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LEIBNIZS IDEALISM AND HUSSERLS MONADOLOGY
A Dissertation Presented
by
Michael Kook Shim
To
The Graduate School
in Partial Fulfillment o f the
Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctorate o f Philosophy
in
Philosophy
State University of New York
at Stony Brook
May, 2003
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State University of New York at Stony Brook
The Graduate School
Michael Shim
We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the
Ph.D. degree, hereby recommend acceptance of the dissertation.
(Dissertation Co-Director)Donn Welton ProfesssorDepartment of
Philosophy
(y 'i'i / T*) v 'C iManfred Baum (Dissertation Co-Director)
ProfessorDepartment of Philosophy Bergische Universitat Wuppertal,
Germany
(Chairperson of Committee) Jeffery Edwards Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Robert Crease ProfessorDepartment of Philosophy
This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School.
The Graduate School
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Abstract of the Dissertation
Leibnizs Idealism and Husserls Monadology
by
Michael Kook Shim
Ph.D. in Philosophy
State University o f New York
At Stony Brook
2003
The dissertation deals with the historical and philosophical
relationship between Leibniz and Husserl. The historical focus
concerns Husserls own interpretation and understanding of Leibniz
as inferred from his logical writings, as well as his appropriation
o f the Leibnizian locutions, monad and monadology. The
philosophical concern deals with the relationship between
epistemology and phenomenology.
In the first portion o f the paper, I address the problems of
Leibnizs conceptualism. Towards remedying some of the well-known
problems with his conceptual metaphysics, I refer to his largely
neglected (in Anglo-American scholarship) writings in epistemology
and the philosophy o f mind. I contend Leibniz does provide a
theory of non-conceptual content to compensate for some o f the
pitfalls o f his conceptualism.
In the second portion o f the paper, I argue for the claim that
Husserls own works in philosophical logic and epistemology may be
characterized as Leibnizian. I provide historical documentation in
support of my view that Husserl enjoyed, in fact, a fairly
sophisticated familiarity with Leibnizs metaphysics, which he
relied upon in the development o f what he calls formal ontology. I
then provide an explanation o f the development o f phenomenology
as the discipline concerned primarily with taking care of the sort
of non-conceptual content indicated by the limits o f Leibnizs
metaphysics. In this light, I go on to provide an explanation o f
Husserls own phenomenological monadology.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction. 1I. LEIBNIZ CONCEPTUAL METAPHYSICS 9
1. The Complete Concept 91.1. Propositional Subj ect 101.2.
Individuation 171.3. Identity 211.4. Concept and Actuality 28
2. Compossibility and Existence 312.1. Essence and Existence
322.2. Relations 39
3. From Concept to Monad 443.1. Concepts and Forces 463.2.
Illusory Dialectic o f Forces 513.3. Monad 58
II. CONCEPT AND ESSENCE 634. Leibniz Idealism 63
4.1. Apperception 654.2. Conceptualism 704.3. Essence and
Exigency 774.4. Exigency and Existence 834.5. Confusion and
Sensation 85
5. From Concepts to Content 905.1. Concepts 925.2. Essence
1015.3. Evidenz 1145.4. Noesis and Noema 1225.5. Hyletic Data
1305.6. From Ego to Monad 133
III. MONADOLOGY 1386. Body and Unity 138
6.1. Ontological Simplicity of the Monad 1396.2. Unity 1416.3.
Monadic Embodiment and Substantial Chain 147
7. Monadic Embodiment 1527.1. Towards a Phenomenological
Monadology 1537.2. The Dual-Aspect View 1567.3. The Functional
Roles of the I-Can 1617.4. Constitutive Circuit 1667.5. The
Objective Self 1737.6. 77ze Concrete Ego Taken In Full Concreteness
1757 .7 .1 and Mine 176
Conclusion. 181Bibliography. 188
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Introduction.In the tradition o f Husserl scholarship, there
have been numerous works that deal
with the relationship between Husserlian phenomenology and its
perceived historical predecessors. The motivation behind such works
ranges from the pedagogical to the systematic. By juxtaposing
Husserl beside better known historical figures, more recognizably
philosophical framework allows for contrasts that can help
illuminate aspects o f Husserlian phenomenology as directed towards
particular epistemological, ontological or methodological aims
established in advance by the classical authors at issue.
Systematically viewed, such contrasts aid us in better appreciating
the critical force o f phenomenology by allowing us to articulate
arguments otherwise barely discernible in Husserls own writings. In
his numerous allusions to, and in lectures as well as critical
remarks on philosophical precedents, such an historical approach is
one encouraged by Husserl himself.1
In this exegetical tradition, the focus has rested on three
figures from the early modem era: namely, Descartes, Hume and Kant.
The appeal o f Descartes2 is the most obvious. As the discoverer of
the modem conception o f subjectivity and consciousness along
strict methodological prescriptions and epistemological criteria,
Cartesianism readily lends itself to invocation for not only
clarifying but, to a large extent, justifying the execution o f the
methodological cornerstone of Husserlian phenomenology: the so-
called epoche. As the culmination o f British empiricism, and the
primary philosophical reference o f late 19th and early 20th
century scientific positivism, Hume serves as a kind of muster for
descriptive accounts of the emergence and development o f
cognitively high-grade concepts in raw sensational experiences. But
the greatest historical temptation has been and remains the founder
o f transcendental philosophy, the way out of both Cartesian
dualism and Humean skepticism: Kant.3
Not only does Husserl especially later in his career, in moments
that can only be described as betraying a sharp anxiety o f
influence frequently invoke Kant, but his very terminological
choices resonate the Kantian vocabulary, encouraging the view that
historically Husserl may best be appreciated as a kind o f
latter-day Kantian. However, upon closer inspection, even Husserls
uses o f Kantian-sounding terms like Anschauung, Apperzeption,
Begriff, Erfahrung, transzendentale Subjektivitat, etc., tend to
suggest that either Husserl was an especially bad reader o f Kant
or he should not be considered especially Kantian at all. For
example, all levels (from the empirical to the eidetic) o f
Anschauung for Husserl are conceptually saturated precisely in
opposition to Kants definition o f that term. For Husserl,
Apperzeption need have nothing to do with self-consciousness.
Begriff, for Husserl, is inextricably tied up with Wesen or Essenz.
Erfahrung is an intentional derivative o f what Husserl considers
the more fundamental Erlebnis. Since Husserl denies himself
anything constructive like the transcendental deduction, what he
means by transzendentale Subjektivitat can enjoy little
clarification by recourse to Kants conception.
1 Until the publication of Einfuhrung in die Philosophie, volume
35 of the Husserliana, the two volumes of Erste Philosophie remain
exemplary of this encouragement.2 For a recent book-length
historical study, see: P.S. Mcdonald, Descartes and Husserl.3 There
have been numerous comparative studies o f Kant and Husserl, but
the standard remains Iso Kerns Husserl und Kant.
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In the following, I would like to try out a different historical
venue. Instead of ancestrally framing Husserlian phenomenology in
the context o f Cartesian apodiciticity, Humean psychologism or
Kantian transcendental philosophy, I would like to review various
aspects o f Husserlian phenomenology in light o f Leibniz
philosophy. At face value, since Leibniz has been traditionally
viewed as the wildest o f speculative metaphysicians and a gross
conceptual reductionist to boot, such historical recourse may
appear anathema to anything like the phenomenological project.
After all, Husserlian phenomenology has been at the vanguard of the
critical dismissal of traditional metaphysics that largely
characterizes 20th century philosophy. Moreover, the orientation o
f phenomenology around the description o f self-evident experiences
must be considered diametrically opposed to the sort o f
overwhelming conceptualism of Leibniz logically- rooted
metaphysics. Yet, not only does Husserl often invoke Leibniz in
glowing terms, and develop his theory of the concrete ego and
intersubjectivity in the language of Leibniz monadology, but there
is also well-documented evidence o f H usserls deep and
sophisticated familiarity with Leibniz philosophy as a whole.
In his report delivered at the 1966 International Leibniz
Congress, H.L. van Breda notes three distinct phases of Leibniz
influence on the development o f Husserls phenomenology. The first
period (1887-1897) is concentrated on Leibniz conception of logic
and mathesis universalis. The second period (1897-1905) is oriented
around Leibniz Nouveaux essais, which, van Breda claims, may have
served as counter-weight to Husserls preoccupation with the
empiricists during this period. I n fact, van Breda goes so far as
to suggest that Husserls study of the New Essays could have very
well been the birth-hour for his own philosophy of reflection.4
Finally, between 1910 and 1925, Husserls interest in Leibniz is
focussed on the Monadology, guiding Husserls own monadological
reconception o f the concrete ego and the development o f his
theory o f intersubjectivity. And, in a letter to Dietrich Mahnke,
Husserl even baldly refers to himself as a Leibnizian.5 The point o
f my project is to figure out what this allegiance to Leibniz m ay
h ave m eant t o H usserl, a nd m ay mean f or h ow w e s hould u
nderstand Husserlian phenomenology.
The most obvious aspect of Husserls Leibnizian allegiance comes
across in his logical writings, typified by the following from 60
of the Prologomena, where Husserl writes: Among the great
philosophers, to whom the conception o f logic presented here
recurs... we stand relatively closest to [Leibniz]. Yet, it is in
Formal and Transcendental Logic, the presentation o f his more
mature views on logical issues, that Husserls Leibnizianism is most
clearly evident. The key is to focus on what Husserl from t his p
eriod c alls formal o ntology, and t o i nterpret f ormal o ntology
i n t erms o f Husserls theory of concepts. The second aspect o f
Husserls Leibnizian allegiance is to be discerned in Husserls
adaptation of Leibniz language o f the monadology. The purpose o f
my project is to clarify both these aspects and figure out whether
there is an inherent connection between these two aspects o f
Husserls Leibnizianism. To this end, I propose the following three
theses on Husserl:
(HI) In his logical writings Husserl endorses an especially
stringent form of non- foundational conceptualist epistemology that
is, among the philosophical precedents with which Husserl was most
familiar, closest in design and purpose to that o f Leibniz. As
4 H.L. van Breda. Leibniz EinfluB auf das Denken Husserls, 142.5
As reported by Cristin and Sakai in their Einfuhrung to
Phanomenologie und Leibniz.
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opposed to the sort o f Brentanian psychologism characteristic o
f his Philosophie der Arithmetik, the mature Husserl conceives o f
knowledge and truth along the principles of identity and
non-contradiction centered on the propositional form. In this
light, I propose to ascribe to Husserl three correlated
philosophical positions that amount to what I will call the no
windows-clause. First, in his epistemology Husserl promotes a kind
o f eliminativist theory o f reference. For Husserl an object
devoid o f predicate-concepts is a formally empty Etwas uberhaupt,'
which is epistemologically irrelevant though intentionally
responsive. Otherwise, a true proposition does not causally relate
to a reference but relate rationally to other true propositions.
Second, Husserls theory o f truth may be characterized as a
coherentism. Because Husserl denies direct causal contact between
thoughts and things, the truth of a proposition is guaranteed not
by the object itse lf b u t b y consistency with o ther p
ropositions articulated o f the same object. Third, because like in
Leibniz, such a theory o f truth is sufficient only for probable
truth, the epistemic strength o f such truth per coherence is left
in contrast to demonstrative truths o f formal ontology, synthetic
but a priori truths o f so-called regional ontologies (of nature,
geometry, lived body and consciousness), as well as reflexively
self- evident or apodictic propositions pertaining to immanent
noetic, hyletic and noematic data. And, like in Leibniz, the
veridical brakes of coherence are to be found in assent from
cognitively compatible interlocutors. This latter search for
veridical brakes, I will go on to argue, is the origin of Husserls
concerns with the issue of intersubj ectivity.
(H2) Based on my review in (HI), I go onto characterize the
emergence o f Husserlian phenomenology as motivated by the
inadequacies o f conceptualist epistemology. In this sense, as
Husserl himself frequently claims, phenomenology is a critical
enterprise. But critical in this sense does not amount to a
rejection. The point I try to make in (HI) is that Husserl fully
embraces conceptualism in his theories of (empirical) knowledge and
truth. When, in moments o f almost dogmatic rational optimism,
Husserl talks about the contact b etween Vemunft and Wirklichkeit,
the negotiation o f that contact is an entirely conceptual affair.
For Husserl, a scientific theory evolves towards a complete or
adequate account o f actuality by little more than internal
coherence between quantitatively ever-increasing number o f
propositions that make up the theory. However, concepts alone are o
f course proverbially empty: they do not suffice for the provision
o f material content. Phenomenology is the attempt to make
intelligible by eidetic description what Husserl calls
pre-predicative or, as I prefer, extra-conceptual experience.
Consequently, Husserl needs to draw a sharp distinction between
concepts and what he calls essences.
Viewed in this way, we can feel immediately the stress to which
French phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty and Derrida have been
most sensitive. In fact, I think the evolution o f Husserlian
phenomenology from a static phase to a genetic and, later,
generative phases may be read as a story o f Husserls attempt to
deal with this stress. The stress can be summarized briefly as
follows: since what can count as intelligible or epistemologically
relevant must be conceptually saturated, how can Husserl claim to
make intelligible what is stipulated to be extra-conceptual?
Critically viewed in Heideggerian language, we might say Husserls
epoche enables him to say what he must incessantly deny. Or, as
Derrida has put it, Husserl seems to wind up having to write under
erasure.
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In static phenomenology, it is customary to speak of Husserls
formalization of the extra-conceptual. Husserl treats as serving
conceptual roles what are, o f themselves, not conceptual at all.
On my reading, Husserls formalization follows from a two-fold
strategy. First, the eidetic singularity of intentionality is made
intelligible by articulation into its abstract moments. Despite his
incessant talk o f intentionality, Husserl r arely t alks a bout i
ntentionality a s s uch. Instead, h e p refers t o t alk a bout t
he various abstract moments o f intentionality: e.g., ego, cogito,
cogitationes, cogitata, noesis, hyle, noema, etc. I think this
tendency to avoid dealing with intentionality as such should not be
construed an oversight but, to his credit, as Husserls observation
of systematic consistency. Based on the strength o f his own
arguments, I want to say that for Husserl there is nothing like a
concept of intentionality as such. Unlike empirical, regional and
categorical concepts (for example, respectively, yellow, scalene
triangle, unity), there is no discrepancy between an eidetic
instance o f intentionality and its essence. And thats because
there is no general concept that may be satisfied by eidetic
variation. Whenever I am in an intentional state (i.e., whenever I
am conscious at all) Ive exhausted the essence o f intentionality.
Further, unlike the concepts of empirical, regional and categorical
judgments, there is no normative force to intentionality. One
cannot be accused of doing intentionality wrong. Insofar as I m
conscious at all, I do it right every time. In contrast, despite
the concrete eidetic singularity o f each intentional act each
unique like a droplet o f water or, more famously, a snowflakethe
moments o f intentionality may be abstracted and generalized. But
when thus generalized, as I will argue, we wind up back to the
business o f concepts. It is precisely because o f these
abstractable conceptual moments of intentionality that the talk of
intentionality may be made intelligible at all.
Second, another singular and conceptually incorrigible element
is what Husserl calls hyletic data. Why hyletic data may be
construed singular and extra-conceptual may be illustrated as
follows. Lets imagine a color-spectrum invert who is conceptually
normal. For the invert, what would appear to a hyletically normal
person as red appears as green. However, because he is conceptually
normal, when he sees green he applies concepts associated with red
and conversely; thus, he would be as successful w ith color
concepts as any hyletically normal p erson. S hould a hyletically
normal person be able to get into the inverts head, the hyletic
norm can tell the invert that hes doing it wrong. But of course one
cant get into another persons head. Consequently, not only is the
invert incorrigible, but we couldnt even diagnose the invert as
somehow defective or abnormal. Nevertheless, we can conceive o f
such abnormality. Such singular, private and conceptually
incorrigible elements o f experience are what Husserl calls hyletic
data. In turn, Husserl proposes to formalize hyletic data with a
functionalist account. In themselves, hyletic data are meaningless
or epistemologically irrelevant, but they are as Husserl calls
itthe stu ff with which we constitute the (noematic) meaning of
(empirical) objects.
(H3) Though epistemologically irrelevant, singular acts o f
intentionality and hyletic stu ff are of course, in a sort o f
ontological sense, everything. It is, what Merleau-Ponty calls the
primordial silence o f being: silent, because, as such,
conceptually inarticulable. In the 1920s, Husserl adopts Leibniz
language of monadology to talk about what he calls the concrete ego
in its full concreteness. As I understand it, Husserls use o f the
term monad is his attempt both to compensate for
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the formal emptiness o f conceptually reducible abstract moments
o f otherwise singular intentional acts, as well as to reintegrate
the conceptually irreducible content o f hyletic data. Thus viewed,
Husserls monad does capture everything but then winds up risking
intelligibility. Aside from the effect of desperate hand waving
through what Maurice Natanson calls the phenomenologists infinite
task of nominalist descriptions, the stress o f having to
articulate by means o f concepts under erasure is simply
exacerbated. To mitigate this risk, I think it helpful to examine
Husserls monadology with recourse to the motivation o f Leibniz
original formulation.
To fully appreciate the two aspects of Husserls Leibnizianism, I
begin by providing a global synopsis o f Leibniz metaphysics. My
reconstruction is extensive because o f t he e normous i nfluence
exerted o n 2 0th c entury Leibniz s cholarship b y t he
groundbreaking works o f Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat. Due
to this influence, their common view may be considered the standard
position and can be summarized neatly by Couturats claim that
Leibnizs metaphysics rests solely upon the principles of his Logic,
and proceeds entirely from them.6 The upshot of this position is
that Leibniz is not entitled to draw any distinction between causes
and reasons and, correlatively, between will and understanding, and
things or substances and their complete concepts, etc. Now, both
Russell and Couturat promote a critical interpretation: they do not
say Leibniz himself did not observe the related set o f
distinctions, only that these distinctions do not make any sense
given the strength o f Leibniz arguments. As Benson Mates correctly
points out,7 regardless o f whether or not he is entitled to them,
Leibniz definitely wanted to maintain the relevant
distinctions.
However, I think both Russell and Couturat wind up with a
somewhat exaggerated logical reductionist interpretation. On point
of historical accuracy, Russells virulent suppression o f Leibniz
concerns with epistemology and the philosophy o f mind is
especially egregious. According to Russell, the esoteric or genuine
Leibniz is the author o f the Discourse on Metaphysics', that is,
the Leibniz o f the so-called middle period. On Russells view,
works like the Theodicy, the Nouveaux essais, as well as the
Monadology are all exoteric works o f a courtier designed to win
favors, as Russell puts it, especially from princesses. Given the
fact that the Theodicy was found offensive by most o f Leibniz
contemporaries, if it were to be construed a work o f a politician,
we would have to conclude that Leibniz was not much o f a
politician at all. The fact that the Nouveaux essais was never
published should also give us pause from thinking it a work o f
political winks and nudges.
On my interpretation, especially the Nouveaux essais (and other
texts from this period) must be considered central to any adequate
understanding o f Leibniz philosophy as a whole. In my view,
Leibniz general metaphysics or ontologythe theory of possible
beings as such cannot be understood without Leibniz special
metaphysics, or natural theology and pneumatology. Thats because
Leibniz ontology would be formally empty of material content. And
there is simply no other text by Leibniz than the Nouveaux essais
that provides a thoroughgoing discussion o f the issues o f special
metaphysics. In this light, I want to argue, not only was Leibniz
entitled to the relevant distinctionsbetween cause and reason, will
and understanding and, above all, between
6 Couturat. Logique de Leibnizi, x.7 Mates. Leibniz, 50.
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things and conceptsbut was compelled to maintain them. In
support o f my argument, I offer the following three theses on
Leibniz:
(LI) Empirical concepts definitive of the individual identity o
f any substance enjoy meaning only relative to the complete concept
o f that substance. When we say o f Alexander that he is a king,
the generality o f the concept king can be illuminated by its
applicability to other individuals of which that predicative may be
true. For example, Solomon is a king. But precisely because o f
this generality, Leibniz in the Discourse calls such predicatives
accidental, meaning thereby that they do not suffice for
individuation. But later in the Discourse, Leibniz writes: some may
ask, from whence it is that this man would assuredly sin? The
answer is easy, since otherwise he would not be this man. For God
sees at all times that there would be a certain Judas, whose
concept or idea of whom God has, contains this future free act (G
IV 455). Despite their generality, the removal o f just one
accidental predicative from the complete concept o f an individual
substance can disrupt the identity o f that substance.
Consequently, Leibniz winds up denying the reality o f accidental
predicates: forLeibniz, all truly ascribable predicates are
essential. I argue in Chapters 1 and 2 that this position, dubbed
super-essentialism by Fabrizio Mondadori, entails what I call
hypernominalism. On my hyper-nominalist interpretation, all
empirical concepts for Leibniz are singular and not general. If the
concept king can truly be ascribed to Alexander, then the very
meaning of this concept would be relative to the complete concept
unique to Alexander. And in terms of empirical concepts, I fully
endorse Russells thesis: remove the empirical predicates true o f a
substance then we wind up with no individual substance.
However, Leibniz retains the generality o f both categorical
and, for the lack o f a better term, what may be described as
pneumatological concepts. Thus Leibniz can say things like All
substances possess... categorical concepts like unity,
individuality, but also pneumatological-concepts like perception
and appetition, etc. Because of this diversity in scope between
singular (empirical) concepts and general concepts, we may speak of
a diversity in levels between empirical propositions and
metaphysical propositions in Leibniz. Based on this diversity, I
want to say that Leibniz talk of complete concepts pertains only to
empirical concepts combined in the individuation of singular
substances. In contrast, categorical and pneumatological concepts
pertain to substances in general. Thus, against Russell: take away
the complete concept o f a substance and you still have something
left, only that its no longer individuating. In Chapter 3, I argue
for a closer examination o f Leibniz epistemology and philosophy of
mind to best understand such general, metaphysical concepts
pertinent to all substances.
(L2) In Chapter 4, I go on to discuss Leibniz idealism. I begin
by quickly dispatching attempts to reconcile the Leibnizian kind o
f idealism with the phenomenal sort promoted by Berkeley. Since for
Leibniz there are abstract ideas and concepts somehow more real
than sensational appearances, Leibniz could not have viewed
phenomena as epistemologically and ontologically fundamental. On
the other hand, Leibniz also cannot be considered a strictly
conceptual idealist and, thus, a kind of forerunner to Hegel
either. Instead, even at the most basic level, Leibniz must admit
as de facto irreducible non-conceptual elements. I argue that such
concern with the extra- conceptual can be best gleaned in Leibniz
talk of primitive truths offa c t such as ones own existence, that
one enjoys various thoughts and phenomena, ones own power, etc.
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The point I want to make is that such measures are Leibniz
attempts to compensate for the formal emptiness of his otherwise
strict conceptualism. In Chapter 5, I gear my discussion o f (HI)
to let Husserl critically clarify the limits o f such conceptualism
and to open up the discussion o f what may be considered
extra-conceptual.
(L3) When the term monad is first introduced in 1695, Leibniz
characterizes it as the unity of simple, ideal and soul-like
substance (which is how the monad is generally understood) with
primitive passive power or materia prima. In Chapter 6 I tackle
recent discussions of this aspect in Leibniz metaphysics. Against
the grain, I argue for the shift o f focus from trying to come up
with reasonable ontological explanations of this characterization o
f the Leibnizian monad to an epistemological explanation. Because
Leibniz claims that the body is the source o f all confused
sensations, yet that we can know with certainty that we undergo
confusion, it seems to me Leibniz winds up having to claim that we
can know with certainty that we have a body. What we cannot know
with equal epistemological strength is that the body we
subjectively and irreducibly experience is that body we objectively
perceive. Thereby, I propose a kind of dual-aspect view
interpretation of the Leibnizian monad: from my subjective
perspective, I not only enjoy the exercise o f activity but suffer
the consequences o f passivity as well. And, insofar as I am a
finite creature, this dual-aspect experience of presumably the same
substance is inevitable and, therefore, as certain as any tmth o f
fact can be. What I want to say is that, in his own uses o f the
term monad, Husserl may have been the first to see this dual-aspect
view of the monad at work in Leibniz original formulation.
Accordingly, Husserls Leibnizian allegiance may be spelled out
as follows. In his formal ontology, Husserl embraces the
epistemological consequences o f Leibnizian conceptualism. The
limitations o f such conceptualism in dealing with singularity and
hyletic data motivate the phenomenological reduction. Under the
reduction, it becomes possible to restore and reform Leibniz talk
of spontaneity in terms of constitution. Epistemological activism
is articulated by analyzing the role o f concepts in the
constitution of meaning. Husserls maintenance o f intentional
diversity at every step o f analysis helps him avoid the collapse o
f concepts and objects, while the abstractable conceptual moments o
f intentionality allows him a certain latitude o f generality.
Intelligibility or intellectual shareability is thereby preserved
in the phenomenological analysis o f consciousness. In a sense, we
may think o f phenomenology as the project o f reintegrating
concerns with subjective or mental concerns into the conceptual
scheme of objective scientific discourse without, however, risking
naturalism or material reductionism. A t the same time, rather than
claim some Aufhebung or reconciliation between concepts and the
extra-conceptual on the basis o f such reintegration, by allowing
intentionality its eidetic singularity and admitting the passive
meaninglessness of hyletic data, Husserl retains the
extra-conceptual. This segregation without reconciliation,
precisely like in Leibniz, is articulated as the inevitable unity
from the first-person perspective of conceptual distinctness and
sensational confusion, o f activity and passivity, o f the
constituting lived body and the constituted corporeal entity. And,
exactly following Leibniz, Husserl calls this epistemological
diversity unified in the first person perspective the monad. In
this light, as the concrete ego in its full concreteness, the monad
may be viewed as the integrated system of general concepts,
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the eidetic singularity of their application in intentional acts
o f constitution, and the lived body as the source of hyletic
data.
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1. The Complete ConceptBroadly speaking, there have been three
dominant strategies in the 20th century
for interpreting Leibniz metaphysics. The most influential
approach in the Anglo- American world remains the
logical-reductionist strategy as promulgated by Bertrand Russell
and Louis Couturat at the turn of the century. According to this
model, Leibniz metaphysics may be more or less reduced as a
consequence o f Leibniz subject-predicate logic. The other two
approaches may both be traced to Ernst Cassirers Leibniz System in
seiner wissenschaftlichen Grundlage, a work contemporary with
Russells and Couturats. Especially strong in France as represented,
for example, by Martialt Guerault, Michel Serres and, more
recently, Gilles Deleuze has been the emphasis on Leibniz dynamics.
Under this strategy one points out that Leibniz himself thought of
his restoration and reformation of the scholastic doctrine of
substantial forms with recourse to physical forces; and, therefore,
that Leibniz substance metaphysics may to a great extent be
extracted from his dynamics. The third approach is to place
emphasis on Leibniz doctrine o f the Ego, which grounds Leibniz
very conception o f substance on his epistemological and
psychological conceptions of the self.
In the following, I would like to promote the view that Leibniz
had two metaphysical systems, which are logically independent o f
one another though not mutually exclusive. My two system
interpretation may be won by strengthening a set of distinctions
that is all too frequently overlooked. Because Leibniz himself was
messy and careless about these distinctions, accusing Leibniz o f
having conflated the propositional subject, the complete concept
and substance itself, remains a persistent temptation. Historically
viewed, it is clear that Leibniz himself never intended such a
conflation. But the problem is whether he is systematically
entitled to maintain the distinctions he does indeed draw. I will
argue that Leibniz is entitled to these distinctions, but only by
paying the price of rejecting Leibniz intended derivation of
substance metaphysics from his dynamics.
The first kind of metaphysics is metaphysics understood in the
broad sense, which may be described as conceptualist. The scope o f
Leibniz conceptualist metaphysics is open to the entire expanse of
the realm of possibilities or Gods understanding. Conceptualist
metaphysics is close to traditional metaphysics and, therefore,
congenial to logical-reductionist interpretations. In (1.1), I will
reconstruct Leibniz conceptualist metaphysics by beginning with
Leibniz intensional interpretation of subject-predicate logic then
proceeding to the determination of the best o f all possible
worlds. In (2), I will show that, once the best o f all possible
worlds is conceptually determined, the limitations of conceptualist
metaphysics becomes increasingly more evident. Briefly put,
conceptualist metaphysics may specify the formal conditions for the
actualization o f the best of all possible worlds, but cannot
furnish the substantial content o f that best o f all possible
worlds. I propose to address these limitations by examining Leibniz
deeply problematic predicative-use o f the term existence.
The second kind o f metaphysics is construed narrowly by
restricting its scope to the actually existent best o f all
possible worlds. This kind of metaphysics Leibniz in the Nouveaux
essais callspneumatology, which embraces knowledge of God or
natural theology, as well as knowledge o f souls and simple
substances in general (NE 57, 329, 326). Pneumatology, as special
metaphysics, is concerned not so much with the complete concept of
substance but with substance itself. In (3), we will take a look at
two
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candidates for pneumatology available in Leibniz. The first
candidate is the derivation of metaphysical forces from dynamic
forces. Leibniz ontological dynamics recommends itself by virtue of
its logical dependence on conceptualist metaphysics. However, this
derivation of substance from the behavior of physical forces will
be revealed to rest on what I will call an illusory dialectic
between two kinds o f forces stipulated in advance to be radically
different from one another. On systematic grounds, therefore,
ontological dynamics cannot be defended.
The second candidate is a pneumatology restricted to
epistemology and philosophy o f mind. Pneumatology rests on the
results o f reflective introspection by an Ego of itself;
asserting, in turn, this reflective conception o f the Ego as the
very model for substances in general. Pneumatology is logically
independent o f conceptualist metaphysics. Consequently, proponents
o f the logical-reductionist interpretation have shied away from
epistemology and philosophy of mind in Leibniz as inconsistent with
Leibniz subject-predicate logic. In my view, however, it is
precisely this logical independence that recommends pneumatology as
preferable to dynamics.
Scholastic m etaphysics adopted and elaborated upon a c
onception o f s ubstance stemming from Aristotle. According to this
picture, that which qualifies as substantial is what can serve as
the proper subject of a categorical proposition. To serve as the
proper subject o f a categorical proposition, substance must
satisfy two conditions: (1) theconcepts of all the predicates truly
ascribable to that substance must be contained in the concept of
that substance; and, (2) that substance may not be represented as a
predicate- term ascribable to another substance. In other words,
substance is to be understood as self-sufficient. Like Spinoza,
Leibniz takes up this traditional conception as the departure point
for his metaphysics of substance.
Logically, however, any nominative term or noun may qualify as
the subject of a proposition. For example, All gold is metal is
logically a perfectly acceptable proposition. But the subject term
(gold) o f this logically acceptable proposition would not accord
with the above definition o f substance, since gold itself may
count as the predicate term in another proposition and attributed
to another subject term. Consequently, to be in accord with the
above definition o f substance, one must also speak of kinds o f
categorical proposition. The kind o f categorical proposition that
best accords with the above definition of substance is the singular
proposition, which are propositions involving individual nominative
terms. In general, the best examples o f individual nominative
terms are proper names like Alexander the Great, or indexicals like
this or I.
Given Leibniz adherence to this definition o f substance, one
must also decide on an appropriate logical interpretation of
categorical propositions. Categorical propositions may be analyzed
under an extensional interpretation or under an intensional
interpretation. The extensional interpretation is most appropriate
for dealing with the semantic scope o f terms involving universal
and existential quantifiers. What is thus suggested is that the
subject terms of extensional interpretation are generic and the
quantity o f their instantiations is relevant. In turn, the concern
with the quantity of instantiations suggests existential import.
However, when dealing with singular propositions, the extensional
approach is less informative since the semantic scope of an
individual term should involve no more than 1 member. When dealing
with the subject terms of singular propositions, the analysis o f
the concept o f the term that has
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narrowed the semantic scope to a singular individual is
preferable. Since, for Leibniz, the primary issue o f metaphysics
is substance, and the definition o f substance he accepts accords
best with the subject terms o f singular propositions, Leibniz
prefers the intensional interpretation (1.11). However, in the
following, we must keep in mind that the modem terms extensional
and intensional were not available to Leibniz. Thus our u se o f t
hese t wo t erms w ill b e 1 argely d etermined b y an exegetical
reconstruction based on the distinction Leibniz nevertheless draws
and the preference he thereby stakes.
Logically, intensional interpretations o f generic terms are o f
course also permissible; but we must keep in mind Leibniz concern
with the metaphysical relevance o f logical analyses. The concepts
o f generic terms do not suffice for the specification of a
singular individual. Such generic concepts, Leibniz occasionally
describes as full; however, such generic concepts are not complete.
Broadly speaking, what Leibniz calls complete concepts are concepts
that include all the properties o f the propositional subject
appropriate for qualification as substantial. Insofar as a
substance is defined as a singular individual, it is appropriate in
this sense to speak o f individuation (1.12). However, following
for instance the Frege-Russell theory of description, we may speak
of individuation under the extensional interpretation as well. In a
true proposition, the extension of a descriptive phrase like the
discoverer o f planetary orbit or the victor at Jena and defeated
at Waterloo do specify a singular individual. But such extensional
relevance would obtain if Leibniz only concern was with
individuation. A common way of illustrating the limitations of the
Frege-Russell descriptive model o f individuation is the
introduction of modal considerations.
When modal considerations are introduced, the concept most
successful for interworld individuation is the complete concept o f
the subject-term (1.13). In order to illustrate the importance of
considering the complete concept in his metaphysics of substance,
Leibniz frequently speaks o f counterfactual worlds and substantial
identity. In recent American scholarship, the tools o f modem modal
logic and possible world metaphysics have been introduced to refine
sharply the focus on this particular aspect of Leibniz philosophy.
However, to say that Leibniz used modal means to illustrate
complete concepts is one thing; but to claim that Leibniz was
therefore committed to possible world metaphysics is quite another.
Even the texts most frequently invoked by those who endorse this
amplified modal interpretation suggest a mere heuristic and
polemical use o f modal considerations while avoiding any decisive
ontological commitments to possible worlds. A leading clue to the
non-ontological orientation of Leibniz modal concerns is that
Leibniz could not have been a realist about possible worlds. I will
argue that only when an extensional view with existential import is
introduced can Leibniz be considered a modal realist; since,
however, Leibniz excludes the legitimacy of such a view in his
metaphysics, modal realism cannot be entertained as a permissible
exegetical option.
In (1.14), I will argue that in the greater context of Leibniz m
etaphysics, modal considerations can be shown to play a relatively
minor role. My approach stakes a sharp distinction between mere
possibility and actuality. I argue that there are two levels of
possibility in Leibniz metaphysics: i.e., a logical level o f
possibility and an ontological level.1 T he e ntertainment o f t he
1 ogical 1 evel i s a n atural i nclination o f finite r
ational
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creatures that compensates for their epistemological
limitations. However, when viewed under the principles of
perfection and sufficient reasonwhen viewed speculatively, as it
were, through the eyes o f Godmuch o f what may merely be logically
possible must be considered, de facto, ontologically
impossible.
1.1. Propositional SubjectIn logic, Leibniz prefers the
intensional approach as opposed to the extensional.
Broadly put, the extensional approach is oriented around sets or
classes, while the intensional approach is concerned with concepts.
When dealing with class, semantic considerations are primary. The
emphasis in the extensional approach is placed on the reference o f
the terms, as well as the quantity o f referred objects subsumable
under the classes o f the terms involved. In contrast, emphasis in
the intensional approach is placed on predication of the subject
and the sense of the terms involved.
Take for instance the affirmative universal proposition, All
gold is metal. Under the extensional approach, the proposition may
be restated as: For all instances in the extension of gold, the
instances also fall in the class o f metal. Viewed in this way, by
semantic scope of the class of metal, the extension o f metal may
be understood as a whole o f which the extension of gold would be a
part. Accordingly, metal may be understood as a genus of which gold
is a species. Indeed, it might even be argued that the introduction
o f part-whole and species-genus distinctions is of relevance to
the extensional approach precisely because o f this emphasis on the
quantity, through the categorization, of referred objects.
Correlatively, the extensional approach is implicitly committed
to the existence of the r eferred o bjects. Under t he e xtensional
approach, s uggested i n t he statement All gold is metal is that
instances of gold should exist. Otherwise, the very meaning of the
proposition becomes controvertible. Such controvertibility is
evident when limit cases, such as unicorn or present king o f
France, are considered cases o f terms whose extensions are null.
In other words, propositions under the extensional approach must
always be regarded as existence claims.
On the other hand, the intensional approach would not be
committed to the existence o f the referred object. For instance, a
unicorn means a homed white horse, even if the extension of the
term should be null. No realist theory o f reference, and an
empiricist epistemology, would be warranted. Similarly, under the
intensional approach, All gold is metal simply states that the
concept o f gold involves the concept of metalregardless o f
whether instances specified by that concept should exist. Under the
intensional approach, propositions are the meanings of the terms,
and not about the things to which the terms refer. According to
G.H.R. Parkinson: Leibniz is proposing to treat all universal
affirmative propositions... so that the truth o f any such
proposition does not depend upon the existence of its subject
(Parkinson: Leibniz, 18).
The logical consequences o f Leibniz intensional approach from
Elementa calculi from 1679 is worth comprehensive examination. To
begin with, a term (terminus) is
'As we will see in greater detail in the next chapter, this
distinction we are drawing between two uses o f the term impossible
is suggested by Leibniz himself as early as the De summa rerum
period: Cf. AK VI iii 463 f.
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either the subject or the predicate of a categorical
proposition. A categorical proposition is simply a proposition of
the subject-predicate form. Traditionally, there are four kinds o f
categorical proposition: universal affirmative, i.e., All A is b"
or Vx Fx, universal negative (No A is b or Vx ~Fx), particular
affirmative (Some A is b or 3x Fx) and particular negative (Some A
is not b or 3x ~Fx). Leibniz later claims, since
universal-affirmative and particular-negative contradict one
another and the particular- affirmative contradicts the universal
negative, negatives can be understood from the
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positives and the other way around. Accordingly, Leibniz prefers
dealing in most cases exclusively with affirmative propositions;
assuming negative propositions can be understood simply by the
contradiction of the affirmative propositions.
Leibniz further adds: the categorical is the basis o f the rest,
and the modal, hypothetical, disjunctive, and all the others
presuppose [supponunt] the categorical.4 Take for example a modal
proposition such as All A is necessarily b. According to Leibniz,
then, such a modal proposition presupposes the universal
affirmative proposition All A is b, with the modal stipulation in
all possible worlds constituting the difference. Granting conversio
per accidens, what this entails is that the modal proposition in
question would also presuppose the particular affirmative
proposition, Some b is A. In general, this claim asserts a mainstay
o f Leibniz logic: allpropositions are reducible to the
subject-predicate form o f categorical propositions.
But 11 hink i t m ay s uccessfully b e argued t hat Leibniz p
laces e specially strong emphasis on singular propositions,
involving individual terms or what we prefer to call singular
subjects. An example of an affirmative singular proposition is,
Leibniz was German; an example of a negative singular proposition,
Leibniz was not French. For now, I will devote the exposition
exclusively to universal and particular categorical
propositions.
Above all, what the intensional approach allows is the
preservation o f the in-esse principle: i.e., that the concept o f
the subject contains the concept o f the predicate (if veraciously
ascribed to that subject). This is most evident in universal
affirmative propositions. Under the extensional approach, All gold
is metal requires subsumption of the subject term (gold) under the
extension of the predicate term (metal). The class o f metal
objects is the whole, of which the class of gold objects is a part.
In contrast, Leibniz recurs to the intensional approach to reverse
this order o f subsumption. Every true affirmative universal
categorical proposition signifies nothing other than some
connection between predicate and subject... namely it is said that
the predicate that it is in the subject or is contained in the
subject (my italics).5
2 OF 49/1: Terminus est sujectum vel praedicatum propositionis
categoricae. Here, signum is to be understood as quantifiers. This
is clear from the last sentence o f the next paragraph: Signi
varietate accedente, ut vel universalis sit propositio et de omni
subjecto intelligatur, vel particularis de quodam (Ibid./2)3 OF
52/8: Itaque patet ex affirmativis negativas intelligi posse et
contra illas ex istis. For example: 3x ~Fx z> ~(Vx Fx) or,
conversely, 3x Fx z> ~(Vx ~Fx).4 OF 49/2: est autem categorica
caeterarum fundamentum et modales, hypotheticae, disjuntivae,
aliaeque omnes categoricam supponunt.5 OF 51/7: Omnem propositionem
veram categoricam
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Accordingly, under the intensional approach, affirmative
universal propositions express some subject-predicate relation o f
either, respectively, whole-part or whole- whole. Under this
approach, in All gold is metal, the term gold does not express a
partbut, instead, the term gold expresses the whole; thereby the
part-whole relation that would obtain under the extensional
approach is reversed. Rather than say that all instances of gold
belong under the extension of metal, we say that the concept o f
gold includes the concept o f metal. Whole-whole relations,
according to Leibniz, obtain in affirmative universal propositions
expressing synonymous terms: e.g., All gold is metal melting a t 1
062 C . In this c ase, the concept o f gold contains the concept
metal melting at 1062 C. However, since the concept metal melting
at 1062 C specifies a natural k ind d e f acto coincident w ith the
c oncept o f gold in the actual world, the concept o f metal
melting at 1062 C also contains the concept o f gold. Leibniz
proposes to address all such cases of co-extension in terms o f
whole-whole conceptual relation. Notice, nevertheless, whether
whole-part or whole-whole, we are permitted to speak o f a
uni-directional containment: more specifically, always the
containment by the subject o f the predicate.
However, Leibniz does note that particular affirmative
propositions do not easily fit this picture o f subsumption. For
instance, in Some metal is gold, the subject term cannot be
considered the whole under the proposed analysis. Particular
affirmative propositions, under the intensional approach, appear
rather to express a part-whole relation between, respectively,
subject and predicate. To accommodate this discrepancy, Leibniz
proposes an epistemological distinction between absolute regard and
a relative regard o f the concepts involved. Leibniz writes:
Nevertheless a distinction in containment is obtained between
the subject o f a universal and a particular proposition. The
subject o f a universal proposition regarded in itself and
comprehended absolutely must contain the predicate, so the concept
[notio] o f gold regarded in itself and absolutely comprehended
involves the concept o f metal. That the concept of gold is the
concept heaviest metal. But in affirmative particular propositions,
it is sufficient that the thing follows i f some thing is added [to
the subject]. But the concept o f metal absolutely regarded and in
itself comprehended does not involve the concept o f gold; and then
is something added involved, namely the particular sign... (my
italics).6 The relative regard, accordingly, compels the
preservation o f the grammatical
structure of an affirmative particular proposition. In an
affirmative particular proposition like Some metal is gold, if the
subject (metal) is nevertheless to be regarded as containing the
concept o f the predicate term (gold); then some particular sign
must be added. From paragraph (1), we know that such a signi.e., a
quantifierby itself cannot qualify as a term. But such a sign added
to a proper term may qualify an extensional part as an
intensionally proper subject. In other words, the subject in Some
metal is gold is to be seen as not merely metal but some metal,
since the concept of
6 OF 51/7: Discrimen autem est in continendi modo inter
subjectum propsositionis universalis and particularis. Nam
subjectum prositionis universalis in se spectatum et absolute
sumtum debet continere praedicatium, ita auri notio per se spectata
et absolute sumta metalli notionem involvit. Nam notio auri est
metallum ponderosissimum. . Sed notio metalli absolute spectata et
in se sumta non involvit auri notionem; et ut involvat addendum est
aliquid. Nempe signum particulare...
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metal absolutely regarded... does not involve the concept of
gold. What the particular sign or the existential quantifier allows
is the treatment o f the part (metal) as a wholetherewith narrowing
the scope of the generic extension o f metal to a species of metal
implicitly co-extensive with the extensional scope of the predicate
term (i.e., gold); and, consequently, preserving the in-esse
stipulation that the subject must contain the predicate. In this
particular case, the intensional meaning of gold specifies the
extensional scope to be narrowed by some metal. Thus in paragraph
(18), Leibniz writes:
[I]n affirmative particular propositions it is not necessary
that the predicate be in the subject as such and regarded
absolutely to be in it, or that the concept o f the subject as such
contains the concept o f the predicate, but it suffices that the
predicate is contained in some species o f the subject or that the
concept o f some exemplar or species o f the subject contain the
notion o f the predicate; even if it be not be expressed what kind
the species may be.7Viewed absolutely, however, the concept o f
metal must be contained in the
concept of gold. Without a quantifier specifying a narrower
semantic scope, the concept o f the genus metal is to be integrated
into the concept of the species gold. Either way, the primary
concern is the preservation of the in-esse principle. This primary
concern may be seen more clearly once L eibniz coordinates the
part-whole distinction with the distinction between, respectively,
genus and species.
Above we noted that, under the extensional approach, part and
whole may be coordinated respectively with species and genus. For
example, under the extension of metal belong not only gold but also
silver. The term metal signifies the extensional whole o f which
both the classes of gold and silver are parts. If metal is then
regarded as the genus, we can claim that gold and silver are
species o f metal. However, under the intensional approach as
endorsed by Leibniz, this intuitively straightforward coordination
between part-whole on the one hand and species-genus on the other
would not obtain:
Two terms containing each other but not coincident are commonly
called genus and species. As component concepts or terms (as is
viewed here by me), these differ as part and whole, so that the
concept o f genus should be the part, concept o f species should be
the whole [my italics], since [the latter] is composed of the genus
and a differential [element]. For example, the concept o f gold and
concept o f metal are distinguished [not respectively] as part and
whole; for in the concept o f gold is contained the concept of
metal and something besides, e.g., the concept o f the heaviest
among metals. Thus, the concept o f gold is greater than the
concept o f metal.8
7 OF 55/18: ... in Propositione affirmativa particulari non est
necesse ut praedicatum in subjecto per se et absolute spectato
insit seu ut notio subjecti per se praedicati notionem contineat,
sed sufficit praedicatum in aliqua specie subjecti contineri seu
notionem alicujus speciei subjecti continere notionem praedicati;
licet qualisnam ea species sit, non exprimatur.8 OF 52-3/11: Duo
Termini sese continentes nec tamen coincidentes vulgo appellantur
Genus et Species. Quae quoad notiones seu terminos componentes (ut
hoc loco a me spectantur) differunt ut pars et totum, ita ut
generis notio sit pars, speciei notio sit totum: compoinitur enim
ex genere et differentiae. Exempli causa Notio auri et notio
metalli differunt ut pars et totum; nam in notione auri continetur
notio metalli et aliquid praeterea, exempli causa ponderosissimi
inter metalla. Itaque notio auri est major notione metalli.
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Accordingly, metal is indeed the genus o f which gold is a
species. However, genus is coordinated with part and species with
the whole. Leibniz explanation being that the concept o f the
species contains the concept o f the genus and a differential
element that distinguishes that particular species from all the
other species o f the genus: i.e., what would distinguish gold from
silver despite both belonging to the common genus metal.
Extensionally viewed, the classes of both gold and silver belong
within the extension of metal. Talk o f species as opposed to genus
makes sense at all since the whole o f the genus (metal) is divided
into parts that constitute the species. Instead, however, Leibniz
incorporates the differential element into the concepts o f the
species involvedthereby enhancing the concepts o f the species over
against the concept of the genus. In paragraph (12), Leibniz
concedes the strangeness o f his preferred approach, which seems to
have appeared even to him as confusing.9 Regardless, Leibniz goes
on to write:
In the School something else is said, regarding n o t the
concepts but exemplars subsumed under universal concepts. Thus
metal is said to be wider than gold, so that more species are
contained than gold; if we seek to count the individuals of gold on
the one hand and individuals o f metal on the other, there would be
more o f the latter than the former, such that the former should be
contained in the latter as the part o f a whole... However I
preferred to regard universal notions or ideas and their
compositions, 5 ince these do no t rely on the existence
ofindividuals. Thus, I say that gold is greater than metal since
more is required in the notion of gold than in metal, and it is
more work that produces gold than just some metal (my italics).10As
already noted, Leibniz prefers the intensional approach because it
allows him
to avoid c ommitment to dealing w ith existential import as
would b e implied b y the extensional approach.11 But why? Once
again, we must emphasize Leibniz commitment to the in-esse
principle, a commitment determined less by Leibniz logic and more
by his metaphysics as we will see in greater detail in (1.14).
Let us take another look at the affirmative universal
proposition All gold is metal under the extensional view. Within
the extension o f metal belong various classes of metal.
Disregarding metals other than gold, we isolate the class o f
existent
9 Thus, at the end o f Elementa calculi, Leibniz expresses
reservations of having introduced the genus- species distinction at
all: OF 57.10 OF 53/12: In scholis aliter loquuntur, non notiones
spectando, sed exempla notionibus universalibus subjecta. Itaque
metallum dicunt esse latius auro, nam plures continet species quam
aurum; et si individua auri ab una parte et individua metalli ab
altera parte numerare vellemus, utique plura essent haec illis, imo
ilia in his continerentur ut pars in toto... Vemm malui spectare
notiones universales sive ideas earumque compositiones, quia ab
individuorum existentia non pendent. Itaque dico aurum majus
metallo, quia plura requiruntur ad notionem auri quam metalli, et
majus opus est aurum producere quam metallum qualecunque...11
Robert Merrihew Adams writes: There are well-known difficulties in
maintaining the validity o f thetraditional inferences in the
square o f opposition [in the table o f categorical propositions],
under anextensional interpretation, if the subject or the predicate
concept (or one o f their complements) has anempty extension,
because of the way in which the truth o f the propositions,
extensionally interpreted,depends on the existence o f individuals
satisfying (or not satisfying) the concepts. Leibniz could justify
all the traditional inferences, under his intensional
interpretation, without assuming anything about the actual
existence of individuals, but assuming only that the subject and
predicate concepts (and their complements) are consistent (and
hence possibly exemplified) (Adams: Leibniz, 63).
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instances o f gold. We can then speak of various subordinate
kinds o f exemplification: i.e., jewelry, paint, dust, nuggets,
bars, etc. Isolating gold jewelry, we can speak of further
exemplications: i.e., earrings, necklaces, bracelets, etc. This
procedure ofisolation o f classes and specification o f relevant
objects can be continued until we arrive at a particular piece o f
gold necklace belonging to a particular individual, whom we will
call John. Assuming John owns only one piece o f gold necklace, we
can say that the class o f g old n ecklaces b elonging t o t his p
articular Jo hn h as 1 m ember. R egardless, extensionally viewed,
this 1 member class is itself a member among countless members o f
objects subordinated under the extension o f metal. Intensionally
viewed, however, the concept o f metal per se does not include the
concept o f Johns 1 gold necklace. On the other hand, Johns 1 gold
necklace includes in its concept not only the concept o f metal b
ut t he c oncept o f gold a s w ell a s a 111 he d ifferential e
lements t hat h ave narrowed its extension to 1 member. According
to this proposed schema, we can say that the narrower the scope o f
extension the greater the intension o f the concept and
conversely.
Now Leibniz does not deny the validity o f extensional logic;
Leibniz merely prefers the intensional approach.12 What we are
suggesting is that Leibniz preference appears determined by his
concern with substance metaphysics. Extensional logic can
successfully specify the only member of an isolated class but
restricts the discourse to quantity, unless recourse be taken to
greater genera. Extensionally regarded, a unique class like Johns
gold necklace expresses only a quantity. However, should recourse
be taken to greater genera, then the membership would be less
specific. For Leibniz, in other words, genera like metal are what
he calls accidents or accidental properties which do not suffice
for individuation. Since these genera do not suffice for
individuation, such generic terms cannot qualify as
substantial.
Recourse to conceptual discourse as provided by intensional
logic, on the other hand, incorporates the differential elements o
f specification as predicates into the concept of the subject. For
instance, Johns gold necklace includes in its concept all the
elements that distinguish it from other necklaces, other kinds o f
gold, other kinds of metal, etc. While preserving this schema, we
can of course increase the number of differential elements as well
as the number o f diverse genera, thereby inversely and
proportionally expanding the concept. If that concept can be
augmented to the infinite, then that concept can qualify for
candidacy as the concept o f an individual subject; i.e., that
concept qualifies as the concept of a substance. The concept o f a
substance, Leibniz calls the complete concept. Or, as Leibniz
himself elsewhere puts it: I f that concept should be complete, or
from it a reason can be given fo r all the predicates o f the same
subject to which this concept may be attributed, such would be the
concept o f an
1 Tindividual substance, and conversely.''
1.2. Individuation
12 OF 53/12: .. .hac quidem observatione adhibita, et
characteribus accommodatis possent omnes regulae Logicae a nobis
demonstrari alio nonnihil calculo quam hoc loco fiet; tantum quadam
calculi nostri inversione.. .Nostrae itaque et scholarum phrases
hoc loco non quidem contradicunt sibi, distinguendae sunt tamen
diligenter. Caeterum in loquendi modis nihil a me sine quadam
ratione atque utilitate innovari, patebit considerandi. The
scholastic approach referred to is the extensional approach.13 OF
403: Si qua notio sit completa, seu talis ut ex ea ratio possit
omnium praedicatorum ejusdem subjecti cui tribui potest haec notio,
erit notio Substantiae individualis. et contra.
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Concepts may be viewed epistemologically: we cognize objects,
events, properties, etc. by using concepts. Logically viewed,
concepts constitute the linguistic meaning o f terms, and make
possible the determination of truth by the relation of these terms.
Concepts are nothing more than the propositional content o f
judgments bearing truth-value, as opposed to sentences that
linguistically express concepts. According to Leibniz, propositions
are either always o f the subject-predicate form or reducible to
the subject-predicate form. Moreover, in a true proposition, the
concept o f a subject must contain the concept o f the predicate.
This is the in-esse principle, a cornerstone of Leibniz
metaphysics.
In a proposition like Gold is metal, we say the concept o f the
subject (gold) contains the concept o f the predicate (metal).
However, gold is itself a generic term. Viewed extensionally, we
may claim that the extension of gold includes all instances of
gold, but can specify no particular instance o f gold. Nor,
intensionally regarded, can the concept o f gold suffice to specify
any individual entity either. Furthermore, the concept o f gold may
be intensionally contained by a more specific concept, like gold
necklace or Johns gold necklace, etc.
What then would qualify a concept adequate as a complete
individual concept? An example Leibniz offers is the concept o f
Alexander the Great (DM 8). Traditionally, one draws the
distinction between accidental or chance properties and essential
properties or properties whereby something is what it is.14 Leibniz
restores this distinction while placing emphasis on essential
properties. As we will see in the next chapter, however, Leibniz
uses the term essential in two related but different senses. In the
present Chapter, I will be concerned with just one use o f this
term. According to Leibniz, an essential property is a predicate
that can specify an individual in the actual world. An accidental
property, on the other hand, is a generic term that does not
individuate. Notice, nevertheless, that an essential property is
capable o f specifying an individual in the actual world regardless
o f whether viewed extensionally or intensionally. Yet, despite
success in individuation (in the actual world), a single essential
property is certainly not exhaustive o f the concept o f that
entity thus individuated.
In the concept o f Alexander the Great is included the predicate
o f being a king. In the extension of the genus king is, however, a
plurality o f diverse individuals; thus, the predicate o f being a
king does not suffice for individuation. In other words, the
predicate of being a king like the predicates o f bom in 336 B.C.
or being a Macedonian is an accidental property o f Alexander the
Great. In contrast, the predicate of being the conqueror o f Darius
and Poms does specify an individual. However, though Alexander the
Great can thus be specified by the predicate conqueror of Darius
and Poms, this essential property is o f course not exhaustive o f
the concept of Alexander the Great; since Alexander the Great was
more than just the conqueror of Darius and Poms. Once again we see
the metaphysical limitations o f extensional logic.
Leibniz calls a complete concept the sum total o f predicates
truly ascribable to a substance.15 Thus are included in the
complete concept both essential and accidental
14 Cf. Woolhouse II/Mittelstrass, 58.15 OF 520: Notio completa
seu perfecta substantiae singularis involvit omnia ejus praedicata
praeterita, praesentia ac futura (original italics). Fabrizio
Mondadori, however, disputes this formulation
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properties. Taken singly, as noted, the distinction between
accidental and essential properties rests on individuation.
Essential properties can specify an individual, but accidental
properties cannot. Nevertheless, as suggested by C.D. Broad (Broad:
Leibniz, 2 If.), a combination of accidental properties can specify
an individual. For example, take the following three accidental
properties: king, Macedonian and bom in 336 B.C. As accidental,
none o f these properties alone would suffice for individuation.16
Moreover, these predicates are logically independent o f one
another: i.e., the concept o f king includes the concept o f
neither Macedonian nor bom in 336 B.C.17 All three properties taken
together, however, do specify Alexander the Great. By virtue o f
such specification, this combination o f accidental properties also
contingently entails in the actual world all the other properties o
f Alexander the Great. For example, if Macedonian king bom in 336
B.C., then also sired by Philip o f Macedonia, etc. Following C.D.
Broad, any such set of accidental properties whose combination
specifies an individual, we will call a nuclear sub-set o f the
complete concept.
C.D. Broad then goes on to the following set of claims: (1) a
nuclear sub-set would suffice to distinguish an individual, not
only from every other actual individual, but also from every other
possible individual; (2) a selection o f propositions which is
non-nuclear may suffice to distinguish an actual individual from
all other actual individuals, or to distinguish a possible
individual from all other possible individuals which belong to the
same possible world; and, (3) a non-nuclear set o f propositions
does not entail all the other predicates which belong to the actual
Adam, and it does not suffice to distinguish the actual Adam from
all other possible individuals (Broad: Leibniz, 21). We will deal
with these three claims individually.
(1) A nuclear sub-set o f properties, e.g., Macedonian king bom
in 3 36 B .C., does specify an individual in the actual world,
since under the extension o f things that are king, Macedonian and
bom in 336 B.C. would be a single actual member. Thus this nuclear
sub-set does distinguish the individual from every other actual
individual.
(Woolhouse I/Mondadori, 257ff.). Invoking in favor of his
interpretation Leibniz letter to the Landgrave o f Hessen from May
1686, where Leibniz says on na qua prendre ensemble tous les
predicates primitifs pour former la notion complete dAdam
suffisante pour rendre raison de tous les phenomenes appertenans a
Adam, ( G I I44: my italics) Mondadori claims Leibniz definitely
rejected the view that a complete concept is made up of all o f the
properties possessed by the individual exemplifying it. Borrowing
from Margaret Wilson, Mondadori prefers to equate complete concept
with core set o f properties, meaning a cluster of properties which
would suffice for the entailment o f all the other properties.
However, Mondadoris orientation as we will shortly see is rooted in
individuation under an implicitly extensional commitment. Notice,
in the passage Mondadori cites, that Leibniz endorses the
consideration o f the primitive predicates constitutive of the
Wilsonian core set o f properties sufficient to deduce from it
everything that is ever to happen to him. Thus Leibniz use o f
complete concept here is relative to the desired function. However,
absolutely regarded, all the predicates would be required to speak
accurately o f a complete concept. Thus, in a marginal note in the
July 1686 letter to Amauld, Leibniz adds: Notio plena comprehendit
omnia predicata rei... fnotio] completa, omnia predicata subjecti.
. (G I I49: my italics).16 It might be argued, however, that two o
f these properties combined specifically, king bom in 336 B.C.does
factually individuate. But such predication would be predicated on
a specific ignorance o f the actual world, suppressing historically
unrecorded instances o f kings contemporaneous with Alexander the
Great, who may also have in fact been bom in 336 B.C. Instead, we
are assuming total qua divine knowledge of actual states of
affairs, leaving room for factually contemporaneous kings.17 The
extension o f king would, of course, contain at least 1 member who
fits the bill; but under extension, this 1 member could not be
specified by king.
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However, it is not as clear whether such a nuclear sub-set
distinguishes the individual from every other possible individual
as well. Continuing with our example, in order for distinction from
every other possible individual, it would have to be shown that no
possible individual can be Macedonian king bom in 3 36 B .C. and no
t e ntail a 111he other properties of Alexander the Great. But we
can imagine a possible world in which the government o f Macedonia
was a duarchy, whose two kings happen to have been bom in the same
year, but only one as the sire of Philip. Given such a
counter-factual scenario, our nuclear sub-set would suffice for
specifying Alexander the Great in the actual world, but not in the
given counter-factual world. To be fair, Broads argument follows
from a normative criterion o f what he is calling a nuclear
sub-set, such that should a set of properties not suffice for
distinguishing an individual from every other possible individual,
then that set cannot qualify as nuclear. However, under such
unrestricted m odal d emands, i t w ould t hen b e d ifficult t o s
ee h ow a nuclear s ub-set could be anything other than a complete
concept.
(2) From above, if Macedonian king bom in 336 B.C. cannot
distinguish an individual from every other possible individual,
then Macedonian king bom in 336 B.C. cannot be considered
nucleardespite its individuating success in the actual world. Thus,
Broads claim that a selection o f propositions which is non-nuclear
may suffice to distinguish an actual individual from all other
actual individuals would hold for our example. However, it is again
unclear how such a non-nuclear selection o f properties can then
distinguish a possible individual from all other possible
individuals which belong to the same possible world. In our
duarchical Macedonia, the two possible individuals in the same
possible world would not, in fact, be distinguished from one
another by this non-nuclear selection. At this point, it may be
argued that our Macedonian king bom in 336 B.C. does not qualify as
the sort o f non-nuclear selection of properties that Broad is
talking about either. A further stipulation may be required, e.g.,
a sire o f Philip. However, given our example, Macedonian king bom
in 336 B.C. sired by Philip would then qualify as a nuclear
sub-set. If further disqualified by Broads criterion as in (1);
then, as in (1), it is unclear in the consideration o f possibility
what the difference might be between a nuclear sub-set and a
complete concept.
(3) If Macedonian king bom in 336 B.C. is non-nuclear, then
Broad would be wrong; since, this non-nuclear selection does in
fact, by virtue o f individuation, entail all the o ther p
roperties o f t he a ctual i ndividual t hus s pecified i n t he a
ctual w orld. If o ur example should qualify as a nuclear sub-set,
however, it would still not suffice for interworld individuation as
required by Broads normative definition.
It appears Broad has confused entailment in the actual world
with possible entailments in counter-factual worlds. Broads
formulation o f the nuclear sub-set appears well-suited for
individuation in the actual world by a cluster o f combined
accidental properties. However, given Broads normative criteria,
what would best function as a nuclear sub-set in trans-world
individuation is a complete concept. For individuation in the
actual world, all that is needed is either an essential property
(e.g., conqueror o f Darius and Poms) or a variably individuating
set o f accidental properties (e.g., Macedonian king bom in 336
B.C.). In contrast, for inter-world individuation, all the
properties of the individual both accidental and essentialwould be
required. For instance, though the property of being a king is
accidental, it becomes essential for distinguishing the actual
Alexander the Great from possible individuals who may to
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varying degrees share with the actual Alexander the Great many o
f the same properties. For two individuals sharing the exact same
properties except the property o f being king (and all the
properties logically entailed by the possession o f that accidental
property), may be possible. The doctrine that maintains that the
complete concept is essential for inter-world individuation has
come to be known as super-essentialism.
1.3. IdentityIn Discourse 30, Leibniz somewhat lackadaisically
notes: some may ask, from
whence is it that this man would assuredly sin? The answer is
easy, since otherwise he would not be this man. For God sees at all
times that there would be a certain Judas, whose concept or idea o
f whom God has, contains this future free act (my translation and
italics).18 The implication is super-essentialist. Were we to
abstract from the concept o f Judas the subsidiary set of the
property treachery and all properties entailed by this
propertythen, according to Discourse 30, the identity o f Judas can
no longer be preserved. Accordingly, every property in the concept
o f Judas is essential to the identity of Judas. Switching to
another of Leibniz examples, according to this position, should
Adam not have sinned, such a counter-factual individual would not
be Adam.
Yet, in Leibniz letter to Amauld from July 14, 1686, Leibniz
appears to deviate somewhat from this super-essentialist position.
In this letter, Leibniz speaks o f an infinity o f possible Adams
(G II 54: my italic); adding that, in speaking o f a plurality of
possible Adams, Leibniz means some possible individuals who all
share a finite number of predicates (Ibid.) with the actual Adam.
However, as merely purely possible substances, the concepts o f
these possible individualsthe number o f whose predicates is
finitewould not suffice for the determination o f an actual
individual. In other words, the concepts o f possible individuals
are not complete.19 As bearers o f incomplete concepts, such
individuals have no other reality than that which they have in the
divine understanding, and in the active power o f God.20
Nevertheless, Leibniz then goes on to claim, should we reject such
entertainment of possibilitieswhich enter naturally into the mind
(G II 55) we would be compelled to surrender contingency and
freedom. In light o f Leibniz otherwise clearly super-essentialist
position, what are we to make of such statements?
Among some more recent American scholars, this issue has
received a great deal of attention. One notable approach to this
issue, as represented by Fabrizio Mondadori, takes recourse to a
variation of David K. Lewis counterpart theory.21 Roughly put,
Lewis counterpart theory states that for any individual in this22
world there exists a
18 G IV 455: Mais dira quelque autre, dou vient que cet homme
fera asseurement ce peche? La reponse est aisee, c est quautrement
ce ne seroit pas cet homme. Car Dieu voit de tout temps quil y aura
un certain Judas dont la notion ou idee que Dieu en a, contient
cette action future libre.19 G II 54: Cela est vray, quelque nombre
fini de predicats incapables de determiner tout le reste quon
prenne, mais ce qui deterine un certain Adam doit enfermer
absolument tous ses predicats, et c est cette notion complete qui
determine rationem generalitatis ad individuum.20 Ibid.: ... quils
nont point dautre realite, que celle quils ont dans lentendement
divin, et dans la puissance active de Dieu.21 Cf. D.K. Lewis,
Counter/actuals, pp. 85ff.22 As we will shortly see, no easy
equivalence between this world and the actual world obtains for
Lewis, since what would appear to us in this world as a merely
possible world must be for Lewis just as actual or real as this
world.
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similar individual in another world; thereby lending meaning to
counterfactual modalizations. Intensionally interpreted using
Leibnizian terminology, this inter-world similarity may be
understood as significant sharing o f properties in the respective
concepts o f two (or more) individualswhich may even include the
sharing o f the same proper name to warrant closeness in identity;
yet without their complete concepts being identical to one another.
According to Mondadori, Leibniz was not only a super- essentialist,
but also adopted a primitive version o f counter-part theory thus
described above to make room for the entertainment o f possible
individuals.
Mondadori begins by distinguishing between what he calls the
variable sense of an individual substance and its constant sense
(Woolhouse I/Mondadori, 23Iff.). For our purposes, I want to think
of variable sense as meaning that subsidiary cluster of both
essential properties (that singly can specify an individual in the
actual world) and Broads nuclear sub-set o f combined accidental
properties. Accordingly, extensionally viewed, the variable sense o
f an individual substance is more than sufficient for the
individuation o f an entity in the actual world. On the other hand,
Mondadoris constant sense is interchangeable with what we have been
calling the complete concept, which is sufficient for
distinguishing an individual from all other possible individuals. I
would like to further note that Mondadoris use of the Fregean term
sense belies Mondadoris preference for the extensional approach.
Thereby, Mondadori implies individuation of existents by an
adequate description relative to the context o f either the actual
world or possible worlds.
Stressing the significance of the theological profile in Leibniz
consideration of concepts, Mondadori claims: he [Leibniz] seems to
have held... that all o f a given individuals properties are
essential to him (Ibid., 237). Though systematicallyas applied in
the actual worldthe Frege-Russell descriptive model o f nominal
individuation w ould hold for variable sense, Mondadori correctly
notes that Leibniz always insists God cognizes individuals using
their complete concepts23 (Ibid., 234ff). Nevertheless, since for
actual world individuation the variable sense proves sufficient,
the fact that Leibniz should thus insist on the relevance o f
complete concepts warrants according to Mondadori an expansive
examination of modal considerations. That is, the question should
read: What suffices for individuation between not only different
actual entities but between possible entities as well? The answer,
contra Broads suggestion, is the complete concept.
Now, beforeproceeding, I want to note the difference between the
extensional and intensional approaches, while keeping in mind that
Leibniz preferred the intensional approach. Given existential
import for affirmative universal propositions under the extensional
approach, it may be said that the Frege-Russell model o f actual
world individuation is extensionally applicable, but intensionally
unimportant. The fact that a component (i.e., either an essential
property or a nuclear sub-set) o f variable sense should
successfully individuate is determined by the facts of the actual
world, one of whose members just happen to fit in the extension
thus specified. However, I believe Leibniz adherence to the
intensional approach signals what he views as necessary for
actualization. For Leibniz, in order to qualify for actualization,
substance must possess a complete (and, a foritori, infinite)
concept. In this sense super-essentialism follows from
23 E.g., FC 179ff., D M 8, etc., as we have abundantly dealt
with in (1.2).
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Leibniz commitment to the intensional approach, preferred by
virtue o f its metaphysical preservation of the in-esse principle;
following thus far, however, without modal import. The fact that
modal individuation should be consistent with this view is as a
rider to Leibniz commitment to the intensional approach; and not,
as Mondadori appears to believe, the other way around.
Nonetheless, based essentially on this systematic consistency,
Mondadori imports Lewis counter-part theory as his main strategy
for interpreting Leibniz metaphysics. Accordingly, Mondadori claims
that whenever Leibniz speaks o f a plurality o f possible
individuals (e.g., a plurality of possible Adams'), Leibniz is
talking about inter-world counterparts. Given super-essentialist
inter-world individuation, an alteration o f any single one o f an
individuals properties would entail not only a different though
similar individual, but a different though similar world24. Thus,
strictly speaking in terms of identity, in a world where the said
individual should not possess a property viewed under
super-essentialism as essential for the constitution o f its
identity, that individual would not exist (Ibid., 239). Instead, in
the place of that individual would exist a similar but essentially
different counterpart in an essentially different world. The point
is, for Mondadori, the class described by the complete concept is
required just because that would allow the only extension specific
enough for picking ou t an existent i ndividual from possible
worlds. In turn, this would then suggest that whatever description
as comparably complex as such an extensional description would
isolate an existent individual, whether in this world or otherwise.
For Leibniz, however, inter-world individuation is merely a logical
side-effectthough Leibniz probably found it a
0 Sfortuitous side-effect of his ontological commitments.The
most general problem with Mondadoris above interpretation is
its
implication that Leibniz was a realist about possible
worldswhich was clearly not the case. For Leibniz, I will argue,
since it is not permissible to adopt any version o f the
counter-part theory without commitment to modal realism, Leibniz
could not have endorsed even a primitive variant o f the
counter-part