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Contact UsLaw is for Society This saying is attributed to Hammurabi
of Babylon, acclaimed to be the worlds first real
law-maker26/11/2014
Law is for Society This saying is attributed to Hammurabi of
Babylon, acclaimed to be the worlds first real law-maker or law
giver. So, the law will change as and when society changes but
changes in society cannot be determined by the law.
In the past century and a half, the socio-economic framework of
India has undergone radical changes, but the legal structure has
failed to keep pace with the change and the demand of the day.
India, being a country with more than one billion population and
counting, the problems faced by the multitude are myriad and
changing. Ever since India became independent and even before
independence, many statutes have been enacted for protecting the
people from the problems they face which are varied and
innumerable.
Does anyone know how many statutes exist in India? Do we still
need all these statutes in the present day? These are two pertinent
questions which are difficult to answer. There are many statutes
which still exist in our country but have not been used for a long
time. These are enactments created for the society of the day in
consonance with the needs of the people at that time, but today due
to a lot of technological as well as social changes, the way of
life as well as thinking of people has undergone a sea change thus
rendering many of these statutes redundant.
The good old laws
Around 170 statutes have been passed before 1900 when India was
under the British rule. During this period many laws inter alia,
the Indian Penal Code (IPC) 1860, The Indian Evidence Act 1872, The
Indian Contract Act 1872 and The Land Acquisition Act 1894 have
been formulated. Many other laws which were framed in the British
rule are 100 years old and we are still using them. They are of
little use to the present day scenario. Acts such as the Indian
Telegraph Act, 1885, Indian Trust Act, 1882, and Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, have been amended and needs to be amended
further in such a way that they can be relevant in the present
context. It is quite evident that these archaic laws are not
serving the purpose of their enactment.
Too many laws on one subject
Over the years there have many legislations on a single subject
which is also one of the reasons for the ongoing complexity and
which in turn is leading to chaos. For instance, the Beedi Workers
Welfare Cess Act, 1976, Beedi Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1976, Beedi
and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 These Acts
were passed within a period of 20 years and the subject of
enactment is the same. It would be less complex and convenient to
have a single legislation which would cater to all the needs of the
Beedi workers (in this case). Too many laws can only make things
worse and complicated instead of making it simple to use them.
There has been a lot of confusion for having an old and a new law
on the same subject which needs to be repealed. In such a scenario,
proclamation should be made through media about the same, to avoid
confusion and chaos.
Time frame for laws?
There is also the opinion advanced by experts that while
enacting a statute itself, it should come with a time frame or
limit; which means that if a particular statute is not used or put
to use for a certain period of time, then that statute would become
redundant and put on a list of statutes to be repealed for
consideration of the Government. The Government should be vigilant
and check if a statute or Act when not put to use, or a situation
for such use of the Act has not arisen for a specified number of
years, then it can either be revoked or updated as per current
needs and requirements.
Do we need to repeal ancient laws?
This is something that has to be seriously pondered upon. As
there are many laws which are redundant but are still in force
because they have not been formally repealed it is time these
unnecessary laws are done away with or amended to suit the needs of
the day. The ancient laws were framed based on the social, economic
and political conditions prevalent then and it would be foolish to
have those laws govern us today.
For instance, The Christian divorce laws which were outdated
were updated after the recommendations by the community council.
There is however, still room for updating The Christian Marriage
Act 1872, although, it will be a daunting challenge when it comes
to the questions of how to recognize, choose and prioritize and
restructure such laws.
Should the statutes for repealing be taken up
chronologically?
Should we first take up economic laws or communal laws or every
regulation in a chronological order or, on the basis of long
standing evidence of non-use? Some basic questions still loom
large. The reality of regulations enacted in the context of
socialization of riches and finances, mostly in the seventies, is
due for reconsideration in todays age of globalization and
liberalization. The better approach lies in interlinking of various
laws than to ignore and publish ad hoc supplementation of new
laws.
A few statutes still exist even though they are not implemented
as they are outdated. Under the Indian Serais Act, 1887, it is a
punishable offence for inn-keepers not to offer free drinking water
to passers-by. Recently, a Delhi five-star hotel was taken to court
by the municipal corporation on the grounds that the hotel was not
doing so. The real reason might have been something totally
different. It would be a thoughtless idea to make such an Act find
a place in the legal system.
The Indian Telegraph Act was passed by the Legislature in 1885
and it came into force on 1st October, 1885. The word Telegraph by
the definition would include a phone and FAX also. A video and
Television both fall within the definition of telegraph. A
telegraph wireless receiving position is a telegraph as
characterized in the Act. Most of the provisions in the Act are
similar to that of the Telecom Regulatory Act 1994. Revoking this
Act would not do any harm to the Indian society as it is far from
implementation considering the modern era. Some amendments to the
Telecom Regulatory Act 1994 to include certain relevant provisions
from the Telegraph Act 1885 should serve the purpose.
Why do laws become obsolete?
There are some causes for laws becoming obsolete. It could be
due to natural reasons inter alia, time, change of position,
over-exploitation of loopholes.
The Police Act, 1861, still needs a policeman to take off his
cap or helmet before a member of royalty; Section 108 of the
Customs Act, Section 40 of FERA and Part 171A of the Sea Culture
Act are identical. Proposing a wide alternative to both initiate
happy enforcement people and lawbreakers looking for a loophole to
slip through.
As per the Industrial Arguments Act 1947, an employer cant
effect any change in working situation, salaries, compensatory
allowances, work hours, rest gaps, new disciplinary directions,
even raise or reduce the number of employees, except casual,
without consent from the befitting authority. The confusing
industrial law regime encompasses over 50 notable legislations and
an identical number of state laws, which include the Workmens
Reimbursement Act 1923, Trade Unions Act 1926, Minimum Wages Act
1936, Factories Act 1948 and Industrial Disputes Act 1947. Sections
of this last Act make it tough for employers to recast sick units
through modernization and technological advancement as it
constrains their right to make any change in service situation
while conciliation proceedings are on, therefore boosting trade
unions to stall introduction of new technology.
Strides towards revoking obsolete laws:
The special commission appointed by NDA government in 1998 and
headed by PC Jain, identified at least 1,382 laws for repeal, but
only 415 have been repealed to date; 17 are in various stages of
repeal and nine are still being examined. Till date, the Parliament
has enacted more than 3,500 laws and almost 25,000 state
legislations. The Law Commission of India during its search for
repealing of the old laws and replacing them with new ones has
found that only 40% of the Laws in India are regularly used. The
members of law commission are planning to include those laws which
are not properly used into a single codified system. The law
commission is keen to discard the obsolete laws and replace them
with new laws. The Law Commission is handicapped as their role is
limited to advising the Union Government in framing new laws.
The government of India had not lent an ear to the suggestions
made by the law commission for the enacting of laws which would be
apt to the present day situation. The law commission prepared 170
reports for the future generations including suggesting scrapping
of the obsolete laws but the Government had not bothered to look
into them.
Procedure for repealing Statutes
The necessity of repealing an entire statute lies when an entire
subject matter dealt by a given statute is entirely taken by a
subsequent statute. Repealing and amending of Acts have no
legislative effect but are intended to excise dead matter from the
statute book to reduce its volume. There can be either repeal of a
given provision which is inconsistent with the statute or repealing
the statute itself. As per Lord Westburry, in the 148th Report by
Law Commission of India, there are four objectives which can be
achieved by statute law revision and repealing of defunct statutes,
which are, to have renovation, order and symmetry, easy access to
legislation and bringing harmony amongst different subject
matter.
As per 150th Report of Law Commission of India, there are four
categories of statutes. Statutes which do not need any change, acts
which require to be repealed, acts which require to be amalgamated
and re enacted as a single enactment and the acts which have to
make changed or amended; that are still under consideration. The
mode of repealing statutes can be either express or by implication.
Express repeal of a statute is made by stating that the earlier
statute or a particular provision is repealed. This is usually
mentioned as a schedule attached to the repealing statute.
The right of repeal is inherent power of the legislature just as
they have the right to make the law. It is the power of the
Parliament to repeal the law. When a statute is repealed, then
order, rules, notification or circular is issued in this regard to
notify the expiry of the statute or some of its provisions. Under
Article 252 of the Constitution of India, if any Central Act is
repealed or amended by an Act of Parliamen,t then such similar act
in the State may be amended or repealed by legislature of the
State. Thus the repeal of the old statutes will reduce the number
of redundant or defunct laws which are not suitable for the present
scenario.
Concluding remarks;
With the present Government making the right noises in its
endeavour in repealing obsolete laws, and the intent seeming
genuine, one can only hope that it results in clearing the system
of statutes which are obsolete due to efflux of time or their
non-relevance or over use. The panacea for the problem of confusion
caused due to a plethora of legislations would be to have
periodical updates to the laws by way of amendments and not
enacting more legislation where there are already statutes in
place. Keeping the laws current and relevant should be the
mantra.
source:livelaw.in
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Top of FormBottom of FormTop of Form
Bottom of FormUser Queriesorder 9 rule 13ex parte decree set
asideleave to defendservice of summonsorder 37 rule 4order 9 rule
13 doctypes:supremecourtsummons for judgmentorder 37order 37
doctypes:supremecourtorder 9, rule 9order 9, rule 13
doctypes:judgmentsorder 9 rule 13ex parte decreeservice of summons
doctypes: supremecourt,laws"service of summons"order 37
doctypes:judgmentsex parte decree set aside
doctypes:supremecourtleave to defend doctypes:supremecourtorder 9,
rule 9ex parte decree set aside doctypes: judgmentsSupreme Court of
IndiaRajni Kumar vs Suresh Kumar Malhotra And Anr. on 28 March,
2003Equivalent citations: AIR 2003 SC 1322, 2003 (4) ALD 82 SC,
2003 (2) AWC 1597 SC, 2003 (2) CTC 59, 2003 (4) JCR 213 SC, JT 2003
(3) SC 307, (2003) 134 PLR 249, RLW 2003 (2) SC 301, 2003 (3) SCALE
434, (2003) 5 SCC 315, 2003 3 SCR 66, 2003 (2) UJ 810 SCAuthor: S S
QuadriBench: S Quadri, A BhanJUDGMENT Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri,
J.1. Leave is granted.2. In this appeal, from the Judgment and
Order of the High Court of Delhi in C.R. No. 138 of 2001 dated
October 15, 2001, the short point that arises for consideration is:
whether the High Court committed jurisdictional error in declining
to set aside the ex parte decree on the application of the
appellant under Rule 4 of Order 37, on the ground that he failed to
disclose facts sufficient to entitle him to defend the suit.3. The
facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal may be noted here.4.
The appellant-tenant had taken on rent residential flat No. C-470,
Sarita Vihar, Ground Floor, New Delhi - 110 004, from the
respondent-landlord for a period of nine months under an agreement
of lease reduced to writing on November 26, 1993. After the expiry
of the term of tenancy she continued to occupy the said premises as
tenant till January 11, 1997. Alleging that the appellant did not
pay the electricity and water consumption charges for the period
starting from November 26, 1993 to January 11, 1997, the respondent
filed suit No. 597 of 1997 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge,
Delhi, under Order 37 of Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.), for
recovery of Rs. 33,661. On the ground that on April 21, 1999
summons for judgment was sent by registered post A.D. to the
appellant pursuant to the order of the Court dated April 16, 1999
the Court drew inference of deemed service on him, proceeded with
the case and decreed the suit ex parte on August 12, 1999. The
appellant, however, filed application under Rule 4 of Order 37
C.P.C. in the trial court to set aside the ex parte decree. On
January 6, 2001, the application was dismissed as no special
circumstances were stated in the petition both in regard to there
being illegality in deeming service of summons for judgment on the
appellant as well facts sufficient to entitle him to defend the
suit. Aggrieved by the order of the trial court, the appellant
filed revision C.R. No. 138 of 2001 in the High Court, which was
also dismissed on October 15, 2001. That order of the High Court is
assailed in appeal before us.5. Mr. A. Sharan, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant, strenuously contended that
there was no proof or record to show that any notice by registered
post with acknowledgment due was issued to the appellant by the
respondent who had taken the notice from the court but did not file
any proof of issuing the notice to the appellant, therefore, there
was special reason for the appellant not to appear in response to
the summons for judgment. He argued that sufficient amount was
deposited with the respondent as advance and that Order 37 C.P.C.
was not applicable to the facts of the case, therefore, the
appellant had good defence to the suit. The trial court as well as
the High court, submitted Mr. Sharan, erred in dismissing the
application under Rule 4 of Order 37 C.P.C.6. The respondent
appeared in-person and argued his case with precision and
perfection. He submitted that summons for judgment was issued on
April 21, 1999 and that the court had rightly drawn presumption of
service on the appellant; that nowhere in her application had the
appellant stated anything about her defence to the suit and
therefore the order under challenge was rightly passed by the
courts below.7. To appreciate the contentions of the parties it
would be useful to refer to Rule 4 of Order 37 C.P.C. which is in
the following terms."Order XXXVII-Summary Procedure (1) to (3) xxx
xxx xxx (4) Power to set aside decree - After decree the Court may,
under special circumstances, set aside the decree, and if necessary
stay or set aside execution, and may give leave to the defendant to
appear to the summons and to defend the suit, if it seems
reasonable to the Court so to do, and on such terms as the Court
thinks fit."8. A careful reading of Rule 4 shows that it empowers,
under special circumstances, the court which passed an ex parte
decree under Order 37 to set aside the decree and grant one or both
of the following reliefs, if it seems reasonable to the court so to
do and on such terms as the court thinks fit:(i) to stay or set
aside execution and(ii) to give leave to the defendant (a) to
appear to the summons and (b) to defend the suit.9. The expression
'special circumstances' is not defined in the C.P.C. nor is it
capable of any precise definition by the court because problems of
human beings are so varied and complex. In its ordinary dictionary
meaning it connotes something exceptional in character,
extra-ordinary, significant, uncommon. It is an antonym of common,
ordinary and general. It is neither practicable nor advisable to
enumerate such circumstances. Non-service of summons will
undoubtedly by a special circumstances. In an application under
Order 37, Rule 4, the court has to determine the question, on the
facts of each case, as to whether circumstances pleaded are so
unusual or extra ordinary as to justify putting the clock back by
setting aside the decree; to grant further relief in regard to
post-decree matters namely, staying or setting aside the execution
and also in regard to pre decree matters viz., to give leave to the
defendant to appear to the summons and to defend the suit.10. In
considering an application to set aside ex parte decree, it is
necessary to bear in mind the distinction between suits instituted
in the ordinary manner and suits filed under Order 37 C.P.C. Rule 7
of Order 37 says that except as provided thereunder the procedure
in suits under Order 37 shall be the same as the procedure in suits
instituted in the ordinary manner. Rule 4 of Order 37 specifically
provides for setting aside decree, therefore, provisions of Rule 13
of Order 9 will not apply to a suit filed under Order 37. In a suit
filed in the ordinary manner a defendant has the right to contest
the suit as a matter of course. Nonetheless, he may be declared ex
parte if he does not appear in response to summons, or after
entering appearance before framing issues; or during or after
trial. Though addressing arguments is part of trial, one can
loosely say that a defendant who remains absent at the stage of
argument, is declared ex parte after the trial. In an application
under Order 9 Rule 11, if a defendant is set ex parte and that
order is set aside, he would be entitled to participate in the
proceedings from the stage he was set ex parte. But an application
under Order 9 Rule 13 could be filed on any of the grounds
mentioned thereunder only after a decree is passed ex parte against
defendant. If the court is satisfied that (1) summons was not duly
served, or (2) he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing
when the suit was called for hearing, it has to make an order
setting aside the decree against him on such terms as to cost or
payment into court or otherwise as it thinks fit and thereafter on
the day fixed for hearing by court, the suit would proceed as if no
ex parte decree had been passed. But in a suit under Order 37 the
procedure for appearance of defendant is governed by provisions of
Rule 3 thereof. A defendant is not entitled to defend the suit
unless he enters appearance within ten days of service of summons
either in person or by a pleader and files in court an address for
service of notices on him. In default of his entering an
appearance, the plaintiff becomes entitled to a decree for any sum
not exceeding the sum mentioned in the summons together with
interest at the rate specified, if any, upto the date of the decree
together with costs. The plaintiff will also be entitled to
judgment in terms of Sub-rule (6) of Rule 3. If the defendant
enters an appearance, the plaintiff is required to serve on the
defendant a summons for judgment in the prescribed form. Within ten
days from the service of such summons for judgment, the defendant
may seek leave of the court to defend the suit, which will be
granted on disclosing such facts as may be deemed sufficient to
entitle him to defend and such leave may be granted to him either
unconditionally or on such terms as the court may deem fit.
Normally the court will not refuse leave unless the court is
satisfied that facts disclosed by the defendant do not indicate
substantial defence or that defence intended to be put up is
frivolous or vexatious. Where a part of the amount claimed by the
plaintiff is admitted by the defendant to be due from him, no leave
to defend the suit can be granted unless the admitted amount is
deposited by him in Court. Inasmuch as Order 37 does not speak of
the procedure when leave to defend the suit is granted, the
procedure applicable to suits instituted in the ordinary manner,
will apply.11. It is important to note here that the power under
Rule 4 of Order 37 is not confined to setting aside the ex parte
decree, it extends to staying or setting aside the execution and
giving leave to appear to the summons and to defend the suit. We
may point out that as the very purpose of Order 37 is to ensure an
expeditious hearing and disposal of the suit filed thereunder, Rule
4 empowers the court to grant leave to the defendant to appear to
summons and defend the suit if the Court considers it reasonable so
to do, on such terms as court thinks fit in addition to setting
aside the decree. Where on an application, more than one among the
specified reliefs may be granted by the Court all such reliefs must
be claimed in one application. It is not permissible to claim such
reliefs in successive petitions as it would be contrary to the
letter and spirit of the provision. That is why where an
application under Rule 4 of Order 37 is filed to set aside a decree
either because the defendant did not appear in response to summons
and limitation expired, or having appeared, did not apply for leave
to defend the suit in the prescribed period, the court is empowered
to grant leave to defendant to appear to the summons and to defend
the suit in the same application. It is, therefore, not enough for
the defendant to show special circumstances which prevented him
from appearing or applying for leave to defend, he has also to show
by affidavit or otherwise, facts which would entitle him leave to
defend the suit. In this respect, Rule 4 of Order 37 is different
from Rule 13 of Order 9.12. Now adverting to the facts of this
case, though appellant has shown sufficient cause for his absence
on the date of passing ex parte decree, he failed to disclose facts
which would entitle him to defend the case. The respondent was
right in his submission that in the application under Rule 4 of
Order 37, the appellant did not say a word about any amount being
in deposit with the respondent or that the suit was not
maintainable under Order 37. From a perusal of the order under
challenge, it appears to us that the High Court, was right in
accepting existing of special circumstances justifying his not
seeking leave of the court to defend, but in declining to grant
relief since he had mentioned no circumstances justifying any
defence.13. In this view of the matter, we do not find any
illegality much less jurisdictional error in the order under
challenge to warrant interference of this Court. Inasmuch as having
regard to the provisions of Section 34 of the C.P.C. and the facts
of the case that the liability does not arise out of a commercial
transaction, we are of the view that the grievance of the appellant
with regard to rate of interest is justified. We, therefore, reduce
the rate of interest from 18 per cent to 6 per cent per annum.14.
We directed the appellant to deposit the decree amount to serve as
security for the suit amount in the event of this Court granting
him leave to defend the suit. Since that relief is not granted to
him, it will be open to him to withdraw the said amount or have it
adjusted in satisfaction of the decree.15. Subject to above
modification of the order of the trial court as confirmed by the
High Court the appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Legal Blog: The Concept of 'Finality of Judgment' : Supreme
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Bottom of FormFriday, July 22, 2011The Concept of 'Finality of
Judgment' : Supreme Court Explains
Justice Dalveer BhandariSupreme Court of India
Justice Dalveer Bhandari and Justice H.L. Dattu of the Supreme
Court of India, inIndian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union
of India & Ors., have examined the concept of finality of
judgment and how the adversarial system in India is being abused by
litigants, and its adverse impact of the administration of justice.
While examining various authorities on the subject, the Hon'ble
court has also examined the law prevalent in other countries such
as England, Canada, Fiji and Australia. The relevant extracts from
the judgment are reproduced hereinbelow;
FINALITY OF JUDGMENT
114. The maxim `interest Republicae ut sit finis litium' says
that it is for the public good that there be an end of litigation
after a long hierarchy of appeals. At some stage, it is necessary
to put a quietus. It is rare that in an adversarial system, despite
the judges of the highest court doing their best, one or more
parties may remain unsatisfied with the most correct decision.
Opening door for a further appeal could be opening a flood gate
which will cause more wrongs in the society at large at the cost of
rights.
115. It should be presumed that every proceeding has gone
through infiltration several times before the decision of the Apex
Court. In the instant case, even after final judgment of this
court, the review petition was also dismissed. Thereafter, even the
curative petition has also been dismissed in this case. The
controversy between the parties must come to an end at some stage
and the judgment of this court must be permitted to acquire
finality. It would hardly be proper to permit the parties to file
application after application endlessly. In a country governed by
the rule of law, finality of the judgment is absolutely imperative
and great sanctity is attached to the finality of the judgment.
Permitting the parties to reopen the concluded judgments of this
court by filing repeated interlocutory applications is clearly an
abuse of the process of law and would have far reaching adverse
impact on the administration of justice.
116. InManganese Ore (India) Ltd. v. The Regional Assistant
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Jabalpur(1976) 4 SCC 124 this court held
that the doctrine of stare decisis is a very valuable principle of
precedent which cannot be departed from unless there are
extraordinary or special reasons to do so.
117. InGreen View Tea & Industries v. Collector, Golaghat
and Another(2002) 1 SCC 109 this court reiterated the view that
finality of the order of the apex court of the country should not
lightly be unsettled.
118. A three-Judge Bench of this court inM/s Northern India
Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi(1980) 2 SCC 167 held
that a party is not entitled to seek a review of this court's
judgment merely for the purpose of rehearing and for a fresh
decision of the case. Departure from the normal principle that the
court's judgment is final would be justified only when compelling
our substantial circumstances make it necessary to do so. Such
circumstances may be that a material statutory provision was not
drawn to the court's attention at the original hearing or a
manifest wrong has been done.
119. InUnion of India & Another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by
L.Rs.(1989) 2 SCC 754, this Court held that the plea for
reconsideration is not to be entertained merely because the
petitioner chooses to reagitate the points concluded by the earlier
decision in Sub-committee on Judicial Accountability.
120. InMohd. Aslam v. Union of India & Others(1996) 2 SCC
749, the Court considered the earlier decisions and held that the
writ petition under article 32 of the Constitution assailing the
correctness of a decision of the Supreme Court on merits or
claiming reconsideration is not maintainable.
121. InKhoday Distilleries Ltd. and Another v. Registrar
General, Supreme Court of India(1996) 3 SCC 114, the Court held the
reconsideration of the final decision of the Supreme Court after
review petition is dismissed by way of writ petition under article
32 of the Constitution cannot be sustained.
122. InGurbachan Singh & Another v. Union of India &
Another(1996) 3 SCC 117, the Court held that the judgment order of
this court passed under Article 136 is not amenable to judicial
review under Article 32 of the Constitution.
123. Similar view was taken inBabu Singh Bains and others v.
Union of India and Others(1996) 6 SCC 565, a three-Judge bench of
this Court held that a writ petition under Article 32 of the
Constitution against the order under Article 136 of the
Constitution is not maintainable.
124. Another three-Judge bench of this Court inP. Ashokan v.
Union of India & Another(1998) 3 SCC 56, relying upon the
earlier cases held that the challenge to the correctness of a
decision on merits after it has become final cannot be questioned
by invoking Article 32 of the Constitution. In the instant case the
petitioner wants to reopen the case by filing the interlocutory
application.
125. InAjit Kumar Barat v. Secretary, Indian Tea Association
& Others(2001) 5 SCC 42, the Court placed reliance on the
judgment of a nine-judge Bench inNaresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State
of Maharashtra and anotherAIR 1967 SC 1 and the Court observed as
under: It is difficult to see how this decision can be pressed into
service by Mr. Setalvad in support of the argument that a judicial
order passed by this Court was held to be subject to the writ
jurisdiction of this Court itself.... In view of this decision in
Mirajkar case it must be taken as concluded that judicial
proceedings in this Court are not subject to the writ jurisdiction
thereof.
126. The Court in the said case observed that having regards to
the facts and circumstances of the case, this is not a fit case to
be entertained to exercise jurisdiction under Article 32 of the
Constitution.
127. InMr. X v. Hospital Z(2000)9 SCC 439, this Court held
thus:
Writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution against the
judgment already passed by this Court cannot be entertained.
Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that prayer (a) which
seeks overruling or setting aside of the judgment already passed in
Mr X v. Hospital Z may be deleted. This prayer shall accordingly be
deleted. So also, the other prayers which indirectly concern the
correctness of the judgment already passed shall stand deleted.
Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the petition may not
be treated as a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution but
may be treated as an application for clarification/directions in
the case already decided by this Court, viz., Mr X v. Hospital Z
(CA No. 4641 of 1998).
128. InTriveniben v. State of Gujarat(1989)1 SCC 678 speaking
for himself and other three learned Judges of the Constitution
Bench through Oza, J., reiterated the same principle. The court
observed: (SCC p. 697, para 22) ...It is well settled now that a
judgment of court can never be challenged under Articles 14 or 21
and therefore the judgment of the court awarding the sentence of
death is not open to challenge as violating Article 14 or Article
21 as has been laid down by this Court inNaresh Shridhar
Mirajkar(supra) and also in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, the only
jurisdiction which could be sought to be exercised by a prisoner
for infringement of his rights can be to challenge the subsequent
events after the final judicial verdict is pronounced and it is
because of this that on the ground of long or inordinate delay a
condemned prisoner could approach this Court and that is what has
consistently been held by this Court. But it will not be open to
this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 to go
behind or to examine the final verdict reached by a competent court
convicting and sentencing the condemned prisoner and even while
considering the circumstances in order to reach a conclusion as to
whether the inordinate delay coupled with subsequent circumstances
could be held to be sufficient for coming to a conclusion that
execution of the sentence of death will not be just and
proper....
129. InRupa Ashok Hurra(supra), this Court observed thus:
24. ... when reconsideration of a judgment of this Court is
sought the finality attached both to the law declared as well as to
the decision made in the case, is normally brought under challenge.
It is, therefore, relevant to note that so much was the value
attached to the precedent of the highest court that inThe London
Street Tramways Co. Ltd. v. London County Council(1898 AC 375) the
House of Lords laid down that its decision upon a question of law
was conclusive and would bind the House in subsequent cases and
that an erroneous decision could be set right only by an Act of
Parliament. ... ... ...
... ... ...
26. ...This Court will not sit as a court of appeal from its own
decisions, nor will it entertain applications to review on the
ground only that one of the parties in the case conceives himself
to be aggrieved by the decision. It would in our opinion be
intolerable and most prejudicial to the public interest if cases
once decided by the Court could be reopened and reheard:
There is a salutary maxim which ought to be observed by all
courts of last resort -- interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.
(It concerns the State that there be an end of lawsuits. It is in
the interest of the State that there should be an end of lawsuits.)
Its strict observance may occasionally entail hardship upon
individual litigants, but the mischief arising from that source
must be small in comparison with the great mischief which would
necessarily result from doubt being thrown upon the finality of the
decisions of such a tribunal as this.
32. ...When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions
are, under Article 141, binding on all courts within the territory
of India, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of
this Court to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and
continuity in the interpretation of law in the country. Frequent
exercise by this Court of its power to review its earlier decisions
on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the
Court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law
uncertain and introduce confusion which must be consistently
avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the
Court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous,
it should hesitate to correct the error; but before a previous
decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court must be
satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that
a revision of the said view is fully justified. It is not possible
or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down
any principles which should govern the approach of the Court in
dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier
decisions.
33. InMaganlal Chhaganlal(1974) 2 SCC 402 case a Bench of seven
learned Judges of this Court considered, inter alia, the question:
whether a judgment of the Supreme Court inNorthern India Caterers
case(1967) 3 SCR 399 was required to be overruled. Khanna, J.
observed: (SCC p. 425, para 22)
At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that certainty and
continuity are essential ingredients of rule of law. Certainty in
law would be considerably eroded and suffer a serious setback if
the highest court of the land readily overrules the view expressed
by it in earlier cases, even though that view has held the field
for a number of years.
In quite a number of cases which come up before this Court, two
views are possible, and simply because the Court considers that the
view not taken by the Court in the earlier case was a better view
of the matter would not justify the overruling of the view. The law
laid down by this Court is binding upon all courts in the country
under Article 141 of the Constitution, and numerous cases all over
the country are decided in accordance with the view taken by this
Court. Many people arrange their affairs and large number of
transactions also take place on the faith of the correctness of the
view taken by this Court. It would create uncertainty, instability
and confusion if the law propounded by this Court on the basis of
which numerous cases have been decided and many transactions have
taken place is held to be not the correct law.
42. The concern of this Court for rendering justice in a cause
is not less important than the principle of finality of its
judgment. We are faced with competing principles -- ensuring
certainty and finality of a judgment of the Court of last resort
and dispensing justice on reconsideration of a judgment on the
ground that it is vitiated being in violation of the principles of
natural justice or giving scope for apprehension of bias due to a
Judge who participated in the decision-making process not
disclosing his links with a party to the case, or on account of
abuse of the process of the court. Such a judgment, far from
ensuring finality, will always remain under the cloud of
uncertainty. Almighty alone is the dispenser of absolute justice --
a concept which is not disputed but by a few. We are of the view
that though Judges of the highest court do their best, subject of
course to the limitation of human fallibility, yet situations may
arise, in the rarest of the rare cases, which would require
reconsideration of a final judgment to set right miscarriage of
justice complained of. In such case it would not only be proper but
also obligatory both legally and morally to rectify the error.
After giving our anxious consideration to the question, we are
persuaded to hold that the duty to do justice in these rarest of
rare cases shall have to prevail over the policy of certainty of
judgment as though it is essentially in the public interest that a
final judgment of the final court in the country should not be open
to challenge, yet there may be circumstances, as mentioned above,
wherein declining to reconsider the judgment would be oppressive to
judicial conscience and would cause perpetuation of irremediable
injustice.
130. A four-judge bench of this court inSumer v. State of
U.P.(2005) 7 SCC 220 observed as under:
InRupa Ashok Hurra(supra) while providing for the remedy of
curative petition, but at the same time to prevent abuse of such
remedy and filing in that garb a second review petition as a matter
of course, the Constitution Bench said that except when very strong
reasons exist, the court should not entertain an application
seeking reconsideration of an order of this Court which has become
final on dismissal of review petition. In this view, strict
conditions including filing of certificate by a Senior Advocate
were provided inRupa Ashok Hurra(supra). Despite it, the
apprehension of the Constitution Bench that the remedy provided may
not open the flood gates for filing a second review petition has
come true as is evident from filing of large number of curative
petitions. It was expected that the curative petitions will be
filed in exceptional and in rarest of rare case but, in practice,
it has just been opposite. This Court, observing that neither it is
advisable nor possible to enumerate all the grounds on which
curative petition may be entertained, said that nevertheless the
petitioner is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae if he
establishes (1) violation of principles of natural justice in that
he was not a party to the lis but the judgment adversely affected
his interests or, if he was a party to the lis, he was not served
with notice of the proceedings and the matter proceeded as if he
had notice, and (2) where in the proceedings a learned Judge failed
to disclose his connection with the subject-matter or the parties
giving scope for an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely
affects the petitioner. To restrict filing of the curative
petitions only in genuine cases, Rupa Ashok Hurra (supra) provided
that the curative petition shall contain a certification by a
Senior Advocate with regard to the fulfilment of all the
requirements provided in the judgment. Unfortunately, in most of
the cases, the certification is casual without fulfilling the
requirements of the judgment.
131. InSita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant
Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi & Others(2009)10 SCC 501,
this Court held thus:
41. We must also observe that the petitioner has been able to
frustrate the acquisition and development of the land right from
1980 onwards by taking recourse to one litigation after the other.
The record reveals that all the suits/writ petitions, etc. that had
been filed had failed. Undoubtedly, every citizen has a right to
utilise all legal means which are open to him in a bid to vindicate
and protect his rights, but if the court comes to the conclusion
that the pleas raised are frivolous and meant to frustrate and
delay an acquisition which is in public interest, deterrent action
is called for. This is precisely the situation in the present
matter.
42. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed with costs which are
determined at rupees two lakhs. The respondents, shall, without
further loss of time proceed against the appellant.
132. This court in a recent judgment inM. Nagabhushana v. State
of Karnataka and others(2011) 3 SCC 408 observed that principle of
finality is passed on high principle of public policy. The court in
para 13 of the said judgment observed as under:
That principle of finality of litigation is based on high
principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle
great oppression might result under the color and pretence of law
inasmuch as there will be no end of litigation and a rich and
malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing his opponent
by repetitive suits and actions. This may compel the weaker party
to relinquish his right. The doctrine of res judicata has been
evolved to prevent such an anarchy. That is why it is perceived
that the plea of res judicata is not a technical doctrine but a
fundamental principle which sustains the rule of law in ensuring
finality in litigation. This principle seeks to promote honesty and
a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse in the matter
of accessing court for agitating on issues which have become final
between the parties.
133. In order to discourage a litigation which reopens the final
judgment of this court, while dismissing the petition imposed costs
of rupees 10 lakhs.
134. We find full corroboration of this principle from the cases
of other countries. We deem it appropriate to mention some of these
relevant cases in the succeeding paragraphs.
ENGLAND
135. The England cases have consistently taken the view that the
judgments of final court must be considered final and conclusive.
There must be certainty in the administration. Uncertainty can lead
to injustice. Unless there are very exceptional or compelling
reasons the judgment of apex courts should not be reopened.
136. InRegina v. Gough, [1993] 1 A.C. 646, with regards to
setting aside judgments due to judicial bias, the House of Lords
held that there is only one established special category and that
exists where the tribunal has a pecuniary or proprietary interest
in the subject matter of the proceedings as inDimes v. Proprietors
of Grand Junction Canal, (1852) 3 H.L. Cases 759. The courts should
hesitate long before creating any other special category since this
will immediately create uncertainty as to what are the parameters
of that category and what is the test to be applied in the case of
that category. Lord Goff of Chievely stated that I wish to draw
attention to the fact that there are certain cases in which it has
been considered that the circumstances are such that they must
inevitably shake public confidence in the integrity of the
administration of justice if the decision is to be allowed to
stand. Such cases attract the full force of Lord Hewart C.J.'s
requirement that justice must not only be done but must manifestly
be seen to be done. These cases arise where a person sitting in a
judicial capacity has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the
proceedings. In such a case, as Blackburn J. said in Reg. v. Rand
(1866) L.R. 1 Q.B. 230, 232: any direct pecuniary interest, however
small, in the subject of inquiry, does disqualify a person from
acting as a judge in the matter. The principle is expressed in the
maxim that nobody may be judge in his own cause (nemo judex in sua
causa)... In such a case, therefore, not only is it irrelevant that
there was in fact no bias on the part of the tribunal, but there is
no question of investigating, from an objective point of view,
whether there was any real likelihood of bias, or any reasonable
suspicion of bias, on the facts of the particular case. The nature
of the interest is such that public confidence in the
administration of justice requires that the decision should not
stand (p. 661).
137. InR v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex
parte Pinochet Ugarte(No 2) (1999) 2 W.L.R. 272, the House of Lords
set aside one of its earlier orders. In this case, the majority at
the House of Lords had earlier ruled whether Augusto Pinochet, the
former dictator of Chile, could be extradited to Spain in order to
stand trial for alleged crimes against humanity and was not
entitled to sovereign immunity. Amnesty International had been an
intervener in this case in opposition to Pinochet. Lord Hoffman,
one of the majority judges, was a director of Amnesty International
Charitable Trust, an organization controlled by Amnesty
International, and Lady Hoffman had been working at AI's
international secretariat since 1977. The respondent was not aware
of Lord Hoffman's relationship to AI during the initial trial. In
this case, the House of Lords cited with approval the respondents'
concession acknowledging the House of Lords' jurisdiction to review
its decisions -
In principle it must be that your Lordships, as the ultimate
court of appeal, have power to correct any injustice caused by an
earlier order of this House. There is no relevant statutory
limitation on the jurisdiction of the House in this regard and
therefore its inherent jurisdiction remains unfettered.
138. According to the English law, the judgment of the Apex
Court can be reviewed in exceptional circumstances particularly
when the judge associated with any of the organizations to be a
good ground for reviewing the judgment.
139. InPinochet test in Regina (Edwards) v Environment Agency
and others[2010] UKSC 57, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
overruled an earlier order of costs made by the erstwhile apex
court, the House of Lords, on the grounds that the House of Lords
had made a substantive error in the original adjudication. However,
this appeal was lodged under Rule 53 of the The (U.K.) Supreme
Court Rules, 2009, 2009 No. 1603 (L. 17). Rule 53 provides as
follows:
53. (1) A party who is dissatisfied with the assessment of costs
made at an oral hearing may apply for that decision to be reviewed
by a single Justice and any application under this rule must be
made in the appropriate form and be filed within 14 days of the
decision.
(2) The single Justice may (without an oral hearing) affirm the
decision made on the assessment or may, where it appears
appropriate, refer the matter to a panel of Justices to be decided
with or without an oral hearing.
(3) An application may be made under this rule only on a
question of principle and not in respect of the amount allowed on
any item in the claim for costs.
140. In this case, Lord Hope, citing the Pinochet case stated
that:
The Supreme Court is a creature of statute. But it has inherited
all the powers that were vested in the House of Lords as the
ultimate court of appeal. So it has the same powers as the House
had to correct any injustice caused by an earlier order of the
House or this Court... In this case it seems that, through no fault
of the appellant, an injustice may have been caused by the failure
of the House to address itself to the correct test in order to
comply with the requirements of [certain EU] directives [at para.
35].
CANADA
141. The Canadian Supreme Court is of the same view that
judicial bias would be a ground for reviewing the judgment.
InWewaykum Indian Band v. Canada[2003] 2 SCR 259 the court relied
on Taylor Ventures Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Taylor 2005 BCCA 350 where
principle of judicial bias has been summarized.
142. The principles stated inRobertsregarding judicial bias were
neatly summarized inTaylor Ventures Ltd. (Trustee of)(supra), where
Donald J.A. stated -
(i) a judge's impartiality is presumed;
(ii) a party arguing for disqualification must establish that
the circumstances justify a finding that the judge must be
disqualified;
(iii) the criterion of disqualification is the reasonable
apprehension of bias;
(iv) the question is what would an informed, reasonable and
right-minded person, viewing the matter realistically and
practically, and having thought the matter through, conclude; (iv)
the test for disqualification is not satisfied unless it is proved
that the informed, reasonable and right-minded person would think
that it is more likely than not that the judge, whether consciously
or unconsciously, would not decide fairly;
(v) the test requires demonstration of serious grounds on which
to base the apprehension; (vi) each case must be examined
contextually and the inquiry is fact-specific (at para 7).
143. Cases from Australia also support the proposition that a
final judgment cannot ordinarily be reopened, and that such steps
can be taken only in exceptional circumstances.
144. InState Rail Authority of New South Wales v. Codelfa
Constructions Propriety Limited(1982) 150 CLR 29, the High Court of
Australia observed:
... it is a power to be exercised with great caution. There may
be little difficulty in a case where the orders have not been
perfected and some mistake or misprision is disclosed. But in other
cases it will be a case of weighing what would otherwise be
irremediable injustice against the public interest in maintaining
the finality of litigation. The circumstances that will justify a
rehearing must be quite exceptional. ...
145. InBailey v. Marinoff(1971) 125 CLR 529, Judge Gibbs of the
High Court of Australia observed in a dissenting opinion:
It is a well-settled rule that once an order of a court has been
passed and entered or otherwise perfected in a form which correctly
expresses the intention with which it was made the court has no
jurisdiction to alter it. .. ....The rule tests on the obvious
principle that it is desirable that there be an end to litigation
and on the view that it would be mischievous if there were
jurisdiction to rehear a matter decided after a full hearing.
However, the rule is not inflexible and there are a number of
exceptions to it in addition to those that depend on statutory
provisions such as the slip rule found in most rules of court.
Indeed, as the way in which I have already stated the rule implies,
the court has the power to vary an order so as to carry out its own
meaning or to make plain language which is doubtful, and that power
does not depend on rules of court, but is inherent in the court....
And, further:
The authorities to which I have referred leave no doubt that a
superior court has an inherent power to vary its own orders in
certain cases. The limits of the power remain undefined, although
the remarks of Lord Evershed already cited suggest that it is a
power that a court may exercise if, in its view, the purposes of
justice require that it should do so.
146. InDJL v. Central Authority(2000) 170 ALR 659, the High
Court of Australia observed:
...It is now recognized both in Australia and England that
orders made by ultimate appellate courts may be reopened by such
courts in exceptional circumstances to repair accidents and
oversights which would otherwise occasion a serious injustice. In
my view, this can be done although the order in question has been
perfected. The reopening may be ordered after due account is taken
of the reasons that support the principle of finality of
litigation. The party seeking reopening bears a heavy burden to
demonstrate that the exceptional course is required without fault
on his part. ...
147. Lastly, inLexcray Pty. Ltd. v. Northern Territory of
Australia2003 NTCA 11, the Court appeals of the Supreme Court of
the Northern Territory expressly stated: ...As a final court of
appeal the High Court of Australia has inherent jurisdiction to
vacate its orders in cases where there would otherwise be an
irremediable injustice....
148. American courts also follows a similar pattern. InUnited
States of America v. Ohio Power Company353 US 98 (1957), the U.S.
Supreme Court vacated its earlier order denying a timely petition
for rehearing, on the ground that the interest in finality of
litigation must yield where interests of justice would make unfair,
strict application of Supreme Court's Rules.
149. InRaymond G. Cahill v. The New York, New Haven and Hartford
Railroad Company351 US 183, the Supreme Court observed:
...There are strong arguments for allowing a second petition for
rehearing where a rigid application of this rule would cause
manifest injustice.
FIJI
150. The Supreme Court of Fiji Islands incorporating Australian
and British case law summarized the law applicable to review of its
judgments. It has been held that the Supreme Court can review its
judgments pronounced or orders made by it. The power of the
appellate courts to re- open and review their orders is to be
exercised with great caution.
151. The cases establish that the power of appellate courts to
re-open and review their orders is to be exercised with great
caution. The power, and the occasions for its exercise were
considered inIn Re Transferred Civil Servants (Ireland)
Compensation (1929) AC 242, 248-52; and State Rail Authority NSW v
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd (1982) HCA 51 : (1982) 150 CLR 29,
38-9, 45-6, where earlier Privy Council cases are referred to. The
principles were summarised inSmith v NSW Bar Association(1992) 176
CLR 252, 265 where the High Court of Australia said:
The power is discretionary and, although it exists up until the
entry of judgment, it is one that is exercised having regard to the
public interest in maintaining the finality of litigation. Thus, if
reasons for judgment have been given, the power is only exercised
if there is some matter calling for review ... these considerations
may tend against the re-opening of a case, but they are not matters
which bear on the nature or the review ... once the case is
re-opened ... the power to review a judgment ... where the order
has not been entered will not ordinarily be exercised to permit a
general re- opening ... But ... once a matter has been re- opened,
the nature and extent of the review must depend on the error or
omission which has led to that step being taken.
152. The principles were further considered inAutodesk Inc v
Dyason(No 2) (1993) HCA 6 : (1993) 176 CLR 300, 303 where Mason CJ
said:
What must emerge, in order to enliven the exercise of the
jurisdiction, is that the Court has apparently proceeded according
to some misapprehension of the facts or the relevant law and this
... cannot be attributed solely to the neglect of the party seeking
the rehearing. The purpose of the jurisdiction is not to provide a
backdoor method by which unsuccessful litigants can seek to reargue
their cases.
153. The ratio of these judgments is that a court of final
appeal has power in truly exceptional circumstances to recall its
order even after they have been entered in order to avoid
irremediable injustice.
154. Reviewing of various cases of different jurisdictions lead
to irresistible conclusion that though the judgments of the apex
court can also be reviewed or recalled but it must be done in
extremely exceptional circumstances where there is gross violation
of principles of natural justice.
155. In a case where the aggrieved party filing a review or
curative petition was not a party to the lis but the judgment
adversely affected his interest or he was party to the lis was not
served with notice of the proceedings and the matter proceeded as
if he had notice. This court inState of M.P. v. Sugar Singh &
Otherson 9th March, 2010 passed the following order in a curative
petition :
Though there were eight accused persons, only four accused were
arrayed as party respondents in the said appeals namely, Sughar,
Laxman, Onkar and Ramesh. Other accused, namely,Bhoja, Raghubir,
Puran and Balbir were not impleaded as respondents in these
Criminal Appeals and consequently notices were not issued to them.
This Court, by judgment on 7th November, 2008 in the aforesaid
Criminal Appeals, reversed the acquittal of the accused by the High
Court and found them guilty of the offences punishable under
Section 304 Part-II read with Section 149 of the I.P.C. and
sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for a period of six years.
The conviction of the accused for the offences punishable under
Section 148 as also Section 326 read with the Section 149 of the
I.P.C. and the sentence imposed by the Sessions Court in regard to
the said offences was upheld by this Court.
We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners. The
respondent State, though served with a notice through standing
counsel, has not chosen to enter appearance. These Curative
Petitions have been filed by accused No.2 (Raghubir) and by accused
no.4 and 5 (Sughar Singh and Laxman) on the ground that acquittal
of Bhoja, Raghubir, Puran and Balbir have been reversed without
affording an opportunity of being heard. We see that there is
serious violation of principles of natural justice as the acquittal
of all the accused has been set aside even though only four of them
were made respondents before this Court and the others were not
heard. We are, therefore, constrained to recall the 3 judgment
passed by this Court in Criminal Appeal Nos.1362- 1363 of 2004 on
7th November, 2008.
Consequently, the accused Sughar Singh, Laxman, Onkar and
Ramesh, if they are in custody, are directed to be released
forthwith.
In the result, these Curative Petitions are disposed of and the
Criminal Appeal Nos.1362- 124 1363 of 2004 are restored to the file
for being heard afresh with a direction that the other four accused
(Bhoja, Raghubir, Puran and Balbir) be impleaded as respondents and
all accused be served with fresh notices.
156. In the instant case, the applicants had adequate
opportunity and were heard by the court at length on number of
occasions and only thereafter the writ petition was disposed of.
The applicants aggrieved by the said judgment filed a review
petition. This review petition was also dismissed. In the instant
case even the curative petition has also been dismissed. The
applicants now want to reopen this case by filing these
interlocutory applications.
157. The applicants certainly cannot be provided an entry by
back door method and permit the unsuccessful litigant to re-
agitate and reargue their cases. The applicants have filed these
applications merely to avoid compliance of the order of the court.
The applicants have been successful in their endeavour and have not
permitted the judgment delivered on 3.2.1996 to acquire finality
till date. It is strange that other respondents did not implement
the final order of this court without there being any order or
direction of this court. These applications being devoid of any
merit deserve to be dismissed with heavy costs.Posted byThe Legal
Blogat10:36 PMCategoryLegal Concepts,Practice and Procedure4
comments:1. RCJuly 23, 2011 at 3:36 AMI was recently told that
corroboration of the principle from the cases of other countries
makes a case stand on shaky ground but this judgement shows courts
are aware of other countries laws and willing to hear them in areas
which are left grey in our acts.Reply2. SurajAugust 21, 2013 at
8:05 PMthe article is a milestone for the common man of India who
very often faces vexatious and frivolous cases.........Thanks a lot
for sharing this article.....Thanks a lotReply3. Rajan
KarunakaranAugust 24, 2013 at 1:15 PMFinality of Judgment is
subject to the fact the it is not based on fraud committed before
the Court.In the case reported (2007 )4 Supreme Court cases page No
221(A.V Papayya Shastry and others ...Appellants V/s Government of
A.P and others it was held that any order , Judgement obtained by
committing fraud on the court is illegal ,null and void and not
binding on the court.What about finality of such Judgments, orders?
Rajan Karunakaran Advocate , [email protected]. Wedding
gardens in IndoreJanuary 9, 2014 at 5:45 PMI enjoyed reading you
post. I am sharing it with my other friends as the information is
really very useful. Keep sharing your excellent work.ReplyNewer
PostOlder PostHomeSubscribe to:Post Comments (Atom)
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