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INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPINESCODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CHAPTER I. THE LAW AND SOCIETY

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND ANDPROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidencein the legal system.

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay anyman’s cause.

Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fairsettlement.

CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT ANDCONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVE-NESSOF THE PROFESSION.

Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to render legal adviceto the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s rights. Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless the circumstancesso warrant.

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST,FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used. The continueduse of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communicationsthat said partner is deceased.

Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the firm and his name shall bedropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law concurrently.

Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipationof, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.

CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM BYINITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICIPATE INCONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS



IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST INDISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THEDISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.

Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice isdone. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of theaccused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance hisprivate interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment inconnection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

CHAPTER II. LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL

PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material factin connection with his application for admission to the bar.

Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person known by him tobe unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shallhe, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDORTOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST

OPPOSING COUNSEL.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive orotherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of anotherlawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance tothose seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZEDPRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by lawmay only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed topractice law, except:a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s death, moneyshall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the agreement; orb) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; orc) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based inwhole or in part, on a profitable sharing arrangement.



CHAPTER III. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead,or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or theargument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provisionalready rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS ANDTO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.

Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before theCourts.

Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materialityto the case.

Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST INTHE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself on the law and thefacts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its preferences. He should also be ready with theoriginal documents for comparison with the copies.

Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let theperiod lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.

Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgement or misuse Courtprocesses.

Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or recess in the trial, while thewitness is still under examination.

Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to impersonate another.

Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly inconvenience him.

Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, and the like, or



b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event hemust, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANYIMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THECOURT

Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity forcultivating familiarity with Judges.

Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending toarouse public opinion for or against a party.

Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or agency of the government inthe normal course of judicial proceedings.

CHAPTER IV. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT

CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.

Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter’s race, sex, creedor status of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.

Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an appointment as counsel deoficio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters forrendition of free legal aid.

Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client unless:a) he is in no position to carry out the work effectively or competently;b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between a present client andthe prospective client;

Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees shall observe thesame standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGSAND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.01 - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether thematter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform theprospective client.

Rule 15.02 - A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters disclosed tohim by a prospective client.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned givenafter a full disclosure of the facts.

Rule 15.04 - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator insettling disputes.

Rule 15.05 - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits andprobable results of the client’s case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case.



Rule 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislativebody.

Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and principles of fairness.

Rule 15.08 - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of law

shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of otherskept by him.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, heshall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful feesand disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent

on all judgements and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected bythe nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when inthe interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFULOF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is notqualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as

collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within areasonable time to client’s request for information.

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THELAW.

Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client andshall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain animproper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of the representation,perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failingwhich he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure on handling the case.





Rule 22.01 -A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases:a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling;b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employmenteffectively;e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer

agreement;f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; andg) Other similar cases.

Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over allpapers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transferof the matter, including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.

A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

F. Power to regulate practice of law

ARTICLE VIII

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the followingpowers:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission tothe practice of law, the integrated bar, and legalassistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shallprovide a simplified and inexpensive procedure forthe speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for



all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules ofprocedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies

shall remain effective unless disapproved by theSupreme Court.

G. Nature of Power to Admit Candidates to Legal Profession

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of1946 to 1953;ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern asRepublic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules ofCourt governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) maybe deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a generalaverage of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the differentbar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which theexamination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidateswho had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this

court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note toR.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower thanthose admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of SenateBill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill.Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted writtencomments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did notoverride the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially theprovisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable



views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without hissignature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FORBAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEENHUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO ANDINCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND

FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the Philippines in Congressassembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of sectionfourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven ofthe Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained ageneral average of seventy per cent in any barexaminations after July fourth, nineteen hundred andforty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per cent in thenineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations;seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundredand fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three percent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four barexaminations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteenhundred and fifty-five bar examinations without acandidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in anysubject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe thecorresponding oath of office as member of thePhilippine Bar: Provided, however , That for thepurpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of afraction, shall be considered as one and included aspart of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade ofseventy-five per cent in any subject in any barexamination after July fourth, nineteen hundred andforty-six shall be deemed to have passed in suchsubject or subjects and such grade or grades shall beincluded in computing the passing general averagethat said candidate may obtain in any subsequentexaminations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executiveapproval.



After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission tothe bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examinationpapers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission.There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without,however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court firstreviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked

Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. Ifthey are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, ifdeclared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions ornot. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as amore detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as

Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical dataare set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No.972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18

1946 (November) 477 228 43

1947 749 340 0

1948 899 409 11

1949 1,218 532 164

1950 1,316 893 26

1951 2,068 879 196

1952 2,738 1,033 426

1953 2,555968 284

TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 havefiled either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions forreconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of saidRepublic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, butfailed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest gradesin different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient toreach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, ofwhich only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 hadindividually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessfulcandidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pendingbecause they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has beenalready stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades



UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legalprofession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed asto its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the solequestion of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of themembers of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects inwhich the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, VicenteJ. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law,and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz,Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan deBlancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda ofcounsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and AntonioEnrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helpedus in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and

American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation

for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majorityopinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above allsuspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, thosecandidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable SenatorPablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per centpassing grade is the tremendous handicap whichstudents during the years immediately after theJapanese occupation has to overcome such as theinsufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacyof the preparation of students who took up law soonafter the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And nowit is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), becausethey suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 lawgraduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as

was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands oflegal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problemevolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vitalrequisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. Tothe legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. Toapprove officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such adelicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was aninsufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials.Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during



those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annualdigests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines publishedabroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revisedand enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of PhilippineReports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the additionof new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicableprinciples, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case ofsimilar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there anyprecedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the

judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, andwhich we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial historyof more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find acase in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validitycite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240

NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), ofGuariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote ofthe original bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had beenpromulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within ourpower to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has beencited to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of

Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying thepetition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statuteconcerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which wasdeclared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office ofpublic trust. All votes for either of them for any electiveoffice except that of the Court of Appeals, given by theLegislature or the people, shall be void. They shall notexercise any power of appointment to public office.

Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of

good moral character, and who possesses therequisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall beentitled to admission to practice in all the courts of thisState. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; thepower of appointing them had previously rested with



the judges, and this was the principal appointing powerwhich they possessed. The convention was evidentlydissatisfied with the manner in which this power hadbeen exercised, and with the restrictions which the

judges had imposed upon admission to practice beforethem. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was

aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of theprovision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in thisparticular section of the Constitution, evidently arosefrom its connection with the object of this prohibitoryclause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in thecourts or of a disposition to preserve any portion oftheir power over this subject, unless the SupremeCourt is right in the inference it draws from the use ofthe word `admission' in the action referred to. It isurged that the admission spoken of must be by thecourt; that to admit means to grant leave, and that thepower of granting necessarily implies the power of

refusing, and of course the right of determiningwhether the applicant possesses the requisitequalifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affectingthe validity of the act. (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided thatthe possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree ofBachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required ofapplicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law,which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, theCourt of Appeals said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent.Columbia College being an institution of establishedreputation, and having a law department under thecharge of able professors, the students in whichdepartment were not only subjected to a formalexamination by the law committee of the institution, butto a certain definite period of study before beingentitled to a diploma of being graduates, theLegislature evidently, and no doubt justly, consideredthis examination, together with the preliminary studyrequired by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legalrequirements, to the ordinary examination by the court;and as rendering the latter examination, to which nodefinite period of preliminary study was essential,unnecessary and burdensome.



The act was obviously passed with reference to thelearning and ability of the applicant, and for the merepurpose of substituting the examination by the lawcommittee of the college for that of the court. It couldhave had no other object, and hence no greater scopeshould be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose

that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense withthe plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution;and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate anintention that the authorities of the college shouldinquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the studentsbefore granting a diploma. The only rationalinterpretation of which the act admits is, that it wasintended to make the college diploma competentevidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant,and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as amodification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to beread in connection with these statutes and with the

Constitution itself in order to determine the presentcondition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

x x x x x x x x x

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that hassimply prescribed what shall be competent evidence incertain cases upon that question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may beclearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed inthe bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the courtits jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree theadmission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different onthe matter of admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and theirsupervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute,its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have beendemonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid oftitles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, altersupplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law,to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatementof the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable.



The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whetherpast or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts aregoverned by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And itbecomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on thepetitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession isconcededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had beenundertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of alegislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts wasdiscussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative powerwithout parallel in the history of the English speakingpeople so far as we have been able to ascertain.There has been much uncertainty as to the extent ofthe power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate

qualifications of attorney at law has been expresslycommitted to the courts, and the act of admission hasalways been regarded as a judicial function. This actpurports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law,and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion oflegislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested ina Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far asthe prescribing of qualifications for admission to thebar are legislative in character, the Legislature isacting within its constitutional authority when it sets upand prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed thosequalifications which in its judgment will serve thepurpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the powerof the court to impose other and further exactions andqualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

Under our Constitution the judicial and legislativedepartments are distinct, independent, and coordinatebranches of the government. Neither branch enjoys allthe powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to itsdepartment. Neither department should so act as toembarrass the other in the discharge of its respectivefunctions. That was the scheme and thought of thepeople setting upon the form of government underwhich we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;

Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis.,567. (p. 445)



The judicial department of government is responsiblefor the plane upon which the administration of justice ismaintained. Its responsibility in this respect isexclusive. By committing a portion of the powers ofsovereignty to the judicial department of our stategovernment, under 42a scheme which it was

supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment orinterference by any other department of government,the courts cannot escape responsibility fir the mannerin which the powers of sovereignty thus committed tothe judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar andintimate relationship. The bar is an attache of thecourts. The quality of justice dispense by the courtsdepends in no small degree upon the integrity of itsbar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal andreproach to the administration of justice and bring the

courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct andsevere supervision over their bars, at least in theEnglish speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: Formore than six centuries prior to the adoption of ourConstitution, the courts of England, concededlysubordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of1688, had exercise the right of determining who shouldbe admitted to the practice of law, which, as was saidin Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's NewCases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." Ifthe courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity,the power to determine who should be admitted topractice law is a constituent element of that entity. Itmay be difficult to isolate that element and say withassurance that it is either a part of the inherent powerof the court, or an essential element of the judicialpower exercised by the court, but that it is a powerbelonging to the judicial entity and made of not only asovereign institution, but made of it a separateindependent, and coordinate branch of thegovernment. They took this institution along with thepower traditionally exercise to determine who shouldconstitute its attorney at law. There is no expressprovision in the Constitution which indicates an intentthat this traditional power of the judicial departmentshould in any manner be subject to legislative control.



Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of ourconstitution was to make the three great departmentsof government separate and independent of oneanother. The idea that the Legislature might embarrassthe judicial department by prescribing inadequatequalifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with

the dominant purpose of making the judicialindependent of the legislative department, and such apurpose should not be inferred in the absence ofexpress constitutional provisions. While the legislaturemay legislate with respect to the qualifications ofattorneys, but is incidental merely to its general andunquestioned power to protect the public interest.When it does legislate a fixing a standard ofqualifications required of attorneys at law in order thatpublic interests may be protected, such qualificationsdo not constitute only a minimum standard and limitthe class from which the court must make its selection.

Such legislative qualifications do not constitute theultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannotgo in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessaryby the course of the proper administration of judicialfunctions. There is no legislative power to compelcourts to admit to their bars persons deemed by themunfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law.(p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise thepower of appointment. It is quite likely true that thelegislature may exercise the power of appointment

when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions.However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous thatthe power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a

judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey(In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as ourinvestigation reveals, attorneys receive their formallicense to practice law by their admission as membersof the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex

parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs.Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs.Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519;

Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice havingbeen perpetually exercised by the courts, it havingbeen so generally held that the act of the court inadmitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of thecourt, and an attempt as this on the part of theLegislature to confer such right upon any one being



most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that thelicensing of an attorney is and always has been apurely judicial function, no matter where the power todetermine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of

the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and tointerpretation of the laws that there be members of thebar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and soundmoral character. This arises from the need ofenlightened assistance to the honest, and restrainingauthority over the knavish, litigant. It is highlyimportant, also that the public be protected fromincompetent and vicious practitioners, whoseopportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said byCardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242

N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851:"Membership in the bar is a privilege burden withconditions." One is admitted to the bar "for somethingmore than private gain." He becomes an "officer of thecourt", and ,like the court itself, an instrument oragency to advance the end of justice. His cooperationwith the court is due "whenever justice would beimperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without suchattorneys at law the judicial department of governmentwould be hampered in the performance of its duties.That has been the history of attorneys under thecommon law, both in this country and England.

Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almostwithout exception conceded to be a judicial function.Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are otherproceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to thebar is accomplish and made open and notorious by adecision of the court entered upon its records. Theestablishment by the Constitution of the judicialdepartment conferred authority necessary to theexercise of its powers as a coordinate department ofgovernment. It is an inherent power of such adepartment of government ultimately to determine thequalifications of those to be admitted to practice in its

courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself inthis respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficientlearning, and those not possessing good moralcharacter. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly andwith finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L.Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules andpractice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusivelywith the court to determine who is qualified to become



one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, andfor what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice thelegal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed.366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to beunconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney'soffice as follows: "They are officers of the court,admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of theirpossessing sufficient legal learning and fair privatecharacter. It has always been the general practice inthis country to obtain this evidence by an examinationof the parties. In this court the fact of the admission ofsuch officers in the highest court of the states to whichthey, respectively, belong for, three years precedingtheir application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of

the possession of the requisite legal learning, and thestatement of counsel moving their admission sufficientevidence that their private and professional characteris fair. The order of admission is the judgment of thecourt that the parties possess the requisitequalifications as attorneys and counselors, and areentitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein.From its entry the parties become officers of the court,and are responsible to it for professional misconduct.They hold their office during good behavior, and canonly be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained anddeclared by the judgment of the court after opportunity

to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron,admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of amere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicialpower, and has been so held in numerous cases. Itwas so held by the court of appeals of New York in thematter of the application of Cooper for admission. ReCooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", saidthat court, "are not only officers of the court, butofficers whose duties relate almost exclusively toproceedings of a judicial nature; and hence theirappointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to thecourt, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very

justly considered as engaged in the exercise of theirappropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

Admission to practice of law is almost withoutexception conceded everywhere to be the exercise ofa judicial function, and this opinion need not be



burdened with citations in this point. Admission topractice have also been held to be the exercise of oneof the inherent powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a

judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court.— A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislaturerespecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial andlegislative departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislativeand the judicial departments is that it is the province ofthe legislature to establish rules that shall regulate andgovern in matters of transactions occurring subsequentto the legislative action, while the judiciary determinesrights and obligations with reference to transactionsthat are past or conditions that exist at the time of theexercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vitalone and not subject to alteration or change either bylegislative action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall beinvaded by either of the other departments of thegovernment. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control theaction of the courts by requiring of them construction ofthe law according to its own views, it is very plain itcannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments,compelling them to grant new trials, ordering thedischarge of offenders, or directing what particularsteps shall be taken in the progress of a judicialinquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, ageneral average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted inmass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment

revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidatesconcerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executivedepartment, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be aclear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement therule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no validargument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:



Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the powerto promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, andprocedure in all courts, and the admission to thepractice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for allcourts of the same grade and shall not diminish,increase or modify substantive rights. The existing

laws on pleading, practice and procedure are herebyrepealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court,subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter andmodify the same. The Congress shall have the powerto repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerningpleading, practice, and procedure, and the admissionto the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitutionof the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equalresponsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power andresponsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress

found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing overwhich to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rulespromulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in theSupreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permitthat Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power onthe matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbaror reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law.Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if accordingto its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this powerdoes not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneysat law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for theadmission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement themmay and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving carefulconsideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powershave existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitationbeing found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admissionto the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with highvirtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal,amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power,which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and thesupervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the

minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms thelofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending,disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise withintheir proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other inattaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exactingnecessities of the administration of justice.



The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination andfailed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that onewho had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law withouta previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties ofFiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previousexaminations. The court said:

Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No.1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to thebar, without taking the prescribed examination, on theground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal forthe Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907,is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of ActNumbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Actproviding a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions andSpecial Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," ishereby amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the lawsand orders of the Islands under the sovereignty ofSpain or of the United States and are in good andregular standing as members of the bar of thePhilippine Islands at the time of the adoption of thiscode; Provided , That any person who, prior to thepassage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shallhave held, under the authority of the United States, theposition of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of theCourt of First Instance, or judge or associate judge ofthe Court of Land Registration, of the PhilippineIslands, or the position of Attorney General, SolicitorGeneral, Assistant Attorney General, assistantattorney in the office of the Attorney General,prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, cityattorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila,provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, orassistant attorney for the Moro Province, may belicensed to practice law in the courts of the PhilippineIslands without an examination, upon motion beforethe Supreme Court and establishing such fact to thesatisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a formeroccasion this appellant took, and failed to pass theprescribed examination. The report of the examiningboard, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he receivedan average of only 71 per cent in the various branches



of legal learning upon which he was examined, thusfalling four points short of the required percentage of75. We would be delinquent in the performance of ourduty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of thisaffirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicantin the required qualifications of learning in the law at

the time when he presented his former application foradmission to the bar, we should grant him license topractice law in the courts of these Islands, without firstsatisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass theexamination on that occasion, he now "possesses thenecessary qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of theabove-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of rightto be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribedexamination "upon motion before the Supreme Court"accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held

and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of theProvince of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind theobject which the legislator apparently sought to attainin enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlierstatute, and in view of the context generally andespecially of the fact that the amendment was insertedas a proviso in that section of the original Act whichspecifically provides for the admission of certaincandidates without examination. It is contented thatthis mandatory construction is imperatively required inorder to give effect to the apparent intention of thelegislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have

the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2,16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon thiscourt by the commission and confirmed to it by the Actof Congress would be limited and restricted, and in acase such as that under consideration whollydestroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in theabove citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, orof any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting

the power conferred upon the commission is to thatextent invalid and void, as transcending its rightfullimits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positionsenumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:



In the various cases wherein applications for theadmission to the bar under the provisions of thisstatute have been considered heretofore, we haveaccepted the fact that such appointments had beenmade as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications ofthe applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason

to believe that the applicants had been practicingattorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, itaffirmatively appears that the applicant was not andnever had been practicing attorney in this or any other

jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment asprovincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appearsthat he was deficient in the required qualifications atthe time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on

that occasion, we do not think that his appointment tothe office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactoryproof if his possession of the necessary qualificationsof learning and ability. We conclude therefore that thisapplication for license to practice in the courts of thePhilippines, should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took theexamination he fell only four points short of thenecessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice;and in view also of the fact that since that time he hasheld the responsible office of the governor of theProvince of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidenceof such marked ability in the performance of the dutiesof that office that the Chief Executive, with the consentand approval of the Philippine Commission, sought toretain him in the Government service by appointinghim to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we wouldbe justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No.1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examinationprescribed by general rule, provided he offerssatisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a specialexamination which will be given him by a committee ofthe court upon his application therefor, without

prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to presenthimself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribedby general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongsexclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissivecharacter, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.



The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to sufferfrom the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make aclassification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, untilDecember 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began

studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diplomaissued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass anexamination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies afterthe aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being,among others, a class legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to thebar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law schoolsissued to the applicants. The act of the generalassembly passed in 1899, under which the applicationis made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of anact entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to

attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884,in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as itappears in the enacting clause, consists in the additionto the section of the following: "And every applicationfor a license who shall comply with the rules of thesupreme court in regard to admission to the bar inforce at the time such applicant commend the study oflaw, either in a law or office or a law school or college,shall be granted a license under this actnotwithstanding any subsequent changes in saidrules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diplomaregularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whoseregular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior toNovember 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The otherbranch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, orpart of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course ofstudy began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination bythe examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right toadmission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantialrights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative

creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)

Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibitedby the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys topractice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe thecharacter of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisitelearning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons orclasses of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license



for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right toappear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certainexemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. Thelaw conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, inframing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishingclasses in general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some

difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to thesubject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs.People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish abasis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where suchphysician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrarydiscrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18

Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for theprofession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning,character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of personswho began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes— First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31,1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part ofthe time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in thesubjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seemsto be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions ofthe rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time arefixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon thecompletion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there beanything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon themere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Thosewho began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years aswell as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two

years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, althoughthey would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. Ifpossessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, andwithout any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must bepursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any naturalreason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is forthe sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislatureattempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards toits aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power toprescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and licensethose applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner hereattempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike andaccord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications ofthose desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of everycitizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may choose,



subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, andcondition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of ourrepublican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All maybe pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for theirsuccessful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired inthem — that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great value to the

possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personalproperty can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarlysituated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutesregulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on thepart of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, havebeen challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from suchexaminations of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law renderedsuch law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. ThomasCall, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis.172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to

confer upon him the right to practice law and toconstitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matterof legislative grace or favor. It is not material that hehad once established his right to practice law and thatone time he possessed the requisite learning and otherqualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in nomatter affect the power of the Legislature to selectfrom the great body of the public an individual uponwhom it would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424)commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the

practice of law without examination, all who hadserved in the military or naval forces of the UnitedStates during the World War and received a honorabledischarge therefrom and who (were disabled therein orthereby within the purview of the Act of Congressapproved June 7th, 1924, known as "World WarVeteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated atleast ten per cent thereunder at the time of thepassage of this Act." This Act was held|unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violatedthe quality clauses of the constitution of that state. Inre Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331,

227 N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be validmust rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and,furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided



the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, asdistinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable toone class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situationof that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason onwhich it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situationand circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all

other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation aspresents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and intheir rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unlessthere is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally onall. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office asmembers of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature

indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and nonehas been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the generalaverage indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessfulcandidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification ofunsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is theexclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact thatthis Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concernedmay prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, itis argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permittedadmission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more;in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 percent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by theRules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in thepassing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it isdesired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did notobtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose todo so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamentedis that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946

to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, theeffectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955,increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidatesbe admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what thelaw attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of theCourt, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should havedone during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power



exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What wasdone was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution hasgranted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This powercorresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals.

The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it mayhappen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in thismanner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first barexaminations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case,however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effectonly from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinitetime. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annulsarticle 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullityaffect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the

legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second,because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutionalprinciples; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basicprinciples. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 isunconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons,to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinationsof 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as wasexactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of thesecandidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present alreadyprepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contraryto reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutionalresponsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions ofthese 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, andalthough it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiablereasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directlyRepublic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter andsupplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as theyought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend toimprove and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimumnorms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyersto the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicialfunctions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary andinherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may beadmitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.



4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, iscontrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar oflaw students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly aclass legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the

Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law isvoid.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to theexaminations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations inthose years, shall continue in force.

R E S O L U T I O N

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent andimpassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close ofthe debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of twoof our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to takepart in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have votedand resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and withoutforce and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the

examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is validand shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in theexaminations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in theexaminations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having agrade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they havefiled petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permittedto take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date ordates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,

vs.



VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

R E S O L U T I O N

CASTRO, J.:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injusticecommitted against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, asa tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore withoutreasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution withimpunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust

judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the samebreath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court,saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not onlyblind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people'sforum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that"whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." Heends his petition with a prayer that

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of theundersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that atany time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, wemay retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, onSeptember 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose thetribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitionsor appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client wascondemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "whereour Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for

justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commitculpable violations of the Constitution with impunity .

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns hisliving, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to allcases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those



unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasissupplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of[sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpableviolations of the Constitution with impunity

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle ofSeptember 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had"accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "hischarge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, afterdue hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received acopy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. Heserved on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time andplace of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for executionof the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove thathe did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacenfiled on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the requiredregistry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawnby the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier,that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposedno objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to theCourt of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & FidelityCo., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in thefollowing words:

Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appelleepraying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed bydefendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses,the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966(pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time andplace of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (ManilaSurety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and,

consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time. Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is notdecisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court inSupport of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, theCourt of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:



Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and thesupplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying forreconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this caseand that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R.

No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8,1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the questionraised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in theManila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.

There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety &Fidelity Co.

In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion todismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issuedon November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation ofthe decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, theresolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Courtissued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In themain decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passedupon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary tothe resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Suretyand Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on thematter in issue.

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and byminute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion forreconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration andfor extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the secondmotion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from therecords.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition toSurrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersedfrom beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatoryremarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, abehavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his

petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him tomake good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate,which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on hispetition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection withCase G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay , said case is now final and executory;" that thisCourt's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negativeact; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."



In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and grossmisconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause"why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in theNovember 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why nodisciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Courtresolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof,

his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incidentsubmitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "thecomplainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "inperson and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity andcandor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no timeto hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file awritten explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far frombeing contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this timeembellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:

At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:—

"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measureyou measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou seethe speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beamin thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me castout the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thyown eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy owneye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thybrother's eyes."

"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you alsoto them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in hispetition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible withhis lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any incourt. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statementscontained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and

derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring theentire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conductunbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and hasbeen asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainlymotivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our



client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE,our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity,generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highestinterest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED,with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Courttowards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards ourparticular case.

xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court thatnotwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, thisCourt in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflictpunishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE,CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justifytheir stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that yourrespondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statementwith emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, thateven our own President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to itstruth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it isused to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutallythat justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."

xxx xxx xxx

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR.We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. Wewere compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for thefinality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. Wenever interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end,after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against ourclient and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his Godgiven right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.

xxx xxx xxx

The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the furtherviolations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. RecallingMadam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are



committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed inthy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."

xxx xxx xxx

We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, butwho would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. Astrong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in allcourts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it isalso deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has everheard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for

justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, andpleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one wordwas spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the abovestatement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of thisCourt and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, INTRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow.

As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone maydecide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose betweenforcing ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court butdisregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by

the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as astudied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of thecriticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions.We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out thereasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abjectfrustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulouslymarshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truthto tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to

have been lodged at all.3

The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstandcritical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions forcertiorari .

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition wereject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by theConstitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S.Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whoseresolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."



Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore RadioShow , 94 L. ed 562, 566:

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the samepetition different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .

Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasonsfor denying petitions for certiorari , it has been suggested from time to time thatthe Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. Inorder that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties,Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within theCourt's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Courtdenied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review.If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, howeverbrief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required isprohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons notinfrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular

case at a particular time makes review undesirable.

Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G.8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered viewon this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violatesSection 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raisedbefore; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the aboveconstitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review shouldnot be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; andeven ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should beremembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not amatter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fullyexplain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are alreadymentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court inalleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S.Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered"dismissed".

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of

Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons tobuttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic thatthe supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended togive every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rulesof Court which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary .— A review is not a matter ofright but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there arespecial and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling



nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons whichwill be considered:

(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, nottheretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a wayprobably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme

Court;

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usualcourse of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lowercourt, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination ofthe pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered thedismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far fromstraying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced theprocedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no needfor this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the periodof appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (whichhe did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly hedid not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. BatuConstruction & Co., supra:

The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general byRule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such noticeshall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Partiesconcerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of thesame Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of suchnotice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but auseless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28,1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v.Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil.117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place ofhearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees toor objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since theRules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply oropposition.

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he hasonly himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which,incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of hiscarelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture ofa martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifyingthis Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appearthat there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.



Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspectconsideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time heloses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'widelatitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also themanner in which they are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of publicofficers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticismconcerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to publicconsumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment onthem, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, mustanswer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reasonwhy courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations. 9 This

danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entireCourt are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.

Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations.10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestryof justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only toexercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretionsof courts and judges. 11

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of theirperformance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in thesoil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it isexpected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and

judges. The reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to himin the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions ofthe courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, aswell as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6F Supp. 487) .

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. Inthe prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals hedissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). Asaptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:

No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion orpublication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than



members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forminga correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say thatan attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called toaccount and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or

judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position toomonstrous to be

entertained. ... .

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise theright, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor ishe "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which wouldnot expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to becomeconversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likelyto abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in thepreservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v.Hart , 116 N.W. 212, 216)

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lipsof those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speakdisparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judgemay be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. CircuitCourt , 72 N.W. 196)

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spillover the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the Onehand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate andunfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct thatsubjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mereflux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burdenmore basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward thecourts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and theRules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of

justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towardsthe courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office,but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by expressdeclaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is notmerely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all timesthe respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is notdischarged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court,but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensiveconduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20Law. 4d. 647, 652)



The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderlyadministration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even thosegifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer thanthe judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he

regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to theorderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. Thedecisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed todecide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectfulsubmission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That ishis privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it.That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not beallowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in wordscalculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples ofright. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer , L-22979. June

26, 1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney atone time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in privateconversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched ininsulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subjectthe attorney to disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticismof his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608,nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute theadministration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties,"adding that:

It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court isbeyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds ofdecency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidencein the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of theadministration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusationsthen the rule is otherwise.

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating aleaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of havingcommitted judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and ofbeing subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "Theysay that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF andDUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, asa lawyer, had a right to do.



The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittleand besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.

3. In In Re Humphrey , 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-yearsuspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was acandidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the

judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank tokeep that money." Said the court:

We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to thecriticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, orintegrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by theattorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against theintelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart . 116N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, forinstance:

"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelouspublication by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, couldbe so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of itsauthor."

Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver characterthan those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is thatwhich requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing lawthe strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty andfairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the publicconfidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity andusefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.

4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing awoman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill ofreview. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libelsuit against the judge and others. The letter began:

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name isprotected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shallbe compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the casewarrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to gounchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible politicalmanikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court ofIllinois declared:

... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is properground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer tosubmit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and theadministration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and



respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conducttoward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, whichtend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy publicconfidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judgewas plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicialfunctions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in

the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disreputewith the public.

5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influencedby corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does notappear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyerwas charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of twoyears. The Court said:

A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority ofthe court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments intocontempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right,

and interfere with the administration of justice. ...

Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise ofdisciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech whichhe possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, incases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honestcomment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits oflegitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty ofspeech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independentcourt, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy , 111 Atl. 723. 725.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submittingto an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which theappeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifyingsuspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements,and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered graveinjustice. The Court said:

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the professionof criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of theirduties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating theimpression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Everyattorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is hisduty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove

judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show aviolation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, orhas improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges tothe tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and theperson making themprotected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a casedecided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisionsof the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the



motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when theproceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tendsto subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in theadministration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of thecourts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, theattorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell , 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possibletemporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, asmy clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for adecision in their favor against a widow residing here.

The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety andprivileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation andinnuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a primafacie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a licensefrom this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity tothe court as well as to his client.

The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.

8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaperan article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, chargingthe court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ ofhabeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversiveof the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to therequirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...

The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is ofprime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinkingman would concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, aswell as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise,would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But suchright does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to acthonestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is

administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or thepublic good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truthand honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary.The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supplythan is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthywanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence thepublic, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with theaffairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his



strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of themembers of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court.

9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook , 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by anattorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt,and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal

prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was consideredconduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was orderedstricken from the roll of attorneys.

10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greaterlatitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending.This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesotaimpugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates inthe decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. Theletters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:

You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it thanthe burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, withthe court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got noundueadvantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable,short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation ofmorals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committeechosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by theresearches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of thecourt, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for thedecision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantineafter it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months,delivered its opinion as follows:

The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconductin sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as wehave found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of thiscourt; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because ofacts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such acommunication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effectin any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate theofficers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regardto their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of anyconstitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluencedby passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer,with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than bymethods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive,vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redressin any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication orlibelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionablepublication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the



sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly differentfrom his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, whollydifferent principles are applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as heexercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned

by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he wasimmune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extenthis rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed asan officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the ChiefJustice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, onthe contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courtsand judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing therules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of courtfrom all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personallyfor their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher , 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. Andthere appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between theindignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act,

and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutesmisconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken toothers. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained byauthority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in thatcase, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulingsof the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarilypunished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court,for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," saidthe court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only theassailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the

judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame

submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example ofpunishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded,manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally,constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may beimposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in acase, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct andreflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will bedisciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a

sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, inreference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is Ihave been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not acontempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of theSupreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court,"counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of

judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery,either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general publicmay feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus



the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into bad repute."

The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respectmuch the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote andmailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of

mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms tothe conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of theattorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having"willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, andthereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle,and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex

parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149;Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244,3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134;Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far

sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficientlesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under thesinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.

12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack againstthe official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney wasdisbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judgewas dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial ofcases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort ofpropaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession intodisrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case,prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Courtdeclared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member ofthe bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from thebar.

The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicialpronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers,critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, whichtranscend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend tobring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderlyadministration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited withdisbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in theexercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals andethics of the legal fraternity.



Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outburstsof counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparablenature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which,although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, neverthelessillustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.

A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez , 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion forreconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of thepetitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court,although conceding that

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of hisclient, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it isnot, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidationor proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courtsrequires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stabilityof their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on avery shaky foundation,

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed

... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentionalcontempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less thanhaving proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'ofthe untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked andflouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .

2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law,reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law,refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in ilocal newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not onlyerroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency ornarrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so manyblunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to putan end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal hedenounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnablebulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel

Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." Hethere also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming

session of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the SupremeCourt. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of theguarantee of free speech, this Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published inthe press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decisionof the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by thisCourt upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate themembers of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of



which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducingthe number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Courtwhich decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetentand narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by thisCourt, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But therespondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent

purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading theadministration. of justice ... .

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committingdeliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has beendeciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part ofthe adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered,in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily toundermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of themembers of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administrationof justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under theConstitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain

relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampledupon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of themembers of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, theymight be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhapschaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts,

Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity andauthority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he hastaken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of

justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, whichwithout such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to berespectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removedfrom office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrantmisconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al.,supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindlyadhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" ofthe Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal.

Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion forreconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. Itspeaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the

jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall isthe tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of thelaw on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court,blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to andanalysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court.



The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that indetermining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error andcontinuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Courtas one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictionalboundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of thisCourt on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those

statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. Theybring into question the capability of the members — and some former membersof this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone ofsarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of

jurisdiction."

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest ofbrevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involvedcontumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with thedoctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against

scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and notafter the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of acontempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon toaccount were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment .

The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of itsvitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for amodification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief JusticeManuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P.Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settledrule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of theManila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity ofthe said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption ofthe view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them maystill be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief JusticeMoran in Alarcon:

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courtsin administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminalcontempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends todegrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tendsto bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt,and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt,to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-importantduty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In thesecond kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate thecourts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroypublic confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is noaction pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced bythe newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a



pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity.Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements andactuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appealhad attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been

perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt forsuch post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolutionof November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as itconcerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as anofficer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authorityand duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from theintrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, thependency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The soleobjective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing orsuspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted

with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is thesolemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law.Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from thepractice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in theBar. Thus —

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent andincidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct ofattorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without

support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the rightto admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has theinherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice.23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he isworthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that —

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of thetrust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but theduty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege ofministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally heldthat both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is

admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right,but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mereinherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court.25



Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make anassessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in questionare properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.

The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond

making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actuallyavailed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integratedentirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for anddisrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar ofhypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not onlyblind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and itsmembers with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and"short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of

justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people'sforum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculatedeffort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Calledupon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with

characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to theScriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocritesincapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentationspeaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried fartranscend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purposebut to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more importantof all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them tothe detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texturepresents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionatecommitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross

violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, itcannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thuslaid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any otherGovernment entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism.But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as thecourt of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymousto obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached onlythrough constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of

judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises,that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants,prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension,if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our roletherein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of



an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether ornot the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise ofits disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his

actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legalprofession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession ofmembers who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrustedwith the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture,there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tiradeagainst the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individualmembers thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entityseparate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with theintrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. onlyas a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30

So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be theCourt itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves whoserights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should theadministration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge thesolemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of thepower to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vestedexclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterallyrenounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the memberscollectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualifythem from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a

Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such acase. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities ofcomplainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may rangefrom mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under thecircumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretionof the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity orprejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence ofthe Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealouslymaintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot beoveremphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never bedecreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it maynot perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realizethat abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in everyeffervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view thatsuspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his



misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way ofdetermining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decreethat the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because

jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without thecomforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude aperson from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in

degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The meritof this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine forhimself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspensionbecomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice oflaw.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he ishereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effectimmediately.

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court,respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUELTOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971

Bar Examining Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang,alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty.Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo,Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-

correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, OscarLandicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%,65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact thatthe grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reasonor another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.).This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C.Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that thereare strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjectsalso underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note



that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the barcandidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formalmotion, there is no reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motiontherefor is made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that somecandidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be reconsidered'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en

banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter ofadmission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 BarExaminations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public InternationalLaw, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful barcandidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were dulyinitialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the recordsrevealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennialbar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with agrade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a

Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 barexaminations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar ConfidantVictorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statementson the matter, with which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the fiveexamination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respectiveexaminers for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which thesame was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluatedand/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation tohim by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examineeconcerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Courtrequired, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show causewithin ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papersof Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized , and therefore he did not obtaina passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not bestricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examinersconcerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice whyno disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.).while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19,1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on

August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in





In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting theexamination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it isthe practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a

review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidateobtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one inanother, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluationand change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to mean examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to himthe owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark ;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practiceand policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was justmanifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsideredthe grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers werebased on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others;thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No.5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasissupplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972affidavit with following additional statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it isno longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the sameevaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I

did not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of theHonorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief thatI am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo,based on the following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16,1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had



developed to the point that with respect to the correction of theexamination booklets of bar candidates I have always followedhim and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules andpolicy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same;that I have no alternative but to take his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering hismisrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of theHonorable Supreme Court , I did not bother any more to get theconsent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee.Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members ofthe Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the BarCommittee for fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for suchrecorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet inRemedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the originalcorrection of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasissupplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Lawand Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from methe last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to myresidence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court,with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee'snotebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requestedme if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook becauseit appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to theBar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law .

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee thenotebook as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I wasauthorized to do so because the same was still within my control and authority aslong as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the codenumber decode and the examinee's name was revealed . The Bar Confidant told

me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that Ihad given a particularly low grade to said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me,and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the saidnotebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it inaccordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading of theentire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade



of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct thegrades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee inquestion had not been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected thetotal grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properlyinitia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to itemNo. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar

Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant broughtwith him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.;emphasis supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondentBernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earliersworn statement and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and internationallaw, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came toknow his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; nowknowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that Ihave never met him even up to the present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make suchreview, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized tomake such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of theexaminee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant'sassurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course ofexpress prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, andthe Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, Irefrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairmanlest I be identified as an examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in theevening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with theChairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized orsuspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of theSupreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, whichwas usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as itwas about the same hour that he used to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition aswhen I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook codenumbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not tomake the examinee pass the subject . I considered it entirely humanly possible tohave erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971,considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the saidexaminee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was84% in remedial law , if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual



that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to knowand that there was nothing irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examineewith notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the

subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass,notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committeeconsensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passedthe rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobodyobjected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still didnot know the names of the candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it . It had absolutely noknowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, anddid not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with himbefore or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examinationbooks to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in

Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in anothersubject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Lawsaying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only afraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few

points to 75% then he would make the general passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of,if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised alsothe mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm.Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word ofthe Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of theexaminee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor didI derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:



xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house atNo. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee'snotebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him.

He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed thesaid notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possiblyreconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examineconcerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparativelylow grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of

passing . Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed Imight find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I canrecall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers theexaminee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevohowever informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had

previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant toaddress such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the

presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and everyitem of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, Iincreased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, andmaintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr.Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation,the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of75% in my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents ofhis sworn statement, adding the following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the totalgrade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%,herein respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted fornot having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners thelegitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however,pleads in attenuation of such omission, that —

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he wasnot aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was notwithin the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court torequest or suggest that the grade of a particular examinationnotebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right to

presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of theBar Confidant, that the request was legitimate.



xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned,herein respondent carefully evaluated each and every answerwritten in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laiddown by the Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of

doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only inthat particular subject that the said examine failed , hereinrespondent became convinced that the said examinee deserved ahigher grade than that previously given to him, but that he did notdeserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given thepassing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, inreappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded aprevious rating of an answer written by the examinee, from 9.25%to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17,1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after theBar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed allother subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook

(No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of thisparticular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in thegrade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his swornstatement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in MercantileLaw in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement madeduring one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where acandidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned , which I did.



3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made theaforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Lawpertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that Ihave never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No.1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheetsand the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and theanswers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks.Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandumcircularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should thenbe given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par.4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking .

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of theresults of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of theexaminees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy theiranswers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of themwould file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now,we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for

submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have tobe denied because the result of the examinations when released is final andirrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me tobring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in hishotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not hisintention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on thecontrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in apresumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation wasinorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, hedoes not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that heremembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meetinga matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average



but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed toremove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject,respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned whothereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If heremembers right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir suchserious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in allgood faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed anothersworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned intobelieving that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, thefact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to therespective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they somerited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked asExh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which wascirculated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter ofwhether or not re-evaluation was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks inquestion:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part ofFebruary, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) afterlunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always madeit a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a numberfrom any object and the first number that comes into my sightbecomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the firstnumber that I saw was "954" boldly printed on an electricalcontribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to apost standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towardsthe Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and almostadjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo

High School(photograph of the number '954', the contrivance onwhich it is printed and a portion of the post to which it is attachedis identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number"954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).

With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz tolook for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, Ifound a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digitscorresponded to "954". This number became doubly impressive to



me because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was"27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I do I trysomewhat instinctively to link or connect it with said numberwhenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on theMaster List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of theexaminations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the

number "27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master Listis identified and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" atthe beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List asExh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, asExh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and thefigure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; andthe 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" atthe end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of theseincidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while withthe Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan,

Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalizedat the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will berecalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941.While I was still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombedand strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resultingin many casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941as the beginning of a new life for me having been saved from thepossibility of being among the casualties;(b) On February 27,1946, I was able to get out of the army byway of honorabledischarge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and sincethen we begot children the youngest of whom was born onFebruary 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket,I resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of thenotebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooksbearing the office code number "954". As the number was stillfresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry intothe contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of thewriting and language and the apparent soundness of the answersand, thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of theaforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo andExh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-evaluation, I set themaside and later on took them back to the respective examiners for

possible review recalling to them the said ConfidentialMemorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretionand judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to eitherof the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during themeeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respectiveexamines, namely:



(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general averagebut with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(thenotebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110,identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook inMercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with theoriginal grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh.

9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline generalaverage of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subjectwhich, at the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left inthe office the data thereon. It turned out that the subject wasPolitical and International Law under Asst. Solicitor GeneralBernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the OfficeCode No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and thenotebook in Political and International Law bearing the Examiner'sCode No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66%after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in

Political and International Law is precisely the same notebookmentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor GeneralBernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, onlyone (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, onlyMercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in thelatter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee andpursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooksinvolved to the examiners concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review orre-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committeethat there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since thesubject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's storyis devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set ofnotebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answerson the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in thegrading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, hestated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of thenotebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant VictorioLanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the latterrespondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.

xxx xxx xxx



4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider"failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a"passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the barconfidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinarycourse of official business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests areasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolutiondated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar ConfidantVictorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. Infact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the hereinrespondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated inthe Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded tothe benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar ExaminationCommittee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards thepaper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it musthave been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase thepercentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuationthat only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of BarConfidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the factthat BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefitan evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidantLanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous ineffect because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar ExaminationCommittee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result oftheir work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences aredeductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes toshow said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make thisRespondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo aswell as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of someconspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is deniedand it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of theirduties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

I

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically andcleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the



answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after thecorrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant,who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before

Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latterwas in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made therepresentations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjectsof the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in onesubject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned thenotebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972 , respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that theexaminee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade insaid subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average.

Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that wasreally the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was justmanifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered theexaminee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to anexaminee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examineeis Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity ofthe examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects includingCivil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtainthe passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972 , respondentLanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street,Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo andpreviously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo toreview the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining andrepresenting that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned haddone well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given saidexaminee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee wasshort of passing . Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that hethought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examineedeserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called theattention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himselfclearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention ofrespondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legalfundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a testof memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given toclarify of language and soundness of reasoning.



Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter ofreconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing thatrespondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and furtherbelieving that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers inthe presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particularsubject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his

signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The saidnotebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in hisaffidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo,

Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passinggrade due to his failing marks in five subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went todeliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examinationpapers in Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevobrought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo,

Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee whoowns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law andPublic International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark beincreased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himselffrom respondent that this is possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this isthe practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondentPablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the saidnotebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. Afterthe re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%.Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading sheet andaccordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code Number 954 alsobelonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still belowthe passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought backto respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing thelatter, who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public InternationalLaw, as he had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject— Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed thepassing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would beraised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting thewords of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to bethe one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64%to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general listand likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his OfficeCode Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 &3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevowhen the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo



declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed inone subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee'snotebook in the failing subject . He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of theConfidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondentLanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to apassing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. Forthe revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly setthe last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the BarExamination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondentLanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, theexaminer concerned would review the notebook . Nobody objected to it as irregular and theCommittee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No.1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo wasinformed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except MercantileLaw. This information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, whowere all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondentMontecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%.Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers,decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter officiallybrought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particularexaminee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented tomake the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewiseadded that there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personalrecords, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report,referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, withExaminer's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972 , when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence ofrespondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevoreturned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the SupremeCourt of the Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this wasaround the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar ExaminationCommittee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebookbearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requestedrespondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because , accordingto respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook obtained higher gradesin other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondentLanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers ofthe examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has



number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

A

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG,alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the fiveexaminers concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passinggrade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabledGalang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the

passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in anysubject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had noauthority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation ofthe answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galangfailed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, RespondentLanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of theConfidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51,

Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar ExaminationCommittee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the samemerited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust

reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned;and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm.Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidentialmemorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of theexamination papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any suchsuggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian —

whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed byrespondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No.1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation andhearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing ofexaminee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patentlikewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust andconfidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as



BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized hisrelationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thusdeceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang in five subjectsthat resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted amember of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the fiveexaminers concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/orwas on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations weremade, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his generalaverage was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestlyclaimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact,before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and PracticalExercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galangbefore and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:

B A I

1. Political Law PublicInternational Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.or 30 weighted points

B A I

Labor Laws and SocialLegislations 67% 67% = no re-evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 pointsor 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and PracticalExercises 81% 81% = no re-evaluation made.————————————



General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in thefive (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25%was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage andprejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other

examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition ofexaminees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluatedfor each of the latter who — Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg andMercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing markbefore or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the correctednotebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individualgrades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average.That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing andfailing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on

the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc.The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannotassume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He isnot the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any requestfor re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to theCourt, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposeshimself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention ofbetraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardlyinvite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averagesranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), whichcould be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondentLanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examinersfor re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang,there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examineeswere more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed byrespondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Barexaminations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure ofrespondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the factof re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as thesame is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law ofErnesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give hisactuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninetyexaminees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated theagreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when theexaminee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) andthree (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.



The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang'snotebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental swornstatement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigationwith this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. Itonly serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support.Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973

or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.

B

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAWTO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OFEXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINERBERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HISGRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaidnotebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and ErnestoQuitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruzand Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimedthat these two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its firstmeeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examinersconcerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove thedisqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevofurther claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which waspresented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise arecord of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol.VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of thedates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as,according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he wenton leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however,that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of respondentLanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol.VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebookin Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personalfile and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner codenumber is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang.It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz waschanged to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change isauthenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevopresented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 andOffice Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty.Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.



In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of anexaminee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except inone and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in thesubject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, buthe is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he isnot aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a

grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613(belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to returnit to the Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examineewith Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and heaccordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs toGalang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law thatwas taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee(Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was

referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of ErnestoQuitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the membersof the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others,the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook(Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. CaseNo. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referredback to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, asfollows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade inPolitical Law are as follows:

B A

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27weighted pointsLabor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluationCivil Law 75% 75% = "Taxation 69% 69% = "Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "Criminal Law 78% 78% = "





As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their namesstricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause andthe corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

A

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be strickenoff the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation ofhis answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law,Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, whichnecessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and

principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3)a decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination ofwhether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion(Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composedof a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act asexaminers in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort ofliaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individualmembers of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputyclerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of

discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance withthe established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court.With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designationindicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined andcircumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondentGalang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevowithout any authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed bythe Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondentGalang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity.The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of

examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not anexaminee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal ofsuch answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or aprivy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led tothe candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.

B



Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, withthe character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicantfor admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moralcharacter ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moralcharacter, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or arepending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar

applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of goodmoral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay beforethe Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enablethe Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to whatcrime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity oflaying before or informing the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminallyindicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes morecompelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the SupremeCourt beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moralturpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which hehas been accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galangwhen he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the

applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to showsatisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court allhis involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainmentand determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal recordsbefore it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for itcould not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending orterminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon hischaracter or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang tookthe Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Courtfor use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not beenaccused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moralturpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang

took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for useof applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moralturpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that"he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; oraccused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moralturpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet,respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminalcase of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court ofManila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications totake the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently

concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, hecommitted perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court.By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondentGalang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972was allowed to take his oath.





The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one whodemands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sounddiscretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conductwhich merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would bea disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as anofficer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then

to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this presentcase is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the pastnullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on thegrounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, therequirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the SupremeCourt striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of thefindings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962;In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re:

Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades ofMabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of publicdocuments.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFIJudge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, nowdeceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty.Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidantLanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the gradesof the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks;and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the recordsclearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any considerationwhatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members tothe Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercisedgreater care and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the requestof respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the BarExamination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least therespondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them thecomplete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo tohave failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline ofpassing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances.This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have beenavoided.



Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared underoath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades;and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg'sanswers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear thatthey increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of themisrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz:

"You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed,however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average and ifhe would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because Idid not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondentPablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subjectexcept this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase themark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I askedhim 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help outexaminees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Justleave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go overthe book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which

were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it wasnot complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correctthe grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasissupplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made byrespondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that theincreases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certainextent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo.Thus in their own words:

Montecillo —

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation ofthe paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord inthe absence of such information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at thattime" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4

& 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to mean examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him



the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practiceand policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was justmanifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered

the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief thatI am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. VictorioLanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo —

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondentcarefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing theanswer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee thebenefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only inthat particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent becameconvinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previouslygiven him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to begiven the passing grade of75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo —

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I correctedthat particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially therepresentation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher

grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if Irecallcorrectly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.;emphasis supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to inducethe herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claimthat the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, theirconceded integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given afterthe said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners,which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of theanswers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of anydisciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained toremind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission of members to theBar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of theproceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in theperformance of their duties relative thereto.



V

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973,claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lendingundue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent'srefusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971

Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records willshow, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the lateJustice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refuteLanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during theinvestigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did notmake this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferredthe filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landichobefore the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it bemisread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this caseon the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not

impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, whoalso affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondentGalang in their respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, OscarLandicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examinerPamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations.Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar ExaminationCommittee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination bookletwas re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7,rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the officialrelease of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of theJudiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to therules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinationsand to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondentLanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuableconsideration.

A

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the officialrelease of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to hissalary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BFHomes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, forthe amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but wasnotarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent



Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lotin favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972 , date ofinscription — April 20, 1972 : Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914:date of instrument — April 5, 1972 , date of inscription — April 20, 1972 ). [D-2 toD-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of

only P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, ofthe purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 camefrom his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through aniece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII,pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loanfrom his sister ; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit

in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listedunder Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of theP2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only theamount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized becausethe transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets andLiabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from hismarried sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of$2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971 Statement of Assets andLiabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which heallegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not evenpresented by respondent during the investigation. And according to RespondentLanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did not seriouslyconsider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon bythem. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promisedto furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise wasnot fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing thathis sister, who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa orhas saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that theP17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared incomeis inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.

On August 14, 1972 , respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BFHomes house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992:

August 14, 1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription).On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgagein favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondentLanuevo and thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III,



rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance ofrespondent's house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthlyamortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets andLiabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement (filedOctober 13, 1972 ), the house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued

at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statementwas the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of

Assets and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956VW car valued at P5,200.00 . That he acquired this car sometime betweenJanuary, 1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no suchcar or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in theyears previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excludingreceivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00 , while in his 1972 (as ofNovember, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lotwas P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Barexaminations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to linkor tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed byrespondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers orto show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of theabove properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passingthe Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevoof the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho'sConfidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his swornstatement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed hisletter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. Hisresignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informedof the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Barexaminations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 toJanuary 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00.He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for hisBF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) inrelation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an actconstituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competentauthority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, orallowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violationor offense.





Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the PhilippineVeterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know thelocation of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rightseducational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester tosubmit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to theGSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the

neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine VeteransBuilding is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, heinvestigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits anddisability benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties asveterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educationalbenefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him(Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operatingat Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49,

rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with thePhilippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged.During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had nocommunications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and doesnot remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with thePhilippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol.VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed atCamp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and washospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there whentheir camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Swornstatement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces,otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a memberthereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached

and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationedheadquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed atCorregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date ofrecognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal datedDecember 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to theBar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior



authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of theactuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D.LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THEROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON

E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

H. Requirements for Bar Candidates

ATTORNEYS & ADMISSION TO BAR

Rule 138

Sec. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. -

Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a

citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, ofgood moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and

must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of

good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving

moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in

the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. - All

applicants for admission other than those referred to in the two

preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the

examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly

studied law for four years, and successfully completed all

prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially

approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The

affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from

the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of

such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

R E S O L U T I O N



KAPUNAN, J .:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien fathervalidly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority?This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application foradmission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since hisbirth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. LouisUniversity in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution

of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject tothe condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the followingdocuments:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of theProfessional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified publicaccountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,Election Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union

showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo,showing that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan ofTubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one ofthe successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduledon 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was notallowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he wasrequired to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of theSolicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the

bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of aChinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizenand continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippinecitizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An

Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall beDeclared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat heacquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election



upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditionsmust concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) themother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) saidelection must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains themeaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean areasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted bythe Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op.,Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extendedunder certain circumstances, as when a (sic ) person concerned has alwaysconsidered himself a Filipino (ibid ., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12,46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done afterover seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and,if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present

jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG

recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonableperiod" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No.625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election ofPhilippine Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation,Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in myschool records and other official documents;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipinocitizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the SangguniangBayan from 1992 to 1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance withCommonwealth Act No. 625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before anotary public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegianceto the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;



9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic )the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised iswhether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative,whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under ArticleIV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipinomother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the ageof majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship wasrecognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippinecitizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" arecitizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried overto the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipinomothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippinecitizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on theelection of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on anyirregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If thecitizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject tochallenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced beforethe effectivity of the new Constitution. 8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippinecitizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may electPhilippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to bythe party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with thenearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath ofallegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within whichthe election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that theelection should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority thencommenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justiceon cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved bybasing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn,based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government tothe effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age ofmajority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election shouldbe made within three (3) years from reaching the age ofmajority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year periodis not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period afterreaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled thatthree (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the



constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended undercertain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always consideredhimself a Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenshipis not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. Hebecame of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made onMay 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven(7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said electionhas not been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) yearsold when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen(14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase"upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonableyardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in thisconnection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i .e., his continuous anduninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registeredvoter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the lawspecifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labelsas informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: FlorencioMallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic ) legally married to analien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has beenestablished that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, andthat as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was alreadyparticipating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. Theseacts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein arevery different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, EstebanMallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No.625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A.No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling inMallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for

Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being anatural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself aFilipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights andprivileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16,1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be



taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenshipprivileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of theHouse of Representatives, 18 where we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informalprocess.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held thatthe exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercisesconstitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exactpronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of ageconstitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52:emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has establishedhis life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted tohave elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the InRe Mallare rule.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those whostill have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect

came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding .Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office wherecitizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office,and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestationsfor these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is analien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There isno doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one(21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private

respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resultedin an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we considerthe special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his lifeand his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain usto disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed tovalidly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time hereached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship



is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the ageof majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippinecitizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tediousand painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election ofPhilippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching'sunreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when neededand suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship hasonly an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor,enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to electPhilippine citizenship and, as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application foradmission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

I. Requisites for Bar Admission

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant , vs. EDWIN L. RANA,respondent .

D E C I S I O NCARPIO, J .:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moralintegrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is ofgreater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilegebestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice

law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (―respondent‖) was among those who passed the 2000Bar Examinations.



On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful barexaminees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre(―complainant‖) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during thescheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International ConventionCenter. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneyspending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, r espondent took the lawyer’soath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and gravemisconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared ascounsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board ofElection Canvassers (―MBEC‖) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges thatrespondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal

Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office ofVice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as ―counsel for and inbehalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan,‖ and signed the pleading ascounsel for George Bunan (―Bunan‖).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipalgovernment employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon,Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in anycourt or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accusesrespondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (―Bunan‖)

without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondentfiled the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoraltycandidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take thelawyer’s oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared ofthe charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent tocomment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his ―specific assistance‖ torepresent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that ―he decided to assist andadvice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.‖ Respondent admits

signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in thecanvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer orrepresented himself as an ―attorney‖ in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims thathe submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on thesame date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of RevocableResignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondentfurther claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is



the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he beallowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment andrefuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to

extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 EmilyEstipona-Hao (―Estipona-Hao‖) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidatefor mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. Whenrespondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned hisappearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2)he was an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating hisclaim that the instant administrative case is ―motivated mainly by political vendetta.‖

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant(―OBC‖) for evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBC’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel forBunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show thatrespondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found thatrespondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oathon 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that r espondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubton his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that

respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to thepractice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admissionto the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law whichrespondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was agovernment employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation wasaccepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before theMBEC.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged inthe unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the PhilippineBar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records showthat respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, beforerespondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the







should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to beperformed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signaturein the Roll of Attorneys.9

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allowrespondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body

since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan priorto the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letterdated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer ofthe Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning ―effective upon youracceptance.‖10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11 May2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted ascounsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows thatBunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC

and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless hadno authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the PhilippineBar.

SO ORDERED.

[B.M. No. 674. June 14, 2005]

VILLA vs . AMA

EN BANC

Sirs/Mesdames:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 14 2005.

Bar Matter No. 674 (ROMULO M. VILLA vs. JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, MICHAELFREDERICK MUSNGI and CRISANTO SARUCA, JR., Successful Bar Examinees.)



Before this Court is a Petition filed on April 13, 2005 by Junel Anthony D. Ama, asuccessful 1992 Bar Examinee, praying that he be admitted to the Philippine Bar, beallowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys.

The petitioner, along with other members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity of the Ateneo de Manila School of Law, was implicated and criminally charged for the death of

Jose Leonardo "Lenny" Villa. An Amended Information for serious physical injuries wasfiled with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 53, against thepetitioner, docketed as Criminal Case No. 155211. Another criminal Information forHomicide, in relation to the death of Villa, was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Caloocan City, docketed as Criminal Case No. C-38340.

On April 16, 1993, Romulo Villa, the victim's father, filed a petition with the Courtpraying that the petitioner be disallowed from taking the Lawyer's Oath and from signingthe Roll of Attorneys pending final judgment in the criminal cases filed against him.

Eventually, on February 28, 1996, the MTC rendered its decision and acquitted thepetitioner. On the other hand, the RTC, in its Decision dated November 27, 1993, found

the petitioner guilty of homicide through conspiracy.The RTC Decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR

No. 15520. On January 10, 2002 the appellate court rendered its decision, setting asidethe lower court's finding of conspiracy and considered the individual actuation of theaccused. As for herein petitioner, the appellate court found him guilty of slight physicalinjuries under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced him to twenty (20)days of arresto menor. He, along with the other accused, was likewise ordered to jointlypay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 as indemnity.

Instead of serving the twenty (20) day imprisonment, the petitioner applied forprobation[1] which the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 130 granted on October 11, 2002.[2]

After six (6) months, or on April 10, 2003, the RTC issued its Order [3] discharging thepetitioner on probation, and declared the case terminated.

Appended to the present petition are various certifications[4] attesting to thepetitioner's moral character.

On May 6, 2005, the petitioner manifested that he made a manifestation in the caseentitled People vs. Court of Appeals, et al, docketed as G.R. No. 154954, that he iswilling to deposit his share of P7,500.00 in the civil indemnity provided in the CADecision.

In her Report dated May 10, 2005, Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant Atty.Ma. Cristina B. Layusa recommended that petitioner be allowed to take the lawyer'soath and sign the Roll of Attorneys, citing the cases of In Re: Al Argosino[5] and In Re:

Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.,[6] both involving bar passers who were convicted of the crimereckless imprudence resulting in homicide, but after serving their respective sentences,were nevertheless allowed by the Court to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of

Attorneys. It was also pointed out that in Bar Matter No. 832, the Court allowed AntonioM. Tuliao, convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide (which arose out ofthe same incident as that of Argosino and Cuevas, Jr.,) to take the Lawyer's Oath andsign the Roll of Attorneys.

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The Court agrees with the foregoing recommendation. The crime for which thepetitioner was convicted — slight physical injuries — is after all, a light offense, andcannot be considered a grave violation of the moral sentiment of the community or donein the spirit of cruelty, hostility, or revenge; certainly not a crime involving moralturpitude.[7]

The Court thus resolves to GRANT the petition of Junel Anthony D. Ama. He ishereby allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys upon a showingof proof of having deposited his share in the civil indemnity stated in the Decision of theCourt of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520, and upon payment of the required fees.

Tinga, J., no part.

Very truly yours,

LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court

(Sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA

Asst. Clerk of Court

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs . ATTY. FRANCISCO R.

LLAMAS, respondent .

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J .:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against

respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.

In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr.,

himself a member of the bar, alleged that:

On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate

sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now,

has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place ofissuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he

has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the followingattached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals

available)

Annex "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated









to be respondent’s signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal

259060."12 Also attached was a copy of the order,13 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge

Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent’smotion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art.

316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification14 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent’s "last

payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to coverhis membership fees up to the present."

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days fromreceipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and

recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,15 dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:16

3. That with respect to the complainant’s absurd claim that for using in 1995,

1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent isautomatically no longer a member in good standing.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the

bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.

The complainant’s basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good

standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision ofdismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,

concealment of encumbrances. Chief



As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside

and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to

Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.

Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was

appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal

as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision ofconviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned

himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.

4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in

his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return,

up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his IncomeTax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectaresorchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in

1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he

honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but onlyin a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated

Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP

member to vote and be voted upon.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and

if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed andrefused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all

past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to

tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again

irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by thecomplainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him

to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the

contrary. Esmsc

On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution17 adopting and approving

the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent

guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied



by the IBP in a resolution,18 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of the

Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent’s

suspension for three months.

The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:

On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent’s non-indication of the

proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of

the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at leastthree years."

The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal

Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent’s last payment of his

IBP dues was in 1991."

While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by

respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, heis legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."

. . . .

The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the

"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up

to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of

Respondent’s Memorandum).

Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated

Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis

On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court

about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadingsof at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his

memorandum did not discuss this issue.

First . Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having

paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by

complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, atleast for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter

membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims,

however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he





believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP

dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of

law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this

decision be attached to Atty. Llamas’ personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant andcopies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the

land.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO B.M. No. 1678

RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY,

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,QUISUMBING,*

YNARES-SANTIAGO,SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,



GARCIA,

VELASCO, JR.

NACHURA,

REYES and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 17, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

R E S O L U T I O N

CORONA, J .:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay

for leave to resume the practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced

law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for



his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s

free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a

Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention

and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.20

On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the

Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the

Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question,

however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the

Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this

petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites

Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:



SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar . – Every

applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at

least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the

Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good

moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been

filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his

reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the

qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It

recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,

conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and

responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with

certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.21

It is so

delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the



State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and

promote the public welfare.22

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest

degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession,

compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and

payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the

conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying

the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions

makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients

repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.23

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:







education requirement;32

faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal

profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.33

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still

practice law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the

Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.34

Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof

terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to

engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso



jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law

is a privilege denied to foreigners.35

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization

as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225.

This is because “all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country

shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions

of *RA 9225+.”36

Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another

country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it

in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have

terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume

law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the

Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions



“(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in

such practice.”37

Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino

citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure

from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in

the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing

legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the

applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him

of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of

his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the

Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the

Republic of the Philippines.



Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a

member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby

GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and

submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may

retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004]

PEDRO G. TOLENTINO, ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M.LUMALANG, SR., MELITON D. EVANGELISTA, SR., and NELSON

B. MELGAR, com plainants, vs . ATTY. NORBERTO M. MENDOZA,respondent .

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:



Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M.Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. NorbertoM. Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct.

Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that respondent, a former MunicipalTrial Court Judge, abandoned his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his

paramour, Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G. Marcos;respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente have been cohabiting openly and publicly ashusband and wife in Brgy. Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro; respondent had fatheredtwo children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuentedeclared in the birth certificates of their two daughters that they were married on May12, 1986, making it appear that their two children are legitimate, while in respondent’sCertificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC during the 1995 elections, respondentdeclared that his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia; in respondent’s certificate of candidacy forthe 1998 elections, he declared his civil status as separated; such declarations in thebirth certificates of his children and in his certificate of candidacy are acts constitutingfalsification of public documents; and respondent’s acts betray his lack of good moral

character and constitute grounds for his removal as a member of the bar.Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that complainants, who are his

political opponents in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this case to exactrevenge on him for his filing of criminal charges against them; complainants illegallyprocured copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela FuenteMendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24,

Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such documents are inadmissible inevidence; respondent did not participate in the preparation and submission with thelocal civil registry of subject birth certificates; respondent never declared that he had twowives, as he has always declared that he is separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V.

Valderia; and complainants have used this issue against him during elections and yet,the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still elected him as Mayor, hence, respondenthas not offended the public’s sense of morality.

The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines(hereinafter IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, theCommission on Bar Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings.

Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo M. Laygo, submittedtheir affidavits as their direct testimony and were subjected to cross-examination byrespondent’s counsel.

Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as follows: He knows respondent

for they both reside in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Respondent is known as a practicinglawyer and a former Municipal Trial Court Judge. Respondent has been cohabitingopenly and publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente, representing themselves to be husbandand wife, and from their cohabitation, they produced two children, namely, Mara KhrisnaCharmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza.Sometime in 1995, he (witness Melgar) received a letter from a concerned citizen,informing him that respondent was married to Felicitas Valderia of San Rafael, Bulacan,on January 16, 1980, but respondent abandoned his wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela



Fuente. Attached to the letter was a photocopy of a Certification issued by the CivilRegister attesting to the marriage between respondent and Felicitas Valderia. He alsoreceived information from concerned citizens that Marilyn dela Fuente is also legallymarried to one Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced by a Certification from the Office of theCivil Register. Respondent stated in his Certificate of Candidacy filed with the

COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to Felicitas Valderia. In respondent’sCertificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC in 1998, he declared his civil status asseparated. Respondent has represented to all that he is married to Marilyn delaFuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where respondent holds the position ofChairman of the Board of the Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by saidnewspaper as husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna Charminaand Myrra Khrisna Normina.

On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as follows: He was the formermayor of Naujan and he and respondent belong to warring political parties. It was notrespondent who told him about the alleged immoral conduct subject of the presentcase. Although he received the letter of a concerned citizen regarding the immoral

conduct of respondent as far back as 1995, he did not immediately file a case fordisbarment against respondent. It was only after respondent filed a criminal case forfalsification against him that he decided to file an administrative case againstrespondent.[1]

On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that there were people who wereagainst the open relationship between respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente asrespondent had been publicly introducing the latter as his wife despite the fact that theyare both still legally married to other persons, and so someone unknown to him justhanded to their maid copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina andMyrra Khrisna Normina.[2]

The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted as his direct testimony, ispractically identical to that of witness Melgar. On cross-examination, witness Laygotestified that he was not the one who procured the certified true copies of the birthcertificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra KhrisnaNormina dela Fuente Mendoza, as somebody just gave said documents to NelsonMelgar. He was a municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter of a concerned citizenregarding respondent’s immorality was sent to Melgar, but he did not take any actionagainst respondent at that time.[3]

Complainants then formally offered documentary evidence consisting ofphotocopies which were admitted by respondent’s counsel to be faithful reproductionsof the originals or certified true copies thereof, to wit: a letter of one Luis Bermudezinforming Nelson Melgar of respondent’s immoral acts,[4] the Certification of the LocalCivil Registrar of San Rafael, Bulacan, attesting to the celebration of the marriagebetween respondent and one Felicitas Valderia,[5] the Birth Certificate of Mara KhrisnaCharmina dela Fuente Mendoza,[6] the Birth Certificate of Myrra Khrisna Normina delaFuente Mendoza,[7] the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 9, 1995,[8] the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent dated March 25, 1998,[9] Certification issuedby the Civil Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated October 27, 1998, attesting to

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the marriage celebrated between Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos,[10] and theeditorial page of the Naujanews (February-March 1999 issue),[11] wherein it was statedthat respondent has two daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.

Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any evidence and merelysubmitted a memorandum expounding on his arguments that the testimonies of

complainants’ witnesses are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and theirdocumentary evidence have no probative weight.

On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No.XVI-2004-123, reading as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner ofthe above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex ―A‖; and, findingthe recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable lawsand rules, and considering respondent’s violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby SUSPENDED

INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactory proof that he is nolonger cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has abandoned such immoralcourse of conduct.

Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP Commission on BarDiscipline, upon which the above-quoted Resolution was based, read as follows:

FINDINGS:

The evidence of complainants to support their charge of immorality consists in a)the testimonies of Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo given by way of affidavitsexecuted under oath and affirmed before the Commission and b) their documentaryevidence consisting of their Exhibits ―A‖ to ―H‖.

Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not formally present oroffer any evidence. Respondent opted not to present his evidence anymore becauseaccording to him ―ther e is none to rebut vis-à-vis the evidence presented by the privatecomplainants.‖ Respondent instead submitted a memorandum through counsel toargue his position. As can be seen from the comment and memorandum submitted,respondent’s counsel argues that the complaint is politically motivated sincecomplainants are political rivals of respondent and that the birth certificates Exhibits ―D‖and ―D-1‖ which were offered to show that respondent sired the children namely MaraKhrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela FuenteMendoza out of his cohabitation with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible becausethey were allegedly secured in violation of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993.The rest of the exhibits are either hearsay or self-serving according to respondent.

The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein, on the other hand,categorically state in their affidavits [Exhibits ―A‖ and ―B‖] particularly in paragraph 2that ―Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn de la Fuente,representing themselves to be husband and wife.‖ In paragraph 10 of said affidavitsthe witnesses also categorically state that ―respondent has even represented to all andsundry that Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife.‖ These categorical statements madeunder oath by complainants are not hearsay and remain un-rebutted. Respondentchose not to rebut them.











Exhibit ―E,‖ the Certificate of Candidacy executed by respondent shows thatrespondent is married to one, Felicitas V. Valderia. As shown by Exhibit ―H‖, amarriage certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is married to one, Ramon G. Marcos. Dulycertified true copies of said exhibits have been presented by complainants.

With respect to Exhibits ―D‖ and ―D-1‖, we believe that they are competent and

relevant evidence and admissible in this proceedings. The exclusionary rule whichbars admission of illegally obtained evidence applies more appropriately to evidenceobtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. The instant case cannot beanalogous to an illegal search or seizure. A person who violates Rule 24 of

Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by respondent risks the penalty ofimprisonment or payment of a fine but it does not make the document so issuedinadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the present case. Exhibits ―D‖and ―D-1‖ which are duly certified birth certificates are therefore competent evidence toshow paternity of said children by respondent in the absence of any evidence to thecontrary.

By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the testimonies ofwitnesses Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo, and corroborated by the documentary

exhibits will show that indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a certainMarilyn de la Fuente who is not his wife and that out of said cohabitation respondentsired two children. These facts we repeat have not been denied by respondent underoath since he chose to just argue on the basis of the improper motivations and theinadmissibility, hearsay and self-serving nature of the documents presented.Complainants have presented evidence sufficient enough to convince us that indeedrespondent has been cohabiting publicly with a person who is not his wife. Theevidence taken together will support the fact that respondent is not of good moralcharacter. That respondent chose not to deny under oath the grave and seriousallegations made against him is to our mind his undoing and his silence has not helpedhis position before the Commission. As between the documents and positivestatements of complainants, made under oath and the arguments and comments of

respondent submitted through his lawyers, which were not verified under oath byrespondent himself, we are inclined and so give weight to the evidence ofcomplainants. The direct and forthright testimonies and statements of Nelson Melgarand Romeo Laygo that respondent was openly cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente isnot hearsay. The witnesses may have admitted that respondent Mendoza did not tellthem that a certain Marilyn de la Fuente was his paramour (for why would respondentadmit that to complainants) but the witnesses did state clearly in their affidavits underoath that respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente who is not respondent’swife. Again their categorical statements taken together with the other documents, areenough to convince us and conclude that respondent is not of good moral character.

Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that possession of good

moral character is a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.The continued possession of good moral character is a requisite condition forremaining in the practice of law [Mortel vs. Aspiras 100 Phil. 586 (1956); Cordova vs.Cordova 179 SCRA 680 (1989); People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA 682 (1990)]. The moraldelinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includesconduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,conduct for instance, which makes ―mockery of the inviolable social institution ofmarriage‖ [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1 (1997)].



In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a mockery of thefundamental institution of marriage. Respondent in fact even so stated in Exhibit ―F‖that he is separated from his wife. This fact and statement without any furtherexplanation from respondent only contributes to the blot in his moral character whichgood moral character we repeat is a continuing condition for a member to remain ingood standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer

shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent hasviolated this rule against engaging in immoral conduct.

We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the pronouncement made in Santos vs.Dischoso, 84 SCRA 622 (1978) that courts should not be used by private personsparticularly disgruntled opponents to vent their rancor on members of the Bar throughunjust and unfounded accusations. However, in the instant case the charges canhardly be considered as unfounded or unjust based on the evidence presented. Theevidence presented shows that respondent no longer possess (sic) that good moralcharacter necessary as a condition for him to remain a member of the Bar in goodstanding. He is therefore not entitled to continue to engage in the practice of law.

We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be fully supported by thepleadings and evidence on record, and, hence, approve and adopt the same.

The evidence presented by complainants reach that quantum of evidence requiredin administrative proceedings which is only substantial evidence, or that amount ofrelevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support aconviction.[12]

Witness Melgar’s testimony that respondent had been publicly introducing Marilyndela Fuente as his wife is corroborated by the contents of an article in the Naujanews,introducing respondent as one of Naujan’s public servants, and stating therein thatrespondent has been blessed with two beautiful children with his wife, Marilyn delaFuente.[13] It should be noted that said publication is under the control of respondent, he

being the Chairman of the Board thereof. Thus, it could be reasonably concluded that ifhe contested the truth of the contents of subject article in the Naujanews, or if he did notwish to publicly present Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife, he could have easily orderedthat the damning portions of said article to be edited out.

With regard to respondent’s argument that the credibility of witnesses for thecomplainants is tainted by the fact that they are motivated by revenge for respondent’sfiling of criminal cases against them, we opine that even if witnesses Melgar and Laygoare so motivated, the credibility of their testimonies cannot be discounted as they arefully supported and corroborated by documentary evidence which speak forthemselves. The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and

Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22,1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and theCertification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to theexistence in its records of an entry of a marriage between respondent and one FelicitasValderia celebrated on January 16, 1980, are public documents and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, as provided for under Article 410 [14] of the CivilCode of the Philippines.
















Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 and the RevisedRules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birthcertificates in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should beproperly taken into consideration in the resolution of this administrative case againstrespondent.

Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina delaFuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and respondent’sCertificate of Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent himself declared hewas married to Felicitas Valderia, were never denied nor rebutted by respondent.Hence, said public documents sufficiently prove that he fathered two children by Marilyndela Fuente despite the fact that he was still legally married to Felicitas Valderia at thattime.

In Bar Matter No. 1154,[17] good moral character was defined thus:

. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from goodreputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is

held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjectiveterm but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal andprofessional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person toescape the penalty of criminal law.

In Zaguirre vs. Castillo,[18] we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, to wit:

. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to showindifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, itmust be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to bereprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revoltingcircumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.

In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member of the Bar and officer ofthe court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping ofmistresses but must also behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creatingthe belief that he is flouting those moral standards and, thus, ruled that siring a childwith a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of moralityrequired of every lawyer .[19]

We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The fact that respondentcontinues to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his legal wife, thus,siring children by her, shows his lack of good moral character. Respondent should keepin mind that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent

to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain one’sgood standing in the legal profession.[20] In Aldovino vs. Pujalte, Jr .,[21] we emphasizedthat:

This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral characterof members of the Bar. They are expected at all times to uphold the integrity anddignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessenthe trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity ofthe legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it




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http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/feb2004/ac_5082.htm













is made to appear that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence ofthe public, it becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court, which made himone of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdrawthe privilege.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is hereby found GUILTY of

immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He isSUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits satisfactoryproof that he has abandoned his immoral course of conduct.

Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on respondent at his last knownaddress and entered in his record as attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and theCourt Administrator be furnished also a copy of this resolution for their information andguidance as well as for circularization to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

J.- - - -

ATTORNEYS & ADMISSION TO BAR

Rule 138

Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys. - It is the duty of an attorney:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines

and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the

Philippines;

(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of

justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as

appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes

to be honestly debatable under the law;

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes

confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth

and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial

officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to

himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no

compensation in connection with his client's business except

from him or with his knowledge and approval;



(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no

fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or

witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which

he is charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance

of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any

corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself,

the cause of the defenseless or oppressed;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and

honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the

guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law

permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or

liberty, but by due process of law.

Lawyer’s Oath (MEMORIZE!!!)

I _____ , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the RP:

I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly

constituted authorities therein;

I will do no falsehood nor consent to its commission;

I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor

consent to the same;

I will not delay any man’s cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to

the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the court as to my clients; and

I will impose upon myself this obligation voluntarily, without any mental reservation or purpose of

evasion.

So help me God.



II. Legal Ethics

A. Definition

Legal Ethics, Defined:

Legal Ethics denotes that body of principles by which the conduct of members of the legal profession is

controlled. It is that branch of moral science which treats of the duties which an attorney at law owes to

his clients, to the courts, to the bar and to the public. (G.A. Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics 8 (1949))

Privileges of attorney

o A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law during good behavior before any judicial, quasi-

judicial or administrative tribunal.

o An attorney enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of his duty. (i.e. He is immune, in the

performance of his obligation to his client, from liability to a third person insofar as he does not

materially depart from his character as a quasi-judicial officer.)

o There are also privileges inherent in his status as a quasi-judicial officer. (i.e. the law makes his passing

the bar examination equivalent to a first grade or second grade civil service eligibility.)

B. Sources of Legal Ethics - - - - -

III. Code of Professional Responsibility

A. Lawyer’s Duty to Society

A.1 Canon 1

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC

2004 Rules on Notarial Practice



RESOLUTION

Acting on the compliance dated 05 July 2004 and on the proposed

Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 submitted by the Sub-Committee for

the Study, Drafting and Formulation of the Rules Governing the

Appointment of Notaries Public and the Performance and Exercise of

Their Official Functions, of the Committees on Revision of the Rules of

Court and on Legal Education and Bar Matters, the Court Resolved to

APPROVE the proposed Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, with

modifications, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

RULE I

IMPLEMENTATION

SECTION 1. Title. - These Rules shall be known as the 2004 Rules on

Notarial Practice.

SEC. 2. Purposes. - These Rules shall be applied and construed to

advance the following purposes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) to promote, serve, and protect public interest; chan robles virtual law library

(b) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the rules governing notaries

public; and (c) to foster ethical conduct among notaries public. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 3. Interpretation. - Unless the context of these Rules otherwise

indicates, words in the singular include the plural, and words in the

plural include the singular.

RULE II

DEFINITIONS

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - “Acknowledgment” refers to an act in

which an individual on a single occasion: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an

integrally complete instrument or document;

chan robles virtual law library (b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or

identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity



as defined by these Rules; and -

chan robles virtual law library (c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the

instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the

purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has

executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act

and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that

he has the authority to sign in that capacity.

SEC. 2. Affirmation or Oath. - The term “Affirmation” or “Oath” refers

to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: chan robles virtual law library

(a) appears in person before the notary public; chan robles virtual law library

(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary

public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these

Rules; and chan robles virtual law library (c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of

the instrument or document.

SEC. 3. Commission. - “Commission” refers to the grant of authority to

perform notarial acts and to the written evidence of the authority.

SEC. 4. Copy Certification. - “Copy Certification” refers to a notarial act

in which a notary public: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) is presented with an instrument or document that is neither a vital

record, a public record, nor publicly recordable;

(b) copies or supervises the copying of the instrument or document;

(c) compares the instrument or document with the copy; and

(d) determines that the copy is accurate and complete.

SEC. 5. Notarial Register. - “Notarial Register” refers to a permanently

bound book with numbered pages containing a chronological record of

notarial acts performed by a notary public. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 6. Jurat. - “Jurat” refers to an act in which an individual on a

single occasion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


instrument or document;



Rules; chan robles virtual law library



(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary;

and

(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such

instrument or document.

SEC. 7. Notarial Act and Notarization. - “Notarial Act” and “Notarization” refer to any act that a notary public is empowered to

perform under these Rules.

SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate. - “Notarial Certificate” refers to the part of,

or attachment to, a notarized instrument or document that is

completed by the notary public, bears the notary's signature and seal,

and states the facts attested to by the notary public in a particular

notarization as provided for by these Rules. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 9. Notary Public and Notary. - “Notary Public” and “Notary” referto any person commissioned to perform official acts under these

Rules.cralaw

SEC. 10. Principal. - “Principal” refers to a person appearing before

the notary public whose act is the subject of notarization. chan robles virtual law

library

SEC. 11. Regular Place of Work or Business. - The term “regular place

of work or business” refers to a stationary office in the city or province

wherein the notary public renders legal and notarial services. chan robles

virtual law library

SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase “competent

evidence of identity” refers to the identif ication of an individual based

on:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official

agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual; or chan

robles virtual law library (b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the

instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to thenotary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two

credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,

document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and

shows to the notary public documentary identification.



SEC. 13. Official Seal or Seal. - “Official seal” or “Seal” refers to a

device for affixing a mark, image or impression on all papers officially

signed by the notary public conforming the requisites prescribed by

these Rules.

SEC. 14. Signature Witnessing. - The term “signature witnessing”refers to a notarial act in which an individual on a single occasion: chan

robles virtual law library





Rules; and chan robles virtual law library

(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary

public.

SEC. 15. Court. - “Court” refers to the Supreme Court of the

Philippines.

SEC. 16. Petitioner. - “Petitioner” refers to a person who applies for a

notarial commission.cralaw

SEC. 17. Office of the Court Administrator. - “Office of the Court

Administrator” refers to the Office of the Court Administrator of the

Supreme Court. cralaw

SEC. 18. Executive Judge. - “Executive Judge” refers to the Executive

Judge of the Regional Trial Court of a city or province who issues a

notarial commission.cralaw

SEC. 19. Vendor. - “Vendor” under these Rules refers to a seller of a

notarial seal and shall include a wholesaler or retailer. chan robles virtual law

library

SEC. 20. Manufacturer. - “Manufacturer” under these Rules refers to

one who produces a notarial seal and shall include an engraver andseal maker. chan robles virtual law library

RULE III

COMMISSIONING OF NOTARY PUBLIC



SECTION 1. Qualifications. - A notarial commission may be issued by

an Executive Judge to any qualified person who submits a petition in

accordance with these Rules. chan robles virtual law library

To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the petitioner: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) must be a citizen of the Philippines; chan robles virtual law library

(2) must be over twenty-one (21) years of age; chan robles virtual law library

(3) must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and

maintains a regular place of work or business in the city or province

where the commission is to be issued; chan robles virtual law library

(4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing with

clearances from the Office of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court

and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and

(5) must not have been convicted in the first instance of any crime

involving moral turpitude.

SEC. 2. Form of the Petition and Supporting Documents. - Every

petition for a notarial commission shall be in writing, verified, and shall

include the following: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) a statement containing the petitioner's personal qualifications,

including the petitioner's date of birth, residence, telephone number,

professional tax receipt, roll of attorney's number and IBP membership

number;

(b) certification of good moral character of the petitioner by at least

two (2) executive officers of the local chapter of the Integrated Bar of

the Philippines where he is applying for commission;

(c) proof of payment for the filing of the petition as required by these

Rules; and

(d) three (3) passport-size color photographs with light background

taken within thirty (30) days of the application. The photograph should

not be retouched. The petitioner shall sign his name at the bottom part

of the photographs.

SEC. 3. Application Fee. - Every petitioner for a notarial commission

shall pay the application fee as prescribed in the Rules of Court. chan robles

virtual law library



SEC. 4. Summary Hearing on the Petition. - The Executive Judge shall

conduct a summary hearing on the petition and shall grant the same

if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) the petition is sufficient in form and substance;

(b) the petitioner proves the allegations contained in the petition; and (c) the petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the Executive Judge

that he has read and fully understood these Rules.

The Executive Judge shall forthwith issue a commission and a

Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal in favor of the

petitioner. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 5. Notice of Summary Hearing. -

(a) The notice of summary hearing shall be published in a newspaper

of general circulation in the city or province where the hearing shall be

conducted and posted in a conspicuous place in the offices of the

Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court. The cost of the publication

shall be borne by the petitioner. The notice may include more than one

petitioner.

(b) The notice shall be substantially in the following form:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

NOTICE OF HEARING

Notice is hereby given that a summary hearing on the petition

for notarial commission of (name of petitioner) shall be held on

(date) at (place) at (time). Any person who has any cause or

reason to object to the grant of the petition may file a verified

written opposition thereto, received by the undersigned before

the date of the summary hearing. chanrobles virtual law library chan robles virtual law library

_____________________

Executive Judge

SEC. 6. Opposition to Petition. - Any person who has any cause or

reason to object to the grant of the petition may file a verified written

opposition thereto. The opposition must be received by the Executive

Judge before the date of the summary hearing. chan robles virtual law library



SEC. 7. Form of Notarial Commission. - The commissioning of a notary

public shall be in a formal order signed by the Executive Judge

substantially in the following form: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ______________

This is to certify that (name of notary public) of (regular place

of work or business) in (city or province) was on this (date)

day of (month) two thousand and (year) commissioned by the

undersigned as a notary public, within and for the said

jurisdiction, for a term ending the thirty-first day of December

(year) chan robles virtual law library

________________________

Executive Judge

SEC. 8. Period Of Validity of Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a

Notarial Seal. - The Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial

Seal shall be valid for a period of three (3) months from date of issue,

unless extended by the Executive Judge.

A mark, image or impression of the seal that may be purchased by the

notary public pursuant to the Certificate shall be presented to the

Executive Judge for approval prior to use. cralaw

SEC. 9. Form of Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial

Seal. - The Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal shall

substantially be in the following form: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF_____________ chan robles virtual law library

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION

TO PURCHASE A NOTARIAL SEAL chan robles virtual law library

This is to authorize (name of notary public) of (city or

province) who was commissioned by the undersigned as a

notary public, within and for the said jurisdiction, for a term

ending, the thirty-first of December (year) to purchase a

notarial seal.chanrobles virtual law library chan robles virtual law library



Issued this (day) of (month) (year).

________________________

Executive Judge

SEC. 10. Official Seal of Notary Public. - Every person commissioned

as notary public shall have only one official seal of office in accordance

with these Rules.

SEC. 11. Jurisdiction and Term. - A person commissioned as notary

public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial

jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years

commencing the first day of January of the year in which the

commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary public has

resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 12. Register of Notaries Public. - The Executive Judge shall keep

and maintain a Register of Notaries Public in his jurisdiction which shall

contain, among others, the dates of issuance or revocation or

suspension of notarial commissions, and the resignation or death of

notaries public. The Executive Judge shall furnish the Office of the

Court Administrator information and data recorded in the register of

notaries public. The Office of the Court Administrator shall keep a

permanent, complete and updated database of such records. chan robles

virtual law library

SEC. 13. Renewal of Commission. - A notary public may file a written

application with the Executive Judge for the renewal of his commission

within forty-five (45) days before the expiration thereof. A mark,

image or impression of the seal of the notary public shall be attached

to the application. cralaw

Failure to file said application will result in the deletion of the name of

the notary public in the register of notaries public. cralaw

The notary public thus removed from the Register of Notaries Publicmay only be reinstated therein after he is issued a new commission in

accordance with these Rules. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 14. Action on Application for Renewal of Commission. - The

Executive Judge shall, upon payment of the application fee mentioned

in Section 3 above of this Rule, act on an application for the renewal of



a commission within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. If the

application is denied, the Executive Judge shall state the reasons

therefor.cralaw

RULE IV

POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF NOTARIES PUBLIC

SECTION 1. Powers. - (a) A notary public is empowered to perform the

following notarial acts: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) acknowledgments;

(2) oaths and affirmations;

(3) jurats; chan robles virtual law library

(4) signature witnessings;

(5) copy certifications; and

(6) any other act authorized by these Rules.

(b) A notary public is authorized to certify the affixing of a signature

by thumb or other mark on an instrument or document presented for

notarization if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) the thumb or other mark is affixed in the presence of the notary

public and of two (2) disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the


(2) both witnesses sign their own names in addition to the thumb or

other mark;

(3) the notary public writes below the thumb or other mark: "Thumb

or Other Mark affixed by (name of signatory by mark) in the presence

of (names and addresses of witnesses) and undersigned notary

public"; and chan robles virtual law library

(4) the notary public notarizes the signature by thumb or other mark

through an acknowledgment, jurat, or signature witnessing.

(c) A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a person who is

physically unable to sign or make a mark on an instrument or

document if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) the notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or make

a mark to sign on his behalf;

(2) the signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence of two

disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;

(3) both witnesses sign their own names ;

(4) the notary public writes below his signature: “Signature affixed by



notary in presence of (names and addresses of person and two [2]

witnesses)”; and

(5) the notary public notarizes his signature by acknowledgment or

jurat.

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - (a) A notary public shall not perform a notarialact outside his regular place of work or business; provided, however,

that on certain exceptional occasions or situations, a notarial act may

be performed at the request of the parties in the following sites located

within his territorial jurisdiction: chan robles virtual law library

(1) public offices, convention halls, and similar places where oaths of

office may be administered;

(2) public function areas in hotels and similar places for the signing of

instruments or documents requiring notarization;

(3) hospitals and other medical institutions where a party to aninstrument or document is confined for treatment; and

(4) any place where a party to an instrument or document requiring

notarization is under detention.

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as

signatory to the instrument or document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the

notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identifiedby the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined

by these Rules. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 3. Disqualifications. - A notary public is disqualified from

performing a notarial act if he: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized;

chan robles virtual law library (b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee,

advantage, right, title, interest, cash, property, or other consideration,except as provided by these Rules and by law; or

(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or

relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth

civil degree. chan robles virtual law library





SEC. 3. Prohibited Fees. – No fee or compensation of any kind, except

those expressly prescribed and allowed herein, shall be collected or

received for any notarial service. cralaw

SEC. 4. Payment or Refund of Fees. - A notary public shall not require

payment of any fees specified herein prior to the performance of anotarial act unless otherwise agreed upon. chan robles virtual law library

Any travel fees and expenses paid to a notary public prior to the

performance of a notarial act are not subject to refund if the notary

public had already traveled but failed to complete in whole or in part

the notarial act for reasons beyond his control and without negligence

on his part.cralaw

SEC. 5. Notice of Fees. - A notary public who charges a fee for notarial

services shall issue a receipt registered with the Bureau of InternalRevenue and keep a journal of notarial fees. He shall enter in the

journal all fees charged for services rendered. chan robles virtual law library

A notary public shall post in a conspicuous place in his office a

complete schedule of chargeable notarial fees. cralaw

RULE VI

NOTARIAL REGISTER

SECTION 1. Form of Notarial Register. - (a) A notary public shall keep,

maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in theseRules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts

consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages. chan robles

virtual law library

The register shall be kept in books to be furnished by the Solicitor

General to any notary public upon request and upon payment of the

cost thereof. The register shall be duly paged, and on the first page,

the Solicitor General shall certify the number of pages of which the

book consists.cralaw

For purposes of this provision, a Memorandum of Agreement or

Understanding may be entered into by the Office of the Solicitor

General and the Office of the Court Administrator. chan robles virtual law library

(b) A notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any

given time.cralaw



SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. - (a) For every notarial act,

the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of

notarization the following: chan robles virtual law library

(1) the entry number and page number; chan robles virtual law library

(2) the date and time of day of the notarial act; (3) the type of notarial act; chan robles virtual law library

(4) the title or description of the instrument, document or proceeding;

(5) the name and address of each principal; chan robles virtual law library

(6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules if the

signatory is not

personally known to the notary; chan robles virtual law library

(7) the name and address of each credible witness swearing to or

affirming the person's identity;

(8) the fee charged for the notarial act; (9) the address where the notarization was performed if not in the

notary's regular place of work or business; and

(10) any other circumstance the notary public may deem of

significance or relevance.

(b) A notary public shall record in the notarial register the reasons and

circumstances for not completing a notarial act.

(c) A notary public shall record in the notarial register the

circumstances of any request to inspect or copy an entry in the

notarial register, including the requester's name, address, signature,thumbmark or other recognized identifier, and evidence of identity.

The reasons for refusal to allow inspection or copying of a journal

entry shall also be recorded. cralaw

(d) When the instrument or document is a contract, the notary public

shall keep an original copy thereof as part of his records and enter in

said records a brief description of the substance thereof and shall give

to each entry a consecutive number, beginning with number one in

each calendar year. He shall also retain a duplicate original copy for

the Clerk of Court. cralaw

(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document

executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number

corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the

instrument or document the page/s of his register on which the same

is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries. cralaw



(f) In case of a protest of any draft, bill of exchange or promissory

note, the notary public shall make a full and true record of all

proceedings in relation thereto and shall note therein whether the

demand for the sum of money was made, by whom, when, and where;

whether he presented such draft, bill or note; whether notices were

given, to whom and in what manner; where the same was made,

when and to whom and where directed; and of every other fact

touching the same.cralaw

(g) At the end of each week, the notary public shall certify in his

notarial register the number of instruments or documents executed,

sworn to, acknowledged, or protested before him; or if none, this

certificate shall show this fact. cralaw

(h) A certified copy of each month's entries and a duplicate original

copy of any instrument acknowledged before the notary public shall,within the first ten (10) days of the month following, be forwarded to

the Clerk of Court and shall be under the responsibility of such officer.

If there is no entry to certify for the month, the notary shall forward a

statement to this effect in lieu of certified copies herein required. cralaw

SEC. 3. Signatures and Thumbmarks. - At the time of notarization, the

notary's notarial register shall be signed or a thumb or other mark

affixed by each:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) principal; (b) credible witness swearing or affirming to the identity of a principal;

and

(c) witness to a signature by thumb or other mark, or to a signing by

the notary public on behalf of a person physically unable to sign.

SEC. 4. Inspection, Copying and Disposal. - (a) In the notary's

presence, any person may inspect an entry in the notarial register,

during regular business hours, provided;

(1) the person's identity is personally known to the notary public orproven through competent evidence of identity as defined in these

Rules;

(2) the person affixes a signature and thumb or other mark or other

recognized identifier, in the notarial register in a separate, dated

entry;

(3) the person specifies the month, year, type of instrument or



document, and name of the principal in the notarial act or acts sought;

and

(4) the person is shown only the entry or entries specified by him.

(b) The notarial register may be examined by a law enforcement

officer in the course of an official investigation or by virtue of a courtorder.

(c) If the notary public has a reasonable ground to believe that a

person has a criminal intent or wrongful motive in requesting

information from the notarial register, the notary shall deny access to

any entry or entries therein. cralaw

SEC. 5. Loss, Destruction or Damage of Notarial Register. - (a) In case

the notarial register is stolen, lost, destroyed, damaged, or otherwise

rendered unusable or illegible as a record of notarial acts, the notarypublic shall, within ten (10) days after informing the appropriate law

enforcement agency in the case of theft or vandalism, notify the

Executive Judge by any means providing a proper receipt or

acknowledgment, including registered mail and also provide a copy or

number of any pertinent police report. cralaw

(b) Upon revocation or expiration of a notarial commission, or death of

the notary public, the notarial register and notarial records shall

immediately be delivered to the office of the Executive Judge. cralaw

SEC. 6. Issuance of Certified True Copies. - The notary public shall

supply a certified true copy of the notarial record, or any part thereof,

to any person applying for such copy upon payment of the legal fees. cralaw

RULE VII

SIGNATURE AND SEAL OF NOTARY PUBLIC

SECTION 1. Official Signature. – In notarizing a paper instrument or

document, a notary public shall: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) sign by hand on the notarial certificate only the name indicatedand as appearing on the notary's commission; chan robles virtual law library

(b) not sign using a facsimile stamp or printing device; and

(c) affix his official signature only at the time the notarial act is

performed.



SEC. 2. Official Seal. - (a) Every person commissioned as notary public

shall have a seal of office, to be procured at his own expense, which

shall not be possessed or owned by any other person. It shall be of

metal, circular in shape, two inches in diameter, and shall have the

name of the city or province and the word “Philippines” and his own

name on the margin and the roll of attorney's number on the face

thereof, with the words "notary public" across the center. A mark,

image or impression of such seal shall be made directly on the paper

or parchment on which the writing appears.

(b) The official seal shall be affixed only at the time the notarial act is

performed and shall be clearly impressed by the notary public on every

page of the instrument or document notarized. chan robles virtual law library

(c) When not in use, the official seal shall be kept safe and secure and

shall be accessible only to the notary public or the person dulyauthorized by him. chan robles virtual law library

(d) Within five (5) days after the official seal of a notary public is

stolen, lost, damaged or other otherwise rendered unserviceable in

affixing a legible image, the notary public, after informing the

appropriate law enforcement agency, shall notify the Executive Judge

in writing, providing proper receipt or acknowledgment, including

registered mail, and in the event of a crime committed, provide a copy

or entry number of the appropriate police record. Upon receipt of such

notice, if found in order by the Executive Judge, the latter shall orderthe notary public to cause notice of such loss or damage to be

published, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a

newspaper of general circulation in the city or province where the

notary public is commissioned. Thereafter, the Executive Judge shall

issue to the notary public a new Certificate of Authorization to

Purchase a Notarial Seal. cralaw

(e) Within five (5) days after the death or resignation of the notary

public, or the revocation or expiration of a notarial commission, the

official seal shall be surrendered to the Executive Judge and shall be

destroyed or defaced in public during office hours. In the event that

the missing, lost or damaged seal is later found or surrendered, it shall

be delivered by the notary public to the Executive Judge to be

disposed of in accordance with this section. Failure to effect such

surrender shall constitute contempt of court. In the event of death of



the notary public, the person in possession of the official seal shall

have the duty to surrender it to the Executive Judge. cralaw

SEC. 3. Seal Image. - The notary public shall affix a single, clear,

legible, permanent, and photographically reproducible mark, image or

impression of the official seal beside his signature on the notarialcertificate of a paper instrument or document. cralaw

SEC. 4. Obtaining and Providing Seal. - (a) A vendor or manufacturer

of notarial seals may not sell said product without a written

authorization from the Executive Judge. cralaw

(b) Upon written application and after payment of the application fee,

the Executive Judge may issue an authorization to sell to a vendor or

manufacturer of notarial seals after verification and investigation of

the latter's qualifications. The Executive Judge shall charge anauthorization fee in the amount of PhP 4,000 for the vendor and PhP

8,000 for the manufacturer. If a manufacturer is also a vendor, he

shall only pay the manufacturer's authorization fee. cralaw

(c) The authorization shall be in effect for a period of four (4) years

from the date of its issuance and may be renewed by the Executive

Judge for a similar period upon payment of the authorization fee

mentioned in the preceding paragraph. cralaw

(d) A vendor or manufacturer shall not sell a seal to a buyer except

upon submission of a certified copy of the commission and the

Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal issued by the

Executive Judge. A notary public obtaining a new seal as a result of

change of name shall present to the vendor or manufacturer a certified

copy of the Confirmation of the Change of Name issued by the

Executive Judge.cralaw

(e) Only one seal may be sold by a vendor or manufacturer for each

Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal. cralaw

(f) After the sale, the vendor or manufacturer shall affix a mark, imageor impression of the seal to the Certificate of Authorization to Purchase

a Notarial Seal and submit the completed Certificate to the Executive

Judge. Copies of the Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial

Seal and the buyer's commission shall be kept in the files of the

vendor or manufacturer for four (4) years after the sale. cralaw





IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed below my signature and

seal of this office this (date) day of (month) (year). chanrobles virtual law library chan robles

virtual law library _________________

(official signature)

(seal of Executive Judge)

RULE X

CHANGES OF STATUS OF NOTARY PUBLIC

SECTION 1. Change of Name and Address. -

Within ten (10) days after the change of name of the notary public by

court order or by marriage, or after ceasing to maintain the regular

place of work or business, the notary public shall submit a signed and

dated notice of such fact to the Executive Judge.

The notary public shall not notarize until: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) he receives from the Executive Judge a confirmation of the new

name of the notary public and/or change of regular place of work or

business; and

(b) a new seal bearing the new name has been obtained.

The foregoing notwithstanding, until the aforementioned steps havebeen completed, the notary public may continue to use the former

name or regular place of work or business in performing notarial acts

for three (3) months from the date of the change, which may be

extended once for valid and just cause by the Executive Judge for

another period not exceeding three (3) months.

SEC. 2. Resignation. - A notary public may resign his commission by

personally submitting a written, dated and signed formal notice to the

Executive Judge together with his notarial seal, notarial register and

records. Effective from the date indicated in the notice, he shallimmediately cease to perform notarial acts. In the event of his

incapacity to personally appear, the submission of the notice may be

performed by his duly authorized representative. cralaw

SEC. 3. Publication of Resignation. - The Executive Judge shall

immediately order the Clerk of Court to post in a conspicuous place in



the offices of the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court the names

of notaries public who have resigned their notarial commissions and

the effective dates of their resignation. cralaw

RULE XI

REVOCATION OF COMMISSION AND DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS

SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions. - (a) The

Executive Judge shall revoke a notarial commission for any ground on

which an application for a commission may be denied. chan robles virtual law

library

(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or

impose appropriate administrative sanctions upon, any notary public

who:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) fails to keep a notarial register;

(2) fails to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register

concerning his notarial acts;

(3) fails to send the copy of the entries to the Executive Judge within

the first ten (10) days of the month following;

(4) fails to affix to acknowledgments the date of expiration of his

commission;

(5) fails to submit his notarial register, when filled, to the Executive

Judge;

(6) fails to make his report, within a reasonable time, to the ExecutiveJudge concerning the performance of his duties, as may be required by

the judge;

(7) fails to require the presence of a principal at the time of the

notarial act;

(8) fails to identify a principal on the basis of personal knowledge or

competent evidence;

(9) executes a false or incomplete certificate under Section 5, Rule IV;

(10) knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act prohibited

or mandated by these Rules; and

(11) commits any other dereliction or act which in the judgment of

the Executive Judge constitutes good cause for revocation of

commission or imposition of administrative sanction.

(c) Upon verified complaint by an interested, affected or aggrieved

person, the notary public shall be required to file a verified answer to

the complaint. If the answer of the notary public is not satisfactory,



the Executive Judge shall conduct a summary hearing. If the

allegations of the complaint are not proven, the complaint shall be

dismissed. If the charges are duly established, the Executive Judge

shall impose the appropriate administrative sanctions. In either case,

the aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the Supreme Court for

review. Pending the appeal, an order imposing disciplinary sanctions

shall be immediately executory, unless otherwise ordered by the

Supreme Court.

(d) The Executive Judge may motu proprio initiate administrative

proceedings against a notary public, subject to the procedures

prescribed in paragraph (c) above and impose the appropriate

administrative sanctions on the grounds mentioned in the preceding

paragraphs (a) and (b).cralaw

SEC. 2. Supervision and Monitoring of Notaries Public. - The ExecutiveJudge shall at all times exercise supervision over notaries public and

shall closely monitor their activities. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 3. Publication of Revocations and Administrative Sanctions. - The

Executive Judge shall immediately order the Clerk of Court to post in a

conspicuous place in the offices of the Executive Judge and of the

Clerk of Court the names of notaries public who have been

administratively sanctioned or whose notarial commissions have been

revoked.cralaw

SEC. 4. Death of Notary Public. - If a notary public dies before fulfilling

the obligations in Section 4(e), Rule VI and Section 2(e), Rule VII, the

Executive Judge, upon being notified of such death, shall forthwith

cause compliance with the provisions of these sections. chan robles virtual law

library

RULE XII

SPECIAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. Punishable Acts. - The Executive Judge shall cause theprosecution of any person who: chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) knowingly acts or otherwise impersonates a notary public; chan robles

virtual law library (b) knowingly obtains, conceals, defaces, or destroys the seal, notarial

register, or official records of a notary public; and



(c) knowingly solicits, coerces, or in any way influences a notary public

to commit official misconduct.

SEC 2. Reports to the Supreme Court. - The Executive Judge

concerned shall submit semestral reports to the Supreme Court on

discipline and prosecution of notaries public.

RULE XIII

REPEALING AND EFFECTIVITY PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. Repeal. - All rules and parts of rules, including issuances

of the Supreme Court inconsistent herewith, are hereby repealed or

accordingly modified. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 2. Effective Date. - These Rules shall take effect on the first day

of August 2004, and shall be published in a newspaper of general

circulation in the Philippines which provides sufficiently wide

circulation.

Promulgated this 6th day of July, 2004.

EN BANC

[B.M. 850. October 2, 2001]

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

R E S O L U T I O N

ADOPTING THE REVISED RULES ON THE CONTINUING LEGAL

EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OFTHE PHILIPPINES

Considering the Rules on the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the

Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committeeon Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to approve, as it hereby approves, the following

Revised Rules for proper implementation:



Rule 1. PURPOSE

SECTION 1. Purpose of the MCLE . — Continuing legal education is required of members

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep

abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the

standards of the practice of law.

Rule 2. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Commencement of the MCLE . — Within two (2) months from the approval of

these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted and

shall commence the implementation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) program in accordance with these Rules.

SEC. 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE . — Members of the IBP not exempt under

Rule 7 shall complete every three (3) years at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legaleducation activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:

(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics equivalent to six (6) credit units.

(b) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills equivalent to four (4)

credit units.

(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution equivalent to five

(5) credit units.

(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws, and jurisprudence equivalent to nine (9) credit units.

(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy equivalent tofour (4) credit units.

(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international conventions

equivalent to two (2) credit units.

(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by theMCLE Committee equivalent to six (6) credit units.

Rule 3. COMPLIANCE PERIOD

SECTION 1. Initial compliance period . -- The initial compliance period shall begin not laterthan three (3) months from the adoption of these Rules. Except for the initial compliance period

for members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all compliance

periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after the end of the previouscompliance period.

SEC. 2. Compliance Groups. -- Members of the IBP not exempt from the MCLE

requirement shall be divided into three (3) compliance groups, namely:



(a) Compliance group 1. -- Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila areassigned to Compliance Group 1.

(b) Compliance group 2. -- Members in Luzon outside NCR are assigned to Compliance Group2.

(c) Compliance group 3. -- Members in Visayas and Mindanao are assigned to Compliance

Group 3.

Nevertheless, members may participate in any legal education activity wherever it may

be available to earn credit unit toward compliance with the MCLE requirement.

SEC. 3. Compliance period of members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the

program. — Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the programshall be assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on

the date of admission or readmission.

The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of

the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other

members in the same Compliance Group.(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or

readmission, the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for theinitial compliance.

(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission orreadmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approvedcontinuing legal education activities equal to the number of months remaining in the

compliance period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall berequired to complete a number of hours of education in legal ethics in proportion to thenumber of months remaining in the compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be roundedup to the next whole number.

Rule 4. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS(CU)

SECTION 1. Guidelines. - CREDIT UNITS ARE EQUIVALENT TO CREDIT HOURS.

CREDIT UNITS measure compliance with the MCLE requirement under the Rules, based

on the category of the lawyer’s participation in the MCLE activity. The following are the

guidelines for computing credit units and the supporting documents required therefor:

PROGRAMS/ACTIVITY CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION

PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER RELATED RULES

1.1 PARTICIPANT/ 1 CU PER HOUR OF CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDEE ATTENDANCE ATTENDANCE WITH

NUMBER OF HOURS

1.2 LECTURER FULL CU FOR THE PHOTOCOPY OF

RESOURCE SUBJECT PER PLAQUE OR



SPEAKER COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSOR’S CERTIFICATION

1.3 PANELIST/REACTOR 1/2 OF CU FOR THE CERTIFICATIONCOMMENTATOR/ SUBJECT PER FROM

MODERATOR/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD SPONSORING

COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION FACILITATOR

2. AUTHORSHI P, EDITING AND REVIEW

2.1 LAW BOOK OF NOT FULL CU FOR THE PUBLISHED BOOK

LESS THAN 100 PAGES SUBJECT PERCOMPLIANCE PERIOD

2.2 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK

AUTHORSHIP CATEGORY WITH PROOF AS EDITOR

2.3 RESEARCH PAPER 1/2 OF CU FOR THE DULY

INNOVATIVE PROGRAM/ SUBJECT PER CERTIFIED/CREATIVE PROJECT COMPLIANCE PERIOD PUBLISHED

TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER

2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE OF AT 1/2 OF CU FOR THE PUBLISHED ARTICLE LEAST TEN (10) PAGES SUBJECT PER

COMPLIANCE PERIOD

2.5 LEGAL NEWSLETTER/ 1 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED LAW JOURNAL EDITOR NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL

2.6 PROFESSORIAL CHAIR/ FULL CU FOR THE CERTIFICATION OF BAR REVIEW LECTURE SUBJECT PER LAW DEAN OR

LAW TEACHING/ COMPLIANCE PERIOD BAR REVIEW DIRECTOR

Rule 5. CATEGORIES OF CREDIT UNITS

SECTION 1. Classes of Credit units . -- Credit units are either participatory or non-

participatory.

SEC. 2. Claim for participatory credit units . -- Participatory credit units may be claimedfor:

(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, conventions, symposia,

in-house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussion.

(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker,

moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.

(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.

SEC. 3. Claim for non-participatory credit units . — Non-participatory credit units may be



claimed per compliance period for:

(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for publication,e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the legaleducation of the author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of themember’s practice or employment.

(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.

Rule 6. COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS (CH)

SECTION 1. Computation of credit hours. -- Credit hours are computed based on actual

time spent in an education activity in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour reported in decimals.

Rule 7. EXEMPTIONS

SECTION 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE . -- The following members of the Bar are

exempt from the MCLE requirement:

(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries andUndersecretaries of Executive Departments;

(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;

(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired

members of the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council andincumbent court lawyers covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing

judicial education;

(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Departmentof Justice;

(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitors General;

(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;

(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the SpecialProsecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;

(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;

(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for atleast ten (10) years in accredited law schools;

(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and ProfessorialLecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and

(l) Governors and Mayors.

SEC. 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE . — The following Members of the Bar are



likewise exempt:

(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.

(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.

SEC. 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement — A member may

file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification

of any of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a

procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.

SEC. 4. Change of status. — The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the

month in which a member ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall

end on the same day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.

SEC. 5. Proof of exemption. — Applications for exemption from or modification of theMCLE requirement shall be under oath and supported by documents.

Rule 8. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF

EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

SECTION 1. Approval of MCLE program. — Subject to the implementing regulations that

may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program may be grantedapproval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an accredited provider and

certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 2 of this Rule; and (2) the provider is

specifically mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.

SEC. 2. Standards for all education activities. — All continuing legal education activities

must meet the following standards:

(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.

(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects andthe legal profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance legal skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legalwriting and oral advocacy.

(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.

(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must bedistributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the time the

activity is offered.

(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free frominterruption like telephone calls and other distractions.

Rule 9. ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDERS



SECTION 1. Accreditation of providers. -- Accreditation of providers shall be done by the

MCLE Committee.

SEC. 2. Requirements for accreditation of providers. — Any person or group may be

accredited as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be renewed, upon writtenapplication. All providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-house providers,

are eligible to be accredited providers. Application for accreditation shall:

(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the MCLE Committee;

(b) Contain all information requested in the form;

(c) Be accompanied by the appropriate approval fee.

SEC. 3. Requirements of all providers. -- All approved accredited providers shall agree to

the following:

(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the providerfor at least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include the memberon the official record of attendance only if the mem ber’s signature was obtained at the time

of attendance at the activity. The official record of attendance shall contain the member’sname and number in the Roll of Attorneys and shall identify the time, date, location, subjectmatter, and length of the education activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished theMCLE COMMITTEE.

(b) The provider shall certify that:

(1) This activity has been approved BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE in the

amount of ________ hours of which ______ hours will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), asappropriate to the content of the activity;

(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed by these Rules and such regulations as may be prescribed by the MCLE

COMMITTEE.

(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time, date,location, subject matter and length of the activity.

(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal education activity by THE MCLE COMMITTEE, members of the IBP Board of Governors, or designees of theCommittee and IBP staff Board for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.

(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time devotedto each topic and identity of the instructors. The provider shall make available to each participant

a copy of THE MCLE COMMITTEE-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.

(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a period of

not less than one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the MCLE COMMITTEE.

(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or issues aspurious certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.

SEC. 4. Renewal of provider accreditation . — The accreditation of a provider may berenewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to comply with any of the

requirements of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding

period.



SEC. 5. Revocation of provider accreditation . -- the accreditation of any provider referred

to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the MCLE Committee, after notice and

hearing and for good cause.

Rule 10. FEE FOR APPROVAL OF ACTIVITY AND ACCREDITATION OF PROVIDER

SECTION 1. Payment of fees. — Application for approval of an education activity oraccreditation as a provider requires payment of the appropriate fee as provided in the Schedule of

MCLE Fees.

Rule 11. GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. Compliance card. -- Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a

Compliance Card before the end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card byattesting under oath that he has complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt,

specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to the

Committee not later than the day after the end of the member’s compliance period.

SEC. 2. Member record keeping requirement. -- Each member shall maintain sufficientrecord of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required

to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3© of Rule 9 should be a

sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory activityshall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.

Rule 12. NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

SECTION 1. What constitutes non-compliance. — The following shall constitute non-

compliance:

(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;

(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;

(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status)within the prescribed period;

(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance withinsixty (60) days from receipt of non-compliance notice;

(e) Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period;

(f) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent orevade compliance with the MCLE requirements.

SEC. 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance. -Members failingto comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will be



given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to file a response clarifying the deficiency or

otherwise showing compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain the following

language near the beginning of the notice in capital letters:

IF YOU FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLEREQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM DATE OF NOTICE), YOU SHALL BE

LISTED AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICELAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE

MCLE COMMITTEE.

Members given sixty (60) days to respond to a Non-Compliance Notice may use this period to attainthe adequate number of credit units for compliance. Credit units earned during this period may only

be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless units in excessof the requirement are earned, in which case the excess may be counted toward meeting the current

compliance period requirement.

Rule 13. CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

SECTION 1. Non-compliance fee. -- A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-

compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.

SEC. 2. Listing as delinquent member. -- A member who fails to comply with the

requirements after the sixty (60) day period for compliance has expired, shall be listed as a

delinquent member of the IBP upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee. The

investigation of a member for non-compliance shall be conducted by the IBP’s Commission onBar Discipline as a fact-finding arm of the MCLE Committee.

SEC. 3. Accrual of membership fee. -- Membership fees shall continue to accrue at the

active rate against a member during the period he/she is listed as a delinquent member.

Rule 14. REINSTATEMENT

SECTION 1. Process. -- The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminatedwhen the member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment

of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit units to meet the requirement

for the period of non-compliance during the period the member is on inactive status. These credit

units may not be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement. Credit

units earned during the period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the

prior compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.

SEC. 2. Termination of delinquent listing is an administrative process. — The termination

of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature AND it shall be made by the MCLE

Committee.



Rule. 15. COMMITTEE ON MANDATORY CONTINUING

LEGAL EDUCATION

SECTION 1. Composition. — The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5)

members, namely, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court as Chair, and four (4) members

respectively nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated bythe Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law professors.

The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall beappointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such

compensation as may be determined by the Court.

SEC. 2. Duty of committee. — The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such

implementing rules as may be necessary subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. It shall, in

consultation with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with theapproval of the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. Staff of the MCLE Committee. — Subject to approval by the Supreme Court, theMCLE Committee shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping,auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions.

SEC. 4. Submission of annual budget. — The MCLE Committee shall submit to the

Supreme Court for approval, an annual budget [for a subsidy] to establish, operate and maintain

the MCLE Program.

This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth of September 2000, following its publication

in two (2) newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000, as amended on 02 October 2001.

Cases:

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 6882 December 24, 2008

MARISA BACATAN WILLIAMS and ORLANDO VERAR RIAN, JR., petitioners,vs.ATTY. RODRIGO ICAO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N



CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Maria Bacatan Williams and Orlando Verar Rian, Jr. (petitioners) administratively charge Atty.Rodrigo Icao (respondent) for violation of the Notarial Law and for unlawful, dishonest, immoral,and deceitful conduct unbecoming of an attorney.1

In their Joint-Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment,2 petitioners allege that on May 23, 2002,respondent notarized a Declaration of Heirship and Partition3 (the document) making it appearthat three of its signatories – Lucia Briones, Ramon Verar, and Martin Umbac – signed it in hispresence when in truth they did not. In support of their allegation, they gave the followingdetails, quoted verbatim:

Proof that Attorney Icao was not present when the DECLARATION was actually signedcame to light on June 3, 2003 during the trial in Criminal Case No. 3051 held at MCTCBacong, Negros Oriental when, in his sworn testimony, Francisco B. Ventolero, one ofthe six signers, said that he was the one to carry the document from one signer to thenext to get their signatures. x x x

Additional support that the document was not signed in attendance with Attorney Icao isfound where the participants declared they signed the document on 14 January 2002 inBacong as opposed to the acknowledgment where Attorney Icao declares that theysigned the document on 23 May 2002 in Dumaguete City.

It is also apparent that Lucia Briones did not sign with Attorney Icao in attendance sinceher Community Tax Certificate was not recorded, nor was any notation made as to howshe was identified. In addition, her printed signature (L. Briones) on page #2 is quitedifferent from her written signature (Felicidad Briones) on page #1 and #3 suggestingfurther that the signing was not attended by Attorney Icao. In addition, it is commonlyknown amongst the participants that Lucia Briones lived in Cotabato for 20+ yearsbefore she died in 2004. It was equally known that she was deathly sick in 2002 whichexplains why Francisco B. Ventolero had to take the document to Cotabato for hersignature.

The style of the signatures of Francisco and Desiderio Ventolero also appear not to beunder the guidance of a legal expert since the family name of "Ventolero" is used onpage #2 while the family name of "Briones" is used on page #1 and #3. An attorneywould never knowing[ly] allow such an inconsistency in a legal document. Bouncingback and forth from one family name to another and from a written signature on page #2to thumbmarks on page #1 and #3 also seem to be highly irregular for a documentsupposedly signed in front of a lawyer .4 (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioners additionally charge respondent to have conspired with Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez (Atty.Enriquez), one of the signatories to, in the falsification, of the document.5

In his Comment,6 respondent, admitting that the document was not executed in his presence,claims that before he notarized it, the parties thereto appeared before him and he ascertainedtheir identities as well as of those of their witnesses; that he explained to them the contents ofthe document which they acknowledged to be true and correct; that all the partiesacknowledged before him that the signatures appearing thereon were theirs and that theyexecuted the same freely and voluntarily; that he did not find in the document anything contrary

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to law, morals and public policy since at the time of the notarization, the signatories wereaccompanied by their counsel, Atty. Enriquez; that he did not require the presentation of otherdocuments to support the document as he was not privy to its preparation; and that petitioners’complaint had already prescribed under Section 1, Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of theCommission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the IBP under which a complaint for disbarment,suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two years from the date of the professional

misconduct.

Respondent attached to his Comment a Joint Affidavit7 of Ramon Ventolero Verar, MartinUmbac, and Desiderio Briones Ventolero, who are among the signatories to the document, inwhich they attested to having appeared before respondent to acknowledge as theirs thesignatures they had previously affixed thereon.

The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,report and recommendation.8 While a mandatory conference/hearing was set on April 24, 2007,9 petitioners requested that the case be resolved on the basis of the parties’ position papers.10

In his Report and Recommendation,11 IBP Commissioner Edmund T. Espina (Espina), brushingaside respondent’s defense of prescription, citing Calo v. Degamo12 which held that disbarmentproceedings do not prescribe, found respondent guilty of violation of the Notarial Law.

Espina thereupon recommended that respondent be reprimanded, with warning that similar actsin the future would merit severe penalty.

The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of December 14, 2007, resolved to dismiss thecase, viz :

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of theInvestigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case

for lack of merit .

13

(Italics and emphasis in the original)

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,14 averring that:

The Commission on Bar Discipline [sic] must have made an error by dismissing thiscase for "lack of merit" considering that Commissioner Espina stated on page #7 of hisreport and recommendation that, "The manner on which all the parties signed thedocument is highly irregular and questionable." Furthermore, on page #8 theCommissioner added, "Sad to say, respondent miserably failed to refute the allegationsagainst him15 (Italics and underscoring in the original),

which motion the IBP forwarded to the Court.

The Court finds for petitioners.

On the technical issue of prescription, Frias v. Bautista-Lozada,16 holds that that prescriptiondoes not lie in administrative proceedings against lawyers.

x x x As early as 1967, we have held that the defense of prescription does not lie inadministrative proceedings against lawyers. And in the 2004 case of Heck v. Santos,17















































It bears recalling that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act.27 It is investedwith substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act asnotary public.28 As a notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face,notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance oftheir duties, lest the confidence of the public in the integrity of the document will beundermined.29

No concrete evidence being appreciated from the records in support of the charge of complicityin the falsification of the document, the same must fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Atty. Rodrigo Icao is SUSPENDED from the practiceof law and from his commission as a notary public for a period of one year, effectiveimmediately, with warning that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall bedealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Barof the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 6408. August 31, 2004]

ISIDRA BARRIENTOS, com plainant, vs. ATTY. ELERIZZA A. LIBIRAN-METEOROrespondent .

R E S O L U T I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:

Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro for deceit and non-payment of debts.

A letter-complaint dated May 21, 2001 was filed with the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP) under the names of Isidra Barrientos and Olivia C. Mercado, whichwas signed, however, by Isidra only. It states that: sometime in September of 2000,respondent issued several Equitable PCIBank Checks in favor of both Isidra and Olivia,amounting to P67,000.00, and in favor of Olivia, totaling P234,000.00, for the paymentof a pre-existing debt; the checks bounced due to insufficient funds thus charges forviolation of B.P. 22 were filed by Isidra and Olivia with the City Prosecutor of

Cabanatuan; respondent sent text messages to complainants asking for the defermentof the criminal charges with the promise that she will pay her debt; respondent howeverfailed to fulfill said promise; on May 16, 2001, respondent, through her sister-in-law,tried to give complainants a title for a parcel of land in exchange for the bounced checkswhich were in the possession of complainants; the title covered an area of 5,000 squaremeters located at Bantug, La Torre, Talavera, Nueva Ecija, registered in the name ofVictoria Villamar which was allegedly paid to respondent by a client; complainantschecked the property and discovered that the land belonged to a certain Dra. Helen

















8. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of all the foregoing and toprove that I have no cause of action against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro.[6]

On August 9, 2001, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Hearing requiring both partiesto appear before it on September 6, 2001. On said date, both parties appeared andagreed to settle their misunderstanding.[7]

On November 27, 2001, the parties agreed that the balance of P134,000.00 whichrespondent acknowledged as her indebtedness to complainant will be settled on astaggered basis. Another hearing was then set for February 5, 2002. Respondentfailed to appear in said hearing despite due notice. It was then reset to February 28,2002 with the order that should respondent fail to appear, the case shall already besubmitted for resolution.[8]

Respondent appeared in the next two hearings. However, this time, it wascomplainant who was unavailable. In the hearing of July 31, 2002, respondent wasabsent and was warned again that should she fail to appear in the next hearing, theCommissioner shall resolve the case. On said date, respondent did not appear despite

due notice.[9]

On August 1, 2002, respondent filed with the Commission a motion for

reconsideration of the July 31 order stating that: she got sick a few days before thescheduled hearing; she had already paid complainant the amount of P64,000.00; inMarch of 2002, respondent’s father was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit of theUniversity of Santo Tomas Hospital thus she was not able to settle her remainingbalance as planned; and because of said emergency, respondent was not able to fullysettle the balance of her debt up to this date. Respondent prayed that she be givenanother 60 days from August 1,2002 to finally settle her debt with complainant.[10]

On April 30, 2003, the IBP-CBD issued an order granting respondent’s motion and

setting aside the order dated July 31, 2002. It noted that while respondent claims thatshe already paid complainant P64,000.00, the photocopies of the receipts shesubmitted evidencing payment amount only to P45,000.00.[11] A hearing was then set forMay 28, 2003 at which time respondent was directed to present proof of her paymentsto the complainant. The hearing was however reset several times until August 20, 2003at which time, only complainant appeared. Respondent sent somebody to ask for apostponement which the commission denied. The commission gave respondent a lastopportunity to settle her accounts with complainant. The hearing was set for October 7,2003 which the commission said was ―intransferrable.‖[12]

On October 7, 2003, only complainant appeared. The commission noted thatrespondent was duly notified and even personally received the notice for that day’s

hearing. The case was thereafter submitted for resolution.[13] On October 24, 2003, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan

submitted his report pertinent portions of which read as follows:

The issue to be resolved is whether or not Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro hascommitted a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Office holds thatshe has. More particularly, the respondent, by initially and vehemently denying herindebtedness to herein complainant and then subsequently admitting liability by

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proposing a staggered settlement has displayed a glaring flaw in her integrity. She hasshown herself to possess poor moral characters. In her motion for reconsideration,seeking the reopening of this case, the respondent made a false assertion that she hadsettled up to P64,000.00 of her indebtedness but the receipts she submitted total onlyP50,000.00. What is more disconcerting is that while she is aware and duly notified ofthe settings of this Office respondent has seemingly ignored the same deliberately.

Finally, the respondent has not offered any satisfactory explanation for, nor has shecontroverted the complainant’s charge that she (respondent) had tried to negotiate atransfer certificate of title (TCT) which had been entrusted by a certain Dra. HelenGarcia to her relative to a transaction which the former had with the Quedancor whererespondent was formerly employed. Based on all the foregoing findings and thedeliberate failure of the respondent to come forward and settle her accountabilities,inspite of several warnings given her by the undersigned, and her failure to attend thescheduled hearings despite due notice, this Office is convinced that Atty. ElerizzaLibiran-Meteoro has committed a glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer butalso the dictates of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which mandates that a worthy member of theBar must constantly be of good moral character and unsullied honesty.[14]

He then recommended that Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro be suspended fromthe practice of law for two years and meted a fine of twenty thousand pesos. [15]

On October 29, 2003, respondent filed another motion for reconsideration statingthat: she was not able to receive the notice for the October 7 hearing because she wasin Bicol attending to pressing personal problems; she only arrived from the province onOctober 25, 2003 and it was only then that she got hold of the Order dated October 7;from the very beginning, respondent never intended to ignore the Commission’shearings; as much as she wanted to pay complainant in full, the financial crisis which hither family since 2001 has gravely affected her ability to pay; until that day, the expensesincurred by respondent due to the hospitalization of her father has not been paid in fullby her family; the family home of respondent in Cabanatuan has already been

foreclosed by the bank; respondent’s husband has been confined recently due tothyroid problems and respondent herself had sought medical help on several occasionsdue to her inability to conceive despite being married for more than five years; if not forsaid reasons, respondent could have already paid the complainant despite respondent’sknowledge that the amount complainant wanted to collect from her is merely the interestof her debt since she already returned most of the pieces of jewelry she purchased andshe already paid for those that she was not able to return. Respondent prays that theresolution of the case be deferred and that she be given another 90 days from said dateor until January 19, 2003 to settle whatever balance remains after proper accountingand presentation of receipts.[16]

On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution asfollows:

RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-67CBD Case No. 01-840Isidra Barrientos vs.

Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED,the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-















entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex ―A‖; and, finding therecommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable lawsand rules, with modification, and considering respondent’s glaring violation not onlyof her oath as a lawyer but of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is hereby SUSPENDED from thepractice of law for six (6) months and Restitution of P84,000.00 to complainant.[17]

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP except as to the allegedmatter of respondent offering a transfer certificate of title to complainants in exchangefor the bounced checks that were in their possession.

We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthlesschecks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned withsuspension from the practice of law.[18] Lawyers are instruments for the administration of

justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legalproficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing sothat the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. [19] They must atall times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their

clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conductthemselves in a manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal profession asembodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[20] Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitlystates that:

CANON 1 -- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land andpromote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitfulconduct.

In this case, respondent in her answer initially tried to deny having any obligationtowards Isidra Barrientos. Upon appearing before the IBP-CBD, however, respondent

eventually acknowledged her indebtedness to Isidra in the amount of P134,000.00,promising only to pay in a staggered basis. Her attempt to evade her financialobligation runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility,above quoted, and violates the lawyer’s oath which imposes upon every member of thebar the duty to delay no man for money or malice.[21]

After respondent acknowledged her debt to complainant, she committed herself tothe payment thereof. Yet she failed many times to fulfill said promise. She did notappear in most of the hearings and merely submitted a motion for reconsideration on

August 1, 2002 after the IBP-CBD Commissioner had already submitted the case forresolution. She claimed that she got sick days before the hearing and asked for sixty

days to finally settle her account. Again, she failed to fulfill her promise and did notappear before the Commission in the succeeding hearings despite due notice. After thecase was submitted anew for resolution on October 6, 2003, respondent filed anothermotion for reconsideration, this time saying that she was in the province attending topersonal matters. Again she asked for another ninety days to settle her entire debt.This repeated failure on her part to fulfill her promise puts in question her integrity andmoral character. Her failure to attend most of the hearings called by the commissionand her belated pleas for reconsideration also manifest her propensity to delay the

























case, complainants submitted a photocopy of a TCT in the name of Victoria Villamartogether with their letter-complaint, which according to complainants was the titlerespondent tried, through her sister-in-law, to negotiate with them in exchange for thebounced checks in their possession.[28] No other evidence or sworn statement wassubmitted in support of such allegation. Respondent in her answer, meanwhile, denied

having any knowledge regarding such matter and no further discussion was made onthe matter, not even in the hearings before the commission.[29] For this reason, we holdthat respondent should not be held liable for the alleged negotiation of a TCT tocomplainants for lack of sufficient evidence, but only for the non-payment of debts andthe issuance of worthless checks which were sufficiently proved and which respondentherself admitted.

We reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a privilege and demands ahigh degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission,but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.[30]

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondent’s misconduct. TheIBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practiceof law for six months. In Lao vs. Medel ,[31] which also involved non-payment of debt andissuance of worthless checks, the Court held that suspension from the practice of lawfor one year was appropriate. Unlike in the Lao case however, respondent is this casepaid a portion of her debt, as evidenced by receipts amounting to P50,000.00. Thus wedeem that six months suspension from the practice of law and the restitution ofP84,000.00 to complainant Isidra Barrientos would be sufficient in this case.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is found guilty of gross misconductand is hereby SUSPENDED for six months from the practice of law, effective upon herreceipt of this Decision, and is ordered to pay complainant Isidra Barrientos the amountof P84,000.00, as balance of her debt to the latter, plus 6% interest from date of finality

of herein decision.Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on

the IBP as well as the court administrator who shall circulate herein Resolution to allcourts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4762. June 28, 2004]

LINDA VDA. DE ESPINO, complainant, vs. ATTY. PEPITO C.PRESQUITO, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

PUNO, J .:



















On June 9, 1997, Linda Vda. de Espino wrote a letter-complaint 38 with the thenCourt Administrator Alfredo Benipayo, charging respondent Atty. Pepito C. Presquito, amember of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Misamis Oriental Chapter, for―having employed fraud, trickery and dishonest means in refusing to honor and pay [her]late husband Virgilio Espino, when he was still alive, the sum of P763,060.00.‖

According to complainant, respondent’s unlawful refusal and dilatory tactics partlytriggered the death of her husband, who died ―disillusioned and embittered.‖ 39 The letter-complaint and affidavit also alleged that notwithstanding the numerous oral demands byMr. Espino and complainant (after the death of Mr. Espino), respondent still refused topay the amounts represented by the eight checks which had all been dishonored.Complainant surmised that Atty. Presquito’s refusal to pay may be due to his relianceon the influence of his father-in-law, a former Executive Judge of the RTC (Cagayan deOro), and of his uncle, an RTC judge (Cagayan de Oro).

The records show that sometime in September 1995, respondent was introduced tocomplainant’s late husband, Mr. Virgilio M. Espino. Mr. Espino, a resident of DavaoCity, had sought the assistance of respondent, a resident of Cagayan de Oro, regarding

the sale of his piece of land with an area of 11,057.59 sq.m. situated in MisamisOriental. The discussion between Mr. Espino and the respondent resulted in the sale ofthe property to respondent.40 Under the terms of the agreement between Mr. Espino andrespondent,41 the purchase price of the land was P1,437,410.00, payable on astaggered basis and by installments.42 Pursuant to the terms of payment in theagreement, respondent issued eight post-dated checks, totaling P736,060.00.43 Respondent then entered into a joint venture or partnership agreement with Mrs.



Guadalupe Ares for the subdivision of the land into home-size lots and its development,with a portion of the land retained by respondent for his own use.44 The land waseventually titled in the name of respondent and Mrs. Ares, and subdivided into 35 to 36lots.

Meanwhile, the eight post-dated checks issued by respondent were all dishonored.

Mr. Espino made repeated demands for payment from respondent but the latterrefused. Mr. Espino died in December 1996. His widow, complainant, then tried tocollect from respondent the value of the eight checks. When complainant’s numerouspleas remained unheeded, she filed the complaint in June 1997.

In his comment dated September 22, 1997, respondent denied any wrongdoing,and said that the allegations that he had employed ―fraud, trickery and dishonestmeans‖ with the late Mr. Espino were totally false and baseless. The complaint,according to respondent, stemmed from complainant’s lack of knowledge as to ―the realstory‖ of the transaction between complainant’s husband and respondent. He alsovehemently took exception to the imputation that he was banking on the influence of his

father-in-law and uncle-in-law.Respondent does not deny the issuance of the eight checks. What respondent

claims, however, is that the nonpayment was justified by the unresolved problems heand Mrs. Ares have with respect to the right-of-way of the land. He alleged that Mr.Espino had made assurances that the land had a right-of-way required for itsdevelopment, but respondent later found out that such road-right-of-way required theconsent of four other land owners, and the expense would be considerably more thanhe was made to believe. According to respondent, he and Mr. Espino had agreed thatthe latter would not encash the checks or demand the equivalent of the same until theright-of-way problem of the land had been resolved. 45 Respondent’s position is that untilthe problem of obtaining a right-of-way to the land has been resolved, nothing has yet

accrued against him or Mrs. Ares (his partner), as it would be ―very unfair and unjust‖ forthem to pay Mr. Espino when the land could not be developed and sold. 46

Respondent also alleged that he was entitled to set-off against the amount he owesMr. Espino or his heirs from the purchase of the land, the advances he made to Mr.Espino, and the cost he incurred when he defended Mr. Espino’s son in a criminal case.He later on manifested that he has fully paid the portion of the land which had been



titled in his name through the same advances and incurred expenses. 47

In a resolution dated November 26, 1997, 48 the case was referred to the IntegratedBar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision, andassigned to the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).

In the IBP-CBD report dated November 12, 2002,49

Investigating CommissionerCaesar R. Dulay found that ―the facts and credible evidence made available in this caseindubitably establish respondent’s failure to live up to the demands of the Lawyers Codeof Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics.‖ For having failedto act with candor and fairness toward complainant, Commissioner Dulay recommendedthat respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months, and orderedto immediately account with complainant regarding the sale of the piece of land whichhad been subdivided in the name of respondent and his business partner. On June 21,2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a Resolution adopting/approving theReport and Recommendation of Commissioner Dulay, finding that ―respondent’s lack offairness and candor and honesty [was] in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility.‖ After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, we agree that

respondent was wanting in fairness, candor and honesty demanded of him by the Codeof Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics. We find,however, the recommended penalty of six (6) months suspension too light consideringrespondent’s gross misconduct.

Complainant’s testimony and exhibits have clearly established that: (1) there was anagreement between respondent and complainant’s late husband for the sale of thelatter’s land; (2) respondent had issued the eight checks in connection with saidagreement; (3) these checks were dishonored and remain unpaid; and (4) the land sold

had an existing road-right-of-way. Complainant’s exhibits were formally offered as earlyas January 6, 1999,50 and were admitted without objection from respondent.51



In the face of these uncontroverted facts, it was incumbent upon respondent toprove a legal excuse or defense for nonpayment of the eight checks.

Respondent utterly failed in this regard.

From the termination of complainant’s presentation of evidence on December 1998

until Commissioner Dulay’s report on November 12, 2002, the records show thatrespondent was unable to present evidence - either testimonial or documentary - toprove that he had legal cause to refuse payment, or that he was entitled to legalcompensation. Even respondent’s own statements - which, without corroboratingevidence, remain mere self-serving allegations - fall short of testimony, as he failed tosubmit to cross-examination by opposing counsel or for clarificatory questions by theIBP-CBD. Worse, respondent attached eighteen documents to his comment, but only

went so far as to m ark (without a formal offer) the agreement between him and Mr.Espino (for the sale of the land), and the partnership agreement between him and Mrs.

Ares. Thus, respon dent had no evidence other than his ow n al legat ions .

Respondent’s failure to present evidence is a breach of Rule 12.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility,52 especially in the light of the numerous postponements andresettings he requested for and was granted with, on the ground that he needed moretime to prepare his evidence. We note that respondent was first scheduled to presenthis evidence on December 14, 1998. Two years - five resettings, and three orderssubmitting the case for resolution - later, respondent still had not proffered testimonial ordocumentary evidence.

Respondent claims that his failure to present evidence was due to his financialdifficulties, i.e., he could not afford to spend for travel expenses of his witnesses.53 Weare not persuaded. First, it boggles the mind how financial constraints could haveprevented respondent from presenting the originals of the documents attached to his

comment, proving, among others, the alleged advances and costs on Mr. Espino’sbehalf. The originals of these documents are presumably in his possession. Second,with respect to the absence of testimony, respondent could have submitted theaffidavits of his witnesses - the taking of which he could have done himself in Cagayande Oro to keep down the cost. The records are clear that he was allowed this option.54 But he did neither.



All these circumstances lead us to the ineluctable conclusion that respondentcould not present evidence because there really was none to justify hisnonpayment.55

Even if we were to excuse respondent’s procedural lapse and consider his writtenpleadings as testimony, we agree with Commissioner Dulay that respondent’s problems

with respect to the right-of-way or his partnership with Mrs. Ares do not excuse hisnonpayment. As stated in the IBP-CBD report:

[T]he solution to the right-of-way problem however clearly lies in the hands ofrespondent….We note that respondent has already taken title over the propertytogether with Guadalupe Ares by making complainant’s late husband, sign over theproperty by way of the Deed of Sale. We therefore find respondent’s position vis-à-visthe widowed complainant sneaky and unfair. We reiterate that respondent hasassumed responsibility for the negotiations on the road-right-of-way and was aware ofthe problem. To [sic ] our mind he has used the alleged road-right-of-way problem onlyas an afterthought and a reason to delay and in fact deny the complainant payment ofwhat is due her. Respondent also alleges and blames the deceased husband of

complainant for the failed project but the facts show otherwise. They are just bareallegations and remain unsubstantiated. Besides, respondent and Ares took risks inthe business venture and are now the titled owners of the property. The seller cannotbe blamed for any failure in the project. Respondent’s actuations in the wholetransaction is [sic ] not at par with the standards demanded of him as a member of thebar. Respondent is lacking in fairness and candour [sic ] and honesty. The fact that hehas unreasonably delayed and failed to account with complainant for a long time andthe fact of his having allowed the checks he issued to bounce is [sic ] unacceptable andcensurable behavior for a member of the bar.56 [citations omitted ]

Having no legal defense to refuse payment of the eight dishonored checks,respondent’s indifference to complainant’s entreaties for payment was conduct

unbecoming of a member of the bar and an officer of the court. Respondent violated theCode of Professional Responsibility by his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conducttowards complainant and her late husband,57 first by allowing the eight (8) checks heissued to bounce, then by ignoring the repeated demands for payment until complainantwas forced to file this complaint, and finally by deliberately delaying the disposition ofthis case with dilatory tactics. Considering that the property of complainant and her latehusband is already in respondent and Mrs. Ares’ name, the injustice of respondent’s







Vicente Ting. Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T.Torres, who is married to herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Theirparents died intestate and left several parcels of land, to wit:

a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing anarea of 43,908 square meters more or less, and covered at that time by TCT

No. (T-6203) RT-19151 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of

16,073 square meters, more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;

c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of22,131 square meters, more or less and covered at that time by TCT No. T-1869 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite.

According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationshipwith her and her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfullydue them even if it involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She

attributes to the respondent the following acts or omissions:1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against,

the perjury committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when theyexecuted a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986,wherein the two made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses JulitaReynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false. He presentedthat document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title over LotNo. 1586 in the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel HoldingsInc. for P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by, Felicisima andMiriam.

2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against,

the forgery of complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlementdated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at thattime working as an overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsifieddocument to the Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property infavor of his wife Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification wasmade to enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was receivedand misappropriated by Felicisima and Marcelina.

3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of theOriginal Copy and Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T -1869 Covering Lot No. 1605of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainant’s sistersMarcelina and Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the respondent made grossmisrepresentation and offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina andFelicisima are the only children and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting andJulita Reynante for the purpose of obtaining a new title in their names. With thereconstituted title, and with the express conformity of the respondent, Felicisima andMarcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 andprofited from the sale to the exclusion of their other siblings. Partial payment was evenreceived pending the reconstitution proceedings.

4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and falsemisrepresentations for the purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer



through a certain Mrs. Ong to release the full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretensethat the order of reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that itwould be impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on12 August 1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the stationery ofthe Philippine National Bank, of which he was an employee.

In his Comment,66

the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint andasserts that he did not take advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs ofhis wife of the estate left by his parents-in-law.

Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriamwere not motivated by any desire to solely profit from the sale. Neither can he be faultedby the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involvingLot 1603 because he had no part in the execution of the document. All the while hebelieved in good faith that the Ting sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of thesaid lot. If ever complainant’s signature was affixed on that document, it was done ingood faith.

The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., inLRC Case No. 5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony ofMarcelina in that case that she and Felicisima were the only children of spouses VicenteTing and Julita Reynante could not be faulted on him because such was a clearoversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605 to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision ofMarcelina and his wife. His conformity through his signature was pro-forma becausethe property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his wife. Anent his allegedgross and false misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution would be released bythe end of November 1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the Clerkof Court, Mr. Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usuallyuncontested and granted by courts.

Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him inbombarding him with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No.TM-855 for ―Annulment of Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages‖; and acriminal case for Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents.

In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedlymade by her mother and allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in view ofthe following circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden death in 1967; and partition ofthe properties in total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible, since the latterwas still alive; (2) when their mother died, four of the siblings were still minors includingrespondent’s wife herself; (3) on 5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response

to the previous letter of Felicisima, Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence of atoka. She further states that the respondent was not merely a passive onlooker but, ashe admitted, the administrator of the properties of the Ting spouses.



On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation or decision. 67

On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented byboth parties, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission onBar Discipline of the IBP found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules

1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility. Thus she recommended that the respondent be disbarred from thepractice of law.68

In its Resolution No. XV-2003-33369 of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of theIBP approved and adopted Commissioner San Juan’s report, but reduced the penalty tosuspension from the practice of law for six years.

We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts andconclusion of culpability. The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he ismorally and legally unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legalprofession. In his long years as a lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a

lawyer. It is time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers thatpledge; thus:

LAWYER'S OATH

I, ……………… , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republicof the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legalorders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent toits commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false orunlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money ormalice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge anddiscretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose uponmyself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

SO HELP ME GOD.

This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicatethemselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicinglaw to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trustthat lawyers must uphold and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyer’soath, they become guardians of truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the



fair and impartial dispensation of justice.70 This oath is firmly echoed and reflected in theCode of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land andpromote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitfulconduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of thelaw or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

. . .

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legalprofession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

…

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on hisfitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a

scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

. . .

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of anyin court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system.When the respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made asolemn promise to so stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserablyfailed.

The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlementof Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante andthus adjudicated only between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their othersiblings.71 There was concealment of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs tothe estate of the deceased. Significantly, the respondent is the brother-in-law ofcomplainant. Being married to complainant’s sister, he knew of his wife’s siblings. Infact, he declared that the complainant stayed with them while she was in thePhilippines.72 Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register of Deeds of



General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the nameof his wife and his sister-in-law Miriam.

It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted73 regarding the falsification ofcomplainant’s signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement74 dated 17 March 1995 involvingLot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by the complainant of her right over the

property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainant’s name in that document.75 Such act of counterfeiting the complainant’s signature to make it appear that thecomplainant had participated in the execution of that document is tantamount tofalsification of a public document.76

Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney andagainst committing falsification, he presented77 such document to the Registry of Deedsto secure a new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife. 78 He himself, therefore,may also be held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of thecomplainant and her other co-heirs.79 Notably, he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22May 1995 that he prepared the legal documents for the transfer of Lot 1603. 80





Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. VicenteTing, Jr. and Julita Reynante?

WITNESS:

A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.

Q Do you have other brothers and sisters? A None, sir.87

The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony88 incourt, and he never corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts andcircumstances of the case.89 Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such falsetestimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony.90

Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyerowes candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall ―not do any falsehood, norconsent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misledby any artifice.‖91 This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he

permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima andwhen he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title involving Lot1605.

The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the courtcalled upon to assist in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is aninstrument to advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs andimpedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinaryaction against him.92



It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offeredin evidence an Affidavit of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized byhim. During the hearing of this administrative case, Marcelina admitted that herstatement in that affidavit that the title was in her possession was false, as she wasnever in possession of the title93 and would not, therefore, know that the same was lost.

Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, therespondent requested the release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot1605, relaying to Antel Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong that he was assured by theClerk of Court that the order directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would bereleased within the month.94 Respondent’s information was misleading because hepresented evidence only on 12 August 1997, or almost a year after he sent the letter. 95 Such act, therefore, shows lack of candor and honesty on the part of the respondent.

Respondent’s acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bringintolerable dishonor to the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for whichhe may be disbarred or suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of

Court, which provides:Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds

therefor . -- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office asattorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconductin such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crimeinvolving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to takebefore the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of asuperior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a casewithout authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose ofgain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer,

we take into account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protectthe administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important functionshall be competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may reposeconfidence.96 While the assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily



addressed to our sound discretion, the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic,nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlledby the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar.97

Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases ofmisconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of

the court and member of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney fromthe esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. 98 Verily, given thepeculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find that respondent’s grossmisconduct calls for the severance of his privilege to practice law for life, and wetherefore adopt the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torresguilty of gross misconduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath, as well as Canons 1 and10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy ofcontinuing membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED fromthe practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective

immediately.Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which

shall forthwith record it in the personal files of the respondent; all the courts of thePhilippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereofto all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic ofthe Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 4256 February 13, 2004

JOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO, complainantvs.ATTYS. WARFREDO TOMAS ALEJANDRO and MARICRIS A. VILLARIN, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:



This is an administrative case filed in 1994 by Jovita Bustamante-Alejandro chargingrespondents Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro and Atty. Maricris A. Villarin with bigamy andconcubinage.

Complainant alleged that respondent, Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro, is her husband; thatthey were married on March 3, 1971 at Alicia, Isabela, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract; 1

that she bore him three (3) sons, namely, Dino, Eric, and Carlo, born in 1971, 1973, and 1978,respectively, as evidenced by their respective Certificates of Live Birth;2 that respondentabandoned her and their children in 1990 to live with his mistress, respondent Atty. Ma. Cristina

Arrieta Villarin,3 at 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City; that respondents have since then beenpublicly representing themselves as husband and wife; that respondent Atty. Villarin gave birthto Paolo Villarin Alejandro on January 17, 1992 as a result of her immoral and scandalousrelationship with complainant’s husband whom she named as the father of her son in the latter’sCertificate of Live Birth;4 and, that in said Certificate of Live Birth, respondent Atty. Villarinidentified herself as "Ma. Cristina V. Alejandro" having been married to Atty. Alejandro on May1, 1990 at Isabela Province. Complainant alleged that she filed this administrative complaintwhen she learned that her husband has been nominated as a regional trial court judge. Sheinsists that he is not fit to be a judge considering that he, and co-respondent Atty. Villarin, do not

even possess the basic integrity to remain as members of the Philippine Bar.

We required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint in our Resolution datedJuly 4, 1994. When copies of our resolution and of the complaint and its annexes addressed torespondent Atty. Alejandro at 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City were returned unserved withnotation "moved," we required complainant to submit the correct and present address of herhusband.5 No similar return of service with respect to respondent Atty. Villarin appears on therecord.

In an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion dated December 5, 1994, complainant insisted that herhusband’s correct address remains to be 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City; that it was him whotold the postman that he had already moved; and, that any subsequent service by mail willresult in the same failure as respondent will either refuse service or misrepresent a change ofaddress again. Complainant therefore asked that copies of the complaint and Court resolutionrequiring comment be served personally upon her husband by the Court’s process servers. Wenoted and granted the prayer.6 However, when the Court’s process server attempted to effectpersonal service on February 16, 1995, respondent Atty. Alejandro was allegedly out of thehouse and his house helper refused to accept service. Consequently we considered the copiesas having been served upon respondent Atty. Alejandro in our Resolution of July 31, 1996,7 andrequired him to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt forhis continued failure to file comment, and to file such comment, considering the considerablelength of time that has lapsed since he has been first required to do so. Respondent Atty.

Alejandro failed to comply. Hence, we fined him P1,000.00 and directed that he file the requiredexplanation and comment on the administrative complaint.8

When copies of both resolutions were again returned unserved with postal notations "moved,"we required complainant anew to submit the correct and present address of respondents, withinten (10) days from notice, under pain of dismissal of her administrative complaint.9 In ahandwritten letter dated September 10, 1998, complainant disclosed respondents’ presentaddress as "12403 Dunlop Drive, Houston, Texas."10





Thus we have in a number of cases11 disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty ofmisconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not onlyas a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continuedmembership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct wascommitted in the lawyer’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyermay not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at

another.12 He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he whocannot apply and abide by the laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in hisprofessional dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to beexpected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. 13 Theadministration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court,demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that the courts andclients may rightly repose confidence in him.14

In the instant case, sufficient evidence was presented to show that respondent Atty. Alejandro,while being lawfully married to complainant, carried on an illicit relationship with another woman,co-respondent Atty. Villarin. Although the evidence presented was not sufficient to prove that hecontracted a subsequent bigamous marriage with her, the fact remains that respondent Atty.

Alejandro exhibited by his conduct a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of himas a member of the Bar. We have already held that disbarment proceedings is warrantedagainst a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with anotherwoman15 who had borne him a child.16 We can do no less in the instant case where respondent

Atty. Alejandro made himself unavailable to this Court and even fled to another country toescape the consequences of his misconduct.

The same penalty however cannot be imposed on respondent Atty. Villarin. I is noted that ourResolution dated July 4, 1994 requiring comment on the administrative complaint was never"deemed served" upon her, in the same way that it was upon Atty. Alejandro. In fact, it does notappear that copies of the administrative complaint, its annexes, and of our resolution requiringcomment were even sent to her. Although sent at the address she allegedly shared with co-

respondent Atty. Alejandro, the envelope bearing the copies was addressed to the latter only. 17 That was why when both service by registered mail and personal service failed, the copies weredeemed served solely upon Atty. Alejandro.18

The IBP for its part attempted to serve copy of the complaint upon Atty. Villarin with directive forher to file answer. It is noted however that the same was sent to respondent’s old address at 27 -C Masbate St., Quezon City, not "12403 Dunlop Drive, Houston, Texas," which wasrespondents’ new address on record supplied by the complainant. The return of servicetherefore showed the postal notation "moved." Considering the serious consequences ofdisbarment proceedings, full opportunity upon reasonable notice must have been givenrespondent to answer the charge and present evidence in her behalf. It is only in clear cases ofwaiver that an administrative case be resolved sans respondent’s answer.

WHEREFORE, for Gross Immorality, respondent Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro isDISBARRED from the practice of law, to take effect immediately upon his receipt of thisDecision. Let copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Alejandro’s personal record in the Officeof the Bar Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The complaint against respondent Atty. Maricris A. Villarin is REFERRED BACK to theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines for further appropriate proceedings.



SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and A.C. No. 9081

MAXIMO A. GLINDO,

Complainants, Present:

CARPIO, J .,Chairperson,

BRION,

- versus - SERENO,

REYES, and

PERLAS-BERNABE,* JJ .

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA, Promulgated:

Respondent. October 12, 2011

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2011/october2011/9081.html#sdfootnote1sym






The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa(Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaña(Omaña).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaña with violation of her oathas a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wifeElena Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaña’s legal advice on whether theycould legally live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July1983. Omaña then prepared a document entitled ―Kasunduan NgPaghihiwalay ‖ (contract) which reads:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS

BAYAN NG GUMACA

LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino, may sapat nagulang, dating legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang naninirahan at may pahatirang sulatsa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca, Quezon, at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sapagkakasunod-sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay nagpapatunayng nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:



1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhayng walang pakialaman, kung kaya’t bawat isa sa amin ay maaari nghumanap ng makakasama sa buhay;

2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John Espinosa, 14 na taong

gulang; Aiza Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin Espinosa, 10 taonggulang ay namili na kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si Ariel Johnat Aiza Espinosa ay sasama sa kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at angbunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama naman sa ina na si Elena;

3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila aypansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina, habang tinatapos angkanilang pag-aaral. Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama, sa lugarkung saan siya ay naninirahan;

4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng sino man sa aming dalawatuwing may pagkakataon;

5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o suporta ang ama kay Aldrin atang kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito ay pupunan ng ina;

6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mgakagamitan sa kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob kay Elena at hindina ako interesado dito;

7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino man sa amin dalawa sa mgapanahong darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari na at hindi napinagsamahan o conjugal.

BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre,1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.

(Sgd) (Sgd)

ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA



Nagkasundo Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong ika-17 ng Nobyembre,1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAÑA

Notary Public

PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97

Gumaca, Quezon

Doc. No. 482;

Page No. 97;

Book No. XI;

Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of thevalidity of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing itsterms and conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all theirchildren and took possession of most of the property they acquired duringtheir union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a lawgraduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaña was notvalid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file acomplaint against Omaña before the Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesCommission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).



Omaña alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally knowEspinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted thatEspinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract

but she told him that it was illegal. Omaña alleged that Espinosa returned thenext day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signatureand notarized the contract. Omaña presented Marantal’s ―SinumpaangSalaysay ‖ (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show that the complaintwas instigated by Glindo. Omaña further presented a letter of apology fromher staff, Arlene Dela Peña, acknowledging that she notarized the documentwithout Omaña’s knowledge, consent, and authority.

Espinosa later submitted a ―Karagdagang Salaysay ‖ stating that Omañaarrived at his residence together with a girl whom he later recognized as theperson who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaña was not inher office when the contract was notarized.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation1 dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBDstated that Espinosa’s desistance did not put an end to the pr oceedings. TheIBP-CBD found that Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage inunlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated thatOmaña had failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her functionas a notary public and to comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the inconsistencies in the defense of Omaña who first claimed thatit was her part-time staff who notarized the contract but then later claimed thatit was her former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found:






Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still disclaimed itsauthorship, thereby revealing much more her propensity to lie and make deceit, whichshe is deserving [of] disciplinary sanction or disbarment.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaña be suspended for one year from thepractice of law and for two years as a notary public.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governorsadopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Omaña filed a motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors deniedOmaña’s motion for reconsideration.

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaña violated the Canon ofProfessional Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosa’s―Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay .‖

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution ofthe conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.2 The Court has alsoruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriageand the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and







extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal partnership,3 which is exactly whatOmaña did in this case.

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,4

the Court cited a number of cases where thelawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in thiscase, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which permittedthe husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live with anotherman, without opposition from each other ;5 ratifying a document entitled ―LegalSeparation‖ where the couple agreed to be separated from each othermutually and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizingeach other to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have againsteach other ;6 preparing a document authorizing a married couple who hadbeen separated for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action

which each may have against the other ;7 and preparing a document declaringthe conjugal partnership dissolved.8

We cannot accept Omaña’s allegation that it was her part-time office staff whonotarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaña herselfnotarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff whonotarized the contract, it only showed Omaña’s negligence in doing hernotarial duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for

the entries in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of thisresponsibility by passing the blame on his secretaries9 or any member of hisstaff.

We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a voiddocument, Omaña violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility which provides that ―[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.‖ Omaña knew fully well that the―Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay ‖ has no legal effect and is against public policy.Therefore, Omaña may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach ofthe ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility.10


































WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaña from the practice of lawfor ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaña’s notarial commission, if stillexisting, and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaña’s personal record in

the Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnishedto all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in theland.

SO ORDERED.