Lawrence J. Walker

Review

Sex Differences in the Development of MoralReasoning: A Critical Review

Lawrence J. WalkerUniversity of British Columbia

WALKER LAWRENCE J, Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A CriticalReview. CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 1984, 55, 677-691, In this article the bases for recent allegationsof sex bias in Kohlberg's theory of moral development are discussed. Studies comparing thedevelopment of moral reasoning between the sexes are then reviewed. Only a few inconsistentsex differences have been found in childhood and adolescence. Some studies indicate that, inadulthood, males evidence higher moral development than females, but in these studies sexdifferences are confounded with differences in level of education and occupation, A metaanalysis(a statistical procedure for combining findings) supported the conclusion that the overall patternis one of nonsignificant sex differences in moral reasoning. Discussion focused on implications tormoral development theory and research.

Kohlberg's (1969, 1976, 1981) theory ofmoral reasoning development has beencriticized as being biased against women(e,g,, Gilligan, 1977, 1982a; Haan, 1977;Holstein, 1976). The allegation of sex bias isa serious charge against any psychologicaltheory and is even more controversial whenleveled against a theory of moral develop-ment. The minimal foundation for such aninterpretive claim against a theory would beevidence indicating greater moral maturityfor males than for females. For this reason itseems appropriate to review the existing re-search literature to determine whether con-sistent sex differences in reasoning aboutmoral dilemmas have been found and, if so,what explanations might account for thesedifferences. Such a review is necessary sincethe assertions regarding sex bias and sexdifferences in moral reasoning are becomingbolder and more frequent and are found notonly in scholarly writing but also in text-books and the popular press (e,g,, Gilligan,1982c; Saxton, 1981), Although the currentcontroversy revolves around a contemporarytheory of moral development, the issue is notnew; historically, women have often been

regarded as morally inferior to men (e,g.,Freud, 1927),

The charge of sex bias might be war-ranted for two reasons. First, a theorist couldexplicitly advocate or popularize a poorlyfounded claim that the sexes are fundamen-tally different in rate and end point of moraldevelopment. For example, Freud (1927) as-serted that women lack moral maturity be-cause of deficiencies in same-sex parentalidentification. Second, a theorist might offerno such opinion, but define and/or measuremoral maturity in ways that inadvertentlyfavor one sex or the other and thus create afalse impression of real differences in moralmaturity. The allegations of sex bias againstKohlberg's theory have been based primar-ily on the latter reason.

Gilligan (1977, 1979, 1982a, 1982b) hasbeen the most articulate critic alleging sexbias in Kohlberg's theory. She contends thatKohlberg's theory and scoring system are in-sensitive to characteristically feminine con-cerns for welfare, caring, and responsibility,and that Kohlberg, in failing to recognize theprincipled nature of these concerns, has de-

Portions of this paper were presented at the meeting of the Canadian Psychological Associa-tion Montreal June 1982, Many thanks to Sandra L, Bichard for her help in the preparation of thispaper, and to Michael Boyes, Merry Bullock, C, Ann Cameron, Michael Chandler, Brian de Vnes,Robert Leahy Tannis MacBeth Williams, and three anonymous reviewers for their helpful com-ments. Requests for reprints should be sent to Lawrence J, Walker, Department of Psychology,University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada V6T 1Y7,

[Child Development, 1984, 55,677-691, © 1984 by the Society for Research in Child Development, Inc,All rights reserved. 0009-3920/84/5503-0001$01,00]

678 Child Development

nigrated such thought to lower stages. Sheargues that Kohlberg's conception of moral-ity is androcentric in that there is an empha-sis (particularly at the higher stages) on tra-ditionally masculine values such as ration-ality, individuality, abstraction, detachment,and impersonality—an emphasis that is re-flected by the assertion that justice is theuniversal principle of morality,

Kohlberg's Theory

A brief description of Kohlberg's theory(1969, 1976, 1981) may be helpful at thispoint. He has postulated six stages in the de-velopment of moral reasoning. The initialtwo stages form the preconventional level.People at this level (primarily children) con-ceive of rules and social expectations asbeing external to the self. In Stage 1—punishment and obedience—right is definedby literal obedience to authority and theavoidance of punishment and physical dam-age. In Stage 2—individualism, instrumentalpurpose, and exchange—right is defined asserving one's own interests and desires andas letting others do likewise; cooperativeinteraction is based on terms of simple ex-change. The conventional level subsumesStages 3 and 4, People at this level (primarilylate adolescents and adults) identify with, orhave internalized, the rules and social ex-pectations of others, including authorities.In Stage 3—mutual interpersonal expecta-tions, relationships, and conformity—right isdefined as concern for shared feelings, ex-pectations, and agreements that take pri-macy over individual interests. In Stage4—social system and conscience main-tenance—focus is on the maintenance of thesocial order and the welfare of society or thegroup by obeying the law and doing one'sduty. Stages 5 and 6 form the post-conventional and principled level. At thislevel, people (a small minority of adults)differentiate themselves from the rules andexpectations of others and think in terms ofself-chosen principles. Stage 5—prior rightsand social contract or utility—has utilitarianovertones in that right is defined by mutualstandards that have been agreed upon by thewhole society and by basic rights and values.In Stage 6—universal ethical principles—right is defined as accordance with self-chosen, logically consistent principles thatare abstract and ethical and that all humanityshould follow. It should be noted that Stage6 has been dropped except as a theoreticalconstruct because of its absence in Kohl-berg's longitudinal data (Colby, Kohlberg,Cibbs, & Lieberman, 1983),

In Kohlberg's approach, moral devel-opment is assessed by responses to a numberof hypothetical moral dilemmas that cur-rently entail the following issues: life, law,morality and conscience, punishment, con-tract, and authority. Scoring of these re-sponses according to Kohlberg's manual(Colby, Kohlberg, Cibbs, Candee, Hewer,Kaufman, Lieberman, Power, & Speicher-Dubin, in press) can yield two measures: aglobal stage score and a moral maturityscore. The global stage score is determinedby the modal stage of reasoning, with aminor stage being included if the secondmost frequent stage has 25% or more of thescored responses. The moral maturity score(MMS), a more quantitative measure, isgiven by the sum of the products of the per-centage of usage at each stage multiplied bythe number of that stage; it can range from100 to 500,

Kohlberg (1976) claimed that the orderof the stages is invariant, but he predictedvariability in rate and eventual end point ofdevelopment. There are two main determi-nants of rate of moral development: (1) at-tainment of appropriate levels of cognitivedevelopment, and (2) exposure to appropri-ate sociomoral experiences. Kohlberg (1973,1976) has hypothesized that cognitive de-velopment is a necessary but not sufficientcondition (i.e., a prerequisite) for the de-velopment of moral reasoning. This claimhas been supported by studies (e,g., Kuhn,Langer, Kohlberg, & Haan, 1977; Walker,1980) that indicate that attainment of a moralstage requires the prior or concomitant at-tainment of the parallel cognitive stage.

Level of moral development is in-fluenced not only by cognitive prerequisitesbut also by exposure to sociomoral experi-ences (Kohlberg, 1969, 1973). The essentialfeature of these social experiences for moraldevelopment is the provision of role-takingopportunities in conflict situations. Theseexperiences arise both through interpersonalrelationships with family and friends andthrough real participation in the economic,political, and legal institutions of society.The effect of these experiences is thought tobe a function not only of their quantity but oftheir quality in terms of the degree to whichthey afford opportunities for leadership,communication, decision making, and re-sponsibility. Both of these determinants ofrate of moral development (cognitive pre-requisites and sociomoral experiences) maybe useful in explaining variability in moralreasoning between groups (e.g., socio-

economic classes, cultural groups, thesexes).

The Issue of Sex Bias

Kohlberg's philosophical defense of hismodel of moral reasoning development (e.g.,Kohlberg, 1981) may seem to reinforce theview expressed by Cilligan and others thathe considers thinking at the higher stages tobe detached, disinterested, and unmindfulof the concrete realities of interpersonal re-lationships. However, there are two prob-lems with that conclusion. First, it fails torecognize the self-limiting scope ofKohlberg's approach to moral development.His theory is a cognitive theory that dealswith the adequacy of justifications for solu-tions to moral conflicts. It does not speak di-rectly to the issues of moral emotions andbehaviors, although Kohlberg (1978) hasadmitted the necessity and desirability ofgoing beyond "cognition," Second, thiscriticism fails to recognize the contextualbasis of principled moral judgment in action(vs, abstract descriptions), Kohlberg (1982)argues that there is no conflict betweenusing moral principles and being con-textually relative in moral judgment. Princi-pled moral reasoning is contextually relativesince it can be sensitive to aspects of a givensituation in ways that rule-bound moral rea-soning cannot. Boyd's (1979) interpretationof principled moral reasoning in terms of itsaccompanying "psychological postures"demonstrates the concrete aspects underly-ing such reasoning. For example, central toKohlberg's conception of mature moral rea-soning is the attitude of mutual "respect forpersons" as ends, not means (Boyd, 1983), Itshould be remembered in this context thatprincipled moral thinking is not the exclu-sive domain of moral philosophers but hasalso been used by activists such as MartinLuther King and Mother Teresa of Calcutta(Kohlberg, 1981),

Cilligan's (1977) response to the biasshe saw inherent in Kohlberg's theory was topostulate an alternative stage sequence forthe development of women's moral reason-ing. These stages were derived from inter-views with 29 women who were consideringhaving an abortion. In the first level thatCilligan described, the orientation is to in-dividual survival in that the self is the soleobject of concern. The following transitionallevel represents a movement from this self-centered orientation toward responsibilitythat entails an attachment to others. In thesecond level, goodness is seen as self-

Lawrence J. Walker 679

sacrificial caring for others in order to gaintheir acceptance. The second transitionallevel represents an attempt to be responsibleto self as well as to others and is based onnotions of honesty and fairness. In the thirdlevel, the orientation is to a morality of non-violence, and caring is seen as a universalobligation. Unfortunately, the only data thathave been presented as yet to support thisproposed stage sequence have been anec-dotal (Cilligan, 1982a), None of the usualtypes of evidence for a stage sequence (i,e,,longitudinal, cross-sectional, or experi-mental) has been reported. Nor has she pro-vided an explanation as to why males andfemales may develop different orientationsto moral judgment. Despite this lack of em-pirical support, her claim that the sexes fol-low different developmental pathways is,nevertheless, intended as a major challengeto the cognitive-developmental assumptionof the universality of stage sequences (Cilli-gan, 1982b).

If there is sex bias in Kohlberg's ap-proach, how could it have arisen? A trite re-sponse is that, because Kohlberg is a man, hehas taken a masculine point of view intheorizing about moral development. Anequally trite rejoinder would be to point outthat Kohlberg has had a number of femalecolleagues, including the senior author ofthe recent editions of the scoring manual(Colby et al,, in press), A second and muchmore serious possible source of bias is thatthe stage sequence has been constructedfrom the longitudinal data provided by anexclusively male sample (Colby et al,, 1983),This lack of representativeness is a realthreat to the generalizabiiity of the modeland could easily be a source of sex bias, butto date, no data have been presented to showthat females do not follow Kohlberg's se-quence of stages. Nonetheless, it is im-possible to determine whether the samestages and sequence would have been de-rived if females had been studied originally,A third potential source of bias is the pre-dominance of male protagonists in the moraldilemmas used as stimulus materials ineliciting reasoning. Females may have dif-ficulty relating to these male protagonistsand thus exhibit artifactually lower levels ofmoral reasoning. The effect of protagonists'sex on moral reasoning has been examinedin a number of studies, Bussey and Maughan(1982) found more advanced reasoning withsame-sex protagonists (for male subjectsonly). Freeman and Ciebink (1979) alsofound more advanced reasoning with same-sex protagonists (for female subjects only).


On the other hand, Orchowsky and Jenkins(1979) found more advanced reasoning withopposite-sex protagonists, and Carwood,Levine, and Ewing (1980) found no evi-dence of differential responding when pro-tagonist sex was varied. Thus, the data areequivocal regarding this potential source ofbias.

To summarize, it is possible that sex biasexists in Kohlberg's theory, in particular be-cause of his reliance on a male sample, butthis remains to be determined. This reviewwas undertaken to examine the consistencyof sex differences in moral reasoning.

Sex Differenees in Moral Reasoning

This review of the literature covered allstudies using Kohlberg's measure in whichsex differences in development of moral rea-soning were examined. A study was ex-cluded (a) if only one sex was assessed, (b) ifthere was no report or analysis of sex dif-ferences, (c) if age and sex were confounded(e.g., comparing mothers and their sons), (d)if subjects were selected according to stage,(e) if the data had been reported previouslyin another study (e,g., Kuhn et al. [1977] andHaan, Weiss, & Johnson [1982] both re-ported data that had been previously re-ported by Haan, Langer, & Kohlberg [1976]),or (/) if some objective measure of moralreasoning (such as the Defining Issues Test[DIT]) was used instead of Kohlberg's inter-view measure. There were several reasonsfor excluding studies using the DIT andsimilar measures: It is not appropriate forchildren and early adolescents; it does notstage-type (instead it yields continuous in-dexes, the "P" or "D" scores); it relies onstage definitions that differ somewhat fromKohlberg's (cf, Kohlberg, 1981; Rest, 1979);and Rest (1979) has already provided a briefreview of DIT research on sex differences.He found that DIT studies were fairly con-sistent in failing to reveal significant sexdifferences.

It is important to note that the exclusionfrom this review of studies that did notexamine sex differences implies that the re-view probably overestimates the incidenceof sex differences in research on moral de-velopment. It is reasonable to assume thatmost of the researchers who did not report asex difference found the sexes to be similar.The fact that differences are more likely toget published exacerbates the problem andmakes Type I error more likely (what Ro-senthal [1979] labeled the "file-drawerproblem").

Since the concerns regarding sex bias inKohlberg's theory have focused primarily onthe conventional and principled stages (e,g.,Cilligan, 1977), it is possible that sex dif-ferences would only become apparent inadulthood, when such moral reasoning ispredominant. To clarify' this issue, a de-velopmental analysis of sex differences inmoral reasoning seems appropriate. There-fore, the studies to be reviewed are pre-sented in three tables that divide the lifespan into the somewhat arbitrary periods: (a)childhood and early adolescence, (b) lateadolescence and youth, and (c) adulthood. Afinding for each sample within a study isprovided if there were separate analyses or anonsignificant interaction between sampleand sex. Unless otherwise noted, a non-significant finding indicates that both themain effect of sex and any interactions withsex were not significant; that includesstudies involving repeated measures, whichare designated "experimental design" or"longitudinal design," as appropriate, Anumber of researchers who did not analyzesex differences did present enough data(e,g,, the number of males and females ateach moral stage) to allow me to do such ananalysis (typically conducting a Kolmogorov-Smimov test for ordinal data; Siegel, 1956),and that is noted.

Childhood and early adolescence.—Theresults of research in which sex differencesin moral reasoning in childhood and earlyadolescence were examined are summarizedin Table I, There were 31 such studies, in-volving a total of 2,879 subjects who rangedin age from about 5 years to 17 years. Thepattern revealed is that sex differences inmoral reasoning in childhood and earlyadolescence are infrequent; for the 41 sam-ples, only six significant differences werereported.

One of these differences (White, 1975)cannot be taken at face value since the re-ported statistical analysis is actually notsignificant, contrary to the author's conclu-sion. This leaves five significant findings,Biaggio (1976) found that girls in her Brazil-ian sample of 10-, 13-, and 16-year-olds weremore advanced in moral reasoning than theboys (MMS = 275 vs, 235). Blatt andKohlberg (1975, Study 2) found pretest dif-ferences among their 15-16-year-olds thatfavored girls (316 vs. 275). Krebs andCillmore (1982) found that the girls in theirsample of 5-14-year-olds evidenced slightlymore advanced moral reasoning than theboys, Turiel (1976) found differences favor-

ing girls for 10-11-year-olds (268 vs. 254) and12-14-year-olds (308 vs. 279). Finally,Saltzstein, Diamond, and Belenky (1972)found that girls tended to be classified atStage 3, whereas boys tended to be classifiedprimarily at Stages 1-2, but also at Stages 4-5(these stages were collapsed for analyses). Itshould be noted that one-third of this samplewas classified at Stages 4-5. Such high scor-ing for young subjects seems anomalous, es-pecially according to current scoring proce-dures. (Revisions in scoring and stagedefinitions will be discussed in a later sec-tion.)

To summarize, sex differences in moralreasoning apparently are rare early in the lifespan and, when they occur, indicate moremature development for females, althougheven these infrequent differences are rela-tively small.

Late adolescence and youth.—The re-sults of research in which sex differences inmoral reasoning in late adolescence andyouth were examined are summarized inTable 2. There were 35 such studies, in-volving a total of 3,901 subjects who weremostly high school and university students.As was found earlier in the life span, sexdifferences in moral reasoning in lateadolescence and youth are infrequent: only10 of the 46 samples yielded significant sexdifferences.

Three of these sex differences are ofdubious relevance, as the researchers eitherfailed to provide appropriate statistics tosubstantiate their claims (Alker & Poppen,1973; Fishkin, Keniston, & MacKinnon, 1973)or conducted highly questionable analyses(Lockwood [1975] used incorrect error termsin his analysis of variance).

Two other researchers found that,although there were no overall sex dif-ferences, sex did interact with other vari-ables. Arbuthnot (1975) found an interactionbetween sex and sex role identity that in-dicated that both women and men with non-traditional sex role identities had highermoral reasoning. Levine (1976) found thatwomen used more Stage 3 reasoning thanmen did on the standard dilemmas involvingfictitious characters, whereas there were nosex differences on modified dilemmas in-volving primary others (i.e., one's ownmother or best friend).

Five additional findings indicatingsignificant sex differences in late adoles-cence and youth remain to be discussed. Ar-buthnot (1983) found that women in his uni-


versity sample evidenced more advancedmoral reasoning than men (by about one-third of a stage). Bar-Yam, Kohlberg, andNaame (1980) reported two significant dif-ferences in a study of Israeli high school stu-dents. In both the Moslem-Arab and Youth-Aliyah samples, boys had higher levels ofmoral reasoning than girls (296 vs. 249, and376 vs. 350, respectively). Both sampleswere drawn from ethnic groups where thestatus of women has traditionally been low,with few opportunities for decision makingwithin the family and society and with typi-cally low levels of education. It is interestingto note that no differences were found in thekibbutz and Christian samples, in which at-titudes could be expected to be more egalita-rian,

Bussey and Maughan (1982) found thatmen in their university sample evidencedmore advanced moral reasoning thanwomen. My analysis of data presented byHaan, Smith, and Block (1968) for their studyof university students indicated that womenwere overrepresented at Stage 3. This studymay involve some misseoring of stage ofmoral development (a possibility that Haan[1971] has noted). There are two bases forthis suggestion. First, subjects responded tothe dilemmas in questionnaire format ratherthan the recommended interview format(Colby et al., in press), which would result inmore ambiguous responses and hence lessreliable scoring. Second, moral stage defini-tions have been significantly altered sincethat study was conducted, in part because ofthe anomalous scoring of many subjects intheir university sample as being precon-ventional.

To summarize, sex differences in moralreasoning in late adolescence and youth arerare, as was the case earlier in development.In contrast to the data from childhood andearly adolescence, however, most studies inwhich sex differences were obtained in-dicate more mature development for males,although the differences, once again, weresmall (i.e., less than half a stage).

Adulthood.—The results of research inwhich sex differences in moral reasoning inadulthood were examined are summarizedin Table 3. There were 13 such studies, in-volving a total of 1,223 subjects who rangedin age from 21 years to over 65 years. Sexdifferences in moral reasoning in adulthoodare slightly more frequent than earlier in thelife span; or, alternately, sex differences aremore frequent in this generation than in latergenerations. (It is impossible to separate de-

TABLE 1

STUDIES EXAMINING SE.X DIFFERENCES IN MORAL REASONING IN CIIILDMOOIJ AND EARLY ADOLESGENCE

Study Sample Finding,s Comments

Baumrind, Note 1 9 years {N= 164) N.S,

Bear & Richards, 1981 11-13 years (N = 60)Biaggio, 1976 10 years (N = 30);

13 years (N = 30);16 years (]V = 30)

Bielby & Papalia, 1975 10-14 years (N= 12)Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975

(Study 2) 11-12 years (^ = 66);15-16 years (A? = 66)

Davidson, 1976Gibbs, Widaman, & Colby,

1982 4th grade=10 years(]V = 26)5th grade=10 years{N = 30)7th grade=12 years{N = 23)7th grade=12 years(iV = 35)9th grade=14 years(N=18)

Gilligan, Langdale, Lyons,& Murphy, Note 2 8 years {N = 16)

12 years (]V=16)15 year,s (N=16)

Haan, 1978 13-17 years {]V = 56)Haan, Langer, & Kohlberg,

1976 10-15 years (N = 42)Holstein, 1976 initially 13 years

(Af = 53)Kavanagh, 1977 14-15 years (^ = 48)Keasey, 1972 6th grade=12 years

(N=155)Krebs, 1967 6th grade==12 years

(N=123)

Krebs & Gillmore, 1982 5-14 years (IV = 51)Kuhn, Note 3 K-2d grade=5-7

years (N = 68)Leming, 1978 7th grade=13 years

(N = 30)Parikh, 1980 12-13 years (IV = 20);

15-16 years (N=19)

N.S,girls > boys

N.S,

finding based on dataobtained from author& calculated by mevia the Kohnogorov-Smirnov test; for adescription of thisstudy see Baumrind(1982)

Brazilian sample

apparently N,S, for the experimental design;younger group; girls an age x sex interac-

tion was found, butno analysis of the

> boys for the oldergroup

7-13 years {N= 176) N,S,

N,S,

N,S,

N,S,

N,S,

N,S,

N.S,N,S,N,S,N,S,

N,S,N,S,

N,S,N,S,

N,S,

simple main effectswas reported

3-year longitudinaldesignexperimental design

no analysis by author;finding based on datafrom his Table 3 andcalculated by me viathe Kolmogorov-Smir-

girlsN,S,

N,S,

N,S,

> boysnov test

Indian sample;age X sex interactionnot examined


TABLE 1 (Continued)

Study Sample Findings Comments

Saltzstein, Diamond, & Be-lenky, 1972 7th grade==13 years

(N = 63)

Selman, 1971 (Study 1) , , ,,Simon & Ward, 1973Sullivan, McCullough, &

Stager, 1970

8-10 years (N = 60)11-12 years (N = 60) N.S,

girls tended to be atStage 3, while boystended to cluster atlower stagesN,S,

Taylor & Achenbach, 1975 ,

12 years (]V = 40)14 years (2V = 4O)K-2d grade=5-7years (N = 30); retar-dates matched for MA

Timm, 1980,

Turiel, 1976.

N.S,N,S,N,S,

N,S,

Walker, 1980,

5th grade=ll years(iV = 80)10-11 years (iV = 63); girls > boys for the12-14 years (N = 62); two younger groups;15-17 years (N = 85) girls=boys for the

older group

9-13 years (N= 101) N,S,

Walker, 1982 10-13 years (N = 50) N,S,Walker, 1983 10-12 years (iV = 60) N,S.Walker, de Vries, & Bi-

chard, in press 13-14 years (N = 16)White, 1975 7-8 years (N= 15)

9-10 years (N = 42) i\,s,11-12 years (iV = 54) N,S,13—14 years (N = 23) claims boys > girls

N.S,N.S,N,S,N,S,

White, Bushnell, & Regne-mer, 1978 8-17 years (N = 426) N,S, (except for data

previously reportedby White [1975])

British sample

an age x sex interac-tion was found, butno analysis of thesimple main effectswas reportedexperimental design;no relevant analysisby author; findingbased on data of ini-tial sample and calcu-lated by me via the (testexperimental designexperimental design

Bahamian samples

the validity of theanalysis is suspectsince the t value re-ported is actually n.s.

Bahamian samples;cross-sectional, longi-tudinal, and sequen-tial designs

velopmental and cohort differences withthese data.) For the 21 samples considered,four significant differences were reported,all favoring men.

Unlike previously discussed studies thatinvolved rather homogeneous samples ofschool and university students, in thestudies of adults that revealed differences inmoral reasoning, sex was often confoundedwith educational and/or occupational dif-ferences. Haan et al. (1976) found that menscored higher than women in both their 21-

30-year-old sample and their 47-50-year-oldsample (parents of the younger group). Ac-cording to Haan (1977), the older women inthis study were mostly housewives. The oc-cupational status of the younger women wasnot described.

In the two remaining studies that re-vealed differences, sex was similarly con-founded with occupational differences.Holstein (1976) found differences favoringmen (409 vs. 366) on her first test but not onthe retest. Nearly all the men in her sample

TABLE 2

STUDIES EXAMINING SEX DIFFERENCES IN MORAL REASONING IN LATE ADOLESGENCE AND YOUTH


Alker & Poppen, 1973 undergraduates men were more likely no descriptive statis-{N= 192) to be at the precon- tics and no statistical

ventional or princi- analyses providedpled levels

Arbuthnot, 1975 undergraduates N.S. main effect of nontraditional sex(N = 78) sex, but interaction role identities were

with sex role identity associated withhigher moral reason-ing for both sexes

Arbuthnot, 1983 undergraduates women > men(N = 207)

Bar-Yam, Kohlberg, &Naame, 1980 kibbutz-born 15-17 N.S, Israeli samples

years (N=19)Christian-Arab 15-17 N,S,years (N = 37)Moslem-Arab 15-17 boys > girlsyears (iV = 25)Youth-Aliyah 15-17 boys > girls Youth-Aliyah wereyears (N= 12?) disadvantaged immi-

grants who were sentto kibbutzim

Berkowitz, Gibbs, &Broughton, 1980 undergraduates N,S, experimental design

(iV = 82)Bielby & Papalia, 1975 15-19 years (W= 12) N.S,

20-34 years (N= 12) N,S,Bush & Balik, 1977 undergraduates N,S, experimental design

(iV = 40)Bussey & Maughan, 1982... undergraduates men > women, also Australian sample

(N = 40) interaction with sexof protagonists indilemmas

D'Augelli & Cross, 1975. . . . undergraduates N,S, no analysis by au-(N= 133) thors; finding based

on data from their Ta-ble 4 and calculatedby me via the Kolmo-gorov-Smirnov test

Edwards, 1978 16-21 years (N = 40) N,S. Kenyan samplesundergraduates N,S,(N = 52)

Evans, 1982 high school students N,S, experimental design(iV = 81)

Fishkin, Keniston, & Mac-Kinnon, 1973 undergraduates women tended to be no descriptive statis-

(iV = 75) Stage 3; men tended tics and no statisticalto be Stage 4 analyses provided

Froming, 1978 undergraduates N,S,(N = 200)

Gibbs, Arnold, Ahlborn, &Gheesman, in press 14-18 years (JV = 60) N,S, experimental design;

sample composed ofdelinquents

Gibbs, Arnold, & Buckhart,in this issue 11-21 years (iV= 177) N,S,

Gibbs, Widaman, & Colby,1982 14-17 years (N= 165) N,S, experimental design

10th grade=16 years N,S,(N = 34)

684

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Study Sample Findings

10th and 11th N.S.grades = 15 years(N = 23)undergraduates=19 N.S,years {N = 51)undergraduates=19 N,S.years (.V = 38)

Gilligan, Kohlberg, Lerner,& Belenky, 1971 high school=15-17 N,S,?

years (N = 50)

Gilligan, Langdale, Lyons,& Murphy, Note 2 19 years (/V= 16) N,S,

Haan, 1975 undergraduates N,S,(iV = 310)

Haan, Langer, & Kohlberg,1976 16-20 years (N = 78) N.S.

Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968 university students more women thanand Peace Corps vol- men were at Stage 3unteers (N = 510) (41% vs, 23%); no ap-

parent differences atother stages

Haan, Stroud, & Holstein,1973 16-35 years (N = 58) N,S,

Haier, 1977 undergraduates N,S,?(]V=112)

Kahn, 1982 12-19 years (AT = 30) N,S,

Kavanagh, 1977 17-18 years (N = 48) N,S,Leming, 1978 11th grade=17 years N.S,

(N = 30)Levine, 1976 undergraduates N.S. main effect of

(A/= 300) sex, but interactionwith content ofdilemma

Lockwood, 1975 8th grade=14 years claims boys > girls(N = 30); Uthgrade=17 years(IV = 28)

Maqsud, 1980a 16-19 years (iV = 57) N.S.17-19 years (N = 56) N.S,

Maqsud, 1980b 14-17 years (N = 97) N,S,Murphy & Gilligan, 1980 , ,, initially undergradu- N,S,

ates (N = 26)Simon & Ward, 1973 14-16 years (iV = 60) N,S,Small, 1974 undergraduates N,S.

(N = 48)Sullivan, McGuUough, &

Stager, 1970 17 years (JV = 40) N,S,Walker, de Vries, & Bichard,

in press 15-17 years (N= 16) N,S.undergraduates 17-24 N,S,years (Af=16)

Comments

boys and girls dif-fered by only 11MMS points, but noanalysis was reported

no analysis by au-thors; finding basedon data from their Ta-ble 2 and calculatedby me via the Kolmo-gorov-Smirnov test

sample composed of"hippies"men and women dif-fered by only 7 MMSpoints, but no analy-sis was reportedIrish sample; findingbased on analysisprovided by Kahn(Note 4)experimental design

the validity of theanalysis is suspectsince incorrect errorterms were used (seehis Table 3)Nigerian samples

Nigerian samplelongitudinal design

British sampleexperimental design

685

TABLE 3

STUDIES EXAMINING SEX DIFFERENCES IN MORAL REASONING IN ADULTHOOD


Baumrind, Note 1» parents of 9-year-olds, N.S. finding based on data obtainedages not provided from author and calculated by(N = 284) me via the Kolmogorov-Smir-

nov test; for a description ofthis study, see Baumrind(1982); sample composed ofmarried couples

Bielby & Papalia, 1975 . . 35-49 years (N= 12) N.S.50-64 years (N = 12) N.S.65 years + (N=12) N.S.

Buck, Walsh, & Roth-man, 1981 parents of preadoles- N.S. sample composed of married

cents, ages not pro- couples; no analysis by au-vided (]V = 60) thors; finding based on data

from their Table 1 and calcu-lated by me via the Kolmogo-rov-Smirnov test

Gibbs, Widaman, &Colby, 1982 mostly parents of un- N.S.

dergraduates, meanage was 38 years(N = 30)

Gilligan, Langdale,Lyons, & Murphy,Note 2'' 22 years (]V= 16) N.S.

27 years (2V= 16) N.S.36 years (N= 16) N.S.46 years (A'= 16) N.S.

Haan, 1974 Peace Gorps volun- N.S. for both 1st longitudinal design; no analy-teers, initially mean and 2d test sis by author; finding based onage was 23 years data from her Table 4 and cal-(N = 7Q) culated by me via the Kolmo-

gorov-Smirnov testHaan, Langer, & Kohl-

berg, 1976 21-30 years (N = 83). men > women47-50 years (N= 179) men > women sample composed of married

couplesHolstein, 1976 initially mean age men > women 3-year longitudinal design;

was early 40s on 1st test; N.S. sample composed of married(A? =106) on 2d test couples

Nassi, 1981 former Free Speech N.S. no direct analysis by author;Movement arrestees finding based on data from her(W = 26) Table 2 and calculated by meformer student gov- N.S. via Fisher's test for each sam-ernment leaders pie of subjects; average age of(N = 28) all three samples is 34 yearsrandom sample of for- N.S.mer students (N = 23)

Parikh, 1980 parents of teenagers, men > women Indian sample; sample com-ages not provided posed of married couples(N = 78)

Walker, Note 5 23-84 years (N = 62) N.S. sample composed of universityemployees

Walker, de Vries, & Bi-chard, in press graduate students 2 1 - N.S.

52 years (N=16)Weisbroth, 1970 21-39 years (]V = 78) N.S.

• It should be noted that, althongh my an.-ilysis revealed no significant difference between men and women,Baumrind (1982) did report a difference favoring men. Her finding was not inchided in this table because it was basedon a subsample of the data provided by Baumrind (Note 1).

'' Although Gilligan et al. (Note 2) found no differences in their analysis of M.MSs, they did report a subsidiaryanalysis that indicated that more men than women displayed at least one instance of postoonventional reasoning.However, the relevant data as presented in their Figure 2 indicates the opposite pattern. Thus, the appropriateinterpretation of this analysis remains unclear.

had careers in business, management, or theprofessions, whereas only 6% ofthe womenwere employed. Similarly, Parikb (1980)found that men in her Indian sample scoredhigher than women (326 vs. 280). The menwere all self-employed professionals,whereas most of tbe women were house-wives. All of tbe remaining studies sum-marized in Table 3 seem to have entailedmore homogeneous samples and have notyielded significant sex differences. TheWeisbroth (1970) study, for example, in-volved doctoral students and professional orsemiprofessional employees in universitiesor teaching hospitals and revealed no dif-ferences. The men and women in the Buck,Walsh, and Rothman (1981) study, Gilligan,Langdale, Lyons, and Murphy (Note 2)study, and Walker (Note 5) study were com-parable in education and occupational lev-els, and no differences in moral reasoningwere found. Several other studies (Bielby &Papalia, 1975; Buck et al., 1981; Haan et al.,1968; Holstein, 1972; Keasey, 1971; Parikh,1980) have provided direct evidence re-garding the relation between moral de-velopment and a variety of social experi-ences (e.g., family discussions, education,occupation, political and social activity).

A widely shared assumption (initiallystated by Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969) is thatwomen fixate at Stage 3, whereas men pro-gress to Stage 4, or, as alleged by Gilligan(1982a, p. 70), "the thinking of women isoften classified with that of children." Evenamong the studies that yielded some evi-dence of sex differences, there is no evi-dence, in adulthood, for such a claim. Tbemodal stage for both men and women in theHolstein (1976) study and Haan et al. (1976)study (as reported by Haan et al. [1982] for alarge subsample of their 47-50-year-oldsubjects) was Stage 4, and the modal stagefor both sexes in the Parikb (1980) study wasStage 3. Thus, although sex differences maybe reported in some studies, they tend not tobe ofthe magnitude that has been suggested.

To summarize, it is apparent that sexdifferences in moral reasoning in adulthoodare revealed only in a minority of studies,and even in those studies the differencestend to be small.

MetaanalysisThe conclusion indicated by this review

is that the moral reasoning of males andfemales is more similar than different. How-ever, this traditional method of literature re-view has been criticized as being suscepti-


ble to biases and ignoring valuable infonna-tion available in researcb reports. Meta-analytic procedures that enable reviewers tocombine statistically the results of a series ofstudies are viewed as a more powerful andobjective method than summary impression(Gooper & Rosenthal, 1980) and thereforewere used as an adjunct to the traditionalreview described above.

Rosenthal (1978) has provided a com-prehensive discussion of metaanalytic pro-cedures, which need not be duplicated here.One of the more powerful, yet simple androutinely applicable, methods is the Stouffermethod. Briefly, the steps in this method are{a) compute the exact one-tailed p ofthe teststatistic reported, (b) compute the Z score(the standard normal deviate) associatedwitb each p value, (c) sum these Z scores anddivide by the square root of the number offindings being combined, and {d) computethe appropriate p value for this overall Zscore, which indicates the probability levelfor the observed pattern of findings. Step arequires that a test statistic with degrees offreedom be provided. However, since sexdifferences were often of secondary interestto researchers, many failed to report thestatistics on which they made inferences ofno differences or reported statistics withoutindicating direction. The solution adoptedfor this review, but one that may increasedistortion, was to assume an exact finding ofno difference and use p = .50.

This metaanalysis of the studies re-ported earlier in this paper tested thehypothesis that males are more advancedthan females in moral reasoning develop-ment, and, although the trend was in tbepredicted direction, tbis pattern was notsignificant, Z = +.73, p = .23, one-tailed.Even this finding probably overestimatesthe incidence of sex differences, given thereporting and publishing biases discussedearlier. Tbus, the conclusion yielded by themetaanalysis is consistent with that of thetraditional review.

It is also important to note that Kohlberghas introduced both conceptual and pro-cedural revisions to his theory in an attemptto account more adequately for his lon-gitudinal data (Golby et al., 1983). The pre-conventional stages have undergone littlerevision, but the more advanced con-ventional and principled stages—the level ofmoral reasoning common to adulthood—have been significantly redefined. The ex-tent of these changes is refiected in the lowcorrelation (.39) between the scores yielded


by the original and current scoring manuals(Carroll & Rest, 1982). Revisions in scoringprocedures (Colby, 1978; Kohlberg, 1976)have been twofold: (1) in the definition ofthe unit of analysis, and (2) in better dif-ferentiation of content from structure. Colby(1978) claimed that these revisions shouldeliminate the tendency to underestimate thereasoning of females because of particularcontent (e.g., focus on relationship.s, love,and caring).

Earlier studies, in particular, may haveinvolved considerable misscoring (as waspreviously argued for the Haan et al. [1968]and Saltzstein et al. [1972] studies) that mayaccount for some of the reported sex dif-ferences. Thus, it is interesting to note thatall but two (Arbuthnot, 1983; Bussey &Maughan, 1982) of the research teams thatfound significant sex differences used earlyversions of Kohlberg's scoring manual: the1958 version (Turiel, 1976), the 1963 version(Saltzstein et al., 1972), the 1968 version(Haan et al., 1976), the 1971 version (Bar-Yam et al., 1980; Biaggio, 1976), and the1972 version (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975; Hol-stein, 1976; Parikh, 1980). The version usedby Haan et al. (1968) was not reported. It isunlikely that this pattern is coincidental, butfortunately there is more direct evidence re-garding the effects of changes in scoring.Holstein (1976) rescored data previouslypresented in a preliminary report (Holstein,1972). The modal stage for men according toboth scoring methods was Stage 4, but themodal stage for women changed from Stage3 with the older scoring method to Stage 4with the newer scoring method. Thus, someof the reported sex differences in earlystudies may, in fact, represent measurementartifacts.

ConclusionsThe allegation that Kohlberg's theory is

biased against the moral reasoning of womenhas become more vehement and morefrequently expressed. The primary basis forthis claim is that Kohlberg relied solely onthe data from his longitudinal sample ofmales to derive and validate his descriptionof moral development. This review andmetaanalysis of the research literature in-dicates that, contrary to the prevailingstereotype, very few sex differences in moraldevelopment have been found. Of the 108samples summarized in Tables 1-3, onlyeight clearly indicated significant dif-ferences favoring males. Furthermore, sev-

eral of these studies yielding sex differencesfavoring men were methodologically flawed,primarily because sex and occupational/educational differences were confounded.In addition, most studies reporting sex dif-ferences relied on early stage definitions andscoring procedures.

Support for the null hypothesis (i.e., thatthere are no sex differences in stage of moralreasoning), such has been amassed here, isusually not of any particular significance; butgiven the persistent belief that there are sexdifferences, this review may provide aheuristic perspective on a difficult issue. Atthe same time it is important to realize, asKohlberg (1982) has noted, that the lack ofstage disparity in moral reasoning betweenmales and females does not preclude thepossibility of sex differences in contentwithin a stage (e.g., reliance on particularnorms) or in the preferential use of variousorientations in the making of moral judg-ments.

Rather than arguing over the extent towhich sex bias is inherent in Kohlberg'stheory of moral development, it might bemore appropriate to ask why the myth thatmales are more advanced in moral reasoningthan females persists in light of so little evi-dence. This review of the literature shouldmake it clear that the moral reasoning of menand women is remarkably similar, especiallygiven publication and reporting biases thatmake differences more likely to be reported.Perhaps it is time to focus our attention onother concerns, such as the questions of therole of cognitive prerequisites and socio-moral experiences in facilitating moral de-velopment and of the relationship of moralreasoning to moral emotions and behaviors.

Reference Notes

1. Baumrind, D. Personal communication,March 3, 1982.

2. Gilligan, C, Langdale, S., Lyons, N., & Mur-phy, J. M. The contribution of women'sthought to developmental theory: The elimi-nation of sex bias in moral development re-search and education. Unpublished manu-script, 1982. (Available from the Center forMoral Education, Harvard University, Cam-bridge, Massachusetts 02138.)

3. Kuhn, D. Role-taking abilities underlying thedevelopment of moral judgment. Un-puhlished manuscript, 1972. (Available fromD. Kuhn, Craduate School of Education, Har-vard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts02138.)


4. Kahn, J. V. Personal communication,November 22, 1982.

5. Walker, L. J. Social experiences and moraldevelopment in adulthood. Paper presentedat the biennial meeting of the Society for Re-search in Child Development, Detroit, April1983.

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Lawrence J. Walker

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