1 Legislator activities in parliament and electoral performance in a mixed-member electoral system. The case of Hungary, 1998-2010 Zsófia Papp Research Fellow Centre for Social Sciences Hungarian Academy of Sciences [email protected]First draft Presented at the ECPR General Conference in Prague, 9 September 2016 Abstract Students of legislative behaviour appear to agree with Mayhew’s start ing point, and consider MPs as ‘single minded seekers of re-election’. Consequently, most of the things MPs do in the present are attributed to their individual desire to future re-election. However, within the premises of legislative studies, little attention has been paid to whether MP behaviour in parliament indeed affects electoral performance. The main question of the paper is whether there is a connection between activities carried out by legislators and their performances at the next elections. I wish to investigate this matter in a mixed-member electoral system permitting multiple candidacy which produces at least two types of MPs with different sets of incentives to act. To establish the effect of parliamentary activities on electoral outcome, I use parliamentary activity panel data from three electoral terms. The results of the multilevel models suggest that there is no connection between the intensity of work MPs carry out in parliament and how they perform in single member district on the one hand, and where they are placed on closed party lists on the other. The findings partially question the existence of activity-based personal accountability in Hungary. Keywords Legislators; Parliament; Hungary; Accountability; Elections
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Legislator activities in parliament and electoral performance in a mixed-member
Students of legislators’ behaviour might differ regarding the activities they study, the factors
with which they explain the variance in these activities and the methods they apply to uncover
causal relationships. However, the majority of authors seems to agree with Mayhew’s oft-
cited starting point, and consider Members of Parliament (MPs) as ‘single-minded seekers of
re-election’ (Mayhew, 1974). Consequently, most of the things representatives do in the
present are attributed to the MPs’ individual desire for future re-election. At the same time,
Hazan and Rahat point out that under centralised selection rules with a high number of safe
seats, the aim of re-selection is superior to the purpose of being re-elected (Atmor, Hazan, and
Rahat, 2011; Hazan and Rahat, 2010). In the former case, where re-election incentives
dominate, candidates who are able to attract extra votes will be selected, whereas in the latter,
where re-selection motivation prevail, candidate loyalty is considered as priority.
Nevertheless, even in safe districts, to maintain the electoral base, it might appears to be
reasonable to follow strategies that highlight the individual legislator without endangering
party unity (see also Russo, 2011).
Within the premises of legislative studies, less attention has been paid to whether MP
behaviour in parliament and in the constituency indeed affects electoral performance.
Extensive research has been done on the determinants of legislative behaviour, all based on
the presumption that the MPs’ perceptions on the utility of their work is more important than
the actual electoral benefit. Legislators work more and better because they think it will
increase their re-election chances regardless of whether this is indeed the case. While this
argument holds in several cases, it does not bring scholars closer to understanding the
implications of member behaviour and whether it is realistic to assume that such behaviour
yields extra votes or better positions on party lists.
Lessening the gap in the literature, my main question is if there is a connection between
activities carried out by legislators in parliament and their performances at the next elections
in the case of Hungary. I wish to investigate this matter in a mixed-member electoral system
permitting multiple candidacy for several reasons. Firstly, the case of mixed electoral system
is particularly interesting for students of the electoral formula, as it enables to test the effects
of two different set of rules within the same electoral and cultural context. Secondly, being a
candidate on multiple electoral tiers at the same time creates a larger pool of viable strategies
compared to system with one legislative tier on the one hand, and mixed-member system
without multiple candidacy on the other. Thirdly, besides being able to investigate the effects
of electoral activities on candidate votes share, by examining party list positions on closed
lists, we can test party priorities in candidate selection at the same time. The main hypothesis
of the paper is that both, selectors and voters evaluate the ‘goodness’ of the legislators
through their parliamentary activities. Voters seek to elect ‘good’ representatives who are
willing to do hard work in parliament, and they may use prior performance to evaluate future
potential. Additionally, it can be argued that parties will also consider this aspect when
organizing the party lists. Putting hardworking MPs on the top of the lists makes sure that
they have reliable legislators to do the leg-work in parliament.
The paper is structured as follows. First, I will briefly outline the theoretical framework of the
paper, which is followed by a short introduction of the Hungarian case. In the data and
methods section, the dependent and independent variables of the analysis are introduced. In
the analysis section I apply various types of multilevel regression to establish the effect of
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legislator activities on electoral performance. Finally, I will draw conclusions in the last
section.
Theoretical framework
The missing link in the literature bears theoretical relevance especially for research
establishing the connection between electoral rules and legislators’ personal vote-seeking.
Namely, the linkage between MP behaviour and voter decisions, which authors refer to as the
‘accountability linkage’, is used to describe the mechanism that creates the effect of the
electoral formula on MP activities in the first place.
Figure 1 clarifies this issue by displaying the relationship between the three factors: electoral
rules, MP’s activities and their electoral performance. As to the causal effects, (a) stands for
the effect of electoral formula on member behaviour, while (b) covers the relationship
between behaviour and electoral outcome. Establishing connection (a) in legislative studies
often implies that connection (b) is already manifested.
Figure 1. The relationship between electoral rules, member behaviour and electoral
performance
The underlying argument is that, since one constituency has one single representative in SMD
systems, voters will be able to determine who to reward or punish for the positive or negative
outcomes (Lancaster, 1986; Lancaster and Patterson, 1990; Norris, 2004), thus making direct
sanctioning possible (Mitchell, 2000). In Multi-Member Districts (MMDs) with a
geographical overlap among legislators (Heitshusen, Young, and Wood, 2005) the
accountability link becomes confused, and the incentive to free-ride increases. The reason for
this is that the voters have difficulties identifying the representative responsible for the
benefits, leaving little room for recognition and reward (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987;
Lancaster, 1986; Scholl, 1986). In MMD-systems, members are more accountable to the party
leadership than to the electorate (Norris, 2004), which makes the contest for re-election a fight
for higher positions on the party list (Curtice and Shively, 2009). Single member district MPs
on the other hand are more dependent on local support, since their electoral fortunes depend
on the votes cast for them, and these votes cannot be enhanced or diminished by the electoral
performance of fellow party members (Curtice and Shively, 2009; Mitchell, 2000). One MP is
responsible for the whole constituency, and cannot delegate problem-solving to other
representatives (Gallagher and Holliday, 2003; Norris, 2004). As voters in SMDs can easily
identify who to approach with their problems (Scholl, 1986), and as members are usually
better known by the electorate (Cooper and Richardson, 2006), single member districts tend to
generate larger demand for constituency service, than MMDs (Scholl, 1986). And since SMD
MPs are more dependent on local support, they are more vulnerable to the pressure from the
electorate as well (Cooper and Richardson, 2006). In short, voters have expectations that are
called forth when casting the vote; and whether they can easily decide whether legislators had
met these expectations or not depends on electoral rules.
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The first models of representation described it as some kind of agreement between citizens
and the representatives. The main goal of elections was to choose the ‘best individuals to
defend the interests or values of the community or group’ (Colomer, 2011, p. 2). However,
the emergence of political parties shifted this relationship toward an interaction between
citizens and parties instead of citizens and the individual legislators representing their
districts. This was further enhanced by the extensive usage of multi-member Proportional
Representation (PR) electoral systems, where voters were offered to choose between parties
instead of individual candidates. This made party representation more stressful against
personal representation. The shift from single member majority systems toward PR also made
it difficult to apply theories of representation that were based on the logic of one member
representing one constituency, further diminishing the linkage between representatives and
the represented. The main principle of party representation is the representation of policy
preferences: ‘party representation is necessary in order to select the most relevant issues in the
public agenda and to design public policy’ (Colomer, 2011, p. 7). Personal representation on
the other hand aims to ensure the good quality of representation, by appointing individuals
who are reliable and responsive to the voters’ demands. In modern societies, the two aspects
of representation appear in a special mixture in which the composition is heavily influenced
by the given setup of the electoral system. This fits the conclusion of Eulau and Karps (Eulau
and Karps, 1977) as well as Mansbridge (Mansbridge, 2003, 2009) on the presence of the
different types of responsiveness and models within the same system. This indicates that even
in systems, where electoral rules or special circumstances support party representation, some
forms of personal representation should be detectable. This involves that voters will be
inclined to increase the quality of representation by electing representatives of the ‘good’
kind. Practicing accountability on the basis of former promises for a ‘good’ representative,
they might do this by judging incumbent MPs for their actions during the previous terms.
There are several ways in which Members of Parliament can mark out of the crowd of fellow
legislators to advertise their ‘goodness’. They engage in constituency service in the districts:
they hold office hours, carry out ombudsman-like activities and deal with problems arising in
the area as well as respond to individual petitions (Cain et al., 1987; Fenno, 1978; Norris,
1997; Norton and Wood, 1990). However, MPs do not necessarily need to be present in their
constituencies to gain visibility. As they spend most of their time in parliament, they must
find different ways to differentiate themselves from other members. On the one hand, the
contents of parliamentary activities reflect the focus of one’s legislative work. The local focus
of bill initiation (Crisp and Ingall, 2002; Marangoni and Tronconi, 2011), membership in
certain committees (Manow, 2013; Stratmann and Baur, 2002), speeches (Hill and Hurley,
2002), parliamentary questioning (Martin, 2011) and the willingness to desert the party line at
roll-call (Carey, 2007; Tavits, 2009) can reflect general concerns about issues that are
potentially important for citizens of a well-defined geographical location. On the other hand,
the intensity with which MPs engage in these activities is a simple proxy for their efforts to
establish the reputation of a hard-working representative. Voters and parties gain important
information on legislators simply by looking at their track records. Bill sponsorship, (Bowler,
2010; Bräuninger, Brunner, and Däubler, 2012), the frequency of floor speeches (Anderson,
Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman, 2003) and tabling questions (Lazardeux, 2005;
Rasch, 2009) or simple attendance indicate that they work just as hard as other members
without having to assess the local nature of these activities.
On the basis of the above, the question of whether MP behaviour is relevant in explaining
electoral performance is important to make our assumptions stronger when tying MP
strategies to electoral systems. More importantly, answering this question supplies us with
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ideas on how well personal accountability works in a given country. A steady relationship
between member behaviour and electoral performance would suggest that a certain type of
legislative accountability mechanism is in place. If MPs are judged individually on the basis
of their performances as legislators, they are indeed encouraged to perform better to gain extra
votes at the next elections. Contrarily, no correlation between MP behaviour and their
electoral fate would indicate that Members of Parliament are not held personally accountable
for their actions while in office. Thus, the question regarding the link between behaviour and
performance might not only justify our basic assumptions in legislative studies, but contribute
to the discussion on the personal accountability of individual MPs and the broader topic of
representation.
The Hungarian case
During the period under investigation (1998-2010), Hungary has a three-tier electoral system,
which is commonly classified as mixed-member majoritarian with partial compensation
(Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001). A total of 386 legislators are elected from 176 single
member districts (SMD tier), 20 regions1 (regional tier) and the national level (national tier).
From the regional tier, a maximum of 152 representatives gain their mandates under the rules
of proportional representation2. A minimum of 58 seats and unallocated mandates from the
regional tier are distributed on the national tier3. Both list tiers apply closed party lists. Parties
may nominate candidates on multiple electoral tiers at the same time. This practice is quite
widespread in Hungary: between 1990 and 2010, almost 40 % of the candidates were
nominated on more than one tier. Furthermore, candidates may be nominated by more than
just one party. Joint candidacy is possible on all electoral tiers, but it is most common in the
case of SMD candidates and is usually restricted to a rather small amount of candidates. There
are some exceptions to this between 1990 and 2010, particularly on the right, namely the
electoral coalitions of Fidesz and MDF in 2002 and Fidesz-KDNP in 2010 which concerned
all candidates on all electoral tiers. Additionally, from 1994 on, legislators are allowed to hold
multiple elected offices such us various positions on the local level.
In the Hungarian parliament, House rules entitle individual legislators to sponsor bills and
submit questions. There are four types of questions in the Országgyűlés: interpellations,
written and oral questions as well as direct inquiries. These types differ in terms of the form
of the required response as well as sanctions in case the questioning MP does not accept the
response to the question. Interpellations, oral and direct questions must be answered at the
plenary session, while written questions require written response. With the exception of direct
questions, all questions have to be submitted in writing prior to the session. Interpellations are
said to be the most powerful among the question types, because if the questioning MP does
not accept the answer of the government, a plenary vote is called to decide on the response.
Hungarian legislators may also make brief speeches on the plenary during debates. However,
PPG leaders and their deputies enjoy a wider range of opportunities to take the floor in the
parliament than backbench MPs. Last but not least, representatives may sit in committees as
permanent members. However, as the partisan setup of each committee is fixed, committee
assignments are decided by the PPG leadership.
Data and variables
1 19 counties and Budapest.
2 Seats on the regional tier are distributed using the Hagenbach-Bischoff formula.
3 Seats on the national tier are distributed using the d’Hondt formula.
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The analysis builds upon a dataset that collects publicly available electoral4, socio-
demographic5 and parliamentary activity
6 data. Information on the parliamentary activities of
MPs is unavailable for the first two electoral terms (1990-1994, 1994-1998). The raw dataset
is available in wide form7, but for the sake of the analysis it is transformed into long form
8. As
we follow a relatively large number of individuals (large N) throughout a relatively short
period of time (small T), the data can be handled as panel. Since there are also MPs who did
not participate in every single election under investigation, the panel is fairly unbalanced.
Throughout this paper t will denote the year of the election under investigation. MPs are
elected at election t-1, serve between t-1 and t, and evaluated by the voters and parties at t.
Overall, the dataset in long form has 2032 observations. This figure consists of 1130
individual MPs serving between 1990 and 2010. For the above reasons, the analysis is
restricted to the period between 1998 and 2010, which leaves us with 1211 observations for
755 individuals9. 419 MPs only served once during the three electoral terms under
investigation, 216 served twice and 120 three times. Table 1 shows the distribution of
observations across the different values of t.
Table 1. The distribution of MPs across the different electoral terms t-1 t Elected
MPs (t-1)
Candidates
(t)
SMD
candidates
(t)
Regional list
candidates (t)
National list
candidates (t)
1998 2002 402 214 163 188 156
2002 2006 397 260 178 204 143
2006 2010 412 239 158 198 118
Number of
observations in
long form
1211 713 499 590 417
Dependent variables
The analysis section investigates the effect of legislator activities on three types of dependent
variables. First, candidate vote share in the SMDs at election t is explained. In this case, the
selectors have already decided that the given MP will be running as an SMD candidate at the
next election. Thus, the first dependent variable shows how voters react to the legislative
record of the different MPs. In this case MPs who were nominated in SMDs at election t are
taken into account. Nevertheless, legislative activities may not only influence voters in their
electoral decisions, but also parties and selectors at the candidate nomination stage. As being
an SMD MP in Hungary is considered to be a somewhat more prestigious position compared
to holding a list mandate10
, the second DV will differentiate between SMD and list
candidates. Nominating legislators in SMDs may be part of a reward mechanism for
hardworking representatives regardless of which type of mandate they hold between elections.
4 www.valasztas.hu
5 www.parlament.hu, and the dataset of the Centre for Elite Research at the Corvinus University of Budapest.
6 www.parlament.hu
7 Records in the datasets represent individual candidates and MPs. Each candidate appears in the dataset only
once (Weiss, 2006, p. 24). 8 Records in the datasets represent individual candidates and MPs at the given election. Every candidate and MP
has as many records as the number of elections he or she has participated in (Weiss, 2006, p. 24). All descriptive
statistics in this paper are calculated on the dataset in the long form. 9 Note, that MPs elected in 2010 are not part of the analysis, as the election of 2014 is not investigated due to the
changing electoral rules. 10
SMD MPs have more money at their disposal. Additionally, having to demonstrate that they also have a
considerable local support, these representatives often have more leverage within their parties.
c: Multilevel generalized linear model (meglm, family(gamma))
Last, but not least, floor time was excluded from the models because it’s high correlation with
the number of speeches. Table 5 shows the results of models that include floor time as an
independent variable. The number of minutes for an MP takes the floor is only relevant if
non-active MPs are taken into account. In this case, floor time influences candidate vote share
in the SMD and the relative position on the regional party list. In the former case, the total
length of the speeches affects constituency performance positively, while in the latter, MPs
spending more time with speaking on the floor, get higher on the party list than those with
less floor time.
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Table 6. Multilevel models explaining candidate vote share, SMD candidacy, and relative positions on the regional and national party lists Variables Model 13