logistic support in vietnam monography 9.pdf

7/28/2019 logistic support in vietnam monography 9.pdf

1/68

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

FROM:

AUTHORITY

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

AD877967

Approved for public release; distribution isunlimited. Document partially illegible.

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agenciesonly; Administrative/Operational Use; 15 DEC1970. Other requests shall be referred toAssistant Secretary of Defense (Installationsand Logistics), Attn: OASD (I&L) SD,

Washington, DC 20301. Document partiallyillegible.

asd-rd ltr, 20 jun 1974


2/68

\J LOGISTICSUPPORTINTHEVIETNAMERAtCO

ONOGRAPH 9 00 EXCESSESAREPORTBYTHEJOINTLOGISTICSREVIEWBOARD

' ' - ' - - u m


3/68

THIS DOCUMENT IS BESTQUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPYFURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINEDA SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OFPAGES WHICH DO NOTREPRODUCE LEGIBLYo


4/68

. p-^

Itefls s

MMAUMtOftlAH letWK

OFFICEOFTHEASSISTANTSECRETARYOFD2FSNSSWASHINGTON,O.C. 2 0 2 0 1

18 E C 1 9 7 0

MEMORANDUMFOR THE DIRECTOR,DEFENSE DOCUMENTATIONCENTERSUBJECT:oint Logistics Review BoardReportIti s requestedthat the attached three volumes,eighteenmonographs andfiveclassified appendixes,which comprise thesubject report,be made availablefor distribution through your center toU.S.Governmentagencies.he fol-lowing distribution statementi s provided a srequired byDepartmentofDefenseDirective 5200.20 dated2keptember 1970,subject:DistributionStatementson Technical Documents:"

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT "B"Distribution limited to U.S.Government agencies only;thereport containsdetailed staff advice,opinions andrecom-mendations prepared for use by logistics managers;state-ment applied 15 December 1970.ther requests for thisdocument must be referred to the Office oftheAssistantSecretary ofDefense(Installations and Logistics) ATTN:QASD(I&L)S D .

Enclosures( 2 6 )As stated

PAULH .RIL5YjJfcputy AssistantSecretaryofDof^T(S upp l y ,^inten-nco& Sorvices)


5/68

laohrensa-.,- ) TABLEOFCONTENTS

PageLISTOFABLES iiLISTOFIGURES

I. INTRODUCTION1 .ASISORTUDY2.IGNIFICANCE3.TUDYOBJECTIVES4.COPE5 .RGANIZATIONOFONOGRAPH

II . GENERALESCRIPTION1 .ISTORICALEVELOPMENT2.URRENTRGANIZATIONNDROCEDURES3 .URRENTTUDIES 1

III .IETNAMXCESSES 31 .ENERAL 5 2.RMYEXCESSES 5 3 .AVYXCESSES 9 4.ARINEORPSEXCESSES1 5 .IRORCEXCESSES 4 6.UMMARYOFAUSESOFXCESSESND THEIRREVENTION 67.ONCLUS IONSNDRECOMMENDATIONS8

IV.ORLDWIDEXCESSES 31.NTRODUCTION 5 2.COPEF ORLDWIDEXCESSES5 3.OTALUMULAT IVEXCESSES74.ESULTSOFHEODTIL IZATIONND DISPOSALROGRAM ,Y4HROUGHY9 75 .ROBLEMREASOFURRENTORGANIZA - TIONSNDROCEDURES76.EWEVELOPMENTS 4 7.ONCLUS IONSNDRECOMMENDATIONS5 V. SUMMARY 71.VERVIEW 9 2.IETNAMXCESSES 0 3.ORLDWIDEXCESSES 1

APPENDDC. PAC IF ICTIL IZATIONNDEDISTRI -BUTIONGENCYQUICK-FDC"ON-CURRENTCREENINGROCEDURES -1 APPENDDC. ALTERNATE PROPOSEDCREENING SYSTEM FORVERSEASXCESSES...-1APPENDIX. LISTFCRONYMSANDBBREVIA-TIONS -1

APPEND IX. BIBL IOGRAPHY


6/68

PMCIDIIOtMLANK.N0TIIMBD

LISTOFTABLES Page

1 .UMMARYOFROBLEMSNTILIZATIONFAVAILABLEMATERIELNHEEPARTMENTOFEFENSE 02.ATERIELTILIZATIONROGRAM1 3.ATERIELTILIZATIONROGRAM ECHANIZED SCREENINGROGRAMEPORTING,PROJECTLUS 2

i

nt


7/68

Pra tCHKHJAQ1LUOCNOTI IMSD

LISTOFFIGURES Page

1 .ENTRALIZED ECHANIZEDCREENING SYSTEMPLUS)2.ROGRAMNHE PACIFICREAORHEUTILIZATIONNDDISTRIBUTIONFXCESS MATERIEL 03.TRATIFICATIONFODUPPLYYSTEMNVEN-TORYNCLUDINGTOCKUNDY0-FY964.ODTILIZATIONNDDISPOSALROGRAMS-

TOTALTILIZATIONNDISPOSAL8 5.ATERIELTILIZATION PROGRAM9

A-l. PURAONUSCP/DLSCCREENA-5B-l. PROPOSEDENTRALIZEDTILIZATION REDISTRIBUTIONGENCY B-5


8/68

PWCTDIAG1UHK-NOT I IMBD

CHAPTERINTRODUCTION


9/68

FmcsDvaA SSUNK-NOTTUOD

CHAPTERINTRODUCTION

1.ASISORTUDY , TheointLogisticsReviewBoardJLRB )waschargedwithexaminationof logisticu p p o r ttoU .S .orcesduringtheVietnamera. TheBoard'sTermsofReferencespecifiedthat"...particularattentionwill edirectedto...identification,processinganddis-positionofexcessandsurplusstocks." 1 Excessstocksarethequantitiesofanitemnhandha t exceedtheauthorizedretentionlevel faDepartmentof DefenseDOD)omponent . Sur p l u sstocksaretemsno trequiredby anyFederalagency,includingDOD,asdeterminedby theGen-eralServicesAdministrationGSA) .2.IGNIFICANCE

a.hismonographaddressesexcessesgeneratedinSEAsiaasaresultof theVietnam conflict,andsystemsandproceduresfortheredistributionandutilizationofexcessesworld-wide.ntheSEAsiacontext,excessesarematerielandequipmentshippedintoVietnam,ornt ootherPacificbasesforu p p o r tof operationsinVietnam,whichsubsequentlyaredeterminedt obeexcess.llinterserviceandintraservicetransfersareincludedwithintheWesternPacific(WESTPAC)areawithheexceptionofintraserviceransferswithinVietnam. Underhisdefi-nition,heServiceshavedentifiedover$1billionof excessmateriel,of whichignificantpor-tionshave eenredistributedforusenVietnamandhePacificheater. moreormaldefini-tionhas eenusedwhenaddressingexcessesonaworldwidebasis:xcessesarematerielha t exceedsauthorizedretentionlevels.

b.xcessstocksareignificantintwoareasof militarylogistics:(1 )hedeliveryof unnecessarymaterieloacombatareaconsumesogisticre-sourcese.g.,personnel,MHE ,andstoragepace)hatareurgentlyneededofulfillheegiti-materequirementsof theoperatingforces.(2 )hepotentialu rcostreductionthroughtheeliminationofprocurementactionsandmureefficientutilizationu fdistributionresources.

c.hedentificationandanalysisu fthefactorsthatcreateexcessesarenecessarytode-termineheogisticmanagementactionsrequiredtoreduceexcessestuaminimum.nhisre-gard,excessesc anbeclassifiedasnormalandabnormal.(1 )ormalExcesses. Certainypesu fexcessesaccruebecauseofobsolescenceandth enpredictablena tureofwarfareandcannotbeavoided. Technologicaldevelopmentsand

changesnpolicies,plans,forcedeployments,expenditurerates,andenemyactivityallaffecttheeconomicalprovisionu fthep r upe rmaterielattherightplaceandattheighttime. Anac-curatedeterminationcannotbemadeastoth epercentageu fthist y p eofexcessototalexcesses.Anotherfactorhatcreatesunavoidableexcessessth eengthandrelativenflexibilityof the materielpipeline. Forexample,ongeadimesassociatedwithrequisitioningandprocurementmayresultnmaterieldeliverymonthsafterheequirementhasbeenreducedoreliminated.

(2)bnormalExcess. Thist y p eofexcess,generatedbynadequatecontrolovermovementof materleT,ackofrequisitioningdiscipline,andpoorvisibilityoftockson-hand,c anbeavoided. Preventionof avoidableexcessessaresponsibilityof everycommander. Theidentificationofhepracticesoractorsthatontr ibutedt othegenerationofabnormalexcessestrVietnamwillacilitateu t u r emprovementsnlogisticmanagement .'mittl\Mrtir\ lMrnj*\M'mo:tmhtn


10/68

EXCESSES3. STUDYOBJECTIVES. Therear ef iveobjectivesofthisstudy:

a.dentifythemagnitudeandt ypesof excessesgeneratedinSEAsiabytheVietnamcon-flict.b.dentifythecausesoftheseexcesses.c .nalyzeactionstakenbytheServicestoreduceorprecludeexcessesandtoredistribute andutilizematerielidentifiedasexcessinSEAsia.d.xamineworldwideDepartmentof Defenseproceduresandorganizationsfortheredis-tributionandutilizationof excessmateriel.e.ecommendth eactionsnecessarytoreduceexcessesinany f u tureconflict .

4- SCOPE. Theprimaryf o cusofthemonographisonexcessesdirectly attributabletoth ewarinVietnam.eportsfromth eServicesandfromth eCommander,U.S.MilitaryAssistanceCommand,Vietnam(MACV),haveprovidedth eprimaryinputsforanalyzingtheextent oftheseexcessesas wellasthecausesandcorrect iveactionstakenbytheServicestominimizeex-cesses.henaddressingbothSEAsiaandworldwideexcesses,U t estudyeffortincludesan examinationof th eredistributionandutilizationofidentifiedexcessesbu tdoesnotconsiderop -erationsoftheproperty disposalsystemoritsrelationship tootherprogramsandagencies,suchasth eMilitaryAssistance rogramorth eAgencyforInternationalDevelopment. 5 .RGANIZATIONOFMONOGRAPH .n additiontothisintroduction,themonographisor-ganizedintofouradditionalchapters:

a.hapterI I briefly describesthehistoryof excessesinpreviousmilitaryoperationsand outlinesthedevelopmentof theorganizationsandproceduresinvolvedintheredistributionand utilizationof excesses.b.hapterI I IexaminesexcessesgeneratedbytheVietnamconflict .heexcessesdirectly relatedtocombatoperationsar equantified,causesar eidentified,andactionstakenbyth eServicestou setheexcessesonhandandtoreduceorprecludefurtheraccretion ar ecited. c.hapterI V addressesDepartmentofDefenseprogramsforth eredistributionandut i -lizationofidentifiedexcesses,lessproperty disposalactions.rimaryemphasisisconcentratedonchangesinth esizeoftheprogramandth eproceduresusedduringFY 64 throughFY 69 .d.hapterV providesanoverviewof th eentiremonographandsummarizesthesignificant lessonslearnedandrecommendationsdevelopedbyth et udy .


11/68

WBCIDDOAMLUOUNOrFIUBD

CHAPTERIIGENERALDESCRIPTION


12/68

CHAPTERIIGENERALDESCRIPTION

1 .ISTORICALDEVELOPMENTa.xcesseshavealwaysbeengeneratedbylargescalemilitaryoperations.hemagni-tudeofWorldWarI Iandit sabruptendingfoundthemilitary withtremendousamountsofmate-rielthatweresurp lustoanyforeseeableneedsoftheGovernment. newapproachwasdevel-opedtodisposeoftheunneededpropertythroughth ereationoltheWarAssetsAdministration(WAA). Asidefrommaterielplacedinreserveagainstf u turecontingencies,th eWAA redistrib-uted,sold,orotherwisedisposedofthebulkofsurp lu smaterielgeneratedbyWorldWarII .H istoricalrecordsindicatethatatleast$5 0billionworthofsurp lu sproperty wasdisposedof followingthiswar.hesmallersue,shorterduration,andgradualendingofth eKoreanWarpermittedthereductionof thequantitiesofsurp lusmaterieIs,althoughtherewereexcesses

totaling$1 2billion. 1gain,majorportionsofth eresiduewereplacedinwarreservesand'h eremainingsurp lu swasdisposedofthroughexistingServicedisposalorganizations.b.nordertoincreasetheutilizaiionof excessmateriel,theInterserviceSupplySupport Program(ISSP)wascreatedbyDODDirect ive41 40 . 6inJuly955 . Thisprogramattemptedtoobtaingreaterutilizationof availablematerielwithinandamongthemilitary departments.he ISSP requiredamilitaryservicetoascertainif otherknownusershadanitemor anacceptable subs t i tu teavailableforitsu sepriortoinitiatingprocurementoftheitem.n December955 th eServicesagreedonthepolicies,responsibilities,andorganizationalframeworkfortheISSP.Thisoriginalagreementwassubsequently amendedtoprovideforth eestablishment ofth eArmedForcesSupplySupportCenter(AFSSC)nJuly958toadministerth eISSP andtodevelop proceduresforitsoperation.oimprovetheeffectivenessofAFSSC,OSDdirectedtheServices inJanuary959to exchangeinformationonquantitiesofi temsthatwereavailablefortransfer. Thissystemfor th etransferandu seof availablematerielwaslaterdesignatedasth eDefenseMaterielUtilizationProgram.

2 .CURRENTORGANIZATIONA ND PROCEDURESa.oleoftheDefenseSupplyAgency .heDefenseSupplyAgency(DSA)wasestablished in961by DODDirect ive5105.22.heAFSSCwasplacedunderDSA andwasredesignatedth eDefenseLogist icsServicesCenterHim,uti|*t-t: jlttt/al t t inmiH*Mim>HitHn>lI 'vMMrrn-lin ihrI'arihrArra.Hi^wt t .UNan.ara. 'tmmlrr'"7.


13/68

EXCESSES

3o tr .i f t tn -o 2y

zop5 5 Li

t

w h CO c o O2 w CO QwN Xuw SQu N J


14/68

EXCESSESb.copeofUtilization . Thebulkof potentialexcessanddeclaredexcessinterserviceredistributionisaccomplishedbetweenth eServicesbyIC Pmanagersasaresultofdirect interrogation. DuringFY 69 ,PLUSwasresponsibleformatching$26millionoftheestimated$290millionof potentialexcesstosuppl ysystemt o cksthatwereredistributedandformatch-ing$1 9millionoftheestimated$268millionof declaredexcessesthatwereredistributed. Thesei temswere,forthemostpart,highdollari temswhichdidnothaveFederalStockNum-bers(FSNs),andthereforecouldnotbeaccommodatedbyPLUS . Inaddition,intraservice t i-

lizationamountedtoanestimateof $845millionduringFY 69 ,of whichanestimated$208millionwasredistributionof potentialexcessesandanestimated$637millionwasredistributionof declaredexcesses.c .heCentralizedMechanizedScreeningSystem. ReferringagaintoFigure,DLSCusesth eCentralizedMechanizedScreeningSys tem,ProjectPLUS ,toperformtheutilizationandre-distributionfunctionforDODsuppl ysysteminventorys tocksanddeclaredexcesses. ProjectP LUSreceivesaninputofcurrentyear,budgetyear,andbeyondbudgetyearrequirementsfrom ICPsoftheServicesandDSA. Assetsidentifiedasretentions tocksoraspotentialDODexcessesar ereportedtoDLSCatleastsemiannuallybyth eICPs . DLSCscreensth ereportedassetsagainstreportedrequirements;whenamatchismade,anofferissubmittedtotheIC P withth erequirement. TheIC Pscreensth eofferandaccep t sorrejectstheofferbasedoncurrentsupp lys tatus . If accepted,th eIC PinitiatesarequisitiontotheIC Preportingtheexcessmate-riel. Therequisitionisprocessedagainstcurrents tocksand,ifavailable,thematerielsshipped. Ifnot available,therequisitionisdenied. I n additiontohandlingpotentialDODex-cessesandretentions tocks ,DLSCalsohandlesreportabledeclaredexcessesfromtheproperty disposaloff ices(PDOs) . PotentialDODexcesses,afteraperiodof20days,becomedeclaredexcessproperty andar ereportedtoproperty disposaloff ices(PDOs) . Proper tythatisre-portedtoPDOreceivesanadditional80daysofscreeningbyth e LU Ssystem. d.aci ficUtilization andRedistributionAgency(PURA)andMaterielAssetRedistribution Center,EuropeMARCE)

(1)heorganizationschargedwiththeutilizationanddispositionofexcessesingeographicareasar eth ePaci ficUtil izationRedistributionAgency( PURA)andtheMateriel AssetRedistributionCenter,EuropeMARCE).(2)heSecretaryof Defenseappointedth eA irForceastheexecu t iveagentforex-cessredistributioninEurope. MARCE,whichhadbeenorganizedbyth eA irForcen966to

assistinth erelocationof assetsfromFrance,wasdesignatedtoperformheredistributionfunctionforal lServicesinEurope.(3)URAnd rogramnhe acificrea,UtilizationndRedistribution of ExcessMaterielPURM) ,wereestablishedinNovember967. Theprogramwasdesignedto giveintensivemanagement emphasistoth eidentification anddispositionof excessmaterielthathadaccumulatedinWEST^ACactivitiessinceheinitialphaseofth econflict . TheArmywasdesignatedtooperateheprogramandtoserviceallDODorganizationsinth ePaci f i c . PURA becamefully operationalinJuly968. AschematicoftheURAsystemforredistributionof excessesisshowninFigure2.

e.urrentURAProcedures. TheprocedurestartswithWESTPACactivities-orURA part i c ipants-submi t t ingServiceInterestReportstoPURAfori temstheymaywanttorequisi- tion. Theactivitiesalsoreportal lmaterielabovetheirauthorizedretentionleveltoPURAonForeignExcessCards.namonthlybasis,URAmatchesth eServicenterestReportsagainst reportedexcessesthroughoutthegeographicarea,andthematchesar epublishedonanavail-abilitylistlorparticipants . Requisit ionsar esubmittedtoURAbasedonavailabilitylistingsandreferralsar emadetoth eholdingactivitywithth eexcessuntilthequantityofstockreported isdepleted. ThenominationsfortheArmyandNavyareheld30 daysbyURAforintraservice screeningbeforebeingmatched. TheA irForce,inadditiontopartic ipatingintheURApro-gram,establishedth e acificA irForceAssetRedistributionCenterPARC)orit sownintra-serviceexcessutilizationscreening. TheMarineCorpsp lacesit smaterielaboveauthorizedretentionintoPURAforimmediatecreening. Thes tocksreportedtoPURAarethenscreened9


15/68

EXCESSES

s

s

oCM

Z0tn c ii iQ2xoli.u

0 )

DZ8

J

0 )

tSitfll

z'2 fc lS i 5 1

z z22tin1I

8 3

8OQ Id

1 0


16/68

EXCESSESfora90-dayperiodbeforeURA notifiestheparticipatingactivitythatthetocksarenote-quiredinWESTPAC. PotentialexcessescanthenbereportedbytheparticipatingactivitytoitscontinentalnitedStatesCONUS)CPwhereheyarereviewedagainstServiceandICPrequire-ments. IftheassetsarenotrequiredtofillworldwiderequirementsoftheService,theexcessesareeportedtoDLSCforcreeningactiondescribedinparagraph2cfthishapter).3. CURRENTTUDIES

TheDLSC,URA ,andMARCEystemsforheredistributionandutilizationofexcessesarenotoperatingaseffectivelyasdesired. ThetudiesdescribedinChapterVarebeingcon-ductedwiththepurposeofincreasingtheefficiencyofthesesystems.

1 1


17/68

vmcmaoptaBUMWWTmm

CHAPTERIIVIETNAMEXCESSES


18/68

CHAPTERII IVIETNAMEXCESSES

1 . GENERALa.uringlate967,afterheVietnambuilduphadbeenlargelyompleted,excessesbegantoattractseriousattention. In establishinganagencynthePacificareaforheutilizationandredistributionoftheseexcesses,heSecretaryofDefensttatedthat"ThepeedandmagnitudeoftheVietnambuilduphasunavoidablyresultedin theaccumulationofsomembalancesandex-cessesininventories. Wewillbeginimmediatelyoredistributeheseexcessesoastoassuretheirapplicationagainstapprovedmilitaryequirementselsewherenhemilitaryupplyys-tem. Bydoingsoweanavoidthenefficienciesandwasteexperiencedin thepast."* ThischapterpresentshecopeftheexcessesidentifiedinthePacificreaandin Vietnam,hecausesoftheseexcesses,andtheactiontakenbyheServicesoredistributeordisposeoftheexcessesaswellasrecommendationsfortheeductionofavoidableexcessesnfutureonflicts.b.btainingmeaningfuldataon thecopeofexcessescausedbyheVietnamWarwasdif-ficultasthereareoreportsthatprovideinformationon thetotalumulativevalueofexcessesidentified. ThereportsofthePacificUtilizationandRedistributionAgencyPURA)annotbe usedforthepurposeofquantifyingthevalueof excessescausedbytheVietnamWarbecausethereportsncludexcessesreportedtoURA thatwerenotattribuUbleothewar.ntheotherhand,alargepartoftheexcessescausedbyhewarreoteportablehroughURA ;orex-ample,URA doesnoteceiveexcessesthatarepeculiartooaeService.therproblemsen-counteredndeterminingthecopefexcesseswerehateliableecordswereotavailablefortheperiod96 5through96 6andthatheServicesusedifferentcriteriafordeterminingwhichpartoftheirtotaltockisexcess. Theexcessesdiscussedinthischapterarehemate-rielandequipmentthatwerehippedtoVietnamortootherPacificbasesforthesupportof operationsinVietnamndsubsequentlybecameexcess. However,tshouldbeemphasizedthattheexcessesasdefinedandreportedarenotnecessarilyexcesstotheworldwideequirement

oftheeportingServiceortotheDepartmentofDefense.hispointisillustratedbytheactthatapproximatelytwo-thirdsofexcessesgeneratedasaresultoftheVietnamonflictnViet-namndthePacificareawereubsequentlyutilizedbyheDepartmentofDefense.pproxi-matelyone-thirdoftheotalvalueofexcessesidentifiedhasbeendisposedofthroughpropertydisposalhannels.c.nanalysisofthelassesofmaterielandequipmenteportedasexcessrevealsthatClassesIIgeneraluppliesandclothing),Vconstructionandbarricademateriel),andIX (repairparts)ontainedtheargestvaluesofexcesses. Manyfhetemsntheseategoriesareubjectoiargeluctuationsndemand,andplanningfactorsusedoestimateonsumptionratesforheautomaticupplyphaseofaonflictmaybeexpectedtoequiremajoradjustmentsastheesultofactualwarexperiences.

2- ARMYXCESSES a. ScopefArmyExcesses

(1 ) ExcessesreportedyheArmy2ncludehosedentifiednVietnam.Okinawa,andapan. PrioroFebruary967,OkinawaprovidedupplyupportorouthVietnam.*SeerelarvfVfcnse,Memorandum,ubjec t : tili/atinndKct t t s t iihutionof KMT*M:ilrrM'!in the PacificArci.toliert.McNanu tn t ,MNovember i 7 .-Ilrjtt^i'tcrs,' .S.Artm.Pacific,HriWintgolltel . UH ,ubject: VietnamKvesses,.M,i\ l;T,'

If )


19/68

EXCESSESSubsequent ly,Vietnamwasuppl ieddirectly fromCONUS. Thischangensupportconceptpro-ducedthefirstsurgeofexcessmaterielwhenOkinawarecomputeditsstocklevelsandwithdrewfromdirectsupportofVietnam. Althoughadditionals tockscontinuedtocomeintoOkinawaafterMarch967becauseof delaysinherentinadjustingtheflowofmaterielfromthepipeline,theseexcessesweresubsequently reducedbyroutingU.S .Army ,Vietnam,requisitionsthroughOki-nawaonafill-or-passbasis. Thevalueofidentifiedexcessesgeneratedbecauseofth echangeinth esupportconceptwasapproximately$114millionthroughtheendof967.

(2)n additiontoth eexcessesidentifiedinOkinawa,th eArmyshippedatotalofap -proximately $440 .7millioninretrogradefromVietnamtoOkinawaandJapan. Partofthisma- terielwasretrogradedintheGreyBoxprogramwhichwastoidentifypackagesinopenstorageareasthathadlosttheiridentitythroughweathering,andfromtheSpaceEaterprogramtoiden-t ifylargebulkyexcess.n bothprograms,th eobjectivewastogeneratespaceforstoragethatwascri ticallyneededfo rthereorganizationof depotstorageareasinordertocompleteanef -fec t i veinventory. Anotherprogramusedbyth eAmytoidentifyexcessesinVietnamwas ProjectCounterI,II ,andIII. Thisprograminvolvedalargescaleinfusionof ArmyMateriel CommandpersonnelonaTDYbasistohelp incompK tinganinventory ofArmydepotsinViet-nam. DuringSeptember968hroughJanuary969 ,anotherprogram, rojectCountI ,wascom-pletedwhichresultedinthefirstperimeter-to-perimeterinventoryofArmydepotsinacombat theater. TheseandotherprogramsidentifiedtheexcessesthatwereretrogradedtoOkinawaandJapan. (3)sof31December969 ,therewere$107.8millionof excessesonhandinViet-naminprocessofscreeningforutilizationorawaitingdispositioninstructions.nJapanand Okinawatherewasanother$67.1millionof excessesonhandinthissamecategory .( 4 )heutilizationoftheArmy ' sexcessesamounted . t c valueof over$414million.Approximately$130millionofth eexcessesidentifiedinJapanor Okinawaweresubsequently reissuedtotheU.S.ArmyinVietnamandapproximately$144 .6millionwereusedtosatisfy otherArmyrequirementsinthePaci fic area.ver$121millionoftheexcesseswerereturned toCONUStosatisfy worldwideArmyrequirements. Thebalance,$18.4million,wenttoothermilitaryservices,Governmentagencies,andtoalliedforcesinVietnam.nly $73millionof thetotalvalueof excessesidentifiedhavebeendisposedofthroughpropertydisposalchannels. (5)ummarizingtheabove,propertyvaluedat$532millionwasidentifiedasexcesstoVietnamrequirements.fthisamount,$284.1millionhasbeenusedtofillotherrequire-

ments,$73millionhasgonetopropertydisposal,and$174.9millionisonhandandinprocessofbeingscreenedforutilization.nadditiontoth eabove,another$130.5millioninexcesses,whichwereretrogradedtoJapanandOkinawaforidentification becauseof alackofspaceand capabilityinVietnam,werenippedbacktoVietnamtofillArmyrequirements .(6)thermajorprogramsthatwereemployedbytheArmytopreventexcessesinVietnamwere rojectStop,Stop/See,andStop/SeeExpanded. ProjectStop wasinitiatedinJune1968toreduceth eflowofsuppliestoVietnamromCONUSsuppl yactivities. ProjectStop re-sultedinrequestsfo rcancellationofrequisitionsandrequestsfo rfrustrationofshipmentsof over$500millioninsuppl iesandequipment. However,owingtu thediff icultyinturningof fth epipeline,only$108.2millionwasactually cancelledorfrustrated. WhenitbecameevidentthatProjectStup wasnotaccomplishingitsobjective,Stop/Sec wasinstitutedon22September968.Thisprogramwastocancel ,frus trate ,ordivertitemsenroutetoVietnamthatwereexcessto requirementsandtoholdselectedbulkyassetsinCONUSthatwereactually requiredbu tcouldnotbereceiveddu etoalack ofstoragespace . Thesecondpartoftheprogram,"See,"ad-dressedtheactualinspectionaboardship andtheturnaroundofi temsarrivingin-countrythatwereexcess. TheStopeeprogramwasexpandedandmodifiedinearly969toincludeblock-ingentireFederalsuppl yclassesbyth eLCOP . Cumulatively , rojectsStop,Stop ee ,andStop/SeeExpandedhaveresultedinthecancellationofrequisitionsvaluedat$305.1millionand frustrationsvaluedat$11.8million.

!6


20/68

.,,.VjOT4pi-t--;--*"'"---* ::''-!i-Vl-;

EXCESSESb.ajorCausesofArmyExcesses

(1)nabriefingtoth eJLRB,th eDepartment ofth eArmyidentifiedth efollowingmajorcausesofexcesses:3(a)hechangeinsupportconceptforVietnaminFebruary967causedex-cessestobeidentifiedinOkinawawhenth eauthorizedstockagelevelsforOkinawawererecom- puted.( b )hepushpackagesthatwerereceivedinVietnamduringth e965-67buildupwerebasedonestimatesthatdidnotmatchVietnamrequirements. Additionally,theavailability of personnelandstoragefacilitieslaggedbehindth ereceip tofsuppl ies .(c )herewasandstillisalackofskilledandqualifiedpersonnelindepot andDSU/GSUoperationsinVietnam.( d )he968cutbackinconstruction reducedrequirements,bu tshipmentscouldnot bestoppedordivertedinal lcases.hestLogisticalCommandstillhas41,000 shorttonsof excessconstructionmaterialsthatar eplannedforredistributionor disposalpriorto30June970.dditionalconstructionmaterialexcessesar ebeingidentifiedinthehandsof contractors .(e)heestablishmentof anausteri tylivingprogramin968furtherreducedrequirementsforcantonmentitems.owever,requisitioningdidnotreflectthisreducedstand-ardasrapidlyasrequiredtostopth eflowof materielfromCONUS.(f)hecargoship t ie-up inlate966 andearly967resultedinth edumpingofcargowhichinmanyinstanceswasneverproperly identifiedandinventoried.onsequently,likei temswerere-requisitionedonCONUSwhenthei temswerealreadyinVietnam.(g)heabsenceof acentralizedstockmanagementagencyinVietnamwasasignificantfac tor .lthoughtheinventory controlcenterwasfinallyestablishedinMarch967,ittookaconsiderableperiodoft imebeforestockrecordduplicationswereeliminatedand effec-t ivefollow-up,cancellation,andreconciliationprocedureswereeffected.

(2)nadditionalcauseofArmyexcessesdeterminedbytheJLRBwasth eclosingofth eArmy' sOverseasSupplyAgencies(OSAs)n964 .saresultoftheapprovalofProject 80 inJanuary962,OSDbySubject / I ssue69 ontheFY964budgetremovedal lfundsfortheOSAs*heArmy wasdirectedtophaseou tth eOSAsandtoabsorbthecostof operationoftheOSAsafter30June963fromotherOperationandMaintenancefunds.4

(a)unct ionsthatwereperformedbytheOSAswererelatedtorequisitioncontrol,broadquantity editingfollow-up onrequisitions,cargomovementcontrol,andoverseasliaison.hesefunct ionswerefragmentedacrossothercommandsandagenciesinSEAsiaand inCONUSaftertheclosingoftheOSAs.(b)heBrownBoard5notedthatth eresponsibility forprovidingsupportto overseasareashadbeenfragmentedbyth elossof theOSAsandrecognizedthattheArmyneededacontrolpointintoandou tofCONUSinsupportof overseasoperations.

' !Hea


21/68

EXCESSES(c ) TheU.S .ArmyMaterielCommandestablishedLogist icsControlOff i ces(LCOs)n1965tocentralizemovementscontrolandtohandleth emaintenanceofcontingency plans. Unfortunately ,theLCO-P didnot havethecapabilitytohandleth eVietnambuildupin1965andit wasnotunti l967thatLCO-P achievedtheoperationaleff ic iencyof theOSAsphasedou tin964 .

c. LessonsLearnedbyth eA rm y ?(1)alancedForceStruc tureCombat/Log). Toprecludemassivegenerationof excessinacombattheateritisabsolutelyessentialthatsufficientlogisticforcesbet ime-phasedearly inaforcebuildup. Thisisnecessaryoensurethatthecombatforces,eitherU.S .or Allied,canbesustainedwithoutamassfloodingofsupp l iesinthecombatareaand/oroffshore areas.hefloodingofsupp l iesthatoccurredinsupportofVietnamactuallyinhibitedeffect iveandefficientlogistic supportinth ecombatareaandwasamajorgeneratorof excesses. I n ad-dition,al llogistic forcebuildupplanningisnegatedifth emajorlogisticunitsar einth eReserveandar enot availableforth ebuildup.(2)ogisticsDoctrine. TheU.S .logisticsdoctrinemustensurethatthenitedStatesprovidenotonlyanef fec t i veandefficientsystemforsendingtherequiredlogistic re-sourcestothecombatareabu talso,asamatterof routine,forthetimelyretrogradeof ex -cessesfromthecombatzone.tisalsomandatorythattheU.S .systembeflexibleenoughto

readilyaccommodatesignificantchangesinacombatsituation.(3)anagementTools.f fec t i vemanagementtoolsmustbeavailablepriortoth edeploymentoflogistic forces,suchasmanualprocedures ,automatedsystems,andappropriatehardwareandsoftwaretomaketh elogisticys temeffect ivelyresponsive. Further,th ehard-wareandsoftwaremustbesufficientlyflexible? idresponsive.(4 )raining.ogisticpersonnelmustbethoroughly trainedintheu seofthesemanagementtoolstoensuretheirthoroughunderstandingandu seinbothpeaceandwar.nadequatelogisticpersonnelandunits t ru c tu re ,includingab. lancedtrainingbasewithCONUSon-the-jobtraining,mustbeestablishedandmaintainedinbothpeaceandwar. TheUnitedStatesmustensurethatU.S .logisticspersonnelar eproperlytrainedtomasterthesys tem.(5 )upp lyManagementSystem.nsupportoflogisticsdoctrineitisessentialthat anArmy worldwidecommonsuppl ymanagementsystembedevelopedwhichwillbefullyre-

sponsivetoth eneedsoftheuserandsuppl ymanagers.hesystemmustbesimpleandef fec -tiveandshouldbestaffedbyadequateprofessionalpersonnel,whohavebeenhistorically diff icult toacquire.heys temmust :(a)imitstockageatunitlevelofastmoving,urgentlyrequiredi temsonly.( b )rovideorminimaltockagein-theatersupportofth ecombatzone.(c )nsuremanagementof unserviceableassets.( d )rovideforrapiddeliveryofrequireditemsdirectlytotheequiredlevelinthecombatzonef r cmCONUSsuppl yources .(e)omputestockageobjectivesbasedonpredictedf u tureonsumptionrather

thanrelyingsolelyonpastdemandhistory. (f)ncludemanagementu lexcessmaterielesponsivetoth erequirementto redistributeexcessesinanexpeditiousmanner.hecurrentURA .FTE,andDLSCreportingproceduresar etooslowandtooinflexibletopermitth eaccelerateddispositionof excesses.'Arm* aterielCommand,(Sencralir*ltT*i \MatwiamiI.u>m*nihrrtitfS.''ll*;uk|u:irt*r!*,.S.ArmvPacificUr tH inu h t* .llJtll,ut i trr t : \MtnamKMI'SM, Ma\ l ' T < .

18


22/68

EXCESSES( g ) EnsureadvancedocumentationonassetsIntransportationchannels. Suchdocumentationmustprovidecompleteintransitvisibilitytothecus tomerandtoth eCONUSs up -p lysource .u chaprocedureisessentialif the"inventory-in-motion"conceptistobeeffec-tivelyusedandwillprecludeconsiderables tocksonth eground,doubleordering,andattendant accumulationof excess.( h ) Provideacentralcontrolagency inCONUScloselyassociatedwithbothsuppl yandtransportationelements,ascurrently existsattheLCO-P .hisagencyisessential

tomaintainintransitcontrolandef fec tcancellationandfrustrationofshipmentsasrequired.Theagencymustbehighly responsivetodirectionfromthetheatercommandertopreclude movementof assetsnolongerrequiredandtoprovideaninterfacebetweenthetheaterof opera-tionsandCONUSsuppl ysources.(6)u roverallDODsystemmustbemoreresponsivetothereturnof excessmate-riel.hecurrentDSA/GSA policyof"allsalesarefinal"pu t stheArmyinthepositionofnot beingabletoreturni temstoth eoriginalsupp lysourceonabulkbasis.nmostinstancesDSA andGSA prefernottotakebacki temsandnormallywillagreetodosoonlyona"nocredit" basis.hisisparticularly significantsinceapproximately73percentof ou rFY 71stock fundbudgetisforDSA/GSAitems.

3. NAVYEXCESSESa.copeof NavyExcesses

(1 )hetotalvalueofPACOM excessesreportedby theNavyasrelatedtosupport of th eVietnamconflictwas$64.28million.bout$43 .7millionwasgeneratedinVietnamand thebalancefromWESTPACstock pointslocatedat Guam,SubicBay,andYokosuka.fthe$43.7million,$20.6millionhadbeenredistributedbytheendof1969tomeetNavyrequirementsoutsideVietnam. $5.2millionhadbeentransferredtoth eothermilitaryservices,$0.2mil-liontootherU.S .Governmentagencies,$0.1milliontotheforcesof othercountries ,and$2.7milliontoproperty disposal. (2)hestockagelistinsupportof theICorpsTact ica lZone(CTZ)wasinitially limitedtoallowancesof th eNavyMobileConstruct ionBattalions(Seabees),th e3.500commonsupportitemsinth eHeadquartersSupportAct iv i tycatalogandthestockagelistsof AdvancedBaseFunctionalComponents,th elatterbeingcalledforwardinphasewiththeestablishmentof capabili t ies.ollowingspecif icrequestsbytheotherServices,theNavalSupportAct iv i ty(NSA),

DaNang,wasalsoauthorizedtoincreaseI tsstockagelistofcommonsuppl yi temsto8,259at theendof967.8henumberof suchi temssubsequentlyroseto1,000.hendemandsdid not materializeaspredicted,thedemandsfortwoormoreServicesforeachitemwereanalyzed andthelistreducedto4 , 931 .hereisnoinformationastotheextentof excessesgeneratedby theinflatedforecastsbecauseearlysuppl yemphasiswasonsupportandemergency actionsto overcomedeficienciesratherthanth eidentification ofexcesses.pecif icdataonexcessesinICTZbeforeFY 68ar enot available. (3)hebuildup hadbeenaccompaniedby anincreaseof Navypecul iarandcommoni temsof05,000bytheendof968.saresult of diminishingrequirementsasmoreforcesweremovedou tof ICTZandanalysesof demandhistory,th elistwasreducedto60,000i temsinSeptember969 ,andlaterto47,000 . BytheendofY69 ,$14.1millioninexcessestoc u r -rentneedshadbeenidentified.bout$20.2millionmorewereidentifiedinFY70intheNavalSupportAct iv i t y(NSA),DaNang,and$21.1millionintheThirdNavalConstruct ionBrigadeop -eratinginICorps. (4 )n summary,theNSA,DaNang,hadanaverageannualinventory valueof $58.9 millionduringth eperiodFY 66throughone-halt ofFY 70 .uringth esameperiodth eaverage

^Commander,ServiceFont.Paeifk* .SummaryfCommandHistory.Sl-31kvrmhrrM ufOKFI IHTK-TIAU. """ 1 9


23/68

EXCESSESannualvalueof saleswasat arateof over$181million.hisshowsanaverageannualinven-toryturnoverratioof betterthan3to.hetotalcumula t ivevalueof excessesgeneratedduringthesameperiodat NSA,DaNang,$20.2million,represents2. 6percentofthetotalsales,$770.2million,forthatsameperiod.9

(5 )nsupport of navaloperationsinU ,ni,andIVCTZ,th elackof adequatestoragespaceresulted inaplanwherebytheNavalSupplyDepot,SubicBay,initiallystockedth erepairpartsforcoastalsurveillance,minesweeping,harbordefense,andriverpatrolcraf t .henc a- pabilitiesbecameadequate,adetermination wasmadetotransfertheses tockstoNSA,Saigon,inAugus t1967,andSubicBay waseliminatedfromth erequisitioningchain. ithmajortransfer ofunitstoth eVietnameseNavyandanalysesof demands,$2.3millioninexcesseswereidenti-fiedinFY 70 .

(6) ithth eheavy deploymentof shipsofth eSeventhFleettoth eSouthChinaSea,deploymentofMarineaircrafttoVietnam,andincreasedbasingofshipsatGuam,thes tocksat theselocationswereincreased. By earlyFY 68,th eSeventhFleetbackupsupportprovidedby theNavalSupplyDepotsatGuamandSubicBayhadincreasedmarkedly.nFY 69 through January970,asubstantialdeclinewasexperiencedinfleetoperationsinsupportof combatinVietnam.hisdeclineinoperationsreducedthesupportrequirements.hedeclinewaspar-t i cularlysignificantatN S D > SubicBay,asitrelatedtoaviationlogistic suppor t . ithreducedsupportrequirements,theNavyimplementeditsprogramto cleanup excesses.hisprogram hasresultedinth eidentificationof thecumula t ivevalueof $20.7millioninexcessesattributable totheVietnam Warat th eWESTPACnavalsupp lydepots,for atotalof $64 .3million,includingVietnam.sof January970,$43.3millionhadbeenredistributed,including15.6percenttoproperty disposal.10b.ajorCau sesofU.S.Navy Excesses.heNavyhashighlightedthefollowingmajorcausesof excesses:11

(1)anagementEmphasis.rimarymanagement emphasiswasinitially placedongettingrequiredmaterielpre-posi tionedwhenandwhereneeded.dentification of excessesanddisposalprograms,of necessity,assumedalowerpriori ty .(2)argeVolumeofMaterielReceivedPriortoEstablishmentofFacilities.he rapidbuildup ofsupp l iesthatwasconductedconcurrently withth econstructionof facilitiesde-gradedinventorymanagementcontrol .helossof Inventory controlwasoffset byspotinventory

teamsusedtoveri fy quantitiesandlocationsof criticalmaterielthatwaslabelednot ins tock .(3)xpansionof theForceLevelBeforeEstablishingaFirn-Logist icalBase.he ICTZforcelevelswereincreasedto4 00percentabovethatinth ebasicestablishedsupportplan.owever,adequatetimewasn o ? rovidedtoadjust thelogistic basetocompensateforthe expansion.hesimultaneousexpansionof thesupporteffortinconjunctionwiththelogisticsbaseovertaxedcapability .(4 )bsolescence.anyexcesseswerecausedbyobsolescence.xamplesoftheseexcessesar efromaircraftmodelchanges,ship or boatequipmentchanges,andothertechnolog-icalchanges.hangesthato c c u roveraperiodoft imecauseobsoleteequipmentandsparepartstobewashedou totth esupp lysystem.(5 )emandFluctuationsDm e oRedeployments. Unforerastredeploymentscausedbythecontingenciesof warhadamajoreffectonsupportoperations. Becauseofthelongleadtimebetweenorderandreceiptofmateriel,excessesweregeneratedbyWESTPACstockpointswhensignificanteductionsinaircraftlyinghoursandrapidfleetmovementsoccurred .

-*Ik


24/68

., ?.**& : rsj;-i-r-w~ x -S

EXCESSES(6) LackofFinancialRestraintPriorto July967 . NSA,DaNang,andNSA,Saigon,operatedunderanopenallotmentforNavystock-fundedmaterielpriorto July967.A tthattimeNSA,DaNang,wasconvertedtoaclosedallotmentbasisandfinancialestraintswerealsointroducedat NSA,Saigon,byconversiontoanendu sefundbasis. Alackoffinancialrestraintandcontrolduringth ebuildupphasecausedexcesses;however,italsoprovidedes-sentialsupp l ieswithminimumdelays.

c . LessonsLearnedbytheNavy , ThefollowinglessonslearnedwerereportedbytheNavy . 1 2n somecasesth eNavyhas alreadyinitiatedthesechanges,bu tthelessonslearnedmaybeofbenefitasaguideforf u ture'ogisticplanning.(1 )heresaneedforpromptestablishmentofadequateport ,stevedoring,andstoragefacilitiesbeforehippinglargevolumesofmateriel,(2)nventorymanagersshouldchallengeduplicateordersforlargequantitieswithinshorttimeperiods.(3)nexcessprogramandcontinuingidentificationoflongsupplyitemsshouldbeestablishedearly. Promptdisseminationoflongsupplyinformationwouldenabletimelyre-distribution.

sys tem.(4 ) Proceduresshouldbese tupforanearlytransitionfromthe"push"tothe"pull"(5 ) esupplypipelineshouldbeturneddownorof fsufficientlyinadvanceofde-partureofredep ,.gunits .(6)ontrolofshipmentsshouldbeimprovedtoenablefrustratingofmaterielinCONUSpvr t sanddepots;th eabilitytodosohasimprovedasaresultofth eapplicationof MilitaryStandardTransportandMovement roceduresMILSTAMP) .

4 . MARINEORPSEXCESSESa.copeofMarineCorpsExcesses

(1 )hetotalvalueofWESTPACexcessesreportedbytheMarineCorps13asrelatedtosupportofth eVietnamconflictwas$42.8millionasof January970.fthistotal,$7.6mil-lionwasgeneratedinVietnamand$35.2millionwasgeneratedinOkinawa.hisamountconsistsof excessesthathavebeenreportedtoPURA andthosethatresultedfromtwospecialprogramsconductedbyth eForceLogistic Command(FLC)nVietnam. Yherear eootheridentifiableexcessesinWESTPACthatcanbeattributedtotheconflic tinS EAsia. Anyransactionproc -essedtoproperty disposalofficespriortothenstitutionofURAprocedurescanbet tributedtomaterielwornou tinserviceatherthanmaterielinexcesstoneeds. Theseexcessesweregeneratedovera5-yearperiodofintensivebuildup andupp l yupportofMarineforcesinViet-nam.

(2)saresultoftheconflic t ,th efollowingexcessesweregeneratedincertainclassesofsupp ly :ClassI I Clothing,individualequipment,tentage,toolsetsandkits,handtool*,administrativeami housekeepingsuppl ies .

*3tkM*W|twrtri" '* ..J* . ur im-Yrf , .Hr i r lMMt"** 'itHI* ,M-ri*nM vmtu A r : lrl.it >Yn>l


25/68

EXCESSESClassIVonstruction,forti ficationmateriel. ClassD Cepairparts ,lessmedicalspareparts .

TheexcessconstructionmaterielwasacquiredforsupportofMarineunitsandnotcontractor-ownedorused.(3)fthe$42.8milliontotalexcessesgenerated,$11.9million($4.3millionfromVietnamretrogradedtotherdForceServiceRegiment(FSR)andtoth eCONUSsupp lysys tem,and$7.6millionfromOkinawaretrogradedtotheCONUSsupplysystem)wasrequiredtosatisfy MarineCorpsrequirementsincludingunfundedwarreservedeficiencies,on-islandOkinaware- quirements,andrequirementsforCONUS-basedunits. ThisretrogradeofexcessmaterielwasaccomplishedafterofferingtoPURA .(4 )xcesseslocatedinVietnamwhichhavebeenredistributedtoothermilitary servicesinth ePacif icareatotal$.37million.xcesseslocatedonOkinawawhichhavebeenredistributedtoothermilitaryservicesinth ePacif icareatotal$2.5million.xcesseslocatedonOkinawawhichhavebeenredistributedtootherGovernmentagencies,primarily theCONUSintegratedmanager,total$9.7million.(5)hevalueof totalexcessestransferredtopropertydisposalofficesinth ePaci fic areais$8.7million. Property disposalactionisaccomplishedonlyafterPURAscreening,fol-

lowedbyMarineCorpsscreening,CONUSintegratedmanagercreening,andDLSCcreening.(6)hevalueofidentifiedexcessesstillonhandasof January970was$9.6 million,$2.0 millioninVietnamand$7.6millioninOkinawa. Thisrepresentsexcessesstillinth ePURAsys tem,otherscreeningcycles,andsomenoty etturnedovertoPDO.

b.ajorCausesofMarineCorpsExcesses. ThefollowingmajorcausesofMarineCorpsexcesseswereidentified:(1)orceBuildup . DuringtheperiodJuly965toJuly967,theMarineCorpsin-troducedatotaloftw oreinforced divisionsandoneairwingintoVietnam.naddition,for cet roopsunits,suchasmotortransportbattalionsandengineerbattalions,weretransferredin -country . neworganization,theForceLogisticCommand,wasformedtoprovidelogisticu p -port . Thisforcebuildupcausedatremendoussurgeinmaterielrequirements. (2)ransportation. iththeubstantialncreaseddemandsformateriel,therewas anassociatedincreaseddemand for shipping. Lack oftimelyshippingand/oroff- loadingcapa-bilitiescausedperiodicurgesofmaterieltobereceivedbytherdFSR andtheFLC . Thesesurgescausedvolumesofmaterieltobereceivedbyheserviceupportunitswhichfarver-taxedtheavailablepersonnel,equipment,andcomputerspreviouslykeyedtoamuchlowerlevelof operations. Forexample,ifth eunitrequisitionedanitemanddidnotreceiveth eitemwithinprescribedtimeframes,th eunitoftensubmittedanotherrequisitionwithahigherpriority .Nor-mally,theoldrequisitionwasnotcancelledbecausetwasrationalizedthatthematerielwas neededandth ealreadylapsedtimeshouldnotbeost .hiscreatedac y c l eofpyramidingde-mands. A sacaseinpoint,inSeptember966,therewere3shiploadsofmaterielreadyonOkinawaforshipmenttoMarineforcesinVietnam. Unfortunately ,therewasnoshipping. Whentheshippingbecameavailable,thematerielwasmoved. Thissurgecarriedrightthroughtoth eFL CandForceLogisticGroups(FLGs). Thisvolumeinsuchasnorttimeexceededthecapa-bilitiestoproperlyreceive,locate,andaccountforthemateriel. Theworkloadprecludednormalchecksandbalancesand,coupledwithinadequatestoragefacilities,causedextensiveerrorcon-ditionsinlocatoranditemnventoryrecords. (3)ersonnel. Priortoth eVietnamconflirttheMarineCorpspersonnelauthoriza- tionsdidnotpermit00percentmanninglevelsof allcombatserviceupportunits . Thiscon-ditionresultedinausterestaffingofwarehousemenandstockmanagersattheserviceunitevelandfewersuppl yclerksattheusingunit.Whenth enitialuildupoccurred,itwastheseMa-rineswhoborethebruntofincreaseddemandsfo rsupp l iestofightth econfl ictnSEAsiaand

22


26/68

EXCESSES thematerielurgescausedbyhippingandoff-loadingdeficiencies.verworkedandunder-strength,hepersonnelnheupplychelonscausederrorswhichresultedinthegenerationofexcesses.nthewarehousingarea,heheervolumeeceivedduringth eperiodicurgesofma-terielcausedbyerraticransportationresultedin materieloston location.eceiptswereftennotreportedtotheaccountingunits,andphysicalnventorieswerenotpossible.heseproblemsbecameesspressingashippingandoff-loadingcapabilitiesmproved,uthedamagehadbeendone.

(4)luctuatingRequirements. Fluctuatingrequirementswereanotherauseof ex-cessesbeinggenerated. Asaunit'smissionorommitmentwashangedtomeetvaryinglevelsofenemy-initiatedactions,itsrequirementsalsohanged,withheesultthatmaterielnhandoron orderwouldbecomexcesstotsneeds. I twouldturninhexcessesotheupportingserviceunitoritwouldanceltsrequisitionbeingheldbyheerviceunit. Asanexample,supportunitswerefragmentedinupportofnfantrybattalionsarbeyondthecopeordurationpreviouslynvisioned. Thisragmentationcausedaompoundingofrequirementsforepairparts. Whentheupp^tunitwaseunited,excessesdeveloped. AnexamplefthiscouldbeheitemomponentcalledTrailLeftforhe05mmowitzer. Althoughabattalionmayrequirewoeachofthesetemswhileoperatingasaunit,eachbatteryequiredoneachwhileoperatingn-dependentlywithabattalionlandingeamorwhiledeployedon aupportmissionindependently.Althoughthissonlyneexample,twasymptomaticfaproblem.(5)ntimelyExecutionDecisions. Perhapshegreatestcausefexcessgenerationhasbeenheackoffirmxecutiondeeisions~forheedeploymentsnddeactivationsofMarine

forcesinVietnam. AsheunitswereedeployedromVietnam,materieltillarrivedwhichwasnownexcessoftheequirementsftheemainingunits. Unitshadobeprovidedwithe-quireduppliesuptotheminuteheyeftVietnam. Owingtotheackofearlyirmedeploymentdates,hepipelinehadtoekeptfullptotheimeexecutiondecisionsweremade. Thus,whenunitsdepartedVietnam,hepipelinewasoftenfullandexcessesweregenerated. Experiencehasshownthatitisasdifficulttotopthelowfsuppliesastsotartthelow. FlexibilityordecisionmustbeaprerequisitefcommandrightupohePresident. Thisflexibilityhasbeenused. However,tmustbeecognizedatallevelsthathisflexibilityannotemaintainedwith-outgenerationofexcesses.(6 )aturefheWar. Theverynaturefthewarendedogeneratexcesses.Sincetwasareaction-typewar,unitshadobepreparedforanycontingency. Underuchir-cumstances,eithermaterielrequirementsmusteanticipatedohatufficientamountsandtypesofmaterieiareonhandornorder,orheystemmustbeableoespondtoheextremes

ofafluctuatingdemandasheesultofvaryingituations. Eitherapproachwillproduceexcesses.c. LessonsLearnedbyheMarineCorps:(1 )ycentralizingthenventorymanagementofallerviceupportunitsn-countryduring967,heMarineCorpswasableoullyutilizessetstoredathreewidelyeparatedlocations. Acustomer'sequisitionwascreenedagainsthessetsofhehreeocationsandsatisfiedfromhenenearesthim. Ifnoneofhen-countryocationshadanyassets,hee-quirementwaspassedtohe3rdSRon Okinawa. Priorothisentralizationduring96 5and1966 ,heustomer'sequisitionwaspassedohe3rdSRftouldoteatisfiedbyheserviceunitupportingheocation,evenhoughheotherwoerviceunitsmightav eadhe requiredtemnhand.(2)ncludedmtheMarineCorpsogisticphilosophysheonceptfailoredesup-pl ypackagesorourombatorces. Thesepackagesareommor'yeierredoasmount-out.

mount-outaugmentation,andautomaticesupply. ThisconceptsdesignedorheraditionalMarineCorpsolenamphibiouswarfarenwhichheresotufficientimenorstacticallysoundohaveheombatunitspull"heiruppliesromheystem, However,becausefhe nature> fheVietnamonflict,twasdeterminedhattwasotnecessaryoontinueheim-ited,ailoredesupplyystemfterheunitshadonsumedheirnitialpackage> fupplies.Thismadeheutomaticesupphesavailableorunits'ig hpriorityequirementsnapull"basis. Thisimitedesupplyystemllowedorheequireduppliesduringthenitialphases23


27/68

EXCESSESofheonflictobeavailableoheusingunits. Thistailoredresupplyystemminimizedex-cesses;hequickreversionoa"puli"ystemwhenthetacticalituationallowedfurthermini-mizedhem.

(3)equirementsofunitswereontinuallycreenedagainstheon-handassetsof otherunits. Thisscreeningprocesswascontinualandwasconductedatthedivision/wingusingunitevel. ThisMarineCorpscreeningutilizedmaterielhatcouldhavebeenotherwisede-claredexcesstoMarineCorpsneeds. WiththeadventofURA ,hiswasexpandedtoaninter-servicecreeningamongallPacificServiceomponents.

(4)heprimaryesponsibilityftheogisticystemstoensurehatufficientsuppliesareon handornthepipelineoustaintheMarineCorpsombatunits. Thiscanbe changedonlywhenfirmxecutiondecisionsareeceivedndicatingredeploymentsordeactiva-tions.therwise,heuppliesmustbekeptavailable. Asoonasthisfirmguidancewasre-ceived,heMarineCorpsnitiatedactionswhicheducedhelowfmaterieloWESTPACandintohetoresystem. Thiswasccomplishedbyancellingexcessdue-insoheupplyourceandbyeducingrequisitioningobjectivesattheerviceunitsandtheorecastdemandsattheInventoryControlPointICP).5. AIRORCEXCESSES

a* ScopefAirForceExcesses(1 )heAirForce-reportedexcessesnSEAsiancludedClarkAirBasewhichn-cludeddataforallAirForcebasesandunitsnthePhilippines),Thailand,andVietnam. ThereasonforincludingClarkAirBasewasthat,nitially,AirForceacticalunitswerelargelyresuppiiedthroughClarkAirBase. Asactivityncreased,upplyaccountswereestablishedfirstatTanSo nNhutforVietnamndaterateachofthemainbasesin VietnamndThailand.14Whenhoseaccountswerestablished,thebasesequisitioneddirectlynCONUSwholesalede-potsandtheequirementsorassetsatClarkAirBasedecreased. TheAirForcedoesnotmain-tainwholesaledepotsoverseas. Excesses,herefore,aredevelopedateachbase. Whenshown bycountry,hefiguresactuallyepresentaotalftheocalbaseexcessesin thatcountryatagivenime. SuchdatadoesotepresentountryorAirForceexcessesinceheyareum-marizedwithoutegardoedistributionactions. Also,heAirForceeportsexcessesoreconomicorderquantityEOQ)temshatexceedthe-yearetentioncriteriaratherthanthe3-yearriteriauggestedyOSD.(2)sof1December969 ,heAirForceeportedpotentialexcessesorClarkAirBaseandbasesnThailandandVietnamnhemountf$75.1million. Thisamountwasacumulativeotalromllbasesas esultfhequarterlyomputationoftockevelspre-scribednheStandardBaseupplySystem,andncludedequipmentaswellsupplies. The$75.1millionofpotentialxcessanbeelatedoaotalf$334.4millionnwarehousetocksand$506.5fn-usequipmenttheamebases.(3)ajorprogramswerenitiatedyheAirorceduringY8odentifyndto useordisposeofexcesses. SomefthesenrogranswereCOMMANDORAMP,RIPE,EASY,andURGE . AswellascontributingexcessesoUteURAprogram,heAirForcelsoestab-lishedhePacificAirForcesAssetRedistributionCenterPARC)ortswnntraserviceex-cessutilizationcreening. Aotalf$191.8millionnpropertywasdistributednFYs68,9 ,an d0.)meetequirementsoutsidefRVN . Olhisotal,propertyvaluedat1 54millionwasreturnedoCONUSand$37.8millionwasedistributed meetequirementsootherPacific

AirForcer.PACAF)bases. Includednheseotals,however,waspro|xrtyhathadbeene-quiredorutilizedbeforebecomingxcessoSKAsiaequirementsandubjectoedistribution.Forexamples,uppliesandequipmentelatedoF-100aircraitwereransferredoKorea,andF tilgroundupportquipmentndpareswereeturnedoCONUSwhentheF-11 1ircraftwereeturned.''ih'.-i u .mni f jM.riii.ulatiijA;I>in-hrs!. .>. f.t.tMi*hri|I1 ltl!Th.til.tnHn!w >mimwr


28/68

EXCESSES (4)rojectURA ,operatedbyheArmy,effecteddispositionof $9millionworthf

AirForcepropertyoothermilitaryervicesinFYs69and0.(5)inceY6 ,propertytransferredtodisposaltotaled$183million. However,hisfigurencludedpropertythathadbeenusedandwaswornoutorwasnolongereconomicallye-pairable,soitdoesnotrepresentarueexcessamount. ThebreakdownbyYsasfollows:FY66Y67Y68Y9Y0otal13 .97. 55.24.12. 383 .0 (6)ummarizingtheabove,propertyvaluedat$383.8millionwasedistributedfromSEAsiaandClarkAirBaseordisposedofin propertydisposal;nother75.1millionwasden-tifiedaspotentialxcessasof1December96 9tEAsiabasesandClarkAirBase,awaitingfurthercreeningand/ordisposition.(7)nadditiontotheabove,propertywasedistributedamongbasesinSEAsiatoprovideateralupportthroughactionsnitiatedn-theaterornresponseoredistributionn-structionsfromCPsin CONUS. DuringtheVietnamra,heAirForcedevelopedprocedurestoprovidedailyvisibilityattheCONUSICPlevelfthemoreostlytemsinorderomakee-distributionactionsesponsivendeffective. Althoughocalbaseexcesseswereeducedoreliminatedbyedistributionactions,itemsnshortsupplyAirForce-widewerealsoredistrib-

utedtopointsofgreatestneed. Headquarters,USAF,estimateshatredistributionactionsmayhaveexceeded$230million. Thisestimatesnotverifiable.b. MajorCausesofAirForceExcesses***

(1 )heforemostfactorausingexcessesnheAirForceupplySystemsaesultoftheVietnamonflictwastheapidbuildupofforcesandairoperationsnSEAsia. Duringlate965 and966,aircraftanddeployedquadronsnsupportofSEAsiancreasednearly40 0 percent. Tosupportthencreasedmissionitwasnecessaryorapidlyexpandbarebasestoullinstallationsandtoincreasethenumberfbaseupplyaccountsfromneo7. Therewasanincreasenthenumberoflinetemstockedin baseupplyaccountsrom25,000o.2million,addingallbaseaccounts. Theapidbuildupmadetnecessaryoprovideuppliesyautomaticorpush"hipmentsornitialparepartsupport,nitialSparesSupportListsISSLs),ndorequipmentpackagesuchasBitterWineornitialbaseupport. Actualonsumptionratesof manyuppliesprovidedn"push"hipmentsdidotorrespondwiththeonsumptionatesusedasplanningfactorstodevelopthepush"packages;onsequently,materielprovidedbyautomaticsupplyhatwasnotneededbecamexcess.(2)notherfactorontributingoexcesseswasheypendnumberofortieslowninVietnam, In someases,aircraftwereotusedtoheextenthatlogisticplanninghadpro-videdor;onsequently,excessesweregenerated. Anexamplefthisituationwasheermina-tionofbombingmissionsoverNorthVietnam.(3)heapidotationofupplypersonnelndheestrictedin-country"personnelceilingsalsocausedexcesses. Supportpersonnelwereotauthorizednufficientquantitiesurthemonumentalaskofmanaginglargeupplyccounts,especiallyduringhebuildup. Propertywasequisitionedanduppliedwhenalreadyavailable,althoughocalecordsdidotevealtsavailabilityorocation. Afurtheromplicationwastheusefmanualorardprocessorys-temsornventoryontrolnheearlyphasesofheonflict. SupplypersonnelnCONUSno

longerusedtheseproceduresandha duberainedn-country. CONUSpersonnelwererainedto5eheStandardAirForceSystem. However,hetandardystemusinghe050-IIwasotintroducednVietnamuntil966 andotompleteduntil968 .twasnecessaryiortheAirForceLogisticsCommandodevelopandprovideRapidAreaupplySupportRASS)eamsosolvepeakworkloadproblems. During96 7hereweresmanyas00HASSteampersonnelnKAsia.l"H*': i i l


29/68

EXCESSES(4) AlackofadequateransportationfacilitiesnVietnamontributedtoexcesses.A irerminalsandportfacilitieswerenadequatenhebuildupphaseftheonflictohandlethemassofmaterielhippedtoVietnam. Thesehipmentscloggedexistingportandairer-minalsandcausedexcessivedelaysnoff-loading. Thedelaysnreceivinguppliesandgettingthemonpropernventoryecordsesultedinconsiderablemultipleequisitioningandin duplicateshipmentsoftheequiredmateriel. Itwasalsonecessaryouseig hpriorityequisitionsnd

airransportationfortemsnormallyobtainedbyoutineurfacehipmentsnorderoensureuninterruptedsupport.c. LessonsLearnedyheAirFor:e.

(1 )ogisticupportpersonnelhouldedeployednadequatetrengthoncurrentlywithoperationspersonnel.(2)ailoredupportpackageshouldedevelopedon anausterebasisorannitialstockage. Dependencepona"push"upplyystemhouldbeminimizedanda"pull"upplyys-temnitiatedasearlyaspossibleafterinitialdeployment.(3)hehundredsofthousandsofitemsofsupplyhatareequiredtosupportmodernmilitaryforcesin combatcannotbeeffectivelyandefficientlymanagedusingamanualaccountingsystem. Standardoperatingproceduresandtandardsupplymanagementequipmentmustbe availableforupplyoperationsinoverseastheatersaswellasin CONUS. Themechanized

StandardAirForceBaseupplySystemprovidedahighlyeffectivemeansforhemanagementofsupplies,ncludingthedentificationoflocalbaseexcesseseachquarteroftheiscalyear.(4)heangefdepthoftocklevelsncombattheatershouldbeminimizedandairesupplyhouldbehenon.ialmethodofsupportorallmissionessentialtems.(5)dequateurfaceandaerialportfacilitiesmustbeestablishedassoonaspossi-bleafterdeploymenttoensurexpeditiousmovementofpropertyfromerminalacilitiesoheultimateuser. Iftheatertocksareobeeducedanddependenceplaceduponaerialesupplyofcriticaltems,adequateerminalacilitieswilleriticalouccessfuloperations.

6 . SUMMARYOFAUSESOFXCESSESNDHEIRREVENTION a.herearewogeneralategoriesofmilitaryexcesses: thosehatareunavoidableowingtotheontingenciesofwarandt sewhichcouldbeavoidedoreduced. Unavoidablex-cessesncludehoseausedbyhangesnplans,policy,typeofcombatoperations,andchangestoeplacequipmentmadeobsoleteyechnologicalhange. Itmustbeecognizedthatn -avoidablexcesseswillbegeneratedduringwartimeandthat,egardlessofheorrectivec-tiontakentopreventexcesses,heseunavoidableexcesseswilloccur. Onheotherhand,utudyofheausesofxcesseshatcouldhavebeenavoidedoreducedmayprovidennsightowardtheirpreventionnheuture.b.an yftheproblemsdiscussednothermonographsofthisstudyontributedtoex-cessesandtheecommendationsfromhosemonographs,whenmplemented,willendoeduceexcessesinutureonflicts. Thesemajorproblemscontributingoexcessesareummarizedinhissectionandheignificantecommendationsarencluded,withppropriateeferences.c.ynthesisofthemajorausesofavoidableexcessesWhichwereretriedyin 1 Serviceswereasollows:

(1 ) TheackofontrolnthemovementfuppliesntoVietnamduringhebuildupphast > f965hrough96 6wasamajorausefexcesses. Theargevolumefuppliesmovedinto tnamduringhatiernxlausedannundationofheapabilitv!h e *heateroadequatelyreceivendtorehemateriel.'II.i.l

2 ;


30/68


31/68

EXCESSESstored,andissuedtoheuser. Theogisticbasehouldalsoncludeadequaterained


32/68

>-:--:'f t ''J:'r?"",v" :


33/68

EXCESSES(MP-1) ContingencyplanningintheServicesincludealternativesthatprovideefficientlogisticmanpowerresourcesintheeventthatReserveorcesareotmobilized.

(2)ithRespecttoFacilities. InheupplyManagementMonograph,heBoardrecommendsthat:(SM-32) TheServicesdevelopmethodsofestablishinginitialessentialupplystoragefacilitiescapableofbeingerectedandoutfittedinminimumimewithoutreliancen

standardconstructionprograms. TheArmy'sContainerizedDepotProjectYZJ,theNavy'sAdvanceBaseFunctionalComponents,heMarineCorps'ExpeditionaryAirField,andheAirForce'sProjectCORONETBAREonceptsuggestmethodsthatshouldbeexploitedanddeveloped.Apossiblemeansofprovidinginitialminimumessentialupplytoragefacilitiesincludepre-packagedmobiledepots,vans,binnedcontainers,emipermanentquickerectstructures,andingmatting,portableeeferunits,loatingtorage,andrapidsoiltabilizationtechniques. TheServicesshouldincludeuchcapabilitiesin planningforontingencies.(3)ithRespecttoADPEquipment. In theAutomaticDataProcessingSystemsMonograph,theBoardecommendsthat:

(DP-1) ForontingencyoperationseachServicehaveavailableAutomaticDataProcessingSystemspackagescompatiblewiththeontinentalUnitedStatesystemswithwhichtheymustnterface. TheseAutomaticDataProcessingSystemspackageshouldincludemobileAutomaticDataProcessingequipment,provenprograms,datatransmissionequipmentan drainedpersonnel,andmustbedesignedthattheycanbereadilyexpandedtomeetunforeseenrequire-mentswithoutmajorproblemsntranslationtogreaterapacity. Contingencyplanshouldpro-videforearlydeploymentofanAutomaticDataProcessingSystemspackageadequatetomeetforecastedin-countryogisticsmanagementequirements,withaeasonableafetyfactortomeetunforeseendemands.(4)ithRespecttoRangeandDepthofStocks. In theupplyManagementMono-graph,heBoardrecommendsthat:

(SM-21) A llServicesreducehetockageidemandsupportedconsumableitemsofmateriel,includingrepairpartsinforwardoperatinglocations,toarangeofitemsnaccordancewiththeollowingcriteria:(a)achServicehouldestablishtringenttargetsofapecificnumber

offrequenciesof demandforantemoqualifyfornitialtockageandetention. TheargetswillvarybyService,activity,typefmateriel,andcombatenvironment.(b)uringheearlytagesofaontingencywhenfacilitiesandperson-nelareatbestmarginal,thecriteriafortockageshouldbeparticularlytringentandcouldthenbeelaxedoheextenthateconomyandcapacityohandlematerielnddatawarranted.

(5)ithRespecttoMovementControl. InheupplyManagementandTransporta-tionMonographs,heTkiardrecommendsKat:(SM-35) TheArmyontinueomaintainLogisticControlOfficesandaentrallogisticdatabankwiththecapabilityoprovidetimelyandpertinentogisticntelligenceorworldwideoverseasArmyesponsibilitymaienelmovements.(TR-9) TheJointChiefsofStallestablishpositiveprocedurestoensurehatthecommandersofunifiedommandsdetermineealisticargoeceptionandclearanceapa-bilitiesnconnectionwithheirontingencyplanning,hathoseommandersandheServicesconsiderhoseapabilitiesndeterminingthephasingofheirequipmentndupplvequire-ments,andhathipsnoteailedotheontingencyreaunlessheyJit\beunloadedex|>edi-tiouslv.

30


34/68

EXCESSES(6 )ithRespectoMaintenance. IntheMaintenanceMonograph,theBoardrecom-mendsthat:

(MT-17) EachServicedevelopandefinereparableontrolsystemsfore-lectedcomponentswhichwill:(a )ssurehat,fromheimefremovalromamajorenditem,helocationandstatusofeachcomponentsknownatthepropermanagementlevelsuntiltheitem

isepairedandreturnedtoserviceorcondemnedanddroppedfordisposal.(b)ak eppropriateusefairransportationformovementofrep-arables.

(7)ithRespectoContainerization. IntheContainerizationMonograph,heBoardrecommendshat:(CN-2) Themilitarydepartmentsexploittheusefcontainersymaximizingtheusefcontainersforpurposesonclude:

(a )ovingunitequipmentosupportdeployments.(b)rebinningofstockswhendesirableofacilitaten-theaterogisticoperations.(c)eneralargodistribution.(d)emporarytorage.

31


35/68

v^^WTKr -JrB.-wirc;; ^ . v ^

CHAPTERIVWORLDWIDE EXCESSES


36/68

CHAPTERIVWORLDWIDEEXCESSES1 . INTRODUCTION

Thischapteraddressesthescopeof worldwideexcessesandtheDODUtilizationandDis-posalProgramduringtheVietnamera.roblemareasareidentifiedaHrecommendationsfor improvementsinth eys temar eincluded.2. SCOPEFWORLDWIDEXCESSES

a.xcessReporting(1) knowledgeofth etotalcumula t ivevalueofworldwideexcessesgenerateddur-ingaf iscalyearsause fu ltoolformeasuringth eeff ic iencyofsupplymanagement. Thealueoftheseexcesses,whenmeasuredagainstinventoryvalue,thevalueofsales,orprocurement

valueonanannualbasis,providesmeaningfulmanagementdata. Also ,th evalueofexcessesisalwaysofinteresttoCongress.(2)heJointLogis t i csReviewBoard(JLRB)xperienceddiff icultynobtainingth econsistentdataonworldwideexcessesneededtomakeathoroughanalysisofthetruempactof excessesontheDODlogisticys tem. AlthoughbothDDForm138(RCS701)andDDForm1461RCS495 )addresstotalcumula t iveexcesses,insomecasesth edatawerenconsistent.TheDDForm138RCS701)wasdesignedtoprovideanon-handvalueofth eDODinventory at apointntimeratherthanforaperiod,thusthevalidity ofdataontotalcumulativeworldwideexcessesgeneratedduringaperiodisquestionable.heDDForm461showsthetotalquantity ofpotentialexcessesonhand,generated,anddisposedofoniquarterly basisbyInventoryCon-trol oints(ICPs). However,thisreportislimitedtocontinentalUnitedStates(CONUS)ex -cessesanddoesnotincludeexcessesonaworldwidebasis.

b.tratificationoftheDODSupplySystemnventory Thestatusofth eDODsupplysystemnventorysreportedintermsofdollarsto Congressonanannualbasis.* ThebasisofthisreportistheDDForm138(RCS701)note* prev iously . Stocksarestratifiedintofourcategoriesinthisreport:pprovedforceacquisition stocks,2retentionstocks,^potentialDODexcesses,*andunstratifiedstocks .* Theeport

'I*hHealnilPersonal'r wrtveprts.-A| |rn*lorcecquisitiontuck*n-hoseassetsulhe*>!> su|>pt\ystemmentonhairell*-ate!i< theApproved'orceAcquisition'biective.his .hequantityofntemuthorize!or acctimccqutst-lnn< >quipn !ustainhe.S.ApprovedFortenpeacetimeminwartimeorheterioedb\heatestogisticguidancessuedb\heSecretarydDelen.se.tock*nhisstra-tumheh!nmeSenteereotequired< notherServierwithouteimbursement,hutretentiontocksmipotential*> l> excessesareubject >ranlerwith>uteimbursement.healue ! ,matt,htp-i.miStrategiemissileshaseenxcluded,:stetcnttontocksonsistfAjtfirmrtloneteten'i.fStock*).enormeetentionStockHIS,mit'**tiftuene\lctcntionSttskCltS). AMtT-Siit-hose*sct*llocate!ohepprovedorceetchtionevel,huhhe{uatttit\,ndditionoheppnedn Acquisition* l i -ctt -v * .hats*qulrsju:pmisustainheitpn>\c , > tockshatit 1xec**"he VppiovedorceKetcntln'ulwhichrcu r ecoumi r e'tteitoitilizationamihebalam*tse!becomes!i-


37/68

EXCESSES includesdatafromllDODcomponentsreportedon aommonbasis. Consequently,datafromthisreportwereelectedin anattempttoanalyzehetratificationofheDODupplyysteminventoryduringtheVietnamndpre-Vietnamras. DatafromheseeportsarehowninFigure. AnanalysisofthetratificationoftheDODupplysystemnventoryduringtheY0throughY9periodrevealsthattheotalyear-endvaluefpotentialexcesseson handattheendofY69 ,4.8billion,wasapproximately12-1/2percentelowheyear-endaveragevalueofpotentialexcesseson handduringthepre-Vietnamperiod,Y0hroughY64,$5.4billion.Thisupportstw omajorpoints: thatxcessesregeneratedduringpeacetimeaswellswar-time,andthattherehasbeensomemprovementncontrollingtheccumulationofpotentialexcesses.

TOTAL DOD SUPPLYSYSTEM TINVENTORYNCLUDINGSTOCKFUND 46.3

P2.2

FIGURE. STRATIFICATIONFODUPPLYYSTEM INVENTORYNCLUDINGTOCKUNDY0-FY9 Sourer: K ;tlm< lVrsimal'ro|*'i1\ Ki'|iu|ls1hit'purUiH'Ul ! Ik'lrnsrDO It:*"Son'.- Ui'linilS).

36


38/68

EXCESSES3.OTALUMULATIVEXCESSES

Althoughthevalueofpotentialxcesseson handatheendofY9howsomemprove-mentoverpreviousperiods,heoverallperformancefDODnthereaofexcessescannotedeterminedfromon-handvaluesatapointintime. Serviceomponentsouldbegeneratingex-cessesatanincreasedratenddisposingoftheexcessesgeneratedatanevenfasterate,leavingtheon-handbalanceatthendofthefiscalyearowerhanhatofpreviousperiods. In thiscasetwouldshownimprovementfthebilityoutilizeorodisposeof excesses,butnottopreventtheirgeneration.4.ESULTSOFHEODTILIZATIONNDDISPOSALROGRAM,Y4THROUGH FY9

a.otalUtilizationan dDisposal. TheesultsoftheDODUtilizationandDisposalPro-gramduringtheY64oY69periodarehowninFigure4. Aconsiderableportionofthemateriellassifiedaspotentialexcess,declaredexcess,orurplusycurrentproceduresseventuallyusedtofillvalidrequirementsforheDepartmentofDefense. Theotalvalueofex-cessesusedntheDODUtilizationProgramshownin theopareaofeachcolumninFigure4. Figure providesabreakoutoftheDODUtilizationProgramhowingthevaluesofutilizationfromtw osources: potentialxcessesfromheupplyystemnventoryanddeclaredexcessesfromhePropertyDisposalOfficePDO). TheargerpartoftheDODUtilizationProgramcomesfromherecoveryofdeclaredexcessandsurplusoutoftheDO ratherhanfrompoten-tialxcesseshataretillntheupplyystemnventory. From osttandpoint,twouldbe beneficialomaximizeheutilizationofpotentialexcessesatherhantoconsumeheexcessesafterheyhavebeenprocessedhroughheextensivecrpc-ningofpropertydisposal.

b.ontributionofPLUS,PURA,andMARCE. ArelativelymallpartoftheDODUtiliza-tionProgramsfromheontributionsoftheacifictilizationandRedistributionAgency (PURA),MaterielAssetRedistributionCenter,EuropeMARCE),andtheCentralizedMechanizedScreeningSystemPLUS)Figure).fheotalutilizationofpotentialexcessesfromhen-ventoryControlPoint(ICP)upplyystemf$498milli nY69,ProjectLUScontributedonly$2 6million, percentoftheotal;URA contributed$155millionor1percent;ndMARCEonly$6.6millionor.3 percent. Thebalancef62.7percentwasusedbyntraservicectionordirectinterrogationbetweenheServices. Improvementsareneededntheutilizationofpoten-tialexcessesoeduceheostoftheengthyprocessingoftockshroughthedisposalystem.TheurrentDODorganizationsandproceduresforheutilizationofxcesseshaveotprovidedthemaximumefficientuseofpotentialDODexcesses. Someoftheproblemareasntheurrentorganizationsandproceduresz redescribedntheollowingparagraphs.5 .PROBLEM AREAS OF C U R R E N T O R G A N I ZATIONS AND PROCEDURES

a.eneral. AreviewfheesultsofheoperationofheDefenseLogisticServicesCenterDLSC),URA ,ndMARCEevealshatheyaveotachievedmaximumpotentialf-fectivenessnheutilizationandredistributionofexcesses. ProblemreaswereimilarnthethreeorganizationsandappearedoeausedchieflybyaackofcentralizedontroloverheworldwideDODUtilizationandDisposalProgram.b.roblemAreasin theLU SSystem

(1 ) ExamplesofproblemreasnheLU SystemrepresentednTable. In areportoCongressyheGAOdatedMay4,960,twaspointedou thathecreeningystemhadn-tbeentullyeffectivedu eoheollowingreasons:

(a )ackfiM)|K'ratunonhepartfCPsnprovidingDLSCwithnforma-tionofneededan davailablematerial.(b)ataprovidedoDLSCvheCPswereotlwaysurrentoraccurate.


39/68


40/68

2000

1500< jjoQU.oin zgJJ

1000

500

'vvy

&&

FY65 FY66POTENTIALEXCESSREDISTRIBUTION

II UTILINATION3 NTWASt:HVIk.l.11 ) T IL. I A T I N

DECLAREDEXCESSREDISTRIBUTIONL I'.V.'.'JuTI LI.'ATIUS

|lNTHAStiMVICl. 1UTIUiATluN

EXCESSES

FY67Y68REDISTRIBUTION FY69BYMARCEBYPURABYPLUSFIGURE 5. MATEKIELTILIZATION PROHAM

_ M tAugust V M \ \ 1 ,

cedures.** (r)DLSCackedauthority todirectServiceompliancewithpoliciesndpro-

(2 ) HistoricalecordsfperformancelheervicendDSAusun;heLUSys-temonfirmhemdinusofheUAU. ThesedatarencludednTable. Thehiiihdelinquencyrate> nofferrejectsndhipmentdenialswasunsatisfactoryormaximumutilizationndus-tuinfi*onfidencenheystem. Also.iu>oilerejections,whenoinpandwithoilers,were > < > hii '.h. Ttte.seates remurevidentnTablewhereht rexprcssi-dn ercentasisor*vt'i\ill>erforuiance> !heystem,(3 l AeviewtheLUSpr vX)1)duringiltiii >determinetheeasonst rhepparentackiilettivenesssndicated> vLUSstatisticsl1Decentberi*tiK.

,', ! in ! > !;u i!" .' |! ';.;;,; | , t ! |t.|:


41/68

EXCESSESTABLE 1

SUMMARYFROBLEMSN UTILIZATIONKVAILABLEMATERIELINHEEPARTMENTFEFENSEPROBLEMS

$130millionndentifiedxcessmaterielnoteportedyServicesoDLSC*RecordsnotcreenedtoillequirementsCentralizedmanagementontroloverutilizationprocedurestCPsimitedLackofnterserviceoordinationAdditionaldirectionndontroleededtheDODevel

In/ormationonneededndvailablematerielnoteportedoDLSC;crxample:a.J6'lof1 1xcesstemsheckedb.207)millionofavailablematerielc.equirementsor7temsd.Materielprogrammedorrepairn

1%7CiAOdeter.ninedtLSChatufficientma-terielasvailableorransferoelimi-nateneedoepairunserviceablemateriel;reportingofthematerielouldhavee-sultednheransferoferviceablemate-rielvaluedt2.VJ.000ndheliminationof103,000nepairostsInformationeportedyCPsotlwaysaccurateorurrent$117millionotteredoDLSCvllServicesinYU;1 ejectedorouldotbeshippedOfDransactionsestedtl.SCduringPJfi,'J .ori" J')hadotbeeilompletedandemove!romhecreeningile;DSAuditorsstimatedhatmateriele-portedhippedb\ DSAhadbeenover-statedv." iAYCOMequirementseportedol.SCadbeenemovedromhecreeningile

ACTIONA KEN- AGENCY

a.Transferred13,400ofmaterieloAYCOM.b.51),000ofmaterieleq-uisitionedromDLSC

+\\illionemovedromScreeningile

> ! ;_',ionotmaterielub-sequcntlv issuedoAYCnM

AllServices

a.gdenAirMaterielarea(OAMA)b.avvAviationSupplvOfficec.rmyAviationMaterielCommandAYCOM)d.MarineCorpsSupplyActivitv

DLSCmiServices

DLSC

DIM*

'AMAancelledequirementsbecauseo|Mu v . responseol.SC M ample |7 .fersnHsc :,.,,requisitionsr.'>|hetemshadotlii-enssuedA ith in '>da\salterhedfef

acceptance

1)1*1'ndMAMA

DIM'ndService*

hirner.il \icovntmi;Uliee


42/68

TABLEMATERIELTILIZATIONROGRAM

EXCESSES

& a t

Service FY

aJ< t1 45.0 ' * s 31.4

Navy 65 96.9 71."66 61.0 2,519.0 160.5 3U. 6.6 SI.O 49." 1".9 69.7 66."*i7 676.0 0,009.0 132.7 2*>.9 6.9 1^7.5 67.3 21.5 63.9 19.568 720.0 13,540.0 112.3 2*.l 9. 74.2 61.0 25.0 54.4 60.069 716.0 12,211.0 93.2 4".4 5.1 93." 67.9 1.9 66.1 HO.3

AirForce 65 SI.4 11.1O H 3,103.0 72,274.0 161.4 59.0 36.s 47.2 SUi 35. * > 2.. 63.367 2,089.0 11M42.0 136.7 65.9 23.7 rH. i 196.4 4 ".2 : ; o : 71.7 6 s 2,101.0 !M,62*.I) 11*.2 M.l 26.4 :{7.7 69.3 51.7 ," i.i 40.569 3,199.0 121,121.0 126.7 71.9 22.5 61.S "9.1 59.1 25." :.;

Marine 65 *.3 iv;Corps 66 3.0 164.0 10.9 6.3 .i 16.6 23.0 57.7 31.9 .i..i

67 24.0 174.0 9.3 5.0 . 23.7 11.M 53.7 36.7 61.3h-i 12.0 117.0 10,-1 2.* > 7 13.5 26.9 21.569 16.0 121.0 14.0 v' .ni ',.1 12.7 " , ^ 3*'i.5 33.3

PercentdelinquencyeflectofferejectsotprocessedvServicemithin0da\s,ndlhipmentdentalsno tpriK-essedmithin0davs.Source: DefenseMaterieltili/ationndDisposalrograms.rogramdministrators Progresse|>ort,1t hC^tr..Ys5,M.7.H,nd.9.

(a) In briefingoASDI&L)onheresultsufheeview,heeamointedouttheollowingbasicactorshatffectedheLUSoperation:1 .nscrubbedRequirements. Machine-computedequirementsweree-portedoDLSCwithouttemmanagereviewndevision;herefore,heywereoftenoverstated.2.rossRequirements. ICPsubmittedgrossequirementsoDLSC.Due-insromontracts,romprocurementequestsnprocessofward,ndrometailctivitieswerenotdeductedfromhegrossequirementigureeportedoDLSC.herefore,herewashighuifer-rejectate.

4!


43/68

EXCESSESTABLE

MATERIELTILIZATION PROGRAMECHANIZEDCREENING PROGRAMEPORTING,ROJECTLU S (SMillions)f idealYear

Transaction 19*5.1 i-yfiii un s7 pjs I9i9OffersMade L'^*',.i> 147.9 ;\**).'2 o . " > 7 . ' > :IU.TOffersAccepted _ _ _ ._ _ li.UI.ilAcceptanceShipped 1) - ;^.'.t

OffersKejerU'd 1 1.7 IM.9 !7:*.l i"7.:Rate ) I'M 1*". :i!.o tl.u 7.7Delinquent > PL 1 ;-. 119,0 j 1 '0*.'>

Requisitionsnt*>ee->-- 'v;.Shipmentenials; 7 . " > jO.l ; . . " >7.L'Delinquent(')n \ j . i .>.u : i . u> i > . oI.uShipmentsMade : < . . " .Source: Defense SuppUgenrt DefenseMaterieltilizationni l Disposalronrams,ProgramAdministrator: ProgressReport,thl^tr.,Ya - * " , * ,CameronStation,Alexandria,Va,

3.n>cessin^a^tune. WhenDLSCmadei\offeronCPwithrequirement,30 dayswereauthorizedorprocessingime. However,hectualprocessingimewasgenerallybetween60nd90davs,ndometimesbeyond90davs.4.rovisioningtems.epairpartswhichwereproducedoupportmajortemewoheupplyystemhadnodemanddataccumulatedbecausetequiredev-eralyearsororiginalpartsowearout.heseassetswereotdemandupported;herefore,theywerehandledy omputersetentiontocksorxcessesndheywereeportedo

DLSCoredistribution.hennofferwasmadeorheseassets,hetemmanagerejectedtheoffernnticipationofutureequirementsorheassets.5.losedLoopProblems. Becauseofhenaccuracydhepreviousreportingystem, losedoopprocedurewasmplementednY69. ThisewprocedurecauseddelaysmprocessingLUSransactions.6.erviceEmphasis. Therewas needorgreaterServicendCPemphasisonheLUSprogram. PLUSransactionshad elativelyowriorityomparedwithotherday-to-dayasksoftemmanagers.7.esources. AllCPsvisaedc|HrtedheK'cdordditionale

sources,prituijullversonnel, processheukl>i:fLUSransaction*.(b ) ThemoreignificantonclusionsofheUSDeamweresollows:

1 .LUSouldd"U'ltrr*ithmacmphasis,moreesounes.ndgreatereviewndontroltCPs.2 .U * *ole .|SAspr>.amclminislr.ilTI H)DhouldU strengthenedyoldun;)S Aesponsibleorhei*'am,ban.uu>SA sthin -**i*nsi!n!it;forercdp retre*so|ieLUSprogramtCl*s,nd


44/68

EXCESSES 3.heresaneedofullyimplementheDODuniformtratificationsystemsprovidedinDODI4140.24.4.heusefmechanizedprocessingwhichhasbeenonlypartiallyn-stitutedmustencreased.

d. ProblemAreasntheURASystem(1 )totaluf$764millionofexcesseswasreportedoURAduringheperiod

1April968hrough1August969. Asf1August969,URAhaddirectedheedistribu-tionofexcessesvaluedat J O Gmillion. Ofhebalance,approximately54 4millionha dbeene-leasedohewningServicesornormalxcessingaction,andapproximately1 1 4millionwasstillnprocessingofcreening.? Th eeffectivenessfheURAprogramar .bemeasuredyaomparisonofhevaluefeferrals,106million,oheotalexcessesnominated,76 4mil-lion,essthevalueofassetsnprocessofcreening.$114million. Thisndicateshatonly6 .3 percentfhessetseportedoURAareedistributedhroughheURAystem.(2)entativeeviewfindingsyheGAOeportedon theURAoperationduring1969ndicatedthatmanyfheproblemreasoundnheLU Systemwerealsoprevalentin thePURA system.0 Somefheignificantindingsareistedbelow:

(a)URA'seportedaccomplishmentsmayhavebeenoverstatedbecausehey werebasedon directed shipmentsoreferrals,atherhanactualhipments. Itwasoundhatdeniedreferralsangedfrom7percentoashighs0percent.(b)hereppearedoe needforbettermanagementontrolnPUR/..tshouldbendependentofheServicesandshouldconcentratepo nnterserviceupportatherthanntraserviceupport.(c)URA'sesponseimenprovidingtatusnequisitionswasexcessive.Thisact,combinedwithhehighatefequisitioncancellations,discouragedtheusefPURAasaourcefupply.(d)l thoughURAobjectivesalledorMilitaryAssistanceProgramMAP)participationnPacificCommandPACOM)xcesses.MAPwasotaURAparticipantbecauseitwasprocedurallyncompatible.(e)inancialestraintsimitedPURA'spotentialoredistributionufassets.(f)onic Serviceswere notrequisitioningagainstURAassetsoillequire-ments. Thiswasdu eohenecessityfmanuallvcreeningavailableassetsagainstequire-ments. In otherases,heServiceswereno treportinglleportablessetsoURAoredis-tribution.

(3)problemreaeportedohe11 .RhbyheCommandernChief,Pattin(CiNCPAC)wastheinterfacefutomatedystemsmongheServiceswithCON USagenciesinvolved. DespiteatandardMILSTRIPSystem.Servicemplementationsottandardizednallasesopermitonlinehandlingt argevolumefransactions. Further,entralizedys-temsdesignedandprogrammedynagency !in-MilitaryDepartmentsomplicatesn 'milledcommandersolemattainingystemsompatabilitv."*'|h*putm'Mt!h - \nm, \gi^i -Sue! '1' " M.IIUMUIIKI Ml f t ? . ; .'\\u- i!Kit..>- i.-n -. t.Ot ,,,t.. \;.(pi.:.tt v IM^t"!.( ! ' ""('|!.[-!|"!l>t.t':i'l! ! '(;. I':,'(.Vr, ! .! ., \ ,*--,''* I:. "S..'. .If)h - |'|*>,;!.if! : i II!I. i'i ir It< !i'-- if-'! ? ' ' M! r r ' i" if ' * ''.' ' . i' < iV ..''Hi'.hjiMltrrv,'l'titu itlit! it ht'f.'MliHI., c I"! : < ' \U U '.V.'. i\r'imint!f rvti in.!. v--;!;..tt*u, ,,*,..*.,

4.1


45/68

EXCESSES (4) OtherproblemareaswiththeURAsystemwhichwereeportedbyCINCPACareistedbelow:10

(a )heurrentcreeningtimeof40 dayswasexcessiveandnonresponsive.(b)URAwasnotntheequisitioninghainwithCONUS. ThisnecessitatedamanualhallengeprocedureoensurehatmaterieloehippedromCONUSwasothenavailablenACOM.(c)heuseofFEXs, IR s;ndtheeviewfavailabilityilesausedproce-duralproblemsbecauseheywerenon-MILSTRIPprocedures.(d)hepastandpresentfundingpolicyausedontinuousproblems.

6. NEWEVELOPMENTSa.roblemareasntheURAystemedCINCPACoproposehatewproceduresorPURA bemplementedoeducecreeningimesandncreaseeutihzationates. Aftereceiv-in gServiceommentson theproposalheASDI&L)decidedhat,whileheonceptepresentedanmprovementoverhepresentystem,twasyomeansanoptimumystemunderwhichoverseasexcesseswhereverheymightdevelop,couldbedealtwithdirectlyndpromptlyoensuremaximummaterielutilization. Itwasalsooncludedhatheproposedystemwasot compatiblewithheServices'emergingmaterielmanagementystemsndcouldnotemple-mentedprioroanuary972.b.heASD(I&L)did,however,oncludehatheedistributionandutilizationfACOM excesseswasaproblemwhichneededoedealtwithmmediatelySopposedoaong-rangeprogram. In a February970memorandumedirectedheServicesoeffectmprovementsinhepresentURAsystemreferredoasQuickFixURA)ntheollowingareas:1!

(1 )Improvedupplydiscipline,fullusefURA,andcompliancewithtsproce-duresbyallmilitaryervices. Thissanurgentmatterorommandattention. If everyactiv-itynACOMwouldeporttsexcessassetsoURApromptlyndwouldmakeeveryeffortoutilizealloffersmadeyURA ,tsbelievedeutihzationateswouldlimbuarkedlv.(2)ReducedScreeningTimes. Presentimeramesareunnecessarilyxtendedandcanbehortenedsignificantlyy1)promptactionbyCONUSCPsnprovidingpromptnd

completedispositionnstructionsotheholdingactivitieswhenequested,and2)nex{>edited andconcurrentDefenseLogisticsServicesCenterDLSC)creeningfssetseportedasex-cessoCPneeds.(3 )AdditionalPeripheralADPE. PURAoperatingpersonnelav endicatedhatwithminorADPEugmentationheveletURAcouldIK-x|>ediiediguiticantlvndvolumeexpanded. Suchaugmentation,fpromptlyandallydentifiedanprobablvemadevailablefromxistingDefenseassets.(4)ClosedLoopReporting. Itsssential establishlosedoo preporting< de-termineheeffectivenessfystemoperations."

c.ointworktmiroupunderheeadershipofASD(l&L)developedar|*sed thodofccomplishingQuuk-Fix"URA. FollowingServiceeviewndncoriratio> ]mostN\ic euchestionsURAQuak-Fix"ConcurrentScreeningProcedureswerepublishedit1 'April1970seeAppendixA). Theseewproceduresrepresentlycheduled< rmplementationnIOctober970.1IN.J.jif-,'.,.>,-:,, u.*.'.


46/68

EXCESSES (1 )hencommentingonCINCPAC'sproposedchaagestoURA ,theArmyecom-mendedthatDSAinitiate tudyoascertainthefeasibilityfCONUSICPsLSCassumingthepresentfunctionsofURA . ASD(I&L)onsideredtheproposaloundanddirectedthatDSA takeheeadindevelopingandrecommendinganoptimumystemordealingwithoverseasexcesses,whichwouldbeapablefimplementationby anuary97 2ndcompatiblewithServices1emergingmaterielmanagementsystems.(2)heointstudygroupdevelopedaconceptinaccordancewiththeASD(I&L)guid-

ance,whichwaspresentedtoheServicesandDSA. TheunanimouspositionofheServicesandDSA washatthisproposedconceptwouldbencompatiblewithemergingmaterielmanagementsystems. Analternativeonceptwasdevelopedbyhetudygroupwhichwillprovideentralizedscreeningofworldwideexcessesatoneocation(DLSC),therebyeliminatingtheequirementforPURAandMARCEseeAppendixB) . TheServices,DSA,andGSAhaveoncurrednthebasicconceptwithheunderstandingthattheoperatingprocedureswillhaveformalServicegencystaffingpriorofinalapproval.7. CONCLUSIONSNDECOMMENDATIONS

a.onclusions(1 )oint-in-timeiguresonotalexcesseson handduotprovideanadequateyard-stickformeasuringServiceperformancenthepreventionandmanagementofexcessespara-graphs and3) .(2)onsistentdataun cumulativeworldwidexcessbyServicesoturrentlyavailableparagraph). (3)orldwideexcesses,bothpotentialanddeclared,houldbeeportedbyeachService,usingconsistenteportingcriteriahatwillallowmeaningfulanalysisofdatacollected(paragraph2).(4 )tilizationanddispositionfexcessesisaccomplishedbydirectnterrogationbetweenCPsandbyhreeeparateorganizations,DLSC,URA,andMARCEparagraph).(5)LSC,URA ,andMARCEhaveotachievedmaximumpotentialffectivenessintheutilizationanddistributionofexcessesparagraph). (6 )LSC,URA ,andMARCEhavemajordifferencesntheiroperationalproce-duresandbothDLSCandURAhaveignificantproblemswithurrentoperationsparagraph). (7)SDI&L)hasrecognizedtheproblemwithURAanddirectedatudyorCPsDLSCoassumeheunctionsofURAby anuary972paragraph6).(8 )heointstudygroupproposedscreeningystemoroverseasexcessesseeAppendixB)wouldtandardizean dentralizehexcesscreeningprocessandhouldeliminatemanyfheproblemswithhecurrentystemndmproveutilizationofworldwidexcessma-terielparagraph6).1 9 } Excessesaregeneratedbothnpeacetimeandwartime;herefore,apermanentsystemorheutilizationan ddispositionofexcessesswarrantedparagraph* *i\d61 .

b.ecommendations. TheBoardecommendshat:(EX-2) ThedministrateorheDelenseMaterielUtilizationProgram.Director,DefenseupplyAgency,ncoordinationwithheServices,eviewurrentxcesseportingys-temsndecommendaeportingvstemhatwillprovideomparabledatanaingleeportshowingyServiceworldwidexcesses,othpotentialnddeclaredconclusions\).2*.and(3)).

4 f >


47/68

EXCESSES(EX-3) TheAssistantSecretaryo!DefenseInstallationsandLogist ics)approvetheconceptofasingleworldwideexcessscreeningactivi tyunderthecontroloftheDefenseSupply Agency . TheDefenseSupplyAgencyshouldbechargedtodevelop,inclosecoordinationwithth eServices,standardsystemsandproceduresrequiredtoimplementthisconcept(conclusions(4),(5),(6),(7),(8),and(9)).

)

46

1

I


48/68

CHAPTERVSUMMARY

i


49/68

rmcsxnmPAU W U W O Tmm

CHAPTERVSUMMARY

1 . OVERVIEW a.nlarge-scalemilitaryoperations,theessationofhostilitiesorphase-backofopera-tionshasalwaysresultedinlargequantitiesof materielbeingleftoverandcreatedtheproblemsof makingthebestuseofthismaterielfromhepointsofviewfreadinessandeconomy. DuringtheVietnamonflict,theDepartmentofDefensehasgivenintensiveattentiontothedentificationofquantitiesxcesstoimmediateneedswhileheconflicthasbeenin process,andtotheedis-tributionorxpeditiousdisposalofthesexcesses.b.om eexcessesareunavoidable. Someesultromeasonableprudencenprovidingforpossibleemergencies.thersare,toalargedegree,avoidable. Themportancefreducingtheattertoaminimumhaybeenforciblybroughtou tbyexperiencesntheVietnamonflict,andgoesbeyondcostreductionandeffectiveuseofassets. Thedeliveryofunnecessarymaterieltoacombatarea,withtshandlingandstorage,aturatesogisticapabilitiesanddegradestheef-fectivenessandefficiencywithwhichimportantneedsoftheoperatingforcesarefulfilled particularlynthenitialtagesoftheonflict.c.hegoaloftheDepartmentofDefensehasbeenoreduceavoidableexcessesotheminimumandtohaveo[,.sticystemsnbeingthatprovideorhearlydentificationofallo- tentialexcesses,maximumedistributionofpotentialxcessmaterieloatisfyotherDepart-mentofDefenseequirements,andthexpeditiousdisposalofexcessesthatareotequiredby theDepartmentofDefense. SincetheKoreanWar,ubstantialffortshavebeenmadeoncreasetheutilizationofexcessmateriel. In962theDefenseLogisticsServiceCenter,partfheDe -fenseupplyAgency,wastaskedwithaproject,Proceduresfor ngSupplyAssetUtilizationandScreeningPLUS),designedtomoreeffectivelydeterminetheta' 3ofmaterielatnventoryControlPointswhichwasavailableforransferosatisfyequirementsofothernventoryCon-trolPoints. In effect,theDefenseLogisticsServiceCenterervesasthefinallearinghouse

fortheutilizationnadredistributionofexcessestocomponentsoftheDepartmentofDefense. It isnoteworthy,however,thatthebulkofutilizationandredistributionofexcessmaterielsac-complishedbetweentheServicesbydirectnterrogation. In additiontotheDefenseLogisticsServiceCenter,herearetw ootherorganizationsnowhargedbytheSecretaryfDefensewiththeutilizationanddispositionofexcessesngeographicareas,hePacificUtilizationandRedis-tributionAgencyardtheMaterielAssetsRedistributionCenter,EuropeMARCE) . ThePacificUtilizationandRedistributionAgencysoperatedbyheArmyoprocessexcessesntheWest-ernPacific,andtheMaterielAssetsRedistributionCenter,Europe,soperatedbyheAirForceorheedistributionofexcessesnEurope.d.heServiceshavedentifiedmorethan$1billionofexcessmaterielntheWesternPacificasaesultftheVietnamWar,ofwhichmorehantwo-thirdshasbeenedistributedto meetvalidDepartmentofDefenseequirements.e.ubstantialquantitiesofmaterielxcesstotheoperatingequirementswerentroducedintoVietnamndtheWesternPacificreaearlynhewar. Somefhismaterielwashipped

toVietnamwithunitsduringearlvdeployments;however,mostfheexcesseswereentoVietnamviathepush"orpull"upplyystemsoftheServices. Duringate96 7sthebuildupwasnearmgompletion,excessesbegantoattracteriousattention. ForheustimenthehistoryfUnitedStateswarfare,extensivemanagementprogramswereundertakenduringopen conflictopurifvtockageevels;u'identify,edistribute,oretrogradexcesstocks,ndocancelorrustratecheduledhipmentsofargo.f.hefiintLogisticsReviewhoardexperienceddifficultyndentifyingtheotalumula-tivevaluefpotentialxcessmaterielgeneratedon aworldwideba.^isdu run:heVietnamra.Tw oeportsave>eendentifiedhatprovidenformation< > n theta'us|potentialxcesses.

40


50/68

EXCESSESTheseareheReportofUtilizationTransfersofSupplySystemStocksDDForm461)ndtheChangesinAppropriationFinancedInventoriesDDForm138)eport. Neitheroftheeportsprovidestop-levelmanagementwithnformationthatisconsistentmongorwithintheServiceson thennualcumulativevaiueanddispositionofworldwidepotentialxcesses.

g. Atpresentmmediateattentionisbeingfocusedntheutilizationan dedistributionof assetsntheWesternPacificreayhePacificUtilizationandRedistributionAgency. Meas-uresarebeingtakentoimprovehepresentPacificUtilizationan dRedistributionAgencyys-temoensureitsfulluseandcompliancewithitsproceduresyallmilitaryservices,oreducescreeningtimes,oprovideadditionalperipheralautomaticdataprocessingequipment,andto establishlosedloopreporting. In addition,underheguidancefheAssistantSecretaryfDefenseInstallationsandLogistics),aong-rangeonceptofentralizedcreeningfworldwideexcessesatoneocationisbeingexplored,whichmayosultneliminatingtheequirementsorbothhePacificUtilizationan dRedistributionAgencyandheMaterielAssetsRedistributionCenter,Europe. Thebalancefhishapterummarizeshemajoressonsearnedthroughhe Board'seviewfheausesofVietnamxcessesan dworldwidecreeningprocesses,andiststheecommendationsdevelopedwithinhemonograph.2. VIETNAMXCESSES

a.essonsLearned(1 )heVietnamxperiencehasndicatedhathemajorityfthematerielhatbe-comesexcesstothentendeduseranbeedistributedtoatisfyvalidDODrequirements. T.essthanone-thirdofthepotentialxcessesdentifiedthusarasaesultftheVietnamWarhavebeenreportedtopropertydisposalofficers.(2)omeexcessesareunavoidabledaringawar. Consequently,hebestogisticsyste