G.R. No. L-33705 April 15, 1977
G.R. No. L-33705 April 15, 1977AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (GASTON GROUP), petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and AIR LINES PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (GOMEZ GROUP), respondentsFacts:
These are two petitions for certiorari (L-33705 and L-35206), consolidated for purposes of decision because they involve more or less the same parties and interlocking issues.L-33705
On January 2, 1971, the ALPAP, represented by Capt. Gomez, who claimed to be its president, filed a petition with CIR praying for certification as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of "all the pilots now under employment by the Philippine Air Lines, Inc, and are on active flight and/or operational assignments." This was opposed by Capt. Gaston who also claimed to be the president alleging that CIR had no jurisdiction over the subject matter because a certification proceeding in the Court of Industrial Relations is not the proper forum for the adjudication of the question as to who is the lawful president of a legitimate labor organization. The Judge thereafter ruled in favor of Gomez.
ALPAP then held a meeting where 221 of the 270 members adopted a resolution amending ALPAPs constitution and by-laws by providing in a new section thereof that Any active member who shall be forced to retire or forced to resign or otherwise terminated for union activities as solely determine' by the Association shall have the option to either continue to be and remain as an active member in good standing or to resign in writing his active membership with the Association.
Gaston then said that the amendment was adopted "In anticipation on the fact that they may be forced to resign or retire because of their 'union activities.' A majority of ALPAP members filed letters of retirement/ resignation from PAL. Thereafter, an election for officers was held resulting to the election of Gaston as president. Those however, who did not tender resignation voted for Gomez as president. On June 3, 1971, ALPAP (Gaston) filed an opposition in Case 101-IPAB to an urgent ex parte motion of the PAL to enjoin the members of ALPAP from retiring or resigning en masse. It claimed that they sought for reinstatement and that their filing of resignations is a valid exercise of their constitutional rights and they could not be deprived of their benefits. The opposition however was denied. L-35206
A labor dispute was certified by the President of the Philippines between ALPAP and PAL and was assigned to Judge Paredes. After conferring with the parties, the Judge issued a return-to-work order, which ordered ALPAP members to return to work and ordered PAL not to suspend or dismiss any employee as result of the strike and failure to comply to the said order shall result to contempt of court. The employees then returned to work but Gaston, however, did not and it resulted to his termination.
PAL then filed an urgent motion with the CIR to enjoin the members of ALPAP from proceeding with their intention to resign/ retire en masse. The judge then issued an order to ALPAP not to strike otherwise they will be terminated. ALPAP then filed an MR alleging that such order subjects them to involuntary servitude. Their MR was denied.
It then resulted to mass resignation and PAL accepted such and the caveat pilots who retired were no longer entitled to benefits as the Pilots acts constituted a violation of the courts order not to strike. Gomez then filed a petition to allow him to represent ALPAP since those who voted for Gaston has already resigned. Gaston and the pilots who resigned then prayed to the CIR that they be reinstated. This was opposed by Gomez and PAL but the judge ordered a dismissal of their opposition and ordered the reinstatement. The CIR however reversed the order of Judge Paredes on the ground that the question of the employee status of the pilots who were seeking reinstatement with PAL has already been raised squarely in Case 2939-MC and resolved by the said tribunal found that the said pilots have already lost their employee status as a consequence of their resignations and/or retirement from PAL which had been duly accepted by the latter.Issue: WON the authorization given by the industrial court to ALPAP (Gomez), in a certification proceeding to take over the corporate name, office and funds of ALPAP is valid.Held:
No. We have made a careful examination of the records of L-33705 and we find the adoption of the resolution introducing the questioned amendment to be substantial compliance with the ALPAP constitution and by-law. Indeed, there is no refutation of the act that 221 out of the 270 members of ALPAP did cast their votes in favor of the said amendment on October 30, 1970 at the ALPAP general membership meeting.Their Court cannot likewise subscribe to the restrictive interpretation made by the court below of the term "labor organization," which Section 2(e) of R.A. 875 defines as any union or association of employees which exist, in whole or in part, for the purpose of the collective bargaining or dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment." The absence of the condition that the court would attach to the statutory concept of a labor organization, as being limited to the employees of particular employer, is quite evident from the law. The emphasis of Industrial Peace Act is clearly on the purposes for which a union or association of employees established rather than that membership therein should be limited only to the employees of a particular employer. Trite to say, under Section 2(h) of R.A 875 "representative" is define as including "a legitimate labor organization or any officer or agent of such organization, whether or not employed by the employer or employee whom he represents." It cannot be overemphasized likewise that labor dispute can exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. (Section 2(j), R.a. 875).There is, furthermore, nothing in the constitution and by-laws of ALPAP which indubitably restricts membership therein to PAL pilots alone. 1 Although according to ALPAP (Gomez) there has never been an instance when a non-PAL pilot became a member of ALPAP, the complete lack of any such precondition for ALPAP membership cannot but be interpreted as an unmistakable authority for the association to accept pilots into its fold though they may not be under PAL's employ.The fundamental assumptions relied upon by the industrial court as bases for authorizing ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the office and funds of ALPAP being, in this Court's opinion, erroneous, and, in the absence of any serious dispute that on December 18-22, 1970 Felix C. Gaston, and four other pilots, were elected by the required majority of ALPAP members as officers of their association, this Court hereby rules that the mentioned authorization to ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the office, funds and name of ALPAP was done with grave abuse of discretion.DUNLOP SLAZENGER (PHILS.), INC.,petitioner, vs.HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and DUNLOP SLAZENGER STAFF ASSOCIATION - APSOTEU,respondents.D E C I S I O NPUNO,J.:In this petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner seeks the annulment of the Resolution and Order, dated July 19, 1997 and October 16, 1997,[1]of the public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment calling for a certification election in its company.It appears that on September 15, 1995, the respondent union filed a Petition for Certification Election among the supervisory, office and technical employees of the petitioner company before the Department of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. III, San Fernando, Pampanga.It alleged that it is a legitimate labor organization,a duly chartered local of the Associated Professional, Supervisory, Office & Technical Employees Union (APSOTEU); that petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of tennis balls and other allied products; that petitioner is an unorganized establishment and there is no certified bargaining agreement that will bar the filing of its petition for certification election; and that no certification election has beenconducted within one (1) year prior to the filing of its petition for certification election.On October 9, 1995, the petitioner company filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss based on three (3) grounds, namely: (1) that the respondent union is comprised of supervisory and rank-and-file employeesand cannot act as bargaining agent for the proposed unit; (2) that a single certification election cannot be conducted jointly among supervisory and rank-and-file employees; and (3) that the respondent union lacks legal standing since it failed to submit its books of accounts.[2]In its Reply filed on December 5, 1995, the respondent union alleged that its members are supervisors and not rank-and-file employees.It averred that all its members are paid monthly by the petitioner company.It alleged that the bargaining unit it seeks to represent is made up of the monthly paid supervisory employees and other personnel who cannot be classified as belonging to the rank-and-file.It further contended that it has no obligation to attach its books of accounts since it is a legitimate labor organization.It urged that the certification election proceeding cannot be used to question the legal personality of a labor organization.[3]On March 4, 1996, however, respondent union submitted its new books of accounts consisting of the Cash Receipts Journal, Cash Disbursements Journal and two (2) ledgers.[4]On July 15, 1996, Mediator Arbiter Ma. Carmen A. Espinosa granted the petition for certification election.Respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed the Arbiter's decision ruling as follows:"x x x"The order of the Med-Arbiter directing the conduct of a certification elections is well and proper."A perusal of the records shows that the bargaining unit that the petitioner seeks to represent has been properly defined and this is composed of all the supervisory employees of the respondent company.We wish to emphasize that the right of supervisory employees to form their own labor organization separate from that of the rank-and-file union has been recognized by law.This is quite clear from the provisions of Article 245 of the Labor Code, as amended, which states:`ART. 245.Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees-managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization.Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank and file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.'"As to the contention of the respondent that the petitioning union is composed of both supervisory and rank and file employees, suffice it to stress that the same is not a sufficient reason that would warrant the dismissal of the present petition.The same can be taken care (sic) of during the pre-election conference thru the exclusion-inclusion proceedings wherein those employees who are occupying rank and file positions will be excluded from the list of eligible voters."Anent the issue on the legitimacy of the petitioner, we agree with the findings of the Med-Arbiter that the petitioner has acquired the requisite legal personality to file the present petition for certification elections.This is shown by the fact that the petitioner has sufficiently complied with the mandatory reportorial requirements provided for under Section 3, Rule II, BookV of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, as amended and as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the cases of Progressive Development Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor, et al., 205 SCRA 802 and Protection Technology Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. 11711, March 1, 1995."[5]Respondent Secretary of Labor denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration; hence, this petition.It is petitioner's submission that:"I"Respondent Secretary acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the respondent union is composed of all the supervisory employees of the [petitioner] company."II"Respondent Secretary acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that even if the respondent union is composed of both supervisory and rank-and-file employees such can be taken cared of during the pre-election conference thru the exclusion-inclusion proceedings."III"Respondent Secretary acted contrary to law and with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the findings of the Med-Arbiter that the respondent union has complied with all the requirements for it to attain the legal personality to file the petition for certification election."[6]The petition is meritorious.We agree with the public respondent that supervisors can be an appropriate bargaining unit.This is in accord with our repeated rulingthat "[a]n appropriate bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, composed of all or less than the entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of law.Otherwise stated, it is a legal collectivity for collective bargaining purposes whose members have substantially mutual bargaining interests in terms and conditions of employment as will assure to all employees their collective bargaining rights.A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining."[7]The critical issue, however, is whether or not the respondent union can file a petition for certification election to represent the supervisory employees of the petitioner company.The resolution of this issue depends on whether the respondent union is composed solely of supervisory employees or of both supervisory and rank-and-file employees.Article 245 of the Labor Code clearly provides that "supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees x x x."To determine who are supervisory and rank-and-file employees reference has to be made to Article 212 (m) of the Labor Code, as amended, as well as Section 1 (t), Rule I, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, viz:'''Managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees.Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment.All employees not falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this Book [these Rules].'"Determining the status of supervisory and rank-and-file employees is not a hard row to hoe in labor law.The test of supervisorystatus as we have repeatedly ruled is whether an employee possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer, which authority should not be merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment.Corrollarily, what determines the nature ofemployment is not the employee's title, but his job description.[8]In the instant case, the list of monthly paid employees submitted by the petitioner company contains the names of about twenty seven (27) supervisory employees, six (6) managerial employees, one (1) confidential employee and twenty six (26) office and technical employees holding various positions.The list reveals that the positions occupied by the twenty six (26) office and technical employees are in fact rank-and-file positions, i.e., A/C mechanic, draftsmen, storemen, motorpool mechanic, secretaries, accounts clerk, company nurses, industrial mechanic, boiler men, laboratory technicians, payroll clerk, welder, purchasing clerk, company drivers and electricians.It is fairly obvious that these positions cannot be considered as supervisory positions for they do not carry the authority to act in the interest of the employer or to recommend managerial actions.It is not decisive that these employees are monthly paid employees.Their mode of compensation is usually a matter of convenience and does not necessarily determine the nature and character of their job.We also do not agree with the ruling of the respondent Secretary of Labor that the infirmity in the membership of the respondent union can be remedied in "the pre-election conference thru the exclusion-inclusion proceedings wherein those employees who are occupying rank-and-file positions will be excluded from the list of eligible voters."Public respondent gravely misappreciates the basic antipathy between the interest of supervisors and the interest of rank-and-file employees.Due to the irreconcilability of their interests we held in Toyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motors Philippines Corporation Labor Union,[9]viz:"x x x"Clearly, based on this provision [Article 245, Labor Code], a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all.It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization.Not being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a petition for certification electionfor the purpose of collective bargaining.It becomes necessary, therefore,anteriorto the granting of an order allowing a certification election, to inquire into the composition of any labor organization whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of the Labor Code."Needless to stress, the respondent union has no legal right to file a certification election to represent a bargaining unit composed of supervisors for so long as it counts rank-and-file employees among its members.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution and Order dated July 19, 1997 and October 16, 1997, in OS-A-10-171-96 of the public respondent are annulled and set aside.No costs.SO ORDERED.CEBU SEAMANS V CALLEJAFacts:A group of deck officers and marine engineers organized themselves into an association and registered the same as a non-stock corporation known as Cebu Seaman's Association, Inc. (CSAI) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The same group subsequently registered its association with the Bureau of Labor Relations as a labor union known as the Seamen's Association of the Philippines, Incorporated (SAPI).SAPI has an existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Aboitiz Shipping Corporation which remitted checked-off dues to SAPI. Later on, a group of union members headed by Manuel Gabayoyo claimed that they are entitled to the custody of the union dues because they were elected as the new set of officers under the supervision of SEC. Another group headed by Dominica Nacua, claiming that they were the duly elected set of officers of the union and therefore entitled to the union dues, filed a complaint to restrain the group of Gabayoyo from representing the union. CSAI represented by the Gabayoyo group, however, claimed that since Nacua was already expelled as officer/member, she has no personality to represent the union.Issue:Whether or not Seamen's Association of the Philippines is a legitimate labor organization, and therefore entitled to the custody of the union duesHeld:No.CSAI is not a legitimate labor organization because it is only registered with SEC. It is the registration of the organization with the Bureau of Labor Relations and not with the SEC which made it a legitimate labor organization with rights and privileges granted under the Labor Code.On the basis of the evidence presented by the parties, SAPI, the legitimate labor union, registered with its office, is not the same association as CSAI, the corporation, insofar as their rights under the Labor Code are concerned. Hence, SAPI and not the CSAI is entitled to the release and custody of union fees with Aboitiz Shipping and other shipping companies with whom it had an existing CBA.The election of the so-called set of officers headed by Manuel Gabayoyo was conducted under the supervision of the SEC. That being the case, the aforementioned set of officers is of the CSAI and not of SAPI. It follows, then, that any proceedings, and actions taken by said set of officers can not, in any manner, affect the union and its members.G.R. No. 96425 February 4, 1992PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER EDGARDO DELA CRUZ and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA (KILUSAN)-TUCP,respondents.Beltran, Bacungan & Candoy for petitioner.Jimenez & Associates co-counsel for petitioner.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:The controversy in this case centers on the requirements before a local or chapter of a federation may file a petition for certification election and be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the petitioner's employees.Petitioner Progressive Development Corporation (PDC) filed this petition forcertiorarito set aside the following:1) Resolution dated September 5, 1990, issued by respondent Med-Arbiter Edgardo dela Cruz, directing the holding of the certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of PDC:2) Order dated October 12, 1990, issued by the respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment, denying PDC's appeal; and3) Order dated November 12, 1990, also issued by the respondent Secretary, denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.On June 19, 1990, respondent Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa (KILUSAN) -TUCP (hereinafter referred to as Kilusan) filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of the petitioner alleging that it is a legitimate labor federation and its local chapter, Progressive Development Employees Union, was issued charter certificate No. 90-6-1-153. Kilusan claimed that there was no existing collective bargaining agreement and that no other legitimate labor organization existed in the bargaining unit.Petitioner PDC filed its motion to dismiss dated July 11, 1990 contending that the local union failed to comply with Rule II Section 3, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, which requires the submission of: (a) the constitution and by-laws; (b) names, addresses and list of officers and/or members; and (c) books of accounts.On July 16 , 1990, respondent Kilusan submitted a rejoinder to PDC's motion to dismiss claiming that it had submitted the necessary documentary requirements for registration, such as the constitution and by-laws of the local union, and the list of officers/members with their addresses. Kilusan further averred that no books of accounts could be submitted as the local union was only recently organized.In its "Supplemental Position Paper" dated September 3, 1990, the petitioner insisted that upon verification with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), it found that the alleged minutes of the organizational meeting was unauthenticated, the list of members did not bear the corresponding signatures of the purported members, and the constitution and by-laws did not bear the signature of the members and was not duly subscribed. It argued that the private respondent therefore failed to substantially comply with the registration requirements provided by the rules. Additionally, it prayed that Med-Arbiter Edgardo dela Cruz inhibit himself from handling the case for the reason that he allegedly had prejudged the same.In his September 5, 1990 resolution, Med Arbiter dela Cruz held that there was substantial compliance with the requirements for the formation of the chapter. He further stated that mere issuance of the charter certificate by the federation was sufficient compliance with the rules. Considering that the establishment was unorganized, he maintained that a certification election should be conducted to resolve the question of representation.Treating the motion for reconsideration filed by the PDC as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary, Undersecretary Laguesma held that the same was merely a "reiteration of the issues already ventilated in the proceedings before the Med-Arbiter, specifically, the matter involving the formal organization of the chapter." (Rollo, p. 20) PDC's motion for reconsideration from the aforementioned ruling was likewise denied. Hence, this petition.In an order dated February 25, 1991, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the public respondents from carrying out the assailed resolution and orders or from proceeding with the certification election. (Rollo, pp. 37-39)It is the petitioner's contention that a labor organization (such as the Kilusan) may not validly invest the status of legitimacy upon a local or chapter through the mere expedient of issuing a charter certificate and submitting such certificate to the BLR (Rollo, p. 85) Petitioner PDC posits that such local or chapter must at the same time comply with the requirement of submission ofduly subscribedconstitution and by-laws, list of officers and books of accounts. (Rollo, p. 35) PDC points out that the constitution and by-laws and list of officers submitted were not duly subscribed. Likewise, the petitioner claims that the mere filing of the aforementioned documents is insufficient; that there must be due recognition or acknowledgment accorded to the local or chapter by BLR through a certificate of registration or any communication emanating from it. (Rollo, p. 86)The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondent, avers that there was a substantial compliance with the requirements for the formation of a chapter. Moreover, he invokes Article 257 of the Labor Code which mandates the automatic conduct by the Med-Arbiter of a certification election in any establishment where there is no certified bargaining agreement.The Court has repeatedly stressed that the holding of a certification election is based on a statutory policy that cannot be circumvented. (Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA 749 [1989]; Belyca Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja, 168 SCRA 184 [1988]; George and Peter Lines, Inc. v. Associated Labor Unions, 134 SCRA 82 [1986]). The workers must be allowed to freely express their choice in a determination where everything is open to their sound judgment and the possibility of fraud and misrepresentation is eliminated.But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the automatic conduct of a certification election in an unorganized establishment, it also requires that the petition for certification election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. Article 242 enumerates the exclusive rights of a legitimate labor organization among which is the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.Meanwhile, Article 212(h) defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE andincludes any branch or local thereof." (Emphasis supplied) Rule I, Section 1 (j), Book V of the Implementing Rules likewise defines a legitimate labor organization as "any labor organization duly registered with the DOLE andincludes any branch, local or affiliate thereof. (Emphasis supplied)The question that now arises is: when does a branch, local or affiliate of a federation become a legitimate labor organization?Ordinarily, a labor organization acquires legitimacy only upon registration with the BLR. Under Article 234 (Requirements of Registration):Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements:(a) Fifty-pesos (P50.00) registration fee;(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutes of the organizational meeting and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty 20% percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seek to operate;(d) If the applicant has been in existence for one or more years, copies , of its annual financial reports; and(e) Four copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, the minutes of its adoption or ratification and the list of the members who participated in it.And under Article 235 (Action on Application)The Bureau shall act on all applications for registration within thirty (30) days from filing.All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization, as the case may be, and attested to by its president.Moreover, section 4 of Rule II, Book V of the Implementing Rules requires that the application should be signed by at least twenty percent (20%) of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and be accompanied by a sworn statement of the applicant union that there is no certified bargaining agent or, where there is an existing collective bargaining agreement duly submitted to the DOLE, that the application is filed during the last sixty (60) days of the agreement.The respondent Kilusan questions the requirements as too stringent in their application but the purpose of the law in prescribing these requisites must be underscored. Thus, inPhilippine Association of Free Labor Unions v.Secretary of Labor, 27 SCRA 40 (1969), the Court declared:The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. The registration prescribed in Paragraph (b) of said section is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or without said registration. The latter is merely a conditionsine qua nonfor the acquisition of legal personality by the labor organizations, associations or unions and the possession of the "rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations." The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and the privileges, much less said personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of whichregistration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses, fraud or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and unions of workers are engaged affect public interest, which should be protected. Furthermore, the obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation of a certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the members of the organization, considering that the same generally solicits funds or membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts of money due to them or to the organization. (Emphasis supplied)But when an unregistered union becomes a branch, local or chapter of a federation, some of the aforementioned requirements for registration are no longer required. The provisions governing union affiliation are found in Rule II, Section 3, Book V of the Implementing Rules, the relevant portions of which are cited below:Sec. 3. Union affiliation;direct membership with national union. An affiliate of a labor federation or national union may be a local or chapter thereof or an independently registered union.a) The labor federation or national union concerned shall issue a charter certificate indicating the creation or establishment of a local or chapter, copy of which shall be submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations within thirty (30) days from issuance of such charter certificate.b) An independently registered union shall be considered an affiliate of a labor federation or national union after submission to the Bureau of the contract or agreement of affiliation within thirty (30) days after its execution.xxx xxx xxxe) The local or chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and by laws, set of officers and books and accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be observed.Paragraph (a) refers to the local or chapter of a federation which did not undergo the rudiments of registration while paragraph (b) refers to an independently registered union which affiliated with a federation. Implicit in the foregoing differentiation is the fact that a local or chapter need not be independently registered. By force of law (in this case, Article 212[h]); such local or chapter becomes a legitimate labor organization upon compliance with the aforementioned provisions of Section 3.Thus, several requirements that are otherwise required for union registration are omitted, to wit:(1) The requirement that the application for registration must be signed by at least 20% of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit;2) The submission of officers' addresses, principal address of the labor organization, the minutes of organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;3) The submission of the minutes of the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by the laws and the list of the members who participated in it.Undoubtedly, the intent of the law in imposing lesser requirements in the case of the branch or local of a registered federation or national union is to encourage the affiliation of a local union with the federation or national union in order to increase the local union's bargaining powers respecting terms and conditions of labor.The petitioner maintains that the documentary requirements prescribed in Section 3(c), namely: the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts, must follow the requirements of law. Petitioner PDC calls for the similar application of the requirement for registration in Article 235 that all requisite documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the organization and attested to by the president.In the case at bar, the constitution and by-laws and list of officers submitted in the BLR, while attested to by the chapter's president, were not certifiedunder oathby the secretary. Does such defect warrant the withholding of the status of legitimacy to the local or chapter?In the case of union registration, the rationale for requiring that the submitted documents and papers be certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, and attested to by president is apparent. The submission of the required documents (and payment of P50.00 registration fee) becomes the Bureau's basis for approval of the application for registration. Upon approval, the labor union acquires legal personality and is entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor organization. The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it is dealing with is abona fideorganization, one which has not submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The inclusion of the certification and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay these apprehensions of management. Not only is the issuance of any false statement and misrepresentation a ground for cancellation of registration (see Article 239 (a), (c) and (d)); it is also a ground for a criminal charge of perjury.The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the commission of fraud. They likewise afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for dubious ends.In the case of the union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements are found in Rule II, Section 3(e), Book V of the Implementing Rules, which we again quote as follows:(c) The local chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts.For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be observed.(Emphasis supplied)Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions" refers to the certification and attestation requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must likewise comply with these requirements. The same rationale for requiring the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists in the case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact compliance with the certification and attestation requirements because, as previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent union registration are no longer required in the case of formation of a local or chapter. The policy of the law in conferring greater bargaining power upon labor unions must be balanced with the policy of providing preventive measures against the commission of fraud.A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon submission of the following to the BLR:1) A charter certificate, within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts all of which are certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by its president.Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor organization.In the case at bar, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the required documentsunder oathis fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate status.We observe that, as borne out by the facts in this case, the formation of a local or chapter becomes a handy tool for the circumvention of union registration requirements. Absent the institution of safeguards, it becomes a convenient device for a small group of employees to foist a not-so-desirable federation or union on unsuspecting co-workers and pare the need for wholehearted voluntariness which is basic to free unionism. The records show that on June 16, 1990, Kilusan met with several employees of the petitioner. Excerpts of the "Minutes of the Organizational/General Membership Meeting of Progressive Development Employees Union (PDEU) Kilusan," are quoted below:The meeting was formally called to order by Bro. Jose V. Parungao, KILUSAN secretary for organization by explaining to the general membership the importance of joining the union. He explained to the membership why they should join a union, and briefly explained the ideology of the Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa-TUCP as a democratically based organization and then read the proposed Constitution and By-Laws, after which said Constitution and By-Laws was duly and unanimously ratified after some clarification.Bro. Jose Parungao was also unanimously voted by the group to act as the chairman of the COMELEC in holding the organizational election of officers of the union.Bro. Jose Parungao, officially opened the table for nomination of candidates after which the election of officers followed by secret balloting and the following were the duly elected officers. (Original Record, p. 25)The foregoing shows that Kilusan took the initiative and encouraged the formation of a union which automatically became its chapter. On June 18, 1990, Kilusan issued a charter certificate in favor of PDEU-KILUSAN (Records, page 1). It can be seen that Kilusan was moving very fast.On June 19, 1990, or just three days after the organizational meeting, Kilusan filed a petition for certification election (Records, pages 2 and 3) accompanied by a copy each of the charter certificate, constitution and by-laws and minutes of the organizational meeting. Had the local union filed an application for registration, the petition for certification election could not have been immediately filed. The applicant union must firstly comply with the "20% signature" requirement and all the other requisites enumerated in Article 234. Moreover, since under Article 235 the BLR shall act on any application for registration within thirty (30) days from its filing, the likelihood is remote that, assuming the union complied with all the requirements, the application would be approved on the same day it was filed.We are not saying that the scheme used by the respondents isper seillegal for precisely, the law allows such strategy. It is not this Court's function to augment the requirements prescribed by law in order to make them wiser or to allow greater protection to the workers and even their employer. Our only recourse is, as earlier discussed, to exact strict compliance with what the law provides as requisites for local or chapter formation.It may likewise be argued that it was Kilusan (the mother union) and not the local union which filed the petition for certification election and, being a legitimate labor organization, Kilusan has the personality to file such petition.At this juncture, it is important to clarify the relationship between the mother union and the local union. In the case ofLiberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v.Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., 66 SCRA 512 [1975]), the Court held that the mother union, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, had the status of anagentwhile the local union remained the basic unit of the association, free to serve the common interest of all its members subject only to the restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the association. Thus, where as in this case the petition for certification election was filed by the federation which is merely an agent, the petition is deemed to be filed by the chapter, the principal, which must be a legitimate labor organization. The chapter cannot merely rely on the legitimate status of the mother union.The Court's conclusion should not be misconstrued as impairing the local union's right to be certified as the employees' bargaining agent in the petitioner's establishment. We are merely saying that the local union must first comply with the statutory requirements in order to exercise this right. Big federations and national unions of workers should take the lead in requiring their locals and chapters to faithfully comply with the law and the rules instead of merely snapping union after union into their folds in a furious bid with rival federations to get the most number of members.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution and orders of respondent Med-Arbiter and Secretary of Labor and Employment, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated February 25, 1991 is made permanent.SO ORDERED.TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS INTERNATIONAL GOLF CLUB INCORPORATED,petitioner,vs. TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS EMPLOYEES UNION-PGTWO,respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO-MORALES,J.:Before this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 is the petition of the Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club Incorporated (THIGCI) assailing the February 15, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals denying its petition to annul the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Resolutions of November 12, 1998 and December 29, 1998.On October 16, 1997, the Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union (THEU)Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO), Local Chapter No. 776, a legitimate labor organization said to represent majority of the rank-and-file employees of THIGCI, filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE Mediation-Arbitration Unit, Regional Branch No. IV.THIGCI, in its Comment[1]filed on November 27, 1997, opposed THEUs petition for certification election on the ground that the list of union members submitted by it was defective and fatally flawed as it included the names and signatures of supervisors, resigned, terminated and absent without leave (AWOL) employees, as well as employees of The Country Club, Inc., a corporation distinct and separate from THIGCI; and that out of the 192 signatories to the petition, only 71 were actual rank-and-file employees of THIGCI.THIGCI thus submitted a list of the names of its 71 actual rank-and-file employees which it annexed[2]to its Comment to the petition for certification election.And it therein incorporated the following tabulation[3]showing the number of signatories to said petition whose membership in the union was being questioned as disqualified and the reasons for disqualification:# of SignaturesReasons for Disqualification13Supervisors of THIGCI6Resigned employees of THIGCI2AWOL employees of THIGCI53Rank-and-file employees of The Country Club at Tagaytay Highlands, Inc.14Supervisors of The Country Club at Tagaytay Highlands, Inc.6Resigned employees of The Country Club at Tagaytay Highlands, Inc.3Terminated employees of The Country Club at Tagaytay Highlands, Inc.1AWOL employees of The Country Club at Tagaytay Highlands, Inc.4Signatures that cannot be deciphered16Names in list that were erased2Names with first names onlyTHIGCI also alleged that some of the signatures in the list of union members were secured through fraudulent and deceitful means, and submitted copies of the handwritten denial and withdrawal of some of its employees from participating in the petition.[4]Replying to THIGCIs Comment, THEU asserted that it had complied with all the requirements for valid affiliation and inclusion in the roster of legitimate labor organizations pursuant to DOLE Department Order No. 9, series of 1997,[5]on account of which it was duly granted a Certification of Affiliation by DOLE on October 10, 1997;[6]and thatSection 5, Rule V of said Department Order provides that the legitimacy of its registrationcannot be subject to collateral attack, and for as long as there is no final order of cancellation, it continues to enjoy the rights accorded to a legitimate organization.THEU thus concluded in its Reply[7]that under the circumstances, the Med-Arbiter should, pursuant to Article 257 of the Labor Code and Section 11, Rule XI of DOLE Department Order No. 09, automatically order the conduct of a certification election.By Order of January 28, 1998,[8]DOLE Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin ordered the holding of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of THIGCI in this wise, quotedverbatim:We evaluated carefully this instant petition and we are of the opinion that it is complete in form and substance.In addition thereto,the accompanying documents show that indeed petitioner union is a legitimate labor federation and its local/chapter was duly reported to this Office as one of its affiliate local/chapter.Its due reporting through the submission of all the requirements for registration of a local/chapter is a clear showing that it was already included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations in this Office pursuant to Department Order No. 9 Series of 1997 with all the legal right and personality to institute this instant petition.Pursuant therefore to the provisions of Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended, and its Implementing Rules as amended by Department Order No. 9, since the respondents establishment is unorganized, the holding of a certification election is mandatory for it was clearly established that petitioner is a legitimate labor organization.Giving due course to this petition is therefore proper and appropriate.[9](Emphasis supplied)Passing on THIGCIs allegation that some of the union members are supervisory, resigned and AWOL employees or employees of a separate and distinct corporation, the Med-Arbiter held that the same should be properly raised in the exclusion-inclusion proceedings at the pre-election conference.As for the allegation that some of the signatures were secured through fraudulent and deceitful means, he held that it should be coursed through an independent petition for cancellation of union registration which is within the jurisdiction of the DOLE Regional Director.In any event, the Med-Arbiter held thatTHIGCI failed to submit the job descriptions of the questioned employees and other supporting documents to bolster its claim that they are disqualified from joining THEU.THIGCI appealed to the Office of the DOLE Secretary which, by Resolution of June 4, 1998, set aside the said Med-Arbiters Order and accordingly dismissed the petition for certification election on the ground that there is a clear absence of community or mutuality of interests, it finding that THEU sought to represent two separate bargaining units (supervisory employees and rank-and-file employees) as well as employees of two separate and distinct corporate entities.Upon Motion for Reconsideration by THEU, DOLE Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimalipis-Baldoz, by authority of the DOLE Secretary, issued DOLE Resolution of November 12, 1998[10]setting aside the June 4, 1998 Resolution dismissing the petition for certification election.In the November 12, 1998 Resolution,Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz held that since THEU is a local chapter, the twenty percent (20%) membership requirement is not necessary for it to acquire legitimate status, hence, the alleged retraction and withdrawal of support by 45 of the 70 remaining rank-and-file members . . . cannot negate the legitimacy it has already acquired before the petition;that rather than disregard the legitimate status already conferred on THEU by the Bureau of Labor Relations, the names of alleged disqualified supervisory employees and employees of the Country Club, Inc., a separate and distinct corporation, should simply be removed from the THEUs roster of membership;and that regarding the participation of alleged resigned and AWOL employees and those whose signatures are illegible, the issue can be resolved during the inclusion-exclusion proceedings at the pre-election stage.The records of the case were thus ordered remanded to the Office of the Med-Arbiter for the conduct of certification election.THIGCIs Motion for Reconsideration of the November 12, 1998 Resolution having been denied by the DOLE Undersecretary by Resolution of December 29, 1998,[11]it filed a petition for certiorari before this Court which, by Resolution of April 14, 1999,[12]referred it to the Court of Appeals in line with its pronouncement inNational Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Hon. Bienvenido E. Laguesma, et al.,[13]and in strict observance of the hierarchy of courts, as emphasized in the case ofSt. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission.[14]By Decision of February 15, 2000,[15]the Court of Appeals denied THIGCIs Petition for Certiorari and affirmed the DOLE Resolution dated November 12, 1998.It held that while a petition for certificationelection is an exception to the innocentbystander rule, hence, the employer may pray for the dismissal of such petition on the basis of lack of mutuality of interests of the members of the union as well as lack of employer-employee relationship following this Courts ruling inToyota Motor Philippines Corporation v. Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Labor Union et al[16]andDunlop Slazenger [Phils.] v. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment et al,[17]petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence to support its allegations.Hence, the present petition for certiorari, raising the followingISSUES/ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS:THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION DATED 12 NOVEMER 1998 HOLDING THAT SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES AND NON-EMPLOYEES COULDSIMPLYBE REMOVED FROM APPELLEES ROSTER OF RANK-AND-FILE MEMBERSHIP INSTEAD OF RESOLVING THE LEGITIMACY OF RESPONDENT UNIONS STATUSTHE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION DATED 12 NOVEMBER 1998 HOLDING THAT THE DISQUALIFIED EMPLOYEES STATUS COULD READILY BE RESOLVED DURING THE INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION PROCEEDINGSTHE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGATIONS OF PETITIONER HAD BEEN DULY PROVEN BY FAILURE OF RESPONDENT UNION TO DENY THE SAME AND BY THE SHEER WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE INTRODUCED BY PETITIONER AND CONTAINED IN THE RECORDS OF THE CASE[18]The statutory authority for the exclusion of supervisory employees in a rank-and-file union, and vice-versa, is Article 245 of the Labor Code, to wit:Article 245.Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization.Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.While above-quoted Article 245 expressly prohibits supervisory employees from joining a rank-and-file union, it does not provide what would be the effect if a rank-and-file union counts supervisory employees among its members, or vice-versa.CitingToyota[19]which held that a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all, and the subsequent case ofProgressive Development Corp. Pizza Hut v. Ledesma[20]which held that:The Labor Code requires that in organized and unorganized establishments, a petition for certification electionmustbe filed by a legitimate labor organization.The acquisition of rights by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition for certification election,first and foremost, dependsonwhether or not the labor organization has attained the status of a legitimate labor organization.In the case before us, the Med-Arbiter summarily disregarded the petitioners prayer that the former look into the legitimacy of the respondent Union by a sweeping declaration that the union was in the possession of a charter certificate so that for all intents and purposes, Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa sa Pizza Hut (was) a legitimate organization,[21](Underscoring and emphasis supplied),petitioner contends that, quotingToyota,[i]t becomes necessary . . ., anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election, to inquire into the composition of any labor organization whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of the Labor Code.[22]Continuing, petitioner argues that without resolving the status of THEU, the DOLE Undersecretary conveniently deferred the resolution on the serious infirmity in the membership of [THEU] and ordered the holding of the certification election which is frowned upon as the following ruling of this Court shows:We alsodo not agreewith the ruling of the respondent Secretary of Labor that the infirmity in the membership of the respondent unioncan be remediedin thepre-election conferencethru the exclusion-inclusion proceedings wherein those employees who are occupying rank-and-file positions will be excluded from the list of eligible voters.Public respondent gravely misappreciated the basic antipathy between the interest of supervisors and the interest of rank-and-file employees.Due to the irreconcilability of their interest we held inToyota Motor Philippines v. Toyota Motors Philippines Corporation Labor Union, viz:x x xClearly, based on this provision [Article 245], a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all.It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization.Not being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees cannot posses any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining.Itbecomes necessary, therefore,anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election, to inquire into the composition of any labor organization whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of the Labor Code.(Emphasis by petitioner)(Dunlop Slazenger (Phils.), v. Secretary of Labor, 300 SCRA 120 [1998];Underscoring and emphasis supplied by petitioner.)The petition fails.After a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack.It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Section 5 of Rule V, Book IV of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code (Implementing Rules) which section reads:Sec. 5.Effect of registration.The labor organization or workers association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration.Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack,but may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellationin accordance with these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)The grounds for cancellation of union registration are provided for under Article 239 of the Labor Code, as follows:Art. 239.Grounds for cancellation of union registration.The following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration:(a)Misrepresentation, false statement or fraudin connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification;(b) Failure to submit the documents mentioned in the preceding paragraph within thirty (30) days from adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto;(c)Misrepresentation, false statements or fraudin connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to subject these documents together with the list of the newly elected/appointed officers and their postal addresses within thirty (30) days from election;(d) Failure to submit the annual financial report to the Bureau within thirty (30) days after the losing of every fiscal year and misrepresentation, false entries or fraud in the preparation of the financial report itself;(e) Acting as a labor contractor or engaging in the cabo system, or otherwise engaging in any activity prohibited by law;(f) Entering into collective bargaining agreements which provide terms and conditions of employment below minimum standards established by law;(g) Asking for or accepting attorneys fees or negotiation fees from employers;(h) Other than for mandatory activities under this Code, checking off special assessments or any other fees without duly signed individual written authorizations of the members;(i) Failure to submit list of individual members to the Bureau once a year or whenever required by the Bureau; and(j) Failure to comply with the requirements under Articles 237 and 238, (Emphasis supplied),while the procedure for cancellation of registration is provided for in Rule VIII, Book V of the Implementing Rules.The inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraudunder the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of above-quoted Article 239 of the Labor Code.THEU, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered to have already acquired juridical personality which may not be assailed collaterally.As for petitioners allegation that some of the signatures in the petition for certification election were obtained through fraud, false statement and misrepresentation,the proper procedure is, as reflected above, for it to file a petition for cancellation of the certificate of registration, and not to intervene in a petition for certification election.Regarding the alleged withdrawal of union members from participating in the certification election, this Courts following ruling is instructive:[T]he best forum for determining whether there were indeed retractions from some of the laborers is in thecertification election itselfwherein the workers canfreely express their choicein asecret ballot.Suffice it to say that the will of the rank-and-file employees should in every possible instance be determined by secret ballot rather than by administrative or quasi-judicial inquiry.Such representation and certification election cases are not to be taken as contentious litigations for suits but as mere investigations of anon-adversary, fact-finding characteras to which of the competing unions represents the genuine choice of the workers to be their sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative with their employer.[23]As for the lack of mutuality of interest argument of petitioner, it, at all events, does not lie given, as found by the courta quo, itsfailure to present substantial evidence that the assailed employees are actually occupying supervisory positions.While petitioner submitted a list of its employees with their corresponding job titles and ranks,[24]there is nothing mentioned about the supervisors respective duties, powers and prerogatives that would show that they can effectively recommend managerial actions which require the use of independent judgment.[25]As this Court put it inPepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor:[26]Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of subject employees x x x The mere fact that an employee is designated manager does not necessarily make him one.Otherwise, there would be an absurd situation where one can be given the title just to be deprived of the right to be a member of a union.In the case ofNational Steel Corporation vs. Laguesma(G. R. No. 103743, January 29, 1996), it was stressed that:What is essential is thenature of the employees function and not the nomenclature or titlegiven to the job which determines whether the employee has rank-and-file or managerial status or whether he is a supervisory employee.(Emphasis supplied).[27]WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.Let the records of the case be remanded to the office of origin, the Mediation-Arbitration Unit, Regional Branch No. IV, for the immediate conduct of a certification election subject to the usual pre-election conference.SO ORDERED.United Seamens Union v.Davao Shipowners AssociationG.R. No. L-18778 and L-18779 August 31, 1967 J. MakalintalpetitionersUnited Seamen's Union of the Philippines (USUP)respondentsDavao Shipowners Association (DSA), Angtiong Sons and/or Ricardo Ang, owner-manager; Angliongto Sons and Company, Garcia Water Transportation, Court Of Industrial Relationsfacts of the caseOn August 4, 1959, USUP presented a set of demand to DSA, representing the respondent shipping companies, for union recognition, union security, standardization of wages and other benefits. In response, the ship owners brought to the attention of the USUP the existence of a CBA with the Davao Marine Association (DMA), where all of the crewmen of their launches belonged. They suggested to the USUP that they first take the necessary steps for certification as the collective bargaining agent, as the ship owners were bound by the CBA until 1959. However, even before receiving theship owners response to its demands, the USUP had filed a Notice of Strike against the individual ship owners at theDepartment of Labor Davao Office. The Chief of the Labor Operations Section of the Davao Office requested for a conference to solve the conflict. On August 20, 1959, both parties reached a covenant stating the withdrawal of the Notice of Strike, as well as the observance of the status quo regarding the jobs incident to the businesses of the DSA and the withdrawal of the civil case of the DMA against the USUP. It was also stipulated in the contract that the USUP will respect the existing CBA between DSA and DMA, but USUP will file a petition for certification election for determination of union representation. As stipulated, the USUP filed with the CIR a petition for certification election. Subsequent to the covenant, the shipping companies separately served notices of termination upon 64 employees, effecting December 31, 1959, due to different reasons (from stoppage of operations to the death of one of the partners of the shipping companies due to business losses). As a result, USUP reported the terminations to the Department of Labor, which called for a conference. Nevertheless, on December 29, 1959, the USUP notified the Philippine Constabulary, City Mayor, Bureau of Customs and the general public of a strike on January 1, 1960. On February 11, 1960, the shipping companies filed a petition for writ of injunction, as a necessity due to irreparabledamage to properties due to coercion, violence and illegal picketing. On the other hand, on February 24, 1960, theUSUP filed a ULP case against the ship owners and DSA, alleging that the ship owners interfered, and continued to interfere with their right to self-organization by discrimination against employees. CIR however sided with the DSA,dismissing the USUPs ULP case while declaring the strike as illegal.issueWON CIR gravely abused its discretion by declaring the strike as illegal.NO, strike was declared illegal and unjustified by the Supreme Court.ratioThe Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts findings that the USUPs Notice of Strike was but a direct offshoot of the losing effort to compel the DSA and the ship owners to recognize USUP as the sole collective bargaining agent of the employees, to the exclusion of the DMA as the existing collective bargaining agent of the DSA. First, the Court noted that the USUP filed its Notice of Strike even before its receipt of the ship owners answers to its setof demands, thereby showing that the USUP was already set on continuing the strike with or without the answer of the ship owners. This, according to the Court was a clear showing that USUP was aware of the existence of DMA as a validcollective bargaining agent, operating as a legal bar to entertaining USUPs demands.Second, the Court stated that USUP completely disturbed the status quo the return to normal and original operating practices through the strike that was done by USUP. By striking, USUP impaired existing CBA between the ship owners and the DMA which recognized "the right of the Employer to hire, promote and transfer and for legal cause suspend, lay-off or discharge employees subject to the right of the union (referring to the DMA) to notification and to ask reconsideration of any action of the Employer in the premises.UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN V NLRCThis is a petition for review oncertioraripursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul and to set aside the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated October 25, 1982, dismissing the appeal of petitioner in NLRC Case No. RBI-47-82, entitled "University of Pangasinan Faculty Union, complainant, versus University of Pangasinan,Respondent."chanrobles law library : red
Petitioner is a labor union composed of faculty members of the respondent University of Pangasinan, an educational institution duly organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the Philippines.
On December 18, 1981, the petitioner, through its President, Miss Consuelo Abad, filed a complaint against the private respondent with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, Dagupan District Office, Dagupan City. The complaint seeks: (a) the payment of Emergency Cost of Living Allowances (ECOLA) for November 7 to December 5, 1981, a semestral break; (b) salary increases from the sixty (60%) percent of the incremental proceeds of increased tuition fees; and (c) payment of salaries for suspended extra loads.
The petitioners members are full-time professors, instructors, and teachers of respondent University. The teachers in the college level teach for a normal duration of ten (10) months a school year, divided into two (2) semesters of five (5) months each, excluding the two (2) months summer vacation. These teachers are paid their salaries on a regular monthly basis.
In November and December, 1981, the petitioners members were fully paid their regular monthly salaries. However, from November 7 to December 5, during the semestral break, they were not paid their ECOLA. The private respondent claims that the teachers are not entitled thereto because the semestral break is not an integral part of the school year and there being no actual services rendered by the teachers during said period, the principle of "No work, no pay" applies.
During the same school year (1981-1982), the private respondent was authorized by the Ministry of Education and Culture to collect, as it did collect, from its students a fifteen (15%) percent increase of tuition fees. Petitioners members demanded a salary increase effective the first semester of said schoolyear to be taken from the sixty (60%) percent incremental proceeds of the increased tuition fees. Private respondent refused, compelling the petitioner to include said demand in the complaint filed in the case at bar. While the complaint was pending in the arbitration branch, the private respondent granted an across-the-board salary increase of 5.86%. Nonetheless, the petitioner is still pursuing full distribution of the 60% of the incremental proceeds as mandated by the Presidential Decree No. 451.
Aside from their regular loads, some of petitioners members were given extra loads to handle during the same 1981-1982 schoolyear. Some of them had extra loads to teach on September 21, 1981, but they were unable to teach as classes in all levels throughout the country were suspended, although said days was proclaimed by the President of the Philippines as a working holiday. Those with extra loads to teach on said day claimed they were not paid their salaries for those loads, but the private respondent claims otherwise.
The issue to be resolved in the case at bar are the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw libraryI
"WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS MEMBERS ARE ENTITLED TO ECOLA DURING THE SEMESTRAL BREAK FROM NOVEMBER 7 TO DECEMBER 5, 1981 OF THE 1981-82 SCHOOL YEAR.II
"WHETHER OR NOT 60% OF THE INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS OF INCREASED TUITION FEES SHALL BE DEVOTED EXCLUSIVELY TO SALARY INCREASE,III
"WHETHER OR NOT ALLEGED PAYMENT OF SALARIES FOR EXTRA LOADS ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1981 WAS PROVEN BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE."cralaw virtua1aw library
Anent the first issue, the various Presidential Decrees on ECOLAs to wit: PDs 1614, 1634, 1678 and 1713, provide on "Allowances of Fulltime Employees . . ." that "Employees shall be paid in full the required monthly allowance regardless of the number of their regular working days if they incur no absences during the month. If they incur absences without pay, the amounts corresponding to the absences may be deducted from the monthly allowance . . ." ; and on "Leave of Absence Without Pay", that "All covered employees shall be entitled to the allowance provided herein when they are on leave of absence with pay."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is beyond dispute that the petitioners members are full-time employees receiving their monthly salaries irrespective of the number of working days or teaching hours in a month. However, they find themselves in a most peculiar situation whereby they are forced to go on leave during semestral breaks. These semestral breaks are in the nature of work interruptions beyond the employees control. The duration of the semestral break varies from year to year dependent on a variety of circumstances affecting at times only the private respondent but at other times all educational institutions in the country. As such, these breaks cannot be considered as absences within the meaning of the law for which deductions may be made from monthly allowances. The "No work, no pay" principle does not apply in the instant case. The petitioners members received their regular salaries during this period. It is clear from the aforequoted provision of law that it contemplates a "no work" situation where the employees voluntarily absent themselves. Petitioners, in the case at bar, certainly do not, ad voluntatem, absent themselves during semestral breaks. Rather, they are constrained to take mandatory leave from work. For this they cannot be faulted nor can they be begrudged that which is due them under the law. To a certain extent, the private respondent can specify dates when no classes would be held. Surely, it was not the intention of the framers of the law to allow employers to withhold employee benefits by the simple expedient of unilaterally imposing "no work" days and consequently avoiding compliance with the mandate of the law for those days.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Respondents contention that "the fact of receiving a salary alone should not be the basis of receiving ECOLA", is, likewise, without merit. Particular attention is brought to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Wage Order No. 1 to wit.
SECTION 5. Allowance for Unworked Days.
"a) All covered employees whether paid on a monthly or daily basis shall be entitled to their daily living allowance when they are paid their basic wage."cralaw virtua1aw libraryxxx
This provision, at once refutes the above contention. It is evident that the intention of the law is to grant ECOLA upon the payment of basic wages. Hence, we have the principle of "No pay, no ECOLA" the converse of which finds application in the case at bar. Petitioners cannot be considered to be on leave without pay so as not to be entitled to ECOLA, for, as earlier stated, the petitioners were paid their wages in full for the months of November and December of 1981, notwithstanding the intervening semestral break. This, in itself, is a tacit recognition of the rather unusual state of affairs in which teachers find themselves. Although said to be on forced leave, professors and teachers are, nevertheless, burdened with the task of working during a period of time supposedly available for rest and private matters. There are papers to correct, students to evaluate, deadlines to meet, and periods within which to submit grading reports. Although they may be considered by the respondent to be on leave, the semestral break could not be used effectively for the teachers own purposes for the nature of a teachers job imposes upon him further duties which must be done during the said period of time. Learning is a never ending process. Teachers and professors must keep abreast of developments all the time. Teachers cannot also wait for the opening of the next semester to begin their work. Arduous preparation is necessary for the delicate task of educating our children. Teaching involves not only an application of skill and an imparting of knowledge, but a responsibility which entails self dedication and sacrifice. The task of teaching ends not with the perceptible efforts of the petitioners members but goes beyond the classroom: a continuum where only the visible labor is relieved by academic intermissions. It would be most unfair for the private respondent to consider these teachers as employees on leave without pay to suit its purposes and, yet, in the meantime, continue availing of their services as they prepare for the next semester or complete all of the last semesters requirements. Furthermore, we may also by analogy apply the principle enunciated in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 4. Principles in Determining Hours Worked. The following general principles shall govern in determining whether the time spent by an employee is considered hours worked for purposes of this Rule:chanrob1es virtual 1aw libraryxxx
"(d) The time during which an employee is inactive by reason of interruptions in his work beyond his control shall be considered time either if the imminence of the resumption of work requires the employees presence at the place of work or if the interval is too brief to be utilized effectively and gainfully in the employees own interest." (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners members in the case at bar, are exactly in such a situation. The semestral break scheduled is an interruption beyond petitioners control and it cannot be used "effectively nor gainfully in the employees interest. Thus, the semestral break may also be considered as "hours worked." For this, the teachers are paid regular salaries and, for this, they should be entitled to ECOLA. Not only do the teachers continue to work during this short recess but much less do they cease to live for which the cost of living allowance is intended. The legal principles of "No work, no pay; No pay, no ECOLA" must necessarily give way to the purpose of the law to augment the income of employees to enable them to cope with the harsh living conditions brought about by inflation; and to protect employees and their wages against the ravages brought by these conditions. Significantly, it is the commitment of the State to protect labor and to provide means by which the difficulties faced by the working force may best be alleviated. To submit to the respondents interpretation of the no work, no pay policy is to defeat this noble purpose. The Constitution and the law mandate otherwise.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
With regard to the second issue, we are called upon to interpret and apply Section 3 of Presidential Decree 451 to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 3. Limitations. The increase in tuition or other school fees or other charges as well as the new fees or charges authorized under the next preceding section shall be subject to the following conditions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) That no increase in tuition or other school fees or charges shall be approved unless sixty (60%) per centum of the proceeds is allocated for increase in salaries or wages of the members of the faculty and all other employees of the school concerned, and the balance for institutional development, student assistance and extension services, and return to investments: Provided, That in no case shall the return to investments exceed twelve (12%) per centum of the incremental proceeds; . . ."cralaw virtua1aw libraryxxx
This Court had the occasion to rule squarely on this point in the very recent case entitled, University of the East v. University of the East Faculty Association, 117 SCRA 554. We held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In effect, the problem posed before Us is whether or not the reference in Section 3(a) to increase in salaries or wages of the faculty and all other employees of the schools concerned as the first purpose to which the incremental proceeds from authorized increases to tuition fees may be devoted, may be construed to include allowances and benefits. In the negative, which is the position of respondents, it would follow that such allowances must be taken in resources of the school not derived from tuition fees.
"Without delving into the factual issue of whether or not there could be any such other resources, We note that among the items of second purpose stated in provision in question is return in investment. And the law provides only for a maximum, not a minimum. In other words, the schools may get a return to investment of not more than 12%, but if circumstances warrant, there is no minimum fixed by law which they should get.
"On this predicate, We are of the considered view that, if the school happen to have no other resources to grant allowances and benefits, either mandated by law or secured by collective bargaining, such allowances and benefits should be charged against the return to investments referred to in the second purpose stated in Section 3(a) of P.D. 451."cralaw virtua1aw library
Private respondent argues that the above interpretation "disregarded the intention and spirit of the law" which intention is clear from the "whereas" clauses as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is imperative that private educational institutions upgrade classroom instruction . . . provide salary and or wage increases and other benefits . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
Respondent further contends that PD 451 was issued to alleviate the sad plight of private schools, their personnel and all those directly or indirectly on school income as the decree was aimed
". . . to upgrade classroom instruction by improving their facilities and bring competent teachers in all levels of education, provide salary and or wage increases and other benefits to their teaching, administrative, and other personnel to keep up with the increasing cost of living." (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent overlooks the elemental principle of statutory construction that the general statements in the whereas clauses cannot prevail over the specific or particular statements in the law itself which define or limit the purposes of the legislation or proscribe certain acts. True, the whereas clauses of PD 451 provide for salary and or wage increase and other benefits, however, the same do not delineate the source of such funds and it is only in Section 3 which provides for the limitations wherein the intention of the framers of the law is clearly outlined. The law is clear. The sixty (60%) percent incremental proceeds from the tuition increase are to be devoted entirely to wage or salary increases which means increases in basic salary. The law cannot be construed to include allowances which are benefits over and above the basic salaries of the employees. To charge such benefits to the 60% incremental proceeds would be to reduce the increase in basic salary provided by law, an increase intended also to help the teachers and other workers tide themselves and their families over these difficult economic times.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
This Court is not guilty of usurpation of legislative functions as claimed by the respondents. We expressed the opinion in the University of the East case that benefits mandated by law and collective bargaining may be charged to the 12% return on investments within the 40% incremental proceeds of tuition increase. As admitted by respondent, we merely made this statement as a suggestion in answer to the respondents query as to where then, under the law, can such benefits be charged. We were merely interpreting the meaning of the law within the confines of its provisions. The law provides that 60% should go to wage increases and 40% to institutional developments, student assistance, extension services, and return on investments (ROI). Under the law, the last item ROI has flexibility sufficient to accommodate other purposes of the law and the needs of the university. ROI is not set aside for any one purpose of the university such as profits or returns on investments. The amount may be used to comply with other duties and obligations imposed by law which the university exercising managerial prerogatives finds cannot under present circumstances, be funded by other revenue sources. It may be applied to any other collateral purpose of the university or invested elsewhere. Hence, the framers of the law intended this portion of the increases in tuition fees to be a general fund to cover up for the universitys miscellaneous expenses and, precisely, for this reason, it was not so delimited. Besides, ROI is a return or profit over and above the operating expenditures of the university, and still, over and above the profits it may have had prior to the tuition increase. The earning capacities of private educational institutions are not dependent on the increases in tuition fees allowed by P.D. 451. Accommodation of the allowances required by law require wise and prudent management of all the university resources together with the incremental proceeds of tuition increases. Cognizance should be taken of the fact that the private respondent had, before PD 451, managed to grant all allowances required by law. It cannot now claim that it could not afford the same, considering that additional funds are even granted them by the law in question. We find no compelling reason, therefore, to deviate from our previous ruling in the University of the East case even as we take the second hard look at the decision requested by the privateRespondent. This case was decided in 1982 when PDs 1614, 1634, 1678, and 1713 which are also the various Presidential Decrees on ECOLA were already in force. PD 451 was interpreted in the light of these subsequent legislations which bear upon but do not modify nor amend, the same. We need not go beyond the ruling in the University of the East case.
Coming now to the third issue, the respondents are of the considered view that as evidenced by the payrolls submitted by them during the period September 16 to September 30, 1981, the faculty members have been paid for the extra loads. We agree with the respondents that this issue involves a question of fact properly within the competence of the respondent NLRC to pass upon. The findings of fact of the respondent Commission are binding on this Court there being no indication of their being unsubstantiated by evidence. We find no grave abuse in the findings of respondent NLRC on this matter to warrant reversal. Assuming arguendo, however, that the petitioners have not been paid for these extra loads, they are not entitled to payment following the principles of "No work, no pay." This time, the rule applies. Involved herein is a matter different from the payment of ECOLA under the first issue. We are now concerned with extra, not regular loads for which the petitioners are paid regular salaries every month regardless of the number of working days or hours in such a month. Extra loads should be paid for only when actually performed by the employee. Compensation is based, therefore, on actual work done and on the number of hours and days spent over and beyond their regular hours of duty. Since there was no work on September 21, 1981, it would now be unfair to grant petitioners demand for extra wages on that day.chanrobles law library : red
Finally, disposing of the respondents charge of petitioners lack of legal capacity to sue, suffice it to say that this question can no longer be raised initially on appeal orcertiorari. It is quite belated for the private respondent to question the personality of the petitioner after it had dealt with it as a party in the proceedings below. Furthermore, it was not disputed that the petitioner is a duly registered labor organization and as such has the legal capacity to sue and be sued. Registration grants it the rights of a legitimate labor organization and recognition by the respondent University is not necessary for it to institute this action in behalf of its members to protect their interests and obtain relief from grievances. The issues raised by the petitioner do not involve pure money claims but are more intricately intertwined with conditions of employment.
WHEREFORE the petition forcertiorariis hereby GRANTED. The private respondent is ordered to pay its regular fulltime teachers/employees emergency cost of living allowances for the semestral break from November 7 to December 5, 1981 and the undistributed balance of the sixty (60%) percent incremental proceeds from tuition increases for the same schoolyear as outlined above. The respondent Commission is sustained insofar as it DENIED the payment of salaries for the suspended extra loads on September 21, 1981.
SO ORDERED. MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS, INC., vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, et alG.R. No. 183317 December 21, 2009FACTS:On May 2005, private respondent Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. (SMMSC-Independent) was issued a Certificate of Registration as a legitimate labor organization by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region IV-A.On June 2005, petitioner Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union Registration against private respondent, claiming that the latter violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for not complying with the 20% requirement and that it committed massive fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Article 239 of the same code.The Regional Director of DOLE IV-A issued an Order granting the petition, revoking the registration of respondent, and delisting it from the roster of active labor unions.SMMSC-Independent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. BLR ruled in favor of the respondent, thus, they remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.The petitioner appealed and insisted that private respondent failed to comply with the 20% union membership requirement for its registration as
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