%
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2015 2030
Electricity
Losses
Electricity
Consumption
Biofuel
Coal
Natural Gas
Petroleum and
other liquids
World energy consumption by fuel source
Quadrillion Btu
World energy consumption by fuel (with electricity separated)
Quadrillion Btu
Oil Markets
7
Current global oil price cycle not over yet: Lower prices to prevail for longer
$0
$20
$40
$60
$80
$100
$120
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Crude oil prices in real 2015 US dollars and nominal US dollars
An
nu
al a
ve
rag
e p
rice p
er
barr
el
Shale Decade
2010s
China Decade
2000s
Anything but Oil Decade
1980s
OPEC Decade
1970s
Texas Decade
1960s
*1960-83 prices – Arabian Light; 1984-2017 Dated Brent
Lost Decade
1990s
$ 2016 (deflated using U.S. CPI) $ Money of the day
Source: BP Statistical Review of Energy (data) 8
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
Sectoral shares of world liquids use hold relatively constant in the
EIA Reference Case even as total consumption increases
Quadrillion Btu
Transportation
Industrial
Buildings Electricity
54%
36%
6% 4%
56%
36%
5% 2%
Note: Percentages express a sector’s liquids consumption compared to total use of these fuels across all end uses.
Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2017 9
Peak demand depends on GDP growth, efficiency trends, climate policy
and a host of other factors
10
Million barrels per day
Source: BP, Energy Outlook 2017
Million barrels per day
Uncertainty for future oil demand
11
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Statoil (Reform)
Statoil (Renewal)
Statoil (Rivalry)
Exxon
CNPC
BP
IEA (New Policies)
IEA (Current Policies)
IEA (450 Scenario)
EIA
Total (Peak forecast)
Shell (Peak forecast)
OPEC (Reference)
IHS (Autonomy)
Source: CSIS
Electricity Markets and Renewable Energy
12
OECD and non-OECD net electricity generation
Trillion kilowatt-hours
World electricity use by sector
Quadrillion Btu
Net electricity generation in non-OECD countries increases twice as fast as in the OECD
with building use being a major contributor to growth in the EIA Reference Case
0
5
10
15
20
25
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040
non-OECD
OECD
0
10
20
30
40
50
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
Industrial
Residential
Commercial
Transportation
13 Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2017
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 20400%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
World electricity generation by fuel
Trillion kilowatt-hours
Share of net electricity generation
Percent
In the EIA Reference Case, renewables and natural gas provide much of the growth in
electricity generation with their combined share of the total rising to 57% in 2040
Liquids Nuclear
Natural gas
Coal
Renewables
Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2017 14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 20400%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
World net electricity generation from renewable power
Trillion kilowatt-hours
Share of renewable energy
Percent
Wind and solar dominate growth in renewables and represent two-thirds
of related capacity additions by 2040
Other
Geothermal
Solar
Wind
Hydropower
15 Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2017
Disruptions
16
Key innovations/assumptions that could change the consensus
energy outlook
17
• Economic / population growth trends
• Innovations in Buildings / Industry / Transportation efficiency
• Electric vehicles / Autonomous vehicles
• Wind / Solar cost reductions
• Utility and grid-scale batteries / super-grids / distributed power
• Shale – enhanced recovery rates
• Automated drilling /smarter completions and tie-ins
• Carbon tax, fee / Carbon capture, use, and sequestration (CCUS)
• Nuclear: Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) / Fusion
Source: CSIS
Mb/d
Digital revolution
15
20
25
Electric revolution
Mobility revolution scenarios: Impact on oil demand in cars in 2035
Mb/d
15
20
25
18 Source: BP, Energy Outlook 2017
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Bakken
Eagle Ford
Marcellus
Woodford
Haynesville
Fayetteville
Barnett
Today, new shale plays
supports 60% of US gas
production The Marcellus
Shale alone
now produces
more than 6.5
Tcf per yr of
gas.
More than
Canada, Iran
or Qatar…
Shale revolution is not necessarily over – technology advancements continue
Bcf/d
Source: Frank O’Sullivan 19
Paris & Policy
20
Global greenhouse gas emissions: not just fossil fuels
21 Source: IPCCC, Climate Change 2014 Report
Billion metric tons
Energy-related carbon dioxide emissions by fuel
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040
coal
liquids
natural gas
2015
Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2017 22
The 450 Scenario: How might that look?
Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook 2016
Global Oil Demand
Million barrels per day
23
20
30
40
1995 2005 2015 2025 2035
Base case
Faster transition
Even faster transition
Faster transition pathways
0 2 4 6 8 10
Transport
Industry &Buildings
CCUS*
Power
Faster transition
Even faster transition
*Carbon capture, use and storage
(predominantly in power sector)
Billion tonnes CO2 Billion tonnes CO2 in 2035
Carbon emissions Reductions in emissions versus base case
24 Source: BP, Energy Outlook 2017
Perversity, futility, and jeopardy: Why change is resisted
Source: The Rhetoric of Reaction, by Albert O. Hirschman
25
Perversity thesis
Any purposeful action to improve some feature of the political,
social, or economic order will make it (or something else) worse
Futility thesis
Attempts at transformation will be futile - they will simply fail to
"make a dent“ in the problem
Jeopardy thesis
Argues that the cost of the proposed change or reform is too high
as it endangers some existing order
Snapshot of key energy issues by region/country
Source: CSIS 26
For more information on CSIS…
The CSIS Energy and National Security Program is a recognized and respected leader in
understanding the shifting global and domestic energy landscape
• Analyzing and explaining the intersection of policy, market, and technological developments
• Collaborating with government, industry, academia and nonprofits leaders
• Assisting decision makers to craft smart energy policies that balance economic, environmental,
and security priorities
www.csis.org/energy
Adam Sieminski
[email protected] +1 202-775-3288
James R. Schlesinger Chair for Energy & Geopolitics
Center for Strategic and International Studies
1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Washington, DC 20036
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