Long Distance Relay Attack

Long Distance Relay Attack

Luigi Sportiello Joint Research Centre Institute for the Protection and the Security of the Citizen European Commission

Smart Cards

• ˝Something you have˝

• Secure data storage

• Qualify the holder for operations

• Two possible communication technologies

• Contact

• Contactless

Contactless Smart Cards

• Some characteristics:

• quick interactions

• working distance: typically few cm

Contactless Card Reader

Command

Response

(Slave) (Master)

Reader-Card Communication Protocol

• ISO 14443 (+ ISO 7816-4) common solution for many contactless

smart card

• Some time constraints during the communication

Command

Response

Anticollision/Initialization

ISO14443 Frame | Encoded Command

ISO14443 Frame | Encoded Response

APDU: read, write, …

ISO14443

ISO7816-4

Response within max ~5s.

Relay Attack Against a Contactless Smart Card

• Two devices are needed:

• Proxy: emulates a contactless smart card

• Mole: acts as reader nearby the victim card

• Communication channel between Proxy and Mole

Command Command Command

Response Response Response

Relay Attack: Our Aim

• Relay attacks against contactless smart cards are not new

• Some experiments featured with specific hardware modules

• Lab conditions with short distances

• Our proof of concept:

• Long distance attack (>10Km)

• In dynamic conditions (no constraints on devices positions)

Relay Attack on a Mobile Phone Network

• Off-the-shelf equipment

• Mobile phones with NFC (ISO 14443 compliant) as Proxy and Mole

• Mobile phone network for Proxy-Mole communication

• Data network basically provided by all mobile phone network

operators

Internet

Proxy App

NFC NFC

-Card Emulation

-Open Connection

-Msg/Rsp Forwarding

Mole App

-Card Reader

-Accept Connections

-Msg/Rsp Forwarding

IP: X.X.X.X IP: Y.Y.Y.Y

Connection

Cmd/Rsp

Restricted/Private IP Restricted/Private IP:

no incoming connections

Proxy Mole

Our Relay Attack Architecture

Accept connections from phones Commands/Responses forwarding

Open Socket Open Socket

Cmd

Cmd

Rsp

Rsp

Cmd

Rsp

Cmd

Rsp

Our Relay Attack Architecture: More Details

ISO 14443 communication

ISO 14443 communication

Relay Attack on a Geographical Scale

• We successfully relayed a Reader-ePassport communication over several kilometers

• Authentication protocols useless against relay attacks

• No longer possible to assume that a card is physically nearby the reader

15Km

42Km

No Timing Issues

On average, response waiting time ≈ 800ms.

Cmd

Rsp

ISO 14443 communication

Live Experiment: Italy-Austria Relay Attack?

• Let’s try!

• (you know, things never go well in these cases... we apologize in advance…)

541Km

Contactless Smart Card Applications

• Government (e.g., identification)

• Banking (e.g., electronic payments)

• Transport (e.g., tickets)

• Access control

• Loyalty programs

• ...

Market Figures

Source:

Conclusions

• Long distance relay attack in dynamic conditions

against contactless smart cards proved

• A ˝botnet of smart cards˝ is possible

• Practical countermeasures:

• Access codes (e.g., MRZ, PIN)

• Shielding

Thank you for your attention!