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City Sheriff, Iligan City vs. Fortunado
Facts:
Respondents Fortunado are the owners of a registered parcel of
land. It was
mortgaged to Traders Commercial Bank by Arsenio Lopez, jr to
secure a loan.
Consequently, respondents sought the annulment of the real
estate mortgage before the
Court of First Instance, which granted the same. However, on
appeal, it was reversed by
the Court of Appeals which held the said mortgage valid. Traders
Commercial Bank
assigned its rights to petitioner Angel Bautista, who requested
the City Sheriff for the
foreclosure of the mortgage. Thereafter, respondent filed a
complaint for preliminary
injunction of the foreclosure because the mortgage was already
extinguished by the
payment of the loan. It was granted after motion for
reconsideration. Petitioner filed a
petition for review before the Supreme Court.
We gave due course to the petition and required the contending
parties to submit their respective Memoranda on August 31,
1988.
On January 30, 1995, respondents, through counsel Ramon A.
Gonzales, filed a verified Manifestation informing the Court that
the subject real estate mortgage has already been released by the
Traders Royal Bank on December 23, 1983 as shown in the certified
true copy of the Release of Real Estate Mortgage, 7 and that the
petitioner was killed in a robbery in his house. 8 Respondents
therefore pray for the dismissal of the petition.
On February 20, 1995, this Court required petitioner's counsel
Atty. Emilio Abrogena to comment on the said Manifestation.
However, the copy of the resolution of the Court addressed to Atty.
Abrogena was returned unclaimed after three notices, 9 with the
postmaster's remark "moved." In view of this development, the Court
considered the resolution as served.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners counsel violates his duties to the
court?
Ruling:
Yes. However, we take notice of the failure of petitioner's
lawyer, Atty. Emilio
Abrogena, to inform the trial court of the death of petitioner,
a duty mandated by
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides
in part, to wit:
Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a
pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it
shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty
(30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the
name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of the counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground
for disciplinary action.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, the proper substitution of the deceased in accordance
with the aforequoted provisions of Rule 3 could not be
effected.
We likewise note Atty. Abrogena's failure to inform this Court
of his change of address which accounts for his failure to comment
on the manifestation of respondents relative to the death of
petitioner and the release of the subject real estate mortgage.
Atty. Abrogena should bear in mind that a lawyer is, first and
foremost, an officer of the court. His duties to the court are more
significant than those which he owes to his client. His first duty
is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that
end, his
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client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to
and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of
the profession. 12
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for being moot and
academic. Atty. Emilio Abrogena, counsel for petitioner, is hereby
REPRIMANDED for his failure to inform this Court of the death of
petitioner and to perform his duty under Section 16, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court. He is further warned that a repetition of
such omission in the future will be dealt with severely.
SO ORDERED.
Occea vs. Marquez
Facts:
The gross value of the estate of the late William C. Ogan
subject matter of the
probate proceeding in Sp. Proc. No. 423 is more than P2 million.
Petitioners, Atty. Jesus
V. Occea and Atty. Samuel C. Occea, are the lawyers for the
estate executrix, Mrs.
Necitas Ogan Occea, and they had been representing the said
executrix since 1963,
defending the estate against claims and protecting the interests
of the estate. In order to
expedite the settlement of their deceased father's estate, the
seven instituted heirs
decided to enter into compromise with the claimants, as a result
of which the total
amount of P220,000.00 in cash was awarded to the claimants,
including co-executor
Atty. Isabelo V. Binamira, his lawyers and his wife.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Payment of Attorneys Fees
in the amount of
30,000 pesos. However, the trial court granted as total payment
of attorneys fee the
amount of 20,000 pesos. Thus, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with mandamus
arguing that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in making the said
decision. On the arguments that he had opposed in the lower
court petitioners' motion
for payment of partial attorney's fees in the amount of
P30,000.00, and that since
petitioners Samuel C. Occea and Jesus V. Occea are the husband
and father-in-law,
respectively, of executrix Necitas Ogan Occea, the latter cannot
be expected to oppose
petitioners' claims for attorney's fees, thus leaving the
co-executor as the lone party to
represent and defend the interests of the estate, Atty. I. V.
Binamira, who claims to be
co-executor of the Ogan estate, filed with this Court on July,
1967, a Motion for Leave to
Intervene, which was granted in a resolution of August 9, 1967.
Thereafter, Petitioners
have filed petitions for indirect contempt of court against
intervenor I. V. Binamira
charging the latter of having made false averments in this
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not intervenor Binamira is liable for contempt for
making false
averments?
Ruling:
We conclude that intervenor I. V. Binamira has deliberately made
false
allegations before this Court which tend to impede or obstruct
the administration of
justice x x x (See case for false averments)
The foregoing are only some of the twenty-one instances cited by
petitioners which clearly show that intervenor had deliberately
made false allegations in his pleadings.
We find no rule of law or of ethics which would justify the
conduct of a lawyer in any case, whether civil or criminal, in
endeavoring by dishonest means to mislead the court, even if to do
so might work to the advantage of his client. The conduct of the
lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be
characterized by candor and fairness. It is neither candid nor fair
for a lawyer to knowingly make false allegations in a judicial
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pleading or to misquote the contents of a document, the
testimony of a witness, the argument of opposing counsel or the
contents of a decision. Before his admission to the practice of
law, he took the solemn oath that he will do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in court, nor wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any false, groundless or unlawful suit, and conduct
himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to courts as well as to
his clients. We find that Atty. Binamira, in having deliberately
made these false allegations in his pleadings, has been recreant to
his oath.
The charges contained in the counter-petition for indirect
contempt of intervenor I. V. Binamira against petitioners have not
been substantiated by evidence, and they must, therefore, be
dismissed.
We note that no further action was taken on the petition for
contempt filed by petitioners against Generoso L. Pacquiao, who
executed the affidavit attached to intervenor's Answer to
Supplemental Petition, the contents of which petitioners claim to
be deliberate falsehoods. The said respondent Pacquiao not having
been afforded an opportunity to defend himself against the contempt
charge, the charge must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, (1) the petition for certiorari is granted, and the
court a quo is directed to hold a hearing to determine how much the
total attorney's fees petitioners are entitled to, and (2) Atty.
Isabelo V. Binamira, who appeared as intervenor in this case, is
hereby declared guilty of contempt and sentenced to pay to this
Court within ten (10) days from notice hereof a fine in the sum of
Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00). Costs against intervenor.
Chavez vs. Viola
Facts:
In 1966, Atty. Viola assisted Felicidad Alvendia et al in filing
a petition against
Teodoro Chavez where he sought to have the Alvendias be declared
as bona fide lessees
in a land controversy. Said petition was dismissed because of
nonappearance by the
Alvendias.
In 1977, Atty. Viola assisted same clients in applying for an
original registration of title
over the same land in controversy in 1966. In said application,
Atty. Viola insisted that
his clients were the true owners of said land because they
acquired it by sale from
Teresita Vistan way back in 1929.
Chavez then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Viola. Chavez
said that because of the
conflicting claims that Viola prepared in behalf of his clients,
he had willingly aided in
and consented to the pursuit, promotion and prosecution of a
false and unlawful
application for land registration, in violation of his oath of
office as a member of the Bar.
Source:
http://www.uberdigests.info/2012/09/teodoro-chavez-vs-atty-escolastico-viola/
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Viola Chavez violated his duties to the
Court?
Ruling:
Yes. It is evident, then, that respondent has knowingly made a
false statement to
the court in the land registration case. As proven by complaint,
respondent has willingly
aided and consented in the filing and prosecution of a
groundless, if not false,
application for land registration, in violation of his oath as a
lawyer and member of the
bar. 14
It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a
right but a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the
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qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. 15 One of those
requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It cannot
be gainsaid that
candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration
of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor
and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the
other hand, has the
fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the
administration of justice
would gravely suffer if indeed it could proceed at all. It is
essential that lawyers bear in
mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients
but rather to the courts, that
they are above all officers of court sworn to assist the courts
in rendering justice to all
and sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the
exclusive interests of their
clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to do no
falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court. 16
In the instant case, respondent Viola alleged in an earlier
pleading that his clients were
merely lessees of the property involved. In his later pleading,
he stated that the very
same clients were owners of the same property. One of these
pleadings must have been
false; it matters not which one. What does matter is that
respondent, who, as a member
of the ancient and learned profession of the law, had sworn to
do no falsehood before
the courts, did commit one. It was incumbent upon respondent to
explain how or why
he committed no falsehood in pleading two (2) incompatible
things; he offered no
explanation, other than that he had not originated but merely
continued the registration
proceedings when he filed the Amended Application, and that he
really believed his
clients were entitled to apply for registration of their rights.
Respondents excuses ring
very hollow; we agree with the Solicitor General and the
complainant that those excuses
do not exculpate the respondent.
It is clear to the Court that respondent Viola violated his
lawyers oath and as well Canon
22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which stated that [t]he
conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers
should be characterized by candor and fairness
(now Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prescribing that [a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the courts). He has been deplorably lacking in
the candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer
of the court. In his
apparent zeal to secure the title to the property involved for
his clients, he disregarded
his overriding duty to the court and to the law itself.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Escolastico R. Viola guilty of
committing a
falsehood in violation of his lawyers oath and of the Canons of
Professional Ethics (now the Code of Professional Responsibility),
the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent
from the practice of law for a period of five (5) months, with a
WARNING that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will
result in the imposition of a
more severe penalty. A copy of this Resolution shall be spread
on the personal record of
respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Chan Kian vs. Angsin
Facts:
Plaintiff Kian filed a civil complaint against defendant. On the
other hand, defendant filed a criminal complaint against plaintiff.
As a result thereof, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the civil
case. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the civil case on the
ground that, under the rules, after a criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted. It was appealed by the plaintiff to the Court of
Appeals which transmitted the same to the Supreme Court because
only question of law was raised.
The Court's examination, motu proprio, of the record of said
Criminal Case No. 67752 entitled "People vs. Chan Kian" has shown
that the principal issue raised on appeal by herein
plaintiff-appellant that the lower court erred in issuing the order
dismissing his civil complaint against the complainant in the
criminal case on its ruling that the trial of the criminal case
should take precedence over the civil case, has become moot and
academic. This is so because in the meantime long before this case
was certified to this
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Court by the appellate court on September 19, 1967, the trial of
the criminal case had proceeded and terminated with a judgment of
conviction rendered on July 9, 1964 by Judge Kapunan of Branch
XVIII, which in turn was reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals
as per its decision of June 18, 1965.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyers violated their duties to the court
when they failed to notify the court about the finality of the
criminal case?
Ruling:
The Court notes with regret that had the counsels, 10 as
officers of the courts, but faithfully complied with their duty to
deal with the courts in truth and candor, and promptly manifested
to the appellate court the above developments, all by June, 1965,
which have made the principal issue at bar moot and academic, 11
this case would then have been disposed of and need not have been
certified to this Court, and the time needed by it to devote to the
prompt disposition of meritorious cases need not have been thus
dissipated. 12
At any rate, it is clear that the civil case filed by
plaintiff-appellant should merely have been suspended, not
dismissed although without prejudice, by the lower court under the
Rule invoked by it. 13 Appellee concedes as much, stating that the
dismissal without prejudice is in effect a suspension pending the
outcome of the criminal case.
Now that the criminal case has already been resolved, the lower
court's dismissal of the civil case should be set aside and the
case accordingly remanded to it.
On March 12, 1969, the Court, upon motion of
plaintiff-appellant, issued its Resolution authorizing plaintiff
"to sell at the best price obtainable, under the supervision of the
Clerk of this Court or his representative, the 400 drums of
monosodium glutamate subject of this case, now stored in the bodega
of the General Packing Corporation, and to deposit with this Court
the proceeds of such sale, after deducting the storage fees and
other necessary expenses." As per report of the Clerk of Court,
this Resolution has not been implemented to date, due according to
plaintiff's explanation of December 9, 1971, to the very low price
being offered for the article. With the present disposition of this
case, this matter has become moot, without prejudice to plaintiff's
refiling his motion anew with the lower court.
ACCORDINGLY, for the reasons stated hereinabove, the appealed
order of dismissal is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to
the lower court for proper trial and disposition on the merits.
With costs against defendant-appellee.
Casals vs. Cusi
Facts:
Upon the filing on November 2, 1972 of the petition at bar for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the Court as per its resolution of November 9, 1972
resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require
respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice and to
issue a temporary restraining order restraining respondent court
inter alia from proceeding with the hearing of the case 1 pending
before it below.
Despite notice and order of the court, Atty. Delante, as counsel
for respondents, had repeatedly failed to file the required
comment, specifically, he failed three (3) times to file it.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Delante violated his duties to the
court?
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Ruling:
The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's explanation
for his having allowed his extended period to lapse without
submitting the required comment nor extending to the Court the
courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do
so. His inaction unduly prevented and delayed for a considerable
period the Court's prompt disposition of the petition. Worse, when
this was noted and the Court required his explanation, he gave an
explanation that is devious and unworthy of belief since it is
contradicted by his own previous representations of record as well
as by the "supporting" documents submitted by him therewith, as
shown hereinabove.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the lapse of over six months which
he let pass without submitting the required comment which according
to his motion of December 28, 1972 was "already prepared" by him
and was only to be typed in clean, Atty. Delante in his explanation
still brazenly asked the Court for a further period to submit
respondents' comment which supposedly had been readied by him for
submittal six months ago. His cavalier actions and attitude
manifest gross disrespect for the Court's processes and tend to
embarrass gravely the administration of justice.
In Pajares vs. Abad Santos 2 the Court reminded attorneys that
"There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the
Rules of Court which provides that "the signature of an attorney
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and
that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay"
and expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule
an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."
It should also not be necessary to remind attorneys of their
solemn oath upon their admission to the Philippine Bar, that they
will do no falsehood and conduct themselves as lawyers according to
the best of their knowledge and discretion good fidelity to the
courts and their clients.
The unsatisfactory explanation given by Atty. Delante as against
the pleadings of record in the case at bar evinces a willful
disregard of his solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the
conduct of a case "such means only as are consistent with truth and
honor, and never seek to mislead" the courts "by an artifice or
false statement of false statement of fact or law." 3
The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do his best to
honor his oath, as there would be a great detriment to, if not a
failure of the administration of justice if courts could not rely
on the submissions and representations made by lawyers in the
conduct of a case. As stated by the Court in one case, "Time and
time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are
officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the
duty of complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are
likewise held to strict accountability insofar as candor and
honesty towards the court is concerned." 4
Hence, the Court has in several instances suspended lawyers from
the practice of law for failure to file appellants' briefs in
criminal cases despite repeated extensions of time obtained by
them, (except to file the missing briefs), with the reminder that
"the trust imposed on counsel in accordance not only with the
canons of legal ethics but with the soundest traditions of the
profession would require fidelity on their part."
Considering, however, that counsel's record shows no previous
infractions on his part since his admission to the Philippine Bar
in 1959, the Court is inclined to act in a spirit of leniency.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby suspends Atty. Leonido C. Delante
from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective
from his receipt of notice hereof, with the warning that repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. The
clerk of court is directed to circularize notice of such suspension
to the Court of Appeals and all courts of first instance and other
courts of similar rank.
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COMELEC vs. Noynay
Facts:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an
information for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election
Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public school
principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school
teachers, for having engaged in partisan political activities. The
COMELEC authorized its Regional Director in Region VIII to handle
the prosecution of the cases.
Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of
the Omnibus Election were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional
Trial Court of Alien, Northern Samar.
In an Order 2 issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas
B. Noynay, as presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered
the records of the cases to be withdrawn and directed the COMELEC
Law Department to file the cases with the appropriate Municipal
Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P. Blg.
129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 3 the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in
each of the cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment.
In a motion for reconsideration, petitioners counsel incorrectly
cited a decision of the Supreme Court in support of said motion: As
a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has
exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled
issue in the case of Alberto Naldeza -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.,
A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996, where the Supreme Court
succinctly held: The motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with
mandamus.
Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:
16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of "Alberto -vs-
Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr.," 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of
jurisdiction between the lower courts and Regional Trial Court on
election offenses, has ruled, thus:
Issue:
Whether or not in incorrectly citing a decision of the Supreme
Court counsel of petitioner violated his duties to the court?
Ruling:
Yes. If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known
that the correct name of the complainant in the case referred to is
neither Alberto Naldeza as indicated in the motion for
reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the petition, but
ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in volume 245
of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely
represented in the paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254
of the SCRA.
Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition,
Atty. Balbuena deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions
were findings or rulings, or, put a little differently, our own
words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a part of the
memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision.
Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility 14 mandates that a lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision or authority.
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Montecillo vs. Gica
Facts:
Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against
Montecillo. The latter was acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782,
and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court found that
Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid".
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of
Cebu in Civil Case No. R-13075 to the Court of First Instance of
Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Taada but the Court of First
Instance upheld the decision of the City Court. The case was then
elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by
petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G.R.
No. 46504-R.
The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned
by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan and concurred in by Associate
Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on
Sept. 27, 1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the ground
that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M.
Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the negative
evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's
lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded
that its decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded him
five hundred pesos as damages.
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty.
Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for Montecillo, he moved for a
reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled
threat by mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
"Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and "judgment rendered
through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals
allowed itself to be deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the
motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24, 1972,
it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the
Appellate Court rendered an unjust judgment, that it abetted a
falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished
Atty. del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot
compel any court of justice to grant reconsideration. Respondent
del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration,
filed without leave of court, made another threat by stating that
"with almost all penal violations placed under the jurisdiction of
the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204
and 205 of the Revised Penal Code, as Commander in Chief of the
AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal
that will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President
of the Philippines."
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Quirico Del Mar by making threats to the
Court of Appeals Justices violated his duties to the court?
Ruling:
Yes. To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind
them that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do
remind them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its
paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is an
officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the
noble mission of administering justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572). As an
officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the
oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability
of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would
be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re Sotto 82 Phil.
595).
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As We stated before:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it. This is his misfortune. Some
such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of
right. He should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but
men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods,
perhaps much more effective, in calling the Court's attention to
the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA
441, 444-445)
SMRB vs. Cloribel
Facts:
The case involved two contempt cases, to wit:
1st Contempt case:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to
respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co., the Solicitor
General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly
made by Vicente L. Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and
Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion that
disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21, 1968,
this Court issued a show-cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are
set forth in the memoranda personally signed by Atty. Jose Beltran
Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have
made these false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate
attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur International.
Such efforts could be accurately called "scattershot desperation"
(Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-14, three
lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare
the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners. (Respondents'
Supplemental Memorandum and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief,
dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two lines on bottom of the
page).
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their
claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to
pleading in the same case. (Respondents' Supplemental
Memorandum,Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth lines from bottom
of the page).
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys.
Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto,
the Solicitor General points out, contain the following
statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable
law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of the
petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that
such a gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all
bids") can be used by
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vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the
public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus
difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under
many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court
intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in
a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 after judgment
herein was rendered and signed by Vicente L. Santiago for himself
and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and
Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr.
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from considering,
judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof
retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "[t]hat the
brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a
vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of
the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968"
and the ex partepreliminary injunction rendered in the
above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and
predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to
the Chief Justice, the motion states "[t]hat the son of the
Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short
time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this
case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy
discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments
projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the
July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according
to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that
"unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was
"unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners, their appointing
authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said
decision." The "incidents" cited are as follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not
been declared unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the
above-entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and
the right to adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous
cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the
first place when the appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss
was and is neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to a
wholesome development of the law but only served to delay
respondent for the benefit of the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain
the status quo but destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be
avoided that it was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at
all.
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said
decision which the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to
correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided
otherwise in previous decisions, and the main issue "right to
reject any or all bids" is being treated on a double standard basis
by the Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme
Court knows better and has greater understanding than the said
decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred
million dollars by said decision without an effort by the Honorable
Supreme Court to learn all the facts through presentation through
the trial court, which is elementary.
-
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for
himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano Regala and Associates,
in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified
by the Solicitor General were either quoted out of context, could
be defended, or were comments legitimate and justifiable. Concern
he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his
clients. It was stressed that if MacArthur's attorney could not
plead such thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process of
law. However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to
"Supreme Court" appearing on line 7, paragraph 2 of the motion to
inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the
said motion, which in full reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our
judicial authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of
God in all matters that come before them, and that no matter what
the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the
Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable
of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be
the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or
favoritism for a party or an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of
Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge a motion to hold himself
in contempt of court seemingly totally oblivious or uncomprehending
of the violation of moral principle involved and also of Judge
Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case
against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other
cases. What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright
dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral
comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials are
just amoral?
Second Contempt Case:
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969,
respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling
who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth
motion for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said
motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and contained the
following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the
Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was
outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time
of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case which condition is
prohibited by the New Rules of Court Section 1, Rule 51, and we
quote: "Justices; who may take part. ... . only those members
present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take
part in its consideration and adjudication ..." This requirement is
especially significant in the present instance because the member
who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for
approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to
the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals
Company abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the
Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft
and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of
May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator
of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of
deprivation of justice and confiscation of property and /or to the
United States Government, either its executive or judicial branches
or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary
vested rights by the Philippine Government without either
compensation or due process of law and invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the
Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting
to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made.
-
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18,
1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show cause within five
(5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt
with for contempt of court."
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyers in this case violated their duties to
the court?
Ruling:
1st contempt case:
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross
disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from
the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of
faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of
distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we
have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA
441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have
become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse
for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty:
'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and judicial officers.' As explicit is the first canon of legal
ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake
of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a
corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support
the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The
attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be
'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.' Worth remembering is
that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained
by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial
office which he is bound to uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."1
His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should
seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is
disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of
the liberties of the people."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer
that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty
to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration
of justice."4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the
statement that it was necessary for the defense of his client. A
client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line
between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in
perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of
justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to
their clients, as many suppose, but to the administration of
justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and
their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law
and ethics."5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his
well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position,
lacks the power to defend himself and it is the attorney, and no
other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary
and the incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this, Mr. Justice
Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a trying ordeal for
attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience
to the court. It may happen that counsel possesses greater
knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who
presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court
claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in their decisions.
Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar
even under adverse conditions are necessary for the orderly
administration of justice."7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are
not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court finds in the
language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the
administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule
71 of the
-
Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice8 is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is
guilty of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze
the statements pointed out to us by the Solicitor General
hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made
"false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to
prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as
"scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of
petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare "the immoral and
arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with
opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only from
case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such
language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a
feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before
which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were
taken out of context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said
statements. They do not in any manner justify the inclusion of
offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a]
lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession."9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the
Bar "[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged." 10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83
Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused convicted of murder
made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused
since birth was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since
his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his own name.
Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in
exchange of a man's life. A simple job. Perhaps a question of
seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. Once in
a small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant
man blinded by the promise of wealth, protection and stability was
given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea
is a disgrace to the bar and an affront to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or
his assistants may not be considered offended parties in this case.
This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There
should be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish him for
contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts is the
power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its
ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner
connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining
thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has
misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, as
an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties;
and that he too has committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same
rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of
justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.
2nd contempt case:
We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The
fourth motion for reconsideration is, indeed, an act of
contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No
explanation has been made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of
context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows: "Justices; who may
take part. ... only those members present when any matter is
submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication ..." However, the provision in its entire thought
should be read thus
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. All matters submitted to
the court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to
be submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of
the Justices who are members of the division of the court at the
time when such matters are taken up for consideration and
adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not present at the
date of submission; however, only
-
those members present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if
the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in
writing filed with the clerk at the date of submission. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not
attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a
distorted quotation came about the portion left out was anyway
marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22
of the Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize
his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically states that
"it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote."
While Morton Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a
lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted upon
this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that
qualification was intentionally omitted.
De Gracia vs. Warden of Makati
Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus. He was charged
for frustrated homicide, which later amended to a lesser offense of
serious physical injuries. To this charge, petitioner pleaded
guilty. After serving his sentence, he, however, was not released
on the ground the prosecutor opposed it because the victim already
died; therefore, making him liable to homicide. With these
circumstances, petitioner filed the said petition.
The Supreme Court issued a resolution resetting the hearing to
another date. Meanwhile, it was manifested by the public
respondents that petitioner was already released.
On the date of the hearing, petitioner and his counsel failed to
appear, but left a manifestation that petitioner was already
released, and consequently, the petition is now moot and
academic.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners counsel violated his duties to the
court?
Ruling:
Yes. It would appear, therefore, that with the release of
petitioner, the matter had indeed become moot and academic. That
disposes of this petition, except for one final note. There was a
lapse in judicial propriety by counsel Salvador N. Beltran who did
not even take the trouble of appearing in Court on the very day his
own petition was reset for hearing, a lapse explicable, it may be
assumed, by his comparative inexperience and paucity of practice
before this Tribunal. It suffices to call his attention to such
failing by way of guidance for his future actuations as a member of
the bar.
Buenaseda vs. Flavier
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandumas to prevent the Ombudsman from suspending them.
The Supreme Court resolved to require respondents to maintain
the Status Quo.
On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus
Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its
Comment to the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation. Included in said
-
pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in
contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to the
"Omnibus Submission" as annexes were the orders and pleadings filed
in Administrative Case No. OBM-ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners
(Rollo, pp. 268-480).
The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners
with: (1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing
their clients petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly defy,
ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade
their preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the
Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully interfering with and obstructing
the implementation of the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp.
50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3) violation of the Canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and
unethical conduct "by foisting blatant lies, malicious falsehood
and outrageous deception" and by committing subornation of perjury,
falsification and fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus
Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners counsel violated their duties to the
court?
Ruling:
The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of
petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their
clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as
ordered by the Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health can not
prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261). The Motion should be filed, as in
fact such a motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we
find that the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were
legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to question the validity
and propriety of the preventive suspension of their clients.
On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate
language used by counsel for private respondents hurled against
petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private
Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.; (2) Adoption of OSG's Comment;
and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's Comment and Supplemental
Comment, pp. 4-5).
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's
cause. The language of a lawyer, both oral or written, must be
respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in
the profession (Lubiano v. Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use
of abusive language by counsel against the opposing counsel
constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of the
court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned language in
pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light.
The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the
instant special civil action, which is confined to questions of
jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving
persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial
officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members
of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil
action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered
to be maintained in the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is
LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
Santos vs. Cruz
Facts:
In a sworn-letter complaint dated November 16, 1972, addressed
to the then Secretary of Justice, the complainant, PrimitivoSantos
charged Municipal Judge Arturo E. Cruz of the Municipal Court of
Bulacan with partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge for having
intervened with and/or prevented the complainant in filing cases in
the Municipal Court of Bulacan. 1
-
The then Secretary of Justice referred to Municipal Judge Arturo
E. Cruz the complaint of Primitivo Santos for immediate comment.
2
In his comment dated November 22, 1972, the respondent Judge
denied the charges.
the transcript of the stenographic notes shows that during the
formal investigation conducted on February 9, 1973 6 the respondent
judge, while cross-examining the witness, Alberto T. Cano, lost his
temper and said: "You can go to hell I don't care or where do you
want to go Mr. Cano".
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge violated the code of
professional responsibility?
Ruling:
This language of the Judge is unbecoming of a municipal judge
and deserves administrative penalty.
WHEREFORE, the respondent Judge is hereby EXONERATED of the
charge of partiality but is found guilty of conduct unbecoming a
judge by uttering intemperate language during the trial of the
case. The respondent judge is hereby imposed a penalty of a fine
equivalent to one (1) month salary and warned that a repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
People vs. Taneo
Facts:
Appellant Teofilo Taneo was charged 1 and convicted of the crime
of rape and accordingly sentenced by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 5 of Cebu City 2 to suffer "the penalty of death" and "to
indemnify the offended woman, Mencina Taneo, the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and the amount of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, as a deterrent to other fathers from sexually
molesting their own daughters; and to pay the costs." 3 On
automatic review, appellant assigns as errors the following:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS MENCINA TANEO WHICH IS HIGHLY
INCREDIBLE AND CONTRADICTORY.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING IN EVIDENCE
THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DRA. GEMMA MACACHOR AS CONDUCTED ON THE
PERSON OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MENCINA TANEO AND IN INCORRECTLY
ADOPTING ITS OWN BIASED INTERPRETATION OF THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE ON
RECORD WHICH CLEARLY IS BEYOND ITS ADJUDICATIVE POWER TO DO SO.
Issue:
Whether or not counsel of appellant violates his duties to the
court?
Ruling:
Yes. It is unfortunate that counsel for appellant has made a
hasty accusation against the trial court for the above
pronouncement as "taking a partial and biased position" 17 and
having adopted "its own biased interpretation of the physical
evidence." 18 We do not find any cogent and valid ground in the
records of this case which could justify such a grave imputation
upon a member of the bench who merely
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performed his function and expressed his observation on the
conduct of the examination. Counsel should be reminded of his duty
to observe and maintain the respect due the courts of justice and
judicial officers. 19 Arguments, written or oral , should be
gracious to both the court and opposing counsel and be of such
words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another.
Urbina vs. Maceren
Facts:
the verified Joint motion for suspension and/or to declare
respondent and Atty. Marcial Esguerra in contempt of court" filed
by complainant Gaudencio S. Urbina on December 27, 1973 for
allegedly having made through said complainant's former counsel,
Atty. Marcial Esguerra, grave threats against complainant's life if
he (complainant) did not withdraw his complaints against respondent
(a criminal complaint for unjustly rendering judgment; footnote
also shows: Complainant-movant Urbina submitted two affidavits
executed at Manila on December 14, and December 16, 1973 relating
that a person identifying himself as Atty. Esguerra made two
telephone threats against him, saying "Mr. Urbina, mag-withdraw ka
sa iyong habla laban kay Judge Maceren; kung hindi, ipaliligpit
kayo namin," and followed up with a personal visit to his residence
saying that "ikaw naman ay hindi siyang talagang kalaban ni Judge,
kundi si Atty. Gesmundo; kaya't kailangang-kailangan ni Judge
Maceren na mag-withdraw ka sa iyong dalawang habla sa kanya:
Pag-kinalaban ninyo ang Judge, nanganganib kayo;' but that on all
occasions he flatly replied that it was his right to complain and
he would not withdraw his complaints.)
Respondent did admit that in a chance meeting in the courthouse
with Atty. Esguerra, he requested the latter should meet his former
client (Urbina) who alone filed the criminal complaint for
"knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" to inform Urbina that
"respondent bears no ill will against him and if he feels aggrieved
by the decision why not limit his action to an ordinary appeal to
the higher courts as he has already done." Respondent categorically
denied having made any threats whatsoever against Urbina, directly
or through another, confident as he was (although harassed) that
the criminal complaint would ultimately be, as in fact it was,
dismissed by the fiscal for being without basis in law and in
fact.
Respondent further submitted the corroborative affidavit of
Atty. Esguerra, stating that he merely telephoned Urbina to suggest
that the pending appeal rather than the criminal complaint for
allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment was his proper
recourse against respondent's adverse decision, and unqualifiedly
stating that he never made any threats nor went to Urbina's house
and that "The statements I allegedly made as stated in the
affidavit of Gaudencio Urbina did not come from my lips."
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge violates his duties to the
court?
Ruling:
While there are thus conflicting factual averments on the part
of complainant and respondent, the Court is satisfied from the
factual background of the administrative complaint which it has
already dismissed previously for not making out a prima facie case
and from the baselessness of the criminal complaint for allegedly
"knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" which has also been
correctly dismissed by the fiscal, that the complainant's charge of
threats cannot be sustained, resting as it does flimsily on
complainant's bare assertion as against the respondent's
categorical denial supported by Atty. Esguerra's affidavit. In the
light of ordinary human conduct and experience, it is difficult to
give any inherent credence to the complaint for it would have been
extremely foolhardy and pointless for respondent to have asked
Atty. Esguerra to make the alleged threats against complainant. The
Court finds respondent's comment to be satisfactory and will not
subject respondent to further needless harassment and distraction
if it were to give due course to the complaint-motion, as insisted
by complainant in his reply to comment.
-
It is appropriate to enjoin complainants and members of the bar
who file administrative complaints against judges of inferior
courts that they should do so after proper circumspection and
without the use of disrespectful language and offensive
personalities, so as not to unduly burden the Court in the
discharge of its function of administrative supervision over
inferior court judges and court personnel. The Court has meted the
corresponding disciplinary measures against erring judges,
including dismissal and suspension where warranted, and welcomes
the honest efforts of the bar to assist it in the task. But lawyers
should also bear in mind that they owe fidelity to the courts as
well as to their clients and that the filing on behalf of
disgruntled litigants of unfounded or frivolous charges against
inferior court judges and the use of offensive and intemperate
language as a means of harassing judges whose decisions have not
been to their liking (irrespective of the law and jurisprudence on
the matter) will subject them to appropriate disciplinary action as
officers of the Court.
The Court has consistently held that judges will not be held
administratively liable for mere errors of judgment in their
rulings or decisions absent a showing of malice or gross ignorance
on their part. As stressed by the now Chief Justice in Dizon vs. de
Borja, 37 SCRA 46, 52, "(T)o hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders,
assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment
and would make his position unbearable." Much less can a judge be
so held accountable where to all indications, as in this case, his
verdict complained of (and now pending review on appeal) is far
from erroneous.
ACCORDINGLY, complainant Urbina's "joint motion" is denied.
Castaneda vs. Ago
Facts:
Petitioners filed a replevin suit against respondents Ago. A
decision was rendered in favor of petitioners. The court where the
said suit was filed issued a writ of possession upon finality of
the suit, sale to petitioners at a public auction and failure of
respondents to redeem the property. However, the execution of the
judgment was prevented by respondents when they filed for an
annulment of the auction sale of their property. They also applied
for a writ of preliminary injunctions. Respondent filed several
petitions to prevent the execution of the judgment. The execution
of the judgment was prevented for fourteen (14) years.
Issue:
Whether or not counsel for respondents violated his duties to
the court?
Ruling:
Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sheriff's sale (civil case Q-7986), elementary
justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of
their victory in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the
respondents Agos, abetted by their lawyer Jose M. Luison, have
misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to
thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice
of the petitioners. The respondents, with the assistance of
counsel, maneuvered for fourteen (14) years to doggedly resist
execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one
court to another (5 times in the Supreme Court).
We condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel
who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek
justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of
justice. 6
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his
exalted position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has
allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the
conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of
truth and moral justice.
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A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty
his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what
we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite
the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at
bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a
layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or
lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A
lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper
his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the
cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy
is indisputable.
Austria vs. Masaquel
Facts:
The facts that gave rise to the incident in question are not
disputed. Petitioner was one of the plaintiffs in the
above-mentioned Civil Case No. 132581 against Pedro Bravo for the
recovery of three parcels of land one parcel being located at
Bayambang and two parcels in San Carlos, in the province of
Pangasinan. On April 19, 1963, after trial, respondent Judge
rendered a decision declaring the plaintiffs the owners of the
three parcels of land in question and ordering the defendant to
vacate the lands and pay the plaintiffs damages only with respect
to the land located at Bayambang. The plaintiffs filed a motion for
the immediate execution of the judgment which motion was granted by
respondent Judge on May 31, 1963 and, upon the plaintiffs' having
posted a surety bond in the sum of P2,000.00, the sheriff placed
them in possession of the lands located at San Carlos.
On May 23, 1963, Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant or
associate of respondent Judge when the latter was still in the
practice of law before his appointment to the bench, entered his
appearance as the new counsel for defendant Pedro Bravo, vice
Attorney Antonio Resngit. On June 14, 1963, the defendant, through
Atty. Sicat, filed a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the
judgment, and on June 20, 1963 respondent Judge granted the stay of
execution, over the objection of plaintiffs, and ordered the
sheriff to restore the possession of the lands in San Carlos to the
defendant. The petitioner likewise had asked for the appointment of
a receiver over the parcel of land located at Bayambang, which
prayer was granted by respondent Judge on July 8, 1963; but upon
the filing of a bond by the defendant for the non-appointment of a
receiver, the order receivership was set aside. On August 24, 1963,
pending the approval of the defendant's amended record on appeal,
Atty. Sicat filed a motion for new trial and to set aside the
judgment and, over the vigorous objection of plaintiffs, the
respondent Judge granted the said motion on November 7, 1963. The
hearing on the retrial was finally set for February 10, 1964.
Before the opening of the court's session in the morning of
February 10, 1964, Atty. Daniel Macaraeg, counsel for petitioner
and his co-plaintiffs, saw respondent Judge in his chamber and
verbally transmitted to him the request of petitioner that he (the
Judge) inhibit himself from further hearing the case upon the
ground that the new counsel for the defendant, Atty. Mariano C.
Sikat, was his former associate. The respondent Judge, however,
rejected the request because, according to him, the reason for the
request of his inhibition is not one of the grounds for
disqualification of a judge provided for in the Rules of Court.
Petitioners were held liable for contempt of court.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for contempt of
court?
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Ruling:
Certainly, any person is entitled to his opinion about a judge,
whether that opinion is flattering to the judge, or not. It would
be different if a person would deliberately and maliciously express
an adverse opinion about a judge, without reason, but simply to
malign and discredit the judge. In the case now before Us We
believe that petitioner did not mean to malign or discredit
respondent Judge in answering as he did. It can be said that
petitioner was simply moved by a desire to protect his interests in
the case pending before the court, presided by respondent Judge. A
citizen of this Republic is entitled to expect that our courts of
justice are presided by judges who are free from bias and prejudice
and it should not be made a count against the citizen if he so
expresses himself truthfully, sincerely, and respectfully. A judge,
as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as
to feel hurt or offended if a citizen expresses an honest opinion
about him which may not altogether be flattering to him. 10 After
all, what matters is that a judge performs his duties in accordance
with the dictates of his conscience and the light that God has
given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride,
prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of his duties.
And a judge should always bear in mind that the power of the court
to punish for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are
impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for
the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.
It is worth mentioning here that numerous cases there have been
where judges, and even members of this Court, were asked to inhibit
themselves from trying, or from participating in the consideration
of, a case, but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt
even if the grounds upon which they based their motions for
disqualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is
only when there was direct imputation of bias or prejudice, or a
stubborn insistence to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious,
arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants were
held in contempt of court. 11 And this liberal attitude of the
courts is in keeping with the doctrine that "The power to punish
for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and
not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court
invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without
which the administration of justice must falter or fail." 12 The
power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in
its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the
interest of justice.13
Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated February 10,
1964, in Civil Case No. 13259 of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, declaring petitioner in direct contempt of court and
ordering him to pay a fine of P50.00, is hereby annulled and set
aside; and it is ordered that the sum of P50.00, paid under protest
by petitioner as a fine, be refunded to him. No costs. It is so
ordered.
Martelino vs. Alejandro
Facts:
This case presents another aspect of the court-martial
proceedings against the petitioner, Major Eduardo Martelino, alias
Abdul Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
the officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and 97th
Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18,
1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on
the island of Corregidor.
It appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner
Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the
general court-martial, following the latter's admission that he
read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident.
They allege that the adverse publicity given in the mass media
to the Corregidor incident, coupled with the fact that it became an
issue against the administration in the 1969 elections, was such as
to unduly influence the members of the court-martial. With respect
to peremptory challenges, they contend that they are entitled to
eleven such challenges, one for each specification.
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On August 29, 1969 this Court gave due course to the petition,
required the respondents as members of the general court-martial to
answer and, in the meantime, restrained them from proceeding with
the case.
In their answer the respondents assert that despite the
publicity which the case had received, no proof has been presented
showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and
impartiality have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the
petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity,
experience and background" of the members of the court.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a trial by publicity in this case?
Ruling:
No. In contrast the spate of publicity in this case before us
did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the
responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a
"massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper"
at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent
here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the
accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with
the conduct of the trial 16 either by a failure to control the
release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or
to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have
subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners
was being held under circumstances which did not permit the
observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have
come to be identified with due process.
At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and
"prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend
that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that
they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the
suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished the
purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by
postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have
returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and the publicity
surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we
believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.