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    Managem

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    Business Strategy Review Spring 2007 2007 The Author | J ournal compilation 2007 London Business School 61

    6 2 Organisational thunderboltsWhen a management innovator is set loose inside

    an organisation, watch out! Management innovation

    can have thunderous results.

    6 6 From R&D to Connect + Develop at P&GChallenged by its CEO to source ideas from

    outside, Procter & Gamble decided to blaze a new

    path for its research and development function. In

    pursuit of inspiration, its R&D became

    turbocharged by using insourcing to expand

    P&Gs horizons.

    7 0 Perfectly in balance

    Art Schneiderman pioneered what later becamethe concept of the balanced scorecard while a vice

    president of quality and productivity at Analog

    Devices. We talked with Schneiderman to find out

    more about the early evolution of a management

    innovation.

    7 2 Making the firm flexibleHow companies operate has been established over

    two centuries. Is it possible for a firm to break the

    established rules of organisation? Eden McCallum

    did just that.

    7 6 Death to budgetingIts considered one of the basics of management.

    If you dont have a budget, you arent really

    managing. But, UBS has made budgeting

    secondary to performance and customer

    satisfaction.

    7 9 Designing the cultureWhen the design firm, IDEO, opened for business,

    its three founders designed an organisation low on

    hierarchy, big on communication, with a minimal

    amount of ego. Forty years on, it still works.

    8 2 Employees firstInnovation is often focused on products. Yet the

    leader of one Indian company is shifting the

    business model of a 30,000-employee company.

    HCL Technologies reveals how innovation can

    apply to organisational systems as well.

    Written by Julian Birkinshaw, Stuart Crainer and

    Michael Mol.

    Specialreport

    ManagementInnovation

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    2007 The Author | J ournal compilation 2007 London Business SchoolBusiness Strategy Review Spring 200762

    Most people consider

    management a tool of the

    status quo. They consider

    the good manager as someone who

    keepsthings running smoothly; or, if

    theres a problem, as someone who

    restoresthe status quo so that the

    business can keep humming along.

    Consequently, when a manager

    shakes up the status quo and actually

    improvesthe way things run, theimpact (especially in large

    organisations) can be thunderous.

    Boeings Debbie Collard shares the

    story of the manager who thought the

    C-17 jumbo transport plane could be

    built in a radically different way.

    Collard tells of the revolution

    created by Koz (most likely, Don

    Kozlowski), the executive newly

    charged with leading the production

    of the C-17, a plane so gigantic that

    its tail is four stories high. Planes

    that huge require hundreds of peopleto assemble them, and the tradition

    is that such a plane is built in

    stages, by moving it from one

    position to another as the successive

    work is completed. The norm in the

    industry was for movement from

    position to position to occur per the

    set timetable, whether every

    production detail was attended to or

    not. At least in the case of the C-17,

    prior to Koz, thats the way it always

    was. Everyone thought, thats the

    way its supposedto be.

    But, as Collard told J ohn Kotter

    and Dan Cohen, in Heart of Change

    (Harvard Business School Press,

    2002), everything changed when Koz

    rattled the status quo. We are not

    going to move an airplane, she

    remembers Koz saying, until it is

    complete in position. Quality is

    number one, so thats what we aregoing to focus on. Until the plane is

    done and done right, no movement.

    Period.

    Collard then relates how workers

    and managers alike responded to Koz

    and his revolutionary way of doing

    things:

    Everyone thought he was off his

    rocker. You didnt do things this

    way. I think some of his direct

    reports, in particular, thought he

    was crazy. They were convincedthat we would never be able to

    deliver on time if we did it this way.

    Never. Wouldnt happen, anybody

    knows that. Something would

    always bring everything to a halt.

    Youd have employees twiddling

    their thumbs at great expense to

    the company. You might as well

    expect cars to be made by

    secretaries on the fifty-ninth floor

    of the Sears building in Chicago.

    As you probably surmise, Koz

    changed not only the company but

    the rest of the industry. Collard

    completes her story by attesting that

    this one management innovation

    transformed the place, and, as a

    result, quality has gone up and all of

    our aircraft have not only been on

    time, theyve been early!

    Its rare for management to hurl

    an organisational thunderbolt, but itsimpact can be enormous.

    Management innovation the

    implementation of new management

    practices, processes and structures

    that represent a significant departure

    from current norms has

    transformed the way many functions

    and activities work in large

    organisations. Fords introduction of

    the moving assembly line in 1913

    and Western Electrics invention of

    statistical quality control in 1924

    changed businesses forever. Everymanagerial process we now take for

    granted was created by inventive and

    far-sighted individuals: double-entry

    book-keeping was invented by Luca

    Pacioli in 1494, and the limited

    liability company was created in

    1856.

    But management innovation

    remains poorly managed and poorly

    understood. It is typically left to

    occur in an ad hoc fashion, and

    Organisational

    thunderboltsManagement innovation the implementation of new managementpractices, processes and structures that represent a significant departurefrom current norms has transformed the way many functions andactivities work in large organisations. When a management innovator isset loose inside an organisation, watch out, management innovation canhave thunderous results.

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    Business Strategy Review Spring 2007 2007 The Author | J ournal compilation 2007 London Business School 63

    successful management innovators

    like Boeings Koz have to work very

    hard to get others to understand

    what they are doing, or why they are

    doing it. While academic studies of

    the diffusion of existing

    management innovations are

    common, there is virtually no

    literature on its origins, that is, on

    the generative processes through

    which management innovation first

    takes shape.

    In search of...a process?

    Management innovation has some

    obvious commonalities with

    technological innovation as a

    process: it involves key individuals

    pulling together ideas and resources

    in novel ways, championing their

    ideas inside their organisation,

    building coalitions of seniorexecutives to support them and

    using their political skills to

    overcome internal resistance. But

    our research suggested there were

    also two important points ofdifference that made management

    innovation a distinct process.

    Change agentsThe first distinction

    was a much more significant role for

    external change agents. These

    individuals were a mix of academics,

    consultants, gurus and ex-

    employees. They often provided the

    initial source of inspiration, and they

    frequently helped to shape and

    legitimize the management

    innovation as it took hold. Whileexternal agents rarely developed new

    practices themselves, they offered

    important inputs at all steps along

    the way. The process thus had a

    highly interactive quality. It typically

    took place on the fringes of the

    organisation rather than in the core

    through the relations between

    conceptually oriented managers and

    managerially oriented external

    change agents.

    Distant horizonThe second point of

    difference was the amount of

    uncertainty and ambiguity in the

    process. Most management

    innovations took several years to

    implement, and in some cases it was

    impossible to say with any precision

    when the innovation actually took

    place. To some degree this can also

    be the case with technological

    innovations, but the subtle nature of

    the process was particularly acute in

    the management innovations we

    studied.

    How it happens

    Our research suggests management

    innovations occur in five stages.

    Dissatisfaction with status quo In

    cases we studied, the internal

    problem that management innovationaddressed was always some level of

    dissatisfaction with the status quo.

    We use the word dissatisfaction

    because it covers a multitude of

    situations, from a nagging operationalproblem through a strategic threat to

    an impending crisis.

    One classic example: in 2003 UBS

    Wealth Management, the private

    banking arm of the Swiss giant, was

    looking to grow after several years of

    painful cost cutting. The executives

    started looking into the blockers

    the things that were standing in the

    way of the growth agenda and they

    realised that the budgeting process

    was a key problem area. As CFO Toni

    Stadelmann notes, Budgeting ishighly defensive it is cumbersome,

    and it is fundamentally against

    growth. It is about negotiating down

    the targets that are proposed by the

    centre. And it causes people to talk

    about numbers, not about clients

    and market opportunities. This

    realisation led to a complete re-

    thinking of how individual client

    advisors worked and the elimination

    of the traditional budgeting process.

    Wealth Management has been

    growing rapidly ever since (and the

    full story is explored on page 76).

    Inspiration from outside

    Management innovators need

    inspiration examples of what has

    worked in other settings, analogies

    from different social systems or

    unproven but alluring new ideas.

    Managers with thunderbolts revealed

    a breadth of thinking that allowed

    them to strike out on their own path,

    rather than just adopt a proven

    model applied by a competing firm.

    For example, Dee Hock founded Visa

    with a unique cooperative

    organisational model that drew more

    from the principles of J effersonian

    Democracy than from traditional

    hierarchical thinking.

    More generally, we observed thatmany management innovators had

    unusual backgrounds or they had

    worked in a wide variety of different

    functional areas or countries. Art

    Schneiderman, the manager atAnalog Devices who in 1987

    developed the prototype for what

    became known as the Balanced

    Scorecard, was strongly influenced

    by Jay Forresters system dynamics

    concepts during his MBA training at

    MITs Sloan School, then spent six

    years as a strategy consultant with

    Bain working on quality management

    projects in J apan before joining

    Analog Devices. This background

    gave Schneiderman insight into

    continuous improvement techniquesthat were being used in J apan plus a

    system-wide perspective on the

    functioning of the organisation. So

    when asked by CEO Ray Stata to

    develop a quality improvement

    process for the companys

    manufacturing, he quickly developed

    a set of metrics that included both

    financial and non-financial

    components. (Art Schneiderman is

    interviewed on page 70.)

    Its rare for m anagem ent to hurl an organisational thunderbolt.

    W hy so?

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    2007 The Author | J ournal compilation 2007 London Business SchoolBusiness Strategy Review Spring 200764

    Invention It is customary to

    assume that every innovation has a

    eureka moment when the

    inventor makes the key conceptual

    breakthrough or proposal that

    everything else follows from. 3Ms

    Art Fry famously came up with the

    Post-it Note concept at his local

    church as he sought to keep track of

    multiple pages in his book of hymns.

    And people at Boeing still tell the

    Koz C-17 story because eureka

    moments are legendary. However, our

    evidence suggests that such eureka

    moments are rare. Invention is a

    process in which the innovator brings

    together the various elements of a

    problem (dissatisfaction with the

    status quo) with the various elements

    of a solution (which involves some

    inspiration from outside plus a clear

    understanding of the internalsituation and context), but the

    manner in which these elements are

    brought together is typically iterative

    and gradual.

    Consider the case of Connect &Develop, Procter & Gambles radical

    approach to building an external

    network of scientists around the

    world as a means of turbocharging

    its internal R&D. This major

    organisational innovation (analysed

    in our article on page 66) took the

    best part of 10 years to put together.

    Larry Huston, the key architect of the

    model explains:

    Back in the mid-1990s I was

    interested in how to develop a neworganisation form where people

    would be fluid and could swarm to

    the good projects, yet protect the

    base business. We spent time

    actually thinking through the

    detailed, entire organisation

    design and I actually made a

    concept video. I then tried to get

    one company off the ground,

    called Company Way, where you

    would get rewards for participation

    and your peers could give you

    rewards for participating on a web-

    based innovation model.

    Then in 2000 my boss said we

    want you to create the new

    business model of innovation.

    Building on my earlier work I

    started to create the conceptual

    positioning for connect and

    develop. A lot of it starts with

    experiments, making concepts and

    storyboards and films, just like you

    would do if youre making a

    product. People just think this

    stuff falls to the ground: they dont

    realize that these big management

    systems are constructed, and you

    have to be smart about it; it takes

    a lot of skill to do that.

    Internal validation In one important

    respect management innovation isjust like every other form of

    innovation: it involves change and

    uncertainty, and as a result it

    encounters resistance from people

    who dont understand or dont valuethe proposed innovation. And it is

    impossible to accurately predict

    whether any innovations benefits will

    exceed its costs. A critical stage in

    the process, then, is for the

    management innovators to generate

    validation for their new idea. We

    describe the process of validation to

    external parties below; but the more

    important step, at least in terms of

    the initial implementation, is for the

    innovation to gain internal acceptance.

    Management innovation is eventrickier to validate than technological

    innovation because the innovation

    itself is less easily codified, requires

    the willing participation of many

    people for it to work and often

    delivers its results only several years

    after implementation.

    Consider Oticon, which in the early

    1990s developed a radical

    organisation model with no formal

    hierarchical reporting relationships, a

    resource allocation system built

    around self-organised project teams

    and an entirely open-plan physical

    layout. This new model helped

    Oticon to achieve dramatic increases

    in profitability over the rest of the

    decade. Lars Kolind, the CEO of

    Oticon and architect of these

    changes, got his inspiration for this

    new model from his deep

    involvement in the scouting

    movement:

    The scouting movement has a

    stronger volunteer aspect, and

    whenever scouts come together,

    they cooperate effectively together

    without hierarchy. There is no game

    playing, no intrigue; we are one

    family brought together through

    common goals. My experiences in

    scouting led me to focus ondefining a clear meaning for

    Oticon employees, something

    beyond just making money, and to

    build a system that encouraged

    volunteerism and self-motivation.

    Kolinds experiences at Oticon were

    typical. His first challenge was to

    persuade the owners of the company

    (primarily a foundation) that a

    radical change was necessary to

    confront the challenge posed by

    giant competitors like Siemens and

    Philips. Once that had been

    achieved, he embarked on a massive

    internal selling programme to

    explain the nature of his proposed

    changes to the employees. He usedradical slogans such as think the

    unthinkable and visual symbols,

    such as a large transparent chute in

    the middle of the building down

    which all shredded documents fell.

    Inevitably there were some

    employees who chose to leave

    because they were not comfortable

    with his changes, but most were

    quick to see the benefits and

    became involved in implementing

    W e found that there w ere also tw o im portant points of difference

    that m ade m anagem ent innovation a distinct process.

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    Business Strategy Review Spring 2007 2007 The Author | J ournal compilation 2007 London Business School 65

    the transition to what became known

    as Oticons spaghetti organisation.

    The management innovator may be a

    brilliant inventor initially, but it is

    equally important for that inventor to

    then build a support coalition to

    carry the invention into the

    organisation. Effective management

    innovation requires determined

    individuals as much as it does the

    creation of a fertile breeding ground

    for their ideas.

    External validation One of the

    distinctive features of the

    management innovation process that

    emerged during the research was

    what we came to call external

    validation essentially a stamp of

    approval from an independent

    observer, such as an academic, a

    consultancy, or a media organisation.Again, the reason why external

    validation proved to be so important

    had to do with the uncertain and

    ambiguous nature of most

    management innovations. Because

    of a lack of hard data to prove that a

    particular innovation was working,

    companies frequently sought

    external validation as a means of

    increasing the level of internal

    acceptance. This process of

    validation also typically increasedthe visibility of the innovation to

    competitors or companies in other

    industries, which tended to reinforce

    the innovation further. Four types of

    external actors were identified during

    the research:

    The business school academic

    who typically acts as a thoughtful

    observer of the emerginginnovation and who sees his/herrole as codifying the practice in

    question for use in research andclassroom teaching.

    The consulting organisationthatsees its role primarily in terms ofcodifying and documenting the

    innovation so that it can then beused in other settings.

    The media organisationthat sees

    its role as broadcasting the story

    of the innovation to as wide an

    audience as possible.

    The industry associationthatseeks to develop improvedpractices across its member

    organisations. Remember thatTotal Quality Management cameabout when W.E. Deming and

    other quality experts gave a seriesof lectures before the JapaneseUnion of Scientists and Engineers.

    Various member companies of thatUnion then started taking up TQMand sharing their experiences.

    Making thunderbolts

    So what can you do to improve your

    companys capacity for management

    innovation? A number of common

    themes emerged from the research

    that should serve as useful pointers

    for a company that would like to take

    its management innovation efforts

    more seriously.

    Become a conscious management

    innovatorEvery company today

    knows that it needs to continuously

    create new products and services to

    meet customers evolving demands.

    And these firms have all set up some

    sort of innovation function, whether

    it is in the form of a physical R&D

    lab or a new venture division. If you

    want to become a management

    innovator, selling the importance of

    management innovation to yourorganisation is a crucial first step.

    Create a questioning, problem-

    solving cultureWhen you or your

    employees are faced with an unusual

    challenge in your company, look

    deeper into the problem: see the

    problem in new ways and start to

    hypothesize about new ways of

    solving it. Only the latter path can

    take you towards management

    innovation, so you need to encourage

    employees to explore the unexploredand to avoid the easy answers.

    Seek out analogies and exemplars

    from diff erent environments

    Depending on the problem you are

    trying to solve, the types of solutions

    you might want to consider will vary.

    Exposing your employees to many

    different types of environments and

    different ways of operating is also

    invaluable as a means of opening up

    their minds to new alternatives.

    Build a capacity for low-risk

    experimentationIn one company we

    know, there is a sustained effort to

    encourage individuals and teams to

    come up with management

    innovations to tackle everyday

    problems with the existing

    bureaucracy and processes. But

    each innovation must be tested with

    a limited number of people and for a

    limited period of time. This has

    ensured that every idea gets a shot

    at implementation without crippling

    the ability of the organisation as a

    whole.

    Make use of external change-agents

    to explore your new ideasOutsidersfulfil three primary roles. They

    represent a source of new ideas and

    analogies from different settings,

    they can act as a sounding board for

    making sense of your emerging

    innovations, and they can help to

    validate what you have done.

    Become a serial management

    innovatorThe real success stories in

    management innovation are not the

    companies who have innovated onceor twice. The serial management

    innovators (like GE, which has been

    a pioneer in many new approaches,

    from strategic planning to executive

    development to divisions observing

    boundarylessness) are the ones to

    emulate.

    These six points are certainly not a

    recipe for management innovation.

    The process of developing radical

    new ways of working will always have

    some dose of luck and randomnessto it. But you can certainly tilt the

    odds in your favour by working on

    these points and by creating a

    greater understanding in your

    company of how management

    innovation happens. To be sure,

    thunderbolts seldom happen in

    companies in which managers

    worship the status quo.

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    2007 The Author | J ournal compilation 2007 London Business SchoolBusiness Strategy Review Spring 200766

    I

    n 2000 Procter & Gamble (P&G)

    was at a crucial point in its long

    history. One of the worlds best-known corporations and creator of

    some of the worlds most famous and

    successful brands was at a

    crossroads. Its CEO, Dirk Jager, had

    left after a mere 18 months in the

    job. In March, the company

    announced it would not meet its

    projected first quarter earnings. The

    stock price was spiralling downwards

    falling from $116 in J anuary to

    $60 per share by March. The massive

    loss of $85 billion in marketcapitalization was matched by the

    loss of confidence within. It provoked

    a media frenzy. Perhaps most

    poignantly, Ad Ageheadlined its front

    page story: Does P&G Still Matter?

    It was one of many column inches

    devoted to the apparently impending

    demise of the company.

    P&Gs new CEO, A.G. Lafley,

    provided an instant dose of reality:

    We werent delivering on goals and

    commitments to analysts and

    investors. Major P&G businesseswere underperforming only three of

    them accounted for 80 per cent of

    the total value created inthe 1990s.

    Competitors were swooping in and

    gobbling up market share. We were

    overinvested: we overbuilt capacity,

    hired too many people, funded too

    many aggressive introductions of new

    products and expansions of existing

    brands. P&G brands were not

    delivering good consumer value: we

    werent consistently leading

    innovation, and prices were too high.

    We had priced-up big establishedbrands to pay for new products and

    aggressive geographic expansion. Our

    costs were also too high. We had

    frayed relations with important

    customers who were frustrated with

    incompatible strategies, poor service

    levels, and P&Gs inability to create

    value for them. We were too

    internally focused. Consumed with

    the massive reorganisation, and with

    so many people in new jobs, we were

    all spending too much timemanaging internal transactions.

    In addition to this litany of internal

    problems, P&G had the abiding

    corporate challenge of achieving

    growth. A mature company, such as

    P&G, is usually expected to deliver

    organic growth rates of around four

    to six per cent every year.

    Historically, this growth had been

    delivered by the companys

    formidable research and

    development resources thousands

    of researchers spread worldwide. Butwith the proliferation of new

    technologies and intensifying

    competition, P&Gs standard

    approach to R&D was under threat.

    Only 35 per cent of its new products

    met their financial objectives. R&D

    productivity was stagnant.

    Lafleys prescription for the ailing

    corporate patient was wide-reaching.

    Estimating that it would take three

    years to get P&G back on track, he

    focused the company on four core

    businesses (accounting for 54 per

    cent of sales and 60 per cent ofprofits); its big, established leading

    brands; and P&Gs top 10 countries

    (80 per cent of sales and 95 per

    cent of profits). Costs, which had

    rocketed under Jager, were cut.

    Capital spending had leapt to eight

    per cent of sales and was trimmed.

    Nearly 10,000 jobs were lost around

    the world as underperforming

    businesses were closed and the

    company left businesses now

    regarded as non-strategic. Someproduct lines were discontinued,

    investments were written off and

    brands, such as Comet, Crisco and

    J if, were sold off.

    And, perhaps most boldly of all, in

    the midst of establishing the new

    P&G order, Lafley announced an

    entirely new approach to innovation.

    P&Gs corporate innovation fund had

    increased seven-fold in four years.

    Two-thirds of these projects were

    cut. Lafley announced that, in the

    future, instead of relying on itsinternal research and development,

    P&G expected that 50 per cent of its

    innovation would come from outside

    the company. R&D numbers would

    remain the same, but the onus

    would be on maximizing ideas

    internally and externally.

    The logic was simple. For every

    one of the companys researchers,

    P&G calculated there were 200

    people scientists or engineers

    FromR&D toConnect + Developa

    t P&GChallenged by its CEO to source ideas from outside, Procter & Gambledecided to blaze a new path for its research and development function.In pursuit of inspiration, its R&D became turbocharged by usinginsourcing to expand P&Gs horizons.

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    Business Strategy Review Spring 2007 2007 The Author | J ournal compilation 2007 London Business School 67

    outside the company who had

    talents the company could utilise.

    Instead of 7,500 people in corporate

    R&D, P&G recalculated that there

    were 1.5 million worldwide whose

    knowledge they needed to tap into.

    Research and development was

    reincarnated as Connect + Develop

    with an organisation of 1,507,500

    people.

    Green lights; new dawn

    For Larry Huston, then 26 years into

    his P&G career, Lafleys

    announcement was a crucial

    moment, a green light for his work

    stretching back much of the past

    decade. He told his team: Were in

    business, things are going to start

    happening.

    Hustons state of readiness was

    understandable. Tracing back theidea that became Connect +

    Develop, he goes back to the mid-

    1990s and draws parallels with

    artists. Its just like the way some

    artists will develop models and

    sketches before they commit to

    creating the final painting, says

    Huston. Thomas Hart Benton, for

    example, a US-based social realist,

    would create clay models and then

    more models of what he was

    eventually going to paint and then

    he would start working on the

    perspectives with all kinds of

    sketches. He would work on the

    concept for a long, long time before

    he ever actually created a successful

    painting. Thats the way most artistswork; look at all the study pieces

    that everybody does. And, in the

    case of this new innovation model,

    we worked, probably, five or six years

    on creating the studies that led to it

    coming together, ultimately, in the

    year 2000.

    Huston, along with colleague

    Nabil Sakkab, was initially interested

    in how to develop a new organisation

    form that combined the ability to

    deliver high-performing results, yet

    be adaptive. He spoke, among

    others, to Dee Hock at Visa, who had

    instigated a unique organisational

    form labeled the chaordic

    organisation. His attention then

    developed to embrace chaos theory.

    Huston sought to understand

    whether there was a way to attract

    the best people to projects with a

    greater chance of success and to

    allow bad projects to die because

    they would go unstaffed. I wanted

    to create an organisation where

    people would be fluid and move

    around and could swarm to the good

    projects, yet protect the base

    business.

    Huston made contact with Stuart

    Kauffman at the Bios Group and

    spent time thinking through and

    developing a detailed organisationdesign. This was captured on the

    walls of a large conference room in

    Santa Fe, and Huston was then

    filmed giving a guided tour to the

    organisation design of the future

    with Kauffman following with his

    own commentary.

    By way of further experimentation

    Huston then worked with a start-up

    software company to launch a

    company to facilitate a flow to the

    best opportunity model. This web-

    based investigation lasted a year

    while Huston and his team studied a

    handful of innovation projects that

    had been brought in from outside

    P&G. External connections created

    about twice as much value asinternal initiatives when factors such

    as success rates and time to market

    and after costs were fully

    considered. Huston extrapolated that

    a connections model of innovation

    could create a breakthrough in

    driving P&Gs business and its

    productivity.

    Gilbert Cloyd, P&Gs Chief

    Technology Officer, approached

    Huston with a challenge: could he

    create a new R&D model for the

    company?

    This was a moment in time that

    allowed us to really consider a whole

    new operating method, Huston

    summarizes. I had run six years of

    experiments, and went out and

    started studying real world

    innovation networks and how value

    could be created. Then we created

    the conceptual positioning for

    Connect + Develop, around the idea

    of turbocharging our already strong

    base organisation. I had the

    rationale and some ideas about the

    tools and how to get it off the ground

    and created a new role called

    technology entrepreneurs. Lafley

    announced that we were going to get

    half of our innovation from the

    outside. That was a major

    intervention and so we were off andrunning.

    Importantly, Lafleys

    announcement was a very public

    one. He put the stake in the ground.

    Reactions were decidedly mixed,

    Larry Huston recalls: Some peoples

    first reaction was, wow, P&G is

    getting rid of its R&D. Should we

    sell the stock? This is a science-

    driven company, what are they

    doing, have they lost their minds?

    They didnt realize that what we

    were doing was substantially

    strengthening our R&D capability.

    Reality and development

    The positioning of Connect +

    Develop was important. First, it wasmade clear that Connect + Develop

    was not a matter of outsourcing

    P&Gs research and development

    capability. Connect + Develop was

    about finding good ideas and

    bringing them in to enhance and

    capitalize on internal capabilities. In

    essence, an insourcing strategy.

    The second point was that

    Connect + Develop was not a

    transformation programme.

    The Connect and D evelop m odel of innovation is nascent and

    likely to becom e the dom inant innovation m odel of our tim es.

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    I think transformation is a dirty

    word, says Huston. If you go and

    say to a company, Im going to go

    transform you, theyll say, its going

    to be impossible and well never

    finish. In the case of Connect +

    Develop we were careful not to

    position it as transformation even

    though now it is. We said, we have a

    strong, powerful, global organisation,

    weve built outstanding capability all

    over the world, we have world class

    people, what were going to do is

    take this already strong capability

    and turbocharge it. And so the core

    idea is based upon how do we

    turbocharge? And then, what are the

    accepted beliefs that people have

    about this kind of thing? How do we

    create its credentials?

    Connect + Develop focused on

    three areas: the needs of consumers(each business and the company as

    a whole identified the top 10 needs

    of consumers); adjacencies (products

    or services which could help P&G

    capitalize on existing brand equity);

    and, what the company labels

    technology game boards (a

    planning tool which enables P&G to

    evaluate how technologies in one

    area impact elsewhere in the

    business).

    At the heart of Connect + Developis using networks to gain connections

    to new ideas. In the old invention

    model know-how was key and

    really this is what was focused on the

    most. In the new connections model

    know-who would become critical.

    The networks P&G keys into are

    varied. Among the most notable are

    proprietary networks developed

    specifically for Connect + Develop.

    For example, P&Gs leading 15

    suppliers have around 50,000

    people employed in R&D. P&G builtan IT platform to share technology

    briefs with suppliers. Closer working

    relationships and the sharing of

    information have brought a 30 per

    cent increase in projects with staff

    from suppliers and P&G working

    together.

    Even competitors offer sources of

    inspiration. Huston recalls meeting a

    competitor from Japan. He said,

    Are you comfortable with talking? I

    said, Of course Im comfortable

    talking. I consider your 2,500 R&D

    people to be my R&D lab. And this

    really blew his mind.

    P&G also created a network ofwhat it labels technology

    entrepreneurs. They are senior

    experienced people who have seen

    everything, done everything. They are

    focused on being the growth

    provocateurs for the organisation,

    Huston explains. The technology

    entrepreneurs number 70 worldwide.

    They are effectively the eyes and

    ears of Connect + Develop making

    contacts within industry and

    education, with suppliers, and with

    local markets. To date, thetechnology entrepreneurs have

    brought over 10,000 products, ideas

    and technologies to the attention of

    P&G. Each is then evaluated.

    Elsewhere, P&G taps into a

    number of open networks. It is

    involved with YourEncore, which

    connects companies with high

    performing retirees from over 350

    companies; InnoCentive, which deals

    with more specific technical

    problems; and Yet2.com, an online

    intellectual property marketplace.

    Once ideas emerge through the

    networks they are rigorously

    evaluated by P&G before deciding toproceed with further development.

    The innovation dividend

    P&G accomplished its goal. Over 50

    per cent of the companys

    innovations now originate outside

    the company. When Lafley first

    announced his bold target in 2000,

    the figure was under 15 per cent.

    Connect + Develop has helped

    turbocharge more than 250 products

    into the marketplace, and has

    generated billions of sales.Now Procter & Gambles vice

    president for innovation and

    knowledge, Huston believes that

    Connect + Develop offers broader

    lessons on how to develop

    management innovations. The one

    thing that is really important is to

    get the concept right, says Huston.

    P&G is a concept-driven company.

    A concept for us is how the products

    going to make the consumers life

    Larry Huston: well connected

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    better and providing strong reasons

    to believe in it. So we practice

    concept development here every day,

    because we have to move hearts and

    minds. We have to win the battle at

    the store shelf and getting the

    concept right is enormously

    important. In fact, most product

    failure, 75 per cent of product

    failure, is not because the product

    doesnt perform, but because it was

    the wrong idea. It didnt provide

    desired consumer benefits at the

    offered price. Many organisation

    failures are due to both a poor

    concept and poor execution.

    For a number of innovations that

    Huston has been involved in, he

    went through the formal concept

    development storyboarding process,

    applying what P&G does for products,

    to management concepts andbusinesses. One of the new business

    ideas tested was called YourEncore

    (www.YourEncore.com). The concept

    was to take the experience and

    expertise of people who have retired

    and to utilize it in organisations.

    Huston and his team created

    storyboards for the concept and then

    took them to 21 prime prospect

    companies. They commented on and

    critiqued the idea, how it would work,

    and the value proposition. Hustonnext ran financial models to see if

    the desired concept was capable of

    making money. YourEncore now links

    over 1,800 retired scientists and

    engineers drawn from 350

    companies to organisations in need

    of their experience and expertise.

    Its all about bringing in new

    innovation DNA to create new

    sources of growth. Thats the core

    idea, says Huston.

    Clearly, Connect + Develop offers

    further lessons on how companiescan utilize external expertise and

    maximize internal resources. The

    commitment of the companys

    leadership was important. Says

    Huston: This is all about

    leadership, number one, being clear

    about where to play, how youre

    going to win and where you want to

    grow. Thats the job of the CEO and

    the top management to really figure

    this thing out. But, it is trite to say

    that this is all about starting with the

    CEO and changing the rewards

    system. For me, it starts with an

    idea, one that is proven, one that

    can be scalable. Then it moves to

    the top leadership for support. Then,

    on to making the necessary changes

    in the culture, like rewards, to

    enable adoption at scale.

    Second, its about building a lot

    more muscle. Connect + Develop is

    about muscle, its about giving us

    many more hearts, minds, hands and

    feet to do the work. And the third

    thing is, it is about equipping people

    and mindsets. For the most part our

    people have good ideas. We dont

    really have an idea problem. We have

    people who are smart and motivated,

    but mostly organisations are under-

    led around innovation. Its the topofficers that have to really create a

    growth culture based on innovation

    rather than just acquisition.

    There are also cultural challenges

    involved in moving any organisation

    from an emphasis on finding

    solutions internally to tapping into

    brilliant minds elsewhere. Most

    senior managers at P&G have been

    with the company for the vast

    majority of their careers. You rely

    on people outside, to some extent, tohelp challenge you and put ideas in

    your head about what might

    happen, Huston admits. In

    refining your ideas and ideas of

    whats possible, you have to expose

    yourself outside. Whether its going

    to see Dee Hock or Stu Kauffman or

    some little entrepreneurial company

    or studying the movie industry or the

    toy industry, or whatever it might be,

    you have to. The problem is people

    dont know the right questions to

    ask. And if youre inside a companythe only questions you know to ask

    are those within your frame of

    experience. Its hard to ask a

    question outside your frame of

    experience so you have got to be

    moving to other frames of experience

    to come up with good questions.

    Huston believes that the Connect

    + Develop model of innovation is

    nascent and likely to become the

    dominant innovation model of our

    times. It is like developing the

    telephone system. If Procter &

    Gamble developed the telephone

    system and only we had it in the

    world, yes, it would benefit our

    operations. But, if the world has the

    telephone, look how much more

    effective we are and whats most

    important with the telephone system

    is not the utility but the

    conversations. So weve been telling

    our potential partners, heres the

    utility, heres how you do Connect +

    Develop, because fundamentally we

    believe that our competitive

    advantage is knowing the

    consumers, leveraging the strength

    of our brands, and the quality of the

    conversations that we have. Its not

    whether or not there are networks

    out there or people know that we arelinking to scientists, its the quality

    of the conversation.

    Today, for many companies, the

    innovation phone system, the

    innovation phone book, and the idea

    of innovation conversations barely

    exists. For Procter & Gamble,

    management innovation has been an

    important driver of its enduring

    success. It pioneered brand

    management in the 1920s, it was

    one of the first companies toimplement a transnational

    organisation in the late 1980s in

    R&D (also led by Larry Huston), and

    it is now leading the world in its

    approach to open innovation. And

    the beauty of such innovations is

    that they are sufficiently deep-seated

    that competitors take a long time to

    catch up. As Huston observes,

    Connect + Develop is a long-term

    investment: I think P&G will run on

    this model for 20 years, and one-by-

    one many other companies willembrace it.

    ResourcesLarry Huston and Nabil Sakkab,

    Connect + Develop, Harvard

    Business Review, March 2006.

    A.G. Lafley, Getting Procter &

    Gamble Back on Track, speech at

    the Rotman School, April 21, 2003.

    www.pg.com

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    How did you come to a scorecard

    point of view?I was an aerospace research scientist

    for 15 years and decided that I

    wanted to change careers. So I quit

    my job, attended B-school, and

    worked in a strategy consulting firm.

    Ultimately, I became aware of Total

    Quality Management (TQM) on a trip

    to Japan. And thats when I became

    so interested in it that I decided I

    really wanted to focus attention on

    TQM rather than strategy consulting.

    Were you also interested in

    innovation at this point?

    Yes. I wanted to make sure that I

    worked in companies that had a

    record of innovation and were

    particularly responsive to innovation at

    the management level, because TQM

    is a kind of innovation. As I searched

    for American companies that would

    meet the test of being both innovative

    and receptive to TQM principles, I

    increasingly focused on Analog

    Devices, and I wrote to Ray Stata.

    Why that company?

    Ray was and is one of the rare CEOs

    who is really curious and interested

    about management innovation. I

    remember when I first went to see

    him, it turned out that it was quite

    timely because he had just gotten off

    the phone with one of Analogs major

    customers who was irate because a

    key shipment was late. And so I

    talked about TQM and it made for a

    great dialogue. It seemed to me rightaway that Ray and Analog were

    blessed with an innovative culture.

    Did you say culture?

    After years of working with

    innovation, there is no question in

    my mind that the number one

    ingredient is to have an innovative

    environment. You cant innovate in

    an environment that is not open to

    innovation, and that means from the

    very top, from the CEO all the waydown through the organisation. And

    it was clear that Ray was interested:

    he recognized that TQM was an

    important thing, that it had an

    impact on any and every industry,

    but that it would acutely affect the

    semi-conductor industry, of which he

    was a part. Theres no question that I

    immediately liked and respected Ray

    Stata and so that ended up being the

    chemistry of my going to Analog. It

    was the right environment for me

    and it was the right time for him.

    Was everyone inside Analog as

    committed to TQM and innovation?

    No. And, in time, Ray was succeeded

    by someone who has more of a

    traditional approach to management,

    the kind of executive who makes

    doable promises to Wall Street and

    then tries to deliver on them. The

    lesson here is that the leader of a

    company is essential to innovation;

    yet, after a company has become

    innovating and if the industry doesnot demand that you innovate

    further someone of a different

    temperament can lead the company,

    with a much more status quo

    demeanour.

    When you worked on being

    innovative, what kind of time horizon

    was in your mind?

    One of the first assignments that Ray

    gave me at Analog was to develop

    five-year strategic plans.Traditionally, once every five years,

    they would develop a strategic plan.

    Curiously, they would not revisit that

    plan until the five years were up. So

    I started to think of innovation with

    at least this kind of time horizon.

    But five years...does that work in

    todays marketplace?

    Obviously in todays world thats not

    a viable approach, and it did change

    even while I was at Analog more

    toward a continuous strategicplanning model. Thats whats

    needed now. If the market demands

    constant innovation (and just about

    every market does), you have to

    focus on innovation constantly.

    Whats most relevant to note here is

    that innovation is not something that

    is always defined by numerics. Even

    at Analog, I came up with something

    that was called the Corporate

    Performance Audit, an annual audit

    Perfectlyin balancArthur M. (Art) Schneidermanpioneered what later became the conceptof the balanced scorecard while a vice president of quality andproductivity at Analog Devices. We talked with Schneiderman, now anindependent consultant, to find out more about the early evolution of amanagement innovation.

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    Business Strategy Review Spring 2007 2007 The Author | J ournal compilation 2007 London Business School 71

    that used what I called a half-life

    method. The plan we devised used

    an annual context and focused on

    seven or eight non-financial things

    that we needed to manage in order

    to get to where we wanted to be in

    five years, numerically and

    otherwise. In fact, one of my tasks at

    Analog was to manage the agenda

    for the monthly business meetings.

    There was always a battle with other

    senior managers whether we should

    discuss, first, the non-financial

    parameters of the business or thehard numbers. Many companies fight

    that same battle today.

    How did you resolve this battle?

    I cant put my finger on where or

    when it happened, but I suddenly

    realized the best thing to do was to

    try and combine the two items in

    what became the overall scorecard

    for the business. In trying to meet

    the demands of the hard number

    execs, I agreed that we would haveno more than three financial

    measures at the top of the scorecard

    and then non-financial measures for

    the rest. So that is how the Analog

    Devices scorecard was born. The

    general manager urged that we

    abandon the fancy name of

    Corporate Performance Audit and

    call our performance tracking,

    simply, the Corporate Scorecard. And

    guess what? Divisional Scorecards

    soon followed, which gave us a

    weighted average of each divisionsonline performance. What would

    change over time are the things that

    went on the scorecard, not the

    financials but the non-financials. At

    the time, as far as I know, no other

    company was doing it this way.

    The balanced scorecard has evolved

    over time, and it seems that there

    are variants of the concept you

    originally created. Is there one right

    scorecard?

    Some of my colleagues over the

    years have concentrated on creating

    the perfect scorecard, but Im not

    sure its helpful to insist on just one

    form of scorecard. The big problem

    that organisations have is in

    implementing the scorecard; they

    dont have tools in place for

    achieving the goals. And so they fail.

    They have a scorecard but they dont

    achieve the results they desire, so it

    never makes any strategicdifference. In the end, they waste a

    lot of effort and a lot of energy that

    could be spent elsewhere. Some say

    the scorecard itself is the big thing; I

    say the real power of the scorecard

    concept is in how youre going to

    implement the changes. Thats the

    key thing.

    Along those lines, if its important

    how you implement the scorecard, is

    it also important to think about howyou develop the scorecard?

    Absolutely. The process by which

    you develop the scorecard is of

    critical importance. Most of the

    time, measures that people add to

    the scorecard are politically chosen

    measures, not strategically chosen.

    So you have to have a well-

    documented, well-understood

    process that you refine each cycle.

    This means that you not only have to

    work on the scorecard, you also have

    to work on how you are going tocreate it and how youre going to

    ensure that it is widely known and

    thoroughly understood, which leads

    you to how you are going to achieve

    the goals that you come up with.

    So having worked with scorecards for

    so long, do you have any favourite

    lessons learned?

    Let me offer three. First, I think that

    any time you come up with an

    innovation in management that has

    numerical targets as its basis, it is

    unlikely that it will ever be accepted

    with enthusiasm throughout the

    organisation. The lesson is that you

    should focus on rate of improvement

    rather than specific end results.

    Second, I believe the scorecard is

    probably somewhat less important

    than the half-life method: you have

    to test everyones sense of making

    solid progress and thus you have to

    establish sound improvementprocesses in the organisation. And

    then the third thing is to cultivate

    the mental process for process

    management. On my website,

    www.schneiderman.com, I list 7-

    Steps of Process Management. I do

    this for a very important reason: its

    vitally important how you approach

    innovation or the end results will be

    far less than optimal.

    Are your seven steps the same asTQM?

    My 7-step model for process

    management encompasses TQM, but

    it also tells you when, if necessary,

    to redesign a process, to re-engineer

    it. It also has control built into it,

    which basically says that it doesnt

    do you any good to improve a

    process if it has random applicability

    or otherwise is out of control. In

    terms of the steps I recommend, I

    dont care where you start, but I do

    care that you have an open processthat allows you to ask questions from

    time to time, questions like: How are

    we doing? Are we on course? If not,

    why not? A scorecard is an essential

    component to running a business,

    but only if you know how to play the

    game very well. In the end, the

    scorecard tells you whether the

    structure and processes inherent in

    your business are helping or not.

    I cant put m y nger on w here or w hen it happened, but I

    suddenly realized the best thing to do w as to try and com bine the

    tw o item s in w hat becam e the overall scorecard for the business.

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    T

    he origins of the modern firm

    can be traced to the 19th

    century. Yet the nature ofbusiness enterprises remains a

    constant work in progress. Over the

    last decade, in particular, technology

    has opened up a wide range of

    opportunities to change the

    fundamental shape of the traditional

    firm. This potential has been

    enthusiastically charted by

    commentators and academics alike.

    In 1998, Thomas W. Malone and

    Robert J . Laubacher of the

    Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology (MIT) looked at how a

    new kind of organisation could form

    the basis of an economy in which the

    old rules of business are overturned

    and big companies are rendered

    obsolete. Drawing on their research

    at MITs Initiative on Inventing the

    Organisations of the 21st Century,

    Malone and Laubacher heralded the

    dawn of the e-lance economy a

    world where freelance workers would

    come together in temporary or virtual

    constellations rather than astraditional employees. Malone and

    Laubacher were not alone in

    predicting that technology would

    change the shape of organisational

    life. There has been an array of

    variations on the theme of creating

    and managing virtual and networked

    organisations. Yet, despite

    continuing technological strides, the

    predictions of revolutionary change

    remain largely unfulfilled.

    In parallel, the 1990s saw

    increasing interest in professional

    service firms as a uniquely fertilearea for discussions of organisational

    structures. For example, Tom Peters,

    a former McKinsey consultant turned

    management commentator,

    celebrated the multi-functional

    global teams speedily assembled by

    the consulting firm to tackle client

    problems. Their speed and flexibility,

    coupled with their strongly defined

    culture and their ability to manage

    and maximise knowledge, convinced

    Peters that it provided a partialblueprint for how business firms

    could be constructed and behave in

    the global economy.

    Inspirations

    The London-based consulting firm

    Eden McCallum provides an

    innovative take on the nature of the

    firm as well as potential future

    scenarios for the organisation of

    consulting firms.

    Launched in 2000 by Liann Eden

    and Dena McCallum, EdenMcCallum is a network-based

    consulting firm. Rather than having a

    large headquarters and all the

    overheads associated with a

    conventional consulting firm, Eden

    McCallum retains a minimal central

    staff and utilises a network of

    freelance consultants. Eden is a

    former McKinsey consultant who also

    held international marketing roles at

    Unilever and Siemens. McCallum

    was formerly an international vice

    president and director of planning

    and strategy for the publisher CondNast as well as being a former

    McKinsey consultant.

    The inspiration for the firm began

    when McCallum was working at

    Cond Nast and Eden was working at

    McKinsey. McCallum realized that

    her budget did not stretch to hiring

    one of the big-name strategy

    consulting firms McKinsey & Co.,

    Boston Consulting Group, Bain or

    Booz Allen Hamilton but she still

    needed that calibre of support. Edenobserved that many strategy

    consultants, particularly in the dot-

    com era, were reassessing what they

    wanted from their work and

    flexibility and control were key. Soon

    after, the former INSEAD MBA

    classmates came up with the idea of

    creating a pool of experienced,

    independent consultants.

    Six years later, turnover of the

    company is over 10 million and it

    has delivered more than 300

    projects. The firm has grown by morethan 80 per cent per year. It now has

    24 full-time staff and around 200

    freelance consultants, making it the

    second biggest strategy consulting

    company in London after McKinsey.

    Trends and opportunity

    As with many other businesses,

    Eden McCallums evolution was

    based on the benign convergence of

    a number of factors. In hindsight, a

    Ma

    king the firmflexibleHow companies operate has been established over twocenturies. Is it possible for a firm to break the established

    rules of organisation? Eden McCallumdid just that.

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    Business Strategy Review Spring 2007 2007 The Author | J ournal compilation 2007 London Business School 73

    lot of things came together at once,

    explains McCallum. First and

    foremost we wanted to create a

    business. So, we looked at the

    marketplace in a business we knew:

    management consulting. And we saw

    a couple of major trends the

    maturing of the consulting market,and professional people wanting to

    take more control of their careers.

    These then led us into our unique

    business model. And in creating this

    business, we also ended up coming

    up with an entirely new organisation

    model. Business innovation begets

    management innovation.

    The first change was the maturing

    of the management consulting

    market, with clients seeking more

    control and value in their consulting

    spend. The dominance of the bigplayers in the business was and is

    largely unquestioned. It has

    spawned an entire generation of

    companies and senior executives

    who are comfortable with the notion

    and value of management

    consulting. They are aware of its

    potential value to the business. In

    the past, companies hired top

    consulting firms to tap into their

    bright, business-school-educated,

    minds. With MBA graduates and

    former strategy consultants now

    commonplace among the senior

    echelons of multinational firms,

    there is a resistance to formulaic

    consulting products and neatly

    packaged solutions. Instead,

    companies want consulting advicethat is genuinely tailored to their

    situations. Companies are

    sophisticated buyers. They can pick

    and choose and shape. Clients want

    the same flexibility as consultants,

    says Eden.

    The second trend Eden McCallum

    happily tapped was among

    consultants themselves. Many

    consultants were bitten by the new

    economy bug and left consulting

    firms in search of entrepreneurial

    excitement and the opportunity tomake a lot of money. When the new

    economy fizzled from rocket to damp

    squib, many one-time consultants

    had reassessed what they wanted out

    of their careers and were loathe to

    re-enter the corporate world on the

    same terms as before. At the time

    when Eden McCallum began life,

    many experienced consultants were

    contemplating their next career

    moves. At one point everyone

    wanted to be partners, then they all

    wanted to be entrepreneurs, recalls

    Eden. The dot-com thing created

    demand for flexibility. People left

    their traditional careers and then

    didnt come back.

    At an operational level, too, Eden

    McCallum recognized anopportunity. Large consulting firms

    typically focused on high-level board

    issues at FTSE 50 companies. For

    their part, client companies often

    wanted continued consulting support

    on specific strategic issues or

    implementation but were put off by

    continuing high costs. Eden

    McCallum offered a market-breaking

    alternative: consultants with the

    same high-level skills and rigorous

    approach at approximately half the

    cost. After the dot-com crash, thiscombination of quality at lower cost

    was particularly alluring as many

    firms had scaled down their

    consulting budgets.

    Innovative solutions

    Eden McCallums proposition was

    simple but scary: a consulting firm

    without any consultants on the

    payroll and without any proprietary

    methodologies. Instead, they

    Liann Eden and Dena McCallum: flexible friends

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    would employ consultants on a

    contract basis as demanded by their

    clients, and they would use whatever

    methodologies were appropriate to

    solving their clients problems. As

    one former Bain consultant observed,

    this approach appeared to challenge

    everything consultancies held dear: it

    was like the sky falling in.

    To make this model work, Eden

    McCallum had to rethink many of the

    standard precepts of management

    thinking:

    Tailor the offering Eden McCallum

    focuses on tailoring the consultants

    experience, skills and personalities

    to the clients needs. The firm makes

    it clear that it is not in the business

    of creating its own distinctive

    intellectual capital and that it is

    agnostic when it comes to particularmethodologies, despite the fact that

    novel ideas and tools are the

    lifeblood of most big consulting

    companies. We rely on what our

    consultants bring to the table and let

    our clients choose their preferred

    approach by interviewing and

    selecting the consultants, reflects

    McCallum. Clients want to work

    with a person they trust; they dont

    necessarily want a particular

    methodology. They just want theproject to succeed.

    Outsourcing the delivery channel

    Eden McCallums core delivery

    mechanism is effectively outsourced

    to freelance consultants. On the

    surface, at least, this appears to be a

    dangerous strategy. The company is

    clearly reliant on the quality of the

    service offered by the consultants. To

    make it successful, Eden McCallum

    works hard to ensure the quality of

    these people. Only one in 10

    applicants makes it into the

    companys talent pool. The second

    safety element is that consulting is

    built on relationships rather than

    transactions. Relationships are

    between clients and Eden McCallum,

    and the firm endeavours to retain

    control and oversight over the

    relationship with the client. Says

    Eden: If we structure the project up

    front and we have a long-term

    relationship with the client, then we

    dont have to own the delivery

    mechanism. The keys are trust-based

    relationships, clear problem-

    structuring and careful selection of

    consultants.

    Involve the competitionThe standard

    organisational model is to start small

    with the intention of emulating or

    overtaking an industrys big players

    over time. Not so in the case of Eden

    McCallum. From the start, Eden and

    McCallum were clear that theirlivelihoods, and the future of their

    business, depended on what was

    ostensibly the competition: big-name

    consulting firms. We exist because

    they exist, says Eden. Companies

    like McKinsey, Bain and BCG create

    the market on both the client and

    consultant side.

    Before the firm was launched,

    Eden McCallum began a dialogue

    with the big players in the market.

    This alerted them to the potential ofworking with Eden McCallum rather

    than regarding the company as

    another upstart strategy consulting

    boutique with eyes on their own

    markets. And this symbiotic

    approach has worked. Eden

    McCallum has referred business to

    big-name consulting firms, and they

    have returned the compliment.

    Elevate the process behind the

    networkThe idea of a networked

    organisation is not new. Brokers and

    agents are commonplace. What

    marks out Eden McCallum is that the

    process behind the network is where

    a great deal of the value lies.

    Indeed, in a business without its

    own consultants and without its own

    intellectual property, this is the heart

    of Eden McCallums value-added.

    Consequently, about half of its

    full-time staff are fully employed

    ensuring that its consultants are the

    right people in the right jobs. The

    other half of the full-time staff are

    totally dedicated to developing and

    nurturing client relationships. Our

    full-time employees are either

    working on the supply side so they

    are consultant-facing or on the

    demand side which is client-facing,

    explains McCallum. And it is the

    skills of these individuals, and their

    ability to match top-quality

    consultants with the right projects,

    that define Eden McCallum. Every

    consulting company works hard tomatch its consultants to the right

    projects; reflects Eden, the

    difference is we dont have to worry

    about capacity management, so we

    can always make a good match.

    Initially, to build awareness among

    potential consultants, Eden

    McCallum placed advertisements in

    the Financial Timesand The

    Economist a statement of intent as

    much as anything. The ads

    emphasized that the company waslooking for consultants who were

    independently minded with

    experience in a top consulting firm

    and who had an MBA from a leading

    business school. These basic

    recruitment benchmarks remain in

    place. In addition, Eden McCallum

    consultants are evaluated against

    five core competencies, their CVs are

    screened, all references are checked,

    and they go through multiple rounds

    of partner interviews. The people

    who recruit the consultants are,

    themselves, former consultants who

    understand the dynamics and

    demands of the business.

    Eden observed that m any strategy consultants, particularly in the

    dot-com era, w ere reassessing w hat they w anted from their w ork

    and exibility and control w ere key.

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    When they actually go to work,

    Eden McCallum puts two to three

    consultants from its talent pool in

    front of a client. The client then

    evaluates with whom they think they

    would work best. On the completion

    of projects there is an extensive

    feedback process focused on the

    individual consultants and Eden

    McCallums performance. Big

    consulting firms put forward a team

    and the client generally doesnt have

    a say about who is on it, says

    McCallum. Because our clients are

    involved in choosing the consultants

    they work with, they have a vestedinterest in making it work with those

    people.

    Redefine the em ployment

    relationship Eden McCallums

    network of consultants are not

    employees in a traditional sense, nor

    are they entirely freelance

    contractors. They lie somewhere in

    between: they have considerable

    loyalty to Eden McCallum, and they

    get most of their work from thecompany, but they define their own

    terms of engagement. This includes

    choosing which sectors they will

    accept projects in, how many days

    per week and how many months per

    year they work, the logistics around

    travel and many other elements as

    well. We are constantly putting

    together a new puzzle for each

    project, explains Eden. To be sure,

    this arrangement requires constant

    balancing to keep everyone happy,

    and it is not for everyone. But, by

    letting their consultants choose their

    own terms of employment, Eden

    McCallum has a much more

    dedicated and committed workforce

    than would have been possible with

    a traditional hierarchical

    organisation structure.

    Create transparency Eden McCallum

    works very hard on creating

    transparency in its management

    model so that everyone knows where

    he or she stands. This ensures that

    there is a good relationship between

    network members and avoids the

    sense that some people may begetting favourable treatment ahead

    of others.

    One complication lies in financial

    arrangements. To avoid this, Eden

    McCallum is very open about its fee

    structure. For around 100 of its

    consultants, the firm is their main

    source of income. Another 100 work

    on about one project a year. Initially,

    fees were put forward by the

    consultants. Then the company tried

    to allow clients to determine fees.Now, how much consultants are paid

    depends on a banding system in

    which consultants are paid

    according to their seniority and

    consulting skills.

    Another common concern in

    network organisations is how the

    available work gets shared. So the

    firm tries to be clear about the likely

    levels of demand for people with

    different skills sets. It is about

    calibrating expectations, says Eden.

    Were honest with consultants we

    dont anticipate using a lot. We tell

    them that we anticipate using them

    once a year. Our interviews actually

    provide great career coaching for

    them and the network offers them a

    lot of information. Often they will tell

    us what their targets are in terms of

    working with us. Some will work for

    six months and then go travelling or

    do something else others are

    working full-time on back-to-back

    projects. There is no exclusivity in

    the relationship.

    Reinventing the firm

    Eden McCallums experiences helpto shed light on the age-old

    question: What is the real raison d

    tre of the firm? In an era of

    outsourcing and virtual working,

    what are the minimum few things

    that the firm has to do to justify its

    existence?

    The answer is three things. First,

    the Eden McCallum brand

    represents a particular value

    proposition to its clients and its

    consultants, and for the founders akey part of their job is to continue to

    nurture and sustain that value

    proposition. Second, Eden McCallum

    is a nexus of relationships: it gains

    value from the social capital that

    builds up over time in that set of

    relationships. And third, it is a

    mechanism for structuring the work

    and managing projects. These are, in

    essence, the core competences of

    Eden McCallum and are the things

    the company has to sustain as it

    grows and evolves.

    Eden M cCallum s experiences help to shed light on the age-old

    question: W hat is the real raison dtre of the rm ?

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    The 20 top executives of the

    business group held an off-site in a

    windowless room in London at the

    end of 2003. They developed a clear

    agenda for growing the business,

    and then they started looking into

    the blockers, the things that were

    standing in the way of the growth

    agenda. The usual suspects were all

    there centralized structures and

    processes, not enough scope for

    initiative taking and budgeting. As

    Stadelmann notes, Why do we do

    the budgeting process when we arelooking for growth? Budgeting is

    highly defensive. It is not just

    cumbersome, it is fundamentally

    against growth. It is about

    negotiating down the targets that are

    proposed by the centre. And it

    causes people to talk about

    numbers, not about clients and

    market opportunities.

    Ziegler takes an even more

    emotive position: The old budgeting

    process was basically aboutwithholding information. I go in to

    the process arguing that I can make

    30 per cent less than what I think I

    can; and my boss pushes for 30 per

    cent more than he thinks I can do.

    Then we have some kind of a

    bazaar and the one who can

    negotiate more convincingly wins.

    How does this help us achieve our

    growth targets in any way?

    Out with the old

    Following the off-site, a workinggroup was set up for enabling and

    driving growth, with the abolition of

    the budgeting process as one topic

    on the agenda. This was easier said

    than done, however. The process

    could not just be thrown out without

    replacing it with something; client

    advisors still needed to be motivated

    to grow the business.

    And most tricky of all, there were

    no role models for UBS to follow. A

    Swedish bank Svenska

    Handelsbanken had pioneered a

    no-budgeting model back in the

    1970s, so a couple of UBS

    executives took a trip up to

    Stockholm to compare notes. But as

    Ziegler recalls, It was not what we

    thought it would be. Handelsbanken

    were in different business models.

    So we could not learn as much as we

    had expected.

    Were they aware of the Beyond

    Budgeting Round Table, a UK-based

    group that had been looking atalternatives to budgeting since the

    mid-1990s? Stadelmann is almost

    apologetic in his response: No, this

    was not driven from a theoretical

    angle at all. This was driven by pure

    business logic if we want growth,

    then budgeting gets in the way of

    what we are trying to create.

    Interestingly, UBS (the parent

    company) had been part of the

    Beyond Budgeting group until 2002.

    So while there was some awarenessof the round tables activities, it was

    not a primary driver of UBS Global

    WM&BBs initiative.

    In with the new

    The new model was built from the

    ground up, and according to the

    particular needs of the UBS Global

    WM&BB business in all countries

    except the US, which wasnt part of

    this business group at that time.

    Rather than comparing the

    performance of client advisors with abudget number, Stadelmann and his

    team evaluated them against

    themselves (their previous years

    results) and against their peers. As

    he explains, We set up a carefully

    formulated internal benchmark. We

    defined various clusters within the

    bank to make sure we were

    comparing apples with apples. We

    created monthly measures of actual

    performance on the usual criteria

    revenues, net new money,

    cost/income ratio. And then we

    ranked all the desks (groups of

    client advisors) in the cluster. In

    essence, we created performance

    league tables, and we made the

    results available for everyone to see.

    The league tables were designed

    to serve two purposes. The first was

    to fuel the competitive instincts of

    the client advisors and to push them

    to deliver higher levels of

    performance than they would have

    ever done under a traditionalbudgeting process. The desks

    ranking was fed into the annual

    bonus process.

    The second function of the league

    tables was, paradoxically, about

    encouraging higher levels of

    cooperation between desk heads. As

    Ziegler explains, We use these

    results to drive our coaching and

    best-practice transfer processes. We

    are a learning organisation, and the

    primary purpose of the forcedranking is to help us to improve.

    Why would desk heads choose to

    share their success formula with

    their peers? Isnt it like asking

    Chelsea Football Club to reveal its

    secrets to Manchester United?

    Stadelmann laughs at the analogy.

    Actually, no, it isnt. There are two

    key differences. First, this is not a

    zero-sum game: if we all do better,

    we all make more money. And

    second, bonuses are not calculated

    on a formula yes, results are thebiggest single component, but we

    also factor in all the soft stuff,

    including coaching skills, openness

    to sharing, and so forth.

    But we are not so naive,

    Stadelmann continues, to think

    these discussions will happen

    spontaneously. We know a

    competitive system is likely to create

    competitive behaviours that go

    against our philosophy. So we

    O ne issue that every big-com pany m anager can agree on isthat the annual budgeting process is an enorm ous waste of

    tim e and effort.

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    have had to institutionalize a set

    of processes for coaching and best-

    practice improvement. Every week,

    the desk heads get together to share

    their experiences. It is a sales

    meeting of sorts, but with a strong

    coaching element. And every month,

    there is a meeting of the desk heads

    in a cluster where the league table

    results are compared. People talk

    about what has made them

    successful or why they are lagging.And this process is repeated up the

    ladder to business sectors, business

    units, business areas, and even at

    the executive committee level.

    There is no naivet about bonuses

    either. The annual performance

    evaluation also includes a quality

    component: is this individual willing

    to pass on his knowledge, to help out

    with the development of other

    colleagues? This evaluation is made

    at all levels from executivecommittee level down to the

    individual client advisor.

    One further point of clarification is

    in order: no budgeting does not

    mean there are no estimates of

    future performance. Marcel Rohner,

    deputy Group CEO and CEO Global

    WM&BB, needs to have his finger on

    the pulse of the business, and he

    needs to know how the results are

    shaping up over the coming months.

    As Karin Wyss, head of planning in

    UBS Global WM&BB, observes, Westill have to plan: there is a system

    of high-level rolling forecasts for the

    next five quarters. Ziegler adds,

    These are best-estimates only,

    performed by a small group of

    central people, and for the

    executives only to discuss future

    options otherwise this would be

    considered a hidden budget. But it is

    remarkable how accurate these

    estimates are.

    Putting the new systemin place

    The new system represents a massive

    change for employees across the

    bank. How was it implemented?

    Wyss explains: First, the new modelwas demonstrably better than the old

    one. Second, we engaged in a huge

    communication effort, led from the

    top by Marcel Rohner. We had to

    show this was not just the flavour of

    the month, so we had a series of

    roadshows across the bank, using

    Alingi, the winning UBS-sponsored

    Americas Cup yacht, to evoke

    images of teamwork and flexibility.

    And third, we rolled out our leading

    for growth seminar across the bank,which gave senior managers a

    language and a rationale for the

    change of paradigm. UBS Global

    WM&BB also invested in a state-of-

    the-art management information

    system that was just coming online

    in 2004, making it possible to create

    the detailed and transparent league

    tables that are needed for the new

    model to work.

    The abolition of budgeting was, of

    course, part of a broader shift in the

    culture of UBS Global WM&BB ashift towards greater levels of

    personal accountability and

    entrepreneurial leadership across the

    bank. For the first time, desk heads

    were free to hire new people and

    increase their marketing spend

    without having budgeted for them.

    And as Ziegler recalls, it took some

    time for this new level of

    accountability to sink in. Some desk

    heads would still call head office to

    ask for permission to invest in a

    marketing campaign.

    The changes also led to a new role

    for the controllers department in the

    corporate centre. Rather than spend

    all their time monitoring behaviour

    and performance, they became morelike an in-house consultancy. As

    Karin Wyss explains, My job today

    is to support the business rather

    than monitor its performance. We

    have a sophisticated Intranet system

    for comparing performance across

    markets, we share ideas, and this

    helps us to understand why some

    markets are stronger than others.

    And what about the overall results

    of UBS Global WM&BB? Has the

    abolition of budgeting helped? Theresults are certainly at record levels

    in 2005 UBS Global WM&BB

    achieved profits before taxes of more

    than 6.6 billion Swiss Francs,

    compared to just 4.4 billion in

    2003. But as Ziegler points out, It

    is difficult to say how much of this

    has come from the performance

    management system. What is clear,

    though, is that the new system had a

    very positive impact on the

    atmosphere in the bank. As

    Stadelmann comments,Discussions on the sales process

    are of a much higher quality than

    before. We spend our time

    discussing clients and market

    opportunities, rather than

    negotiating figures.

    W hy would desk heads choose to share their success form ula

    w ith their peers? Isnt it like asking Chelsea Football Club to

    reveal its secrets to M anchester U nited?

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    Design is the height of

    corporate chic. It is endorsed

    by management gurus as the

    new thing. Car advertisements

    feature designers rather than

    glamorous men and women. Peopleknow who Tom Ford is. Design

    superheroes, such as Alberto Alessi

    and Philippe Starck, glitter on the

    pages of magazines. Their Midas

    touch is applied to everything from

    kettles to hotels.

    But, in the business world at

    least, the suspicion is that the

    current gushing enthusiasm for

    design is as superficial as was the

    manage