February 21, 2011 5892 Shoreland Trail Orlando, Florida 32807 Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee, Inc. c/o Chris Powell, Secretary/Treasurer 7 Villa Louisa Road Manchester, CT 06043-7541 Re: I need to get the enclosed material, including this and three other cover letters, to Reginald H. Howe indirectly, and believe I can trust GATA for that purpose; never wouldIe-mail him even a hint of this at the start. Dear Chris Powell: This is a cover letter to explai n why you should be i nterested in the enclosed LETTER TO CLERK OF COURT and AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE. These related documents are meant to serve two objectives—let me explain. Litigation aimed at compelling a return to a constitutional monetary system must begin with recognition of two facts as matters of law: (1) The Congressional mandate of4 U.S.C.A., § 72, which provides that, “[a]ll offices attached to the seat of government shall be exercised in the District of Columbia, and not elsewhere, except as otherwise expressly provided by law,”means that a federal Judicial Power decision pursuant to Article III of the Constitution for the United States of America can only be had in D.C.—in nature, it’s a governmental action— and elsewhere is obtained an administrative decision; it doesn’t matter that Article III judges sit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District ofFlorida, for example, when they’re sitting in an Article I court— they are functioning as officers of the court; and, this leads into the two ways to view a complaint; (2) As a Fourteenth Amendment or federal citizen—by presumption of law (disregarding the verification under penalty of perjury)—you come as a complaintant in the nature of28 U.S.C.A., § 1746(2), which provides that,“[i]f executed within the United States, its territories, possessions, or commonwealths: ‘I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under
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8/6/2019 LETTER -- Massachusetts Lawyers Thru GATA
correct…,’ ” and as a state citizen in contradistinction to a
federal citizen, no attachment to government can be presumed.
There isn’t much case law to explain 28 U.S.C.A., § 1746, and what does
exist is misleading. The laws of the United States of America is the common
law found in the several united States, and the laws of the United States is
the 50 titles of statutory law together with any Federal Code of Regulations
that implement them.
In regard to (2), above, the complaintant must come as a state citizen
pursuant to Article IV, § 2, cl. 1 in contradistinction to a presumed federal
citizen pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, § 1. Case law says both
citizenships exist. But, case law also indicates that state citizenship must be
claimed as it is regarded as a choice of law decision. This doesn’t change
the fact that federal citizenship is fraudulent and deceitful; it’s a second classcitizenship in more ways than one. I’m working on the proof of fraud and
deceit so none of that is in the enclosed documents, but I’ve tried to show
how it violates my right to Due Process of Law. Several of the original state
constitutions provided that government officers—constitutional or ministerial
in nature—are the Peoples’ trustees and accountable as such in their
Declaration of Rights; three states attempted to get that language inserted
in the federal constitution:
BEGIN LEGAL CITATION
Footnote 9 is indicative of the law review article’s source for the following
contention:
“E. Popular Sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment
“At the time that [Thomas Tudor] Tucker spoke, the House was considering
adding a statement of popular sovereignty to the Preamble to the
Constitution.130 Tucker objected to this placement on the ground that the
Preamble was not actually part of the Constitution and therefore not binding
upon the government.131
Instead, Tucker wished to make the declaration apart of the official (and binding) Bill of Rights.132 Tucker’s request echoed
similar requests by a number of state conventions that had asked for the
addition of an express statement of popular sovereignty. Virginia,133 North
Carolina,134 and Rhode Island135 had each proposed adding a declaration to
the effect that ‘all power is naturally invested in, and consequently derived
from, the people; the magistrates therefore are their trustees and agents,
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116 “See James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional
Amendments (June 8, 1789), in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 437,444 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).”
.
.
.
130 “See Madison, supra note 116, at 441.”
131 “See Congressional Proceedings, DAILY ADVERTISER (New York, N.Y.),
Aug. 15, 1789, at 2, reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 88, at 128, 128.” 132 “See id.”
133 “See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 9, at 657.”
134 “See 4 id. at 243.”
135 “See 1 id. at 334.”
“We, the delegates of the people of the state of Rhode Island and ProvidencePlantations, duly elected and met in Convention, having maturely considered
the Constitution for the United States of America, agreed to on the
seventeenth day of September, in the year one thousand seven hundred and
eighty-seven, by the Convention then assembled at Philadelphia, in the
commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (a copy whereof precedes these presents,)
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“ ‘2. That all power is naturally vested in, and consequently derived from,
the people; that magistrates, therefore, are their trustees and agents, and
at all times amenable to them.’ ” Ibid., Volume IV, p. 242-243.
END OF LEGAL CITATION
It’s hornbook law that a contract incorporates as reference existing law at
the time of its inception, and the original state constitutions as well as the
federal constitution are regarded as contracts; they are special contracts as
compacts.
BEGIN LEGAL CITATION
The federal and each of the original thirteen state constitutions were social
compacts as they were adopted; and, social compacts are third party
beneficiary contracts; the beneficiaries of these social compacts were state
citizens pursuant to Article IV, § 2 of the Constitution for the United States
of America. ABDI HOSH ASHKIR v. UNITED STATES, 46 Fed.Cl. 438,
441 (2000) ( “The holding in REID v. COVERT, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) was
based, in part, on viewing the Constitution as a social compact, embodying
the consent of the governed to be governed and viewing those governed as
the beneficiaries of that compact. 4 Id . at 5-7, 77 S.Ct. 1222. Under this ‘contractarian’ view, the benefits of the compact flow to citizens wherever
they are located. See UNITED STATES v. CURTISS-WRIGHT EXPORT CORP.,
299 U.S. 304, 318, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936) (‘[n]either the
Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign
territory unless in respect of our own citizens’).5 Moreover, as illustrated by
cases such as MATTHEWS v. DIAZ, 426 U.S. 67, 77, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48
L.Ed.2d 478 (1976) and KWONG HAI CHEW v. COLDING, 344 U.S. 590, 596-
97, 73 S.Ct. 472, 97 L.Ed. 576 (1953), the benefits of the compact also
redound to aliens residing within the territory of the United States, who aredeemed to owe temporary allegiance to the United States and thereby are
entitled to the reciprocal protections of the Constitution. See UNITED
STATES v. BARONA, 56 F.3d 1087, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied ,
(4) A federal citizen owes allegiance to government in his/her
personal and political capacities, but a state citizen owes
allegiance only in his/her personal capacity.
What kind of compact was a constitution of one of the original 13 states?
Every state of the several united States of America was brought into the
Union on the same footing as those of the original thirteen, ILLINOIS
CENTRAL RAILROAD v. ILLINOIS, 146 U.S. 387, 434, 13 S.Ct. 110, 36
L.Ed. 1018 (1892) ( “The State of Illinois was admitted into the union in
1818 on an equal footing with the original states in all respects. Such was
one of the conditions of the cession from Virginia of the territory northwest
of the Ohio River, out of which the state was formed. But the equality
prescribed would have existed if it had not been thus stipulated. There canbe no distinction between the several states of the union in the character of
the jurisdiction, sovereignty, and dominion which they may possess and
exercise over persons and subjects within their respective limits.” ); BAKER
v. CARR, 369 U.S. 186, 226 n. 53, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)
( “On the other hand, the implication of the Guaranty Clause in a case
concerning congressional action does not always preclude judicial action. It
has been held that the clause gives Congress no power to impose
restrictions upon a State’s admission which would undercut the
constitutional mandate that the States be on an equal footing. COYLE v.
SMITH, 221 U.S. 559, 31 S.Ct. 688, 55 L.Ed. 853 [(1911)]. And in TEXAS
v. WHITE, 7 Wall. 700, 19 L.Ed. 227, although Congress had determined
that the State’s government was not republican in form, the State’s standing
to bring an original action in this Court was sustained.” ), and so it would
seem that a description of the Massachusetts compact would do for any and
all: MUNN v. ILLINOIS, 94 U.S. 113, 124, 24 L.Ed. 77 (1876)
( “[T]hrough their State constitutions, or other forms of social compact, [the
original states] undertook to give practical effect to such as they deemed
necessary for the common good and the security of life and property. . . .
“ ‘A body politic,’ as aptly defined in the preamble of the Constitution of
Massachusetts, ‘is a social compact by which the whole people
covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people,
that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.’
(Emphasis mine)” ). This mutual promise sets up the state’s Sovereignty in
the citizenry in their collective capacity in their common law jurisdiction with
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of-the-governed concepts apply to tortfeasors. On the other hand, contract
law involves an entirely different set of principles. Contract law itself
imposes few, if any, duties in the first instance. As a general rule,
contractual duties stem only from the consensual dealings of the parties.
Based upon the expressed (or, in the case of implied warranties, thepresumed) intention of the parties, contract law merely recognizes—rather
than imposes—legal duties and permits the parties wide latitude to limit their
liability and to disclaim implied warranties when the protected interests are
purely economic.” ), when the State of Florida omits our compact clause
from the first provision of our Declaration of Rights, we are deprived of the
fundamental right to give our consent to be governed—“the consent of the
governed”—first found in the Declaration of Independence; this may explain
why STONEY v. FRANKLIN failed to be reported in S.E.2d (2001).
Nowhere in the first Florida Constitution—nor any state constitution in effectat the adoption of the Constitution for the United States of America—is it
stipulated that a citizen must proffer proof of anything to obtain the
opportunity to create constitutional government by compact as a covenant
which is the consent of the governed. HEPBURN and DUNDAS v. AULD, 1
Cranch (5 U.S.) 321, 331, 2 L.Ed. 122, 125 (1803) ( “The only question
in this case is, whether Hepburn and Dundas had a right to insist on this
previous condition; and it is admitted that this question depends entirely on
the agreement of the 27th of September, 1799.
“That an acquittance should be signed, sealed and delivered before the act
itself was performed, which entitled the party to such acquittance, is a mode
of proceeding very unusual, and which certainly could only be rendered
indispensable by express stipulation.
“There is in this case no such express stipulation. . . .
“If we inspect those covenants which relate to the deed of assignment of
Graham’s contract, we find no stipulation respecting a release of any sort.” ).
When an individual is subject to the political jurisdiction, FISHER v.
128 Fla. 338, 174 So. 729. A statute will not be construed as taking away
common law rights unless the pre-existing right is repugnant to the statute.
CULLEN v. SEABOARD AIRLINE RY. CO., 1912, 63 Fla. 122, 58 So. 182.” ),
rehearing denied; MUNN v. ILLINOIS, 94 U.S. 113, 134, 24 L.Ed. 77(1876) ( “A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the
common law. That is only one of the forms of municipal law, and is no more
sacred than any other. Rights of property which have been created by the
common law cannot be taken away without due process; but the law itself,
as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the
legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great
office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are
developed, and to adapt it to the changes of time and circumstances.” ).
In other words, a federal citizen which must be subject to the political jurisdiction of the United States, finds himself/herself restrained in the use of
fundamental rights, the Court says there must be a compelling state interest
to justify it. COASTAL FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION,
INC. v. WILLIAMS, 838 So. 2d 543, 550-551 (Fla. 2003) ( “There is
also no assertion here that the State has a compelling interest in depriving
deputy sheriffs of the right to collective bargaining. Indeed, as noted above,
all police officers and many deputy sheriffs have been exercising such rights
throughout Florida for some time. The most recent case in which this Court
has reviewed a statutory restriction on a public employee’s right to collectivebargaining was in CHILES v. STATE EMPLOYEES ATTORNEYS GUILD, 734
So.2d 1030, 1033 (Fla. 1999), wherein we struck down a statutory attempt
to deny collective bargaining rights to lawyers employed by government.” );
NORTH FLORIDA WOMEN’S HEALTH AND COUNSELING SERVICES,
INC. v. STATE, 866 So.2d 612, 625 n. 16 (Fla. 2003) ( “Under ‘strict’
scrutiny, which applies inter alia to certain classifications and fundamental
rights, a court must review the legislation to ensure that it furthers a
compelling State interest through the least intrusive means. The legislation
is presumptively unconstitutional. The standard of proof is as follows: theState must prove that the legislation furthers a compelling State interest
through the least intrusive means. See generally In re T.W., 551 So.2d
1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989).” ); Ibid., 866 So.2d 612, 635 & n. 50 ( “[I]t is
settled in Florida that each of the personal liberties enumerated in the
Declaration of Rights is a fundamental right. See generally TRAYLOR v.
STATE, 596 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1992).” ), and for private state citizens with no
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regarding nature of contract & footnote (e) ( “1. If the covenants on
either side form the entire consideration for each other, they are mutually
dependent; each is a condition precedent, and neither party can sue withoutalleging that he has performed his covenant, or that he is ready and willing
to perform it (e).” )
(footnote (e): “This is the fourth rule in the notes to PORDAGE v. COLE
(1669), 1 Wms. Saund. 319 l, at p. 320 e; ‘4. Where the mutual covenants
go to the whole consideration on both sides, they are mutual conditions and
performance must be averred’ (see OXFORD v. PROVAND (1868), L. R. 2 P.
C. 135, at p. 156). Accordingly, where a vendor had so changed the
property by cutting down timber that he could not properly perform his
covenant, he could not sue for the purchase-money (DUKE of St. ALBANS v.SHORE (1789), 1 Hy. Bl. 270). . . .” ); the first thing we need do to setup our
damage suit is file petitions for Florida state citizenship which simultaneously
repudiates the federal nature of citizenship and any attachment to political
jurisdiction with the Florida attorney general using the same general form
we used to file Michael L. Hodge’s NOTICE OF LIABILITY in the Orange
County Recorder—the details of which are alluded to in Louis Farrakhan’s
letter.
Declarations of Domicile and Allegiance must be incorporated as referencesin these petitions for state citizenship. SMITH and ARMISTEAD v.CROOM[2], 7 Fla. 180, 185-186 (1857) (“[T]he law of citizenship,
as it is known in America [ ] is found in American decisions. This
citizenship I understand as equivalent to domicil, when applied to an American born or a foreigner naturalized. To be a citizen of a State,
says Judge Story, a man must have his domicil in the State.
“If a man has his domicil in a State, to which he has removed from anotherState, he is a citizen of the former.
“In CASE v. CLARK, 5 Mason C. C. Rep. 70, Story, J., says: ‘It appears tome clear that there is no sufficient proof that the plaintiff is a citizen of Massachusetts. To effect that purpose, it should be established that there as
a bona fide change of domicil; there must be a bona fide intention of removal, and a real change of domicil.
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“In the same case he shows that a removal for business or pleasure, asojoun, does not make a citizen. This was a question of forensic character—
a question as to the right to sue in the Federal Court; and in this case, as inquestion of the right to sue as a citizen of a State has been put upon the
question of whether the person was or was not domiciled in the State for all
purposes, and the rules as to domicil laid down in the same way as insuccession cases, and the cases as to succession referred to.
“In Story’s COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, Vol. 3, pp. 564, 565, in
treating of that clause of the Constitution which gives jurisdiction to theFederal Court, between citizens of one State and citizens of another State,
he explains the meaning of the word ‘citizen’ as there used. He says: ‘Areall persons born within a State to be always deemed citizens of that State,
notwithstanding any change of domicil, or does their citizenship change withtheir change of domicil? The answer to this enquiry is equally plain and
satisfactory. The Constitution having declar- *186* ed that citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, every person who is a citizen of one
State and removes into another, with the intention of taking uphis residence and inhabitancy there, becomes ipso facto a citizen
of the State where he resides , and he then ceases to be a citizen of the
State from which he has removed his residence. In general it may be saidthat a removal from one State into another, animo manendi, or with a
design of becoming an inhabitant, constitutes a change of domicil, and of course a change of citizenship.’
“Here we have emphatically declared, that as to the right to sue inthe Federal Court, ‘domicil’ and ‘citizenship’ are synonymous.
(Emphasis mine)” ).
Long before the Fourteenth Amendment came into existence, a
preponderance of our courts considered American citizens to be attached to
the political jurisdiction of government as owing allegiance to it; the older of
only two U.S. Supreme Court cases that define the meaning of “subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States” cites an 1805 Massachusetts case for
the proposition that a citizen must be born in the common law jurisdiction of
the country wherein he/she is born to be a citizen thereof, and then, his/her
allegiance is due the political jurisdiction. UNITED STATES v. WONG KIM
ARK, 169 U.S. 649, 663-664, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898) ( “The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, speaking by Mr. Justice
(afterwards Chief Justice) Sewall, early held that the determination of the
question whether a man was a citizen or an alien was ‘to be governed
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exposition, and the clear understanding of the contracting parties, or of the
legislating power (it is no matter in which light it be considered), could be
resorted to as the means of expounding an instrument, the continuing andunimpaired existence of this power in the states ought never to have been
controverted.” ), is incompatible with the idea that the people of the political
jurisdiction are one of the contracting parties. If the contracting parties
were as they presume—the citizens in their individual capacity and the
citizens in their collective capacity of the political jurisdiction—there would
not be two ways to construe because “in light of legislative enactment” is
from the point of view of the political jurisdiction. If everyone is attached to
the political jurisdiction, who are they representing? If government can be
seen as acting in the nature of a charitable corporation in the administrationof its business—particularly in the administration of fundamental rights (civil
liberties), it could never be a trustee to anyone internal to its
administration.
It would seem that the U.S. Supreme Court is waiting for an American
citizen to claim the right to state citizenship. WHEELER v. SMITH, 50 U.S.
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(9 How.) 55, 78, 13 L.Ed. 44 (1850) ( “When this country achieved its
independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of
the States. And this power still remains with them, except so far as they
have delegated a portion of it to the Federal government. The sovereign will
is made known to us by legislative enactment. And to this we must look inour judicial action, instead of the prerogatives of the crown. The State, as a
sovereign, is the parens patriae.” ).
It should be eye-opening with respect to the foregoing to contrast Florida’s
view that a state constitution is a limitation on governmental powers in
contradistinction to a grant a power, SAVAGE v. BOARD of PUBLIC
INSTRUCTION of HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, 101 Fla. 1362, 133 So.
341, 344 (1931) ( “The Constitution of this state is not a grant of power to
the Legislature, but a limitation only upon legislative power, and unless
legislation be clearly contrary to some express or necessarily impliedprohibition found in the Constitution, the courts are without authority to
declare legislative acts invalid. The Legislature may exercise any lawmaking
power that is not forbidden by organic law. STATE v. BRYAN, 50 Fla. 293,
39 So. 929; JORDAN v. DUVAL COUNTY, 68 Fla. 48, 66 So. 298; STONE v.
STATE, 71 Fla. 514, 71 So. 634.” ), and that this is a generally accepted
doctrine, BOARD of PUBLIC INSTRUCTION for POLK COUNTY,
FLORIDA v. GILLESPIE, 81 F.2d 586, 589 (CA5, Fla. 1936) ( “It is the
generally accepted doctrine of constitutional law that the powers of state
Legislatures are not conferred by, or to be found in, their constitutions; theyare inherent. That Legislatures look to constitutions not as the source of,
but for limitations upon, their powers. It is the generally accepted doctrine
that exerted legislative powers may not be stricken down upon general ideas
of propriety or justice, or of the force and effect of natural law, but only by
pointing to a constitutional limitation upon the power. LYTLE v. HALFF, 75
Tex. 128, 132, 12 S.W. 610; HARRIS COUNTY v. STEWART, 91 Tex. 143, 41
S.W. 650; BROWN v. CITY of GALVESTON, 97 Tex. 1, 75 S.W. 488. The
Florida courts have announced the same doctrine in COTTON v. COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, 6 Fla. 610 [(1856)]; SAVAGE v. BOARD of PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, 101 Fla. 1362, 133 So. 341; STATE ex rel. MOODIE v.
BRYAN, 50 Fla. 293, 39 So. 929; HARRY E. PRETTYMAN v. FLORIDA REAL
ESTATE COMM., 92 Fla. 515, 109 So. 442; JORDAN v. DUVAL COUNTY, 68
Fla. 48, 66 So. 298.” ); In re APPORTIONMENT LAW SENATE JOINT
constitution to restrict the acts of the legislature within the limits defined by
the constitution.
“The power of determining finally on the validity of the acts of the legislature
cannot reside with the legislature, because such power would defeat and
render nugatory, all the limitations and restrictions on the authority of the
legislature, contained in the bill of rights and form of government, and they
would establish a despotism, and subvert that great principle of the
constitution, which declares that the powers of making, judging, and
executing the law, shall be separate and distinct from each other.
“This power cannot be exercised by the people at large, or in their
collective capacity, because they cannot interfere according to their
own compact, unless by elections, and in such manner as the
constitution has prescribed, and because there is no other modeascertained by which they can express their will. (Emphasis mine)”
WHITTINGTON v. POLK, 1 H. & J. 236, 242-243 (1802); the court
asserts that the state constitution is like the federal constitution in that the
powers of government are delegated and the compact clause of the state
constitution’s bill of rights involves the citizens individually and the citizens
collectively as parties setting up the citizens collectively as the sovereignty
and bringing into existence the political jurisdiction where sovereignty is
exercised in a representative capacity—unhindered.
“The interference of the people by elections cannot be considered as the
proper and only check and a suitable remedy, because in the interval of
time, between the elections of the members who compose the different
legislatures, the law may have had its full operation, and the evil arising
from it become irremediable; nor is it probable that the elections will be
made with the view to afford redress in such particular *244* case, and if
they were, and the law should be repealed, it would not be an adequate
remedy.” Ibid., 1 H. & J. 236, 243-244.
“It is the office and province of the court to decide all questions of law whichare judicially brought before them, according to the established mode of
proceeding, and to determine whether an act of the legislature, which
assumes the appearance of a law, and is clothed with the garb of authority,
is made pursuant to the power vested by the constitution in the legislature;
for if it is not the result or emanation of authority derived from the
8/6/2019 LETTER -- Massachusetts Lawyers Thru GATA