Legal Ethics

1 LEGAL ETHICS (Canons 8&9)

A.C. No. 4807 March 22, 2000

MANUEL N. CAMACHO vs. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN

VITUG, J.:

Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the Code of Professional Ethics, specifically Canon 9 thereof,viz:

A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law.

Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer College ("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which, in effect, required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.

In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that not one of his co-respondents had taken part in the negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the various Re-Admission Agreements complained of and were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing to do with the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an administrative case involving nine students of AMACC who were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo, Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven, Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B. Villareiz, were all members of the Editorial Board of DATALINE, who apparently had caused to be published some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The 3-member Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately convened, and after a series of hearings, it found the students guilty of the use of indecent language and unauthorized use of the student publication funds. The body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the erring students.

The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr. Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President, gave rise to the commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of the expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May 1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997, of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda B. De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 May 1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-Admission Agreement of 22

May 1997 with the AMACC President; letter or apology, dated 22 September 1997, of Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October 1997 with the AMACC President; and letter of apology, dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997 with the AMACC President.

Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06 June 1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for defendant AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was furnished complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.

On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-99-163, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and DISMISSAL of the case against the other Respondents for they did not take part in the negotiation of the case.

It would appear that when the individual letters of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized, complainant was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent Pangulayan had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least

communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This failure of respondent, whether by design or because of oversight, is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission Agreements centers only on the administrative aspect of the controversy is belied by the Manifestation1 which, among other things, explicitly contained the following stipulation;viz:

1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four (4) of whom assisted by their parents/guardian already executed a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC President, AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for violating the AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings which they may have against the AMACC arising from their previous dismissal.

x x x x x x x x x

3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 will by filed them.1âwphi1

The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating Commission and the IBP Board of Governors in their findings; nevertheless, the recommended six-month suspension would appear to be somewhat too harsh a penalty given the circumstances and the explanation of respondent.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision. The case against the other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/mar2000/ac_4807_2000.html#fnt1


evidence. Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5148 July 1, 2003

ATTY. RAMON P. REYES vs.ATTY. VICTORIANO T. CHIONG JR.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Lawyers should treat each other with courtesy, dignity and civility. The bickering and the hostility of their clients should not affect their conduct and rapport with each other as professionals and members of the bar.

The Case

Before us is a Sworn Complaint1 filed by Atty. Ramon P. Reyes with the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victoriano T. Chiong Jr. for violation of his lawyer’s oath and of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. After the Third Division of this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline resolved to suspend him as follows:

"x x x [C]onsidering that respondent is bound by his oath which binds him to the obligation that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. In addition, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. In impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in Civil Case No. 4884, when it was apparent that there was no legal ground to do so, respondent violated

his oath of office as well as the above-quoted Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [r]espondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years."

The Facts

In his Complaint, Atty. Reyes alleges that sometime in January 1998, his services were engaged by one Zonggi Xu, a Chinese-Taiwanese, in a business venture that went awry. Xu invested P300,000 on a Cebu-based fishball, tempura and seafood products factory being set up by a certain Chia Hsien Pan, another Chinese-Taiwanese residing in Zamboanga City. Eventually, the former discovered that the latter had not established a fishball factory. When Xu asked for his money back, Pan became hostile, making it necessary for the former to seek legal assistance.

Xu, through herein complainant, filed a Complaint for estafa against Pan, who was represented by respondent. The Complaint, docketed as IS 98J-51990, was assigned to Assistant Manila City Prosecutor Pedro B. Salanga, who then issued a subpoena for Pan to appear for preliminary investigation on October 27 and 29, 1998. The latter neither appeared on the two scheduled hearings nor submitted his counter-affidavit. Hence, Prosecutor Salanga filed a Criminal Complaint4 for estafa against him before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. On April 8, 1999, the Manila RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest6 against Pan.

Thereafter, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest.7 He also filed with the RTC of Zamboanga City a Civil Complaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages as well as for the dissolution of a business venture against complainant, Xu and Prosecutor Salanga.

When confronted by complainant, respondent explained that it was Pan who had decided to institute the civil action against Atty. Reyes.

Respondent claimed he would suggest to his client to drop the civil case, if complainant would move for the dismissal of the estafa case. However, the two lawyers failed to reach a settlement.

In his Comment8 dated January 27, 2000, respondent argued that he had shown no disrespect in impleading Atty. Reyes as co-defendant in Civil Case No. 4884. He claimed that there was no basis to conclude that the suit was groundless, and that it had been instituted only to exact vengeance. He alleged that Prosecutor Salanga was impleaded as an additional defendant because of the irregularities the latter had committed in conducting the criminal investigation. Specifically, Prosecutor Salanga had resolved to file the estafa case despite the pendency of Pan’s Motion for an Opportunity to Submit Counter-Affidavits and Evidence, of the appeal to the justice secretary, and of the Motion to Defer/Suspend Proceedings.

On the other hand, complainant was impleaded, because he allegedly connived with his client (Xu) in filing the estafa case, which the former knew fully well was baseless. According to respondent, the irregularities committed by Prosecutor Salanga in the criminal investigation and complainant’s connivance therein were discovered only after the institution of the collection suit.

The Third Division of this Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.12Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed its June 29, 2002 Resolution.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for investigation and report, averred that complainant and Prosecutor Salanga had been impleaded in Civil Case No. 4884 on the sole basis of the Criminal Complaint for estafa they

had filed against respondent’s client. In his Comment, respondent himself claimed that "the reason x x x was x x x the irregularities of the criminal investigation/connivance and consequent damages."

Commissioner San Juan maintained that the collection suit with damages had been filed purposely to obtain leverage against the estafa case, in which respondent’s client was the defendant. There was no need to implead complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, since they had never participated in the business transactions between Pan and Xu. Improper and highly questionable was the inclusion of the prosecutor and complainant in the civil case instituted by respondent on the alleged prodding of his client. Verily, the suit was filed to harass complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.

Commissioner San Juan held that respondent had no ground to implead Prosecutor Salanga and complainant in Civil Case No. 4884. In so doing, respondent violated his oath of office and Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The IBP adopted the investigating commissioner’s recommendation for his suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years.

This Court’s Ruling

We agree with the IBP’s recommendation.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel."


Respondent’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. Civil Case No. 4884 was for the "collection of a sum of money, damages and dissolution of an unregistered business venture." It had originally been filed against Spouses Xu, but was later modified to include complainant and Prosecutor Salanga.

The Amended and Supplemental Complaints16 alleged the following:

"27. The investigating prosecutor defendant Pedro Salanga knowingly and deliberately refused and failed to perform his duty enjoined by the law and the Constitution to afford plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan due process by violating his rights under the Rules on preliminary investigations; he also falsely made a Certification under oath that preliminary investigation was duly conducted and plaintiff [was] duly informed of the charges against him but did not answer; he maliciously and x x x partially ruled that there was probable cause and filed a Criminal Information for estafa against plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan, knowing fully [well] that the proceedings were fatally defective and null and void; x x x;

"28. Said assistant prosecutor, knowing also that plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan filed said appeal and motion to defer for the valid grounds stated therein deliberately refused to correct his errors and consented to the arrest of said plaintiff under an invalid information and warrant of arrest.

"29. Defendant Atty. Ramon Reyes, knowing that the suit of defendant Zongoi Xu is baseless connived with the latter to harass and extort money from plaintiff Chia Hsien Pan by said criminal prosecution in the manner contrary to law, morals and public policy, resulting to the arrest of said plaintiff and causing plaintiffs grave irreparable damages[.]"17

We concur with the IBP that the amendment of the Complaint and the failure to resort to the proper remedies strengthen complainant’s allegation that the civil action was intended to

gain leverage against the estafa case. If respondent or his client did not agree with Prosecutor Salanga’s resolution, they should have used the proper procedural and administrative remedies. Respondent could have gone to the justice secretary and filed a Motion for Reconsideration or a Motion for Reinvestigation of Prosecutor Salanga’s decision to file an information for estafa.

In the trial court, a Motion to Dismiss was available to him if he could show that the estafa case was filed without basis. Moreover, he could have instituted disbarment proceedings against complainant and Prosecutor Salanga, if he believed that the two had conspired to act illegally. As a lawyer, respondent should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies. Thus, the filing of the civil case had no justification.

The lack of involvement of complainant and Prosecutor Salanga in the business transaction subject of the collection suit shows that there was no reason for their inclusion in that case. It appears that respondent took the estafa case as a personal affront and used the civil case as a tool to return the inconvenience suffered by his client. His actions demonstrate a misuse of the legal process. The aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them.18

Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. A great part of their comfort, as well as of their success at the bar, depends upon their relations with their professional brethren. Since they deal constantly with each other, they must treat one another with trust and respect. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other. Mutual bickering, unjustified recriminations and offensive behavior among lawyers not only detract from the dignity of the legal profession,19 but also constitute highly unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action.

Furthermore, the Lawyer’s Oath exhorts law practitioners not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same."

Respondent claims that it was his client who insisted in impleading complainant and Prosecutor Salanga. Such excuse is flimsy and unacceptable. While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interests of their clients, their office does not permit violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery.20 Their rendition of improper service invites stern and just condemnation. Correspondingly, they advance the honor of their profession and the best interests of their clients when they render service or give advice that meets the strictest principles of moral law.21

The highest reward that can be bestowed on lawyers is the esteem of their professional brethren. This esteem cannot be purchased, perfunctorily created, or gained by artifice or contrivance. It is born of sharp contests and thrives despite conflicting interests. It emanates solely from integrity, character, brains and skill in the honorable performance of professional duty.22

WHEREFORE, respondent is found guilty as charged and is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 219 September 29, 1962

CASIANO U. LAPUT vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an original complaint filed with this Court charging respondents with unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer, and praying that respondents be dealt with accordingly.

The facts which led to the filing of this complaint are as follow: In May, 1952, petitioner was retained by Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera to handle her case (Sp. Proc. No. 2-J) in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Testate Estate of Macario Barrera". By January, 1955, petitioner had contemplated the closing of the said administration proceedings and prepared two pleadings: one, to close the proceedings and declare Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera as universal heir and order the delivery to her of the residue of the estate and, second, a notice for the rendition of final accounting and partition of estate. At this point, however, the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera refused to countersign these two pleadings and instead advised petitioner not to file them. Some weeks later, petitioner found in the records of said proceedings that respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug had filed on January 11, 1955 a written appearance as the new counsel for Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera. On February 5, 1955 petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera. On February 7, 1955, the other respondent, Atty. Francisco E. F. Remotigue, entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955.

Complainant here alleges that the appearances of respondents were unethical and improper for the reason that they had nursed the desire to replace the petitioner as attorney for the estate and the administratrix and, taking advantage of her goodwill, intrigued against the preparation of the final inventory and accounting and prodded Mrs. Barrera not to consent to petitioner's decision to close the administration proceedings; that before their appearance, they brought petitioner's client to their law office and there made her sign four documents captioned "Revocation of Power of Attorney" and sent the same by mail to several corporations and establishments where the Estate of Macario Barrera is owner of certificates of stocks and which documents purported to disauthorize the petitioner from further collecting and receiving the dividends of the estate from said corporations, when in fact and in truth the respondents fully knew that no power of attorney


or authority was given to the petitioner by his client, the respondents motive being to embarrass petitioner to the officials, lawyers and employees of said corporations, picturing him as a dishonest lawyer and no longer trusted by his client — all with the purpose of straining the relationship of the petitioner and his client, Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera; and that Atty. Patalinghug entered his appearance without notice to petitioner.

In answer, respondent Atty. Patalinghug stated that when he entered his appearance on January 11, 1955 the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera had already lost confidence in her lawyer, the herein petitioner, and had in fact already with her a pleading dated January 11, 1955, entitled "Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and Motion to Cite Atty. Casiano Laput", which she herself had filed with the court.1awphîl.nèt

In answer, respondent Atty. Remotigue stated that when he filed his appearance on February 7, 1955, the petitioner has already withdrawn as counsel.

After separate answers were filed by the respondents, the Supreme Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor General recommended the complete exoneration of respondents.

It appears and it was found by the Solicitor General that before respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug entered his appearance, the widow administratrix had already filed with the court a pleading discharging the petitioner Atty. Casiano Laput. If she did not furnish Atty. Laput with a copy of the said pleading, it was not the fault of Atty. Patalinghug but that of the said widow. It appears that the reason why Mrs. Barrera dismissed petitioner as her lawyer was that she did not trust him any longer, for one time she found out that some dividend checks which should have been sent to her were sent instead to petitioner, making her feel that she was being cheated by petitioner. Moreover, she found that

withdrawals from the Philippine National Bank and Bank of the Philippine Islands have been made by petitioner without her prior authority.

We see no irregularity in the appearance of respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug as counsel for the widow; much less can we consider it as an actual grabbing of a case from petitioner. The evidence as found by the Solicitor General shows that Atty. Patalinghug's professional services were contracted by the widow, a written contract having been made as to the amount to be given him for his professional services.

Petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on February 5, 1955, as counsel for Mrs. Barrera after Atty. Patalinghug had entered his appearance, and his (petitioner's) filing almost simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees, amounted to an acquiescence to the appearance of respondent Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for the widow. This should estop petitioner from now complaining that the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug was unprofessional.

Much less could we hold respondent Atty. Remotigue guilty of unprofessional conduct inasmuch as he entered his appearance, dated February 5, 1955, only on February 7, same year, after Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with petitioner's professional services on January 11, 1955, and after petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance on February 5, 1955.

With respect to the preparation by Atty. Patalinghug of the revocations of power of attorney as complained of by petitioner, the Solicitor General found that the same does not appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurt petitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest of the administratrix. Evidently, petitioner's pride was hurt by the issuance of these documents, and felt that he had been pictured as a dishonest lawyer; for he filed a case before the City Fiscal of Cebu against Atty. Patalinghug and the widow for libel and

falsification. It was shown, however, that the case was dismissed.

No sufficient evidence having been submitted to sustain the charges, these are hereby dismissed and the case closed.

B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE vs. EDWIN L. RANA

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the

Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.


In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political vendetta."

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for evaluation, report and recommendation.

OBC’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the

same pleading respondent stated that he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him" before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to

constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/jun2003/bm_1036_2003.html#fnt1


Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.1âwphi1 However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon your acceptance." Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11 May 2001. Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs.ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:

In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled "People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for Falsification of Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40.1 While respondent's letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondent's authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case.2 On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment.3

In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his

appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave applications approved by the presiding judge.1âwphi1.nêt

On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution denying respondent's request for authorization to appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for appearing in court without the required authorization from the Court.5 On January 25, 1999, the Court Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees," which provides:

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

x x x

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;

In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint.

In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are "close blood cousins" who

belong to a "powerless family" from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondent's help and advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to "seek vengeance" on her cousin. He explained that his cousin's discord with Ms. Andres started when the latter's husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladaga's plea to be her counsel since she not have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with the Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this particular case that he had been administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance for "humanitarian purpose." He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his comment.

In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondent's comment and referred the administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for investigation, report and recommendation.


In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and recommendation:

There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for "Falsification of Public Documents" before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the previous permission of the Court.

An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the respondent appeared aspro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.

It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and independence.

RECOMMENDATION

In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin without first securing permission from the Court, and considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that said appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully

recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.6

We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said section reads:

SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advise to clients.

However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.

In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained the meaning of the term "private practice" prohibited by the said section, to wit:

We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment

for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:

"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services."

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.8

Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the "private practice" of the law profession contemplated by law.

Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law, he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:

Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or professionor be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be

fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.

Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.


RULE 138, SECTION 34

Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

G.R. No. L-8320 December 20, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. SIM BEN

PADILLA, J.:

Sim Ben appeals from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding him guilty of violating paragraph 3, Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, for having exhibit cinematographic films of indecent or immoral scenes inside his establishment, a restaurant which is a place open to public view in the City of Cebu, on the sole ground that he entered a plea of guilty to the information without the aid of counsel.

The minutes of the session of the Court on 31 January 1953 disclose that when the case was called for trial, the appellant was informed by the Court of his right to have counsel and asked if he desired the aid of one. He replied that he did not. Then the Court asked if he was agreeable to have the information read to him even without the assistance of counsel. His answer was in the affirmative. The court interpreter translated the information to him in the local dialect and after the translation he entered a plea of guilty. He was asked whether he knew that because of the plea of guilty the punishment as provided for by law would be imposed upon him and he answered "Yes, sir." The Court asked him if he insisted on his plea of guilty and he answered "Yes, sir." At this juncture the fiscal recommended that a fine of P200 be imposed upon the defendant. Thereupon, the Court sentenced him to suffer 6

months and 1 day of prision correccional and to pay the costs.lawphi1.net

What transpired when the appellant was arraigned shows that his rights were fully protected and safeguarded. The Court complied with its duly when it informed the appellant that it was his right to have the aid of counse. And before pronouncing the sentence the Court took pains to ascertain whether he was aware of the consequences of the plea he had entered. Notwithstanding this precaution and warning, he waived his right to have the aid of counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the information.

Appellant claims that he entered the plea of guilty because the fiscal promised him that only a fine would be imposed. The recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine be imposed upon the appellant seems to bear out his claim; but such recommendation or one of leniency does not mean that the appellant is not guilty of the crime charged against him. A promise to recommend a specific penalty such as fine does not render the sentence void if the Court ignores the recommendation and metes out to the defendant a penalty which is provided by law.

The sentence appealed from is affirmed, with cost against the appellant.

G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977

JOSE GUBALLA vs. THE HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA

SANTOS, J:

In this petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction, petitioner seeks to set aside the Order of respondent Judge dated July 12, 1977, denying his Petition for Relief from Judgment and allowing a writ of execution to issue in Civil Case No. 680-V of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.

The factual antecedents may be recited as follows:

Petitioner is an operator of a public utility vehicle which was involved, on October 1, 1971, in an accident resulting to injuries sustained by private respondent Domingo Forteza Jr. As a consequence thereof, a complaint for damages was filed by Forteza against petitioner with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Branch VIII), docketed as Civil Case No. 680-V. An Answer thereto was filed on behalf of petitioner by Irineo W. Vida Jr., of the law firm of Vida Enriquez, Mercado & Associates.

Because petitioner and counsel failed to appear at the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, despite due notice, petitioner was treated as in default and private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. A decision was thereafter rendered by the trial court in favor of private respondent Forteza Jr. A Motion for Reconsideration was then filed by petitioner seeking the lifting of the order of default, the reopening of the case for the presentation of his evidence and the setting aside of the decision. Said Motion for Reconsideration was signed by Ponciano Mercado, another member of the law firm. The same was denied by the lower Court and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals assigning the following alleged errors, to wit:

a. That the Hon. Court erred in denying defendant Jose Guballa his day in Court by declaring him in default, it being contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter;

b. That this Hon. Court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case;

c. Award of damages in favor of plaintiff, more particularly award of moral damages is contrary to law; and

d. Defendant has valid, legal and justiciable defenses.

The appealed case was handled by Atty. Benjamin Bautista, an associate of the same law firm. The decision appealed from was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.

52610R. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, through a different counsel, Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos II. However the same was denied and the decision became final on June 29, 1977 and was then remanded to the lower Court, presided by respondent Judge for execution.

A Motion for Execution was thereafter filed by private respondent with the lower Court which was granted by respondent Judge.

On July 6, 1977, petitioner, through Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment alleging his discovery that Irineo W. Vida Jr., who prepared his Answer to the Complaint is not a member of the Philippine Bar and that consequently, his rights had not been adequately protected and his properties are in danger of being confiscated and/or levied upon without due process of law.

In an Order dated July 12, 1977, respondent Judge denied the Petition and directed the issuance of a writ of execution for the reasons that said Petition is ". . a clear case of dilatory tactic on the part of counsel for defendant-appellant ..." herein petitioner, and, that the grounds relied upon ". . . could have been ventilated in the appeal before the Court of Appeals ... "

On July 19, 1977, respondent Deputy Sheriff Ricardo G. Carlos, acting upon the writ of execution, issued by respondent Judge, levied on three motor vehicles, of petitioner for the satisfaction of the judgment.

Hence the instant Petition.

Respondent Judge's forthright denial of the Petition for Relief to frustrate a dilatory maneuver is well-taken; and this Petition must be denied for lack of merit. The alleged fact that the person who represented petitioner at the initial stage of the litigation, i.e., the filing of an Answer and the pretrial proceedings, turned out to be not a member of the Bar did not amount to a denial of petitioner's day in court. It should be


noted that in the subsequent stages of the proceedings, after the rendition of the judgment by default, petitioner was duly represented by bona fidemembers of the Bar in seeking a reversal of the judgment for being contrary to law and jurisprudence and the existence of valid, legal and justifiable defenses. In other words, petitioner's rights had been amply protected in the proceedings before the trial and appellate courts as he was subsequently assisted by counsel. Moreover, petitioner himself was at fault as the order of treatment as in default was predicated, not only on the alleged counsel's failure to attend the pretrial conference on April 6, 1972, but likewise on his own failure to attend the same, without justifiable reason. To allow this petition due course is to countenance further delay in a proceeding which has already taken well over six years to resolve,

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction is hereby dismissed. The law firm "Vida, Enriquez, Mercado & Associates" of 209 Sampaguita Bldg., Cubao, Quezon City, is hereby ordered to explain, within ten (10) days from notice this Resolution, why Irineo W. Vida Jr. was permitted to sign the Answer in Civil Case No. 680-V of CFI, Bulacan, when he is not a member of the Bar.

G.R. No. L-16731 March 30, 1960

FFLIPE ECO vs. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.

BARRERA, J.:

In a petition for certiorari filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 33674) on September 11, 1957, Felipe Eco sought annulment of the proceeding, orders, and decisions rendered by the respondents Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources and Director of Forestry, claiming that the latter committed an abuse of discretion in suspending his certificate of Private Wood-land Registration No. 1329, covering a tract of land with an area of 700

hectares, 290 hectares of which were forestal, and the former, in dismissing petitioner's appeal.

After the respondents had duty filed their answer justifying the controverted act, the case was heard.

On April 30, 1958, the court rendered judgment finding, inter alia that on January 17, 1956, petitioner Eco obtained from the Bureau of Forestry a certificate of private wood-land registration under Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code, on the strength of a possessory information title covering 700 hectares but which was made to appear later on a sketch to contain 290 hectares of forest land, 99 hectares of are logged area and 811 hectares cultivated area; TigMan Lumber Co., another timber licensee, protested against this registration and filed a petition for reconsideration which was apparently granted because the Director of Forestry suspended the operation of Eco's certificate; that likewise, it was found that portions of the area released from the forest zone were under occupancy by some 80 oppositors; that after a series of protests and counter-protests, objections and counter-objections between the parties, the Director of Forestry recommended cancellation of Eco's certificate of private woodland and the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources approved the recommendation; that upon the appeal of Eco, the Secretary reopened the case and ordered a formal investigation of the whole controversy to give the parties "ample opportunity to formally present their respective sides of the controversy and (be) given their 'day in court'"; that petitioner Eco refused to submit to this, reinvestigation, insisting that it was not necessary; that in the face of this attitude of Eco, the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources issued a decision, the pertinent part of which reads:

In the light of the above findings and circumstances, this Office is of opinion, and so holds that the dismissal of the appeal of Felipe Eco is perfectly in order. This is because of his adamant stand (not) to submit to the formal

investigation duly ordered by this Office. A clear indication of this attitude is shown by his failure to appear at the investigation on May 2, 1957, when he was duly notified thereof thru his counsel.

WHEREFORE, and as the forested portion of the land in controversy is actually occupied by the TigMan Lumber Co., Ltd., the appellee herein, and the remaining area which was released from the forest zone is under actual occupation and cultivation by public land applicants who had duly filed their respective public land applications therefore, the instant appeal of Felipe Eco should be, as hereby it is, DISMISSED. Conformably herewith, the TigMan Lumber Co., Ltd., is hereby authorized to resume its operation inside the land in question.

HOWEVER, and in order to quiet title to the land in dispute once and for all, the appellant herein is hereby given a period of ninety(90) days from the date hereof within which to institute voluntaryregistration proceedings covering the land; otherwise, this Office will take the necessary steps to bring the land under the operation of Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act 141) in conjunction, with Act No. 496. For this purpose, steps shall be taken by this Office to gather evidence for the Government with a view to supporting its opposition to the voluntary registration proceedings that the appellant herein may institute, or to sustain the move of the Government in the event that it will be compelled to institute compulsory registration proceedings pursuant to Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law in conjunction with Act 496.

So Ordered.

On the basis of the foregoing findings, the trial court, Judge Magno S. Gatmaitan presiding, dismissed the petition for certiorari, stating:

x x x x x x x x x

The Court believes and so holds that there was nothing inherently wrong in the actuations of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and of the Director of the Bureau of Foresty; the Court concurs with their opinion that in order to terminate the litigation between all the parties here, the most proper procedure was for petitioners to institute voluntary registration proceedings; nor can petitioners claim that equity is with him in the meantime since as already stated above, much can be said about the excess in his area. The result will be dismissal. . . .

Copy of this decision was actually received by counsel for the petitioner on May 5, 1958.

On June 3, 1958 or 28 days thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied on June 14, 1958, for lack of merit. On June 21, 1958, petitioner filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond. Respondents registered opposition thereto for the reason that the filing of said notice of appeal and appeal bond was made out of time. Sustaining this allegation, the court, by order of July 5, 1950, disapproved petitioner's appeal bond and notice of appeal.

On September 6 of the same year, petitioner filed a motion for relief under Rule 38, praying for the setting aside of the decision on the ground of excusable negligence. The alleged negligence consisted of the erroneous computation by counsel's clerk of the period within which an appeal may be made, said clerk being of the impression that the prescriptive period to appeal in certiorari cases is also 30 days like in ordinary civil actions instead of 15 days as provided in Section 17 of Rule 41. The motion for relief was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but this court certified the case to us, the question involved herein being one of law.

In support of his view, petitioner-appellant cites our ruling in the cases of Coombs vs. Santos, 24 Phil., 446,1 and Herrera vs. Far Eastern Air Transport, Inc., G. R. No. L-2587, promulgated


on September 19, 1950.2 The aforecited ruling has no application to the one at bar. The delay in the filing of the pleadings in those cases was brought about by the inability to file the same due to the illness either of the clerk or of the attorney. It is quite different in the instant case. Evidently, what was delegated by petitioner's counsel to his clerk was the computation itself of the period within which the appropriate pleading may be filed. This act is hardly prudent or wise.As the lower court aptly said: "the duty to compute theperiod to appeal is a duty that devolves upon the attorney which he can not and should not delegate unto an employee because it concerns a question of study of the law and its application, and this Court considers this to be a delicate matter that should not be delegated." The negligence here cannot, therefore, be considered excusable.

Even considering it on the merits, appellant's cause must also fail. The petition for relief was predicated principally on the ground that the court a quo erred in not holding that the ruling of the respondent Director of Forestry, affirmed by the respondent Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources, suspending his Private Woodland Registration certificate was made in abuse of discretion, because said officials allegedly deprived him of his day in court. It is noteworthy to mention, however, that it is precisely for this reason that the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources ordered a formal investigation of the matter to enable the parties to present their respective evidence. Yet, appellant Eco refused to submit to such investigation. Naturally, the ruling of the respondent Director was affirmed. How can it be claimed then that the Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources gravely abused his discretion in dismissing Eco's appeal?

Furthermore, in his questioned order of June 11, 1957, the respondent Secretary of Agriculture & Natural Resources provides:

HOWEVER, and in order to quiet title to the land in dispute once and for all, the appellant (Eco)

herein is hereby given a period of ninety (90) days from the date hereof within which to institute voluntary registration proceedings covering the said land; otherwise, this Office will take the necessary steps to bring the land under operation of Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law (Commonwealth Act 141) in conjunction with Act No. 496. For this purpose, steps shall be taken by this Office to gather evidence for the Government with a view to supporting its opposition to the voluntary registration proceedings that the appellant herein may institute, or to sustain the move of the Government in the event that it will be compelled to institute compulsory registration proceedings pursuant to Sec. 53 of the Public Land Law in conjunction with Act 496.

SO ORDERED.

Apparently, instead of taking this course and thus proving his alleged right over the property, appellant elected to institute certiorari proceedings against the abovementioned officials in the Court of First Instance of Manila. Underthe circumstances, it is evident that appellant's action has no foundation at all.

Wherefore, finding no error in the appealed order denying petitioner's motion for relief, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-5346 January 3, 1911

W. W. ROBINSON vs. MARCELINO VILLAFUERTE Y RAÑOLA

TORRES, J.:

On April 30, 1908, W. W. Robinson entered suit in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas against Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola, alleging as a first cause of action: That the plaintiff was engaged, in the city of Manila and at the time specified further on, in the importation and sale of flour and other products from abroad, with an office in the city of Manila, a business which he still

continued, through the agency of Castle Brothers, Wolf & Sons, established therein; that the defendant, a resident of Lucena, Tayabas, by an instrument duly executed on October 19, 1906, by his attorney in fact and legal representative, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully empowered and authorized for the purpose, and ratified on the same date before the notary public of Manila, D. R. Williams, acknowledged and confessed that he owed the plaintiff the net sum of P3,852.50; that by the said instrument duly executed the defendant bound and pledged himself to pay to the plaintiff the said sum of P3,852.50 in four monthly installments from that date, at the rate of P1,000 for each of the first three installments and P852.50 for the last one, and likewise the interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, to be adjusted and paid at the time of paying each of the installments fixed; that in the said instrument the defendant moreover bound himself to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P500 for costs and expenses, in case the latter should recur to judicial process for the collection of the aforementioned debt; and that, as security for the payment of the said debt, of the interest thereon and of the amount for costs and expenses, the defendant voluntarily executed, by means of the said instrument and in favor of the plaintiff, a special mortgage upon the properties of his absolute ownership and control, which are:

A., p. 72, back. A rural estate, No. 433, consisting of land planted in coconut trees, in the barrio of Dumacaa of the municipality of Lucena, and containing an area of 2 hectares, 57 ares, and 73 centares.

B., p. 73. A rural estate, No. 434, consisting of coconut land in the barrio of Canlorang Mayao, Lucena, 2 hectare, 4 ares, and 78 centares in area.

C., p. 73. A rural estate, No 435, consisting of unirrigated land containing 1,200 coconut trees, in the same barrio of Lucena, and with and are of 7 hectares, 81 ares, and 4 centares.

D., p. 74. A rural estate, No 436, consisting of coconut land containing 700 coconut trees, in the

barrio of Silangan Mayao, Lucena, and with and area of 1 hectare and 84 centares.

E., p. 74. back. A rural estate, No 438, consisting of land planted with 300 coconut trees, in the barrio of Cotta, Lucena, and measuring 52 ares and 66 centares in area.

F., p. 75. A rural estate, No. 439, consisting of coconut land containing 500 coconut trees, in the same barrio and pueblo, with an area of 98 ares and 66 centares.

G., p. 75, back. A rural estate, No. 440, consisting of coconut land containing 800 coconut trees, in the same barrio and pueblo, with an area of 36 ares and 5 centares.

H., p. 75, back. A rural estate, No. 441, consisting of coconut land containing 300 coconut trees, in the same barrio and pueblo, measuring 50 ares and 73 centares.

I., p. 73. A rural estate, No. 914, consisting of improved land, planted with 1,000 coconut trees situated in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena, of 7 hectares, 12 ares, and 60 centares in area.

J., p. 75. A rural estate, No. 915, consisting of improved land, planted with 100 coconut trees and situated in the barrio Cotta, Lucena, of 93 ares and 22 centares in area.

K., p. 79. A rural estate, No. 916, consisting of improved land, planted with 200 coconut trees and situated in the same barrio and pueblo, of 13 ares and 4 centares in area.

The respective bounderies of each one of the estates above enumerated were set fourth in the said instrument of mortgage, which was duly inscribed in the property registry of Tayabas. This deed does not appear to have been canceled, and constitutes an encumbrance on the properties described in favor of the plaintiff. It was stated in the instrument referred to, that the liability of the property mortgaged was distributed in the following manner:


The estate described under letter A responded for P800 of the

debt and for the sum of P75 as costs .......................................................... P 875.00

Estate letter B, liability P200, costs P40 ............................................................... 240.00

Estate letter C, liability P160, costs P40 ............................................................... 200.00

Estate letter D, liability P130, costs P40 ............................................................... 170.00

Estate letter E, liability P92.50, costs P30 ............................................................. 122.50

Estate letter F, liability P150, costs P40 ................................................................ 190.00

Estate letter G, liability P280, costs P40 ............................................................... 320.00

Estate letter H, liability P250, costs P40 ............................................................... 290.00

Estate letter I, liability P1,400, costs P75 .............................................................. 1,475.00

Estate letter J, liability P260, costs P40 ................................................................. 300.00

Estate letter K, liability P130, costs P40 ............................................................... 170.00 Total .......................................................................................................... 4,352.50

It was stated further, as an express condition, that default of payment of any of the installments specified in the fourth preceding paragraph would cause the entire obligation to mature and would entitle the plaintiff (it says "defendant") to require the payment of the same in its totality and forthwith to institute foreclosure proceedings against any and all of the mortgage properties.

The complaint further alleged, as a first cause of action, that, notwithstanding the repeated demands made upon the defendant, the latter had not paid his debt nor the interest thereon, excepting the sum of P550, paid on different dates on account of the debt and interest due, wherefore the defendant owed the plaintiff the sum of P3,302.50, the remainder of his debt and besides P385.57 as interest due from December 6, 1906, to the date of the filling of the complaint; that the plaintiff was then the legal owner of the mortgage, and that he had not been paid the whole nor any part of the sum expressed in the preceding paragraph.

As a second cause of action against the defendant, the complaint alleged, among other things: That the defendant, by means of an instrument duly executed on December 21, 1906, by his attorney in fact and legal representative, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully empowered and authorized — an instrument ratified on the same date before the notary Daniel R. Williams — and in consideration of the credit which the plaintiff agreed to allow the said defendant up to the sum of P3,560, executed a special voluntary mortgage of the properties of his absolute ownership and control which are described as follows:

No. 1, p. 72. Estate No. 432, first inscription, volume 28, general register; coconut land containing 1,000 coconut trees, 26 hectares, 56 ares, and 87 centares in area, situated in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena. A part of this land is planted with coconut and nipa palm trees and the rest is arable.

No. 2, p. 72, back. Estate No. 433, first inscription of the same volume; coconut land containing 1,000 coconut trees, 2 hectares, 57 ares, and 73 centares in area, situated in the same barrio and pueblo.


No. 4, p. 73, back. Estate No. 434, first inscription of the same volume; coconut land containing 1,000 coconut trees, 2 hectares, 4 ares, and 78 centares in area, situated in the barrio of Canlorang Mayao, Lucena.


No. 6, p. 74. Estate No. 436, first inscription of the same volume; coconut land containing 7,000 coconut trees, 1 hectare, 88 ares, and 54 centares in area, situated in the barrio of Silangan Mayao, Lucena.

No. 7 p. 74, back. Estate No. 438, first inscription of the volume aforesaid; coconut land, 52 ares and 66 centares in area, containing 300 coconut trees and situated in the barrio of Cotta, Lucena.

No. 8, p. 75. Estate No. 439, first inscription of the same volume; coconut land, 98 ares and 66 centares in area, containing 500 coconut trees and situated in the same barrio and pueblo.

No. 9, p. 75, back. Estate No. 440, first inscription of the volume mentioned; coconut land, 36 ares and 5 centares are, containing 500 coconut trees and also located in the same barrio and pueblo.

No. 10, p. 75, back. Estate No. 441, first inscription of the said volume; coconut land, 50

ares and 73 centares in are, containing 300 coconut trees and located in the same barrio and pueblo.

No. 11, p. 73. Estate No. 914, consisting of improved land planted with 1,000 coconut trees, located in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena, with an area of 7 hectares, 12 ares, and 60 centares.

No. 12, p. 76. Estate No. 915, volume 106 general register; an improved piece of land, 93 ares and 22 centares in area, containing 800 coconut trees and situated in the barrio of Cotta, Lucena.

No. 13, p. 79. Estate No. 916, volume 106 general register; an improved piece of land, 13 ares and 4 centares in area, containing 200 coconut trees and situated in the same barrio and pueblo.

No. 14, p. 127. Estate No. 932, volume 106 general register; an improved piece of coconut land, 2 hectares, 79 ares, and 49 centares in area, containing 2,000 coconut trees and located in the barrio of Dumacaa, Lucena.

The respective boundaries of each of the estates above enumerate were set forth in the said instrument of mortgage, which was duly inscribed in the property registry of Tayabas, and does not appear to have been cancelled, and constitutes an encumbrance on the properties described, in favor of the plaintiff. It was stated, in the instrument referred to, that the liability of the property mortgaged was distributed in the following manner:

That the aforementioned mortgage was executed as security for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum or sums which the defendant might owe him by reason of the said credit, which was granted under the following terms and conditions:

1. That the said credit should not exceed the sum of P3,560 and was granted for the period of six months from the 20th of November, 1906, and defendant was to make use of it in taking flour from the plaintiff's warehouse, at current prices,


by means of written duebills or orders signed by the defendant or by his attorney in fact.

2. That the said written duebills or orders should be paid within thirty days from their date, and it was stipulated that the amount or value of each one of them should bear an annual interest of 8 per cent from the date of their maturity, if not paid before.

3. That total amount of what the defendant might be owing, by reason of the said credit, should be settled and entirely paid, together with the interest thereon, by the 20th of May, 1907, on which date all the orders or duebills issued by the defendant against the said credit should be considered as matured, even though the extension above mentioned should not have expired.

4. That it should be optional be optical on the part of the plaintiff to honor the duebills or orders which the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte might issue against the said credit, in the event that the latter should fail to pay the amount of his previous duebills or orders at the time they should respectively fall due, or should fail to comply with and observe any of the conditions and stipulations contained in the said instrument of October 19, 1906, ratified before notary Williams; that the defendant should be bound to pay to the plaintiff P600, in case of litigation, and also to pay all the expenses that might be occasioned by the execution of the said instrument of December 21, 1906, those of its inscription in the registry, cancellation, and release, as well as the expenses incurred by the plaintiff on account of the instrument of October 19, 1906, referred to in the first cause of action, together with those of its inscription in the registry; provided, moreover, that the aforementioned instrument of December 21, 1906, should be retroactive in its effect from the 20th of November of the same year, and that the flour which the said defendant, through his attorney in fact, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, had withdrawn from the plaintiff's warehouses since the 20th of November, 1906, should be

include in the credit opened; that the estates described under the Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13, bore a first mortgage in favor of the plaintiff executed as security for the obligation, the fulfillment of which is demanded in the first cause of action; that, by clause 14 of the said instrument of December 21, 1906, it was stipulated that in case W. W. Robinson, the plaintiff, should have to institute foreclosure proceedings against the property above described, either by reason of the mortgage hereby placed on the same, or of the obligation affecting the said property, in his favor, by virtue of the said instrument of October 19 of the present year, Robinson should be entitled to take charge of the management of all or any of the said realities until they should be sold, and to collect their revenues, rentals, fruits, and products for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the judgment; that, by clause 15 of the said instrument of December 21, 1906, it was also stipulated that it was expressly covenanted that, in case Robinson should have to proceed judicial against the property therein mentioned in order to collect any amount to the payment of which they were subject, all the orders or duebills issued on account of the credit granted in the said instrument should be considered as matured and payable, and Robinson should be entitled forthwith to demand the payment of any balance found to be due him by Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola, with the privilege of levying upon all or any of the realities comprised with the mortgage mentioned in the said instrument; that the amount credited for the expenses referred to in No. 7 of the fifth paragraph of this cause of action reached P174.95; that the defendant, availing himself of the credit granted in the aforementioned instrument of December 21, 1906, took and withdrew from the plaintiff's warehouses, on different dates between the 20th of November and the 19th of December, 1906, inclusive, various quantities of flour, the total value of which amounted to P5,588.15; that the defendant had not paid any part of this amount, except the sum of P375.00, and was owing a balance of P5,213.15; that at the time of the complaint the

said defendant owed the plaintiff the sums of P174.95 and P5,213.15, in addition to P503.79 as interest due up to the date of the complaint; that the plaintiff was then the legal owner of the mortgage above referred to, and that none of the sums mentioned nor any part thereof had been paid to him: wherefore the plaintiff asked that judgement be rendered in his favor against the defendant, for the following amounts: (1) For the sum of P3,302.50, the principal demanded in the first course of action, and interest thereon at 8 per cent per annum from date until its payment; (2) for the sum of P385.57, as interest due on the principal mentioned in the preceding paragraph and remaining unpaid, and, in addition, the interest on this sum at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the complaint until paid; (3) for the sum of P5,213.15, the amount of the debt claimed in the second cause of action, together with the interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent per annum from date until it's payment; (4) for the sum of P503.79, the interest due on the principal mentioned in the preceding paragraph, with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from date until payment; (5) for the sum of P174.95, claimed in paragraph 9 of the second cause of action, with interest thereon at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the complaint until payment; and, (6) for the sum of 1,000 for costs and attorney's fees.

The plaintiff further prayed that an order be issued directing the delivery to the plaintiff of the properties described in the complaint, in order that he might administer them during the course of this suit and until they should ultimately be sold, and authorizing him to collect and receive the revenues, rentals, fruits, and other products of the said estates and to retain them in his possession in order to satisfy the judgment that would be rendered in this case, and that in case the said judgment be not satisfied thereby, the sale of the said properties be ordered and the proceeds thereof be applied to the purpose.

The defendant, in his answer, made a general and specific denial of each and all of the allegations of the plaintiff for each and all of the actions

instituted by him in each and all of the paragraphs of the complaint, and as a special defense, and in his crosscomplaint, alleged: That the defendant did not execute, consent to, nor authorize the execution of a power of attorney of any kind whatsoever in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, empowering the latter to mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of, to the plaintiff or to any person whatever, any of the properties mentioned in the complaint, nor to accept from and open with the plaintiff any credit nor establish with him any business in flour; nor execute any power of attorney nor grant any authority whatever in favor of the said Concepcion so that the latter might represent him and accept in his name credit, or moneys whatsoever from any person; nor dispose of, mortgage, or encumber any of the properties described in the complaint; that the defendant received no sum whatever from the plaintiff nor was he in the latter's debt for the amount claimed in the complaint, nor for any other sum of money; that he did not give his consent to all of to any one of the mortgages alleged in the complaint, and that all the said mortgages on the properties therein mentioned were founded on a supposed power of attorney said to have been executed by the defendant in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, which power of attorney was fictitious, false, fraudulent, null and void, that it was not executed by the defendant, nor did the latter intervene therein and that the said power of attorney had no true reason for existence; wherefore the defendant asked that judgment be rendered absolving him from the complaint with the costs against the plaintiff, by annulling each and all of the mortgages alleged in the complaint and the inscription of each of them in the office of the register of property of Tayabas, and by ordering the cancellation of all the inscriptions of the said mortgages and encumbrances of the aforementioned properties.

The plaintiff, in answering to the counter complaint, set up a general and specific denial of each and all of the allegations of the defendant with respect to each and all of the actions brought by him in each and all of the paragraphs


of the counter complaint, and prayed that judgment be pronounced in his favor, and against the defendant, in conformity with the petitions made in his complaint.

The case came up for hearing on November 30, 1908, and after the presentation of oral evidence by both parties, the documentary evidence being attached to the record, the court, on December 15 of the same year, rendered judgment whereby it directed that the plaintiff should recover from the defendant the sum specified in the first instrument of mortgage, P3,302.50, as principal, the additional sum of P385.57 as interest up to April 30, 1908, besides the interest on the said principal, at the rate of 8 percent per annum from the date just above mentioned until its complete payment, also the P500 stipulated in the said instrument as payable by the defendant as costs and expenses in case of litigation; and the sum mentioned in the second instrument of mortgage, P5,213.15 as principal, besides P503.79, as interest up to the 30th day of April, 1908, in addition to the interest on the said principal at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, form the date just of P174.95, as expenses for the execution of the instrument, for its inscription, cancellation, and acquaintance, as provided for in clause 17 of the said instrument, and the additional sum of P600, which it was stipulated in the second instrument the defendant should pay for costs and expenses in case of litigation. The judgment further ordered that the defendant should pay the several amounts above mentioned, with the interest and costs, on or before the first day of the sitting of the court in April, 1909, and that, in case such order should not be compiled with, the mortgages should be foreclosed and a final writ should be issued directing that all the properties before described the sold, the proceeds of the sale to pay the principal, interest, and costs. The defendant, when notified of this judgement, took exception thereto, announced that he would file a bill of exceptions, and moved for a new trial on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion was denied and exception was taken by the appellant, who filed

the proper bill of exceptions, which was certified to, approved, and forwarded to the clerk of this court. By an order of March 1, 1909, it was provided that the execution of the aforesaid judgment should not be suspended pending the appeal, unless the defendant, for the reasons stated in the said order, should give a bond for P10,000.

The purpose of the suit filed by the plaintiff, W. W. Robinson, is the collection of various sums owed by the defendant, Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola, the payment of which is secured by a mortgage on the real properties set out in the two notarial documents evidencing the debt, exhibited under letter A and B, and inscribed in the property registry of the Province of Tayabas.

The mortgage action brought by the creditor, based upon the two aforementioned notarial documents is proper, inasmuch as it is sought to collect certain sums specified in the said instruments on account of their not having been paid within the periods therein stipulated, and consequently the real properties offered as security for the solvency of the debts contracted by the debtor are duly liable for the satisfaction of the same; and although the credit of P3,852.50, the value of the flour furnished to Camilio C. Gomez, in account with the defendant, and referred to in the instrument lettered A, was to have been paid in four installments from October 19, 1906, at the rate of P1,000 in each one of the three first months and P852.50 in the fourth and last month, yet since the debtor, notwithstanding the demands made upon him, did not comply with his obligation nor pay his debt in conformity with the tenor of the said instrument, letter A, for he only paid the creditor the sum of P550 delivered partially on different dates, the default of payment of any of the installments agreed upon produces the effect that all of these must be deemed to have matured and entitles the creditor to demand the payment of his entire credit and to proceed against the mortgaged properties for the purpose of collecting his credit, which amounts to P3,302.50, after the deduction of the said P550

from the principal, with the interest due from the 6th of December, 1906, amounting to P385.57.

With respect to the credit mentioned in the instrument, Exhibit B, and granted by the plaintiff to the defendant Villafuerte under agreement that the latter should make use of the said credit by taking flour from the creditor's warehouse by means of written duebills or orders signed by the debtor, or his attorney in fact, under condition that the value or amount of the said duebills should be paid within thirty days from their date and that these acknowledgments of debts should bear interest of 8 per cent per annum from the date of their maturity, it was also a condition that the aforesaid instrument should be deemed to be retroactive in its effect, from November 20, 1906, that the quantities of flour which were taken from the plaintiff's warehouse since the said November 20, 1906, should be considered as included, and that the total amount of whatever the defendant might owe, by reason of the credit mentioned together with the interest thereon, should be settled and entirely paid on May 20, 1907, on which date all the orders or duebills issued against the said credit should be deemed to have matured, even though the thirty days' delay stipulated should not have expired.

In view of the fact that the defendant succeeded in withdrawing flour to the value of P5,078.15, without his having paid the amount due therefor, except P375, it can not be denied that there still remains a balance to be paid of P4,703.15 (pp. 5 and 88 of the record).

In the account, Exhibit E, there appears a statement of the sacks of flour which were taken on account of the said credit by means of the nine duebills, Exhibit F, attached to the aforementioned account, in which it also appears that the value of the said sacks of flour was P4,703.15, after the deduction of P375.

The complaint which gave rise to the present suit is in accordance with the provisions of section 255 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the mortgages constituted in the two instruments

aforementioned fulfill the conditions and requirements prescribed in articles 1857, 1874, and 1875 of the Civil Code; wherefore judgment should be rendered favorable to the mortgage creditor, in accordance with section 256, and following, of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The defendant debtor denied the existence of the obligations contained in the said instruments; he asserted that the latter, and the powers of attorney executed in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion were false, and likewise denied that he owed the plaintiff any of the amounts claimed in the complaint, or that he had authorized the said Concepcion to mortgage the realties described in the said complaint, and in asking for his release, he prayed that the aforementioned mortgages and the inscriptions of the same in the property registry be declared null and void.

If it is true, as it appears to be, that the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola executed, on July 11 and October 29, 1906, in this city, the powers of attorney, Exhibits C and D, in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, before the notaries Eugenio de Lara and Daniel R. Williams, respectively, it not having been proved at trial that the said powers of attorney were false or null and void, the mortgages upon the real properties, executed by the attorney in fact, duly authorized for the purpose, in the instruments designated under letter A and B, the first of them ratified in the notarial record, letter G, by the debtor before the same notary, Williams, must be accepted as valid and in force, inasmuch as the said mortgage deeds appear to have been ratified in due form by contracting or interested parties before the said notary in Manila, it not having been proven at trial that they contained any flaw or defect which might operate to annul them.

The evidence adduced by the defendant in his attempt to prove that, on the two dates before mentioned, when the said two powers of attorney appear to have been executed, he was in Lucena, Tayabas, and not in this city of Manila, has not resulted in defeating the validity, authenticity, and force of the said powers of attorney, for the


truth of their contents as well as their ratification by the person executing them was certified to by notaries before whom they were exhibited respectively in the presence of two witnesses; the oral testimony presented by the defendant was insufficient to prove that the notaries Lara and Williams untruthfully certified that Marcelino Villafuerte, whom they attested under oath that they knew, personally appeared before them and ratified in its totality the contents of the aforementioned document, declaring that he had executed it freely and voluntarily and exhibited for the purpose his cedula, No. 453963, issued in Lucena, Tayabas, on January 15, 1906.

In order to establish the conclusion, as the logical result of the evidence, that the said two notaries, falsely, and entirely irrespective of the truth, issued the certificates which appear under their respective signatures and seals at the foot of the powers of attorney, letters C and D, it is not sufficient to prove, by means of the testimony of witnesses, (mostly relatives) and by unauthenticated documents, that on the dates of the execution of the powers of attorney the persons executing them was not here in Manila, where the instruments were certified to, but in Lucena, Tayabas; clear, strong, and irrefutable proof must be adduced to prove that the said notaries could not have averred that the said person was actually in their presence, that they heard him ratify the contents of the respective documents, and could have certified to the number of his cedula, the only one exhibited to both notaries, without having ostensibly perverted the truth. The defendant himself, who averred that he was in Lucena on July 11, 1906, the date of the first power of attorney, said that he was not sure whether on October 29 of the same year, the date of the second, he was in the said pueblo or in this city of Manila.

Public instruments authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities required by law, are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gives rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. They shall also be evidence against the

contracting parties and their legal representatives with regard to the declarations the former may have therein. (Arts. 1216 and 1218, Civil Code.)

The force of proof of depositions of witnesses shall be weighed by the courts in accordance with the provisions of the law of civil procedure, taking care to avoid that, by the simple coincidence of some depositions, unless their truthfulness be evident, the affairs may be finally decided in which instruments, private documents, or any basis of written evidence are usually made use of. (Art. 1248, Civil Code.)

The defendant debtor having been requested by letter, in the beginning of the year 1907, to pay his debt, were it true that he had not contracted the obligations contained in the instruments lettered A and B, nor executed in favor of Vicente Marcelo the powers of attorney lettered C and D, would have at that time made the proper investigations and taken the necessary steps for the annulment or invalidation of the said instruments. The defendant did not even attempt to do anything of the kind, and we do not find any just reason nor any legal ground whatever to warrant a discussion of the conclusion arrived at by the evidence presented in this suit.

Were it true that on the dates of the 11th of July and the 29th of October, 1906, the defendant Villafuerte was in Lucena, Tayabas, and not in Manila, it is not understood how two notaries who attested that they personally knew him could have certified that, on the respective dates aforementioned, the said defendant appeared in person before them, ratified the instrument of power of attorney which he had executed, and, to identify his personality, exhibited to the said notaries his certificate of registration, the only one and the same one which he presented at each of his appearances on the said dates. Without proof, nor rational, acceptable explanation, it is impossible to believe that the personal certificate of registration, which identifies a citizen, was for some four months in the possession of another person residing in a distant place. It was not proved in a satisfactory manner at the trial how

or why the said cedula, or registration certificate, came to remain for so long a time in the possession of the Chinaman Sy Chuy Chim or of Vicente Marcelo, as averred by the defendant or his counsel, and under this supposition, so strange, anomalous, and out of the ordinary rule that every citizen should necessarily keep his certificate of identification in his possession, no explanation whatever was given by the defendant's counsel as to the purpose for which the defendant parted with his cedula and sent it to either the said Chinaman or Marcelo. The Chinaman was not examined in this litigation and the attorney in fact, Marcelo, denied that he had received the said cedula sent by his constituent. So that for the reasons hereinbefore stated, it is evident that the defendant Villafuerte personally exhibited the said cedula to the two aforementioned notaries, on his ratification of the respective instrument of power of attorney before each one of them, and it is not permissible to conclude that the instruments of power of attorney executed by the defendant, as well as the certifications subscribed by the notaries Lara and Williams, are false, because of the absolute absence of proof as a foundation for such a charge; for a notarial document, guaranteed by public attestation in accordance with the law, must be sustained in full force and affect so long as he who impugns it shall not have presented strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaw or detect provided against by law.

Although the documents exhibited by the defendant's counsel could not, for lack of proof of their authenticity, destroy or impair the value and force of the notarial documents or instruments on which the plaintiff's claim is based, it is, however, to be noted that Pedro Cantero, whose signature appears attached to the papers found on pages 159, 162, and 170, of the record, was not examined either, even for the purpose of identifying his signature, he being a Spaniard and an attorney it is not possible to believe that he wrote the aforementioned documents in the form and style in which they appear to have been drawn up; wherefore, on

account of these circumstances, it is reasonable to presume that the documents of pages 159 and 170, and the note of page 162, of the record, were not authentic.

It is also to be observed, in the document or letter found on page 136 of the record, and which also was unauthenticated, that the aforementioned dates of the 11th of July, 1906, appear therein with a correction, made in the proper place, of the figures 11 and 6 of the first date, a repetition and details which induce the presumption that the said letter was written on a different date.

By the foregoing it has been duly shown that the fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh errors attributed to the judgment are devoid of reason and legal foundation. With respect to the third error alleged we hold that the admission of the documents designated by the letters L and M was proper for the purpose for which they were presented, because that of letter L is an original and one of the triplicates drawn up for a single purpose, as stated therein, and that of letter M is also an original ratified before a notary, in the certificate of which, dated July 13, 1906, there certainly appears an annotation of the dame number 453963 of the cedula of the defendant Villafuerte which he exhibited to the notaries who authenticated the powers of attorney Exhibits C and D.

With regard to the first two alleged errors, relative to Jose Moreno Lacalle being permitted to address questions to some of the witnesses during the hearing of the case, notwithstanding the presence of Attorney Agustin Alvarez, who represented the plaintiff, it is unquestionable that the intervention of the said law clerk and employee of Messrs. Haussermann, Cohn & Williams, the plaintiff's attorneys in this suit, was improperly admitted; it was not authorized by any law, for the reason that the said Lacalle did not have the capacity and qualifications of a lawyer admitted under oath to practice his profession before the courts of these Islands, and therefore, on objection being made to his present at the hearing of the case, the judge should have


sustained such objection and should have excluded Lacalle and not permitted him to address questions to the plaintiff's witnesses, notwithstanding the fact that Attorney Agustin Alvares, designated in substitution of the said Haussermann, Cohn & Williams as the plaintiff's representative in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, was present.

Notwithstanding this, the acts performed in the course of some of the proceedings under the direction of Jose Moreno Lacalle are not subject to annulment, as no positive detriment was caused to the defendant, although such intervention is in no manner permitted by the law of procedure.

However, even though the questions addressed by Lacalle to the plaintiff's witnesses and the presentation of documents of various kinds exhibited at the trial be stricken out for the reason that they were made by a person who was neither a party to the suit nor counsel for the plaintiff, yet we do not find any reason, based upon any positive prohibition of the law, to authorize the striking out to the answers given by the witnesses interrogated by Lacalle, even though the said answers may have been evoked by questions addressed by a person not authorized by law, and there is much less reason for rejecting the cross-questions addressed to the same witnesses by the defendant's attorney, and the answers thereto.

Although the presentation of the documents which support the claims of the plaintiff party be deemed to be improper, on account of their having been made by a person who had not the qualifications of a practicing attorney it is nevertheless true that their presentation was authorized by the attorney Alvarez and the documents exhibited continued to be united to the record and were not stricken out therefrom on motion by the other side, but, on the contrary, the attorney for the defendant or his counsel discussed the authenticity and validity of the said documents, made allegations against the same and concluded by asking that these documents,

and also the inscription of those designated under letters A and B, be declared null and void.

From the preceding statements it is concluded that the intervention of Jose Moreno Lacalle in the present suit has in no manner prejudiced the rights and interests of the defendant and that, if judgment was rendered against him and in favor of the plaintiff, it was in consequence of the merits of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff and of the inefficacy and worthlessness of the testimony given by the defendant.

If the defendant Marcelino Villafuerte had presented substantial, strong and convincing evidence of the falsity of the two powers of attorney executed in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, the plaintiff's documentary evidence would have been totally invalidated and annulled, and this suit would have had a different ending.

For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, to affirm the judgment appealed from, as we hereby do, with the costs against the appellant, and in consequence thereof we acquit the plaintiff from the cross complaint relative to the declaration of nullity of the mortgages and inscriptions, as requested by the defendant. The first day of the term of court immediately following the date on which the fulfillment of this judgment is ordered shall be set for the payment of the amounts due and the foreclosure of the said mortgages. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-23467 March 27, 1968

AMALGAMATED LABORERS' ASSOCIATION vs. HON. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

SANCHEZ, J.:

Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu.

The background facts are as follows:

On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others together with their union, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and/or Felisberto Javier, general president of said union, lodged a complaint 1 in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), for unfair labor practices specified in Sec. 4(a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Industrial Peace Act. Made respondents were their former employer, Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc. (Biscom), Rafael Jalandoni, its president and general manager; Gonzalo Guillen, its chief engineer and general factory superintendent; and Fraternal Labor Organization and/or Roberto Poli, its president.

Failing in their attempts to dismiss the complaint (motions to dismiss dated June 30, 1956 and July 6, 1956), respondents Biscom, Jalandoni, and Guillen, on July 9, 1957, answered and counterclaimed. Respondents Fraternal Labor Union and Poli also filed their answer dated July 12, 1957.

With the issues joined, the case on the merits was heard before a trial commissioner.

At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight complainant laborers appeared and testified. Two of these ten were permanent (regular) employees of respondent company; the remaining eight were seasonal workers. The regular employees were Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. Seasonal workers were Catalino Bangoy, Juan Fernandez, Jose Garlitos, Dionisio Pido, Santiago Talagtag, Dominador Tangente, Felimon Villaluna and Brigido Casas.

On November 13, 1962, CIR, thru Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, rendered judgment, which provides,inter alia, that the two regular employees (Reyes and Magtubo) be reinstated "to their former positions, without loss of seniority and other benefits which should have accrued to them had they not been illegally dismissed, with full back wages from the time of their said dismissals up to the time of their actual reinstatements, minus what they have earned elsewhere in the meantime" and that the eight

seasonal workers "be readmitted to their positions as seasonal workers of respondent company (Biscom), with back wages as seasonal workers from the time they were not rehired at the start of the 1955-1956 milling season on October 1, 1955 up to the time they are actually reinstated, less the amount earned elsewhere during the period of their lay-off."

Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and Guillen appealed direct to this Court. 3 On March 28, 1963, this Court dismissed the appeal, without costs. Ground: Petitioners therein did not seek reconsideration of CIR's decision of November 13, 1962. The judgment became final.

Upon the ten complainants' motion to name an official computer to determine the actual money due them, CIR, on June 4, 1963, directed the Chief Examiner of its Examining Division to go to the premises of Biscom and compute the back wages due the ten complainants.

On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner reported that the total net back wages due the ten complainants were P79,755.22. Biscom and the complainants moved for reconsideration: Biscom on August 17, 1963; complainants on September 24, 1963.

In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a respondent herein) filed on July 15, 1963 in the same case — CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu — a "Notice of Attorney's Lien." He alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for the laborers in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu "since the inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court on appeal, as chief counsel thereof"; that he "had actually rendered legal services to the laborers who are subject of this present litigation [CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu] since the year 1956, more or less"; that the laborers "have voluntarily agreed to give [him], representing his attorney's fees on contingent basis such amounts equivalent to 25% thereof which agreement is evidenced by a Note"; and that the 25% attorney's fee so


contracted is "reasonable and proper taking into consideration the length of services he rendered and the nature of the work actually performed by him."

On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez filed an "Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien," which in part reads:

3. That the laborers, subject of this present litigation, sometime on February 3, 1956, had initially voluntarily agreed to give Undersigned Counsel herein, representing his Attorney's fees on contingent basis, such amounts as equivalent to Thirty Per Cent (30%) of whatever money claims that may be adjudicated by this Honorable Court, copy of said Agreement, in the local Visayan dialect and a translation of the same in the English language are hereto attached as annexes "A" "A-1" hereof;

4. That subsequently thereafter, when the above-entitled Case was already decided in their favor, Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of his co-laborers who are also Complainants in this Case begged from the Undersigned Counsel herein that he reduce his attorney's fees to Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) only for the reason that they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%) although the latter's actual services rendered was so insignificant thereof;

5. That because of the pleadings of said Arsenio Reyes, who is the President of said Union, the Undersigned Counsel herein finally agreed and consented that his attorney's fees be reduced to only Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) instead of Thirty Per Cent (30%) as originally agreed upon in 1956.

On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell (a petitioner herein) filed in court a document labelled "Discharge" informing CIR of the discharge, release and dismissal — thru a union board resolution (attached thereto as Annex A thereof) — of Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez as one of the lawyers of the

complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, effective February 28, 1963.

On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez replied. He averred that the grounds for his discharge specified in the board resolution were "malicious and motivated by greed and ungratefulness" and that the unjustifiable discharge did not affect the already stipulated contract for attorneys' fees.

On March 19, 1964, CIR Judge Arsenio I. Martinez resolved Biscom's and complainants' motions for resonsideration objecting to the Chief Examiner's Report and also respondent Fernandez' Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien. Judge Martinez' order reads in part:

(b) Respondent company is further directed to deposit the amount representing 25% of P79,755.22 with the Cashier of this Court, as attorney's fees;

x x x x x x x x x

(d) The amount representing attorney's fees to be deposited by the respondent company is hereby awarded and granted to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez, and he may collect the same from the Cashier of the Court upon the finality of this order, subject to existing auditing procedures; ....

Biscom complied with the order of deposit. 4

On April 10, 1964, Atty. Carbonell moved to reconsider the March 19, 1964 order with respect to the award of attorneys' fees. Amongst his grounds are that CIR has no jurisdiction to determine the matter in question, and that the award of 25% as attorneys' fees to Atty. Fernandez is excessive, unfair and illegal. This motion was denied on April 28, 1964 by CIR en banc.

On June 9, 1964, a motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 1964 resolution was filed by Atty. Carbonell. This was amplified by a similar motion filed on June 11, 1964.

On June 25, 1964, two things happened: First. CIR en banc denied the motion of June 11, 1964. Second. On Atty. Fernandez' motion, Judge Martinez authorized the Cashier of the court to disburse to Fernandez the amount of P19,938.81 representing attorneys' fees and deducting therefrom all legal fees incident to such deposit.

Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and the ten employees, appealed from the June 25, 1964 resolution of CIR, direct to this Court.

1. Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is bereft of authority to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorneys' fees. Their reasons: (1) a dispute arising from contracts for attorneys' fees is not a labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIR's authority; and (2) to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the special and limited nature of said court's jurisdiction.

These arguments are devoid of merit.

The present controversy over attorneys' fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end feature of the main case, CIR No. 70-ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. And, it has been held that "once the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a case under the law of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction until the case is completely decided, including all the incidents related thereto." 5 Expressive of the rule on this point is this —

4. It is well settled that:

A grant of jurisdiction implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and every regularly constituted court has power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the

enforcement of its judgments and mandates, even though the court may thus be called upon to decide matters which would not be within its cognizance as original causes of action.

While a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it (In re Stinger's Estate, 201 P. 693), and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. So demands, matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the Court may thus be, called on to consider and decide matters, which as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance (Bartholomew vs. Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S. pp. 136-138.)

Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., L-11945, August 18, 1958, and Serrano vs. Serrano, L-19562, May 23, 1964, we held that the court having jurisdiction over the main cause of action, may grant the relief incidental thereto, even if they would otherwise, be outside its competence. 6

To direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court as petitioners advocate would only result in multiplicity of suits, 7 a situation abhorred by the rules. Thus it is, that usually the application to fix the attorneys' fees is made before the court which renders the judgment. 8 And, it has been observed that "[a]n approved procedure, where a charging lien has attached to a judgment or where money has been paid into court, is for the attorney to file an intervening petition and have the amount and


extent of his lien judicially determined." 9Appropriately to be recalled at this point, is the recent ruling in Martinez vs. Union de Maquinistas, 1967A Phild. 142, 144, January 30, 1967, where, speaking thru Mr. Justice Arsenio P. Dizon, explicit pronouncement was made by this Court that: "We are of the opinion that since the Court of Industrial Relations obviously had jurisdiction over the main cases, ... it likewise had full jurisdiction to consider and decide all matters collateral thereto, such as claims for attorney's fees made by the members of the bar who appeared therein." 10

2. The parties herein join hands in one point - the ten (10) successful complainants in C.I.R Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu should pay as attorneys' fees 30% of the amount adjudicated by the court in the latter's favor (P79,755.22).

They are at odds, however, on how to split the fees.

Respondent Atty. Fernandez claims twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 30% attorneys' fees. He explains that upon the plea of Arsenio Reyes, union president and one of the 10 successful complainants, he had to reduce his fees to 25% since "they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%)." Atty. Fernandez exhibited a contract purportedly dated February 3, 1956 — before the 48 employees have even filed their complaint in CIR. The stipulated fee is 30% of whatever amount the ten might recover. Strange enough, this contract was signed only by 8 of the 10 winning claimants. What happened to the others? Why did not the union intervene in the signing of this contract? Petitioners dispute said contract. They say that Atty. Fernandez required the ten to sign the contract only after the receipt of the decision.

Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the verbal agreement entered into by the union and its officers thru its President Javier and said two lawyers, Atty. Carbonell and Atty. Fernandez, is that the 30% attorneys' fees, shall

be divided equally ("share and share alike") amongst Atty. Carbonell, Atty. Fernandez and Felisberto Javier, the union president.

After hearing, CIR Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez awarded 25% attorneys' fees to respondent Atty. Fernandez. CIR noted that "the active conduct and prosecution of the above-entitled case was done by Atty. Fernandez up to the appeal in the Supreme Court," and that petitioner Atty. Carbonell manifested that "Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez was the counsel mainly responsible for the conduct of the case." It noted, too, that petitioner Atty. Carbonell did not file any notice of Attorney's Lien.

3. We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union president should share in the attorneys' fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility." The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified.

4. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit "should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness."

Lately, we said:

The principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorney's fees whenever it is found under the circumstances of the case that the same is unreasonable, is now deeply rooted in this jurisdiction....

x x x x x x x x x

Since then this Court has invariably fixed counsel fees on a quantum meruit basis whenever the fees stipulated appear excessive, unconscionable, or unreasonable, because a lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties, and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control. Nor should it be ignored that sound public policy demands that courts disregard stipulations for counsel fees, whenever they appear to be a source of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or mortgagor. See, Gorospe, et al. v. Gochangco, L-12735, October 30, 1959. And it is not material that the present action is between the debtor and the creditor, and not between attorney and client. As courts have power to fix the fee as between attorney and client, it must necessarily have the right to say whether a stipulation like this, inserted in a mortgage contract, is valid.Bachrach v. Golingco, 39 Phil. 138.

In the instant case, the stipulated 30% attorneys' fee is excessive and unconscionable. With the exception of Arsenio Reyes who receives a monthly salary of P175, the other successful complainants were mere wage earners paid a daily rate of P4.20 to P5.00. 13 Considering the long period of time that they were illegally and arbitrarily deprived of their just pay, these laborers looked up to the favorable money judgment as a serum to their pitiful economic malaise. A thirty per cent (30%) slice therefrom immensely dilutes the palliative ingredient of this judicial antidote.

The ten complainants involved herein are mere laborers. It is not far-fetched to assume that they have not reached an educational attainment comparable to that of petitioner Carbonell or respondent Fernandez who, on the other hand, are lawyers. Because of the inequality of the situation between laborers and lawyers, courts should go slow in awarding huge sums by way of attorneys' fees based solely on contracts. 14 For, as in the present case, the real objective of the CIR judgment in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu is

to benefit the complaint laborers who were unjustifiedly dismissed from the service. While it is true that laborers should not be allowed to develop that atavistic proclivity to bite the hands that fed them, still lawyers should not be permitted to get a lion's share of the benefits due by reason of a worker's labor. What is to be paid to the laborers is not windfall but a product of the sweat of their brow. Contracts for legal services between laborer and attorney should then be zealously scrutinized to the end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied the former.

5. An examination of the record of the case will readily show that an award of twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees reasonably compensates the whole of the legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu. This fee must be shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and respondent Atty. Fernandez. For, after all, they are the counsel of record of the complainants. Respondent Atty. Fernandez cannot deny this fact. The pleadings filed even at the early stages of the proceedings reveal the existence of an association between said attorneys. The pleadings were filed under the name of "Fernandez & Carbonell." This imports a common effort of the two. It cannot be denied though that most of those pleadings up to judgment were signed for Fernandez & Carbonell by respondent Fernandez.

We note that a break-up in the professional tie-up between Attorneys Fernandez and Carbonell began when petitioner Atty. Carbonell, on November 26, 1962, complained to CIR that respondent Atty. Fernandez "failed to communicate with him nor to inform him about the incidents of this case." He there requested that he be furnished "separately copies of the decision of the court and other pleadings and subsequent orders as well as motions in connection with the case."

Subsequent pleadings filed in the case unmistakably show the widening rift in their professional relationship. Thus, on May 23, 1963, a "Motion to Name and Authorize Official


Computer" was filed with CIR. On the same day, a "Motion to Issue Writ of Execution" was also registered in the same court. Although filed under the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez," these pleadings were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell.

On September 16, 1963, an "Opposition to respondent Biscom's Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by petitioner Atty. Carbonell. On September 24, 1963, he filed a "Motion for Clarification" of the November 13, 1962 judgment of CIR regarding the basic pay of Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. On September 24, 1963, he also filed a "Motion to Reconsider Report of Chief Examiner." These, and other pleadings that were filed later were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell, not in the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez." While it was correctly observed by CIR that a good portion of the court battle was fought by respondent Atty. Fernandez, yet CIR cannot close its eyes to the legal services also rendered by Atty. Carbonell. For, important and numerous, too, were his services. And, they are not negligible. The conclusion is inevitable that petitioner Atty. Carbonell must have a share in the twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees awarded herein. As to how much, this is a function pertaining to CIR.

6. We note that CIR's cashier was authorized on June 25, 1964 to disburse to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez the sum of P19,938.81 which is 25% of the amount recovered. In the event payment actually was made, he should be required to return whatever is in excess of the amount to which he is entitled in line with the opinion expressed herein. 15

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees solely to respondent Atty. Fernandez contained in CIR's order of March 19, 1964 and affirmed by said court's en banc resolutions of April 28, 1964 and June 25, 1964, is hereby set aside; and the case is hereby remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations with instructions to

conduct a hearing on, and determine, the respective shares of Attorney Leonardo C. Fernandez and Attorney Jose Ur. Carbonell in the amount of P19,938.81 herein awarded as attorneys' fees or both. No costs. So ordered.

A.C. No. 1261 December 29, 1983

TAN TEK BENG vs. TIMOTEO A. DAVID

D E C I S I O N

AQUINO, J.:

The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against lawyer Timoteo A. David (admitted to the bar in 1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer (alleged missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-half of the attorney’s fees received by David from the clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng. Their agreement reads:

“December 3, 1970

“Mr. Tan Tek Beng

“Manila

“Dear Mr. Tan:

In compliance with your request, I am now putting into writing our agreement which must be followed in connection with the accounts that you will entrust to me for collection. Our terms and conditions shall be as follows:

“1. On all commission or attorney’s fees that we shall receive from our clients by virtue of the collection that we shall be able to effect on their accounts, we shall divide fifty-fifty. Likewise you are entitled to commission, 50/50 from domestic, inheritance and commercial from our said clients or in any criminal cases where they are involved.

“2. I shall not deal directly with our clients without your consent.

“3. You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as advances for expenses for the cases referred to us by our clients and careful in safeguarding our interest.

“4. It is understood that legal expenses that we shall recover from the debtors shall be turned over to our clients. Other clients who directly or indirectly have been approached or related (sic) to you as a result of your labor are your clients.

“I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father, that I will be sincere, honest and fair with you in connection with our transactions with our clients. Likewise you must be sincere, honest and fair with me.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Illegible

TIMOTEO A. DAVID

“P.S.

I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our clients.

(Sgd.) Initial

“CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate my sincerity to Atty. David as stated in the last paragraph of this letter.

(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng

MR. TAN TEK BENG”

The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated August 5, 1969. Note that in said agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with the clients.

The business relationship between David and Tan Tek Beng did not last. There were mutual accusations of doublecross. For allegedly not living up to the agreement, Tan Tek Beng in 1973 denounced David to Presidential Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office of Civil Relations at Camp Crame and to this Court. He did not file any civil action to enforce the agreement.

In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership was composed of himself as manager, Tan Tek Beng as assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president and financier. When Jacinto became ill and the costs of office maintenance mounted, David suggested that Tan Tek Beng should also invest some money or shoulder a part of the business expenses but Tan Tek Beng refused.

This case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It was proposed that respondent should submit a stipulation of facts but that did not materialize because the scheduled hearings were not held due to the nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and his counsel.

On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the Philippine Union Colleges Compound, Baesa, Caloocan City but it was only in the manifestation of his counsel dated August 10, 1981 that the Solicitor General’s Office was informed of that fact. A report on this case dated March 21, 1983 was submitted by the Solicitor General to this Court.

We hold that the said agreement is void because it was tantamount to malpractice which is “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers” Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term “malpractice” (Act No. 2828, amending sec. 21 of Act No. 190).


That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. “The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional” (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42; Malcolm, J., Jayme vs. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce vs. Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 569). The commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain canons of professional ethics adopted by the American Bar Association:

“34. Division of Fees. No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility.”

“35. Intermediaries. The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer’s responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer’s relation to his client should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. . . .”

“38. Compensation, Commissions and Rebates. A lawyer should accept no compensation, commissions, rebates or other advantages from others without the knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure.” (Appendix, Malcolm, Legal Ethics).

We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon such void and unethical agreement. We discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal ethics) but because David should have known better.

“Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession” (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743).

WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty of malpractice. A copy of this decision should be attached to his record in the Bar Confidant’s office.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-20282 May 19, 1965

FORTUNATO F. HALILI vs. EUSEBIO DAPLAS

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Eusebio Daplas filed before the Public Service Commission an application for a certificate of public convenience to operate a bus service for the transportation of passengers and freight on the line comprising Amparo Subdivision in Caloocan City to Divisoria (Manila) and vice-versa employing 20 buses for that purpose. To the application Fortunato F. Halili filed an opposition alleging, among others, that the service he is rendering on the line covered by the application is more than sufficient to meet the demands of the traveling public.

Both parties presented testimonial as well as documentary evidence, and after carefully considering the same, the Public Service Commission decided to authorize the applicant to operate at least 12 of the 20 units applied for believing it to be sufficient to serve the needs of the traveling public along the line covered by the application subject to certain conditions therein specified. The oppositor interposed the present appeal.

The evidence submitted by the applicant tends to show that in Amparo Subdivision there are many people living, most of whom are employees working in the City of Manila and students attending classes in the different colleges and universities established in Manila; that these employees and students leave in the morning and come back at noon and in the afternoon; that along the way from Amparo Subdivision to Divisoria there are many passengers bringing their agricultural products to Divisoria and some

to Blumentritt who later return along the same line with whatever purchases they had made; that the buses or trucks of the oppositor make irregular trips most of which are already full to capacity upon passing Amparo Subdivision so that the residents in the area are having difficulty in securing means of transportation; and that this difficulty is also being experienced by the passengers waiting along the way from Amparo Subdivision to Manila.

On the other hand, the evidence of the oppositor tends to show that his service along the Ipo-Divisoria line is sufficient to take care of the passengers traveling on said line, and that he has buses entering Amparo Subdivision to serve the people residing therein who were relatively few, He submitted the reports of the checkers who were posted in two different checking points to observe the flow of the passengers along the line applied for which point out that there is no public necessity for the additional bus service desired by the applicant. On this point, applicant also, presented as rebuttal evidence the report made by another inspector on the checking he underwent at barrio Baesa wherein it is shown that oppositor's buses, whether coming or going to Manila, were loaded to capacity with instances of overloading.1äwphï1.ñët

We note that the applicant has submitted quite a substantial evidence in support of his application. Thus, the testimonial evidence consisted in the testimonies of applicant himself, of Benjamin Salazar, a resident of Novaliches, Quezon City, Leopoldo Garcia, another resident of Quezon City, and Corona B. Venal, a practicing lawyer and a resident of Amparo Subdivision. In addition, applicant also submitted documentary evidence consisting of a petition submitted by the people affected in the line applied for and the reports of two checkers prepared by duly authorized agents of the Public Service Commission. Of course, oppositor likewise presented testimonial and documentary evidence to show that there was no public necessity for the approval of the instant application, among which we notice two employees of Halili Transit, which

is owned by oppositor, like Antonio Santiago, an inspector and Alfredo de la Cruz, its operations manager. He also submitted the reports of two checkers who made a similar observation regarding the flow of passengers on the line applied for.

The Public Service Commission, after weighing carefully the evidence of both petitioner and oppositor, reached the conclusion that there is still room for an increase in the bus service that was then in operation on the line applied for, for which reason it authorized the applicant to operate at least 12 of the 20 units applied for. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission made the following comment:

... . Even the testimony of Inspector Antonio Santiago of oppositor, reveals that oppositor is operating only three buses making only nine round trips during the day which is clearly inadequate for the residents of Amparo Subdivision. And even Isabel Dikit, another witness for oppositor, testified that buses of the oppositor coming from the direction of Ipo upon passing the Amparo Subdivision Gate, have already seating capacity, resulting in the difficulty of residents of the Subdivision, who have to wait at the Gate, to secure accommodation in said buses. This clearly corroborates the testimonies of the witness of applicant to the effect that people residing in the Amparo Subdivision are having difficulty in riding on the buses of oppositor passing on the national road in front of Amparo Subdivision. There being evidence that applicant is a Filipino citizen and financially qualified to maintain and operate the proposed service, the opposition filed herein is hereby overruled, ... .

It appearing that the Commission has found enough substantial evidence to support its conclusion that there is further room for authorizing the operation of additional bus service on the line applied for, which evidence is not only testimonial but documentary, we have no other alternative than to affirm the same since we are not authorized to substitute our


conclusion for that of the Commission. The rule is that the Commission's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive upon this Court. We are only authorized to modify or ignore them when it clearly appears that there is no evidence to support reasonably such conclusion. 1 More specifically, this Court sad: "Whether public necessity and convenience warrant the putting up of additional service on the part of the appellee, is a question of fact which the Public Service Commission has found in the affirmative. This finding, being supported by sufficient evidence, should not be disturbed." (Raymundo Transportation Company v. Cervo, L-3899, May 21, 1952)

With regard to the claim that the service proposed by applicant, far from promoting public interest, would only result in ruinous competition with the established transportation service of oppositor, suffice it to quote what we said in a similar case:

... . In order that the opposition based on ruinous competition may prosper, it must be shown that the opponent would be deprived of fair profits on the capital invested in its business. The mere possibility of reduction in the earnings of a business is not sufficient to prove ruinous competition. It must be shown that the business would not have sufficient gains to pay a fair rate of interest on its capital investment.' (Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co., 66 Phil. 36, 6 L.J. 1117) Mere allegations by the oppositor that its business would be ruined by the establishment of the ice plants proposed by the applicants are not sufficient to warrant this court to revoke the order of the Public Service Commission. (Teodora Santos Vda. de Pilares vs. Consuelo Arranze, G.R. No. L-45462, July 28, 1938) (Ice & Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines, Inc. v. Valero, 85 Phil. 7)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul the decision 1of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.

We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.

Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their "boundary," for every actual working day.

In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already

failed to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.

In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule.

On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."

Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.

On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took

private respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought.

Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the beginning of this resolution.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.

This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4

Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the


deposits made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded therefor.

Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:

Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.

It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.

However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:

YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES

1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00

1988 720.00 760.00 200.00

1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00

1990 605.00 570.00

1991 165.00 2,300.00

———— ———— ————

P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00

The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits through valesor he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5

On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much

more (sic) to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)

Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.

Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.