Local Government Privatization: New Challenges in Governmental Reform Mildred E. Warner Presented at Government Restructuring, Privatization, Regulation.

Local Government Privatization:New Challenges in Governmental

Reform

Mildred E. Warner

Presented at Government Restructuring, Privatization, Regulation and Competition

June 23, 2009

Grup de Recerca en Polítiques Públiques i Regulació EconòmicaHarvard University, Boston, MA

Cornell University, Dept. of City and Regional Planning,[email protected] http://government.cce.cornell.edu

Overview

Late 20th century experiment to expand role of markets in local government service delivery

Privatization experience uneven Lack of cost savings (Bel and Warner 2008a, 2008b, Bel

Fageda and Warner 2009) Exacerbates inequality, does not promote citizen voice

(Warner 2006, Warner and Hefetz 2002) Reversals appear in the late 1990s Not a return to old bureaucratic delivery, instead

A shift to a new mixed position – markets and public delivery Rebalancing Governmental Reform – Pragmatic Approach What is the new research agenda?

Limits of markets, critical role of the public sector Hybrid forms, cooperation to gain scale

Shifting Trends in Privatization

1980s-1990s New Public Management – Emphasized competition and efficiency

1990s-2000s Transactions Costs – Emphasizes the challenges of contract management

2000s New Public Service – Emphasizes citizen engagement and satisfaction

2008 Financial Crisis – New Role for the State in Propping up Markets

The new reforms are a search for balance

Privatization reforms were motivated by concern with government failure Oversupply of public goods, budget

maximizing bureaucrats, inflexible, unresponsive government, lack of choice

Current financial crisis raises attention to market failure Inadequate assessment of risk Lack of fail safe delivery Collusion and corruption Need for regulation

From Government Failure to Market Failure

Market Failures in Public Contracting

Competition is hard to ensure Many public services are natural monopolies Competition erodes Government must structure the market

Need for Failsafe Delivery Loss of internal intelligence and control Transfer risk to public sector

High Costs of Contracting Transactions costs (information asymmetries,

structuring contracts) Leads to relational contract (collusion)

Democracy ≠ Markets Accountability challenges Preference alignment problems Need for public participation in service delivery

Role of Government in the Market Ensure a competitive market

Regulation Act as market player

Manage a Collaborative Network Government money makes all organizations public

(Bozeman) Networks need a central coordinating role (Milward and

Provan) How to avoid collusion?

Insurer of Last Resort As in the current financial crisis

No longer believe we can contract out and walk away

Learning from Past Reforms -Need to Balance Market and State

Institutional Framework for Markets is Socially Constructed Often lags market development (eg Post Socialist

Transition) Requires governmental capacity (regulatory standards,

anti-trust law, enforcement capacity) Many Public Services are Natural Monopolies – public

monopoly better than competition (Warner and Bel 2008) Human Interaction is more than market exchange:

Redistribution, reciprocity, engagement Privatization shifted the social contract, undermined

citizen rights to services Community building is the ultimate public good

Public services provide the mechanisms for citizens to learn to engage heterogeneous differences

Role of Government In Service Delivery

Market player or market manager? Can government promote competition?

Direct Provider, or some form of hybrid public/private firm? What role for public management? Is this a return to government enterprise?

Inter-Governmental Cooperation Gain scale, ensure accountability? Stay public, or go private?

US Large Scale Longitudinal Data

International City County Management Association Surveys of Alternative Service Delivery 1982, 1988, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 U.S. Census of Governments Finance Files (same years) Scope:

64 specific services 6 service delivery options (entirely public, mixed

public/private, for profit, non profit, inter-municipal cooperation, franchises

Factors motivating restructuring (approx 75) Sample Frame:

All cities over 10,000, All counties over 25,000. Response rate 31% - 1444 municipalities in 1992,

32% -1460 in 1997, 24% -1133 municipalities in 2002, 26%-1599 municipalities 2007

US Privatization Peaked in 1997

Average provision as % of total provisionSource: International City/ County Management Association, Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data, 1982, 1988, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007

Delivery Modes All Years

4

5259

5054

1115 1618

1519 1717

5450

15

30

45

60

1992 (N=1444) 1997 (N=1460) 2002 (N=1133) 2007 (N=1474)

per

cen

t

Public Employee Entirely Intermunicipal Cooperation

Privatization to For-Profit Privatization to Non-Profit

Why are the Trends Flat? Some governments do a lot; many do little (6 of 35

services on average) Government has always used private providers

Privatization - new name for longstanding practice Government service provision is dynamic

New services, service shedding, contracting out and contracting back-in

Government managers use a variety of mechanisms to secure public service delivery Internal Reform (direct public delivery) –common and

stable Mixed Public and Private Delivery – dynamic Inter-municipal Cooperation – to gain scale Contracting out and back-in (reversals) – dynamic

Most Delivery is Stable (contract or public), Experimentation is at the Margin

1997 to 2002

Stable Public

43%

Back-in

18%New Cont. 12%

Stable Cont.27%

2002 to 2007

Stable Cont. 29%

New Cont. 12%

Stable Public

46%

Back-in

13%

1992 to 1997

Stable Cont.27%

Back-in

11%

Stable Public

44%

New Cont.18%

Average percent of total provision across all places.Source: ICMA Survey of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 Washington DC. US Municipalities Paired samples. N=500-600 (Hefetz and Warner 2004, 2007)

Why Contract Back-In? ICMA survey 2007

245 governments reporting 61% Service quality was not satisfactory 50% Cost savings were insufficient 37% Local government efficiency improved 17% Strong political support to bring service

back in house 17% Problems with contract specification

Shifting Trends in Privatization U.K., Australia, New Zealand were early

innovators Moderating Position in Last Decade

Disappointment with lack of cost savings Recognize a broader set of concerns than just

cost efficiency Reversals – end of CCT in UK, reverse

privatization in US, Australia and New Zealand

Privatization Levels Higher in Europe than US Reflects more flexible organizational forms

Pragmatic, dynamic, mixed market/government position emerging

Hybrid Approaches: Mixed Market or Public/Private Firm?

US “Free Market” US preference for market competition Primary concern with government failure and

with avoiding public monopoly Strategy – Pursue competitive mixed market

or prop up private market Spain/Latin America “Social Market”

Recognize a wider role for the State and benefits of monopoly

Strategy - Mixed public/private firms Both approaches try to balance New Public

Management and Transaction Cost concerns

Hybrid Approaches

Mixed Market Delivery Mixed Firm – Public/Private Hybrid Governance Network on Public and Private

Actors Informal Economy (no government) Club Goods – voluntary bargaining for public

goods

Importance of Mixed Delivery

Dynamic Process of Innovation and Reform

Source: International City/ County Management Association, Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 Washington DC. (Warner and Hefetz 2008) Sample Size 1100-1500 US municipalities nationwide

28 3318

30

1817 18

52

24

5954 50

0

100

1992 1997 2002 2007

Survey Years

PC

T o

f P

rovis

ion

Direct PublicDelivery

MixedPublic/PrivateDelivery

CompleteContracting Out

What is Mixed Market Delivery?

Benchmarking – information asymmetries Market Management – create competition Redundancy – ensure failsafe delivery Work sharing – network governance or inter-

firm alliances Public Engagement – ensure public

participation in the delivery process

What Explains Mixed Market Provision?

Miranda and Lerner 1995 Redundancy is efficient – reduces costs, creates

competition, ensures failsafe delivery Benchmarking – track process and costs by

remaining in service delivery (transaction costs)Warner and Hefetz 2008 (Probit and GEM

models) Rise in mixed delivery explained by efforts to:

decrease costs, ensure competition, manage opposition, ensure citizen satisfaction

Managerial Learning – market management and political management

Shift in meaning of mixed market delivery

1992 – Reinvention - Mixed delivery associated with efforts to reduce costs and increase competition, and explore new contracting

1997 - Managerial Learning - Professional managers recognize the need to mix even as the level of total contracting out is rising - use competitive bidding

2002 – Managing for Public Service – all managers see need to mix delivery, recognize problems with lack of competition. Increased attention to citizen satisfaction.

Warner & Hefetz 2008, Public Administration Review, “Understanding Mixed Delivery…”

Future Research Questions

Is there a future to promoting competitive mixed markets? U.S. mixed delivery down again in 2007

What about a more collaborative mixed market? Public Private Partnerships Networks Hybrid Firms

Will this raise its own challenges – collusion, management and accountability?

Mixed: Hybrid Firms

Public/Private Firms – Private operates under commercial law (labor

flexibility) Public accountability rules still apply

Common alternative in Spain in water and waste

Common in Latin America – Does it matter who has controlling share –

public or private? Does it matter if private partner is foreign (free

trade rules apply)?

Hybrid Firms: Water and Solid Waste

Case: Spain Benefits:

Public Side: Public Control, Public Values (coverage, equity, accountability, socialize monopoly rents)

Private Side: Commercial management, labor flexibility More stable form of ‘privatization’ Enjoy benefits of monopoly but manage its costs. Recognizes lack of competition.

Europe has both higher and more stable privatization.Probably due to higher use of hybrid firms

Warner and Bel, 2008, “Competition or Monopoly…” Public Administration

Hybrid Firms: Berlin Transit

Purpose to lower costs and bargaining power of labor – cross train drivers, increase flexibility

Public controls routes, system integration Private coordinates drivers on bus and rail lines Most labor shedding and efficiency gains occurred on

public side as part of public planning and coordination Once private contractor was unionized, ‘efficiency’

advantages disappeared Are hybrid firms just a strategy to reduce labor power

and benefits?Swarts, Doug 2009. Masters Thesis, Cornell.

Future Research Questions:Hybrid Firms

Which law will apply? Civil or Commercial, or new Hybrid Law? What happens to public accountability, labor

relations? What Criteria will we measure?

Costs, Quality, Security, Accountability How do we promote process improvement –

real efficiency gains? What benefits or risks occur when the firm is

foreign? (e.g. Spanish firm in Latin America or US) Do free trade rules make a difference?

International Governance Regimes

Free Trade Agreements (GATS, NAFTA) Promote Privatization but undermine Coasian Requirements Clear Property Rights – Superior Property Rights for

Foreign Investors (compensation for regulatory takings)

Adjudicatory Mechanism – Substitute private arbitration for the public courts

Balanced Bargaining Position – Local government regulations subject to international harmonization and foreign investor challenge

Gerbasi and Warner 2007, Administration and Society Ironically, these features undermine the ability of

local government to use private markets for public goods delivery

Networks for Service Provision

Shift from government to governance networks Looser structure than hybrid firms More flexibility, more competition Linked through interdependence and

contracting Public Private Partnerships, Collaborative

Networks Common and growing

Networks: Job Training

Case: Job Training US vs Germany Replace former government contracting with greater

consumer choice (voucher) to stimulate more competition and choice in supply.

Result – under supply training in rural areas and in key job categories

Information asymmetries, risk to providers due to uncertain demand

Preference misalignment

Hipp and Warner, 2006 Social Policy and Administration

Networks: Child Care

Case: US, Netherlands and Australia Promote consumer choice via vouchers to

parents Stimulate private sector supply Supply response best is dense markets

where voucher is high (Netherlands) Low value of vouchers leads to higher use of

lower quality informal care in US Undersupply in rural markets in all 3 countries

(Warner and Gradus, 2009)

Research Questions: Networks

Government needs to be at the center Public Coordination with private contracting

(Barter, Paul, 2008 Policy and Society) Need strong actor at center of network (govt)

(Milward and Provan, JPART) What control does government really have in

a network? Diffused sovereignty throughout the system Harder to manage and ensure accountability Inter-dependence of network is the key (Salaomon 2002, Tools of Government)

Informal Economy and Club Goods

What if government is not at the center, or not even in the game?

Informal Sector – provides many urban services in developing countries

Property Rights proponents herald “spontaneous innovation” of private market solutions to public goods problems (Webster and Lai)

“Club goods” and private interest government are becoming more common models of service provision even in the US

What does this mean for the role of local government?

Part 2: Inter-Municipal Cooperation

Inter-municipal cooperation is the second most common form of local government restructuring in the United States. Now higher than privatization.

Increased academic attention is being given to the potential of such cooperation To gain scale economies and market power Keep the service public Address problems of political fragmentation

US Inter-Municipal Coop Rises in 2007

Average provision as % of total provisionSource: International City/ County Management Association, Profile of Alternative Service Delivery Approaches, Survey Data, 1982, 1988, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007

Delivery Modes All Years

4

5259

5054

1115 1618

1519 1717

5450

15

30

45

60

1992 (N=1444) 1997 (N=1460) 2002 (N=1133) 2007 (N=1474)

per

cen

t

Public Employee Entirely Intermunicipal Cooperation

Privatization to For-Profit Privatization to Non-Profit

Inter-municipal Cooperation:An Approach to Regional Coordination?

Fragmented metropolitan areas in the US make regional integration of service delivery difficult. Local government boundaries do not coincide with the

economic boundaries of the metro area. Political fragmentation leads to inequity

High need inner city Low need but higher tax base suburbs.

Planners’ ideal solution - regionalism Political consolidation politically unpopular. Representative regional government is rare. Inter-municipal cooperation is common.

US Evidence: Metropolitan Differences

Discriminant analysis 1992, 1997, 2002 shows suburbs have wider range of choice - use both inter-municipal cooperation and privatization more than rural or metro places.

Core metro communities rely less on cooperation - have internal economies of scale. Privatization catches up to suburb level by 2002

Rural places tried cooperation and privatization but use drops in 2002 and they rely even more heavily on public provision.

Warner, Social Policy 2006

US Evidence: Efficiency, Equity and Voice

Probit analysis of metro governments (1000 in 1992 & 1997, and 750 in 2002) comparing for profit privatization and inter-municipal cooperation

Efficiency: Governments which use more cooperation and privatization have lower expenditures and higher technical monitoring.

Equity: Richer places privatize more, poorer privatize less. Cooperation is neutral with respect to income and poverty.

Voice: Places with more cooperation gave more attention to citizen voice in 1992 and 1997, but were voice neutral in 2002. Those which privatize more were voice neutral in 1992 and 1997 but gave more attention to citizen voice in 2002.

Warner and Hefetz, 2002, Urban Affairs Review

US Evidence

Levels of privatization and cooperation dropped 1997-2002 Explained by problems

with efficiency, accountability and citizen satisfaction

Warner, 2006 Urban Public Economics Review

Levels rising again in 2007 Monitoring lags

increases in contracting Leads to accountability

problems and reversals Warner and Hefetz ICMA

Yearbook 2009

% Cooperation by Metro Status

5

10

15

20

1992 1997 2002 2007

metro suburb Rural

Spanish Evidence

Cooperation to gain market power Rural municipalities cooperate and then

contract out (51% water 30% waste) (Bel and Fageda 2008)

Such consortiums can lead to lower costs – esp for small rural municipalities (Bel and Mur, 2009, Bel and Costas 2006, Bel and Fageda 2008, González-Gómez and Guardiola, 2009)

May generate more private competition for these markets

Cooperation: Future Research Agenda

Is voluntary cooperation sufficient to address regional inequality? How do we build reciprocity in a fragmented political

system? Can we build regional democratic accountability

structures –or is cooperation just collusion among government officials? Dispersed ownership -> lower incentives for

performance improvement Transaction Costs higher for inter-municipal

cooperation than for privatization Political TC as well as service/market related TC

Cooperation: Future Research Agenda

Is the Spanish approach of cooperating to then privatize a way to help rural communities take advantage of privatization?

Isn’t cooperation just a return to government owned enterprise? Inter-municipal corporations (private labor law,

public accountability) Norwegian data shows municipal corporations

have higher costs and more employment (Sorenson 2007)

References

Warner, M.E. 2008. “Reversing Privatization, Rebalancing Government Reform: Markets, Deliberation and Planning,” Policy and Society.

Bel, G and M.E. Warner 2008, “Does privatization of solid waste and water services reduce costs? A review of empirical studies,” Resources, Conservation & Recycling. 52: 1337-1348

Bel, G. and M. E. Warner 2008b. “Challenging Issues in Local Privatization,” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 26(1): 104-109

Warner, M. E. and G Bel 2008. “Competition or Monopoly? Comparing US and Spanish Privatization,” Public Administration: An International Quarterly, 86(3): 723-736.

Warner, M. E. and A. Hefetz 2008. “Managing Markets for Public Service: The Role of Mixed Public/Private Delivery of City Services,” Public Administration Review,68(1):150-161.

References Warner, M. E. 2009. “Civic Government or Market-Based

Governance? The Limits of Privatization for Rural Local Governments," Agriculture and Human Values 26(1):133-143.

Hipp, Magdalena and Mildred Warner 2008. “Market Forces for the Unemployed? Training Vouchers in Germany and the U.S.” Social Policy and Administration, 42 (1): 77-101

Hefetz, A. and M. E. Warner. 2007. “Beyond the Market vs. Planning Dichotomy: Understanding Privatisation and its Reverse in US Cities,” Local Government Studies, 33(4): 555-572.

Gerbasi, J. and M.E. Warner 2007. “Privatization, Public Goods and the Ironic Challenge of Free Trade Agreements,” Administration and Society, 39(2):127-149.

Warner, M. E. 2006. “Market-Based Governance and the Challenge for Rural Governments: U.S. Trends” Social Policy and Administration 40(6):612-631.

Warner, M.E. and A. Hefetz. 2002 “Applying Market Solutions to Public Services: An Assessment of Efficiency, Equity and Voice,” Urban Affairs Review, 38(1):70-89.