Life After the Voting Rights Act – Identifying Partisan and ......Table4: Pooled-Poisson Analysis – Total Passed Restrictive Access Policies, 2012 Table5: Binary Outcome Logistic

1

Life After the Voting Rights Act

Life After the Voting Rights Act – Identifying Partisan and Racialised Trends in the Proposal and Passage of Restrictive Voter-Access Policy in

the United States of America

A dissertation submitted by 64111 to the Department of Government, the London School of Economics and Political Science, in part completion of the requirements for the MSc in

Political Science and Political Economy.

August 2017

9,960 words

MSc Political Science and Political Economy: Candidate 64111

We are the only country [the USA] in the advanced world that makes it harder to vote rather

than easier. And that dates back. There’s an ugly history to that that we should not be shy about talking about.

(Former President Barack Obama - January 18, 2017)

The African-American community was great to us. They came through, big league…if they had any doubt, they didn’t vote, and that was almost as good because a lot of people didn’t

show up. (President Donald J. Trump - December 15, 2016)

To make it hard, to make it difficult almost impossible for people to cast a vote is not keeping with the democratic process.

The vote is precious. It is the most powerful nonviolent tool we have.

(Congressman John Lewis, Georgia: 5th District – 2012 & 2016)

3


Abstract The 2016 U.S. presidential race was the first in 50 years without the full protection of the

Voting Rights Act, which has key implications for American democracy. Over the last two

decades, there has been a dramatic increase in the proposal and passage of voter-access

policies. As of 27 March 20171, nearly a hundred bills to restrict voter-access have been

introduced in 31 states. The most common examples of restrictive voter-access policies

include photo identification and proof of citizenship requirements as well as registration,

absentee, and early voting restrictions, policies proven to disproportionately target minorities

and depress turnout with “surgical precision.” 2 Proponents argue that these policies

effectively deter voter fraud, while opponents assert that they demobilise voters who

traditionally favour the political left. Democracy is the cornerstone of the American

Experiment, but substantial portions of eligible voters have been barred from participating.

By building on the foundations of Bentele and O’Brien’s (2013) Jim Crow 2.0? Why States

Consider and Adopt Restrictive Voter Access Policies, I expand their study, in light of the

success of voter suppression policy over the past six years. Using random and fixed effects

Pooled-Poisson modelling approaches of publicly available state-level panel data, I identify

relationships between the count of proposed and passed restrictive state voter-access laws and

a variety of explanatory state factor variables. In order to determine which effects increase

the likelihood of participating in the latest Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program,

I provide a model using a binary outcomes regression analysis. The results reveal strategic,

partisan, and racialised trends in the proposal of policy and participation in Crosscheck,

exposing significant weaknesses in the American democratic process.

1 The most current map can be found in the Appendix as Figure A.1. 2 Judge Diana Gribbon Motz (July, 2016) on North Carolina’s 2013 strict ID law


Table of Contents

ABSTRACT 3

LIST OF TABLES 5

LIST OF FIGURES 5

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 5

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 6 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 7

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 10 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 10 THE DEBATE – VOTER FRAUD VS. VOTER SUPPRESSION 13 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND MOTIVATIONS 16

CHAPTER 3: STUDY 19 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 19 METHODOLOGY 20 DATA AND SOURCES 21 DEPENDENT VARIABLES - TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 21 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 26

CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 28 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 28 PROPOSED LEGISLATION 28 PASSED LEGISLATION 32 INTERSTATE VOTER REGISTRATION CROSSCHECK PROGRAM 35 FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS 37

CONCLUSION 38 SUMMARY 38 IMPLICATIONS 38 GOING FORWARD 39

REFERENCES 41

APPENDIX 53 ADDITIONAL FIGURES 53

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List of Tables Table 1: Textual Analysis of Several Prominent Restrictive Voter-Access Policies

Table 2: Pooled-Poisson Analysis – Total Proposed Restrictive Access Policies, 2012-2017

Table 3: Pooled-Poisson Analysis – Total Passed Restrictive Access Policies, 2012-2017

Table 4: Pooled-Poisson Analysis – Total Passed Restrictive Access Policies, 2012

Table 5: Binary Outcome Logistic Regression Analysis – Crosscheck, 2012-2017

List of Figures Figure 1: Proposed Policy Between 2012 and August 2017

Figure 2: Passed Policy Between 2012 and August 2017

Figure 3: Voter Registration

List of Abbreviations ACLU: American Civil Liberties Union

ALEC: American Legislative Exchange Council

B&B: Bentele & O’Brien (2013) Jim Crow 2.0?: Why States Consider and Adopt

BC: Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law

Crawford: Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181 (2008)

Crosscheck: Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program

GOP: Grand Old Party

HAVA: Help America Vote Act

ID: Identification

NCSL-ELD: National Conference of State Legislatures’ Elections Legislation Database

POCR: Proof of Citizenship Requirements

RVAP: Restrictive voter-access policy

Shelby: Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 2 (2013)

SoS: Secretary of State

VRA: Voting Rights Act (1965)

U.S.: United States


Chapter 1: Introduction On November 8, 2016, 79,646 votes3 across three swing states, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and

Wisconsin, delivered 46 electoral votes to Donald Trump and thus the presidency of the U.S,

without a majority of the popular vote. While this margin was not as extraordinary as

Florida’s 540-vote margin that swung the 2000 Election, it represents the latest episode in a

trend of heightened competition in electoral victories. Crucially, it demonstrates that policies

designed to impact the voter franchise, with even trivial effects, could pose serious

consequences on electoral outcomes with limitless implications.

Between 2012 and August 2017, 84 restrictive voter-access policies were passed across 27

states. Bills have ranged from reducing early voting periods and registration restrictions to

the most stringent photo identification (ID) requirements, which set the stage for the latest

revamped effort to demobilise and disenfranchise American voters. These efforts to

manipulate the franchise have intensified in recent years, represented by the sheer volume of

legislation attempting to restrict electoral access. Most of which comes as a direct

consequence of the Shelby County v. Holder case, a landmark Supreme Court decision that

invalidated key provisions of 1965’s Voting Rights Act (VRA) and continues to present

significant concerns for precedent in American democracy.

In contemporary politics, a direct attack on voting rights would not be politically tolerated;

however, targeting voters throughout the registration and voting process under the guise of

ballot security remains feasible. At the centre of these legislations, there exists an on-going

war waged amongst academics, policymakers, and pundits alike on the trade-offs between

voter fraud and ensuring election integrity versus voter suppression. This has resulted in an

increasingly partisan issue, where Republicans primarily have adopted the former platform

and Democrats the latter.

In this dissertation, I argue that these policies are exclusionary reforms, strategically enacted

to establish a partisan advantage. The latest episode in U.S. history to manipulate the

electorate could be provoked by the warped incentives of parties to establish control of the

3 (Bump, 2016)

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policy space, in light of demographic and political changes. I assess the validity of these

claims, by investigating their legitimacy empirically.

Background and Motivation This dissertation defines restrictive voter-access policy as any attempt to place restrictions on

either the registration process or opportunity to cast a ballot. This includes, but is not limited

to: voter-ID laws, proof of citizenship requirements (POCR), restrictions to early and

absentee voting, registration, and felon and social minority disenfranchisement. These tactics

represent new, fundamental features of the modern U.S. election system. State legislatures

continue to increase the hurdle for voters, where direct and indirect costs place

disproportionate burdens on certain segments of the electorate. This typically includes young,

old, ethnic minorities, and lower socio-economic groups.

Meanwhile, it is important to highlight recent trends in the electorate, which became more

salient following Barack Obama’s victory in 2008 that may provide insight into the

aggressive activity of restrictive legislation. This is representative of the electorate who stand

to gain or lose from these policies. Conventional wisdom acknowledges that Democrats

benefit from diversification and high turnout in elections.4 While the electorate becomes

younger and more diverse, party strategies deeply reflect their incentives to win elections, by

either recruiting new voters or minimising the turnout of the opposition. Coupled with the

significant tightening of electoral victory margins, this could mean a growing necessity to

renew these policies, going beyond a simple justification to ensure election integrity.

Over the last six years, the renewed struggle to shape voter-access intensified, as these trends

became more apparent. With new data, academics and legislators are able to contend more

confidently that voter fraud is not a widespread epidemic. In fact, these policies have proven

to depress turnout, by targeting certain groups with “surgical precision,”5 which have held up

in several federal court cases. In total, 569 policies were proposed and 84 passed across all 50

states (see: Figures 1 and 2).

4 Beaulieu (2014) 5 Motz (2016) on North Carolina’s 2013 ID law


Figure 1 – Proposed Policy Between 2012 and August 2017

Figure 2 – Passed Policy Between 2012 and August 2017

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Pivotally, the 2016 Election represents the first in 50 years without the full coverage of the

VRA, signalling one of the greatest levels of unchecked policy freedom between federal and

state powers. For this dissertation, such structural change provides the necessary justification

to re-examine these policies.

While several studies have looked at the consequences of these policies on turnout, few have

taken a macro-overview approach to examine their implementation. None, to my knowledge,

are published utilising the latest data from the 2016 Election and state legislature databases. I

build on the seminal foundations of Bentele and O’Brien’s (2013), hereby known as B&B,

methodological framework from Jim Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and Adopt Restrictive

Voter Access Policies, to analyse this policy puzzle once again, in light of the latest

developments shaping the political landscape, since its findings between 2006-2011. I

analyse two key variables: the effect of partisan control and demographic determinants of the

passage and proposal of restrictive voter-access policy, to test the question of whether these

results have strategic, partisan, and racialised motivations.

By utilising the National Conference of State Legislatures’ Elections Legislation Database

(NCSL-ELD), I categorise and count restrictive policies from 2012 to August 2017. Both the

proposed and passed counts are regressed utilising Pooled-Poisson modelling. These include

partisan control of state legislatures, party affiliations of both the Governor and Secretary of

State (SoS), the difference in party vote share in previous presidential elections, minority

turnout, state demographics, and perceptions of electoral fraud. Additionally, we look at how

these factors influence states’ participation in the controversial new ‘Crosscheck’

programme.

With the knowledge that these policies could depress turnout and have effects significant

enough to determine electoral outcomes, studies like this are necessary to understand these

political interactions. Empirical data regarding the motivation of legislation is crucial to

understanding the ‘new norm’ of American Democracy, especially as federal courts

continuously preside over voter discrimination lawsuits. This legal precedent is crucial for

not only individual voters but also the future legitimacy of the U.S.’s democratic process.


This dissertation structures as follows:

• Chapter 2 proceeds with an overview of the literature on the historical background of

voter rights, the debate between voter fraud and voter suppression, and the empirical

evidence that motivates this study.

• Chapter 3 outlines the study, including research questions, methodology, and data and

sources.

• Chapter 4 presents the results and interprets the analysis, before providing

conclusions and future research suggestions. Finally,

• Chapter 5 concludes with a summary, array of implications, and what this means for

the issues going forward.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Historical Background Political scientists emphasise the central tenet of democratic theory, that “elections transfer

the will and authority of the people to their representatives in government, [where]

democratic government rests on the establishment of fair elections that can accurately capture

the will of the people” (Mycoff et al., 2007, p.2). In the U.S., voting rights were first granted

to land-owning white males (ACLU, 2005). While subsequent expansions of these rights

made it legal for more ‘different’ Americans to vote, recent efforts have successfully

minimised the presence of certain demographics at the polls.

Despite being a constitutional democracy, the American Experiment is tarnished by a long

history of restricting civil liberties. The fight to extend voting rights to freed slaves,

suffragists, and the poor has been the clarion call for the American progressive movement; to

many, voting is seen as being not only the cornerstone of democracy, but as a sacred right

and the basis of maintaining an accountable and legitimate government that represents all

peoples. Thus, it has remained a concern that the quality of democracy in America continues

to be threatened by problems of voter suppression, and thus, a defining characteristic of

American identity.

Lanning (2008) accurately characterises the history of extending the voting franchise as one

of “uneven progress” (p.434). For instance, while African-Americans were granted the right

to vote in 1870 with the passage of the 14th and 15th Amendments, it was only decades later

11


that poll taxes and literacy tests6 barred most of the black populace from the polls in the

American South, until the mid 1960s. He establishes a key theme, as history has witnessed

countless removals of voting rights. This is noteworthy “because it serves as a reminder that

progress is not inexorable, and further movement toward democracy is not inevitable”

(p.435).

Ellis (2009) highlights the strategic nature of politicians. Throughout history, there has been a

political struggle between allowing eligible citizens their vote and being “left prey to the

calculations of politicians attempting to game the electorate” (p.1027). Voters are susceptible

to exclusion from voting, which creates “an underclass of citizens…who will remain

marginalized.” Moreover, we are left with a “consistent theme, which underlies both the anti-

democratic history of the right to vote…” (p.1068) and now the future threat presented by the

accumulation of recent policies.

Crucially, the history of voter suppression further alludes to the strategic and racialised nature

of these policies. I argue that political leaders have seized the latest issues as a mechanism to

justify restrictive legislation, as a means to ensure voters’ confidence and election integrity.

This particularly came to a crossroads with the election of Barack Obama in 2008,

hallmarked by grassroots movements and a massive turnout effort, which increased the

number of registered voters by 5%.

However, in light of Democrats taking control of both the executive and legislative branch,

the spectre of voter fraud re-emerged in legislative discussion. In the aftermath of the 2010

Election7, lawmakers ramped up their efforts on proposing and passing restrictive voter

legislation, introducing 395 new restrictions in 49 states between 2011-2015 (Berman, 2015,

p.10). Legislative efforts became subtler, more nuanced and sophisticated with equal support

in the North and South.

While these laws initially faced scrutiny at a federal level, the latest structural transformation

in oversight has permanently altered the supervision of the policy space. The VRA was

painstakingly enacted at the height of the Civil Rights Movement in August, 1965. It was

designed to enforce the voting rights guaranteed by the 14th and 15th amendments of the 6 Direct example in Figure A.2 7 GOP gained 675 state legislative seats (Balz, 2010).


Constitution, in order to prevent discrimination. Congressman John Lewis called it, “one of

the most vital tools of our democracy” (2013). Its significance on voter registration can be

seen in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3 – Voter Registration (Berman, August 2017, Twitter)

1965 2012

White Black Gap White Black Gap

Alabama 69.2 19.3 49.9 75.6 68.7 6.9

Georgia 62.6 27.4 35.2 72 72.3 -0.3

Louisiana 80.5 31.6 48.0 77.3 77.1 0.2

Mississippi 69.9 6.7 63.2 82.4 90.6 -8.2

South Carolina 75.7 37.3 38.4 73 75.8 -2.8

Virginia 61.1 38.3 22.8 75.8 72.6 3.2

Total Combined 69.8 26.7 43.1 76 76.1 -0.1

Since its passage, the Justice Department stopped more than 3,000 discriminatory voting

changes (Berman, 2015, p.7). However in 2013, federal and states’ rights reached an impasse

at the Supreme Court. While the Act contains numerous provisions to regulate the

administration of elections, Section 4 and 5 instigated the Shelby case. Section 4 contained

the coverage formula, which determined the jurisdictions8 subject to preclearance in Section

5, based on their histories of voter discrimination. In a 5-to-4 vote, the Supreme Court ruled it

unconstitutional, as being out-dated and “no longer responsive to current needs,” placing an

“impermissible burden on the constitutional principles of federalism and equal sovereignty of

the states.” As a consequence, the Justice Department had few legal resources to challenge

election laws. This decision remains a historic blow to voting rights efforts. I stress here the

importance of the ruling in the context of this study, as several state legislatures, once

covered under preclearance, “have been far more active” (Fuller, 2014), passing laws to

purge eligible voters who do not meet the newest requirements.

8 Section 4 mandated Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas and Virginia in their entirety; parts of California, Florida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota.

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Nonetheless, with more young and minority voters coming of voting age, the collective

impact grows. Estimates suggest that in 2020, all Millennials will be of age and comprise

nearly “40% of all eligible voters” (Keyes et al., 2012, p.10). Despite their historical apathy

to voting and low turnout rates, these constituents are notably progressive, and their rising

influence could have “conservatives scared to the point of extreme measures.” This poses

significant reason for such party representatives to minimise the extent of their voting

powers.

When asked why laws are making it harder to vote at such a high rate across the country, Bill

Clinton responded, “This is not rocket science. They are trying to make the 2012 electorate

look more like the 2010 electorate than the 2008 electorate” (2011, in New Yorker, 2012). He

added that the “effort to limit the franchise” has been the most determined “since we got rid

of the poll tax and all the other Jim Crow burdens since voting.” Therefore, today’s struggles

related to voter suppression merely represent the latest episode in a series of efforts to restrict

civil rights, by targeting specific segments of society; an “old poison, in new bottles.”9

The Debate – Voter Fraud vs. Voter Suppression 2016 saw an election of many firsts, as President Trump took to Twitter to claim, “In addition

to winning the Electoral College in a landslide, I won the popular vote if you deduct the

millions of people who voted illegally” (November, 2016). While unverified, it represents the

latest allegation of widespread voter fraud ostensibly plaguing U.S. elections.

Voter fraud is defined as any illegal interference in the election process, to include double

voting, non-citizen or non-resident voting, registration fraud, and voter impersonation

(Ballotpedia). Although this reveals the relative ease in which voter fraud could be

committed, its actual occurrence in elections remains highly controversial and predominantly

partisan. Indeed, two key sides have emerged: those that argue voter fraud is a widespread

epidemic, and that “preventing, deterring, and prosecuting such fraud is essential to

protecting the integrity of our voting process” (Heritage Foundation, 2015), and those that

view it as principally a myth, proven “greatly exaggerated” and a “great deal of smoke

without much fire” (Levitt, 2007).

9 Berman (2015)


Here arises this “tension in the administration of elections between maximizing ballot access

and minimizing voter fraud” (Atkeson et al., 2009, p.66). It is important in a democracy to

protect voter confidence and ensure integrity, as these concerns significantly undermine the

legitimacy of electoral practices (Pastor, 1999) and reduce confidence in democratic

institutions (Gronke and Hicks, 2009). However, these values are sometimes directly at odds:

policies working towards each value have varied implications for election procedures,

making legislation “usually framed as a tradeoff between the goals of guaranteeing access

and ensuring integrity” (Ansolabehere, 2009, p.127).

The 2000 Election was a watershed moment for election protocol. Amidst nearly two million

disqualified ballots, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) began to mitigate the

inconsistencies across the electoral infrastructure, to include updating voting technology and

establishing minimum administration standards. However, the specifics were left to each

state, allowing for varied interpretations to implement stricter legislation. Minnite’s (2010)

notes election law, a subject “once about as sexy as patent law” (p.1), has garnered

significant attention. Stewart (2014) insist that HAVA initiated a process that “stoked

paranoia” (in Bowler and Donovan, 2016, p.344) and eventually bipartisan support faded into

the battle between fraud and stolen elections (Fund, 2004) and voter suppression (Overton,

2013).

Prominent conservative think-tank, the Heritage Foundation10, has led most of the efforts to

lobby voter fraud as a “more widespread, frequent and serious problem than many people are

willing to admit” (Snead, 2017) with “mounting” and “incontrovertible evidence.” It is a

problem “as old as the country itself,” one that continues to threaten the legitimacy of “free

and fair” elections. As a result, there are “several policies states should adopt:” simple

“common sense” measures, sold to voters as a necessary burden to instil public confidence in

the democratic process. In the Crawford v Marion County Election Board Supreme Court

case regarding the constitutionality of strict-ID laws, Judge Posner noted how “exceedingly

difficult [it is] to manoeuvre in today’s America without a photo-ID. Try flying, or even

entering a tall building such as the courthouse in which we sit, without one” (2007). Candid

Republican lawmakers have even confessed the motivations for these laws, including

Pennsylvania representative, Mike Turzai, urging in 2012 that ID laws are “gonna allow 10 Paul Weyrich, first director of the Foundation, remarked in 1980: “I don’t want everybody to vote…our leverage in the elections quite candidly goes up as the voting populace goes down” (Blades, 2012).

15


Governor Romney to win the state of Pennsylvania” (Weinger). Subsequently, public support

for these laws has followed, as fears have stoked.11

While the Heritage Foundation conducts legitimate research with verified policy solutions, I

argue that it fails to put its findings into context. One examination, finds that between 2000

and 2012, there were 2,068 reported instances of alleged voter fraud amongst 146 million

total voters (News21, 2016), approximately one one-thousandth of a percentage point.

Additionally, “only a tiny portion of the claimed illegality is substantiated” (Levitt, 2007,

p.3), while the rest have been “nothing more than speculation or…conclusively debunked.”

Another investigation finds three incidents of voter impersonation of one billion ballots cast

between 2000 and 2014, the specific voter fraud voter-ID laws are intended to target (Levitt,

2014); a voter is more likely to be struck by lightning than impersonate another at the polls

(Levitt, 2007, p.4). In fact, most evidence that “purports to reveal voter fraud can be traced to

causes far more logical than fraud,” (p.7), including bad “matching” against voting rolls and

common mistakes.

Famighetti et al. (2017) highlights numerous other studies, which “have consistently shown

that elections are not infected by widespread fraud” (p.1), reinforcing the wider consensus

that exists amongst academics. Khan and Caron (2012) pulled records from every state and

found the overall rate “infinitesimal,” while the Government Accountability Office (2014)

conducted a review that consistently found “few instances.” Ultimately, the “verdict is in

from every corner that fraud is sufficiently rare and that it simply could not and does not

happen at the rate approaching which would be required to ‘rig’ an election” (Levitt, 2007).

As a nation with one of the lowest turnout rates, attorney Santiago Juarez jests, “Hell, you

can’t get people to vote once, let alone twice” (2014 in Palast, 2016).

The cost-benefit analysis to commit voter fraud is more inconsequential. Unless done on a

systematic scale, swaying an election is nearly impossible. Individual voter fraud would be a

“foolish and ineffective way” to go about winning elections (Levitt, 2007). Any voter

accused runs the risk of a $10,000 fine and five years in prison (p.7). It is “time consuming,

expensive and scales poorly” (Ahlquist et al., 2014, p.9). From the calculus of voting,

11 Four in five Americans support ID laws (Gallup, 2016).


Minnite (2010) argues “voter fraud…is even more irrational than the individual act of voting”

(p.5).

Bowler and Donovan (2016) stress, “democracy requires that both winners and losers view

election outcomes as the result of a fair process” (p.341). This has crucial implications for the

functionality of political life with regards to legitimacy and can dictate the policy space.

Voter fraud may exist, but also “makes a popular scapegoat” (Levitt, 2007) to exaggerate and

distract from the real issues elections face. Therefore, voter fraud claims are used as a means

to justify policies that solve a non-existent problem, by empowering acts of widespread voter

suppression. It is nothing more than a “fabricated” reason necessary “to

disenfranchise…certain groups, such as college students, low-income voters, and minorities,

as possible” (Keyes et al., 2012, p.1).

Recent, unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud have come with swift action at a federal level

with the creation of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. This non-

bipartisan panel, vice-chaired by infamous Kansas SoS, Kris Kobach 12 , has been

controversial since inception, investigating “problems with voting that may undermine the

public’s confidence in elections” (Fessler and Neely, 2017). Its first action to request detailed

voter records from all 50 states has been met by fierce resistance amid privacy concerns to

utilise “names, addresses, birth dates, partial Social Security numbers, party affiliation, felon

status…for every registered voter…” (Fessler, 2017). 3,700 Coloradans have already

deregistered amongst thousands others across the country (Siu, 2017), representing one of the

first instances of self-imposed voter suppression. Only time will tell of the Commission’s

success, but it comes at a time when voting liberties are far from secure.

Empirical Evidence and Motivations The empirical analyses below allow us to make conclusions that go beyond the often partisan

and non-evidenced themes utilised by politicians and pundits. However, there are some

difficulties that arise when applying the scientific method to literature in this manner. While

pre-existing studies provide an overarching examination of the effects of restrictive voter-

access policies, the rapidly changing dynamics of the policy space make these findings often

out-dated. Additionally, interpretations of elections, exit polls, and electoral results each have

their own biases. Moreover, it is challenging to derive conclusions that remain relevant from

12 See Gabriel (2014); MacAskill (2012)

17


one election to another, further emphasising the necessity of a study to provide an overview

of the most recent research.

While the consequences of state voter-access policies on turnout are generally well

established13, we know significantly less about which factors lead to the policies’ initial

adoption. Scholars only recently devoted their attention to studying what motivates policy

from a macro-based perspective. The studies presented offer the foundations essential to

pursuing my own research.

Biggers and Hanmer (2015) examine the restrictions on policies that initially increased voter

convenience over the previous four decades (i.e., through early and absentee voting). They

argue that legislation that creates ‘costly voting’ participation have halted a liberalised voting

process, highlighting the “partisan nature of the debate” (p.203) and the correspondingly

“partisan concern about the political consequences of…convenience voting” (p.193). Using

historical data between 1972-2013, they found partisan influence decisions to adopt

restrictions to early voting. While this signals a “modest role” (p.203) on turnout, it reflects

the politicised nature of recent legislative changes.

Hicks et al. (2015) took a similar approach focusing on voter-ID legislation between 2001-

2012. They initially call these laws “an electoral reform that epitomises the partisan battle for

attaining an electoral advantage in contemporary American politics” (p.18). Republicans are

presiding over an “…electoral coalition that is declining in size; where elections are

competitive, the furtherance of restrictive voter-ID laws is a means of maintaining

Republican support while curtailing Democratic electoral gains.” This is especially relevant

following the 2008 and 2012 presidential victories, as Republicans try to “weather” the

demographic shifts favouring Democrats and take advantage of the razor thin margins needed

to tip an election. “Close elections reveal the ugliness of how the political game is played”

(p.18), by systematically expanding and contracting segments of the electorate.

Paraphrasing Schattschneider (1960), it is clear parties have the incentive to either win an

election by garnering more supporters, or have less of the opposition turn out. Consequently,

the efforts of state legislatures to enact heightened voter restrictions are merely “…indicative

13 See Lanning (2008); Cobb et al. (2012); Hajnal et al. (2016).


of the larger struggle for electoral advantage between two highly polarised and

demographically differentiated parties” (Hicks et al., 2015, p.19). While the exact impact of

strict-ID laws on turnout is not given, in this age of “elite polarisation and

precarious…majorities, a minimal impact may just be enough incentive for partisans to try

and game the system” (p.20). Therefore, instead of expanding mobilisation efforts by altering

issue positions and attracting new supporters, Republicans have turned to restrictive

legislation, proven to disproportionately affect Democratic voters. While this self-interest is

not entirely novel, it is not justified for a party to support institutional rule changes simply to

advantage their party.

Additionally, Hicks et al. (2015) study the contextual factors at a state-level, hypothesising

that partisan competition is the driving force for Republicans to enact these laws: as election

margins decrease, the efforts of legislators increase and are significantly greater in

battleground states. The legislation is not uniformly dispersed, as not all Republican-

controlled legislatures pushed for ID laws. Nonetheless, the “prevalence of Republican

lawmakers strongly and positively” influenced the adoption of ID laws in “electorally

competitive states” (p.18). Interestingly, they highlight the importance of public opinion, as

the majority of voters support laws deterring voter fraud, heightening the incentive for

Republicans to act strategically.

Public opinion can play a key role in this policy space. Beaulieu (2014) emphasises that

politicians are not the only actors that care about winning elections, and we must take into

consideration the voters who are motivated equally along party lines. Their survey-based data

suggests “respondents are able to differentiate between the relative incentives of Democrats

and Republicans where fraud tactics are concerned” (p.24), and whether these tactics are

problematic “…is heavily influenced by partisan bias.” This implies that “individual concerns

for fraud are shaped by a desire for their preferred candidate to win.” In addition to finding

evidence for voters’ bias on this issue, it enriches “our understanding of the forces that shape

voter confidence in the electoral process.” Bowler and Donovan (2016) apply public

perceptions surrounding restrictive laws and confidence in elections, and found that they

were highly conditioned on voters’ party identifications (p.340). Nonetheless, they conclude

that their study reinforces a well-established fact: the electoral process, and the way in which

it is conducted, significantly impacts how people perceive election integrity (p.353).

19


Bentele and O’Brien (2013), the basis of my analysis, examines the causal factors in

proposing and passing restrictive voter-access policies. They find that states’ racial

composition, as represented by minority turnout and the proportion of the electorate that is

African-American, is significantly related to the actions of state legislatures between 2006

and 2011. Crucially, unlike the previous studies, none of their measures of partisan control or

electoral competition had a significant effect (p.1097). With respect to passed policies, this is

the opposite, as Republican composition in state legislatures, the presence of a Republican

governor, and competitiveness increased the likelihood of passing restrictive legislation,

coupled with the effects of minorities and current accessibility to the ballot (p.1099).

The importance of these policies and the future of American democracy cannot be

understated. Burden et al. (2014) emphasise how states shape the franchise as “…one of

central interest to political science” (p.107). Atkeson et al. (2009) accentuate that future

research demonstrates “important testaments to how we apply laws and treat citizens, a

fundamentally important question in democratic studies” (p.72). This dissertation narrows the

research gap in a much-needed effort update the data and arguments, in light of the latest

policy developments.

Chapter 3: Study

Research Questions The literature highlights the diverse motivations for the recently rising activity in restrictive

voter-access policies. If these policies could depress turnout and disproportionately affect

certain segments of the electorate, the importance of understanding them at a macro-level is

more critical than ever. Following recent electoral events and policy developments, the

necessity for a renewed examination into the nature of this legislation is significantly

warranted. By employing the foundations of Bentele and O’Brien (2013), we are able to re-

examine several research questions with crucial implications for future elections:

• Following B&B’s initial findings, are the proposal and passage of restrictive policies

still a strategic, partisan, and racialised affair throughout the 2012 and 2016 elections?

• Have the results been biased on the policies that have already passed prior to the 2012

Election? And as a result, have Republicans in primarily Democratic states put forth

more effort to propose legislation?


• To what extent could the recent intensification and homogenised nature of these

policies become indiscriminate in nature across demographics and partisan lines?

Therefore, the study is revised and expanded with new and updated data to encapsulate the

developments in recent voter suppression policy, especially prominent in the last two

presidential elections.

Methodology This study aims to empirically analyse and establish patterns in the legislative action of the

most common restrictive voter-access policies. While countless studies have attempted to

quantify their effects on turnout, few have examined the origin of the legislation at a macro-

level. This analysis continues a “unique empirical perspective” from B&B, “in which we

systematically examine which political, electoral, and contextual factors are associated…”

(p.1093) with states’ legislation actions on voting policy. By examining the passage and

proposal policy across all 50 states between 2012 and August 2017, I attempt to narrow this

gap with the newest election data, in order to evaluate the latest political agendas. I utilise

state-level longitudinal data through Pooled-Poisson modelling approaches, to examine

trends in the count of legislation and a variety of explanatory variables. Additionally, I

examine what influences participation in the new Crosscheck programme. This is not a

treatment-based analysis looking at legislative effects, but rather “identifies a constellation of

conditions that may shape the policymaking process in this area and subject them to

empirical test.”

The academic literature outlines that restrictive voter legislation could be derived from a

variety of origins: “a response to strategic political calculation…evidence of symbolic

politics and fear, interplay between the structural, partisan, and cultural confines of

policymaking, or all of the above” (p.1093). Consequently, the legislative process to pass

legislation is often constrained within the political context of each state legislature. Some

bills proposed can be expected to fail but are often “motivated by a genuine effort by

policymakers to achieve legislative change or by an interest in engaging in symbolic

politics.” Therefore, by considering both proposed and passed legislation, we can account for

these different perspectives. This, as B&B notes, makes a “contemporary, empirical

contribution…” to a larger literature by pressing “…the normatively important question of

what role political parties play in securing access to the ballot.” While the rhetoric and

21


significance of voting rights continues to rapidly develop, concrete empirical evidence is

essential going forward.

Data and Sources

Dependent Variables - Textual Analysis

The dependent variable is a unique aspect of this study. Restrictive voter legislation takes the

form of an annual count, proposed or passed across state legislatures. We focus here on five

different policies: voter-ID and POCR, restrictions on early and absentee voting, registration,

and felon enfranchisement. I pooled and analysed data from the NCSL-EDL, in order to

identify and classify restrictive proposals. Additionally, some standout language for each

policy type is detailed in Table 1; the judicial landscape for any such law is in constant flux

as courts challenge their intent and legitimacy. Therefore, understanding the language

deployed in these bills is crucial to evaluating their motivation.

Voter Identification Laws

Voter-ID laws 14 are the most recent manifestation of “structural disenfranchisement”

(Donziger, 2001) and the “current chapter in America’s long-running saga over voting rights”

(Alth, 2008, p.202). These laws require voters to provide a form of government-issued ID

before they register or cast a ballot. State requirements vary in whether a photo-ID is

requested. A wide-range of literature has looked at the impact of these requirements on

turnout for the both the direct and indirect costs of acquiring and presenting an ID. Their

findings argue that these laws create barriers to voters and disproportionately affect

minorities and those less likely to have an ID. These requirements are some of the “most

burdensome” (BC, 2016) and have been utilised as an economic force “to block people of

lower economic status…” (Ellis, p.1025-26) as the least flexible and “able to afford the cost

of voting exacted by the law.”

Proof of Citizenship Requirements

Proof of citizenship requirements (POCR) are built on the rhetoric that surrounds the topic of

“illegal” immigration and have garnered significant attention over the last decade. This is

perhaps best evidenced by President Trump alleging that upwards of 3-5 million votes were

cast by undocumented migrants and ineligible voters (Twitter, 2016). POCR demand a voter

14 See Figure A.3


to prove their status prior to registration and voting. Studies highlight the difficulty in

acquiring the documentary evidence necessary to satisfy these requirements (Nielson, 2014)

and those who are most likely to be affected by additional hurdles to the ballot.

Registration Restrictions

Registration restrictions include any policy impacting voters directly or third-party

organisation that works to register voters. This includes reducing time windows, eliminating

same-day election registration, limiting the provisions of the Motor Voter Act, and restricting

voter registration drives. Registration drives are usually targeted with additional protocol,

requiring groups to disclose their actions with the state, partake in mandatory training, and

are forced to meet short deadlines.

Absentee and Early Voting Restrictions

Legislative developments in absentee and early voting before 2000 were a primary example

of policy to increase accessibility. However, recent efforts have reversed this trend and

reduced effectiveness.15 Current restrictions include reducing the time to apply for and accept

absentee ballots and providing for additional ID requirements. As the U.S. does not make

Election Day a national holiday, these laws are particularly harmful to voters that cannot get

time off work or are forced to stand in longer lines. The “Souls to the Polls” movement is a

notable example of those targeted by restrictions (Etter, et al., 2016).

Felon Participation Restrictions

The U.S. is one of most stringent nations for denying the vote to citizens with felony

convictions (Pilkington, 2012). Legislation to restrict the participation of felons includes

provisions to ban voting for life, tougher penalties for voting while ineligible, and increasing

the ineligibility period. By 2014, 6 million Americans had their voting rights stripped, as

some states prohibit voting, even after decades of serving sentences for often nonviolent

crimes (Gonchar, 2014). Many of these laws specifically target the African-American

population: 8% black adults are ineligible to vote, relative to 1.8% of the rest of the adult

population (Pilkington, 2012). Former Attorney General Eric Holder described these

prohibitions as “out-dated practices” and “vestiges” of the discriminatory policies utilised by

the South after the Civil War. 15 Wisconsin struck down a law restricting the hours for in-person voting: “The legislature’s immediate goal was to achieve a partisan objective, but the means of achieving that objective was to suppress the reliably Democratic vote...” (Peterson in Barnes and Marimow, 2016).

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Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program

Crosscheck is the latest initiative promoted to prevent voter fraud, by ensuring that “accurate

and current voter registration rolls are maintained” (HAVA, 2003). The same type of system

was initially designed to track foreign travelers in the wake of September 11th but shut down

“over concerns about racial profiling” (Palast, 2016). Launched by Kris Kobach in 2005, state

participants in the Program contribute to databases on registered voters, in an attempt to

prevent “double voting.” As of 2016, the Program has expanded to 27 states but remains

controversial. Updating voter rolls is essential to accurate elections, but the act of “voter

caging16” threatens the Program’s legitimacy.

Only a handful of voter fraud cases have flagged as more than clerical errors, as several

reports highlight concerns regarding its methodology being built on inherent racial bias. The

system is promoted to match first, middle, and last names, birth dates, and the last four digits

of Social Security numbers. However, an investigative report on the Georgia and Washington

voter lists found more than 1 million potential cases, as the system only matched first and last

names. Statistical analysis “found that African-American, Latino and Asian names

predominate” (Palast, 2016) ran the risk of being wrongly accused, as Census data highlights

how “minorities are overrepresented in 85 of 100 of the most common last names.” The

unreliability of the data (Oregon SoS in Kromm, 2014) resulted in several states dropping out

of the system, to include Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and Florida. This programme

represents the latest efforts to partake in active voter suppression. To our knowledge, this

dissertation is one of the first to consider Crosscheck as a determinant variable in an

empirical analysis of this variety.

Table 1 provides a breakdown by bills’ policy type and a variety of standout language used

by state legislatures. Common themes include the necessity to protect the integrity of the

voting process and strengthening election laws.

16 Voter caging: the act of challenging the legality of voters’ registration status.


Table 1 Textual Analysis of Several Prominent Restrictive Voter-Access Policies

Type of Policy State Bill Date Status Statement of Purpose

Voter ID Maine LD 199 15/1/2015 Failed “An act to strengthen Maine’s election laws by requiring photographic identification for the purpose of voting.”

North Carolina HB 589 12/08/2013 Enacted “An act to restore confidence in government by establishing Voter Information Verification Act to promote the electoral process through education and increased registration of voters…requiring voters to provide photo ID before voting to protect the right of each registered voter to cast a secure vote with reasonable security measures that confirm voter identity as accurately as possible without restriction…”

Connecticut HB 5892 08/04/2013 Failed “To safeguard the integrity of the state's voting process.”

Proof of Citizenship

Florida HM 1225 11/03/2016 Failed “Urges Congress to amend certain federal laws to remove obstacles to states exercising their authority to protect the integrity of elections by ensuring that only United States citizens are registered to vote.”

Michigan HB 5221 13/12/2011 Carryover - Failed

“Voter registration applications shall contain a statement requiring an applicant to submit satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship with his or her application and stating that the application shall be rejected if satisfactory evidence of United States citizenship is not provided.”

Tennessee SB 352 26/05/2011 Enacted “The general assembly recognizes that the right to vote is the right of legal citizens; and whereas, it is of the utmost importance to ensure integrity in our elections within this state…”

Registration New Hampshire SB 3 10/07/2017 Enacted “Any case where supervisors are unable to verify the applicant's domicile or where evidence exists of voting fraud shall be promptly reported to the secretary of state and to the attorney general, who shall cause such further investigation as is warranted.”

Virginia SB 871 11/01/2017 Failed “Relates to third-party registration groups…requires any individual or organization that will be distributing and collecting voter registration applications to register as a third-party registration group with the Department of Elections prior to engaging in any voter registration activities…”

Montana SB 405 23/04/2013 Adopted “Protects the integrity of State elections by ending late voter

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registration on the Friday before election day and eliminating election day registration…”

Absentee & Early Voting

Ohio HB 250 21/08/2013 Failed “For all other voters, other than overseas voters and absent uniformed services voters, who are applying to vote absent voter’s ballots other than in person, ballots shall be printed and ready for use on the thirty-fifth seventeenth day before the day of the election.”

Alabama HB 463 01/03/2012 Failed “Bill would require a voter voting an absentee ballot to submit personal identification when making the application to vote by absentee ballot.”

Felon Franchise

Texas HB 3776 09/03/2017 Failed “The registrar shall cancel a voter's registration immediately if the registrar receives notice from the secretary of state under Section 18.068 that the voter has been convicted of a felony.”

Virginia HJR 539 09/01/2013 Failed “Provides that no person convicted of a felony shall be qualified to vote unless he has completed service of his sentence, including any modifications of the sentence, and made payment in full of any restitution, fines, costs, and fees assessed against him as a result of the felony conviction. The proposed amendment removes the power of the Governor or other appropriate authority (such as another state's law) to restore the right to vote to a felon.”

Mississippi SB 2227 02/05/2012 Enacted “Provide that vote fraud shall be a disqualifying conviction for purposes of voter registration pursuant to…the Mississippi Constitution of 1890.”

Crosscheck New Jersey AR 190 21/11/2016 Pending “Urges certain state chief election officials to join Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck program conducted by Kansas Secretary of State.”

New Hampshire HB 620 08/01/2015 Failed “Requires the secretary of state to enter into an agreement to share voter information and data through the Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program.”

Texas HB 2372 05/03/2013 Failed “To maintain the state-wide voter registration list and to prevent duplication of registration in more than one state or jurisdiction, the secretary of state shall cooperate with other states and jurisdictions to develop systems to compare voters, voter history, and voter registration lists…”


Independent Variables

There are a wide range of state-level factors, which could affect the likelihood for states to

consider restrictive voter-access policies. The primary variables are outlined here.

Partisan Control & Electoral Competition

The first set of factors focus on partisan control, specifically the percent of each state

legislature that is Republican, state party competition, and dummy variables to indicate

whether the state government is divided, has a Republican Governor or SoS. As

demonstrated, Republicans traditionally focus on the voter fraud perspective of voting rights

issues, and therefore support bills more restrictive in nature, creating a partisan divide.

Additionally, recent trends suggest that incentives to suppress the vote have grown in the

context of competitive elections. Therefore, I anticipate the difference in party vote share

from the previous presidential election to increase the chances of supporting restrictive

policies. With the Electoral College as the primary institution determining presidential

victories, the more competitive a state and its impact in swaying additional electoral votes,

the greater the payoff for suppressive efforts. Such an incentive, however, is not balanced

across both parties, as we have seen that the voters likely affected support Democrats.

Therefore, they have little reason to depress the turnout in their own base.

Voter Behaviour & Voter Suppression

This set of variables assesses the effects of turnout and impact on the frequency of supporting

restrictive policies. The literature documents that additional hurdles to voting are more

arduous for those of lower socio-economic status, minorities, and the elderly. Therefore, I

should find restrictive legislation more prominent where these voters turn out at higher rates.

This is studied across the states with higher minority turnout and its changes as well as class-

biased turnout and its changes, all collected from the U.S. Census Bureau. Additionally, I

look at the legislative response to overall turnout, as higher rates typically favour Democrats.

Demographics

Since we analyse the effects of turnout in previous elections, the responses of strategic

politicians are retrospective, “one that may involve initial electoral setbacks” (p.1094).

Therefore, calculated attempts to support restrictive policies may rely on “purely

demographic indicators deemed troubling for their re-election or party.” Including the

27


percentage of African-Americans, non-citizens, and the elderly (over 65) across states tests

this motivation. History already dictates the significance of African-Americans and their

battle for the franchise, so the racial composition of each state could continue to support the

voter suppression narrative. The logic is similar for non-citizens, particularly in light of the

anti-immigration rhetoric afflicting the post-globalisation political climate. It is common

knowledge (Pew Research, 2014) that the elderly vote at a rate higher than any other age

group and disproportionately support the GOP.

Incidence & Perceptions of Electoral Fraud

The current discussion on voter fraud is more prominent than ever. While the actual

occurrence of these activities remains controversial, policymakers argue that restrictive

requirements are an effective means to deter the supposedly widespread epidemic. However,

contemporary politics have reached a generally uncontested conclusion in that fraud is

extremely rare. Nonetheless, this comes as a control variable acquired from News21’s

database containing all cases of alleged election fraud by state from 2000-2012.

The impact of lobbying and interest groups is also crucial to the U.S. policymaking process.

The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is a well-known and involved

organisation, “the largest nonpartisan membership organisation of state legislators dedicated

to the principles of limited government, free markets and federalism” (ALEC.org). Crucially,

they are responsible for the organisation and drafting of several legislative efforts, to include

37 of the 62 voter-ID bills introduced in 2011 and 2012 (Berman, 2015, p.261). Their

influence suggests that state legislations with a higher percentage of ALEC-affiliated

members could increase the likelihood of promoting restrictive policies. This data is merely

an estimate compiled from the ALEC Exposed Project, since membership is not publicised.

Therefore, readers should take this into consideration when interpreting its effects.

The citizen ideology measure used in B&B is not included, as the measure to empirically

proxy states’ political culture, has not been updated since 2013 and would not provide an

accurate representation.


Previous Relevant Policy & Control Variables

Creating and implementing these policies can often be costly. Therefore, an indicator to

assess the likelihood that a state may be constrained by its own economic resources is

included through real state revenue per capita.

The final variables highlight the constantly evolving nature of this issue. Two control

variables record whether a state has already passed some degree of voter-ID or POCR and if

a state makes available either early or no-excuse absentee voting. States with more accessible

election protocol could be subject to greater efforts intended to suppress the vote. These

control variables allows us to take into account policy developments that have already passed

across the states.

Chapter 4: Results and Analysis

Presentation of Results These models 17 assess the significance and magnitude of each variable implicated in

restrictive voter-access policy. Here, I make small modifications to the approach B&B

utilised to accommodate the specifics of the dataset.

Proposed Legislation

We firstly assess which state-level determinants are correlated with higher annual counts of

proposed legislation. The cross-sectional dataset coupled with a count as a dependent variable

leads me to utilise a standard Pooled-Poisson modelling method. Both random effects and

fixed effects are compared, as utilising a fixed effects approach alone has its costs in this

dataset, invalidating any use of time-invariant variables, to include control variable indicators

for ALEC-affiliated state legislators and voter fraud. Nonetheless, Hausman tests are

conducted on the models, in order to assess the validity of the differences between the

effects-based approaches.

Additionally, I note that B&B perceive the percentage of state legislature Republican

indicator to suffer from endogeneity issues, rendering this approach inherently biased, and

leads them to a GMM approach with instrumental variables. Nevertheless, I am advised that

17Models are run using Stata version 13.0.

29


this method is not necessary since no case of endogeneity can be established from our

understanding of the issue.

Table 2 Pooled-Poisson Analysis – Total Proposed Restrictive Access Policies, 2012-2017

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7

All Proposed Legislation ID & Proof of Citizenship

Registration, Early & Absentee, & Felony

Partisan Control % State Legislature Republican 0.4846

(0.9646) .3352 (0.9609)

2.745** (1.301)

0.4343 (1.272)

3.233* (1.744)

1.819 (1.4041)

3.872* (2.183)

Republican Governor 0.2952* (0.1605)

.2942* (.1616)

0.3591** (0.1819)

0.2007 (0.2205)

0.3884 (0.2585)

0.4071* (0.2299)

0.6083** (0.2779)

Republican Secretary -0.3413 (0.2149)

-0.3083 (0.2142)

-0.5762* (0.3049)

-0.4349 (0.2954)

-0.9343** (0.4157)

-0.2698 (0.2959)

-0.2955 (0.3923)

Divided State Government 0.0953 (0.1456)

0.1234 (0.1448)

-0.1976 (0.1687)

0.1083 (0.1982)

-0.2154 (0.2339)

0.2263 (0.2184)

-0.0364 (0.2649)

Electoral Competition State Party Competition 0.0143***

(0.0052) 0.0124*** (0.0051)

0.0263*** (0.0089)

0.0066 (0.0071)

0.0191 (0.0126)

0.0258*** (0.0072)

0.0445*** (0.0139)

Difference in Party Vote Share in Previous Presidential Election

0.8207 (0.9621)

0.4363 (0.9374)

1.303 (1.611)

0.9212 (1.339)

3.612* (2.204)

-0.2468 (1.307)

-1.481 (2.530)


Minority Turnout in Previous Presidential Election

1.988* (1.145)

35.68*** (6.756)

1.437 (1.550)

30.44*** (9.349)

2.421* (1.407)

38.51*** (10.05)

Change in Minority Turnout between Previous Presidential Elections

-2.916 (2.643)

-2.109 (2.628)

-17.09*** (4.257)

-5.408 (3.765)

-16.94*** (5.976)

-0.5205 (3.720)

-14.60** (6.308)

Class-biased Turnout in Previous Presidential Election

0.0059 (0.0069)

0.0021 (0.0065)

0.0068 (0.0133)

0.0146* 0.0091

0.0017 (0.0191)

-0.0017 (0.0094)

0.0057 (0.0208)

Change in Class-biased Turnout between Previous Presidential Elections

-0.0053 (0.0035)

-0.0034 (0.0034)

-0.0098 (0.0063)

-0.0106** (0.0047)

-0.0102 (0.0087)

0.0006 (0.0051)

-0.0044 (0.0101)

Total State Turnout in Previous Presidential Election

2.746 (1.900

1.481 (1.747)

6.252* (3.370)

2.742 (2.584)

9.015** (4.705)

2.014 (2.662)

3.704 (5.003)

Demographic % African American 0.6884

(1.157)

% Non-citizens 10.11** (4.506)

10.51** (4.490)

-53.42 (36.14)

5.929 (6.139)

-109.0** (50.33)

15.22*** (5.557)

10.21 (55.39)

% Over 65 -0.9421 (4.730)

-0.7125 (4.794)

-30.52*** (10.28)

-12.78* (6.708)

-60.57*** (15.09)

12.61* (6.326)

0.2731 (14.73)

Perceptions of Electoral Fraud Reported Cases of Voter Fraud -0.0012

(0.0020) -0.0012 (0.0020)

-0.0023 (0.0027)

-0.0007 (0.0024)

% ALEC-affiliated State Legislators -0.5714 (1.435)

-0.3140 (1.438)

-2.436 (2.214)

-0.5595 (1.744)


Already Passed Photo ID or Proof of Citizenship Requirement

-0.2450 (0.1663)

-0.2308 (0.1672)

-0.3058 (0.2203)

-0.2277 (0.2355)

-0.2149 (0.3454)

No-excuse Absentee or Early Voting Currently Available

-0.3207*** (0.1307)

-0.3447*** (0.1347)

-0.5935 (.5299)

-0.3411** (0.1569)

-0.5087 (0.5393)

Per Capita State Revenue -0.00004 (0.00003)

-0.00014 (0.00003)

-0.00004 (0.00009)

0.00002 (0.00003)

0.00009 (0.00001)

-0.00002 (0.00003)

-0.00009 (0.00013)

Constant -3.262 (2.277)

-1.480 (2.019)

-2.847 (3.011)

-6.461 (3.118)

Log Likelihood -558.95 -560.36 -376.63 -368.66 -222.38 -387.07 -242.34 N 300 300 300 300 258 300 276 *p <0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01


Models 1-3 look at the state-level variables associated with the proposal of all five types of

restrictive legislation. Model 4-5 and Models 6-7 study the changes in counts of the

legislation individually, by examining ID and POCR as well as Registration, Early and

Absentee, and Felony restrictions respectively

The random effects in Models 1&2 reach similar conclusions, when examining the count of

all proposed restrictive legislation. Presence of a Republican governor is mildly significant,

suggesting that the state executive has an influence in increasing proposed bills. For state

lawmakers, this could provide the necessary motivation to propose policies in the hopes that

they are eventually enacted. State Party Competition, as expressed through a simplified

Ranney Index (Berkowitz and Clay, 2011), presents a significant source of legislation

proposals. At first, this runs counter to expectations, in that the more competitive a state

legislature, the more bipartisan support that is required to propose and pass these laws. If the

general understanding is that Republicans tend to support restrictive legislation more

aggressively, then they may have as much power as with a majority. Thus, I argue that the

significance of this variable emphasises the ability of parties to propose legislation, even

when opposition exists across the aisle.

This is consistent with the insignificance of the remaining partisan control and electoral

competition variables and provides justification for the less evident partisan and strategic

nature of these trends. For instance, a majority is not required to propose bills, as it is to pass

them. Moreover, states with Republican majorities may reduce the overall electoral incentive

to propose policies that deter turnout in safe constituencies. Efforts have recently occurred

prominently, if not more so, in traditionally blue states, such as New York and California.

B&B allude that such considerations “may complicate a simple linear relationship” (p.1098)

between partisan control and restrictive proposals.

What is consistent with the rhetoric observed throughout is the significance of both minority

turnout and the percentage of non-citizens residing in each state. This strongly asserts and

provides evidence for the racialised nature of these policies. As demonstrated in B&B, we

attempt to distinguish between the effects of minority turnout and the overall composition of

African-Americans by state and evaluate each variable individually. Nevertheless, the

findings are consistent across all models in that the percentage of African-Americans reports

as positively insignificant with negligible effects to its interchange; as such, it is excluded

31


from the remaining models. While racial composition may not directly affect results, the

direct turnout of these minorities still suggests the more nuanced agendas of these policies.

Interestingly, the previous relevant policy variable dummy for no-excuse absentee or early

voting currently available is significantly negative. We would not necessarily expect it to

affect in this direction, as any opportunity to limit these current access laws should be met

with increased restrictive policies.

However, a Hausman test shows that a fixed-effects approach could be more efficient in this

case. Such models control for “all time-invariant differences between the individuals”

(Kohler and Kreuter in Torres-Reyna, 2007) to avoid bias, but it is key to stress that such

analysis will only reveal within-state changes correlated with the increased chance of

proposing legislation, and the time-invariant control variables are dropped. Ultimately, the

differences between Models 1, 2, and 3 illustrate the significance of some additional factors:

the Republican percentage of a state legislature, presence of a Republican SoS, change in

minority turnout, total state turnout, and elderly population; most of which are consistent with

the racially and possibly strategic nature of restrictive legislation. Overall, these results

highlight the sensitivity of this analysis between the two approaches, each of which has their

own merits and drawbacks.

Models 4&5 look at the likelihood of proposing voter-ID laws and POCR under random

effects and fixed effects respectively. The sensitivity between the two approaches is directly

reflected in the results, with marginal significant effects in class-biased turnout and the

percentage over 65, both of which are intuitively reflected in the literature. Fixed effects

Model 5 shows significant results similar to Model 3, but with implications for the impact of

tightening electoral victories in the difference in party vote share and the effect of increasing

overall turnout rates. The negative correlation between the percentage of non-citizens and

these two requirements presents an intriguing puzzle that could perhaps be impacted by the

reduction in state sample size. Additionally, having already passed a photo-ID or POCR had

no impact on proposing any future policies, which can be reflected particularly in this type of

legislation as one already saturating the policy space prior to 2012.

Lastly, we look at the determinants of proposing restrictions to registration, early and

absentee voting, and felon enfranchisement in Models 6&7. The results closely mimic those

of all types legislative types, as the random effects highlight the effect of a Republican


governor, heightened state party competition, minority turnout, and non-citizens. Model 7

suggests significant partisan and racialised trends motivate these policies, supporting the

conclusions presented in previous chapters and raising the degree of importance for what this

means for the issue going forward. The availability of no-excuse absentee and early voting

also interestingly decreases the frequency of proposed policies again, which is unexpected.

This can potentially be accounted for by states that have these policies already in place, most

of which are blue states and may not face much resistance. Indeed, such support may be

enough to cancel out the opposition and decrease the likelihood of reaching the state capital.

Nevertheless, the overarching concerns of voter suppression through proposed restrictions are

indeed warranted and could be directly motivated by patterns documented in the literature.

Passed Legislation

This analysis endeavours to look at the count of legislation passed to restrict voter-access.

Again, I utilise the Pooled-Poisson approach, disregarding the potential endogeneity issues

reported by B&B. Unlike the results presented in the proposed analysis, random effects

Models 1&2 in Table 3 both exhibit correlations only through class-biased turnout, its

change, and the portion of each state over 65. While these findings are consistent with the

intuition of the literature, it fails to show any relationships with partisan control, electoral

competition, or minority turnout indicators. However, it is argued that minority and class-

biased turnouts might suffer from multicollinearity issues, with the knowledge that portions

of the U.S. underclass are minorities18.

Although the Hausman test conducted for passed policy asserts the use of random effects,

Model 3 is included for sake of completion and comparison to analyse the within-state

developments of passed legislation through fixed effects. As before, only the 28 states

enacting restrictive policies are included and time-invariant cofactors are excluded.

Nevertheless, the results show class-biased turnout and the availability of no-excuse absentee

or early voting as invalidated factors and additionally suggests minor significance of overall

turnout. Overall, these results are far from illuminating in attempting to solve this policy

puzzle and establish determinants for the motivation to pass these policies.

18 State of Working America

33


Table 3 Pooled-Poisson Analysis – Total Passed Restrictive Access Policies, 2012-2017

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

All Passed Legislation


(2.730) 3.410 (2.732)

1.712 (4.690)

Republican Governor 0.7715 (0.5086)

.7708 (0.5075)

0.9311 (0.6142)


-0.6954 (0.5537)

-0.0805 (0.9321)

Divided State Government -0.5795 (0.5096)

-0.5972 (0.5079)

-0.3012 (0.6814)

Electoral Competition State Party Competition 0.0169

(0.0142) 0.0172 (0.0142)

0.0063 (0.0282)


-0.6001 (2.185)

-0.5972 (2.179)

4.571 (4.532)



-1.347 (2.834)

6.621 (17.55)


-5.816 (8.245)

-6.505 (7.885)

-2.578 (12.32)


0.0341** (0.0140)

0.0355*** (0.0132)

-0.0049 (0.0302)


-0.0142* (0.0085)

-0.0148* (0.0081)

-0.0051 (0.0151)


6.389 (4.751)

6.735 (4.604)

19.87* (10.35)

Demographic % African American -1.147

(2.631)

% Non-citizens -13.68 (10.28)

-14.11 (10.29)

-53.42 (36.14)

% Over 65 -34.92*** (12.22)

-34.70*** (12.19)

-30.52*** (10.28)

Perceptions of Electoral Fraud Reported Cases of Voter Fraud -0.0018

(0.0037) -0.0017 (0.0037)

% ALEC-affiliated State Legislators 1.520 (3.028)

1.478 (3.011)



0.1581 (0.3729)

0.1679 (0.3763)

0.4041 (0.6234)


-0.5002** (0.2500)

-0.5034** (0.2548)

-0.2005 (0.5555)


-0.00004 (0.00007)

-0.00014 (0.00028)

Constant -6.736 (5.433)

-7.286 (5.017)

Log Likelihood -172.089 -172.11 -92.865 N 300 300 168 *p <0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01


Table 4 looks specifically at 2012 with 29 (highest number of policies) voter restrictions

passed. The data utilised for these models looks at previous figures from 2008-2012 and how

it motivated the frequency of passed legislation leading up to the 2012 Election. Recent

literature notes the significance of both these election years, particularly regarding minority

voter behaviour, posing a unique opportunity to analyse state efforts motivated by these

Presidential Elections.

The unencumbered Republican majority variable was created using B&B’s construction,

which indicates the Republican presence and strength in each state legislature (p.1100). In

summary, no real insight is gained from this analysis. This is surprising, in light of the fierce

efforts that were launched across state legislatures during this time frame. Potentially more

insight could be obtained utilising data from the 2010 mid-term election, however it is noted

the differences that exist between these two processes in the U.S., which could create too

many additional factors and further bias the results.

Table 4 Pooled-Poisson Analysis – Total Passed Restrictive Access Policies, 2012 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

All Passed Legislation


(2.118


Republican Secretary -1.411* (0.8430)

Divided State Government -0.6127 (0.8000)

Unencumbered Republican Majority 0.6623 (0.9222)

1.592 (1.475)

Electoral Competition State Party Competition 0.0113

(0.0177) Potential Swing State in 2008 0.4025

(0.9879) Voter Behaviour & Voter Suppression Minority Turnout in Previous Presidential Election

1.412 (4.808)


39.26* (23.00)


0.0469 (0.0321)


-0.0015 (0.0202)


9.568 (12.30)

Demographic % African American % Non-citizens -42.29**

35


Unlike B&B’s findings, we are far from establishing consistent trends in the passage of

restrictive-voter access policies, despite the ramped up efforts documented qualitatively, thus

far. Nevertheless, it can still provide insight into recent developments. While no specific

correlations could be established from a directly partisan, competitive, or behavioural

perspective, this sheds light on what could be a trend in itself. 84 restrictive voter access

policies were passed over the last six years and could represent the latest shift in the issue, as

28 states moved forward with legislation to disenfranchise and limit turnout, representing 269

electoral votes of the 270 necessary to win the presidency.

Although the specific characteristics of these states could be more specifically established

prior to 2012, this could represent the general homogenisation of the issue that has occurred

over my time period. Lawmakers may no longer need an inequitable edge or twist to these

policies, as uncovered before. 2016 proved how unpredictable elections truly are, and this has

been reflected across the globe under a variety of circumstances, to include Brexit. The safe

states of yesterday have become the swing states of tomorrow, which underlies the instability

in proposing or passing policies strategically on a state-by-state basis. Therefore, targeting

specific segments of society does not have its merits, as it did before and requires a more

broad-based approach, in order to effectively impact elections. Ultimately, the legislation

examined indicates the negative implications posed on voting rights.

Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program Lastly, the final analysis uniquely applies our state factor determinants, in order to examine

what influences participation in the Crosscheck programme. The results of the binary

outcome regressions are presented in Table 5. Models 1&2 present random and fixed effects

(21.08) % Over 65

-0.3769 (24.32)

Perceptions of Electoral Fraud Reported Cases of Voter Fraud % ALEC-affiliated State Legislators



0.5660 (0.5049)

0.8869 (0.5248)

0.6945 (0.5079)


-0.6874** (0.2843)

-0.6416** (0.2865)

-0.3046 (0.3926)


-0.00002 (0.00008)

-0.00001 (0.00008)

Constant -1.235 (1.464)

-0.3489 (0.8798)

Log Likelihood -44.12 -172.11 -36.78 N 50 50 50 *p <0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01


models including minority turnout respectively, while Model 3 includes the African-

American variable under random effects.

Table 5 Binary Outcome Logistic Regression Analysis – Crosscheck, 2012-2017

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Participation in Crosscheck

Partisan Control % State Legislature Republican 19.06*

(10.60) 48.06*** (18.50)

15.17** (7.772)


4.591 (3.498)

0.8535 (1.225)


-0.4485 (3.018)

0.2107 (1.321)

Divided State Government 1.082 (1.053)

1.956 (1.891)

1.173 (0.9317

Electoral Competition

State Party Competition 0.0559 (0.0453)

-0.1061 (0.1139)

0.0385 (0.0384)


-0.1708 (6.718)

14.12 (25.91)

-1.593 (6.324)



20.13** (9.963)

149.72** (73.05)


-20.63 (16.71)

-83.46* (43.08)

-11.99 (15.21)


-0.0182 (0.0538)

-0.0229 (0.2898)

-0.0407 (0.0520)


0.0354 (0.0320)

0.0408 (0.1403)

0.0430 (0.0301)


-33.40** (16.48)

-117.94** (55.55)

-37.21*** (14.20)

Demographic % African American 16.42*

(9.901) % Non-citizens -44.75

(38.31) 3.447 (405.09)

-33.64 (35.29)

% Over 65 80.07** (33.87)

192.53 (114.93)

81.58** (33.05)

Perceptions of Electoral Fraud

Reported Cases of Voter Fraud 0.0011 (0.0156)

0.0022 (0.0145)

% ALEC-affiliated State Legislators 21.77* (12.79)

20.18* (11.92)




Per Capita State Revenue 0.0003 (0.0003)

-0.0020 (0.0013)

0.0002 (0.0002)

Constant -11.49 (16.01)

-0.9206 (13.64)

Log Likelihood -107.24 -18.90 -107.52

N 300 114 300 *p <0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

37


These results confirm suspicions surrounding the motivation of this relatively new

programme. Specifically, more partisan state legislatures, minority turnout, population over

65, and ALEC affiliated-state legislators all had varying degrees of positive significance in

influencing states’ decision to adopt Crosscheck, all of which are intuitive to its likely covert

agenda. As detailed, Crosscheck represents the latest mechanism in state politics acting

directly to depress turnout and disenfranchise voters through voter caging and purging. The

implications of these results are vast, as this study provides a much-needed look at the

factors, which may increase the likelihood of participating in this controversial programme

(Palast, 2016).

Future Research and Conclusions This research reveals the inherent motivations of policymakers, by examining the

determinants of restrictive policies. As such, it follows that one could expand this predictive

analysis to include the ongoing counter-efforts expanding voting access, by employing a

similar methodology evaluating a number of state-level factors motivating policy efforts to

expand the electorate and voting access. As of May 2017, there have been at least 531 bills

introduced across 45 states attempting to negate voter suppression efforts; of these, 156 of

which have reached legislative committee stage in 30 states (BC, 2017), and it would be of

particular interest to examine how these work in swing states and in special elections. This

research could provide a considerable counter-perspective to the issues examined in this

dissertation.

Ultimately, the results of my study offer insight on the dynamics of a contentious policy

issue. By taking a simple but big-data approach, we were able to examine the variables at and

below the level of the state that could explain potential motivations for proposing and passing

restrictive voter-access polices and Crosscheck. Certain factors and predictive models were

more informative than others, and some showed little to no substantive explanations. In part,

these ‘weak’ or ‘poor models’ are the result of human behaviour embedded in a complex

social and economic framework; each voting cycle is unique and is unable to be replicated,

and some forms of data cannot explain the intricacies and nuances of the 2008, 2012, or 2016

voting cycle. They cannot explain the influence of armed militiamen at polling centres, nor

can they explain one presidential Tweet that motivated a voter to overcome their fears.


Finally, one must consider that these models are necessarily simplistic; as summarised by

statistician George Box, “all models are wrong but some are useful.” It is worthwhile to note

that a result of ‘no-effect’ is equally important to understanding the problem of voter

suppression as a whole, and likewise that failing to reject a null hypothesis does not mean

that it is ‘true.’

Conclusion

Summary The right to vote is historically a gruelling game of tug-of-war in the U.S. As efforts to

expand access to the ballot improve, they are simultaneously met with systematic opposition

to suppress the vote. Of late, there has been a surge in activity of restrictive voter-access

policies. This particularly came to a crossroads with the Shelby decision to invalidate the

VRA. While this legislation is not necessarily novel, it signals a return to Jim Crow-era

America, veiled simply within more sophisticated state and federal level agendas that fit into

today’s contemporary political system, as the electorate becomes more diverse and

progressive. This represents the latest chapter of civil struggle and the latest mechanism to

actively disenfranchise voters under the guise of voter fraud.

Voting rights have become a highly politicised and racialised issue; this dissertation provides

an empirical analysis of how this legislation became a strategic attempt to ‘game’ the

electorate. By compiling and scrutinising six years of data, I utilised the methodological

framework of Bentele and O’Brien (2013), in order to again assess the macro-determinants

that increase the likelihood of pursuing restrictive legislation. Overall, the findings were

modest but striking: elements of partisan control, electoral competition, and minority

composition of the electorate and non-citizen portion of the population proved to increase the

frequency in which policies were proposed; class-biased turnout and population over 65 also

verified significant, positive correlations. These results provide the evidence necessary to

justify aspects of the continued partisan, strategic, and racialised trends of restrictive voter-

access policies active between 2012 and August 2017.

Implications

With the knowledge that restrictive policies and active voter suppression have previously

depressed voter turnout, any effect has the potential to sway an election. This is particularly

evident while institutions like the Electoral College are in place. The 2000 and 2016 elections

39


were pivotal in that the winner of the popular vote did not become president, highlighting the

ease in which only certain swing states need to be targeted to have a marginal impact on the

outcome.

The implications and consequences are limitless, which crucially presses what this means for

the future of one of the most advanced democracies, in terms of representation and

accountability. Political theory stresses the importance of these essential tenants for the

effectiveness of a representative democracy. Without people’s voices accurately reflected in

their politicians, how can we truly understand the will of the majority? The U.S. relies

heavily on its two-party system, and as it becomes increasingly more polarised, the necessity

for an effective legislative space with active policymakers will remain a crucial shortcoming.

Voter suppression, coupled with the latest accounts of electoral redistricting, or

gerrymandering, present another difficult chapter in voting rights history. Until we expose

and identify these latest efforts by their true incentives and motivations, the U.S. and the

future of its democracy will remain confined to the latest resurgence of Jim Crow-style

politics.

Going Forward The U.S. is at a crossroads in the history of voting rights. As efforts to restrict the vote and

expand access dominate the legal conversation, dissent continues to heighten at both state and

federal levels. This current tension is that of two unstoppable forces acting in direct

opposition.

From the restrictive perspective, state legislatures are moving forward with policies to

disenfranchise voters, proposing 99 bills across 31 states in 2017 thus far. The Trump

administration has launched its Voter Fraud Commission to crack down on the “illegal

voters” in the “rigged” election that cost the President the popular vote. Meanwhile, the

Crosscheck programme continues to operate across 27 states, discriminately identifying,

legally caging, and wrongly purging potentially millions of eligible voters leading up to the

2018 Mid-Term Election. All of which illustrates what political life means after the VRA.

Conversely, 531 bills to expand voting access were proposed across 45 states, to include

automatic voter registration and other reforms modernising the voting system. After passing


some of the more restrictive policies, federal courts and the U.S. Supreme Court continue to

weigh in on the discriminatory nature of several notable laws, including North Carolina19 and

Texas’s20 voter-ID requirements. However, one of the most significant hindrances to the

franchise is the unchecked policy freedom of state-legislatures, once prevented by the VRA.

Such proposals include the Voting Rights Amendment Act and the Voting Rights

Advancement Act, both of which update the preclearance formula necessary to make the

VRA operational (BC, 2016). While several provisions do exist to protect voting rights from

discrimination, many are unaware that the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly provide for

the right to vote. Progressive organisations believe that only through a direct institutional

change, an affirmative Right to Vote amendment, would actively protect the most basic

principle of democracy and end the regressive laws plaguing the modern American political

system (Fair Vote, 2017).

Restrictive efforts are a response to America’s recent trend towards inclusion, equity, and

diversity, and clearly voter suppression is an attempt to revive and legitimise racist and

classist mentalities in the wake of the Obama era. Perhaps the public will recognise these

policies as a direct assault on their civil liberties, and that the future of voting rights lies in

their hands. It is up to their continued awareness and efforts, to write a new page that proves

life after the Voting Rights Act ensures the protection of democracy for every eligible

American.

19 Liptak and Wines (May, 2017) 20 Fernandez (April, 2017)

41


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53


Appendix

Additional Figures Figure A.1 (Source: Brennan Center for Justice)


Figure A.2 (Source: Berman, Twitter, 4 August, 2017)

55


Figure A.3 (Source: NCSL, 2017)

Life After the Voting Rights Act – Identifying Partisan and ......Table4: Pooled-Poisson Analysis – Total Passed Restrictive Access Policies, 2012 Table5: Binary Outcome Logistic

Documents