Legalism

Legalism 法家 : Han Feizi

I. Han Feizi 韓非子(280-233 B.C.)

The only nobleman among the important early Chinese philosophers.

Confucius, Mencius, Mozi, Laozi & Zhuangzi were men of lower gentry, descendents perhaps of aristocratic families that had sunk into poverty and no longer occupied a position of any real power in feudalism.

II.1 The Life of Han Feizi

Han Fei was a prince of the royal family of the state of Han ( 韓 ).

Han, was a small state situated in central China.

II.1 The Life of Han Feizi As a prince, distressed by the dangerous

condition of his native state, Han Fei repeatedly submitted letters of remonstrance to its ruler; but the king of Han was unwilling to listen to his advice.

Han Fei then wrote a book, which came into hands of the king of Chin (who was soon to conquer and rule all China) in 246 B.C. King of Chin 秦 showed great respect for the book but it did not deter him from launching an attack on the state of Han in 234 B.C.

II.1 The Life of Han Feizi Han went to the Chin court and was received

with delight by the king. But before he could gain the kings’ full

confidence, his former fellow student, Li-si 李斯warning the king that, since Han Fei was a prince of Han, his loyalties would always be on the side of Han and against Chin.

Han Fei was handed over to the law officials for investigation.

Before the king might have time to regret this decision(as he later did), Li-si sent poison to the prison and Han Fei was confined.

II.1 The Life of Han Feizi

Qn: Why Li-si send his own teacher, Han Feizi to death?

An: Li-si is a legalist. Legalists do not share the Confucian ideas of respecting one’s own teacher.

II.2 Han Feizi: the Legalist He is not the inventor of Legalism, but its

perfector. All the writings of the Legalist School deal

with a single problem: how to preserve and strengthen the state富國強兵 .

Like Machiavelli’s treatise, Han’s work is a handbook for the prince, with a few chapters thoughtfully added for the guidance of his ministers.

II.2 The Legalist

The Legalists take no interest in private individuals or their lives, except to the extent that they affected the interests of the ruling class/ the King.

Unlike Confucianism/ Mo-ism, it made no attempt to preserve/ restore the customs and moral values of the past.

Education: Legalism Unlike the Dao, legalists cared nothing

about principles governing the world or the place of human beings in nature

Practical and efficient approach to statecraft in which the state was strengthened and expanded at all costs

Sought to channel as many people as possible into cultivation or military service and discouraged them from careers as merchants, entrepreneurs, scholars, educators, philosophers, poets, or artists

II.3 Policies The strengthening of the central

government. The establishment of more effective

control over land and population through laws and strict penalties.

The replacement of the old aristocracy by a corps of bureaucrats.

The encouragement of agriculture to provide a steady food supply and of warfare to expand the borders of the state and insure a well-disciplined population.

II.3 Policies

It called for the suppression of all ideas and ways of life that impeded the realization of the above aims.

People should be kept in a state of ignorance and fear, better illiterate.

II.4 Laws/ fa The elaborate system of laws that are to

be drawn up by the ruler, distributed to his officials, and taught and explained by them to the illiterate people.

By such a system of laws, and the inescapable punishments that back it up, all life within the nation was to be ordered.

II.5 Methods of Governing: The Two Handles (H, ch.7) ( 二柄 )

The ruler controls by means of two handles: punishment 罰 and favor 賞 .

The officials and the people are guided and kept in line by laws.

But the ruler, who is the author of law and outside and above it, must be guided by a different set of principles, which is about how to attain a powerful state. The book, Han Feizi, mainly discuss such principles for the good ruler.

Text on “Two Handles” “The enlightened ruler controls his ministers by

means of two handles alone. The two handles are punishment and favor. What do I mean by punishment and favor? To inflict mutilation and death on men is called punishment; to bestow honor and reward is called favor. Those who act as ministers fear the penalties and hope to profit by the rewards. Hence, if the ruler wields his punishments and favors, the ministers will fear his sternness and flock to receive his benefits. But the evil ministers of age are different. They cajole the ruler into letting them inflict punishment themselves on men they hate and bestow rewards on men they like….

Text on “Two Handles” “Now if the ruler of men does not insist

upon reserving to himself the right to dispense profit in form of rewards and show his sternness in punishments, but instead hands them out on the advice of his ministers, then the people of the state will all fear the ministers and hold the ruler in contempt, will flock to the ministers and desert the ruler. This is the danger that arises when the ruler loses control of punishment and favors…

Text on “Two Handles” “The tiger is able to over power the dog

because of his claws and teeth, but if he discards his claws and teeth and lets the dog use them, then on the contrary he will be overpowered by the dog. In the same way the ruler of men uses punishment and favors to control his ministers, but if his discards his punishments and favors and lets his ministers employ them, then on the contrary he will find them in the control of his ministers...”

Text on “Two Handles” “明主之所導制其臣者 , 二抦而已矣 . 二柄者 ,

刑德也 . 何謂刑德 ? 曰 : 殺戮之謂刑 , 慶賞之謂德 . 為人臣者畏誅罰而利慶賞 , 故人主自用其刑德 , 則群臣畏其威而歸其利矣 . 故世之奸臣則不然 , 所惡 , 則能得其主而罪之 ; 所愛 , 則能得之其主而賞之 . 今人主非使賞罰之威早出于己也 , 聽其臣而行其賞罰 , 則一國之人皆畏其臣而易其君 , 歸其臣而去其君矣 . 此人主失刑德之患也 . 夫虎之所以能服狗者 , 爪牙也 , 使虎釋其爪牙而使狗用之 , 則虎反服狗矣 . 人主者 , 以刑德制臣者也 , 今君人者釋其刑德使臣用之 , 則君反制于臣矣 .”

II.6 The Rise of the Legalists

As the more powerful states of late Zhou times grew in size and their government became more centralized, new problems arose.

If a ruler wanted to remain secure in his position, he had to find new ways to control his newly created state.

II.6 The Rise of the Legalists

Unable any longer to attend to all affairs in person, he had to make certain that the men to whom he delegated power were doing their work effectively.

He needed a set of rules for management and personnel control.

II.7 The Legalist and the Daoists From Daoism, Han Feizi borrowed a set of

ideas. Daoist philosophy, with its doctrine of

quietism and its transcendence of worldly affairs, may seems an add place to go in search for ideas in governing.

Legalism, because it rejected all appeals to religion and morality, had to find some other set of terms to glorify the ruler.

Daoism, which likewise rejected conventional religion and morality, provided such a set.

II.7 The Legalist and the Daoists

The Daoist sage has absolute understanding and the Legalist king is of absolute power. In the quality of absoluteness, they are alike.

The sage & the king both rise above conventional good/evil; withdraw from the world.

II.8 Han Fei’s Views on Human Nature Under the influence of Xunzi 荀子 , who

thought that the nature of human is basically evil.

Confucians and Moists claimed that there had been better days under the sage kings of antiquity, and cited history for their argument.

Han Feizi cited history only to enlarge his catalogue of human follies.

II.8 Han Fei’s Views on Human Nature

All attempts to educate and uplift the common people are useless.

The ruler, to succeed, must eschew all impulses toward mercy and affection and be guided solely by enlightened self-interest.

II.9 The Influence of Han Feizi Han wrote his essays on political science

for the king of Han. Yet, it was Han’s enemy and eventual

destroyer, the King of Chin( 秦 ), who appreciated them and put them into practice.

The state of Chin, which later successfully unified China (in 221 B.C.), had been pursuing Legalist policies for almost a century.

II.10 The Unification: the Chin Dynasty (221-

206B.C.)

Assuming the title of First Emperor( 始皇 ), the King of Chin set about the vast bureaucratic empire that Han Feizi had envisioned.

Encourage agriculture and warfare Discipline its people with stern laws Conduct its foreign affairs with

cold-blooded cynicism

II.11 Policies of Chin According to Legalism: 1. Abolishment of feudalism 2. Standardized weights, measures, and the

writing system 3. Controlled people with strict laws 4. Suppressed the teachings of other schools of

philosophy 5. Undertook huge public works 6. Launched foreign wars to push back the

borders 7. Building Luxurious palaces (this practice is

against the ruling principles of Legalism) and the Greatwall

II.12 The Decline of Chin The First Emperor of Chin died in 210

B.C. and in three years, the state fell apart.

Reasons: forces beyond its control– the pull of old local loyalties, the high cost of state undertakings, the natural resistance of men to violent change.

The most important reason: its harsh and ruthless treatment of the people

II.12 The Decline of Chin

Lack of mercy on people. The policies overestimated the

amount of bullying and oppression that people would bear.

II.13 Long-term Influence of Chin No government in China thereafter

attempted to apply legalism in undiluted form.

The penetrating analyses and advice of Legalism have been drawn upon again and again by later rulers.

Often: Confucianism, plus some elements of Legalism (morality & law)

II.14 Passages from the Han Feizi Ch. 5 The Way of the Ruler 主道 “The Way is the beginning of all beings and the

measure of right and wrong. Therefore the enlightened ruler holds fast to the beginning in order to understand the wellspring of all beings, and minds the measure in order to know the source of good and bad. He waits, empty and still, letting names define themselves and affairs reach their own settlement…

“道者 , 万物之始 , 是非之紀也 . 是以明君守始以知万物之源 , 治紀以知善敗之端 .故虛靜以待令 , 令名自命也 , 令事自定也 ...”

II.14 Passages from the Han Feizi Ch. 5 The Way of the Ruler 主道 “Those whose duty it is to speak will

come forward to name themselves; those whose duty it is to act will produce results. When names and results match, the ruler need do nothing more and the true aspect of all things will be revealed.

“有言者自為名 , 有事者自為形 , 形同參同 , 君乃無事焉 , 歸之其情 .”

II.14 Passages from the Han Feizi Ch. 5 The Way of the Ruler “Hence it is said, ‘The ruler must not reveal his

desires, for if he reveal his desires his ministers will put on the mask that pleases him. He must not reveal his will; for if he does so his ministers will show a different face.

“So it is said: Discard likes and dislikes and the ministers will show their true form; discard wisdom and the ministers will watch their steps.

“故曰 : ‘君無見其所欲 , 君見其所欲 , 臣將多雕琢 ; 君無見其意 , 君見其意 , 臣將自表異 .’ 故曰 : ‘去好去惡 , 臣乃見素 ; 去歸去智 , 臣乃自備 .”

II.14 Passages from the Han Feizi Ch. 5 The Way of the Ruler “Hence, though the ruler is wise, he hatches no schemes

from his wisdom, but causes all men to know their place. Though he has worth, he does not display it in his deeds, but observes the motives of his ministers. Though he is brave, he does not present his bravery in shows of indignation, but allows his subordinates to display their valor to the full.

“故有智而不以慮 , 使万物知其處 ; 有賢而不以行 , 觀臣下之所因 ; 有勇而不以怒 , 使群臣盡其武 .”

“Thus, though he discards wisdom, his rule is enlightened; though he discards worth, he achieves merit; and though he discards bravery, his state grows powerful.

“是故去智而有明 , 去賢而有功 , 去勇而有強 .”

Ch. 5 The Way of the Ruler “When the ministers stick to their posts, the

hundred officials have their regular duties, and the ruler employ each according to his particular ability, this is know as the state of manifold constancy…

“群臣守職 , 百官有常 , 因能而使之 , 是謂習常…” “Hence it is said, ‘So still he seems to dwell

nowhere at all; so empty no one can seek him out.’ The enlightened ruler reposes in non-action above, and below his ministers tremble with fear…

“故曰 : ‘寂乎其無位而處 , 謬乎莫得其所 ...”

Ch. 5 The Way of the Ruler “This is the way of the enlightened ruler: he causes the

wise to bring forth all their schemes, and he decides his affairs accordingly; hence his own wisdom is never exhausted. He causes the worthy to display their talents, and he employs them accordingly; hence his own worth never comes to an end. Where there are accomplishments, the ruler takes credit for their worth; where there are errors, the ministers are held responsible for the blame; hence the ruler’s name never suffers.

“明君之道 , 使智者盡其慮 , 而君因以斷事 , 故君不窮于智 ; 賢者勑其材 , 君因而任之 , 故君不窮于能 ;有功則君有其賢 , 有過則臣任其罪 , 故君不窮于名 .”

Ch. 5 The Way of the Ruler “Thus , though the ruler is not worthy

himself, he is the leader of the worthy; though he is not wise himself, he is the corrector of the wise. The ministers have the labor; the ruler enjoys the success. This is called the maxim of the worthy ruler…

“是故不賢而為賢者師 , 不智而為上智者正 . 臣有其勞 , 君有其成功 , 此之謂賢主之經也 ...”

Ch. 5 The Way of the Ruler “The way lies in what cannot be seen, its function in

what cannot be known. Be empty, still and idle, and from your place of darkness observe the defects of others.

“See but do not appear to see; listen but do not seem to listen; know but do not let it be known that you know.

“When you perceive the trend of a man’s words, do not change them, do not correct them, but examine them and compare them with the results. Assign one man to each office and do not let them talk to each other, and then all will do their utmost…

“道在不可見 , 用在不可知 ; 虛靜無事 , 以暗見疵 . 見而不見 , 聞而不聞 , 知而不知 . 知其言以往 , 勿变勿更 , 以參合閱焉 . 官有一人 , 勿令通言 , 則万物皆盡…”

Ch. 5 The Way of the Ruler “The ruler of men stands in danger of being blocked in

five ways. “1. when the ministers shut out their ruler… “2. when they get control of the wealth and resources of

the state “3. when they are free to issue orders as they please “4. when they are able to do righteous deeds in their

own name “5.when they are able to build up their cliques “All these are rights that should be exercised by the

ruler alone, they should never pass into the hands of his ministers…”

“人主有五壅 : 臣閉其主曰壅 , 臣制財利曰壅 , 臣擅行令曰壅 , 臣得樹人曰壅 . 此人主之所以獨擅也 , 非人臣之所以得操也 .”

(H. ch.9) The Eight Villainies

八奸 “凡人臣之所道成奸者有八術 : 1. 同床 2. 在旁 3. 父兄 4. 養殃 5. 民萌 6. 流行 7. 威強 8. 四方

(H. ch.9) The Eight Villainies

八奸 Eight strategies which ministers customarily

employ to work their villainy. 1. “Making use of his bedfellows”: the ruler is

easily beguiled by lovely women and charming boys.

2. “Making use of his attendants”: jesters and entertainers, attendants and favorites of the ruler

3. “Making use of his elders and kin”: The ruler feels close affection for his cadet families and for the princes of the blood, and consults with the elder statesmen and courtiers.

(H. ch.9) The Eight Villainies 4. “Encouraging baleful pursuits”: rulers

love to beautify their palaces, terraces, and pools, to surround themselves with attractive attendants and fine dogs and horses for their amusements.

5. “Making use of the people”: Ministers often distribute funds in order to gratify the people, and hand out small favors in order to win the hearts of the commoners, till everyone in both court and countryside is praising them alone.

(H. ch.9) The Eight Villainies 6. “Making use of fluent speakers”: The ruler,

because the nature of his upbringing, has naturally been cut off from ordinary conversation, and has seldom had an opportunity to listen to debases and persuasive speaking.

7. “Making use of authority and might”: Rulers sometimes believe that the officials and common people are capable of wielding authority and might, and hence whatever these people approve of, rulers approve of too; whatever these people condemn, they condemn, too.

(H. ch.9) The Eight Villainies 8. “Making use of the surrounding states”:

It is customary with a ruler that, if his state is small, he will do the bidding of larger states. When the larger states come with demands, the small state must consent. The ministers therefore double the taxes, empty the coffers, and exhaust the state in the service of the great powers and then make use of their influence with foreign powers in their efforts to mislead the ruler.

(H.ch.10) The Ten Faults 十過 Han Feizi uses historical examples

to illustrate his ten points. A legalist ruler should avoid

committing the following faults.

(H.ch.10) The Ten Faults 十過 十過 1. 行小忠 , 則大忠之賊也 2. 顧小利 , 則大利之殘也 3. 行僻自用 , 無禮諸侯 , 則亡身之至也 4. 不務聽治而好五音 , 則窮身之事也 5. 貪愎喜利 , 則滅國殺身之本也 6. 耽于女樂 , 不顧國政 , 則亡國之禍也 7. 離內遠游百勿于諫士 , 則危身之道也 8. 過而不聽于忠臣 , 而獨行其意 , 則滅高名為人笑之始

也 9. 內不量力 , 外恃諸侯 , 則削國之患也 10. 國小無禮 , 不用諫臣 , 則絕世之勢也

(H.ch.10) The Ten Faults 十過 Each fault is further elaborated with a concrete

example in history. 1. To practice petty loyalty and thereby betray a

larger loyalty. i.e. In a battle, the commander-in-chief A

refused to drink. His junior knew that A loved wine very much, so he told him that it was just “water.” Then commander A could not reject the temptation and kept on drinking until he was very drunk. On the next day, the enemies came and the Duke sent an order summoning A; yet A excused himself, claiming that he had a pain in his heart. The Duke later found out the truth and beheaded commander A.

(H.ch.10) The Ten Faults 十過 Han Fei’s analysis of Fault no.1: “When the junior (Ku-yang)

presented wine to the commander A, his heart was filled only with loyalty and love, yet he ended up by killing him.”

“故竪谷陽之進酒 , 不以仇子反也 , 其心忠愛之而適足以殺之 .”

(H.ch.10) The Ten Faults 十過 2. To fix your eye on a petty gain and thereby

lose a larger one. i.e. Duke Hsien of Chin wanted to passed

through the neighboring state Yu to launch an attack in another state and he was advised to give a precious jade (the jade of Chui-chi) to the Duke of state Yu. An official of Yu warned his Duke not to accept the gift because they would be attacked in the next. The Duke of Yu was greedy and accepted the present. Three years later, state Yu was conquered and the piece of Jade was back to the original state.

Chapter 10 The Ten Faults 3. To behave in a base and willful manner and

show no courtesy to the other feudal lords, thereby bringing about your own downfall.

i.e. Duke Chu summoned the other federal lords to a conference. One of the crown princes arrived late and he was held in prison. Duke Chu also insulted other rulers. He was advised not to do so but he did as he pleased. Ten years passed and Duke Chu went on a tour and his officials stole his throne from him. He was eventually starved to death.

Chapter 10 The Ten Faults 4. To give no ear to government affairs but

long only for the sound of music, thereby plunging yourself into distress.

i.e. Duke Ping of Chin loved music so much that he insisted to hear the music written by music-master Yen for the wicked King Zhou of the Shang dynasty. He was advised to listen to the pure shang mode which were for the rulers of virtue, yet he insisted that he loved music so much and he should enjoy what he delighted. His state suffered with a great drought for three years and his body broke out with sores.

Chapter 10 The Ten Faults

5. To be greedy, perverse, and too fond of profit, thereby opening the way to the destruction of the state and your own demise.

A very long and complicated story…

Chapter 10 The Ten Faults 6. To become infatuated with women musicians and

discard state affairs, thereby inviting the disaster of national destruction.

i.e. Duke Mu of Chin discovered the official of Jung, Yu Yu, was a sage when he was visited by the latter. He knew that such a person would pose a threat to all the rival states around it. Duke Mu then sent a lot of women musicians to the Duke of Jung and suggested that Yu’s return to his state be postponed. Duke of Jung became crazy with the women and ignored his state for a year. When Yu returned, he warned his Duke but ignored. Yu left his state and went to Chin, where he was well received. The state of Chin later took over the state of Jung.

Chapter 10 The Ten Faults 7. To leave the palace for distance travels,

despising the remonstrances of your ministers, which leads to grave peril for yourself.

i.e. Viscount Tian Chang of Chi enjoyed travel by sea so much that he announced that anyone mentioned going home would be killed. An official warned him and he was threatened to be beheaded. The official quoted historical examples of loyal officials being killed by their seniors. The viscount decided to return home and found out that some of his subjects were plotting to prevent him from entering the capital. Without that official, the viscount would have lose the state.

Chapter 10 The Ten Faults 8. To fail to heed your loyal ministers when you are at

fault, insisting upon having your own way, which will in time destroy your good reputation and make you a laughing stock of others.

i.e. Kuan Chung was the most helpful minister of Duke Huan of Chi, who became the first of the five dictators. When Kuan Chung was ill, he was asked by the Duke about his successor. The Duke proposed a number of officials but Kuan pointed out their weaknesses. At last, Kuan said His Ping could do. But when Kuan died, the Duke did not follow his advice and appointed someone Kuan rejected. Three years passed and the Duke journed to a trip and the new successor led a revolt. Duke Huan died of hunger and his body remained unburied for three months.

Chapter 10 The Ten Faults 9. To take no account of internal struggle but rely

solely upon your allies abroad, which places the state in grave danger of dismemberment.

i.e. Chin attacked the small state, Han and the ruler of the latter was advised to give land to Chin for peace. The Duke of Chu was afraid that these two states would join together and attack her. The Duke of Chu then told the ruler of Han that they would help them if they were attacked. The Duke of Han decided to place trust on Chu and urged them to send troops to rescue him. Time flied and there was no troop and the state of Han was conquered by Chin.

Chapter 10 The Ten Faults 10. To ignore the demands of courtesy, though your

state is small, and fail to learn from the remonstrance of your ministers, acts which lead to the downfall of your line.

i.e. Prince Chung-erh of Chin fled from his home and was treated with discourtesy by the Duke of Tsao. An official of Tsao worried about the situation and he sent a lot of gift to Chung-erh, as he believed that Chung-erh was fit as a good leader. Chung-erh eventually became the head of Chin and attacked Tsao. The Duke of Tsao was killed for his behavior and the clever official’s compound was not trespassed. People took refuge in the residential quarter of that official.