-. lesson of Indian history that has come through clearly ...shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/376/11/11_chapter5.pdf · Indian leaders clearly identified 'India's national

CHAPTER V

THE INDIAN OCEAN IN INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

a) Introduction

The parameters of India's security framework obtrude into the seas sur-

rounding the subcontinent. The Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean together protect the flanks of India and separate it from the African and Australasian land masses. The Indian Ocean itself, covering an area of ap-

proximately 700 million square kilometres, stretches from Kanyakumari in India's

southern tip to the Antarctic continent in the South and Africa in the west to

Australia in the East. There are 47 states including 36 littoral states in the region

among which India is a major country. Its importance can be gauged by the fact

that the ocean has been named after it. India's own coast line measures 7,600 kilometres with 500 odd islands belonging to it dotting the ocean and it has a

maritime claim of 200 nautical miles. For centuries, India had ridden the waves

peacefully to forge links to the east and west. With the coming of the modem age,

unpleasant changes in the form of colonialism had transformed Indian polity and

society. The lesson of Indian history that has come through clearly is that India -. had been subjugated because of its vulnerability at sea. However, considering

how European imperialists had gained a foothold on the subcontinent via the

sea, India showed an appalling lack of security consciousness and did not build

a strong navy for a long time. India's policy was largely reactive and in keeping

with its decisions regarding security, external events caused it to formulate its

policies. Both the 1962 debacle and the 1964 Chinese nuclear explosion caused

India to rethink security options. From a period of relative inactivity, India

went on to think of a 'blue water navy'. Indeed by the 1996 s, the question has

begun to be asked whether she is overstretching herself.

This period - the 1980 s - also saw the culmination of the complex multi-

lateral negotiations regarding how the seas were to be regulated by countries around the world. The Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) which was signed by the 119 counhies on 10 December, 1982, was to be an

instrument by which both maritime and non-maritime countries could share the

resources of the oceans.' India had welcomed these regulations as it could

benefit from it, but the U.S. was not so forthcoming. President Reagan had

rejected the articles of the U.N. Conference, stating that it would be against

American private enterprise. The economic and strategic importance of the

region was greatly responsible for the U.S.'s presence in the Indian Ocean and

it triggered off superpower rivalry in the area. India's response to such changes

was an increase in its armed forces, particularly the navy.

b) Evolution of India's Indian Ocean Policy

At the time of Independence, India gave little importance to her maritime

security and coastal frontiers. It was understandable; the problems accompany-

ing partition, the first Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir and the immediate

need to avoid being sucked into the vortex of the super-power conflict, directed

the attention of Indian leadership from this aspect of her security. However,

Indian leaders clearly identified 'India's national interests with a diminution of

military activity by the super powers in South Asia1.= This obviously did not

exclude the Indian Ocean region, but the leaders took some time to formulate

India's policy towards the Indian Ocean.

The Indian Ocean had long been regarded by the United States as a British

pond. The U.S. has considered the British presence in the East as essential for

the non-communist world. Due to their pressing problems, there was little open objection from the Indian leaders in the early post World-War I1 years to the

British presence. Their idea of security assumed that the entire area ought to be

free of global rivalry, but, till 1956, India did not openly articulate her security

concerns.

1. Yenrl~mk of Unitcd N~tiotrs , 1994 (New York 1994) p. 2. Su j i t Mansingh, I~rdiu'iu's Sumch for P m e r . InCra Gatrdhi's F m i g n Pdicy 1966-1982 O\lew

Delhi, 1984) p.6.

The Anglo-French assault in the Suez area in 1956 brought attention to this

area. It exposed the waning power of the former colonial powers and the Indian

Ocean gained the attention of both super powers as the area abutted the oil-

bearing Gulf counhies and was criss-crossed by trade routes.

The increasing importence of the British and the French prompted the U.S. Government to forsee a possible power vacuum in the region. It offered to

share part of' the expenses of the British in the Indian Ocean? As a result, the

British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) was created on November 10, 1965

consisting of three islands of the Seychelles and the Chagos Archipelago,

including Diego Garcia. India and Mauritius (the island state from which the

Chagos Archipelago and Diego Garcia were detached) were disturbed by this

decision. India had a close connection after its independence with the British navy, borrowing their senior personnel and having British admirals as its early

naval chiefs, but functioning with the help of the British was different from

having an Anglo-American presence in the region. It was an invitation to the

superpowers to compete with each other. In 1961, Prime Minister Bandaranaike

of Sri Lanka had mentioned at the Cairo Non-Aligned summit the possibilities

of tension in the region. The Cairo declaration had included the following

statement:

The conference recommends the establishment of denuclearised zones covering these (the Lndian Ocean) and other areas and the Oceans of the World, particularly those which have hitherto been free from nuclear weap0ns.l

In 1970, at the Lusaka Non-Aligned Conference, the Sri Lankans brought it up again and the members called upon the General Assembly to adopt a

declaration defining the Indian Ocean as a Zone which would be free of troubles.

3. M.P.Awati, 'Emerging Sccurity issues in the Indian Ocean: An Indian Perspective', in Selig S. Harrison and K.Subrahmanyarn, ed., Sup0 Porun Riualry in the lndian Ocza11. (New York, 1989.) p.85.

4. India, Minish-y of External Affairs,Ttuo decades of A'a-aligrrment (New Delhi.1983) p.23.

The concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace thus did not spring out

without any warning. There had been concerns that international sea-lanes could be drawn be into nuclear conflicts and that small states along the Ocean would,

willy nilly, be forced to endure the cross-fire of ~onflict.~ On 16 December, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the proposal co-sponsored by

Sri Lanka and Tanzania to declare the Indian Ocean as a Zone of P e a ~ e . ~ The

General Assembly solemnly declared that:

the Indian Ocean within limits to be detern~ined together with the air space above and the Ocean floor subjacent thereto ........ (be) designated for all time as a Zone of Peace.'

It called upon the Great Powers to enter into consultation with the littoral

states of the Indian Ocean with the view to halting further expansion of their

military presence and to ensure that the region would not be an area where

force would be used against any sovereign state.' Indian was among the 61 member states that voted for the resolution. However, it had not taken the

initiative to sponsor it. It became a co-sponsor of the draft at the first revision

stage. While the official line was that India preferred to leave the initiative to

the smaller countries perhaps to ward off suspicions of dominance from them,

it was likely that her involvement in the Bangaladesh war checked any deeper

commitment from her.q

In fact, China accused lndia of concealing its designs behind the co-spon-

sorship."' However, unlike the great powers, India joined in the resolution. The

5. K.Suhmhmanyan, ' A r m s Limitation in the Indian Ocean: Retrospect and Prospect', in Harrison and Subrahmanyan, n.3, p.224.

6. L'nitcd Nation.;, (;c?to-irl Assrmbly Of i c i~ l Rrcords, Resolution 2832 (XXVI), 26th Session, 16 Dc,ccmber, 1971, cited in United Nations Yearbook 1979, Vo1.4 (New York, 1980) p.3-6.

7. Rjid.

8. hid.

9. C.S.R. blurthy, 'lndia and the Deadlocked Zone of Peace on the Indian Ocean.' IDSA l our~~~c l (Ncw k l h i ) Vol.XVII, No.1, July-September 1984, p.1990.

10. /bid.

Western nations had doubts about such an idea, partly because of their belief

in the freedom of the seas and freedom of navigation for their warships and

partly because of the alleged advantages the Soviet Union would gain from

such a concept. The United States abstained on the vote in 1971 to adopt the

declaration (as did the Soviet Union) on the grounds that it would inhibit free-

dom of the seas, something they had always upheld."

The General Assembly expected to have a report on the implementation of

the resolution by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. The Ad Hoc

Committee, comprising at first of 15 members grew by 1989 to 44 members. It

became an annual ritual to have the General Assembly consider the Indian

Ocean Peace concept, call for the conference which to date has not been held

and then ask the Ad Hoc Committee to submit a report on the progress of

holding such a conference at its disarmament sess i~n . '~ The factors preventing

the concept from succeeding were manifold. The superpower rivalry, though

not so intense as in Europe, placed obstructions in the fruition of the concept.

Each had conflicting interests. Both were interested in the oil-rich countries and

in the need to ensure trouble-free sea lanes, if necessary by a military presence.

The early American moves triggered off Soviet action and throughout the 70 s

and much of the 80 s there was a build up of their presence.I3 Additionally, the

need to influence Third World Countries around the rim also called for an infusion of their naval power. This was detrimental to Indian interests. Its foreign

and security policy necessitated a reduction in superpower strength. Realising

after the 1971 Enterprise incident that subcontinental security needs could only be answered by a growing Indian defence force and a diminishing super power

presence, India supported the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

11. Kenneth Wimmel, S~u;et dtid Amc~icalt h'mal Forces i t thc indian Ocean: Anns Race, Military &11unu or Zonr of P'K~.. Unclassified Report (Rhode Island, 1976) p.72.

12. Chandra Kurnar, 'The Indian Ocean: Arc of Crisis or Zone of peace'. International Affairs (London) Vo1.60, No.2, Spring 1984, p.237.

13. R c p t of tJe Task !mid u,i lttdiu, Amr+ and tJle lndian Ocean, Camegie Endowment of International Peace and Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis (Washington D.C., 1985) p.10.

The reasons for Sri Lanka's and Tanzania's objectives for establishing such

a zone were laudable but the former had an additional reason to proceed with

the idea. It was an effective tool to neutralise any Indian designs as well." Some

littoral counhies, Singapore and Pakistan, for example, preferred to have a

balance between the superpowers rather than their elimination from the area so

that their sovereignity could be protected from littoral states. Their fears were

fuelled by the increase of the Indian fleet between 1981 and 1993. Comprising

destroyers, frigates, corvettes and two aircraft caniers (the only counhy with

this in the region) the Indian fleet went up from a total of 30 to 41.15 However,

it was much less than China or Pakistan when one looked at the relative ratio

of guarding the coast per square kilometres.16 In general, defence expenditure

had doubled between 1976 and 1990. Such a expansion was in keeping with its

policy of what security entailed in the 1980 s. By then it became accepted that

India's concern extruded into its neighbouring lands. But this concern did not

derive from any desire for hegemony. It was in keeping with the Indian

leadership's proclivity for a non-aligned policy and a desire to keep the area

free of great power rivalries which had a century earlier resulted in all the states

becoming colonized."

But Pakistan was unconvinced of Indian intentions. In the year 1974, as a

consequence of India's nuclear explosion which was termed 'peaceful' by them,

Pakistan introduced a new element into the scheme, i.e. proposing to declare

the Indian Ocean region a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone." Due to her partia-

pation in American-led, dominated military blocs, Pakistan could not freely

support the motion on the Zone of Peace. But it offered this alternative, osten-

sibly as a part of the concept but in reality as a way of blunting Indian ambi-

14. N~~uslueck (New York) 24 January, 1994, p.3. 5 . I y (New Delhi) 31 July, 1991, p.87. 16. Ilrid.. p.86. 17. Statement by Minister of External Affairs, Y.B.Chavan. November 3974, India, Ministry

of External Affairs, Fnrcign Aff'iirs R e m d (New Delhi) Vo1.20, h'o.11, 1974, pp. 302-304 (hereafter cited as FAR)

18. Pakistan, Foreign Affairs Ministry, Foreign Affi~irs Pakistan (Islamabad) Vo1.6, No.]], November, 1979, p.13.

tions. The Indian nuclear explosion alarmed them considerably and they pro-

posed an item entitled 'Declaration and Establishment of a Nudear Weapons

Free Zone in South Asia' and defended it vehemently against the expected

Indian objection^.'^ India thought it part of the discriminatory Nuclear Non-

Proliferation Treaty and refused to countenance it.

c) Evolution of American strategy in the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan's nuclear ambitions were much in evidence throughout the 1970s

decade, but by offering to consider the Nuclear Free Zone, they were appeasing

the Americans and managing to keep them in good humour. It was part of their

plan to becolne nuclear capable while all the while appearing to work hard for

non-proliferation.. "

After the end of World War I1 the United States had relegated the Indian

Ocean to an insignificant place in its security concerns. It definitely ranked

much lower than the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean in its maritime strategy. The

U.S. Navy had a force, MIDEASTFOR, comprising two destroyers and a com- mand ship based at Bahrein since 1948. It was only in the early 1960 s that units

of the Pacific Fleet began to visit the Indian Ocean. Except for the north-west quadrant, the U.S. was indifferent to matters in the Indian Ocean in the 1940's.

This was due to the British control over their colonies east of Suez. But within

two decades, the decolonization process had been ha~tened.~' Thus there were

a great number of newly independent countries vulnerable to the pressures

19. United Nations, L;dt7crtzl Assrmbly OIficial Rcsords, Resolution 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December, 1974, cited in IIzrifd Nt~tions Ysarbuok 1981 Vo1.15 (New York, 1981) p.197. The Indian representative at the United Nations, stated 'the initiative for the creation of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia should come kom within the %ion'. India saw prolif- eration as a global and not just a regional problem. SeeFAR (New Delhi, 1979) Vo1.25, No.12, Dcccmher 1979, p.228,

20. See Srecdhar, ed., 'Pakistan's Nuclear Dilemma' in Pukistnn's Bomb (New Delhi.1987) pp.92-95.

21. In 19@, Harold Marmillan, Prime Minister of United Kingdom had made his famous Winds of Change' speech in the African Parliament which was to transform the African continent and h e much of its colonies. This was followed by Hamld Wilson's announcement in 1967, to withdraw Britain's forces east of Suez, Pears Cyciqlaedia 1973-74 (Suffolk, 1973) h.20.

exerted by the superpowers. More than those of the Paafic or Atlantic Ocean,

the Indian Ocean states voiced the aspirations of the Third World. Nations

which had been previously colonized, sought to implement poliaes which would prevent any such recurrence of their loss of independence. Among them, India

was determined not to be dictated to and to minimize external interventionism

in her neighbourhood.

The United States had concentrated on building a structure of security

alliances to confine and spy on the USSR. Indeed, in the early 1960 s a U-2 with

its pilot, Gary Powers had been captured by the Soviets on its surveillance flight over their country from Pakistan. The U-2 reconnaissance plane had left from

Peshawar base in Pakistan. But with the development of advanced satellite

reconnissance technology and submarine launched ballistic missiles, the posi-

tion of allies such as Pakistan decreased in importance as did alliances such as

the CENT0 and SEATO.U

The US Navy's Pacific Fleet visited the Indian Ocean in 1962 and three

years later it was agreed that Diego Garcia would be leased to the United States

till 2010 A.D. The base had not assumed an importance comparable to the US Pacific Ocean bases in the mid or late 1960s. It served the purpose of commu-

nications and anti-satellite warfare in the Indian Ocean where there was a vast

expanse of sea at the Equator and the Southern hempisphere. More important

than the small military presence, were the imperatives driving American policy.

In other words, the global pre-occupations of the United States necessarily shaped

their policy in the region. After 1968, when the British had announced their

withdrawal froni the region, the United States had become increasingly con- cerned about the prospects of an energy crisis due to the political problems in

the oil-rich Gulf and Middle East.

22. T.C. Bose, Professor, Kalyani University, pointed this out in a lecture 'Indo-U.S, relations' in the course on 'India and the United States: Reassessment, Realignment and Renewal'at American Studies Research Centre(hereafter cited as ASRC) Hyderabad, January 1993.

2.3. Jasjit Singh, 'Geopolitics and Superpower Rivalry in Indian Ocean', Strategic Airalysis (New Delhi) November 1984, p.808.

President Nixon's Docirine outlined at Guam in 1969 had propounded balancing conimunism with the help of regional 'surrogates'. American ground

power would not be directly involved." It was argued that the Nixon dodrine

was a 'blue water doctrine' and there was a distinct shift in emphasis from

ground forces to sea and air forces. L5 The American military presence was not

acceptable to India in keeping with its belief in non-alignment. Moreover, the

security of the subcontinent was threatened by super-power rivalry in the re-

gion. Its disapprobation became more evident and intense when in the course

of the 1971 Bangladesh was, the United States sent the USS Enterprise of the

Seventh Fleet into the Ocean as part of its gunboat diplomacy. This act seemed

typical of a neo-colonial power threatening a member of the post-colonial Third

World. It validated what Indira Gandhi had stated at Lusaka at the Non-aligned

Conference in 1970, that the Indian Ocean ought 'to be an area of peace and co-

operation. Military bases of outside powers would create tensions and great

power rivalry1.%

The American lease of Diego Garcia only compounded India's problems.

Diego Garcia was just a communication station in the beginning and it became operational only in 1973. The U.S. position was spelt out by them to the 1971

Sri Lankan - Tanzanian proposal of declaring the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace.

It was stated that the station represented the 'legitimate and important U.S. interests' and threatened no one. It was, the Americans said, necessary for US.-Soviet balance in the Indian Ocean." The American found it difficult to accept Indian criticism and they highlighted the fact that the Soviet Union had three major naval operating bases in the Indian O ~ e a n . ~ By 1976, the U.S. was thinking of upgrading the facilities at Diego Garcia, to support the expansion of

24. In a discussion with M.Glen Johnson, Director, at ASRC, Hyderbad, December 1993. 25. Kim Beazley, 'The October was the 1973-1974 Arab Oil Embargo and U.S.Policy on the

Indian Ocean' in Larry W.Bowman and Ian Clark 111dinn O c a n in Global Politics (New Delhi, 1981).

26. FAR (New Delhi) Vo1.9, No.9, September 1970. p. 27. St'ztements b y the United Stutcs, Published by United States Information Service, American

Center (New Delhi, 1984.) p.1. (hereafter cited as USIS). 7.8. n~id. , p.1. 29. President Ford took this position - hid .

their presence and military allies such as Auskalia and Iran supported them in their efforts. The Department of State conducted a survey of the reactions of littoral countries to such proposals. Out of thirty countries. less than ten were in favour, South Africa, Malawi, Ethiopia, Yemen, Abu Dhabi, Pakistan (signifi- cantly) and Singapore. Australia was also in favour. India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Mauritius and Malaysia were against the American scheme.30 Both Indira Gandhi and Swaran Singh (the Foreign Minister) were critical of the U.S. Press coverage in India was also supportive of the Government's stand. This did not deter the United States whose Congress called for another survey,"' before going ahead with their plans. However in 1977 a change of Government brought the Democratic leader Jimmy Carter to the Presidency. He was in favour of the den~ilitarization of the Indian Ocean, stating that they had 'proposed that the Indian Ocean be completely demilitarized, that a comprehensive test ban be put into effect and that prior notification of test missile launchings be ex~hanged ' .~~ Such an agreement would be a prelude to eventual elimination of atomic weap- ons from the planet. Subsequently it was stated that it was the hope of his administration 'to establish with the Soviets, mutual military restraint in the Indian O~ean ' .~ ' Therefore, complete demilitarization was not the goal. Serious attempts were made to limit arms in the region. The U.S. representative to the conference of the Conmiittee on Disarmament of the U.N. General Assembly said:

There has been positive movement on the question of reducing tensions in the Indian Ocean with the beginning of bilateral discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States for stabilizing the level of military activity in the Indian Ocean area.%

30. Kenneth Wimmel. n.11, Amex A. 31. Jl~id. 32. Stutcm~.i~ts ly thc Lli~itcd States n. 27, p.2. 33. President Carter's speech at United Nations General Assembly 17 March,l977, American

For~.ign P i ~ l i ~ y : Basic Documents, 1977-1980 (Washington D.C. 1983) p.4. 34. St i r t~mr i~ t s ly the Clnited States, n.27, pp.34.

Carter had sincerely pursued the cause of disarmament by extending the

Salt II (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) talks with the Soviet Union to include

other items such as a total ban on nudear testing through a Comprehensive

Test Ban Treaty and discussing with them the 'demilitarization' of the Indian

Ocean, India had positively welcomed the American position on the Indian

Ocean, as it was something similar to what it (India) had desired.35 But the goal was not complete demilitarization, it was only a reduction or stabilizing of naval forces. Moreover, the larger issues of 'intervention by Washington or a

Moscow was unrelated to naval deployments'.% While the trend was to avert an arms race in the region, the United States had still not accepted the declaration

i l l toto. By the end of 1978, the United States was, in fact, talking of failure in

achieving their objective because of an increase in the Soviet military presence.

A more important reason was the downfall of the shah of Iran, whom the US

had expected to be the policeman of the Gulf. Indeed, as a consequence of the Iranian crisis when the Shah was overthrown, the U.S. Navy increased the

number of ships deployed in the Arabian Sea-Persion Gulf region since January

1979 to avert any possible Soviet moves in Iran and to reassure pro-West re-

gimes such as Saudi Arabia as well. " The idea was also to maintain pressure

on the Soviet Union. By 1980, with the induction of Soviet troops in Afghani-

stan, the tune had completely changed. The United States not only rejected the

concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, but had become more hawkish.

The President stated:

We have increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air faalities to be used by our forces in the region of north east Africa and the Persian Gulf. Any attempt by any

35. 111dLm E ~ T L . S (New &lhi)ll March, 1977. 36. Dcnni. Kux, Ednrt~gcd Dcmaruries India and thr United Statcs 1941-1991 (New Delhi, 1993)

P. 37. J.P.Anand. 'Diego Garcia Base', IDSA Journal (New Delhi) Vol.12, No.1, July-September

1979, p.7n.

outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be repelled by any means necessary including military force. "

This has been described as the 'Carter Doctrine' and represents a shift from

the Nixon policy of relying as far as possible on surrogates and his own earlier

stance of negotiating with the Soviets. The outrage of Americans at the Soviet

invasion of Afghanistan forced them to take a harder stand. Some opinion

makers urged that Americans maintain naval supremacy in view of 'Soviet

adventur isn~ ' .~~ The Reagan administration took a sterner view affirming that

until the Soviet Union (withdrew its troops from Afghanistan) ........ the improvement in the political and security climate in the region necessary for a successful Indian Ocean Conference could not exist.*

hdeed, the very concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace became

almost farcical. Between 1980 and 1983, Diego Garcia was expanded as a naval

air base. On 1st January, 1983, a new command was created for the conduct of

military operations in areas not specifically under the Atlantic and Pacific com-

mands. The U.S. CentCom (Central Command) was responsible for the Indian

Ocean and its littoral. The United States did not openly discard the notion of the

Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, but neither did it encourage it. At the U.N. Ad Hoc

Committee on the Indian Ocean, the U.S. representative stated that:

it would be a serious mistake ....... to implement a zone of peace while one of the states defined to be in the region, the hinterland state of

38. Shds qf flw llt~krrt h4r.ssrs~ by President Carter. 23 January ,1980. Published by USIS Ameri- wn Center (New Delhi, 1984) 'The Carter Doctrine' Hendrik Smith, Nnu Yo& Timrs, 24 Janua~ . l 98O.

39. 'Indian Ocean and U.S.Srcurity' Vital Syedws of tk Day. Vo1.36, No.22, p.674. 40. Stutrmcnts ly tJw Llnited Stttcdes, n.27, p.7.

Afghanistan continues illegally to be occupied by foreign military forces."

They objected to the terms used by the U.S.S.R. in the document intro-

duced at the U.N. wherein it was said that they (the U.S.S.R) 'can --ell under-

stand the legitimate concern of the coastal states of the Indian O c m wer the

expansion of the U.S. military presence there'j2 The U.S. drew attetion to this

word stating that the hinterland was deliberately left out to veil the b e a t of the

Soviet land-based forces in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the U.S. deniec any threat

from their presence, stating that they were there legally and any &ease was due to the Soviet Union's own expan~ionism.'~ The United States mt inued to

emphasise on the 'adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by dl state^'.^ throughout the decade as a way of setting nuclear disputes. It was no: convinced

of the merits of the idea presented in General Assembly Resolution 332 0 stating that this, in a reference to the littoral and hinterland states -auld 'pre-

dude their right to make appropriate arrangements for individual ani collective

self-defence as provided for in the U.N.Charter'.'S Thus the United Sztes, while agreeing in principle to reduce military tensions, did not subscribe to 5e concept,

and was obviously at odds with the Indian Government's viewpoizt.

d) Evolution of Soviet Strategy in Indian Ocean

The Soviet Union was for the greater part of its Bolshevik his*, a land-

based power. Its navy located in the Black Sea, the Pacific and the Baltic was mainly a defensive one. It had little interest in the Indian Ocean. AI-er Stalin's

death in 1953, the Soviet Union had opted for submarines and m e - me recon-

naissance strike aircraft and there was a shift from guns to missiles. k pariicu-

lar, primary importance was given to the role of antisubmarine wad&?. Admiral S.G. Gorkshkov, a Khrushchev appointee, had supewised the t ransfaa t ion of

41. nlid., p.8.

42. Statement by U.N. Representative Wayne Merry to Ad Hoc Committee, Dnunent 402, Am~n'can Foreign Pol i~y, Current Documents 1983, P.823 (Washington D.C., :.?35).

43. h i d .

44. lndian Ocean as a Zone o f Peace: U.S. Views American Center (New Delhi, 1-+'i) p3. 45. nl;d.

the Soviet Navy from a coastal defence force to a well-equipped navy. He

considered the navy 'a political tool'." He advocated the modernising of the

Soviet Navy and changed its objectives in the light of what he conceived the

United States foreign policy to be based on an oceanic strategy aimed at over

throwing Soviet Communism." Admiral Gorshkov argued that onIy a State with a strong maritime force could become a world power. The Navy according to

him was an instrument of foreign policy in peace time and was not just of use

during war. It was the most effective means of projecting state power beyond

one's borders."

Under Brezhnev, the Soviet Union had become even more active globally,

intervening wherever its interests or socialist regimes were threatened, as in Czechoslovakia in Europe in 1968, and Afghanistan in Asia in 1979. The prox-

imity of the Soviets to the Indian Ocean because of their presence in Afghani-

stan triggered off alarm in the West. The immediate American reaction to their

intervention was to strengthen their Diego Garcia base and arm Pakistan.

Earlier the Soviet Navy's policy in the Indian Ocean was a response to

American naval deployment in the region. The change in American emphasis

from dependence on military allies to a missile based strategy (the U.S. had

developed the range of the Polaris submarine missile to almost 3,000 nautical

miles by 1964), meant that the land mass of the Soviet Union was vulnerable to

attack from the seas as well as the air.(9 The Indian reading of the situation was

that the American deployment led to the introduction of superpower conflict in

the area and the Soviet position could be understood in the light of the American

introduction of the means of aggression.% The Indian viewpoint was self-

serving, in that it expected the two superpowers to respect the expressed wish

46. Dale R. Tahtinen, 'The Superpotvers and the Indian Ocean,' in Dale R. Tahtinen and John Leinzowski, eds.,Arms in thc. Indian Oman (Washington D.C., 1977) p.19.

47. The U.S. Navy threatened the Soviet Union with its submarine launched baIListic missiles. . Tahtinen, n.46. 4 Geoffrey Jukes, 'Soviet Naval Policy in the Indian Ocean', in Bowman and Clark n.25, p.175. 50. T.T Poulose, 'The Indian Ocean in India's Foreign Policy'. Yembwk on India's Foreign Policy

1982-83, ed. Satish Kumar (New Delhi, 1984) p.188.

of the littoral states for realising a Peace Zone, without any suitably accomodating

gesture on its own part. An example of India's hypoaisy was when the Indian

Government obtained the lease of a nuclear powered submarines, I N S . Chakra,

from the Soviet Union, when it itself was touting the concept of a peaceful

Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union lent its voice to India's and the littoral nations objectives because it desired, in its own interests, to scale down the American presence

which threatened its southern region and Afghanistan. It could never have

equalled the ~mer i can Navy but since 1968, it began to register its presence in

the area. Wl~ile it acquired bases in Socotra, Aden and Somalia (from where it

withdrew in 1977) it could not aspire'to equal America's naval might. Its strategy

was to:

1. Reinforce claims on sea as well as land and counter-act the naval and

nuclear forces of the U.S.

2. Provide protection to the Soviet merchant and fishing fleet.

3. Support national liberation movements in the Third World in keeping

with Brezhnev's doctrine and as Admiral Gorshkov had envisaged. 5'

Instances such as during the 1971 Bangladesh war of liberation and the

1973 Arab-Israeli conflict confirmed the Soviet Union as a 'friend of the Third World'. Such displays helped it to gain influence in countries around the Red

Sea (Ethiopia, South Yemen and Somalia). Its support to Iraq in 1973 when it

clashed with Kuwait and to Ethiopia, in 1977, dunng the Ogaden War, aroused

concern in the U.S.A. that its influence was growing and could affect its interests. The Soviets also structured their naval missions to offset the American offensive

potential concentrating on 'undermining' the opponent's military-economic

potential from the mid 1970s onwards.52 Its policy of denying American domi-

nation in these waters coincided with the desire of India and other littoral

countries to proclaim the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The stabilization or, better still, withdrawal of outside fleets from the Indian Ocean was to India's strategic advantage.

e) The Post-1979 phase

After the Soviet invaded Afghanistan, a superpower conflict in the region seemed more imminent. The Soviet army was present in large numbers in a country bordering the oil rich Middle East and near crucial sea lanes, while the

United States of America pumped nlillions into Pakistan to use it as a base against the Afghan G o ~ e r n m e n t . ~ ~ A battle between their proxies Afghanistan and Pakistan, if not between the superpowea, seemed likely indeed. The super- power presence in the region was thus not just represented by blue-water naval forces but also by the growth of rapid deployment forces. Till the late 1980 s,

there were Soviet boops in Afghanistan and it had forces in Soviet Asia. They were also pe~nlitted to use facilities such as at Aden. However, they had noth- ing comparable to the American sea-based forces at Diego-Garcia, Oman, Soma- lia and Kenya. The American navy had by 1987 at the Diego Garcia base, 17 u~amn~oth contained ships loaded with tanks, rocket launchers and amphibious armoured personnel carriers to enable 12,500 U.S. Marines to fight without resupply." It was a matter of deep concern, as expected, to India. The then Minister of External Affairs, P.V. Narasirnha Rao, voiced the Indian Government's opinion in 1981 in Parliament. Referring to the Non-aligned Conference (that had been held under the chairmanship of Mrs. Gandhi in the same year) he said that:

initiatives should be taken aimed at curbing the growing competition between Great Powers with special reference to the need to implement

53. Betwecn 1980 and 1989. olrer 35 billion dollars worth of arms had been given to Pakistan, 7k Hindu (Madras) 28 M a y , 1995.

54. Selig S. Harrison and K.Subrahmanyam, 'Introduction' in Selig S. Harrison and KSubrahmanyam ed., n.2, p.4.

the Declaration of the Indian Ocean

as a Zone of Peace'."

He reiterated the familiar apprehensions India had of any escalation of

superpower conflict. 56

In 1983, members of Parliament continued to express their concern about

the lack of progress in achieving the Peace Zone. They preferred to shift the

onus of blame on to the American side. In one speech, in the Indian Parliament,

United States of America was squarely indicted for not promising to attend the

conference on the Indian Ocean. Its pretext was that as Afghanistan was not

going to be included in the Agenda, it was not willing to attend it. Not

surprisingly the Soviet Union, was reluctant to discuss Afghanistan in the

Conference. Indias also was not too enthusiastic. However, India was correct in

chiding the Americans about their reluctance, since the opposition to the con-

ference was connected with the overthrow of the Shah, the American surrogate

in the region and not just the situation in Afghanistan. Moreover, it was hypo- critical of the Americans to invade Grenada in the Caribbean Sea that year

when their own interests in the area seemed threatened yet condemn a similar

Soviet action in Afghanistan. The entire policy of the United States thus was one

of classic realpolitik. India's error was the familiar one of critidsing the Ameri-

cans but being less harsh on the Soviets. In the same speech at Parliament, a

Congress-I member defended India's policy. The two powers could not, accord-

ing to him, be equated when the Soviet Union had not, unlike the United States,

even established a base in the Indian Ocean. He maintained that it was neces-

sary for India's natural interests as the 'Soviet Union (had) been its most reli-

able, dependable friend'. "The left partners and the ruling Congress party were

very vocal in their criticism of the American action in Pakistan and Grenada but

55. India, Lok Sdha Drhtes, Vo1.14, No.24, 25 March,l981, ~01.290. 56. nl;d.

57. Lok Sd~ha Dabutes, V01.42, No.10, 6 December, 1983, cols.445446. 58. hid.

unfortunately less forthcoming about the Soviet Union. The same debate occured in Parliament over the next few years.59

India continued to urge that the Indian Ocean be declared a Zone of Peace but the Ad Hoc Committee formed to convene such a conference met without fail every year and never achieved its objective. Indian parliamentarians blamed the United States for 'sabotaging and postponing it repeatedly'. As suggested by a veteran politician, the Indians could have taken the initiative to organize such a conference, even though it would not be under United Nations auspices.

But India would never take a step as this. Firstly, most of the littoral countries would themselves include the issue of Afghanistan in the agenda. That would obviously antagonise the Soviet Union, a step India was reluctant to take.

Secondly, organizing the conference would not please the other superpower, the United States especially when India sought a more pragmatic relationship with United States after the 1982 Cancun summit between Reagan and Mrs. Gandhi. Indeed it was discovered that the issue did not constitute a major initant in Indo-American relation^.^^ Though the two counties had differences on the agenda of such a conference if it were to be held, it was not considered a serious obstacle.

More than American opposition to holding the conference, India was concerned with American attempts to link nuclear non-proliferation objectives

to the Peace Zone Concept. India opposed the proposal brought forward by Pakistan to declare the Indian Ocean and littoral region a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone."The United States did not support Pakistan's proposal initially. The Soviet threat to the pro west oil regimes obviously deterred them from fostering such a Zone and giving up nuclear weapons there. Additional reasons such as the Khomeini rule in Iran-Iraq convinced them of the dangers from agreeing to the concept. However, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan they supported

59. For example seelnk S d h Drltntcs ,Vol.3, No.19, 9 April, 1985, coIs.299 - 302. 60. 111;,J. 61. h i d . 62. The R ~ y m t of Tack form n.13, p.73. 63. llnitcd Nations Diwrmumrnt Y c a r M , 1979, Vo1.5 (New York 1980) p.196.

the proposal. They became wonied about the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia and desired to halt nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan.

India rejected American support to this proposal considering it unfair, because

even the NIT did not deter the United States from increasing their weaponry.

Moreover, Indian's concerns vis-a-vis China were overlooked. The US wanted

India 'to come under full-scope safeguards under the NIT' while India only

desired to bar the nuclear and other dangerous weapons of outside powers

from the region in keeping with the Peace Zone C ~ n c e p t . ~ The idea of a Nudear-

Weapons Free Zone smacked of neo-colonialism requiring as it did sh-ingent

controls on regional governments and no such obligation on the nuclear

s ~ p e r p o w e r s . ~ Americans contended that they had not proferred the idea. It

had come from one of the local states and was indicative of the 'real

apprehensions on the part of some powers in the region'.66 These fears became magnified during Rajiv Gandhi'stenure when there was a visible effort to ex-

tend Indian dominance over smaller countries in South Asia.

It was during the 1980s the naval build-up by India began to be looked

at askance by Indian Ocean neighbours, such as Australia? India was described

as harbouring blue water ambitions. At any rate, India began emphasizing a

sbategy of 'regional sea control' by which super powers were not denied access

to the area but were denied the use of the sea against regional navies during

warfare." Obviously, this policy had its genesis in the 1971 war, when the American Enterprise had come to these waters. But there was also an economic

rationale which necessitated the naval expansion. There was a growth in India's

maritime interests in the 70 s and 80 s which called for the protection of these

interests. In fact, the Indian Navy justified its role as in such terms as defending

'India's coast, island territories, merchant shipping and coastal and offshore

64. Thr Rqmt of tlw Tusk Foru n.13, pp. 75-76. 65. b i d . 66. hid . , p.77.

67. 7he Hindu (Madras) 13 November, 1990.

68. Rahul Roy Chaudhary, The Role of the Navy in Indian Security Policy', G n t m p r a y South Asia (London) Vo1.2, 2 November, 1993 p.157.

installations ..... maritime resources'." India began to take an active interest in

the deliberations of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea

(UNCLOS) which was convened by member nations to discuss the sharing of

the world's maritime resources. India was the only 'developing' country to be

given the status of a pioneer in seabed mining. Again, it was the only 'devel-

oping' nation which had built a research station at the Antartica base and had

seriously developed long term aims in utilising the resources of the oceans

around the subcontinent. With the onset of offshore oil rigging and mineral

mining in seas, as well as increased activity of traditional fishing, there was plenty of room for conflict. India had claims over a 200 km Exclusive Economic

Zone but the competitiveness prevalent in the modem world forced it to protect

its interest^.'^ The key objective of the Indian Navy was to ensure the 'security

of India's sprawling coastline and growing maritime interests' and this took an 'added importance in recent times, due primarily to the inddction of sophisticated

armaments in the region and the disquieting growth of rivalry and tensions in

the Indian Ocean'." Unquestionably, India did have a long coastline and did

have to defend its interests. At the least, India required a deterrent naval capacity,

not to perpetuate a kind of domination in the region but to protect its own

interests. Its total naval force strength had gone up to 52,000 by 1988-89 from

49,000 in 1971-72 but the increase in the number of vessels speak largely of Indian intention^.^

70. Ashley Tellis, 'Securing the Barracksp. in Robert H.Bmce, ed, 771~. M c d a n I~rdian Navy and Nw I~rdi'z~r Ossrrrt. Dcvclry~mcnts UIIJ lm1~licntion (Perth, 1989) p.15.

71. India, Ministry of Defence, Annual R~yor t , 1987-1988 (New Delhi, 1988) p.15. 72. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1988-89 cited in Tells, n.71, p.17.

Figure 1 reflects the growth of the Indian navy from 1971 to 1990:

Figure 1. Growth of the Indian navy between 1971-1990.

Weapon Systen~ 1971 I 1985 1990 I - I I

Submarines Nuclear Submarine - - 1" I

I

'1. Returned to the Soviet Union in 1991 as it was on lease. '2. One source (Sh.a?r.a's Ai~alysis, June 1990, Vol.XIlI, No.111, p.241) says only 12 submarines.

Sources 1. Annwl r v t , IC90-91. h,linistry of Defence (New Drlhi, 1991) p.15. 2. M a ~ u s B.Zingrr, Thc Devel~~pmcnt of Indian Naval Strategy since 1971', ContLrnporpry South

Asin o n d o n ) Vo1.2. No.3, 1993, p.344. 3. The Week (Cochin) 7 May, 1995, p.32. 4. SIPRl Year(rook 1988, LVorlJ Arm~immts imd Divrmamrnt (Oxford, 1989) p.229.

Cruisers General purpose C C

Missile destrovers Guided missile DDG

Frieates General purpose FF Guided missile FFG ASW Training FFI

Corvettes Guided missile PCC Anti-submarine PC5

Coastal Forces Fast attack aaft-missile Fast attack craft-gun Offshore Patrol Vessel Large patrol craft

Amphibious forces Landing Ship tank Landing aaft tank Landing aaft utility

Mine warefare forces Fleet mine sweepers Inshore nlinesweepers Total

2

3

1 3 5 -

- - - - - 6

1 2 -

- 8

36

(witli 22 sea

-

5

- 2

14 4

3 -

16 - - 6

- 6 -

10 7

82

Harrier planes)

-

5

- 4

14 3

7 1

12 2 2

12

2 9 7

12 10

El

The Indian Navy acquired another carrier and a nuclear submarine during this period, 13 conventional submarines, 5 destroyers, 21 frigates, 5 corvettes and 15 missile aaft, many of which carried missiles. Along with the above frigates and corvettes there were patrol craft and ships that could be utilised by the Coastal Guard. In keeping with the times, India had become serious about protecting the coastline. However, it was the lease of the nudear power subma-

rine, X.N.S. Chalaa, froln the then Soviet Union in 1983, which went against the concept of a denuclrarized zone and aroused criticisn~ (it was returned in January, 1991) and the carriers wluch aroused queries horn the littoral statessuch

as Indonesia and Australia ." India's intentions were again cded into question as many countries found it hard to equate the build up with the recognisable security concerns of India. Other than the superpowers only India had a size- able naval strength and it beca~ne a matter of concern. What has been called the ideological motivation for the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, was in tune

with India's own subcontinental perspective of security, i.e., India could be free of any problems or fears if the superpowers left the entire area alone and no outside country such as China tlueatened any of the states within the region." Unfortunately, there was rivalry between the superpowers and the Afghan question had brought all these issues to a head. The ideology of proclaiming the Ocean as a Zone of Peace was in keeping with the Third World philosophy of resisting any form of neo-colonial pressure but it held little relevance in the post-1979 era. There was too great a conflict of interests, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan versus the Anle~ican base at Diego Garcia and the Pakistan pro- posal of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone against India's adamant desire to have a

global instead of a regional approach to disarmament and to limit denuclearization of the Indian Ocean to external powers only. Moreover, the proximity to the petroleum-bearing regions of the world made it unavoidable that the America would continue to be based at Diego Garcia. This base with its aircraft and navy had become the pivotal point for the United States strategic

73. Raju G.C.Thomas, T h e Sourccs of Indian Naval Expansion' in Robert H. Bruce, ed.,?he M o r l ~ ~ n Itcrliun A'rruy arid 11!di111l Uam n.71, p.98.

74. Mohammed Ayoob, 'The quest for Autonomy; Ideologies in the Indian Occan Region' in William Dowdy and Russcll B.Tmod, ed.,Tl~r lrtdian h a r t P ~ ~ i u e s o n a Sbategc Arena (Durham, 1985) p32 - 37.

objectives in the Gulf region. After the Afghan crisis, it became with the Rapid Deployn~ent Force based at Diego Garcia, a symbol of their power. The facilities

had been upgraded considerably and aircraft such as the B-52 bombers which

previously could not land there, had by the mid-1980s, been accom0dated.7~

It could service the largest U.S.battle carrier group and twelve warships

could dock in the lagoon enlarged by the Americans at the same time. The base

had the most advanced electronic cenmunication as well. 76 Its use first came

into the public eye with the unsuccessful attempt by the United States to free

the American hostages held by the Iranian revolutionaries in 1980. The Carter

administration's failed effort was denounced vehemently by the littoral coun-

hies including India." Maulitius which had laid claim to Diego Garcia, contin-

ued to press its claim to Diego Garcia, while within the British political system

also there was dissatisfaction with American poli~y.'~ The incident indicated that

Diego Garcia had become a vital part of the United States strategy in the Indian

Ocean Persian Gulf region. Many years later, in 1991, the Gulf crisis in which

the Americans convincingly defeated Iraq's designs seemed to vindicate their

policy of building a strong command there.

India could only deplore their presence and raise the matter in the annual

meetings of the Ad Hoc cou~mitte at the United Nations., but nothing more. The

goal of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace was seemingly unattainable. Above

all the steady growth of India's naval capability testified to the increasing ir- relevance of the concept." Though seminars were held on this issue, the diffi-

culties encountered to ensure that the Indian Ocean be made a Zone of Peace

were insuru~ountable.~ At one point, India's Foreign Minister mentioned that

75. Joel Lirrus. P ~ e g o Grcia: Political Clouds over a Vital US.Base', (Strategic Rrvi~wJ (Waltham, MA) Winter 1982, Vol.10, p.45.

76. Ibid., p.47. 77. FAR, Vo1.26, No.4, April 1980 (New Delhi) p.87. 78. h ~ s , n.74, pp.49-52. 79. From 1311.20 Crows in 1986-87 the expenditure in the Navy increased to Rs.1978 crores in

1990-91. Ail~zutll Rzywrf, 1990-91, Ministry of Defence (New Dclhi) pp.8-9. 80. In 1980 for euample there was one at the India Internatioml centre, New Delhi followed

by meetings at the Non-Aligned Conference.

the concept was still valid and that it was only because it was difficult to resist the pressures of the great powers that it had not materialised.He added that there had been some intangible benefits. It was:

accepted by many nations that if the Indian Ocean is made a Zone of Peace (it might) indeed contribute significantly not only to reduce international tensions but also eliminate one of the major causes for the problems that have arisen between the nations wluch border or lie in the hinterland of these ~ a t e r s . ~ '

Through the 1980 s decade, India held fast to this motion that the removal of external military power would lead to the fruition of the concept. Unfortu- nately, the customary Indian tendency to be more critical of the United States and downgrade the Soviet action did not help the cause. Neither did the su- perpowers agree to reducing their presence. The Pakistan proposal of the Nuclear - Weapons Free Zone was also unpalatable to India because firstly, it was part of their tactic to seek parity in the area and secondly, it was part of their plan

to go along with western non-proliferation nloves on nuclearisation while working all the while towards acquiring nuclear weapons covertly. Thus India supported the Zone of Peace concept because it thought its power position would improve if external powers would leave the region. It also meshed with the policy of non alignment and Tlurd World sentiments." Tlie concept also spelled autonomy for India, as being the largest countly in the region, it could arrogate more powers to itself. The Indian Navy's expansion from coastal du- ties to larger responsibilities was mirrored in the range of ships in its command. It signalled a shift in security thinking in the 1980 s towards a willingness to use military forces to resolve conflicts in neighbouring states and was reflected in the military actions undertaken by India during this period.=

81. P.V.Narasimha Rau, Minister of External Affairs at the Seminar on 11rdi'o1 Ocet~n u Zo11r of Peusr, 20 December, 1980 (India International Centre, New Dclhi, 1981) p.8.

82. Mohammed Ayoob, n.74, p.37. 83. The creation of Bangladesh, the nuclear explosion in 1974 and Operation Bluestar in 1981

tn crush Sikh terrorism were examples of Indira Gandhi's style of politics, while there were the Sri Lankan and the Maldives operiltions in the late 1980's.

Unlike the earlier years, when India's rationale on security perspectives

was virtually absent, the belief that India's concerns extended to neighbouring countries, became more discernible. There was not only recognition that prob-

lems in the neighbouring countries had a serious spillover effect on India, but

that India had to also evolve a clear - cut policy regarding such circumstances.

Rajiv Gandhi as his mother did took certain steps which indicated a military

based policy towards the trouble which occurred in Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

Between 1986 and 1992, the Indian navy saw more action than at any time with

the exception of the Bangladesh war. In 1986, the 1,N.S. Godavari was sent to

South Yemen to evacuate Indian nationals-working in that war-ridden area. This action was repeated duling the Kuwait - Iraq Gulf War, when the Indian

Air Force 'and Air India were pressed into service to rescue Indians in 1991.

India was seriously concerned by events in the Gulf. A majority of the

imn~grants in Kuwait were Indians and the country had excellent relations with

Saddam Hussain's Iraq and the Government was in the unhappy position of

promising to abide by Security Council resolutions which had imposed a block-

ade on Iraq, while suffering all the while the economic burdens imposed by the

sanctions against Iraq." The Gulf crisis demonstrated how India had adapted itself to t l~e changes in the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It had

to take into account the Indian public's outrage with American bombardment

of Iraq when it permitted and then consequently rescinded the refuelling of

planes, but it did not contravene any intelnationally approved resolutions. India's

capabilities to respond to such crises and their resources interested the Ameri-

cans enough to hold joint naval exercises with India later on The crisis brought

11on1e to them, the role India could play in the region." Since 1984 the United States navy had begun visiting India and the nlonlentum to have closer co-

operation between India and United States was developing.' Though a profomla was sent to the concerned embassy, asking for specific infom~ation about t l~e

84. Piyasiri Wickr~masekara, ed., The Gulf Crisis u~rd South Ask, United Nations Development Programme (Geneva, 1993) pp.59-97.

85. In interview with professor Stephen Cohen, December, 1993, Hyderahd. 86. Text of statement, December 2, 1990, FAR (New A,lhi) Vol.36, No.12, p.259.

ships, there was a change in the policy regarding such visits. Between 1972 1984, no U.S.nava1 ship visited Indian ports. Yet no military or naval exerase was conducted during tlus period because it was considered against India's p o l i ~ y . ~ India continued to state that it was against the military presence of-the Great Powers in the Indian Ocean and still desired to implement the Zone of P e a ~ e . ~ But it was an empty, hollow promise. The feeling was steadily growing against the viability of the concept. By the end of the decade, such notions were discarded and were not even considered valid. The Indian navfs expansion

within the span of twenty years, i.e. from 1971-1991 corresponded with the Gandhi duo's vision of India's standing in the region. The United States did not question this, indeed, it recognised India as a power in its own right in the region. By the mid 1980 s, India was referred to as 'the strongest regional nation' in American circlesa9 The Indian navy had to forniulate a perspective in keeping with the countrfs security and foreign policy. Its most crucial function in peacetime was to deter any adventurism. The navy also began to represent the country's ability to cany out political military missions in neiglibouring

countries.

Two major missions which saw the Indian navy in action and indicated this ability took place in Sri Lanka and the Maldives. A major ethnic crisis arose in Sri Lanka during tlie 1980 s in which the Indians became embroiled. The two communities of the island state, the Sinlialas and Tamils, were at war with each other. The Taniil minority accused tlie Sinliala majority of persecution and re-

pression. Their demands for more autonomy for the northern and easteln parts which they wanted to be treated as one unit were resisted by the Sri Lankan

Government and eventually led to a cry for a Taniil 'Eelam' The influential segment of the Tamil separatist moveuient, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelem

87. Lok S~ubhu Ddirrrtes, 2 March, 1988, Vol.XXXV, No.8, 1988, cols 2-4. 8R. Lak Sdl~l ln Dcl,rrtcs, 28 August, 1987, Vol.XXX1, No.71, cols 209-210 89. Document 335, United States, Department of State, A ~ n s r i u ~ i ~ For~igrr Policy Currc~lt &-U-

tneflts 1985(IV~shington D.C., 1986) p.G27. 90. There were many groups demanding autonomy, if not a separate state of them, TULF - The

Tamil United Liberation Front was a moderate party but the Liberation Tamil Tigen of E lam (LTTE) was the most pronment and violent group.

(L'ITE) was moulded under its leader, Prabhakaran into one of the world's

nlmt dedicated and sophisticated forces. His use of terrorist techniques resulted

in relatiatory attacks on the Jaffna peninsula, home to the LTTE, by the

Jayawardene Govemn~ent. The latter's imposition of blockade against Jaffna

was found unacceptable by the Indian Government. India's policy was largely

based on fears that the Tan~ils in India would object to any lack of Indian

initiative or inaction. But there was also an element of the regional policeman

in its policy towards Sri Lanka. Ethnic grievances in neighbouring states almost

always entailed an Indian response and the Sri Lankan crisis was the most

serious one to face India. The growth of the most powerful Tamil organisation, the LITE, was due in part to the M.G.Ramachandran government in Tamil

Nadu's encouragement and to Indira Gandhi's desire to keep him in good

humour. Domestic politics in India was responsible for LlTE's strength because

they were supplied with arms and given training 91 India had always believed

in the integrity of Sri Lanka, but its means were questionable. Some Indian

parliamentarians had brushed aside political solutions to the problem while the

Governn~ent deplored Sri Lanka's indination to go in for a military solution

rather than 'a political s~ lu t ion '~ . The Indian Parliament was the venue where

sonle sabre-rattling took place. In a statement, indicative of India's overarching

concerns, the Minister of External Affairs spoke of the country's worry about a

'growing nlilitaly nexus behveen Pakistan and Sri Lanka following President

Jayawardane's visit to Pakistan in April 1985 and the visit of the President of

Pakistan to Sri Lax~ka. '~~ Besides, there were fears of outside interference. The

Indians continued to advocate a Zone of Peace and were deeply concerned

when the USS Enterprise acconlpanied by 5 United States naval vessels an-

chored at Karachi on 15 March. It was seen as a confirn~ation of the 'significant United States military assistance to Pakistan.'% The American assistance to the

Pakistan navy was at odds with the situation in Afganistan. Items sold such as

91. 1116~1 T d q (New h l h i ) 15 May, 1995, p.53. 92. LIk S&lw Dcl~ntcs, &niands for Gmnts for Ministry of External Affairs 1986-87, on 21

March,1986, Vo1.31, No.3, 19R6. cols.40142. 93. FAR (New Delhi) Vol.32 No.4,1986. p.69. 91. Statement by Minister of External Affairs, B.R. Bhagat in Parliament

FAR (New Dellii) n.91, p.85.

the Harpoon missiles could only be used against India.95 Furthermore, reports that facilities at Gwadar Port in Pakistan were being offered to the United States

only vitiated the atmosphere.%

Without a doubt, the concept of the Zone of Peace could not be imple-

mented without all the countries' cooperation. Morever, it was doubtful whether

India's security needs could be reconaled with the concept." India questioned the discussions going on between SriLanka and the United States over the use of Trincomalee port on the island by he US Kavy and the siting of a Voice of

America station. Such an arrangement would bring the Americans too close to India. Sri Lanka's interest in such a scheme was obviously to offset Indian preponderance. But the use of the port also spelled the virtual collapse of the concept of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of peace wherein no external n~ilitary powers could ply. The Indians were understandably concerned at the proposed American presence and its fall out on the Peace Zone concept. The American Navy was and continues to be the most powerful force in the Indian Ocean and it would be difficult for the Indian Navy to challenge it successfully. Thus when the Tamil problen~ became more bloody and Sri Lanka seemed to be spinning into a civil war, the Indian Government, under Rajiv Gandhi, decided to be take a more active part in the situation.

W l ~ e n riots broke out in July 1983 over the Tamil issue, the Sri Lankan

Govenunent decided to take sterner action. Their purely military approach alien- ated large sections of the Indian Tamil populace and spurred the Indians to take a more direct role in Sri Lanka. Colon~bo resented the Indian reactions and there were reports that President Jayawardane had approached the United States, United Kingdom, Pakistan and Bangladesh to help Sri Lanka against a possible invasion by India.= Such apprehensions were unfounded. It was true that dur-

95. P.V.Narasimha Rao's statement in the Rajyasabha on 12 August, 1983. Asiarr R x o r d ~ r 1983 (New Delhi) p.17360.

96. FAR (New Delhi) n.91, p.85. 97. Senior diplomas as M.A.Vellodi, Former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs have pointed

this out, In i n t e ~ i e w at Madras, 15 March, 1991.

98. A.M.Vohra, 'Indian Peace - keeping in Sri.h&', in Satish Kumar, ed.,Ycurbm>k on Indiu's Foreign Polizy. 195'9 (New Delhi, 1990) p.84.

ing the 1980-1990 decade, India did wax its muscles, but it was with no expan-

sionist aim in mind. Instead it tried to dominate Sri Lanka and rather unpleas-

antly when that was turned back, the Indian Air Force dropped supplies three

days later. By month's end, ships also began to deliver supplies. The Sri Lankans

declared it as a 'violation of independence.'" Not surprisingly, Pakistan and China concurred with them but the Americans did accept the legitimacy of India's role in Sri Lanka.lW It was a clear sign of the general acceptance of India's regional power and served to prod the Sri Lankans into the realisation

that any recipe for success, would of necessity have to include the Indians. The

Indians had openly announced that the continuing ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka

was 'a source of con~ern.'~' The number of refugees who had sought shelter

f ron~ the depredations of the Sri Lanka Army's had grown to 1,30,000 by end

of 1986.'" Their presence was another pressure point for the Indians to act.

Negotiations between India and Sri Lanka led to the signing of the Indo-SriLanka

Accord on July 29, 1987 in Colombo. The accord provided a framework for

satisfying the legitimate aspirations of the Sri Lankan Tamils within a united Sri

Lanka. The Tamils were given an equal status to the Sinhalase and a referen-

dum was to be held in the Eastern province to decide whether the Northern and

Eastern provinces would be pem~anently merged. A general ammesty was

proclain~ed for all those who took of arms aginst the state provided the LTTE surrendered its Arms. The cessation of hostilities was to be monitored and the

Indian A m y would assist in brokering the peace. The Accord was hailed as a

n~ilestone in neighbourly relations and by the United States. Presedent Reagan

acknowledged:

the statesmanship and courage demonstrated by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and the President of Sri Lanka in their

99. hid . 100. Indi~in Exp~ess (Cochin)l2 June, 1987. IOl.lndia, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, India 1988-89, A Rrference Annual

p e w Deihi, 1989) p.658.

102. hid.

efforts to end the ethnic shife ....... 1 have pledged to both leaders our full supportlm

The U.S. provided the Indian forces with data for intervening in the Maldives, clear sign that they accepted the Indian regional dominance. But the Accord soon ran into rough weather. The LlTE leader had been forced by India to acquiesce to it and he had every intention of going against it. His resistance led to the Indian Peace Keeping Force's operations to disarm the LlTE.'"' India was candid that it had secured 'major strategic interests"for itself.loS The Amen-

cans could not get a foothold on the island without India's say (ie, the leasing of the Trincon~alee port could not be considered amongst other things) and the Sri Lankans seemed to have accepted India's power. However nothing could have been farther the truth. Resentment was building up in Sri Lanka about the Indian Army's presence on the Island. The LTTE by far, the most powerful Taxnil faction, were equally antagonistic to India. Within India itself, there were n~isgivings about the turn of events and when fighting broke out, these appre- hensions deepened.lo6 Though the military in its annual report and the Indian Governnient conlniended the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) for its 're- niarkable successes' in containing the LTTE in the Northern and Eastern prov- inces and conlpleting the provincial, Presidential and Parliamentary elections, the truth was that the Indian troops had suffered heavy casualtie~.'~The LTfE, one of the world's great guerilla forces had successfully contained the IPKF.

The new president of Sri Lanka Ranasinghe Prernadasa, capitalised on the anti-Indian feeling in the Island and began to press for the withdrawal of the Indian forces. He began to play a double edged game, co-operating with the LTTE to speed the departure of the Indians.'" He announced at a public rally

103. Document 311. Arn~~icu~t Foreig,r Poliuy, Current Docummts 1987 (Washington D.C., 1988) p.491.

101. Attnuul Kcyort 1987-58, Ministry of Defence (New Delhi, 1988) p.3. 10s. nji,i.

106. Llk SSlta DL+O~<S, August, 1987, Eighth Series, 1987, Vo1.30, No.61, ~01.451. 107. Text of Press Release, 17 Apri1.1989, FAR (New Delhi) Vo1.35, No.4, p.101. 108. In an interview with Chandrika Kumaratunge, President of Sri Lanka, India Toduy

(New Drlhi) 15 b y , 1995.

that he had asked India to withdraw the IPKF by the end of July, 1989 and

several other Ministers of the Government expressed a similar desire.lW The

Indian Government stated that they were 'a little puzzled about the request' and

claimed that after some successes, some Indian troops were already

withdrawing."' The Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, had informed the Army that India would get back but in a way which would preserve the gains achieved."'

But the Sri Lankans became more adamant, with the President declining to

participate in the SAARC.lS1

The death of Indian soldiers also became a focal point in the 1989 General

Elections with the incoming Prime Minister, V.P.Singh promising to withdraw

the troops as soon as possible. He stated as part of his policy on improving

relations with India's neighbours, that Indian troops would be out of Sri Lanka by the end of March, 1990. The Indian exertions in the defence of the Sri Lankan state's integrity were unappreciated by the Sr i Lankans then,"' and the

beating the troops took at the L'ITE hands, were described by Americans as

'India's Vietna~n'."~

The United States had, as stated earlier welcomed the Indian action, giving

its full support to end the ethnic conflict on the Island. Indeed, before the

Accord was signed, the American Administration had supported India's efforts

'to bring the insurgents to the bargaining table so that the long delayed political

negotiations' could be resumed."' It signalled an acceptance of Indian primacy

in the region, an admission which had tacitly been made by the United States

109. FAR (New Delhi) Vo1.35, No.6, 1989, p.162. 110. hid.

111. He made this statement at the Army commanders' conference, 24 April 1989, hid. 112. Text of statement by Official Spokesman, 27June. 1989. FAR (New Delhi) Vo1.35, No.6,

p.167. 113. FAR (New Delhi) Vo1.36, No.3, 1990. p.65. 114. In intenfiew with a Sri Lanliln Professor at ASRC Hyderabad, December, 1993. 115. In interview with Prof. Stephen Cohen, at ASRC, Hyderabad, December, 1993. 116. Michael H.Armacost, 'South Asia and the United States,' h m t m e n t of Stde Bulletin,

July, 1987 (Washington D.C., 1987).

at the end of the mid-1970s. Obviously they were not conce~ned with the loss

of the use of a port such as Tri~~comalee, a signiiicat~t clause in the Accord.

Indeed, it was not just the Adlllinistration but also other political entities

such as the House o i liepresr~~tatives that acclaiuled the Accord."' This acqui-

escence in Indian yre-el~lillcnce in thv region was u~ldoubtedly llattering to

India but it had nlore to do \vith Ameri'an disinterest in Sri Lanka."" Unless

events occurred wllic.11 inlpinged 011 thci~. interests s~cch as their ellergv needs,

or their fight agai~l>t c o ~ l u ~ ~ u ~ r i s ~ l ~ \\'hic.h were seen '15 a direit thceat to their

security, the United St'ltes obviouslv preferred to let things ~ievelup and as

India progressed inevit,~blp to a donlinating position in the region.

This was confinne~l when at the end of 1988, when there was an attempted

coup in the Maldives. A group of hired lnercenaries tcho were behind the

attempt were crushed by t l~c airlifting of Indian troops rushed in at the request

of the Maldivian govvr~ltnent. The Indian govern~nent \\.it11 some justification

stated that it had sa\retl the country iroin being destabilized by outside i o r c e ~ . " ~

The speedy action ul t l~e I I I L ~ ~ , I I I govetn~netlt \\,as univer.;all\~ \velcotncd and 'the

stability in the India11 0c.c.111 rctnained undisturbed'.12" While lndi'i yaw it as a

demonstration of ho\v co~l~ltri~, . ; helped e x h other in ihr 5.IARC region, others

were obviously ~nlore \v.~I.v. \,\:lien there ivas a dea~iluik on the Indo-Nepalese

trade and transit ,>.g~.ccrnent,'~l ~ l t d 1nd1r1 took retali,~to~.\; steps there {tere accu-

sations in Pakistan thClt ltidi.1 I~dd begi111 to behave like an inlperial country.lu

Although the A~ileric~ln Consress 1\~'1s unsparing in criticis~il the ad~~linistration

-- - - .-

I . 1 1 1 I t : , \ ' I 3 h . . ' I X Aug~.yt,l 'JX7, co1.502.

118. Dilicsh Singh btatcd i n 111~. L L ~ 5abh.1 t h a ~ f11r the i i s t tiliic. India's p~.c-elnin~nt position was uniucrsally ~ c k ~ i ~ ~ w l r ~ d g ~ ~ d . l o k 5 . r l r k r l)L~;,.~fc.~ Vo1.30, Nu.65. 11 August. 1987, co1.466.

119. B.R.Bhagat'.; statc~n<.nl's in i h ~ ~ Lc~k %hha l ~ > k S'II~/Z~I l)L,l,#~fc,.<, 26 AtviI , 1989, Vol.49, No.37, col.;.398-399.

120. Text of Press R~blca..c. 11)89. 1 ;iK (h'c\v Di.lIii) n.107, pp.101-102. 121. Thc 1950 trildc and ir.lnsil ,igt.~.i.rn~mt whiili g ~ ~ v c r n c d thc ino\vrnr.~it.s uf gc~ocls and other

stuff had expir~%l atid Nc>l>.ll . ~ c e u r ~ d 1ndi.1 of stifling. 122. H.M. Patel qut)tcd thih rlcsiril~ti~in fnon the Economist, Ittk .5$ii,1 1B~l*lfr?;, 16 April, 19x9,

vcd.4'), h'0.37, ~~11,4111.

was non-cornmital. The treatment of Nepal seemed to be an example of India's

'inaeased disposition to lean on its sulaller neighbour'.Iu

Definitely India had begun to assuu~e more autholity in the region and

other than the uiandatory resolution on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace in

the United Nations being passed, there was little or no effect to convene the

conference on this is,ue. Intleed, by the end of the decade, these seemed to be

an unspoken agreeulent about the non-viability of this concept. The issue of the

Indian Ocean and the continuance of the Diego Garcia base which had been a

security irritant between Indian and the United States had become a point where

their interests could converge. In this one area where the two countries came

into direct contact, a new realisation had emerged. India could not wish away

the Anlerican base anti CentColn conlnland at Diego Garcia nor the sizeable

and more powerful plpscnce o l the United States navy which far surpassed the

Indian navy.lu And llie U~iitetl States could not depreciate the role of India in

safeguarding the stabilit~. of the region and the Indian Navy in providing tech-

nical support to the IPKF in Sii Lanlta and intercepting and capturing the

mercemaries on the illaldives I?'. In fact, even earlier, most govemnlents, being

linked by aid and trade to either or both the Soviet Union or and the United

States, did not make too much of a fuss about their presence lZ6. Most of the

govemnients were bezinning ., to favour alms control measures rather than a demilitarized zone."-

The tacit acceptance of each other's role was again in evidence during the

Gulf war. The Diego Garcia base was a major element in the battle waged by

the United States against Iraq. It was used both for naval and air support and senred as a strategic unit in the Pentagon's network of satellite surveillance over Iraq. In fact, the base has become crucial for most of the con~munication and

123. Kux, n.36, p.415.

124. The Dicgo Garcia b.i-e c a n launch 8-52 strategic bombcrs, F-117 Stealth fighters, F-16 Falcons, F-15 Eagle f i - i l c r z .lnJ Cmisc Missiles from the bombcrs as well.

125. FAR (New Delhi) n. I:, p.lUi>.

126. R e p i on tlw 111do-At,:; : i L . i ~ l 7;r.d' Fcncc: n.13, p.73. 127. n1;d.

spying of the United States in Asia and Africa. The hi-tech Gulf war was

conducted by utilising the facilities at Diego Garaa and indicated how stxate-

gically vital it was to Au~erican security interests.

President Reagan had rejected the articles of the U.N.Corlference on the

Law of the Sea, stating that Ail~erican private enterprise would be stymied by

the provisions for deep-sea inining in international waters.129 Obviously, this

could not be to the liking oi developing countries who have felt that the devel-

oped countries continue to have a virtual monopoly in this technology from awhich valuable poly~netallic nodules are derived. But with the convention in

force Third World countries could benefit quite considerably.

Conclusion

The Indian Ocean area had acquired enormous econon~ic and strategic

significance over the years. The proximity of oil, uranium, gold and other

mineral rich lands to the subcontinent had lent an additional inlportailce to the

ongoing superpower conflict. The invasion of Afghanistan vitiated the atmo-

sphere. At the start of the 1980 s decade, the Indian Ocean had become an area

of acute tension. The naval forces of the superpowers as well as of former

colonial powers such as France and of littoral countries as India itself dealt a

virtual death blow tto the conccpt of the Indian'Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The

concept was an assertion u i 'Third World belief and an expression of idealistic

desire. The increase of u~ilitarisation, consequently meant the end of such ide-

alism. India's own operations in Sri Lanka and the Maldives represented its growing strength in the region. The U.S.'s recognition of India's regional domi-

nance which was notcri during the adlninistxation of Reagan,130 had given rise

128. Tapan Das 'Diego Ccirci~: Forebodings Colnc True', TJu Hindu (Madns) 25 March.1991. 129. S.N.Kohli, 'Indian 0cc.m: an 2r.d of pension and big power pressurn', Indian Quarterly

(New Delhi) Vol.XLl1. N11.2, April-June, 1986, p.163. 130. In 1987, Richard Armit~ge, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense in the U.S, wferred to

Indian as a 'regional superpower.' Stephen cuhen, 'South Asia after the Cold War: Impli- cations for U.S. policy.' Papcr presented at course on India and the Us.:Reassessment, Relignrnent, Rcnewal at American Studies Research Centre, Hyderabad, Dcccmber 1992, p.16.

to the joint naval exercises had between India and the U.S. in the early 1990's.

The onset of such collaboration could be traced to a wholly pragmatic approach

in relations between India and the U.S. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan was too uncou~fortably close to Inilia, and the latter needed the assistance of the

US, which was in control of u~ultilateral financial institution^.'^^ This need

coincided with the American policy of reducing Indian dependence on the Soviet

Union. The Reagan ad~ninistration began to practice 'a strategy of cooption' which combined elelnents oi containment, appeasement and alliance.'32 Such a

policy was deemed In.cessal\. to deal with a state having significant ulilitary or

political resources which cc)uld hinder or further American interests.'33

The area which had bee^^ vie\veil as a syulbol of the divergence of inter-

ests between a Third \Vi)rl~i ;t,Ite such as India and a developed country such

as the U.S. was gradi~,~lly becoming a region wherein both could collaborate.

The evolution of a reallst approach in Indo-U.S. relations was lilost clearly

visible in the Indian Ocean context. The period under survey, the 1980 s, saw

the decline of idealism. A \.irt~lal death blow was dealt to the concept of the

Indian Ocean as a ZVIIL' of peace by the increase of u~ilitarisation in the region

At the beginning of the dccacle, the superpowers continued to coulpete with

each other while India and the other littoral countries reiterated their objections

to their presence. But by thV erlld of the decade ait seemed thaf this concept born

of Third World senti~nents IGCIS not viable. •

131. Dcnnis Kux. 132. Stephen p.Cohen, 'India's Ro:d in the new gl~lbal order. An American pespective', Paper

distributed at the coui3e. n.134, p.14. 133. Il~id.