Liberal Citizenship and Civic Friendship Author(s): Jason A. Scorza Source: Political Theory, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 85-108 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4148170 . Accessed: 19/11/2013 14:06 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Sage Publications, Inc.is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory. http://www.jstor.org
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8/13/2019 Liberal Citizenship and Civic Friendship
Liberal Citizenship and Civic FriendshipAuthor(s): Jason A. ScorzaSource: Political Theory, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Feb., 2004), pp. 85-108Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4148170 .
Accessed: 19/11/2013 14:06
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
.
Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory.
http://www.jstor.org
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usual instrumentalpurposesof liberalcitizenship,which include the com-
mon defense of personalfreedom,the establishmentof basic conditionsof
socialjustice, and the maintenanceof civil peace.It is notsurprising,herefore, hat iberal ndividualists endtorelegate he
practiceof friendship and ts norms)to theprivatesphere,wherecitizens as
private persons are free to establish amicablerelationswith whomevertheychoose (regardlessof whether heir riendsarefellow citizens).2Theydonot,as a rule,proposethatfriendshipserve as a normativemodelfor thepracticeof citizenship,asAristotleand some of his contemporary dmirersdo and as
Emersonappears o do in thispassage.But Emerson s not anordinaryndi-
vidualist,andcertainlynot anordinaryiberal.Significantly,hisconceptionsof friendshipandcitizenshipare both informedby a commitment o "demo-
eral)conceptionsof citizenship,butshould not be mistakenforthem.
The term"democratic onnectedness"was first used by GeorgeKateb,who illuminatesandrefines Emerson'soriginalidea.3Accordingto Kateb,Emersondoes notembraceanextremeorunmodified ndividualism.Rather,he attempts o reconcile a strongcommitment o individualismwith a strongcommitment o a distinctivelydemocratic orm of association.Self-reliance,definedby Katebasthinkingone's ownthoughtsandthinking hemthrough,is the centralpracticeof Emersonian ndividualism,while democraticcon-
nectednessis the centralpracticeof the democratic-rather thanreligious,
racial,tribal,or national-form of associationtheorizedby Emerson.Self-relianceanddemocraticconnectednessdo notthemselvesconstitute
a positive vision of a good life. Rather,they are practicesthat, in theory,enableindividuals o choose for themselves a good way of life frommyriad
possible ways of life, or to engage in a succession of experimentsn living.Thepracticeof democraticconnectedness ntroducesndividuals o thevari-
ousness andpossibilityof human ife throughmmediaterelationswithother
persons,while the practiceof self-relianceenables individualsto navigate
deliberatelythroughthe gardens-and minefields-of humanvariousnessandpossibility.Herewebeginto see the intrinsicvalue of thepracticeof civic
friendship,whichcontributesbothto the developmentof the individualand
to the shareddemocraticculture.
Althoughdemocraticconnectednesscanmitigatesome of theworstego-istic, selfish,competitive,andacquisitive endenciesof unmodifiedndividu-
alism,this is not the mainreasonwhywe shouldvalueit. Almostanyform of
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to in thepublic sphere,notmerelybecausetheyareurgedby teachers, ead-
ers,orimploredbypoliticaltheorists otreat heir ellow citizens like friends.
THEPOLITICALRELEVANCEOF FRIENDSHIP
Systematicattempts o establishthe politicalrelevanceof friendshipcan
be tracedbackto Aristotle,who identifiesthreedifferent ypesof friendship,
based,respectively,on utility,pleasure,and virtue.As he argues amously n
TheNicomacheanEthics,friendshipbased on virtue s the mostperfecttype,
insofar as it aims at the pursuitof goodness or moral excellence for its ownsake rather hanmerelythe interestsorpleasuresof individuals.1oHowever,each kind of friendship s, in a sense, altruistic, ince we are concernedwith
thewelfareof ourfriends ortheirsake,notmerelyforourown.'1Thegeneralbonds of civic friendship politikephilia), which are almostcertainlya vari-
ety of utility friendshiprather han of virtuefriendship,12help maintainus-tice and law in thestate,thuspreservingspacefor the cultivationof personal
friendshipsbased on virtue.Meanwhile, heproliferation f personal riend-
ships based on virtue serves as an independentcheck on the possible civiccorruptionof the state as a whole.'3Citizenswho view one anotheras civic
friendswould come together n a broadconsensus on mattersof public pol-
icy, a consensus made easierin Aristotle'sschemeby the exclusion fromthe
political communityof manymarginalized roupswithpotentiallydiffering
interests,such as women, slaves, andpersonsof foreigndescent.14
Therehave been numerousattemptsn recentyearsto restore heAristote-
lianconceptionof friendship o preeminent tatus.'"Theseefforts, however,
haveconsistentlygenerated artoo demandinga notionof civic friendship.'6Nevertheless, t may not be necessaryto abandon riendshipas a normative
modelforcitizenship ustbecauseAristotelianand neo-Aristotelian oncep-tions are unsuited o modemliberalsocieties.Likewise,it maynotbe neces-
saryto condemnliberalism ortheinstrumental oals of liberalcitizenship)
simply because they are incompatiblewith civic friendship,as it was con-
Likewise, if people invest in the practiceof citizenship,it could gradually
develop beyond its original,modest instrumentalpurposes,into a practicethatis, potentially,both noble andennobling.
Secondly,membersof modem liberalsocieties often disagreeandfightwith eachother,muchas friendsdo.Animportant ifference,however, s that
friendstry to governtheirdisagreements n such a way as to preserveand
develop,rather hanterminate, he bond between them.Theydo not exces-sively stifle or suppressdisagreements,creating deadly silences that could
cause the bonds of friendship ogradually rode. Nor do they engageinunre-
strained ree-for-alls,riskingthe eruptionof violence that could cause the
bonds of friendship o suddenlysnap.Instead, heyemploy relativelysimple(but subtle) communicative norms to achieve a balance, somewhere in
between. One might say that friendstryto disagree todayin a manner hat
will allowthem to disagreeagaintomorrow.Liberalcitizenscould,perhaps,
also learnto governtheirdisagreements n muchthe same mannerand forsome of the same reasons.
On the otherhand,ChristopherHeath Wellmanarguesthatrelationships
amongfellow citizens aredisanalogousto those amongfriends,for at least
threecogentreasons.First,friendshipsare based to somedegreeon consent,whereasconsent is missing fromcitizenship.Second, the strongemotional
bonds found ingenuinefriendshipareabsentfromrelationshipsbetween cit-
izens as such(especiallyinlargecommunitiesorstates).And, third,whereas
friendships commonly udgedto be intrinsically, ather haninstrumentally,valuable,the same cannotbe said for citizenship.'7
Theseobjectionswouldappear o damnthe ethics of friendship o irrele-
vance wherethe practiceof citizenshipis concerned. None of us, initially,consentstomembershipnour stateornation,although t is possibleforus-withconsiderabledifficulty-to withdraw rom suchmembershipswhen we
find themunpalatable.Wellman'spoint,though, s thatwe incurspecialobli-
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absence of consent, there can be no such specialobligationsto fellow citi-
zens.WhileIaminclinedto agreewith thisanalysis,Iwould note one caveat.
Although herelationship f citizenshipmayormaynot entailspecial obliga-
tions, such as givingpreference o the welfareof fellow citizens over "simi-
larlysituatedforeigners,"'"t does conveya dutyto be mindful of how one
speaksto fellow citizens andhowonelistensto them.Ourfellow citizens are
our civic equals,as well as free and autonomouspersons.As such,we maynot conversewith them as if theyarechildren,subjects,or slaves.As long as
our account of obligationsto fellow citizens does not extendprimafacie
beyond certain obligations on democraticdiscourse, but are discoveredinstead throughdemocraticdiscourse, Wellman's first objection against
modeling citizenshipon friendshipcan be refuted.
Wellman's assertionthat the emotional ties between fellow citizens are
nothinglike those between friends, althoughunsubstantiated mpirically,
ringstrueenoughto be takenseriously.As he explains,
Not only does the enormoussize andbureaucratic atureof contemporary tates entail
that citizens will never meet (let alone becomeintimatelyattached o) more than a tinyfractionof theircompatriots,he multiculturalismf most statesoften results nxenopho-bic citizens'harboringantipathy ather hansympathy owardeach other.19
This seems somewhatmuddled,however.As we will see, the practiceof
friendship s dynamic.Individualsdo not as a generalrulebegintheir rela-
tionshipat the mostintense level of mutualregard. nstead, riendshipsgrowand evolve overtime,propelledby aninnermomentumof which we arenot
always fully aware.Friendshipshave a way of sneakingup on us. ConsiderThomas Jeffersonand JohnAdams who-once bitterpolitical enemies-
became friendsin the end.20
Wellmanalsoargues hat herelationship f friendshiphas intrinsicvalue,
and is properlyvaluedfor its own sake, whereascitizenshipcan only ever
haveinstrumentalalue.21Wellman'sposition s usefullycontrastedwiththat
of Mason who arguesthatspecialobligations o fellow citizensemergefrom
the intrinsicmoralvalue of therelationshipof citizenship.This,he suggests,
is basedon being "a memberof a collectivebodyin which
theyenjoy equalstatuswith its other membersand aretherebyprovidedwithrecognition."22
AlthoughI am inclinedto agreewithMason thatfreeandequaldemocratic
citizenshiphas an intrinsicmoralvalue,vestedinthetreatment f eachmem-
ber as worthyof equal recognitionandrespect,I am less confidentthat one
can, or should,attempt o derivemore thana verylimited set of obligationsfromthispremise.Suchobligations, t seemsto me, do not includea dutyof
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politicalparticipation r giving preference o the welfare of fellow citizens,as Masonargues,but,rather, nlya dutyto speakand isten to fellowcitizens
withrespectandregard ortheirequality.23 hat s, these dutiespertainonlyto the enactmentor realizationof the intrinsicvalueof citizenship, namely,thefeelingof mutualrespect,recognition,andresponsiveness hat following
Kateb)I have been calling democraticconnectedness.I would add that the
dynamiccharacter f friendship,whichWellmanneglectsin his analysisbut
ics, includingmutualrecognitionof the equalityof all participantsand anumberof constraints f rationality e.g., absence of forceorstructural res-sure,the admissibilityonly of rationalarguments, he privilegingof no un-sharedassumptions,etc.), workto promote usticeby constrainingdialogueand providecriticalleverage againstmanipulativeand coercive discourse.
Unfortunately,heseidealconditionsarrive romnowhere,relateto no com-mon practice,and are connected to no cultural(much less transcultural)
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economicdivides.25Wehave all experienced riendshipandknow its norms
intimately, ven if we practice hemimperfectly.Althoughmuch moremod-
est, perhaps,thanthe ideal conditionsof full-blown discourseethics, thenormsof friendshipare atleastavailableandfamiliar o anyonewho has,orhasbeen, a friend.This is not to say thatbeyondsome basicnormstherearenotalsosignificantdifferencesbetweentheattitudesoward riendshipndif-
ferenttraditions.26 owever, n spiteof these differences,thereareenoughunderlyingsimilaritiesbetweenconceptionsof friendship o providea basisfor interculturaldiscussion and cross-culturalunderstanding.Many tradi-
tions,forinstance,suggestthat riendshipmust nvolve asignificantmeasureof franknessor truth-telling,n addition o the expectedkindnessor gentle-ness.27 f common norms,such as these,can be transferredo thepracticeofliberalcitizenship,then its practicemay be enhanced,withoutresortingto
ening always to undermine and destroy it. It is, for Emerson,a crucible
throughwhich self-reliancemustpass in orderto realizeitself fully.
Ideally, riendship erves as an aid to self-reliance.Throughacquaintancewith friends,one's acquaintancewith oneself can be renewed.So Emerson
writes,inhis poem"Astraea,""'Whatam I?companion,say.'/And he friendnothesitates/Toassignjust placeandmates;/Answersnot in word or letter;/Yetis understood hebetter;/Eacho each alooking-glass,/Reflectshisfigurethatdothpass."28 mersonmeansthatonlyanother elf, to whomone is openand responsive,can reveal one to oneself.29 n a gesture,pause, word, or
glance, individualscan, in a flash, see themselves throughthe eyes of a
friend. Friendscan also renew one another'sacquaintancewith the world in
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shipalso can undermine elf-reliancebecauseone's integrity s almostcon-
stantlyundersiege by the influenceof one's friends.Whilewe mightdeliber-
ately,orplayfully,choose to tryout a way of life that our friendhas already
exploredor embraced,we also may sometimes feel compelledto accept a
friend'sway of life as ourown,either for fear of losing thatfriend or due to
self-doubt. As Emersonexplainsin his essay "Friendship"1841), the ideal
friend is "a sort of beautifulenemy,untamable,devoutlyrevered."30To con-
ceive of a friend as an enemy, even as a beautifulone, is shocking. And,
clearly,Emersonwants to shock,as does Nietzsche when he transforms he
Aristotelianepitaph"friends, here are no friends" o "enemies,thereis no
enemy "3' Itis his wayof disrupting onceptionsof friendship hatpicture tas a perfectharmonyor unity,or which reduce it to casual companionship(e.g., friendsas golf partners rdrinkingbuddies).Of course,Emersondoes
explains,"Our riendshipshurry o shortandpoorconclusions,because we
havemadethematextureof wineanddreams, nsteadof thetoughfibreof the
humanheart."32y his own analysis,friendshipcannotbeginin the clouds.
He writes,"Iwish thatfriendshipshouldhavefeet, as well as eyes andelo-
quence.It mustplant tself on theground,beforeit vaults overthe moon."33
Consequently,muchof Emerson's heorizing bout riendships concerned-quite properly-with the normsby which its bonds may, slowly and over
time,bedeveloped.Incontrast,whileAristotlealsodiscusses thefrustrationsof "inferior"ypesof friendship i.e., thosebased on utilityorpleasure),heoffers little insightinto how thesecoulddevelopintohighersorts of friend-
ship. This representsa significant differencebetween his conception of
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unanimitybetweenpersons.Rather,he views friendshipas a turbulent nion,characterized lmost as muchby incivilityas by civility,and almost as much
by separatenessas by unityor harmony.Onceagain,therefore,his concep-tion of friendships uniquelysuitedas a model forthepracticeof citizenshipin modem liberalsocieties, sincetheyareoften characterized y deep asym-metries of power and resources,by enduringethnic, racial, and religious
antagonisms,and,most importantly,by moral and culturalpluralism.As a
model for liberal citizenship,Emerson'sconception of friendshipdistin-
Thegreatgainis, notto shine,not to conqueryour companion,-then you learnnothingbutconceit,-but to find acompanionwho knows whatyoudonot;to tilt with him andbe
overthrown,horse and
foot,with utterdestruction
of all yourlogic and learning.38
Appliedto politics,the norm of truthcannot nvolve thetellingof the lit-
eral truth n all instances because the practicalitiesof politics would never
permitsuch a thing. Deception, misinformation,and misdirectionare, for
of the groupacknowledged hatAmericanforeignpolicy was not, perhaps,
alwaysbeneficial o theworldandthatmanyMuslims nthe MiddleEastmayhave legitimategrievanceswith the U.S. This, too, needed to be said, and
there was acertainexpectation hatit wouldbe.
Nonetheless, a great divide of understanding emained and the groupseemedhauntedbythingsunsaid.Apparently,herewere non-Muslimmem-
bers in the group(includingmyself) who expecteda lesson on the natureof
Islam. Itwas not untila numberof Muslimscandidlyexplained hattheyhad
no intentionof explainingor apologizingfor Islam,andthatthey were not
inclined tojustify theirreligionto anyone,thatthe airbeganto clear,even asthe tensionmomentarilyheightened.And it was not untilthe non-Muslims
beganto
grasp why the Muslims were so unwilling-they felt they werebeingaskedtoexplainwhytheyweren'tterrorists,oo-that thegroupbeganto pull togetheracross thedivide.The ritual ormulasof rapprochement is-solved andwhatensued was arealdiscussion of whatcould bedonetogether,as a group, n responseto the tragedy.
Tosaythatpoliticalconversation s constrainedby truth s sometimes ustanotherwayof sayingthat t is unconstrained y silence. A modelof "uncon-
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strained"publicdiscourse,whichrequiresmembersof a societyto articulate
theirtruecommitments,desires,needs,projects,and so on, would,in theory,
promoteacommunity n whichthegenuineneedsandpurposesof individu-als are takeninto account.40Althougha mutualunderstanding f commit-
ments,desires,needs,and so forthalonecannot settlecontroversialpoliticalissues such as abortion,school prayer,affirmativeaction,orcapitalpunish-ment,when citizens find themselves in conflict with one anotherover such
issues, theyarewell-servedby an understanding f the values andcommit-
ments of their fellows. There is no guarantee hat any particularview or
vision of socialjustice wouldemergefrom a condition of improvedmutual
understanding etweencitizens.However,one would expectrival views orvisions ofjusticeto receiveproperhearings.And,anyconsensusconcerning
principlesof justice thatemergedfromsuchhearingswould be theresult of
the process andpracticeof politics, rather hanthe result of a prepolitical
attempt o squelchor silence genuinedisagreementswithina community.Even so, some theoristsdo not believe thatmembers of modem liberal
societies should be expectedto expose to one anothertheirmost intimate
beliefs, desires, fears,andcommitments.Accordingto J. DonaldMoon,for
instance,there s a coerciveaspectto thisexpectation,violatingthevalue of
privacy orindividualsandgroups.Moreover,Moonargues, hisexpectationrunsafoul of normalpsychologicaldefensesagainstvulnerability.41This is a
seriousobjectionto unconstrained iscourse,ortruth,conceivedof as a con-
straintonpublicdiscourse.Certainly,Moon'sassessmentof thepsychologi-cal barriers o such a practice s painfullyaccurate.If one's principlesand
commitmentsarebased on deeply personalreligiousbeliefs, as was thecase
forMuslimparticipantsn thecampusteach-in, t could be agonizingto talk
to nonbelieversaboutthem.Nonetheless,when fellow citizens seek to bindone anotherby law-as, forexample, prolifeandprochoiceadvocatesdo-
we canreasonably xpectthemtopresent hetruereasonswhy theyaredoingso. Itmaybe intrusive,but it is notunreasonable,o ask one's fellow citizens
to explain why they areattempting o use the coercivepowerof the state to
thwartone another'sgoals, hinder he satisfactionof one another'sneeds,or
block theenjoymentof one another'sconceptionof thegood life. However,the requirementof truthwould pertain only to political disagreements n
which citizens intend to subjectone another o a common law orpolicy.Noone should expect fellow citizens to bare their souls or expose theirmost
cherishedbeliefs to public scrutinyunderanyother circumstances.
Anotherobjectionto the idea of truthas a constrainton publicdiscourse
concernsthepotential mpactof truth-telling n mutualrespect.JohnRawls,forone,urgescitizens to invokeonly publicreasonsderived rom anoverlap-
distance.Importantly,enderness, n this first sense, means respectingthe
potentialof other individualsfor self-reliance.Throughouthis essays and
lectures,Emersonargues hateveryhuman ife is properlyviewed as anave-
nue throughwhich great thoughtsandgreatactionsnot only may flow but
also deserve to flow. He insists,therefore, hateverypersonhas a right(and,
perhaps,even a duty)to think and act self-reliantly,dependingas much as
possibleon one's own thoughtsand sense of justice forguidance,andlivingas much as possibleas one likes (provided hatone's way of life andexperi-mentsin livingdo nottransgressuponthedignityorrightsof others).Emer-
son writes,"Fornonconformity he worldwhipsyou withits displeasure."45
Tenderness,n thisfirstsense,means neverholdingthewhip, if one canpos-
sibly avoidit.
On the otherhand,tendernessunderstoodas a mannerof listeningcon-
notes a permeabilityorresponsiveness o impressionsreceivedfrom othersand aboutothers.Thisresponsivenesscanenrichour lives by introducingus
to differentways of life, as well as the variousnessof human life itself.
Describingthis responsiveness,Emersonwrites, "HighthanksI owe you,excellentlovers,whocarryout theworldforme to newandnobledepths,and
certain limitations and liabilities. For instance, one might complain that
effective political talk could neverbe characterizedby tenderness(in the
sense of gentle respectfulness)but must be characterizedby eloquence.Indeed,mosteffectivepoliticalspeakersattemptobecomemastersof words,while takingcarethemselvesto avoidbeingvictims of words;to remainun-
gentlerespectfulness-doesnotnecessitateunilateraldisarmamentn the
politicalarena.Treatingone's fellow citizens with gentle respectcan be as
sound,strategically, s attemptingo trickthem. Thisis especiallytrue nthe
many smallersettingsof middledemocracy,where citizens encounteroneanother face to face, and where participantsn a discussion can responddirectlyto attacks.If we takethe possibility of social justice seriously,wemustacknowledgethe importanceof tenderness.Otherwise,unconstrained
by tenderness,or some comparablenorm,politicalconversation s likely to
be just anothermode of dominationorcynical manipulation,
deaf to theclaims of justice.
Anotherpossibleobjectionto tendernessas a communicative normfor
democraticdeliberation s that it goes farbeyondthepracticeof toleration
normally requiredby liberalism. While toleration merely requires citi-zens to put up with difference, tenderness in the sense of responsiveness)
attempts o entertain hepossibilitiesthatdifferencesuggests.This is one ofthe moreinvitingnoninstrumental ossibilitiesof citizenshipunderstoodn
However,tender-nessmaybe, inotherrespects,amoremodest,and ess taxing,constrainthantoleration.Whereastolerationappearsto requirecitizens to exercise self-
censorshipwhen they encounterways of life inconsistentwith theirvaluesandprinciples,therebyprojectingthe appearanceof at least tacitapproval,the normof tenderness equiresonlythatcitizenshave ago attrying ounder-stand one another.
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mies) may be observedchattingaffablyin the corridorsanddiningrooms.
The UN maybe anunexpectedplaceto discoverthepracticeof Emersonian
civic friendship.However, f it can bepracticed here tcan,perhaps,beprac-ticed elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
Theuse of Emerson'sconceptionof friendshipas a model forliberalciti-
zenship is neither obvious nor unproblematic. ndeed,some scholars,like
Wilson Carey McWilliams,have found this conception unsatisfyingandemotionallycold.Indeed,McWilliamsobserves hatEmersondistrustedper-sonalfriendshipsbecausetheyare "basedonqualitiesof personality which]
hampermen in theirefforts to 'merge'with the all."49 notherwords,Emer-
son is too willingto sacrifice riends or thesakeof an idealizedtranscenden-
tal connectedness. McWilliams also notes that Emerson's conception of
friendship s premisedupon a radical ndividualism hat,in spite of Emer-
that the formeraccepts as given the moraland culturalpluralismof most
modem societies, anddoes not insist that a strongor comprehensivemoralconsensusexist betweencitizenspriorto politics.51UnlikeAristotle,Emer-son had the opportunity o immerse himself in Islamic, Buddhist,Hindu,
Confucian,and othernon-Westernwritings,and can acknowledge signifi-cantintellectualdebtsoutside of theWestern radition.52orinstance, n his
essay "PersianPoetry,"Emersonassertsthat certainEasternpoets, amongthem IbnJemin, Hafiz, andJami,makecontributions o the philosophyof
Emersonhimself)portrays riendshipas growing stronger hroughconstanttesting,writing,"Afriendis he, who, huntedas a foe,/So muchthekindliershows him thanbefore;/Throwstones at him, or ruder avelins throw,/Hebuildswithstoneandsteela firmer loor."53Similarly,oneof Emerson'smorefamousobservations oncerning riendship,"He will havelearned helessonof life who is skilful in theethics of friendship,"s based on aquotation rom
Hafiz, "Thou earnestno secret until thou knowestfriendship,since to theunsoundno heavenlyknowledgeenters."54
The mainstrengthof Emerson'sconceptionof friendshipas a model forliberalcitizenship,when comparedwith Aristotle's,is a dynamicelementthatcouldgive bothdefendersandcritics of liberalismreasonto believe thatthepracticeof citizenship n liberalsocieties can evolve in noninstrumentaldirectionswithoutjeopardizing iberalcitizenship'susualinstrumental ur-poses. Friendshipsdo not springforth,fully grown, like Athena from thehead of Zeus. Rather, f friendshipsare to grow and flourish,they requireinvestmentandgradualdevelopment."Letusbuyourentrance o thisguild,"
The communicativenorms of friendship heorizedby Emersonpromote
solid relationshipswhere disagreementsare possible but not explosive.Friends,afterall, disagreeall thetimebutmakereservingandstrengtheningthe bondsof friendshipa priorityandwinninga particular rgumenta sec-
ondaryconsideration.Strategiessuch as pulling one's punches or leavingthingsunsaidmaybe employedto maintainfriendships,butsuch strategiescould also indirectlyserve to weaken hebonds of friendship n the longrun.
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8. See SibylA. Schwarzenbach, OnCivicFriendship," thics 107(October1996):97-128;AndrewMason,"SpecialObligations o Compatriots," thics 107 (April 1997):427-47; David
11. See Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics, 1155al-1158a36.
12. JohnM. Cooperargues hatAristotle'sconceptionof civic friendship s properlyunder-
stood to be avarietyof utility friendship,andthatutility friendship, ike true riendship,nvolvesmutualanddisinterestedwell-wishing.See JohnM.Cooper,"Aristotle nFriendship,"nEssays
on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie OksenbergRorty(Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress,
ceedings of the XIth Symposium Aristotelium, ed. Gunther Patzig (Friedrichshafen:
Vandenhoeck& Ruprecht,1990), 220-41. In contrast,AlasdairMacIntyreviews Aristotelian
civic friendshipas a kind of virtue riendship.See AlasdairMacIntyre,AfterVirtue, ded. (Notre
Dame, IN: Notre Dame UniversityPress, 1984), 156.
13. See PaulJ.Waddell,Friendship nd theMoralLife(NotreDame,IN:Universityof Notre
Dame Press, 1989), 49, 61-68.
14.Fordiscussion,see SuzanneStern-Gillet,Aristotle'sPhilosophyof Friendship Albany:StateUniversityof New YorkPress, 1995).
15.Forinstance,Schwarzenbach ttempts o shedthe Aristotelian onceptionof some of its
infamousmasculinist,elitist,andxenophobicconnotations,arguing hatcitizens of modern oci-
eties can maintaina close approximation f Aristoteliancivic friendshipbased on a relatively
thin consensusregarding oleration,mutualrecognitionof rights,and a universalvalueof care.
See Schwarzenbach,"OnCivic Friendship," 05-14.
16.Indeed,according o MacIntyre,membersof modern iberalsocieties are unable o prac-tice civic friendshipas Aristotleunderstoodt. For iberal ndividualists,MacIntyre xplains,"a
Jean M. Yarbrough,The Adams-JeffersonLetters: The Complete CorrespondencebetweenThomasJeffersonandAbigailand JohnAdams,ed. LesterJ.Cappon ChapelHill:Universityof
no morethan a means to well-being. See Wellman,"Friends," 23.
22. See Mason,"SpecialObligations," 42. Masonbuildsuponthe workof JosephRaz,who
has argued hatthe obligationsof friendshipare constitutiveof the intrinsicgood of friendship,
rather hanmerelybeingburdens hatbenefitothers.See Raz,"LiberatingDuties,"Law and Phi-
losophy8 (1989): 3-21. Forrefinementsof Raz'sbasic argument, ee SamuelScheffler,"Rela-
tionships and Responsibilities,"Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (summer 1997): 189-209;
Michael O. Hardimon,"Role Obligations,"Journal of Philosophy 91 (July 1994): 333-63.Schefflerargues hatspecialobligationsadhere orelationships hatone happens o value,while
Hardimonsuggests that role identification provides the moral reasons to assume special
obligations.
23.According o Mason,thisobligationcannotbe derived romnational dentitybut,rather,
onlyfromcivic identity,although he reasonsforthis arenotentirelyclear.See Mason,"Special
Obligations,"442. Wellmanarguesthat no such distinctioncan be made between civic and
This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Tue, 19 Nov 2013 14:06:39 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
national dentity,since both provide mainly instrumental oods thatpromotewell-being. See
Wellman,"Friends," 23.
24.Wellman,"Friends,"
30.
25. Some culturescautionagainstcross-cultural riendships.See for instanceQu'ran,3:26,
3:116, 4:137, and5:51.However, reatingothersaccording o some of the normsof friendship or
instrumental easonsis not the same as forming genuinefriendshipswiththem.
26. For an account of the historicaldevelopmentof the concept of friendship n Islamic
thought, see Lenn E. Goodman, "Friendship n Aristotle, Miskawayh, and al-Ghazali," n
FriendshipEast and West:Philosophical Perspectives,ed. Oliver Leaman(Richmond,UK:
Curzon,1996), 164-91; for discussion of Confucian hinkingon friendship, ee David L. Hall
andRogerT.Ames, "ConfucianFriendship:The Roadto Religiousness," n TheChangingFace
of Friendship,ed. LeroyS. Rouner NotreDame,IN: NotreDameUniversityPress, 1994), 77-
94; fordiscussionof traditional ndianviews of friendship, ee BhikhuParekh,"An ndianViewof Friendship,"n The ChangingFace of Friendship,ed. Leroy S. Rouner(Notre Dame, IN:
Notre Dame UniversityPress, 1994), 95-113.
27. We readin al-Ghazali, or instance,thatfriendship"entails ove as well as candor and
"FriendshipnAristotle,"184.Similarly, t wasrecognized nthe Indianepics that riendship"is
one of thefew relationshipsnwhich honestandfearlesscriticism sbothpermitted ndrequired.Friendsmust'speak ruth' satyamvada) o eachother;otherwise heir riendship ests onuntruth
29. In an early lecture,"Society,"Emersonwrites of friendship,"This is anotherself. He
occupiesanotherpointof view,and sees thesameobjectonanother ide.His confirmation f our
report ejoices,his contradictionmakes us pause."RalphWaldoEmerson,"Society,"TheEarlyLecturesof RalphWaldoEmerson,3 vols. (Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1972),vol. 2, 102. This notion of a friendas "another elf' recalls Aristotle'sunderstanding f a truefriend as a "second self."See Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics, 1166a30-35.However,Emersondoes notmean,as Aristotledoes, thatmy friend s anotherme, possessing the same moralper-spectiveandconcern orvirtue,so thatself-loveembracesbothpersonsequally.There s a crucial
34. Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics, 1167a22-1167b15.35. Kateb dentifiesandelaborates hese two aspectsof Emerson'sconceptionof friendship.
AlthoughEmerson laims,initially, ogive theseaspectsequalweightinconstituting riendship,Kateb s probably orrect n his view thattruth eceives a largerplacein Emerson'ssystem,per-hapsdue its moreintimateconnection to self-reliance,which is the centralconceptof this sys-tem. See Kateb,Emersonand Self-Reliance,esp. 102-9.
36. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Behavior,"n Emerson:Essays and Lectures,ed. Joel Porte
(New York:Libraryof America, 1983), 1049.
This content downloaded from 200.14.85.85 on Tue, 19 Nov 2013 14:06:39 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
40. Fordiscussion,see Seyla Benhabib,"LiberalDialogue versus a CriticalTheoryof Dis-
cursive Legitimation,"n Liberalismand the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1989),esp. 146-54.Comparewith Bruce Ackerman'sdefense of
conversational estraint n "WhyDialogue?"Journalof Philosophy86 (January1989):5-22.
41. See J. DonaldMoon, ConstructingCommunity:Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts
(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1993), 92. For a contrastingview, see Stephen
Holmes,"GagRules or thePolitics of Omission," n Constitutionalism ndDemocracy,ed. Jon
44. RalphWaldoEmerson,in "Manners,"Emerson:Essays and Lectures,ed. Joel Porte
(New York:Libraryof America, 1983), 525.
45. RalphWaldoEmerson,"Self-Reliance,"n Emerson:EssaysandLectures,ed. Joel Porte
(New York:Libraryof America, 1983), 264.
46. Emerson,"Friendship,"43.
47. Whitman's"Songof theOpenRoad"concludeswith,"Camerado, give you my hand /I
give you mylove moreprecious hanmoney,/Igive you myselfbeforepreaching rlaw;/Willyou
give me yourself?Will you come travel with me?/Shallwe stick by each other as long as we
live?" See WaltWhitman,Leaves of Grass (New York:New AmericanLibrary,1980), 144.
Derridaappears o echo this sentiment nPoliticsofFriendship,where he writes,"Whenwill we
be readyfor anexperienceof freedomandequalitythat s capableof respectfullyexperiencingthatfriendship,which would at last be just, just beyondthe law, and measuredup againstits
measurelessness?O my democratic riends" p. 306).48. RalphWaldoEmerson,"TheHeart,"n EarlyLecturesof RalphWaldoEmerson,3 vols.
JasonA. Scorzais an assistantprofessor ofphilosophyandpolitical science at FairleighDickinsonUniversity n Teaneck,NewJersey.He is presently completinga book on the