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Managem
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ovationIn
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nnovationLa
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6 2 Organisational thunderboltsWhen a management innovator is set loose inside
an organisation, watch out! Management innovation
can have thunderous results.
6 6 From R&D to Connect + Develop at P&GChallenged by its CEO to source ideas from
outside, Procter & Gamble decided to blaze a new
path for its research and development function. In
pursuit of inspiration, its R&D became
turbocharged by using insourcing to expand
P&Gs horizons.
7 0 Perfectly in balance
Art Schneiderman pioneered what later becamethe concept of the balanced scorecard while a vice
president of quality and productivity at Analog
Devices. We talked with Schneiderman to find out
more about the early evolution of a management
innovation.
7 2 Making the firm flexibleHow companies operate has been established over
two centuries. Is it possible for a firm to break the
established rules of organisation? Eden McCallum
did just that.
7 6 Death to budgetingIts considered one of the basics of management.
If you dont have a budget, you arent really
managing. But, UBS has made budgeting
secondary to performance and customer
satisfaction.
7 9 Designing the cultureWhen the design firm, IDEO, opened for business,
its three founders designed an organisation low on
hierarchy, big on communication, with a minimal
amount of ego. Forty years on, it still works.
8 2 Employees firstInnovation is often focused on products. Yet the
leader of one Indian company is shifting the
business model of a 30,000-employee company.
HCL Technologies reveals how innovation can
apply to organisational systems as well.
Written by Julian Birkinshaw, Stuart Crainer and
Michael Mol.
Specialreport
ManagementInnovation
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Most people consider
management a tool of the
status quo. They consider
the good manager as someone who
keepsthings running smoothly; or, if
theres a problem, as someone who
restoresthe status quo so that the
business can keep humming along.
Consequently, when a manager
shakes up the status quo and actually
improvesthe way things run, theimpact (especially in large
organisations) can be thunderous.
Boeings Debbie Collard shares the
story of the manager who thought the
C-17 jumbo transport plane could be
built in a radically different way.
Collard tells of the revolution
created by Koz (most likely, Don
Kozlowski), the executive newly
charged with leading the production
of the C-17, a plane so gigantic that
its tail is four stories high. Planes
that huge require hundreds of peopleto assemble them, and the tradition
is that such a plane is built in
stages, by moving it from one
position to another as the successive
work is completed. The norm in the
industry was for movement from
position to position to occur per the
set timetable, whether every
production detail was attended to or
not. At least in the case of the C-17,
prior to Koz, thats the way it always
was. Everyone thought, thats the
way its supposedto be.
But, as Collard told J ohn Kotter
and Dan Cohen, in Heart of Change
(Harvard Business School Press,
2002), everything changed when Koz
rattled the status quo. We are not
going to move an airplane, she
remembers Koz saying, until it is
complete in position. Quality is
number one, so thats what we aregoing to focus on. Until the plane is
done and done right, no movement.
Period.
Collard then relates how workers
and managers alike responded to Koz
and his revolutionary way of doing
things:
Everyone thought he was off his
rocker. You didnt do things this
way. I think some of his direct
reports, in particular, thought he
was crazy. They were convincedthat we would never be able to
deliver on time if we did it this way.
Never. Wouldnt happen, anybody
knows that. Something would
always bring everything to a halt.
Youd have employees twiddling
their thumbs at great expense to
the company. You might as well
expect cars to be made by
secretaries on the fifty-ninth floor
of the Sears building in Chicago.
As you probably surmise, Koz
changed not only the company but
the rest of the industry. Collard
completes her story by attesting that
this one management innovation
transformed the place, and, as a
result, quality has gone up and all of
our aircraft have not only been on
time, theyve been early!
Its rare for management to hurl
an organisational thunderbolt, but itsimpact can be enormous.
Management innovation the
implementation of new management
practices, processes and structures
that represent a significant departure
from current norms has
transformed the way many functions
and activities work in large
organisations. Fords introduction of
the moving assembly line in 1913
and Western Electrics invention of
statistical quality control in 1924
changed businesses forever. Everymanagerial process we now take for
granted was created by inventive and
far-sighted individuals: double-entry
book-keeping was invented by Luca
Pacioli in 1494, and the limited
liability company was created in
1856.
But management innovation
remains poorly managed and poorly
understood. It is typically left to
occur in an ad hoc fashion, and
Organisational
thunderboltsManagement innovation the implementation of new managementpractices, processes and structures that represent a significant departurefrom current norms has transformed the way many functions andactivities work in large organisations. When a management innovator isset loose inside an organisation, watch out, management innovation canhave thunderous results.
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successful management innovators
like Boeings Koz have to work very
hard to get others to understand
what they are doing, or why they are
doing it. While academic studies of
the diffusion of existing
management innovations are
common, there is virtually no
literature on its origins, that is, on
the generative processes through
which management innovation first
takes shape.
In search of...a process?
Management innovation has some
obvious commonalities with
technological innovation as a
process: it involves key individuals
pulling together ideas and resources
in novel ways, championing their
ideas inside their organisation,
building coalitions of seniorexecutives to support them and
using their political skills to
overcome internal resistance. But
our research suggested there were
also two important points ofdifference that made management
innovation a distinct process.
Change agentsThe first distinction
was a much more significant role for
external change agents. These
individuals were a mix of academics,
consultants, gurus and ex-
employees. They often provided the
initial source of inspiration, and they
frequently helped to shape and
legitimize the management
innovation as it took hold. Whileexternal agents rarely developed new
practices themselves, they offered
important inputs at all steps along
the way. The process thus had a
highly interactive quality. It typically
took place on the fringes of the
organisation rather than in the core
through the relations between
conceptually oriented managers and
managerially oriented external
change agents.
Distant horizonThe second point of
difference was the amount of
uncertainty and ambiguity in the
process. Most management
innovations took several years to
implement, and in some cases it was
impossible to say with any precision
when the innovation actually took
place. To some degree this can also
be the case with technological
innovations, but the subtle nature of
the process was particularly acute in
the management innovations we
studied.
How it happens
Our research suggests management
innovations occur in five stages.
Dissatisfaction with status quo In
cases we studied, the internal
problem that management innovationaddressed was always some level of
dissatisfaction with the status quo.
We use the word dissatisfaction
because it covers a multitude of
situations, from a nagging operationalproblem through a strategic threat to
an impending crisis.
One classic example: in 2003 UBS
Wealth Management, the private
banking arm of the Swiss giant, was
looking to grow after several years of
painful cost cutting. The executives
started looking into the blockers
the things that were standing in the
way of the growth agenda and they
realised that the budgeting process
was a key problem area. As CFO Toni
Stadelmann notes, Budgeting ishighly defensive it is cumbersome,
and it is fundamentally against
growth. It is about negotiating down
the targets that are proposed by the
centre. And it causes people to talk
about numbers, not about clients
and market opportunities. This
realisation led to a complete re-
thinking of how individual client
advisors worked and the elimination
of the traditional budgeting process.
Wealth Management has been
growing rapidly ever since (and the
full story is explored on page 76).
Inspiration from outside
Management innovators need
inspiration examples of what has
worked in other settings, analogies
from different social systems or
unproven but alluring new ideas.
Managers with thunderbolts revealed
a breadth of thinking that allowed
them to strike out on their own path,
rather than just adopt a proven
model applied by a competing firm.
For example, Dee Hock founded Visa
with a unique cooperative
organisational model that drew more
from the principles of J effersonian
Democracy than from traditional
hierarchical thinking.
More generally, we observed thatmany management innovators had
unusual backgrounds or they had
worked in a wide variety of different
functional areas or countries. Art
Schneiderman, the manager atAnalog Devices who in 1987
developed the prototype for what
became known as the Balanced
Scorecard, was strongly influenced
by Jay Forresters system dynamics
concepts during his MBA training at
MITs Sloan School, then spent six
years as a strategy consultant with
Bain working on quality management
projects in J apan before joining
Analog Devices. This background
gave Schneiderman insight into
continuous improvement techniquesthat were being used in J apan plus a
system-wide perspective on the
functioning of the organisation. So
when asked by CEO Ray Stata to
develop a quality improvement
process for the companys
manufacturing, he quickly developed
a set of metrics that included both
financial and non-financial
components. (Art Schneiderman is
interviewed on page 70.)
Its rare for m anagem ent to hurl an organisational thunderbolt.
W hy so?
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Invention It is customary to
assume that every innovation has a
eureka moment when the
inventor makes the key conceptual
breakthrough or proposal that
everything else follows from. 3Ms
Art Fry famously came up with the
Post-it Note concept at his local
church as he sought to keep track of
multiple pages in his book of hymns.
And people at Boeing still tell the
Koz C-17 story because eureka
moments are legendary. However, our
evidence suggests that such eureka
moments are rare. Invention is a
process in which the innovator brings
together the various elements of a
problem (dissatisfaction with the
status quo) with the various elements
of a solution (which involves some
inspiration from outside plus a clear
understanding of the internalsituation and context), but the
manner in which these elements are
brought together is typically iterative
and gradual.
Consider the case of Connect &Develop, Procter & Gambles radical
approach to building an external
network of scientists around the
world as a means of turbocharging
its internal R&D. This major
organisational innovation (analysed
in our article on page 66) took the
best part of 10 years to put together.
Larry Huston, the key architect of the
model explains:
Back in the mid-1990s I was
interested in how to develop a neworganisation form where people
would be fluid and could swarm to
the good projects, yet protect the
base business. We spent time
actually thinking through the
detailed, entire organisation
design and I actually made a
concept video. I then tried to get
one company off the ground,
called Company Way, where you
would get rewards for participation
and your peers could give you
rewards for participating on a web-
based innovation model.
Then in 2000 my boss said we
want you to create the new
business model of innovation.
Building on my earlier work I
started to create the conceptual
positioning for connect and
develop. A lot of it starts with
experiments, making concepts and
storyboards and films, just like you
would do if youre making a
product. People just think this
stuff falls to the ground: they dont
realize that these big management
systems are constructed, and you
have to be smart about it; it takes
a lot of skill to do that.
Internal validation In one important
respect management innovation isjust like every other form of
innovation: it involves change and
uncertainty, and as a result it
encounters resistance from people
who dont understand or dont valuethe proposed innovation. And it is
impossible to accurately predict
whether any innovations benefits will
exceed its costs. A critical stage in
the process, then, is for the
management innovators to generate
validation for their new idea. We
describe the process of validation to
external parties below; but the more
important step, at least in terms of
the initial implementation, is for the
innovation to gain internal acceptance.
Management innovation is eventrickier to validate than technological
innovation because the innovation
itself is less easily codified, requires
the willing participation of many
people for it to work and often
delivers its results only several years
after implementation.
Consider Oticon, which in the early
1990s developed a radical
organisation model with no formal
hierarchical reporting relationships, a
resource allocation system built
around self-organised project teams
and an entirely open-plan physical
layout. This new model helped
Oticon to achieve dramatic increases
in profitability over the rest of the
decade. Lars Kolind, the CEO of
Oticon and architect of these
changes, got his inspiration for this
new model from his deep
involvement in the scouting
movement:
The scouting movement has a
stronger volunteer aspect, and
whenever scouts come together,
they cooperate effectively together
without hierarchy. There is no game
playing, no intrigue; we are one
family brought together through
common goals. My experiences in
scouting led me to focus ondefining a clear meaning for
Oticon employees, something
beyond just making money, and to
build a system that encouraged
volunteerism and self-motivation.
Kolinds experiences at Oticon were
typical. His first challenge was to
persuade the owners of the company
(primarily a foundation) that a
radical change was necessary to
confront the challenge posed by
giant competitors like Siemens and
Philips. Once that had been
achieved, he embarked on a massive
internal selling programme to
explain the nature of his proposed
changes to the employees. He usedradical slogans such as think the
unthinkable and visual symbols,
such as a large transparent chute in
the middle of the building down
which all shredded documents fell.
Inevitably there were some
employees who chose to leave
because they were not comfortable
with his changes, but most were
quick to see the benefits and
became involved in implementing
W e found that there w ere also tw o im portant points of difference
that m ade m anagem ent innovation a distinct process.
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the transition to what became known
as Oticons spaghetti organisation.
The management innovator may be a
brilliant inventor initially, but it is
equally important for that inventor to
then build a support coalition to
carry the invention into the
organisation. Effective management
innovation requires determined
individuals as much as it does the
creation of a fertile breeding ground
for their ideas.
External validation One of the
distinctive features of the
management innovation process that
emerged during the research was
what we came to call external
validation essentially a stamp of
approval from an independent
observer, such as an academic, a
consultancy, or a media organisation.Again, the reason why external
validation proved to be so important
had to do with the uncertain and
ambiguous nature of most
management innovations. Because
of a lack of hard data to prove that a
particular innovation was working,
companies frequently sought
external validation as a means of
increasing the level of internal
acceptance. This process of
validation also typically increasedthe visibility of the innovation to
competitors or companies in other
industries, which tended to reinforce
the innovation further. Four types of
external actors were identified during
the research:
The business school academic
who typically acts as a thoughtful
observer of the emerginginnovation and who sees his/herrole as codifying the practice in
question for use in research andclassroom teaching.
The consulting organisationthatsees its role primarily in terms ofcodifying and documenting the
innovation so that it can then beused in other settings.
The media organisationthat sees
its role as broadcasting the story
of the innovation to as wide an
audience as possible.
The industry associationthatseeks to develop improvedpractices across its member
organisations. Remember thatTotal Quality Management cameabout when W.E. Deming and
other quality experts gave a seriesof lectures before the JapaneseUnion of Scientists and Engineers.
Various member companies of thatUnion then started taking up TQMand sharing their experiences.
Making thunderbolts
So what can you do to improve your
companys capacity for management
innovation? A number of common
themes emerged from the research
that should serve as useful pointers
for a company that would like to take
its management innovation efforts
more seriously.
Become a conscious management
innovatorEvery company today
knows that it needs to continuously
create new products and services to
meet customers evolving demands.
And these firms have all set up some
sort of innovation function, whether
it is in the form of a physical R&D
lab or a new venture division. If you
want to become a management
innovator, selling the importance of
management innovation to yourorganisation is a crucial first step.
Create a questioning, problem-
solving cultureWhen you or your
employees are faced with an unusual
challenge in your company, look
deeper into the problem: see the
problem in new ways and start to
hypothesize about new ways of
solving it. Only the latter path can
take you towards management
innovation, so you need to encourage
employees to explore the unexploredand to avoid the easy answers.
Seek out analogies and exemplars
from diff erent environments
Depending on the problem you are
trying to solve, the types of solutions
you might want to consider will vary.
Exposing your employees to many
different types of environments and
different ways of operating is also
invaluable as a means of opening up
their minds to new alternatives.
Build a capacity for low-risk
experimentationIn one company we
know, there is a sustained effort to
encourage individuals and teams to
come up with management
innovations to tackle everyday
problems with the existing
bureaucracy and processes. But
each innovation must be tested with
a limited number of people and for a
limited period of time. This has
ensured that every idea gets a shot
at implementation without crippling
the ability of the organisation as a
whole.
Make use of external change-agents
to explore your new ideasOutsidersfulfil three primary roles. They
represent a source of new ideas and
analogies from different settings,
they can act as a sounding board for
making sense of your emerging
innovations, and they can help to
validate what you have done.
Become a serial management
innovatorThe real success stories in
management innovation are not the
companies who have innovated onceor twice. The serial management
innovators (like GE, which has been
a pioneer in many new approaches,
from strategic planning to executive
development to divisions observing
boundarylessness) are the ones to
emulate.
These six points are certainly not a
recipe for management innovation.
The process of developing radical
new ways of working will always have
some dose of luck and randomnessto it. But you can certainly tilt the
odds in your favour by working on
these points and by creating a
greater understanding in your
company of how management
innovation happens. To be sure,
thunderbolts seldom happen in
companies in which managers
worship the status quo.
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I
n 2000 Procter & Gamble (P&G)
was at a crucial point in its long
history. One of the worlds best-known corporations and creator of
some of the worlds most famous and
successful brands was at a
crossroads. Its CEO, Dirk Jager, had
left after a mere 18 months in the
job. In March, the company
announced it would not meet its
projected first quarter earnings. The
stock price was spiralling downwards
falling from $116 in J anuary to
$60 per share by March. The massive
loss of $85 billion in marketcapitalization was matched by the
loss of confidence within. It provoked
a media frenzy. Perhaps most
poignantly, Ad Ageheadlined its front
page story: Does P&G Still Matter?
It was one of many column inches
devoted to the apparently impending
demise of the company.
P&Gs new CEO, A.G. Lafley,
provided an instant dose of reality:
We werent delivering on goals and
commitments to analysts and
investors. Major P&G businesseswere underperforming only three of
them accounted for 80 per cent of
the total value created inthe 1990s.
Competitors were swooping in and
gobbling up market share. We were
overinvested: we overbuilt capacity,
hired too many people, funded too
many aggressive introductions of new
products and expansions of existing
brands. P&G brands were not
delivering good consumer value: we
werent consistently leading
innovation, and prices were too high.
We had priced-up big establishedbrands to pay for new products and
aggressive geographic expansion. Our
costs were also too high. We had
frayed relations with important
customers who were frustrated with
incompatible strategies, poor service
levels, and P&Gs inability to create
value for them. We were too
internally focused. Consumed with
the massive reorganisation, and with
so many people in new jobs, we were
all spending too much timemanaging internal transactions.
In addition to this litany of internal
problems, P&G had the abiding
corporate challenge of achieving
growth. A mature company, such as
P&G, is usually expected to deliver
organic growth rates of around four
to six per cent every year.
Historically, this growth had been
delivered by the companys
formidable research and
development resources thousands
of researchers spread worldwide. Butwith the proliferation of new
technologies and intensifying
competition, P&Gs standard
approach to R&D was under threat.
Only 35 per cent of its new products
met their financial objectives. R&D
productivity was stagnant.
Lafleys prescription for the ailing
corporate patient was wide-reaching.
Estimating that it would take three
years to get P&G back on track, he
focused the company on four core
businesses (accounting for 54 per
cent of sales and 60 per cent ofprofits); its big, established leading
brands; and P&Gs top 10 countries
(80 per cent of sales and 95 per
cent of profits). Costs, which had
rocketed under Jager, were cut.
Capital spending had leapt to eight
per cent of sales and was trimmed.
Nearly 10,000 jobs were lost around
the world as underperforming
businesses were closed and the
company left businesses now
regarded as non-strategic. Someproduct lines were discontinued,
investments were written off and
brands, such as Comet, Crisco and
J if, were sold off.
And, perhaps most boldly of all, in
the midst of establishing the new
P&G order, Lafley announced an
entirely new approach to innovation.
P&Gs corporate innovation fund had
increased seven-fold in four years.
Two-thirds of these projects were
cut. Lafley announced that, in the
future, instead of relying on itsinternal research and development,
P&G expected that 50 per cent of its
innovation would come from outside
the company. R&D numbers would
remain the same, but the onus
would be on maximizing ideas
internally and externally.
The logic was simple. For every
one of the companys researchers,
P&G calculated there were 200
people scientists or engineers
FromR&D toConnect + Developa
t P&GChallenged by its CEO to source ideas from outside, Procter & Gambledecided to blaze a new path for its research and development function.In pursuit of inspiration, its R&D became turbocharged by usinginsourcing to expand P&Gs horizons.
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outside the company who had
talents the company could utilise.
Instead of 7,500 people in corporate
R&D, P&G recalculated that there
were 1.5 million worldwide whose
knowledge they needed to tap into.
Research and development was
reincarnated as Connect + Develop
with an organisation of 1,507,500
people.
Green lights; new dawn
For Larry Huston, then 26 years into
his P&G career, Lafleys
announcement was a crucial
moment, a green light for his work
stretching back much of the past
decade. He told his team: Were in
business, things are going to start
happening.
Hustons state of readiness was
understandable. Tracing back theidea that became Connect +
Develop, he goes back to the mid-
1990s and draws parallels with
artists. Its just like the way some
artists will develop models and
sketches before they commit to
creating the final painting, says
Huston. Thomas Hart Benton, for
example, a US-based social realist,
would create clay models and then
more models of what he was
eventually going to paint and then
he would start working on the
perspectives with all kinds of
sketches. He would work on the
concept for a long, long time before
he ever actually created a successful
painting. Thats the way most artistswork; look at all the study pieces
that everybody does. And, in the
case of this new innovation model,
we worked, probably, five or six years
on creating the studies that led to it
coming together, ultimately, in the
year 2000.
Huston, along with colleague
Nabil Sakkab, was initially interested
in how to develop a new organisation
form that combined the ability to
deliver high-performing results, yet
be adaptive. He spoke, among
others, to Dee Hock at Visa, who had
instigated a unique organisational
form labeled the chaordic
organisation. His attention then
developed to embrace chaos theory.
Huston sought to understand
whether there was a way to attract
the best people to projects with a
greater chance of success and to
allow bad projects to die because
they would go unstaffed. I wanted
to create an organisation where
people would be fluid and move
around and could swarm to the good
projects, yet protect the base
business.
Huston made contact with Stuart
Kauffman at the Bios Group and
spent time thinking through and
developing a detailed organisationdesign. This was captured on the
walls of a large conference room in
Santa Fe, and Huston was then
filmed giving a guided tour to the
organisation design of the future
with Kauffman following with his
own commentary.
By way of further experimentation
Huston then worked with a start-up
software company to launch a
company to facilitate a flow to the
best opportunity model. This web-
based investigation lasted a year
while Huston and his team studied a
handful of innovation projects that
had been brought in from outside
P&G. External connections created
about twice as much value asinternal initiatives when factors such
as success rates and time to market
and after costs were fully
considered. Huston extrapolated that
a connections model of innovation
could create a breakthrough in
driving P&Gs business and its
productivity.
Gilbert Cloyd, P&Gs Chief
Technology Officer, approached
Huston with a challenge: could he
create a new R&D model for the
company?
This was a moment in time that
allowed us to really consider a whole
new operating method, Huston
summarizes. I had run six years of
experiments, and went out and
started studying real world
innovation networks and how value
could be created. Then we created
the conceptual positioning for
Connect + Develop, around the idea
of turbocharging our already strong
base organisation. I had the
rationale and some ideas about the
tools and how to get it off the ground
and created a new role called
technology entrepreneurs. Lafley
announced that we were going to get
half of our innovation from the
outside. That was a major
intervention and so we were off andrunning.
Importantly, Lafleys
announcement was a very public
one. He put the stake in the ground.
Reactions were decidedly mixed,
Larry Huston recalls: Some peoples
first reaction was, wow, P&G is
getting rid of its R&D. Should we
sell the stock? This is a science-
driven company, what are they
doing, have they lost their minds?
They didnt realize that what we
were doing was substantially
strengthening our R&D capability.
Reality and development
The positioning of Connect +
Develop was important. First, it wasmade clear that Connect + Develop
was not a matter of outsourcing
P&Gs research and development
capability. Connect + Develop was
about finding good ideas and
bringing them in to enhance and
capitalize on internal capabilities. In
essence, an insourcing strategy.
The second point was that
Connect + Develop was not a
transformation programme.
The Connect and D evelop m odel of innovation is nascent and
likely to becom e the dom inant innovation m odel of our tim es.
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I think transformation is a dirty
word, says Huston. If you go and
say to a company, Im going to go
transform you, theyll say, its going
to be impossible and well never
finish. In the case of Connect +
Develop we were careful not to
position it as transformation even
though now it is. We said, we have a
strong, powerful, global organisation,
weve built outstanding capability all
over the world, we have world class
people, what were going to do is
take this already strong capability
and turbocharge it. And so the core
idea is based upon how do we
turbocharge? And then, what are the
accepted beliefs that people have
about this kind of thing? How do we
create its credentials?
Connect + Develop focused on
three areas: the needs of consumers(each business and the company as
a whole identified the top 10 needs
of consumers); adjacencies (products
or services which could help P&G
capitalize on existing brand equity);
and, what the company labels
technology game boards (a
planning tool which enables P&G to
evaluate how technologies in one
area impact elsewhere in the
business).
At the heart of Connect + Developis using networks to gain connections
to new ideas. In the old invention
model know-how was key and
really this is what was focused on the
most. In the new connections model
know-who would become critical.
The networks P&G keys into are
varied. Among the most notable are
proprietary networks developed
specifically for Connect + Develop.
For example, P&Gs leading 15
suppliers have around 50,000
people employed in R&D. P&G builtan IT platform to share technology
briefs with suppliers. Closer working
relationships and the sharing of
information have brought a 30 per
cent increase in projects with staff
from suppliers and P&G working
together.
Even competitors offer sources of
inspiration. Huston recalls meeting a
competitor from Japan. He said,
Are you comfortable with talking? I
said, Of course Im comfortable
talking. I consider your 2,500 R&D
people to be my R&D lab. And this
really blew his mind.
P&G also created a network ofwhat it labels technology
entrepreneurs. They are senior
experienced people who have seen
everything, done everything. They are
focused on being the growth
provocateurs for the organisation,
Huston explains. The technology
entrepreneurs number 70 worldwide.
They are effectively the eyes and
ears of Connect + Develop making
contacts within industry and
education, with suppliers, and with
local markets. To date, thetechnology entrepreneurs have
brought over 10,000 products, ideas
and technologies to the attention of
P&G. Each is then evaluated.
Elsewhere, P&G taps into a
number of open networks. It is
involved with YourEncore, which
connects companies with high
performing retirees from over 350
companies; InnoCentive, which deals
with more specific technical
problems; and Yet2.com, an online
intellectual property marketplace.
Once ideas emerge through the
networks they are rigorously
evaluated by P&G before deciding toproceed with further development.
The innovation dividend
P&G accomplished its goal. Over 50
per cent of the companys
innovations now originate outside
the company. When Lafley first
announced his bold target in 2000,
the figure was under 15 per cent.
Connect + Develop has helped
turbocharge more than 250 products
into the marketplace, and has
generated billions of sales.Now Procter & Gambles vice
president for innovation and
knowledge, Huston believes that
Connect + Develop offers broader
lessons on how to develop
management innovations. The one
thing that is really important is to
get the concept right, says Huston.
P&G is a concept-driven company.
A concept for us is how the products
going to make the consumers life
Larry Huston: well connected
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Business Strategy Review Spring 2007 2007 The Author | J ournal compilation 2007 London Business School 69
better and providing strong reasons
to believe in it. So we practice
concept development here every day,
because we have to move hearts and
minds. We have to win the battle at
the store shelf and getting the
concept right is enormously
important. In fact, most product
failure, 75 per cent of product
failure, is not because the product
doesnt perform, but because it was
the wrong idea. It didnt provide
desired consumer benefits at the
offered price. Many organisation
failures are due to both a poor
concept and poor execution.
For a number of innovations that
Huston has been involved in, he
went through the formal concept
development storyboarding process,
applying what P&G does for products,
to management concepts andbusinesses. One of the new business
ideas tested was called YourEncore
(www.YourEncore.com). The concept
was to take the experience and
expertise of people who have retired
and to utilize it in organisations.
Huston and his team created
storyboards for the concept and then
took them to 21 prime prospect
companies. They commented on and
critiqued the idea, how it would work,
and the value proposition. Hustonnext ran financial models to see if
the desired concept was capable of
making money. YourEncore now links
over 1,800 retired scientists and
engineers drawn from 350
companies to organisations in need
of their experience and expertise.
Its all about bringing in new
innovation DNA to create new
sources of growth. Thats the core
idea, says Huston.
Clearly, Connect + Develop offers
further lessons on how companiescan utilize external expertise and
maximize internal resources. The
commitment of the companys
leadership was important. Says
Huston: This is all about
leadership, number one, being clear
about where to play, how youre
going to win and where you want to
grow. Thats the job of the CEO and
the top management to really figure
this thing out. But, it is trite to say
that this is all about starting with the
CEO and changing the rewards
system. For me, it starts with an
idea, one that is proven, one that
can be scalable. Then it moves to
the top leadership for support. Then,
on to making the necessary changes
in the culture, like rewards, to
enable adoption at scale.
Second, its about building a lot
more muscle. Connect + Develop is
about muscle, its about giving us
many more hearts, minds, hands and
feet to do the work. And the third
thing is, it is about equipping people
and mindsets. For the most part our
people have good ideas. We dont
really have an idea problem. We have
people who are smart and motivated,
but mostly organisations are under-
led around innovation. Its the topofficers that have to really create a
growth culture based on innovation
rather than just acquisition.
There are also cultural challenges
involved in moving any organisation
from an emphasis on finding
solutions internally to tapping into
brilliant minds elsewhere. Most
senior managers at P&G have been
with the company for the vast
majority of their careers. You rely
on people outside, to some extent, tohelp challenge you and put ideas in
your head about what might
happen, Huston admits. In
refining your ideas and ideas of
whats possible, you have to expose
yourself outside. Whether its going
to see Dee Hock or Stu Kauffman or
some little entrepreneurial company
or studying the movie industry or the
toy industry, or whatever it might be,
you have to. The problem is people
dont know the right questions to
ask. And if youre inside a companythe only questions you know to ask
are those within your frame of
experience. Its hard to ask a
question outside your frame of
experience so you have got to be
moving to other frames of experience
to come up with good questions.
Huston believes that the Connect
+ Develop model of innovation is
nascent and likely to become the
dominant innovation model of our
times. It is like developing the
telephone system. If Procter &
Gamble developed the telephone
system and only we had it in the
world, yes, it would benefit our
operations. But, if the world has the
telephone, look how much more
effective we are and whats most
important with the telephone system
is not the utility but the
conversations. So weve been telling
our potential partners, heres the
utility, heres how you do Connect +
Develop, because fundamentally we
believe that our competitive
advantage is knowing the
consumers, leveraging the strength
of our brands, and the quality of the
conversations that we have. Its not
whether or not there are networks
out there or people know that we arelinking to scientists, its the quality
of the conversation.
Today, for many companies, the
innovation phone system, the
innovation phone book, and the idea
of innovation conversations barely
exists. For Procter & Gamble,
management innovation has been an
important driver of its enduring
success. It pioneered brand
management in the 1920s, it was
one of the first companies toimplement a transnational
organisation in the late 1980s in
R&D (also led by Larry Huston), and
it is now leading the world in its
approach to open innovation. And
the beauty of such innovations is
that they are sufficiently deep-seated
that competitors take a long time to
catch up. As Huston observes,
Connect + Develop is a long-term
investment: I think P&G will run on
this model for 20 years, and one-by-
one many other companies willembrace it.
ResourcesLarry Huston and Nabil Sakkab,
Connect + Develop, Harvard
Business Review, March 2006.
A.G. Lafley, Getting Procter &
Gamble Back on Track, speech at
the Rotman School, April 21, 2003.
www.pg.com
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How did you come to a scorecard
point of view?I was an aerospace research scientist
for 15 years and decided that I
wanted to change careers. So I quit
my job, attended B-school, and
worked in a strategy consulting firm.
Ultimately, I became aware of Total
Quality Management (TQM) on a trip
to Japan. And thats when I became
so interested in it that I decided I
really wanted to focus attention on
TQM rather than strategy consulting.
Were you also interested in
innovation at this point?
Yes. I wanted to make sure that I
worked in companies that had a
record of innovation and were
particularly responsive to innovation at
the management level, because TQM
is a kind of innovation. As I searched
for American companies that would
meet the test of being both innovative
and receptive to TQM principles, I
increasingly focused on Analog
Devices, and I wrote to Ray Stata.
Why that company?
Ray was and is one of the rare CEOs
who is really curious and interested
about management innovation. I
remember when I first went to see
him, it turned out that it was quite
timely because he had just gotten off
the phone with one of Analogs major
customers who was irate because a
key shipment was late. And so I
talked about TQM and it made for a
great dialogue. It seemed to me rightaway that Ray and Analog were
blessed with an innovative culture.
Did you say culture?
After years of working with
innovation, there is no question in
my mind that the number one
ingredient is to have an innovative
environment. You cant innovate in
an environment that is not open to
innovation, and that means from the
very top, from the CEO all the waydown through the organisation. And
it was clear that Ray was interested:
he recognized that TQM was an
important thing, that it had an
impact on any and every industry,
but that it would acutely affect the
semi-conductor industry, of which he
was a part. Theres no question that I
immediately liked and respected Ray
Stata and so that ended up being the
chemistry of my going to Analog. It
was the right environment for me
and it was the right time for him.
Was everyone inside Analog as
committed to TQM and innovation?
No. And, in time, Ray was succeeded
by someone who has more of a
traditional approach to management,
the kind of executive who makes
doable promises to Wall Street and
then tries to deliver on them. The
lesson here is that the leader of a
company is essential to innovation;
yet, after a company has become
innovating and if the industry doesnot demand that you innovate
further someone of a different
temperament can lead the company,
with a much more status quo
demeanour.
When you worked on being
innovative, what kind of time horizon
was in your mind?
One of the first assignments that Ray
gave me at Analog was to develop
five-year strategic plans.Traditionally, once every five years,
they would develop a strategic plan.
Curiously, they would not revisit that
plan until the five years were up. So
I started to think of innovation with
at least this kind of time horizon.
But five years...does that work in
todays marketplace?
Obviously in todays world thats not
a viable approach, and it did change
even while I was at Analog more
toward a continuous strategicplanning model. Thats whats
needed now. If the market demands
constant innovation (and just about
every market does), you have to
focus on innovation constantly.
Whats most relevant to note here is
that innovation is not something that
is always defined by numerics. Even
at Analog, I came up with something
that was called the Corporate
Performance Audit, an annual audit
Perfectlyin balancArthur M. (Art) Schneidermanpioneered what later became the conceptof the balanced scorecard while a vice president of quality andproductivity at Analog Devices. We talked with Schneiderman, now anindependent consultant, to find out more about the early evolution of amanagement innovation.
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that used what I called a half-life
method. The plan we devised used
an annual context and focused on
seven or eight non-financial things
that we needed to manage in order
to get to where we wanted to be in
five years, numerically and
otherwise. In fact, one of my tasks at
Analog was to manage the agenda
for the monthly business meetings.
There was always a battle with other
senior managers whether we should
discuss, first, the non-financial
parameters of the business or thehard numbers. Many companies fight
that same battle today.
How did you resolve this battle?
I cant put my finger on where or
when it happened, but I suddenly
realized the best thing to do was to
try and combine the two items in
what became the overall scorecard
for the business. In trying to meet
the demands of the hard number
execs, I agreed that we would haveno more than three financial
measures at the top of the scorecard
and then non-financial measures for
the rest. So that is how the Analog
Devices scorecard was born. The
general manager urged that we
abandon the fancy name of
Corporate Performance Audit and
call our performance tracking,
simply, the Corporate Scorecard. And
guess what? Divisional Scorecards
soon followed, which gave us a
weighted average of each divisionsonline performance. What would
change over time are the things that
went on the scorecard, not the
financials but the non-financials. At
the time, as far as I know, no other
company was doing it this way.
The balanced scorecard has evolved
over time, and it seems that there
are variants of the concept you
originally created. Is there one right
scorecard?
Some of my colleagues over the
years have concentrated on creating
the perfect scorecard, but Im not
sure its helpful to insist on just one
form of scorecard. The big problem
that organisations have is in
implementing the scorecard; they
dont have tools in place for
achieving the goals. And so they fail.
They have a scorecard but they dont
achieve the results they desire, so it
never makes any strategicdifference. In the end, they waste a
lot of effort and a lot of energy that
could be spent elsewhere. Some say
the scorecard itself is the big thing; I
say the real power of the scorecard
concept is in how youre going to
implement the changes. Thats the
key thing.
Along those lines, if its important
how you implement the scorecard, is
it also important to think about howyou develop the scorecard?
Absolutely. The process by which
you develop the scorecard is of
critical importance. Most of the
time, measures that people add to
the scorecard are politically chosen
measures, not strategically chosen.
So you have to have a well-
documented, well-understood
process that you refine each cycle.
This means that you not only have to
work on the scorecard, you also have
to work on how you are going tocreate it and how youre going to
ensure that it is widely known and
thoroughly understood, which leads
you to how you are going to achieve
the goals that you come up with.
So having worked with scorecards for
so long, do you have any favourite
lessons learned?
Let me offer three. First, I think that
any time you come up with an
innovation in management that has
numerical targets as its basis, it is
unlikely that it will ever be accepted
with enthusiasm throughout the
organisation. The lesson is that you
should focus on rate of improvement
rather than specific end results.
Second, I believe the scorecard is
probably somewhat less important
than the half-life method: you have
to test everyones sense of making
solid progress and thus you have to
establish sound improvementprocesses in the organisation. And
then the third thing is to cultivate
the mental process for process
management. On my website,
www.schneiderman.com, I list 7-
Steps of Process Management. I do
this for a very important reason: its
vitally important how you approach
innovation or the end results will be
far less than optimal.
Are your seven steps the same asTQM?
My 7-step model for process
management encompasses TQM, but
it also tells you when, if necessary,
to redesign a process, to re-engineer
it. It also has control built into it,
which basically says that it doesnt
do you any good to improve a
process if it has random applicability
or otherwise is out of control. In
terms of the steps I recommend, I
dont care where you start, but I do
care that you have an open processthat allows you to ask questions from
time to time, questions like: How are
we doing? Are we on course? If not,
why not? A scorecard is an essential
component to running a business,
but only if you know how to play the
game very well. In the end, the
scorecard tells you whether the
structure and processes inherent in
your business are helping or not.
I cant put m y nger on w here or w hen it happened, but I
suddenly realized the best thing to do w as to try and com bine the
tw o item s in w hat becam e the overall scorecard for the business.
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T
he origins of the modern firm
can be traced to the 19th
century. Yet the nature ofbusiness enterprises remains a
constant work in progress. Over the
last decade, in particular, technology
has opened up a wide range of
opportunities to change the
fundamental shape of the traditional
firm. This potential has been
enthusiastically charted by
commentators and academics alike.
In 1998, Thomas W. Malone and
Robert J . Laubacher of the
Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology (MIT) looked at how a
new kind of organisation could form
the basis of an economy in which the
old rules of business are overturned
and big companies are rendered
obsolete. Drawing on their research
at MITs Initiative on Inventing the
Organisations of the 21st Century,
Malone and Laubacher heralded the
dawn of the e-lance economy a
world where freelance workers would
come together in temporary or virtual
constellations rather than astraditional employees. Malone and
Laubacher were not alone in
predicting that technology would
change the shape of organisational
life. There has been an array of
variations on the theme of creating
and managing virtual and networked
organisations. Yet, despite
continuing technological strides, the
predictions of revolutionary change
remain largely unfulfilled.
In parallel, the 1990s saw
increasing interest in professional
service firms as a uniquely fertilearea for discussions of organisational
structures. For example, Tom Peters,
a former McKinsey consultant turned
management commentator,
celebrated the multi-functional
global teams speedily assembled by
the consulting firm to tackle client
problems. Their speed and flexibility,
coupled with their strongly defined
culture and their ability to manage
and maximise knowledge, convinced
Peters that it provided a partialblueprint for how business firms
could be constructed and behave in
the global economy.
Inspirations
The London-based consulting firm
Eden McCallum provides an
innovative take on the nature of the
firm as well as potential future
scenarios for the organisation of
consulting firms.
Launched in 2000 by Liann Eden
and Dena McCallum, EdenMcCallum is a network-based
consulting firm. Rather than having a
large headquarters and all the
overheads associated with a
conventional consulting firm, Eden
McCallum retains a minimal central
staff and utilises a network of
freelance consultants. Eden is a
former McKinsey consultant who also
held international marketing roles at
Unilever and Siemens. McCallum
was formerly an international vice
president and director of planning
and strategy for the publisher CondNast as well as being a former
McKinsey consultant.
The inspiration for the firm began
when McCallum was working at
Cond Nast and Eden was working at
McKinsey. McCallum realized that
her budget did not stretch to hiring
one of the big-name strategy
consulting firms McKinsey & Co.,
Boston Consulting Group, Bain or
Booz Allen Hamilton but she still
needed that calibre of support. Edenobserved that many strategy
consultants, particularly in the dot-
com era, were reassessing what they
wanted from their work and
flexibility and control were key. Soon
after, the former INSEAD MBA
classmates came up with the idea of
creating a pool of experienced,
independent consultants.
Six years later, turnover of the
company is over 10 million and it
has delivered more than 300
projects. The firm has grown by morethan 80 per cent per year. It now has
24 full-time staff and around 200
freelance consultants, making it the
second biggest strategy consulting
company in London after McKinsey.
Trends and opportunity
As with many other businesses,
Eden McCallums evolution was
based on the benign convergence of
a number of factors. In hindsight, a
Ma
king the firmflexibleHow companies operate has been established over twocenturies. Is it possible for a firm to break the established
rules of organisation? Eden McCallumdid just that.
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lot of things came together at once,
explains McCallum. First and
foremost we wanted to create a
business. So, we looked at the
marketplace in a business we knew:
management consulting. And we saw
a couple of major trends the
maturing of the consulting market,and professional people wanting to
take more control of their careers.
These then led us into our unique
business model. And in creating this
business, we also ended up coming
up with an entirely new organisation
model. Business innovation begets
management innovation.
The first change was the maturing
of the management consulting
market, with clients seeking more
control and value in their consulting
spend. The dominance of the bigplayers in the business was and is
largely unquestioned. It has
spawned an entire generation of
companies and senior executives
who are comfortable with the notion
and value of management
consulting. They are aware of its
potential value to the business. In
the past, companies hired top
consulting firms to tap into their
bright, business-school-educated,
minds. With MBA graduates and
former strategy consultants now
commonplace among the senior
echelons of multinational firms,
there is a resistance to formulaic
consulting products and neatly
packaged solutions. Instead,
companies want consulting advicethat is genuinely tailored to their
situations. Companies are
sophisticated buyers. They can pick
and choose and shape. Clients want
the same flexibility as consultants,
says Eden.
The second trend Eden McCallum
happily tapped was among
consultants themselves. Many
consultants were bitten by the new
economy bug and left consulting
firms in search of entrepreneurial
excitement and the opportunity tomake a lot of money. When the new
economy fizzled from rocket to damp
squib, many one-time consultants
had reassessed what they wanted out
of their careers and were loathe to
re-enter the corporate world on the
same terms as before. At the time
when Eden McCallum began life,
many experienced consultants were
contemplating their next career
moves. At one point everyone
wanted to be partners, then they all
wanted to be entrepreneurs, recalls
Eden. The dot-com thing created
demand for flexibility. People left
their traditional careers and then
didnt come back.
At an operational level, too, Eden
McCallum recognized anopportunity. Large consulting firms
typically focused on high-level board
issues at FTSE 50 companies. For
their part, client companies often
wanted continued consulting support
on specific strategic issues or
implementation but were put off by
continuing high costs. Eden
McCallum offered a market-breaking
alternative: consultants with the
same high-level skills and rigorous
approach at approximately half the
cost. After the dot-com crash, thiscombination of quality at lower cost
was particularly alluring as many
firms had scaled down their
consulting budgets.
Innovative solutions
Eden McCallums proposition was
simple but scary: a consulting firm
without any consultants on the
payroll and without any proprietary
methodologies. Instead, they
Liann Eden and Dena McCallum: flexible friends
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would employ consultants on a
contract basis as demanded by their
clients, and they would use whatever
methodologies were appropriate to
solving their clients problems. As
one former Bain consultant observed,
this approach appeared to challenge
everything consultancies held dear: it
was like the sky falling in.
To make this model work, Eden
McCallum had to rethink many of the
standard precepts of management
thinking:
Tailor the offering Eden McCallum
focuses on tailoring the consultants
experience, skills and personalities
to the clients needs. The firm makes
it clear that it is not in the business
of creating its own distinctive
intellectual capital and that it is
agnostic when it comes to particularmethodologies, despite the fact that
novel ideas and tools are the
lifeblood of most big consulting
companies. We rely on what our
consultants bring to the table and let
our clients choose their preferred
approach by interviewing and
selecting the consultants, reflects
McCallum. Clients want to work
with a person they trust; they dont
necessarily want a particular
methodology. They just want theproject to succeed.
Outsourcing the delivery channel
Eden McCallums core delivery
mechanism is effectively outsourced
to freelance consultants. On the
surface, at least, this appears to be a
dangerous strategy. The company is
clearly reliant on the quality of the
service offered by the consultants. To
make it successful, Eden McCallum
works hard to ensure the quality of
these people. Only one in 10
applicants makes it into the
companys talent pool. The second
safety element is that consulting is
built on relationships rather than
transactions. Relationships are
between clients and Eden McCallum,
and the firm endeavours to retain
control and oversight over the
relationship with the client. Says
Eden: If we structure the project up
front and we have a long-term
relationship with the client, then we
dont have to own the delivery
mechanism. The keys are trust-based
relationships, clear problem-
structuring and careful selection of
consultants.
Involve the competitionThe standard
organisational model is to start small
with the intention of emulating or
overtaking an industrys big players
over time. Not so in the case of Eden
McCallum. From the start, Eden and
McCallum were clear that theirlivelihoods, and the future of their
business, depended on what was
ostensibly the competition: big-name
consulting firms. We exist because
they exist, says Eden. Companies
like McKinsey, Bain and BCG create
the market on both the client and
consultant side.
Before the firm was launched,
Eden McCallum began a dialogue
with the big players in the market.
This alerted them to the potential ofworking with Eden McCallum rather
than regarding the company as
another upstart strategy consulting
boutique with eyes on their own
markets. And this symbiotic
approach has worked. Eden
McCallum has referred business to
big-name consulting firms, and they
have returned the compliment.
Elevate the process behind the
networkThe idea of a networked
organisation is not new. Brokers and
agents are commonplace. What
marks out Eden McCallum is that the
process behind the network is where
a great deal of the value lies.
Indeed, in a business without its
own consultants and without its own
intellectual property, this is the heart
of Eden McCallums value-added.
Consequently, about half of its
full-time staff are fully employed
ensuring that its consultants are the
right people in the right jobs. The
other half of the full-time staff are
totally dedicated to developing and
nurturing client relationships. Our
full-time employees are either
working on the supply side so they
are consultant-facing or on the
demand side which is client-facing,
explains McCallum. And it is the
skills of these individuals, and their
ability to match top-quality
consultants with the right projects,
that define Eden McCallum. Every
consulting company works hard tomatch its consultants to the right
projects; reflects Eden, the
difference is we dont have to worry
about capacity management, so we
can always make a good match.
Initially, to build awareness among
potential consultants, Eden
McCallum placed advertisements in
the Financial Timesand The
Economist a statement of intent as
much as anything. The ads
emphasized that the company waslooking for consultants who were
independently minded with
experience in a top consulting firm
and who had an MBA from a leading
business school. These basic
recruitment benchmarks remain in
place. In addition, Eden McCallum
consultants are evaluated against
five core competencies, their CVs are
screened, all references are checked,
and they go through multiple rounds
of partner interviews. The people
who recruit the consultants are,
themselves, former consultants who
understand the dynamics and
demands of the business.
Eden observed that m any strategy consultants, particularly in the
dot-com era, w ere reassessing w hat they w anted from their w ork
and exibility and control w ere key.
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When they actually go to work,
Eden McCallum puts two to three
consultants from its talent pool in
front of a client. The client then
evaluates with whom they think they
would work best. On the completion
of projects there is an extensive
feedback process focused on the
individual consultants and Eden
McCallums performance. Big
consulting firms put forward a team
and the client generally doesnt have
a say about who is on it, says
McCallum. Because our clients are
involved in choosing the consultants
they work with, they have a vestedinterest in making it work with those
people.
Redefine the em ployment
relationship Eden McCallums
network of consultants are not
employees in a traditional sense, nor
are they entirely freelance
contractors. They lie somewhere in
between: they have considerable
loyalty to Eden McCallum, and they
get most of their work from thecompany, but they define their own
terms of engagement. This includes
choosing which sectors they will
accept projects in, how many days
per week and how many months per
year they work, the logistics around
travel and many other elements as
well. We are constantly putting
together a new puzzle for each
project, explains Eden. To be sure,
this arrangement requires constant
balancing to keep everyone happy,
and it is not for everyone. But, by
letting their consultants choose their
own terms of employment, Eden
McCallum has a much more
dedicated and committed workforce
than would have been possible with
a traditional hierarchical
organisation structure.
Create transparency Eden McCallum
works very hard on creating
transparency in its management
model so that everyone knows where
he or she stands. This ensures that
there is a good relationship between
network members and avoids the
sense that some people may begetting favourable treatment ahead
of others.
One complication lies in financial
arrangements. To avoid this, Eden
McCallum is very open about its fee
structure. For around 100 of its
consultants, the firm is their main
source of income. Another 100 work
on about one project a year. Initially,
fees were put forward by the
consultants. Then the company tried
to allow clients to determine fees.Now, how much consultants are paid
depends on a banding system in
which consultants are paid
according to their seniority and
consulting skills.
Another common concern in
network organisations is how the
available work gets shared. So the
firm tries to be clear about the likely
levels of demand for people with
different skills sets. It is about
calibrating expectations, says Eden.
Were honest with consultants we
dont anticipate using a lot. We tell
them that we anticipate using them
once a year. Our interviews actually
provide great career coaching for
them and the network offers them a
lot of information. Often they will tell
us what their targets are in terms of
working with us. Some will work for
six months and then go travelling or
do something else others are
working full-time on back-to-back
projects. There is no exclusivity in
the relationship.
Reinventing the firm
Eden McCallums experiences helpto shed light on the age-old
question: What is the real raison d
tre of the firm? In an era of
outsourcing and virtual working,
what are the minimum few things
that the firm has to do to justify its
existence?
The answer is three things. First,
the Eden McCallum brand
represents a particular value
proposition to its clients and its
consultants, and for the founders akey part of their job is to continue to
nurture and sustain that value
proposition. Second, Eden McCallum
is a nexus of relationships: it gains
value from the social capital that
builds up over time in that set of
relationships. And third, it is a
mechanism for structuring the work
and managing projects. These are, in
essence, the core competences of
Eden McCallum and are the things
the company has to sustain as it
grows and evolves.
Eden M cCallum s experiences help to shed light on the age-old
question: W hat is the real raison dtre of the rm ?
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The 20 top executives of the
business group held an off-site in a
windowless room in London at the
end of 2003. They developed a clear
agenda for growing the business,
and then they started looking into
the blockers, the things that were
standing in the way of the growth
agenda. The usual suspects were all
there centralized structures and
processes, not enough scope for
initiative taking and budgeting. As
Stadelmann notes, Why do we do
the budgeting process when we arelooking for growth? Budgeting is
highly defensive. It is not just
cumbersome, it is fundamentally
against growth. It is about
negotiating down the targets that are
proposed by the centre. And it
causes people to talk about
numbers, not about clients and
market opportunities.
Ziegler takes an even more
emotive position: The old budgeting
process was basically aboutwithholding information. I go in to
the process arguing that I can make
30 per cent less than what I think I
can; and my boss pushes for 30 per
cent more than he thinks I can do.
Then we have some kind of a
bazaar and the one who can
negotiate more convincingly wins.
How does this help us achieve our
growth targets in any way?
Out with the old
Following the off-site, a workinggroup was set up for enabling and
driving growth, with the abolition of
the budgeting process as one topic
on the agenda. This was easier said
than done, however. The process
could not just be thrown out without
replacing it with something; client
advisors still needed to be motivated
to grow the business.
And most tricky of all, there were
no role models for UBS to follow. A
Swedish bank Svenska
Handelsbanken had pioneered a
no-budgeting model back in the
1970s, so a couple of UBS
executives took a trip up to
Stockholm to compare notes. But as
Ziegler recalls, It was not what we
thought it would be. Handelsbanken
were in different business models.
So we could not learn as much as we
had expected.
Were they aware of the Beyond
Budgeting Round Table, a UK-based
group that had been looking atalternatives to budgeting since the
mid-1990s? Stadelmann is almost
apologetic in his response: No, this
was not driven from a theoretical
angle at all. This was driven by pure
business logic if we want growth,
then budgeting gets in the way of
what we are trying to create.
Interestingly, UBS (the parent
company) had been part of the
Beyond Budgeting group until 2002.
So while there was some awarenessof the round tables activities, it was
not a primary driver of UBS Global
WM&BBs initiative.
In with the new
The new model was built from the
ground up, and according to the
particular needs of the UBS Global
WM&BB business in all countries
except the US, which wasnt part of
this business group at that time.
Rather than comparing the
performance of client advisors with abudget number, Stadelmann and his
team evaluated them against
themselves (their previous years
results) and against their peers. As
he explains, We set up a carefully
formulated internal benchmark. We
defined various clusters within the
bank to make sure we were
comparing apples with apples. We
created monthly measures of actual
performance on the usual criteria
revenues, net new money,
cost/income ratio. And then we
ranked all the desks (groups of
client advisors) in the cluster. In
essence, we created performance
league tables, and we made the
results available for everyone to see.
The league tables were designed
to serve two purposes. The first was
to fuel the competitive instincts of
the client advisors and to push them
to deliver higher levels of
performance than they would have
ever done under a traditionalbudgeting process. The desks
ranking was fed into the annual
bonus process.
The second function of the league
tables was, paradoxically, about
encouraging higher levels of
cooperation between desk heads. As
Ziegler explains, We use these
results to drive our coaching and
best-practice transfer processes. We
are a learning organisation, and the
primary purpose of the forcedranking is to help us to improve.
Why would desk heads choose to
share their success formula with
their peers? Isnt it like asking
Chelsea Football Club to reveal its
secrets to Manchester United?
Stadelmann laughs at the analogy.
Actually, no, it isnt. There are two
key differences. First, this is not a
zero-sum game: if we all do better,
we all make more money. And
second, bonuses are not calculated
on a formula yes, results are thebiggest single component, but we
also factor in all the soft stuff,
including coaching skills, openness
to sharing, and so forth.
But we are not so naive,
Stadelmann continues, to think
these discussions will happen
spontaneously. We know a
competitive system is likely to create
competitive behaviours that go
against our philosophy. So we
O ne issue that every big-com pany m anager can agree on isthat the annual budgeting process is an enorm ous waste of
tim e and effort.
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2007 The Author | J ournal compilation 2007 London Business SchoolBusiness Strategy Review Spring 200778
have had to institutionalize a set
of processes for coaching and best-
practice improvement. Every week,
the desk heads get together to share
their experiences. It is a sales
meeting of sorts, but with a strong
coaching element. And every month,
there is a meeting of the desk heads
in a cluster where the league table
results are compared. People talk
about what has made them
successful or why they are lagging.And this process is repeated up the
ladder to business sectors, business
units, business areas, and even at
the executive committee level.
There is no naivet about bonuses
either. The annual performance
evaluation also includes a quality
component: is this individual willing
to pass on his knowledge, to help out
with the development of other
colleagues? This evaluation is made
at all levels from executivecommittee level down to the
individual client advisor.
One further point of clarification is
in order: no budgeting does not
mean there are no estimates of
future performance. Marcel Rohner,
deputy Group CEO and CEO Global
WM&BB, needs to have his finger on
the pulse of the business, and he
needs to know how the results are
shaping up over the coming months.
As Karin Wyss, head of planning in
UBS Global WM&BB, observes, Westill have to plan: there is a system
of high-level rolling forecasts for the
next five quarters. Ziegler adds,
These are best-estimates only,
performed by a small group of
central people, and for the
executives only to discuss future
options otherwise this would be
considered a hidden budget. But it is
remarkable how accurate these
estimates are.
Putting the new systemin place
The new system represents a massive
change for employees across the
bank. How was it implemented?
Wyss explains: First, the new modelwas demonstrably better than the old
one. Second, we engaged in a huge
communication effort, led from the
top by Marcel Rohner. We had to
show this was not just the flavour of
the month, so we had a series of
roadshows across the bank, using
Alingi, the winning UBS-sponsored
Americas Cup yacht, to evoke
images of teamwork and flexibility.
And third, we rolled out our leading
for growth seminar across the bank,which gave senior managers a
language and a rationale for the
change of paradigm. UBS Global
WM&BB also invested in a state-of-
the-art management information
system that was just coming online
in 2004, making it possible to create
the detailed and transparent league
tables that are needed for the new
model to work.
The abolition of budgeting was, of
course, part of a broader shift in the
culture of UBS Global WM&BB ashift towards greater levels of
personal accountability and
entrepreneurial leadership across the
bank. For the first time, desk heads
were free to hire new people and
increase their marketing spend
without having budgeted for them.
And as Ziegler recalls, it took some
time for this new level of
accountability to sink in. Some desk
heads would still call head office to
ask for permission to invest in a
marketing campaign.
The changes also led to a new role
for the controllers department in the
corporate centre. Rather than spend
all their time monitoring behaviour
and performance, they became morelike an in-house consultancy. As
Karin Wyss explains, My job today
is to support the business rather
than monitor its performance. We
have a sophisticated Intranet system
for comparing performance across
markets, we share ideas, and this
helps us to understand why some
markets are stronger than others.
And what about the overall results
of UBS Global WM&BB? Has the
abolition of budgeting helped? Theresults are certainly at record levels
in 2005 UBS Global WM&BB
achieved profits before taxes of more
than 6.6 billion Swiss Francs,
compared to just 4.4 billion in
2003. But as Ziegler points out, It
is difficult to say how much of this
has come from the performance
management system. What is clear,
though, is that the new system had a
very positive impact on the
atmosphere in the bank. As
Stadelmann comments,Discussions on the sales process
are of a much higher quality than
before. We spend our time
discussing clients and market
opportunities, rather than
negotiating figures.
W hy would desk heads choose to share their success form ula
w ith their peers? Isnt it like asking Chelsea Football Club to
reveal its secrets to M anchester U nited?
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Design is the height of
corporate chic. It is endorsed
by management gurus as the
new thing. Car advertisements
feature designers rather than
glamorous men and women. Peopleknow who Tom Ford is. Design
superheroes, such as Alberto Alessi
and Philippe Starck, glitter on the
pages of magazines. Their Midas
touch is applied to everything from
kettles to hotels.
But, in the business world at
least, the suspicion is that the
current gushing enthusiasm for
design is as superficial as was the
manage