lo: Fran: 4. TWRS SAR Engineering TWRS SAR Engineering W. Ryin …/67531/metadc709070/... · 2. lo: (Receiving Organization) 3. Fran: (lrlginating Organization) TWRS SAR Engineering

- ~ 2. lo: (Receiving Organization) 3. Fran: ( l r lg inat ing Organization)

TWRS SAR Engineering

8M100 G . W . Ryin

This document was developed and approveil by Westinghouse Savannah R iver S i t e (WSRS) personnel ani1 i s being submitted for approval and re lease i n t o the Hanfo1.d document control sys tern .

TWRS SAR Engineering 5 . Pro)./Prog./Dept./Div.: 6. Cog. Engi .:

8. Originator Remarks:

11. Receiver Remarks:

N/A

DATA TRANSMITTED 15.

(A I IC) ID) ' I E ) ~ ~ t * ~ , D . , s ~ * n o f D.t, ' O m IBl OocurnentlOrawi~ No. NO. NO. NO. Trmsrninad

1 WHC-SD-WM-CN-056 N/A 0 F i r e in,Contaminated Area

4. Related ED1 No.:

8/1/96 ( F ) (C) ttl) ( 1 )

Appmv.1 Reamon OW* ReceiY- Ddsip- for nator er nator Trans- Dimpo- Dispo-

mind s m n sition

N/A 1 ,2 1 1

10. Systan/Bldg./Fecility:

12. Major As=. Dwg. No.:

13. PermitlPermit ~ ippl icat ion NO.:

1 4 . Required Response Date:

[I Aipproved ulcomnents t1 Disapproved u / c m n t s

80-7400-172-2 ( 0 4 / 9 4 ) GEF097

80-7400-172-1 IO7191 I

WHC-SD-WM-CN-056, Rev. 0

Fire in a Contaminated Area

G. W. Ryan Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, WA 99352 U.S. Department o f Energy C o i t r a c t DE-AC06-87RL10930

EDT/ECN: 602625 UC: 510 Org Code: 8M100 Charge Code: NlFC3 B&R Code: EW3120071 To ta l Pages: 27

Key Words: f i r e , c0ntaminat.d f i r e , r a d i o a c t i v e ma te r ia l s , TWRS, tank farms

Abs t rac t : Th i s document su )po r t s t h e development and p resen ta t i on o f t h e f o l l o w i n g acc ident scena'io i n t h e TWRS F i n a l Safety Ana lys i s Report:

F i r e in Contaminated Area.

The c a l c u l a t i o n s needeil t o q u a n t i f y t h e r i s k associated w i t h t h i s acc ident scenar io are i nc ludcd w i t h i n .

TRADEMARK DISCLAIMER. trade name. trademark, manufacturer. or otheruise. does mt n c e s s a r i l y const i tu te or i w l y i t s endorsement, recumendation. or favorins by the United States Govermnt or any agency thereof o r i t s contractors or subcontractors.

Reference herein t o any specif ic camerc ia l product, process, or service by

Pr inted i n the United States of America. To obtain copies of th is doc-t, contact: UIICIBCS Docunent Control Services, P.O. Box 1970, Mailstop H6-08. Richland UA 99352. Phone (509 ) 372-2420; Fax ( 5 0 9 ) 376-6989.

' ease Approval Date Release Stamp

Approwd for Public Release A-6400-073 (10195) tEF321

WHC-SD..WM-CN-056 REV 0 Calculation Cover Sheet 1 o f 26

Pr0,CCl

WHC FSAR Accident Analysis

Tllk

Fire in a Contaminated Area (U)

MECHANICAL

D Reltmtnaly Comrmned WConfirmed

Computer Program No (I) Vw~of lc lcau No n NIA

~ ~~

Purpart md Objective The purpose of this calculation is to determine the (insite and offsite dose consequences resulting from a fire in a contaminated area. summary of Conclvrlo" L/.PZ Analysis of the Fire in a Contaminated Area accident shows that the calculated radiological dose consequences (a rem) are above the onsite risk evaluation guidelires for an anticipated event. The calculated offsite radiologicd dose of0.0046 rem is well below the risk acceptance guidelines for an anticipated event. The calculated toxic dose consequences are within the risk evaluation guidelines for both onsite and offsite receptors.Administrative controls to prohibit the riovement in and around pits of vehicles without protected fue' tanks are recommended.

Revisions

Rev No I Revlr~on Dcrcnwm ~~

0 Ongind Issue

Slgn off

RC" Ongmaror IPnnu vcnfica BO" I Vcnficr I Chccker (Pml) Manager (Pnnrl NO Sign I Oaa checkmg rlcthcd Sign I Date Sign I Dare

TedA Long L A Wootcn

4 U b J J &A* Ronald D Graver 6-2 7-9,

TLd r*, % 2 W h r w C 7 '!.%I /-I'M 6 61 23/v

WHC-SD-WM-CN-056 REV 0 Calculation No M.CLC-C-00235

Sheet No. 2 of 26

Fire In a Contaminated Area

Introduction:

Reference:

Open Items:

Input:

WHC-SD-WM-CN-056 REV 0 I 1

Calculation No M-CLC-G-Oo?3S 1 Sheet No. 3 of 26 -1


TABLE C F CONTENTS

Assumptions:

Analytical Methods and Calculations:

Airborne Source Term

Radioactive Dose Consequence Analysis

Results:

Conclusion:

Attachments:

NAME

COMPUTER I'ROGRAMS USED

CONFIGUW ,TION Control Version

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No No

No No

5

5

6

6

7

8

8

11

15

17

20

If NO Description on pagelin reference

WHC-SD-WM-CN-056 REV 0

CdCIIkitiOn NO M-CLC-G-WZ3S

Sheet No. 4 of 26

Rev. 0

Fire in a Contaminated Area CALC-NOTE CHECKLIST

REVIEWER(S): NAME (PRINT OR TYPE) SIGl4ATURE DATE

u. LQ b,

1. 2.

3.

4. 5 .

6.

7 .

8. 9.

Is the Subject and/or Purpose clearly stated? rKoNE Are the required Input Data and tlieir references and source 6 No provided and are they consistent wit11 the Calc-note purpose: Are the Assumptions clearly identi'ied, valid, and consistent @ No with the Calc-note purpose: Are the Analytical Methods clearly iilentified? a No Are all pages consecutively numbered and identified by the @ No calc-note number? Mare the version(s) of the conputer program(s) used Yes No 6 identified? Are input listings for all computer programs documented in this Yes No @ calc-note? Are the Results and Conclusions clearly stated?

clearly referenced in the results sectic n? Are all OUTPUT documents (if nct part of the calculation)

IF NO TO ANY OF THE ABOVE, SHEEl' NUMBER(S) WITH JUSTIFICATION:

REVIEWER'S NOTES (use additional pag(:s as necessary) Review method used: Alternate calculatior - Attached: Y- N-

Approximated Originator steps -

WHC-SO-WM-CN-056 REV 0 I 1

Calculation No M-CLC-G-OO235

SheetNo. S o f 26

1 Rev. 0 I Fire In a Contaminated Area

Introduction: Accident Descriotion

The analyzed accident is one of a set of hmudous conditions related to fires in contaminated areas selected for analysis because of tie potentially bounding combination of expected consequences and frequency of occurrenx. The accident is initiated by human error in positioning a crane. The fuel tank of the crane or nearby support vehicle hits the pit curb and spills gasoline into the open pit. An igni ion source is conservatively assumed and the fire results in an uncontrolled release of radiocctive and toxic materials. Convection from the fire sweeps the hazardous material into the amosphere where it is transported away from the accident via atmospheric dispersion.

The material at risk for the analyzed accidmt is the radioactive and toxic chemicals on the floor and walls of the pit due to leaks from wast: transfers. Other hazardous conditions bounded by this accident are material waste samples carried in support vehicles, material on contaminated equipment. and fuel In vehicle gas tanks.

Reference: 1. Van Keuren, J. C. and A. V. Savino, 996, “Tank Farm Compositions and Atmosphere

Dispersion Coefficients for use in Sal ety Analysis Consequence Assessments”, WHC- SD-WM-SARR-016, Rev. 2, Westinghouse Hanford Company, kchland, Washington.

2. DOE-HDBK-3010-94, 1994, “DOE IIandbook Airborne Release FractionsRates and Restorable Fraction for Nonreactor b uclear Facilities,”, US. Department of Energy, Richland, Washington.

3. WHC-SD-WM-SARR-037, 1996, “De\ elopment of Radiological Consequences and Unit Liter Doses for TWRS FSAR Raciological Consequence Calculations”, Rev. 0, Westinghouse Hanford Company, Rich1 and, Washington.

4. RDG.1 - Chapter 3, Input Validation Form (IVF) for the Fire in Contaminated Area Accident Analysis (Attachment 1)

5 . Van Keuren, J. C., 1996, “Toxic Che nical Considerations for Tank Farm Releases,”, WHC-SD-WM-SARR-011, Rev. 2. Westinghouse Hanford Company, Richland, Washington.

WHC-SD-WM-CN-056 REV 0 Calculation No M-CLC-G-WXS

Sheet No. 6 of 26

Rev. 0

6 .

7.


D. W. Harwood and E. R. Russel, 19’30, “Present Practices of Highway Transportation of Hazardous Materials”, FHWA-RD-8S -013, U. S. Department of Transportation. H & R 522-1, 1995, “Recornminded Onsitg Transportation Risk Management Methodology”, H & R Technical A.isociates, Inc. Oak Ridge, Tennessee,(prepared for Westinghouse Hanford Company Pac raging Engineering)

Open Items:

This calcnote contains no open items.

Input:

Unit Liter Doses (ULD) for aging waste are given below in Table 2 [Ref. 3, p. 10 ]

Table 2 U LD for Aging Waste

0.092

Integrated Atmospheric Dispersion Coef icients for both onsite and offsite receptors from Ref. 1 are given in Table 2. The integrate( xlQ’ values are used for releases less than 2 hours in duration.

Table 4 Atmosphetric Dispersion Coefficients

I Onsite 0.0341 1 I Offsite 2.83 x lo’


Calculation No M-CLC-G-W?IS

Sheet No. 1 of 26


Dimensions of typical valve pit - Ti e typical valve pit is 12 feet in length and 10 feet wide (inside dimension). A drain is 1 xated in one comer approximately 1 foot from the walls. The floor of the pit is sloped from the 4 walls to the drain. The elevation of the floor at walls of the pit is 1.5 inches higher than at the drain (see Attachment 2 for a sketch of a typical valve pit). [Ref. 41

Assumptions:

It is assumed that the material at risk s bounded by a 1 inch deep layer of dried out aging waste material on the floor of a valve pic around the drain. This is based on the observation that the lip of the drain may protrude a! much as 1 inch above the floor in some pits. A typical valve pit was chosen because it is larger than the other types of pits that may contain contaminated material.

33 vol% AWF solids. This is bounding f(a all possible Hanford waste transfers [Ref. 31 Waste composition is assumed to be 57 vol% Aging Waste Facility (AWF) liquids and

It is assumed that all of the hazardou! material is available to be released during the fire and that the resuspension of any hazardoils material left at the bottom of the pit as a result of the fire is negligible. This is a reasonable assumption since resuspension rate from the floor of a pit several feet below ground would be several orders of magnitude below the suspension rate due to thermal stress [Ref. 21.

For purposes of calculating radiologic,iI dose consequences, the fire is assumed to last for , C I ~ than 2 hours. This means that ttle more conservative annual average integrated atmospheric dispersion coefficient xlQ' without plume meander is used to calculate dose consequence [Ref. I ]

The airborne release fraction (ARF) :ad respirable fraction (RF) discussed in Mishima for the thermal stress of noncombustible iowders was used in the analysis [Ref. 2, p.4-611. This assumption bounds the release of pclwders and the release from contaminated surfaces [Ref. 2, p.4-61 and p. 5-21] due to themlal stress. The ARF x RF for liquid UNH under a gasoline fire with a 1 m/s wind is about a iactor of 3 greater than the ARF x RF for powders.. This accident, however, will most liksly involve the release of particulate from a contaminated surface rather then from a t'oiling liquid. For this reason the assumed ARF x RF value for noncombustible powders is bt:lieved to be sufficently conservative.

I . _ _

WHC-SD -WM-CN-056 REV 0

Calculation No M-CLC-G-00235

1 SheetNo. Sof 26 I Rev. 0


Toxicological consequences depend on the concentration of toxic material in the air [Ref. 51. Since the risk acceptance guideline is stated in 15 minute averages, it was consewately assumed that all of the combustible m~terial was consumed and released in the first 15 minutes of the fire.

A crane or a support vehicle travels ne) more than 150 m per day close enough to a pit for fuel from a ruptured fuel tank to flow iiito the pit. An assumption regarding the distance traveled by vehicles in an around pits is required in order to estimate an accident frequency.

Analytical Methods and Calculations:

The analyzed accident bounds the consequences for any of the hazards associated with fires in contaminated areas. The accident scensrio assumes a 1 inch layer of dried out waste in the form of a powdery residue on the bottom of a valve pit. Fuel spills into the pit from a ruptured fuel tank and ignites. Both rad oactive and toxic particulates are released to the atmosphere as influenced by the fire.

Dose consequences were calculated using the methods given in Ref. 1 for the release of both radioactive and toxic materials.


The determination of the airborne source tmn follows that of Equation 1.1 in Ref. 2:

Q= MAR x DR x ARF x RF x LPF

where

Q = Sourceterm MAR= Material at risk DR= Damage ratio ARF= Airborne release fraction RF= Respirable fraction LPF= Leakpath Factor

WHC-SD -WM-CN-056 REV 0

Calculation NO M-CLC-G-00?35

SheetNo. 9of 26

Fire in a Contaminated Area For aerodynamic entrainment/resuspensicn events, the airborne release rate (ARR) is given. It is multiplied by the time that tne hazardous material is subjected to the entrainment/resuspension mechanism to cbtain the ARF.

WHC-SO -WM-CN-056 REV 0

Calculation No M-CLC-0-00235

Sheet No. 10 of 26


Material at Risk and Damage Ratio

The MAR is calculated for a 1 inch layer of aging waste on the floor of a valve pit that is 10 feet wide and 12 feet long. The drain is 1ol:ated near the comer of the pit. The elevation of the pit at the drain is 1.5 inches lower than a the walls (see Input Section). Based on the above dimensions the volume of aging waste on the pit floor is

The above takes in account the fact that th: floor slopes towards the drain from all four walls (See the sketch of the pit floor in attachmznt 2). The calculation assumes that the four floor segments intersect at the drain. No credi is taken for volume occupied by the protruding drain. Since all of the waste material in thi, pit is assumed to be involved in the fire, DR=l.

Airborne Release Ratesffractions. Resuiralile Fraction, and Leak Path Factor

In the above scenario release and dispersicn of airborne particles comes from the heating of waste material in a gasoline fire. The airborne release due to the fire was conservatively assumed to be sufficiently bounded by the ARF and RF for noncombustible powders under thermal stress [Ref. 2, p.4-611. These value; are:

ARF = 0.006

RF =0.02.

Once the waste is aerosolized by the fire it leaks directly to the atmosphere, LPF=I.


Q = 62.9L 0.006.0.02 = 0.00755L

WHC-SO -WM-CN-056 REV 0

Calculation No M-CLC-G-W?35

Sheet No. 11 of 26

Rev. 0


Radioactive Dose Consequence Ana ysis

The radiological inhalation dose for the b iming of waste material is given [Ref. 11

D = Q . ~ . R . U L D ,nbJl Q,

where

Q

xlQ' R ULD,,ha

= Quantity of respirable ma.eria1 released (1)

= Atmosphere dispersion c ,efficient without plume meander (s/m3) = Breathing rate (3.3 x lo4 m3/s)

= Inhalation unit 1iti:r dose

The ingestion radiological dose consequences is given by [Ref. 51:

where,

ULD,., = Ingestion unit liter dose

Calculation of ULD

The source material for this accident was issumed to be AWF waste composed of 33 vol% solids and 67 vol% liquids. Therefore, usirg the ULDs for AWF liquids and solids given in Table 2 gives

sv sv WILD,,,,, = (1.7. IO6 .0.33+ 1.4. I O 3 . 1.67)- = 5.68.10'- L L

WHC-SD-WM-CN-056 REV 0 Calculation No M-CLC-G-00235

Sheet No. 12 of 26 1-1 Fire in a Contaminated Area

s v sv ULD,,, = (8.1.0.33+0.092.0.67)-- = 2.76- 1. L

Radioloeical Inhalation Dose Conseouenc;

- 3.37 b d Y s g m 3 sv D,,,,, =000755L 0 0 3 4 1 7 33- 568 lOS-=482mSv m S L

3.3%,9-~ &4 7b& s { m ' s v D,,,,, = 0 00755L 0 0000283--;- H- 5 68 IO5 - = 0 04rnSv

m S L

Radioloeical Ingestion Dose Conseouence

Doffrlrt = 0.00755L.88882fwF-s-2 .'6* = W3MmSv 2 . ~ 3 ~ 1 6 m 3 ' SL * 7%

Toxicoloeical Dose Conseauence

Toxicological dose consequences were callxiated using the sum-of-fractions method of Ref, 1. In this method the released quantify is riultiplied by the ARR and then multiplied by the appropriate value for Table 3-8 of Ref. 1. Table 3-8 of Ref. 1 is included as Attachment 3.

For purposes of calculating toxic releases rn accident duration time 30 minutes (1 800 s) is assumed. This gives an ARR of


CdCdnliOn No M-CK-G-03235

SheetNo. 13of 26


ARR = 1/900 s The values used from Table 33-8 of Rei. 1 to calculate the toxicological consequences are given below in Table 5.

Table 5 Sum-of-Fraction of Risk Guidelines for a Unit Release of Chemicals (From Table 3-8, Ref. 1)

Double Shell Liquids (s/L)

Double Shell Liquids (s/L) Double Shell Solids (s/L) 1.8 x io4 Double Shell Solids (s/L) 1.9 x lo2

The toxicological dose consequence are th: ore

for an onsite receptor and

q&$/l for an offsite receptor.

Unmitieated Accident Freauency

This accident is caused by a human errcr in positioning a crane or support vehicle. The hazard analysis placed this accident in the "Anticipated category with frequency > l o 2 per year. However, an unmitigated accident frequency can be calculated for this given the


Calculation No M-CLC-G-W?35

Sheet No. 14 of 26


number of miles per year traveled by a crane or support vehicle near a pit and the vehicle accident statistics involving fires compiled by the U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT)[Ref. 61

The highest accident frequency per mile for trucks operating on a rural roadway is according to data compiled in [Ref. 61.

collision mile

f,",, = 4.5 ' 10" -

This is approximately the per mile accident rate recommended for Hanford Site and is considered to be conservative for congestc:d areas [Ref. 7 , p. B-71.

The total distance traveled in a year by a crane or a support vehicle near a pit is

dav m mile , mile year day 1609m year

d =365-.150---=.84-

The accident initiation frequency per year for the collision of a vehicle with a pit is

collision mile collision mile year year

d = 4.5.10" -. 34-= .5 .104-

The frequency of a fire resulting from a collision not involving another vehicle is [Ref. 61

fire t,o,c = 6 . - collision

Therefore, the unmitigated event frequenc] for a fire in a pit due to a collision with a pit curb is estimated to be

WHC-SO-WM-CN-056 REV 0

Calculation No M.CLC-G.W~

Sheet No. IS of 26


Results:

The results of the calculations are given n Table 6. The radiological results are well within risk evaluation guidelines for offsite rece )tors but over the risk evaluation guidelines for an onsite receptor for an anticipated event.

The toxicological dose consequence results are well within the guidelines for both onsite and offsite receptors.


Calculation No M - C L C - G - W ~ ~ ~

SheetNo. 16of 26

Fire in a Contaminated k e a

Receptor/ Hazard

Offsite/ Radiological

Onsitel Radiological

Offsite/

Table 5 Radiological and Toxicological Dose Consequences for Fire in a Contaminated Area

Calculated

DoseExposure

& -ern 0.00'tl

d r e r n @ +.e L

Frequency: Extrenely Unlikely ( I O 6 < F 5 103 Consequences: Calculated radiological dose exceeds the onsite guideline for an anticipated event but is within guideline for the estimrted event frequency of extremely unlikely.

Toxicological 1 0.0006 Onsitel Toxicological

0.106

Risk Guidelines

Anticipated Unlikely Extremely

Unlikely

I 76

0.1 rem 1 0.5 rem 1 4 rem % 7hi

0.5 rem 5 rem I O rem

WHC-SD-WM-CN-056

Conclusion:

REV 0


For an offsite receptor the calculated dose consequences are well within the risk evaluation guidelines. However, for an onsite receplor the calculated radiological dose is above the risk guidelines for an anticipated event. Tht: calculations are very sensitive to the amount of material at risk and to the ARF x RF valiies used in the calculations. The values assumed for these quantities are believed to be suffici mtly conservative; however, not enough confidence can be placed in these values to ensure thit the release will remain within the calculated bin.

On the other hand, the accident freqiiency analysis performed above shows that the probability for this fire is “beyond extre nely unlikely” using the assumed miles of vehicle travel near pits. Since the margin of e r a r to remain in at least the “extremely unlikely” category is over 2 orders of magnituce, the consequences of this accident should be considered to be within the risk guideline!.

The following Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) and Defense in Depth controls are recommend to prevent this accident. Thesi: TSRs will further reduce the accident frequency.


Sheet No. 18 of 26

Rev. 0


Table 6 Safety Signibicant Administrative Controls

Prohibit the operation of vehicles Prevent vol rule fuel from flowing ' I l u s would prevent the

with unprotected fuel tanks near into a pit frcm a ruptured fuel lank representative accident but would

pits not prevent all of the identified hazardous conditions

Require that vehicles that operate

near pits have their fuel tanks by acollisioi

certified as rupture proof

Require that vehicles with certified

rupture proof fuel tanks be marked

with and easily recognized symbol

Require that bamer be erected Preventative

around contaminated pits in

uncontrolled areas outside of Tank

Farms

Prevent the rupture of a fuel tank

Provide accf ss control


Cdeulntios NO M-CLC-G-00235

SheetNo. 19of 26


Table 7 Delense in Depth Controls

:ire Protection Program at Hanford Fire Revel tion The program contains a number of iite

-ire Protection Manual (WHC- 1.

:M-4-41)

2.

3.

provision that would prevent fues

in pit from causes other than

ruptured fuel tanks

Contai is provisions for the

use. stxage, and handling of

flamm; ble or combustible

materi; Is at Hanford Site

Providt s requirements for

minimi ing and controlling the

use of


Calculation No M-CLC-G-W~~S

Sheet No. 20 of 26


Attachments:

WHC-SD..WM-CN-056 REV 0

Sheet No. 21 of 26

Rev. 0


Attachment 1

FSAR Input Validation Form for Fire in C mtaminated Area

Tracking I R D G . 1

N N ~ C of Originator Organizatio 1 or Team 2 Date 3

511196 RonaldD Gri3vC.S FSAR CHiiPER 3

Statement of Problem For the Fire in Contaminated Area accident the material at risk (MAR) is requircd.This is defined I ~ C waste material that could accumulate in a pitlriser a i d bc available for combustion.

(1) The material at risk in lhis accident is bounded by I 1 in layer of waste at the bottom of a typical valve pit. The typical pit is 10 ft by 12 ff with a drain in OM comer. The dra n may have a 1 in lip above h e floor that could cause waste from a leak 10 stagnant in the pit up to a depth of 1 inch at the drain. The floor of the pit slopes towards the drain from all sides of the pit. The floor elevation at the walls of the pit is I..) inches above the drain. Based on this fact the volume of waste is bounded by 5 ft'.

(2) The composition of waste is 67 percent AWF liquiils and 33 percent AWF solids.

4

Alternatives

5

Decision Reached

1 ~~

Date Requested Sent To Date Requested By 9 10 5/13/96

Response #1 For the purpose of this analysis. the num€ers you have provided can be used. I would offer that you look at Double Shell Tank Pan B Permit Application Chapt. 4.11. which has tables with pit dimensions if it becomes otcessary. For the Plant response to composition of waste. sec IVFCh;.pler 3-Hl.

I2

Response #2 13

At t ; l chme~~~ (List) References (List) I5

14

Responder #1 Name and SIgnatUrC

16 W o r d R u f f i n & 5 - - 3 9 6 17 Responder #2 Name and Signature

POC Filed. Routed


Sheet No. 23 of 26

Rev. 0


Attachment 2

Sketch of Valve Pit 244-AX-A and -B

WHC-SD -WM-CN-056 REV 0 W C L C - G - C M x + r B)s$ 2 q o b ZL

WC-SD-UM-ISB-001, Vol. 2, .Rev. 0

Figure 1-53. ' la lve P i t s 241-AX-A and -6.

e 0 N

f i 0

1-179

WHC-SD -WM-CN-056 R


Attachment 3

Scn of Fraction of Risk Guideline for a 1 Jnit Liter Release of Chemicals

- - - - FV 0 i Page _.~___

~ - C L C - - - O O z z h 6 q 4 L o b 2L

Table 3-8 Sum-of-Fraction of Risk Guidelines tor a Unit Release of Chemicals and Gases (3 sheets)

*The sum of fractions are multiplied by th~ release rate for continuous release and release amount for a puff releases. Release rates for continucus releases are in units of liters per second for liquids and solids, and m3/s for gases. Puff release qiiantities are in units of liters for solids and liquids and m3

for gases.

To D i s t r i b u t i o n

F i r e i n a Contaminated Area I ECN No. -6&W+-

From. Page 1 of 1 G . W . kyan Date 8/1/96

Project TitleMlork Order

A-6000-135 (01/93) YEF067

EDT No. -tctft- L-cJ*eq?

Name Text Text Only Attach./ EDT/ECN

MSlN With All Appendix Only Attach. Only

lo: Fran: 4. TWRS SAR Engineering TWRS SAR Engineering W. Ryin …/67531/metadc709070/... · 2. lo: (Receiving Organization) 3. Fran: (lrlginating Organization) TWRS SAR Engineering

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