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SESSION 1
I. CONCEPT OF PUBLIC OFFICE
1. LAUREL v DESIERTO FACTS During the Aquino administration, an
Administrative Order was issued for the formation of a committee
that would be in charge of the Centennial celebrations. This was
reconstituted during the Ramos administration and was dubbed as the
National Centennial Commission. It was to be chaired by Salvador
Laurel and was described to be an ad-hoc commission, to be
dissolved upon the completion of the centennial celebrations.
Consequently, EXPOCORP was incorporated, wherein Laurel was one of
the directors/incorporators. On a later date, Coseteng delivered a
privileged speech in the Senate alleging anomalies connected with
the Centennial celebrations. This was followed by an investigation
by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Saguisag commission formed by
President Estrada. Both recommended the further investigation and
possible prosecution of Laurel. This led to an investigation by the
Ombudsman who filed a complaint later on against Laurel. Now,
Laurel questions the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, contending that
he is not to be considered a public officer. HELD The Ombudsman has
the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance, and
non-feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or
of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. A public office is the
right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which,
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion
of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a
public officer. The appointment of a portion of sovereign function
is the most important characteristic in determining whether a
position is a public office or not. The NCC performs executive
functions. The executive power is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the
laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
The executive function therefore, concerns the implementation of
the policies set forth by law. In relation to the Administrative
Order and Executive Order creating the commission, the policies and
objectives for its creation was set forth. It was not only
primarily for the coordinated planning for a centennial celebration
but also for the furtherance of arts and culture as well as
enrichment of national economic development. Clearly, the NCC
performs sovereign functions and its Chair is a public officer.
2. MATHAY JR. v CA FACTS During his administration, Simon
appointed the three private respondents for the Civil Service Units
pursuant to a Presidential Decree creating such units. It was later
held in an opinion of the Ministry of Justice that the PD wasnt
published in the Official Gazette and therefore, didnt become a
proper law. Pursuant to this, the CSC issued an order for the
revocation of same appointments. The then mayor Simon remedied this
by issuing an ordinance calling for the automatic absorption of the
appointees to the created Department of Public Order and Safety.
The said department didnt quite reach fruition due to insufficiency
of funds and lack of regular and permanent positions to be filled.
The mayor then issued contractual appointments, which was carried
over by the next mayor Mathay. But at the expiration of the said
contractual appointments, it was no longer approved, prompting the
private respondents to file a complaint with the CSC. The CSC
ordered Mathay to reinstate the private respondents pursuant to the
previous ordinance issued. HELD The CSC has no authority to direct
the mayor to reinstate the private respondents. Applying the old
LGC, the CSC erred in applying the provisions of the ordinance in
ordering the mayor to reinstate the private respondents. The
questioned ordinance ordered the absorption of the personnel of the
defunct CSU into the new DPOS. The ordinance refers to personnel
and not to positions. Hence, the city council is in effect through
the ordinance dictating who shall occupy the newly created DPOS
positions. However, a review of the old Local Government Code shows
that the power to appoint rests exclusively with the local chief
executive and thus cannot be usurped by the city council through a
simple expedient of enacting an ordinance that provides for the
absorption of specific persons to certain positions. In upholding
the provisions of the ordinance on the automatic absorption of the
personnel without allowance for the exercise of discretion on the
part of the mayor, the CA in turn makes the sweeping statement that
the doctrine of separation of powers doesnt apply to local
governments, which is wrong. The powers of the city council and the
mayor are expressly enumerated separately and delineated in the old
LGC. The power to appoint belongs to the city mayor while the power
to create,
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consolidate, and reorganize city officers and positions
supported by local funds belongs to the city council. By ordering
the mayor to reinstate private respondents, the CSC substituted its
own judgment to the appointing power of the mayor. This cannot be
done. The CSCs power is limited to approving or disapproving an
appointment. It doesnt have the authority to direct that an
appointment of a specific individual be made.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
1. FARINAS v THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FACTS A petition was filed
seeking the Court to declare unconstitutional Section 14 of RA 9006
or The Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections Through Fair Election Practices as
it repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code mandating the
ipso jure resignation from public office of one who filed his
certificate of candidacy, except for President and Vice-President.
It is the petitioners contention that the repeal of Section 67 is a
rider on the said law, the same embracing more than one subject,
inconsistent to what the constitution mandates. Further, it
violated the equal protection clause since the said law didnt
repeal provision relating to appointive officials. Appointive
officials would still be considered ipso jure resigned upon filing
of their respective certificates of candidacy. HELD Section 14 is
not a rider. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they are
holding, to the other provisions of the contested law, which deal
with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election
propaganda, doesnt violate the one subject- one title rule. The
Court has held that an act having a single general subject,
indicated in its title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and they may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general subject. The repeal of
Section 67 is not violative of the equal protection clause. Equal
protection is not absolute especially if the classification is
reasonable. There is reasonable classification between an elective
official and an appointive one. The former occupy their office by
virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an
office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon
stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office
in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure
while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction is that by law, appointed officials
are prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity or take
part in any election except to vote.
2. NICOLAS-LEWIS v COMELEC FACTS Petitioners were successful
applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225,
which accords to such applicants the right to suffrage, among
others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections,
petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas
absentee voter" only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the
United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of
Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to
vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year
residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same
letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to
discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the
residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely
certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future
elections. However, the COMELEC denied petition of the petitioners
on the ground that to exercise absentee voting; the one-year
residency requirement should be fulfilled. HELD RA 9189 provides a
list of those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting
mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting
Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country
opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule. Section
5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or
permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country"
because immigration or permanent residence in another country
implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident
abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an
affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in
pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and
2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law" must be entitled to
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exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish
a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical
residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the
framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a
system for absentee voting. After what appears to be a successful
application for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A.
9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political rights,
specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law
- R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and
physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise
their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit
acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants
under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted
an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that
R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all
overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted
of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to
vote. It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional
Commission that [it] intended to enfranchise as much as possible
all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile
of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young
Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of
origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters
for the first time. Considering the unison intent of the
Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that
law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is
that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the
absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189
defines the terms adverted to in the following wise: "Absentee
Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the
Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote; "Overseas Absentee
Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to
register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by
law, who is abroad on the day of elections
3. KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION ET AL v ERMITA FACTS Petitioner filed a
petition to set aside the appointment of Gregory Ong as Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleged that Ong is not a
natural-born citizen and thus, is disqualified to become a member
of the Supreme Court. Respondent Ermita, on the other hand,
contended that Ong was appointed from a list of candidates given by
the JBC and they have referred the matter back to the latter for
the determination of the issue regarding Ongs citizenship.
Respondent Ong contended that he is truly a natural-born citizen,
following a series of changes in nationalities and whatnot with
respect to his ancestors. He also contended that the petitioner has
no standing to file the said petition. HELD First, on the issue of
standing, the petitioners have standing as the issue involved is of
utmost importancethe citizenship of a person to be appointed as a
member of the Supreme Court. Second, on the principal issue of the
case, the Court took judicial notice of Ongs petition to be
admitted to the Philippine Bar. In his petition to be admitted to
the Philippine bar, respondent alleged that he is qualified to be
admitted because among others he is a Filipino citizen, and that he
became a citizen because his father became a naturalized Filipino
citizen and being a minor then, thus he too became a Filipino
citizen. As part of his evidence, he submitted his birth
certificate and the naturalization papers of his father. It was on
basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted evidence of
no less than Ong that the Court allowed him to take his oath as a
lawyer. It is clear therefore, that from the records of this Court,
Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration
and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court
stating that Ong and his mother were naturalized along with his
father. Furthermore, as the petitioner correctly submitted, no
substantial change in an entry in the civil register can be made
without a judicial order. Change in the citizenship status is a
substantial change. The long string of events that Ong alleged
leading to him being a natural-born citizen, all entail factual
assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial
proceedings. NOTE: In this case, there has been no ouster from an
appointment. There may be approval of the appointment but it lacks
other acts that will complete the appointment. The last act in an
appointment is the delivery of the commission. It is now up to the
appointeehe must accept the appointment, take an oath of office,
assume office, etc. It doesnt end here. The CSC can either reject
or approve of the appointment. When the appointee doesnt pursue all
the acts to assume office, the question is whether or not he can be
held liable. The law doesnt provide really that there is a period
to accept or reject an appointment.
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III. DE FACTO AND DE JURE OFFICERS
1. TORNALI v CSC FACTS Tornali was appointed as Department
Management Officer II by the then Executive Director of the Office
of Muslim Affairs. She assumed her duties four months after and
during this time, the records of her appointment werent transmitted
to the CSC for approval. Given that her appointment was incomplete,
upon the entrance of a new Executive Director, her appointment was
revoked and she was replaced by Lucma. This prompted Tornali to
question the validity of Lucmas appointment when she was already
appointed to the position. She protested this but her protests were
dismissed. HELD An appointment to a position in the civil service
is required to be submitted to the CSC for approval in order to
determine, in main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to
hold the position and whether or not the rules pertinent to the
process of appointment are followed. Compliance with the legal
requirements for an appointment to a civil service position is
essential in order to make it fully effective. Without the
favorable certification or approval of the Commission, in cases
when such approval is required, no title to the office canyet be
deemed to be permanently vested in favor of the appointee, and the
appointment can still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing
authority. Until an appointment has become a completed act, it
would likewise be precipitate to invoke the rule on security of
tenure. It was well within the authority and discretion of the new
OMA Director, therefore, to appoint private respondent, and such
prerogative could not be questioned even on a showing that
petitioner might have been better qualified for the position. The
rule has always been that an appointment is essentially a
discretionary act, performed by an officer in whom it is vested
according to his best judgment, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess all the qualifications required therefor.
There is nothing on record to convince us that the new OMA Director
has unjustly favored private respondent nor has exercised his power
of appointment in an arbitrary, whimsical or despotic manner.
2. MALALUAN v COMELEC FACTS Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private
respondent Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the
Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synchronized
National and Local Elections held on 1992. Private respondent
Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for having garnered 10,498
votes as against petitioners 9,792 votes. Evangelista was, thus,
said to have a winning margin of 706 votes. But, on May 22, 1992,
petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court
contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said
municipality. The trial court declared petitioner as the duly
elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato with a
plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the court found
private respondent liable not only for Malaluans protest expenses
but also for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On
February 3, 1994, private respondent appealed the trial court
decision to the COMELEC. Just a day thereafter that is, on February
4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal.
The motion was granted by the trial court, in an order, dated March
8, 1994, after petitioner posted a bond in the amount of
P500,000.00. By virtue of said order, petitioner assumed the office
of MunicipaJ Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and exercised the
powers and functions of said office. Such exercise was not for
long, though. In the herein assailed decision adverse to Malaluans
continued governance of the Municipality of Kidapawan, North
Cotabato, the First Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) ordered Malaluan to vacate the office, said division
having found and so declared private respondent to be the duly
elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. The COMELEC en banc
affirmed said decision. Malaluan filed this petition before us on
May 31, 1995 as a consequence. It is significant to note that the
term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992
elections expired on June 30, 1995. Indeed, this petition appears
now to be moot and academic because the herein parties are
contesting an elective post to which their right to the office no
longer exists. However, the question as to damages remains ripe for
adjudication. The COMELEC found petitioner liable for attorneys
fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, and unearned salary and
other emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995, en musse
denominated as actual damages, default in payment by petitioner of
which shall result in the collection of said amount from the bond
posted by petitioner on the occasion of the grant of his motion for
execution pending appeal in the trial court. Petitioner naturally
contests the propriety and legality of this award upon private
respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged
and proved during trial. HELD We have painstakingly gone over the
records of this case and we can attribute to petitioner no breach
of contract or quasi-
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contract; or tortious act nor crime that may make him liable for
actual damages. Neither has private respondent been able to point
out to a specific provision of law authorizing a money claim for
election protest expenses against the losing party. COMELECs
reasoning in awarding the damages in question is fatally flawed.
The COMELEC found the election protest filed by the petitioner to
be clearly unfounded because its own appreciation of the contested
ballots yielded results contrary to those of the trial court.
Assuming that this is a reasonable observation not without basis,
it is nonetheless fallacious to conclude a malicious intention on
the part of petitioner to molest private respondent on the basis of
what respondent COMELEC perceived as an erroneous ruling of the
trial court. In other words, the actuations of the trial court,
after the filing of a case before it, are its own, and any alleged
error on its part does not, in the absence of clear proof, make the
suit clearly unfounded for which the complainant ought to be
penalized. Insofar as the award of protest expenses and attorneys
fees are concerned, therefore we find them to have been awarded by
respondent COMELEC without basis, the election protest not having
been a clearly unfounded one under the aforementioned
circumstances. Finally, we deem the award of salaries and other
emoluments to be improper and lacking legal sanction. COMELEC
sweepingly concluded, in justifying the award of damages, that
since petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections only by
the trial court and assumed the functions of the office on the
strength merely of an order granting execution pending appeal, the
petitioner occupied the position in an illegal manner as a usurper.
Petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who
undertakes to act officially without any color of right, the
petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color
of election thereto. It matters not that it was the trial court and
not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because
both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power
to so proclaim winners in electoral contests. At the risk of
sounding repetitive, if only to emphasize this point, we must
reiterate that the decision of a judicial body is no less a basis
than the proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened Board of
Canvassers for a winning candidates right to assume office, for
both are undisputedly legally sanctioned. We deem petitioner,
therefore, to be a de facto officer who, in good faith, has haa
possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining
thereto and is thus legally entitled to the emoluments of the
office.
3. PEOPLE v GARCIA FACTS Garcia was convicted for illegal
possession of marijuana and was sentenced to death by Judge Guzman.
The judgment was promulgated on the 20th of February. On April of
the same year, the judge filed for disability retirement and such
was approved. Its effectivity was then made retroactive to the 16th
of February. Here now comes the accused assailing the judgment
against him, given that Judge Guzman had no longer authority to
promulgate judgment given the retroactivity of his judgment. HELD
Accuseds contention is without merit. Undisputably, a decision
promulgated after the retirement of the judge who signed it is null
and void. Under the Rules on Criminal Procedure, a decision is
valid and binding only if penned and promulgated by the judge
during his incumbency. To be precise, a judgment has legal effect
only when it is rendered: (a) by a court legally constituted and in
the actual exercise of judicial powers, and (b) by a judge legally
appointed, duly qualified and actually acting either de jure or de
facto A judge de jure is one who exercises the office of a judge as
a matter of right, fully invested with all the powers and functions
conceded to him under the law. A judge de facto is one who
exercises the office of judge under some color of right. He has the
reputation of the officer he assumes to be, yet he has some defect
in his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time.
In the case at bar, the decision under review was validly
promulgated. Although the effectivity of Judge de Guzman, Jr.'s
disability retirement was made retroactive to February 16, 1996, it
cannot be denied that at the time his subject decision was
promulgated on February 20, 1996, he was still the incumbent judge
of the RTC, Branch LX of Baguio City, and has in fact continued to
hold said office and act as judge thereof until his application for
retirement was approved in June 1996. Thus, as of February 20, 1996
when the decision convicting appellant was promulgated, Judge de
Guzman, Jr. was actually discharging his duties as a de facto
judge. In fact, as of that time, he has yet to file his application
for disability retirement. To be sure, as early as 1918, we laid
down the principle that where the term of the judge has terminated
and he has ceased to act as judge, his subsequent acts in
attempting to dispose of business he left unfinished before the
expiration of his term are void. However, in the present case, as
Judge de Guzman, Jr. was a de facto judge in the actual exercise of
his office at the time the decision under review was promulgated on
February 20, 1996, said decision is legal and has a valid and
binding effect on appellant.
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SESSION 2 IV. CIVIL SERVICE
1. ANDAYA V. RTC FACTS There was a vacancy in the position of
chief of police in Cebu. The regional director of the Cebu police
Andaya submitted a list of 5 eligible appointees to the position to
the mayor of Cebu. However, the mayor refused to appoint one
because he wanted a certain Sarmiento, who was not on the list due
to being disqualified. RTC ruled in favor of the mayor, granting
the appointment of Sarmiento. ISSUE W/N the mayor can require the
Regional Director to include the mayors protg in the list HELD NO.
The mayor has only the power to choose from the list. It its the
prerogative of the regional director of the police to choose the
eligible person who should be included in the list without
intervention from local executives - based on the National Police
Commission (NPC) memorandum, which provides the qualifications of a
chief of police. In case of disagreement, the issue should be
elevated to the regional director of the NPC who shall resolve the
issue within 5 working days. The authority of the mayor is limited,
no power to appoint but basically power to choose from the list.
The purpose is to enhance professionalism and isolate police
service from political domination
2. JAVIER V. REYES FACTS Javier was appointed chief of police in
Malolos by Mayor Aldaba. He already took oath and discharged his
functions as chief of police. However, the municipal mayor was
assumed by Reyes, who recalled his appointed. Reyes even illegally
ousted Javier and replaced him with Clements. Javier took this up
in CSC. It appears that there were already 2 appointments for the
chief of police Javier and Bernardo. The CSC ruled that Javier
should be the one appointed, as Bernardo was not confirmed by the
counsel of Malolos. But Reyes still refused to instill Javier in
the position. ISSUE W/N Javier should prevail as chief of police
HELD YES. Javier should be chief of police. He already took oath
and performed the functions of his office. This amounts to
acceptance by Javier. Javier acted immediately when his position
was taken and filed a mandamus suit, this also amounts to
acceptance. On the other hand, Bernardo never assumed office. He
did not even contested Javiers right to the position. His motion to
intervene in court was way too late. It seems that there was no
acceptance of appointment for his part. Acceptance is important in
appointments. It is what makes the appointments complete.
3. DOCENA V. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF EASTERN SAMAR FACTS The
case arose when Luis B. Capito, who had been elected to and was
serving as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern
Samar (SPES) died in office and petitioner Agustin B. Docena was
appointed to succeed him. The appointment was issued on November
19, 1990, by Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local
Government. Docena took his oath of office before Speaker Ramon V.
Mitra of the House of Representatives on November 22, 1990, and
assumed office as member of the SPES on November 26, 1990. On
November 27, 1990, private respondent Socrates B. Alar was
appointed, also by Secretary Luis T. Santos, to the position
already occupied by Docena. On December 18, 990, the SPES passed
Resolution No. 75 recognizing Alar rather than Docena as the
legitimate successor of the late Board Member Capito. The following
day, the SPES was reversed by Secretary Santos. On January 8, 1991,
SPES passed a resolution reiterating the appointment of Alar and
declaring void the recall issued by Secretary Santos. Docena filed
a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents (SPES) to
recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar.
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ISSUE W/N Docenas appointment was already complete? HELD YES.
The said appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact
already assumed office as member of the SPES as per certification
of the Provincial Secretary. For all legal intents and purposes,
the petitioner's appointment had already become complete and
enforceable at the time it was supposed to have been "superseded"
by the appointment in favor of Alar. Docena's appointment having
been issued and accepted earlier, and the petitioner having already
assumed office, he could not thereafter be just recalled and
replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was permanent in
nature, and for the unexpired portion of the deceased predecessor's
term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the
position and could be removed therefrom only for any of the causes,
and conformably to the procedure, prescribed by the Local
Government Code. These requirements could not be circumvented by
the simple process of recalling his appointment.
4. FABELLA V. CA FACTS On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary
Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers
who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates
during the period of September to October 1990. The mass action had
been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and
passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary
Carino filed administrative cases against respondents, who are
teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required
respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished
for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil
service laws. Administrative hearings started on December 1990.
Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the
proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they were
not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the
investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the
investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove
their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally
constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action
assailing the validity of the administrative proceedings, the
investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents
guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal. ISSUE W/N private
respondents were denied due process? HELD YES. In administrative
proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the
following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the
institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's
favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well
as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected.
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers
administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section
9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachers' administrative cases should be composed of the
school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative
of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers'
organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present case,
the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative
charges against private respondents did not include "a
representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teacher's organization" as required by
Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to
have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by
them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for
the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion
of a representative of a teachers' organization in these committees
was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the
right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of
procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of
notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
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Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was
complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City
Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers
in their respective teachers' organizations does not ipso facto
make them authorized representatives of such organizations as
contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the
teachers' organization possesses the right to indicate its choice
of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating
committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the
secretary of education or the director of public schools or their
underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of
the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating
committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers'
organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA
4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent
general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is
an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize
them.
5. MIRALLES VS GO
FACTS This case is about a Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the
SAC-Napolcom finding Miralles administratively liavble for grave
misconduct and ordering his dismissal. On Dec. 7, 1977 an
administrative complaint was filed against Miralles, alleging that
Miralles committed grave misconduct by wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, without any just motive, and with the intent to kill
assaulted Pat. Ressurrecion by use of firearms, which directly
caused the death of Pat. Resurrecion and Merculio. After the
investigation it was recommended that Miralles be dismissed from
service, the decision was appealed by Miralles to the Adjudication
Board, which was denied. The petitioner then appealed to the
Special Appellate Committee of NAPOLCOM. The appeal was also
dismissed at this point., subsequently the issue was appealed to
the CA, and the CA ruled that the action of Miralles was pre-mature
and it should have filed its action before the Civil Service
Commission. Despite this procedural error, the CA went on to decide
on the case and it affirmed the decision of the lower courts.
ISSUES
1. W/N CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter. 2. W/N the
dismissal of the petition can be sustained by the evidence
presented/used. 3. W/N the petitioner sufficiently establish his
alibi of self-defense.
HELD The Court ruled that Miralles should have filed his appeal
in the Civil Service Commission first, pursuant to RA 6975. The
court found that the contention of Miralles is untenable, he argued
that the decision was promulgated in 1989, years before the
implementation of RA 6975, therefore he should be not be covered by
the said RA. However the Court said that, it is true that the
decision was promulgated on 1989, however Miralles only received
such copy of the decision sometime in 1991, and by then the RA was
already implemented, therefore Miralles should have filed its
action before the CSC. The Court went on and say that the right to
appeal is a statutory right, therefore one who seeks to avail the
right, must comply with the statute or the rile in effect when the
right arose, in this case the right arose or vested when the notice
was delvered to Miralles, therefore Miralles should have complied
with the new rule. Lastly the Court went on to say that the issues
is moot and academic. Regarding the evidence used against Miralles,
according to him it was all hearsays which should not be
entertained by the Court, Miralles alleged that the evidence did
not properly identified the persons who executed them, hence such
becomes inadmissible. The Court however has a different opinion, it
states the except exhibits B and C, the rest of the documents are
public documents, hence they are prima facie evidence. Furthermore
the contention of Miralles that the testimony of Lamsen was
recanted by Lamsen in a cross-examination, the court by searching
the record proved that there was no recantation by Lamsen during
the cross examination. In fact the said recantation was actually a
statement made by Lamsen as a witness for the defense, in which
Lamsen was never cross-examined, making his defense testimony
inadmissible. Lastly, the Court found that the facts of the case
has been consistently the same under the lower court and
committees, it ruled that the Supreme Court respects the integrity
of the facts finding of the lower court, and according to such
Miralles failed to establish his defense of self-defense
sufficiently. With all things considered the Court affirmed the
decision of the CA.
6. LARIN VS. EXECUTVE SECRETARY
FACTS Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and he also appears to be a
co-accused in two criminal cases for violating Section 268(4) of
the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 of R.A. 3019.
Subsequently petitioner was convicted and this was reported to the
President, the then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary
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by the authority of the president issued Memo order 164 creating
an executive committee to investigate the administrative charges.
The committee required that petitioner filed a position paper with
regard to the charges against him, the petitioner complied, and
however his statement was that he cannot comment on the merits of
the case for fear of being cited in contempt by the court.
Petitioner also alleged that the committee doesnt have any
jurisdiction over his person, that the case cannot be validly filed
without violating res judicata, his rights against double jeopardy
and lastly to proceed with the investigation would be redundant and
oppressive against him. While all this is pending, the president
issued an order for the streamlining of BIR, in which case the
office of the petitioner was abolished by the order. His office
being abolished, the petitioner was not reinstated as an assistant
commissioner of BIR, instead another Administrative order was
issued in which it stated that he is being dismissed for being
guilty of grave misconduct in connection to the criminal cases
filed against him. ISSUES:
1. W/N the dismissal of the petitioner was valid or not. a. Who
has the power to discipline the petitioner b. Was due process
observed c. What is the effect of the petitioners acquittal in the
criminal case d. Does the president have the power to reorganize
BIR e. Was the reorganization done in bad faith.
HELD The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls
under the category of Career Executive Service, which is appointed
by the president and being a presidential appointee, it follows
that the president have the power to discipline the petitioner.
Despite the fact that the constitution grants the president the
power to appoint and the inherent power to remove, such power is
not without limit. Under the Administrative code of 1987, career
services are characterized to have security of tenure, therefore
the petitioner is protected from being wilfully removed by the
president, the only way that the petitioner can be validly removed
is for a valid cause and in accordance with the procedural due
process. According to the Court it found that, although the
procedural due process was followed and complied with the
petitioner was not removed for a valid cause, since to start with
the committee was created to investigate the administrative aspect
of the criminal cases being faced by the petitioner at that time.
Now taking into consideration that the petitioner was acquitted
from the criminal cases, the court believes that there is no ground
for the administrative case to continue. It is admitted that
criminal cases and administrative cases usually progress
independently, however in this case it was proven in the criminal
case that the petitioner never committed any of the alleged acts,
therefore the case for the administrative case was also terminated,
and therefore there is no longer any valid cause for the removal of
the petitioner. As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized
the BIR, the court ruled that the president has the authority to do
so, as seen in the preamble of the E.O. which stated the legal
basis of its issuance. Though it is admitted that the president had
the power to reorganize the BIR, the court stated that such power
is not limitless, the reorganization to be valid must be done in
good faith. In the instant case the court found that the
reorganization was done in bad faith or at least there are
indications of bad faith, such as when the E.O. abolished the
intelligence and investigation office and at the same time creating
Intelligence and Investigation service to do the same functions of
the abolished office. Most importantly is the non reappointment of
the petitioner, the petitioner being a holder of a career service,
should have been prioritized or preferred in appointing people to
new offices created by the reorganization, but in this case the
petitioner was never reappointed instead he was dismissed from
service without any separation benefits at all. The court ruled
that the petitioner is reinstated as an assistant commissioner and
is entitled to backwages.
7. MACALINCAG V. CHANG
FACTS Roberto E. Chang, acting municipal treasurer of Makati,
was charged administratively by Lorinda Carlos and Victor
Macalincag, acting Finance Secretary, for illegal disbursements as
well as failure to remit collections to the Bureau of Treasury.
Included in the charge was on Order of Preventive Suspension for
dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. Macalincag sent a letter to the Governor
of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) seeking the implementation of
the preventive suspension. The Officer-in-Charge of the MMC
furnished Chang a copy of the order through ordinary mail dated
October 6, 1989. Chang, on the other hand, filed a petition for
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction and in the
meantime, the RTC temporarily restrained Carlos and Macalincag from
implementing the said order. Upon examination of the pleadings, the
RTC denied Changs petition. Chang filed a motion for
reconsideration, citing a new argument by invoking Sec. 8 of EO No.
932 which created the Metro Manila Authority and thereby
transferred the power to suspend from the Secretary of Finance to
the President of the Republic of the Philippines. The RTC
reconsidered and set aside the previous ruling, this time, ruled in
favor of Chang.
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Macalincag argues that the order took effect upon the receipt of
Chang, which was on October 6, 1989, before the effectivity of EO
No.392. On the other hand, Chang argues that the preventive
suspension would only be implemented upon the happening of 2
conditions, 1) service of a copy of the order to the respondent and
2) designation of replacement. It is the latters argument which
trial court curried favor on. ISSUE W/N the Secretary of Finance
has jurisdiction to issue an Order of Preventive Suspension against
Chang? HELD YES. The Supreme Court held that the trial courts
ruling is untenable given that the designation of a replacement is
not required in implementing preventive suspension. The Order of
Preventive Suspension took effect upon the receipt of Chang, hence,
the applicability of EO No., 392 would be immaterial. The Office of
the Municipal Treasurer is under the Department of Finance, hence,
Macalincag has the power to suspend Chang. Assuming arguendo that
EO No. 932 was applicable, one only has to bring in my mind that
department secretaries are alter egos of the President, making it
still within the authority of the Macalincag as Secretary of
Finance to preventively suspend Chang.
8. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. JUDGE MATAS AND EDUARDO
TORRES
FACTS Judge Jesus Matas and Eduardo Torres, the OIC Clerk of
Court, were accused of violating RA 3019 which caused then Deputy
Court Administrator Ernani Cruz Pano to recommend that the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) to file administrative charges
against the two but said charges will be suspended pending the out
come of the criminal case. The complaint alleged that Judge Matas
and Torres, in connivance with one George Mercado, concealed from
J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises his knowledge of the
petition for issuance of new owners duplicate copies as well as
taking cognizance of the case which was allegedly outside of the
jurisdiction of his court, the land being in Kapalong, Davao.
Notwithstanding that the land in question was owned by J.K. Mercado
and Sons, Judge Matas still ordered the posing of the order and
ultimately issued instructed the Register of Deeds for the issuance
a new owners duplicate to George Mercado. Justice Imperial was
tasked with the investigations. Hearing with the OCA commence but
after presenting two witnesses, it moved for suspension of the
proceedings to amend the complaint adding the grounds of gross
inexcusable negligence and gross ignorance of the law as well as
modifying other portions of the complaint. The complaint alleged
that Judge Matas and Torres acted with bad faith and partiality in
ruling in favour of George Mercado. ISSUE 1. W/N Judge Matas acted
without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case? 2. W/N Judge
Matas acted with gross inexcusable negligence and gross ignorance
of the law in ruling in favor of George Mercado? HELD 1. NO. The
subject parcel of land was well within the jurisdiction of the
court of Judge Matas. The so-called municipality of Sto Tomas in
Davao never legally existed because it was created only by then
President Carlos P. Garcia and not by Congress. The land was
actually part of Kapalong which is within the coverage of Branch 1
of the RTC of Davao del Norte where Judge Matas sits. It was a mere
impropriety of venue which may be waived by the parties. 2. NO.
There was no gross inexcusable negligence and gross ignorance of
the law given that Judge Matas actually ordered the required
posting to give notice. Also, he only ordered the RD to issue a
duplicate of copy existing in record of the Registry and not issue
new ones in the name of George Mercado. SIDE ISSUE WHICH SEEM TO BE
RELATED TO ADMIN LAW: The SC said that the investigating Justice or
Judge designated by the Court to Conduct an investigation, submit a
report, and make the appropriate recommendation does not have an
authority to grant or deny a motion to dismiss the case. Also, the
initial recommendation of the Court Administrator regarding the
suspension of the administrative proceedings pending the criminal
case is inappropriate since administrative cases must be resolved
as expeditiously as possible. There are different quantum of
evidence, procedure to be followed and sanctions imposed, hence,
the finding of one shouldnt be necessarily binding on the
other.
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9. SANDOVAL V MANALO
FACTS On or about 12am of May, inside his house in
Coron-Province,Palawan, Jermaine Echague shot Alexander Sandoval
(hitting the right part of his nose bridge) using an unlicensed 38
caliber revolver, Smith Wesson, without serial number, snub nose
(paltik.) The latter died. Thereafter, Echague, in order to hide
the body, removed the body of the victim, tied it up with an empty
oxygen tank and threw it into the sea. Antonio Sandoval filed a
criminal complaint for murder with the MCTC of Palawan against
Echague for killing his son. Judge Manalo issued a warrant for the
arrest of Echague and recommended no bail. Since Echague did not
file the required counter-affidavits and evidence to support his
case, the judge issued an order declaring that Echague had waived
his right to a preliminary investigation and finding a prima facie
against him. He forwarded the case to the Provincial Prosecutor for
appropriate action. Chief of Police also filed against Echague a
criminal case for illegal possession of firearms (paltik used) and
on the same date, Manalo issued a warrant of arrest for Echague. It
seemed however that Echague could not be found nor located. The
victims father, Antonio Sandoval, filed a complaint against the
presiding judge (Manalo.) The complaint charges the judge with
ignorance of law, dereliction of duty and grave abuse of authority
for hastily lifting the warrant of arrest previously issued without
giving the prosecution reasonable time to file any pleading
regarding the motion. Judge Manalo contends that he only lifted the
warrant of arrest based on humanitarian considerations. (Echague
was only 18 years old; he voluntarily surrendered; his counsel
attested that releasing him would not frustrated the ends of
justice.) He also contends that as an investigating judge, he had
the power to exercise his discretion in issuing warrants in cases
during preliminary investigation. Subsequently, Antonio Sandoval
filed a desistance to the administrative complaint against the
judge stating that he is satisfied with the outcome of the criminal
case. He also stated that he didnt know that what his counsel let
him sign was a complaint against a judge. He thought that it was
just an affidavit to be filed in court in order that the accused
would be put back to prison. He did not know that it was a
complaint against the judge since it was written in English.
ISSUE W/N the acts of Judge Manalo renders him liable regardless
of the desistance of Sandoval HELD YES. Desistance of Sandoval does
not affect the truth and integrity of the affidavit-complaint
against Judge Manalo. Judge Manalo did not even dispute the facts
alleged therein. Disciplinary actions against public officers and
employees do not involve purely private or personal matters. They
are impressed with public interest by virtue of a public trust
character of the public office. Administrative actions are not
therefore made to depend upon the will of every complainant who
may, for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. A mere
reprimand is not enough since Manalo did not commit a mere error of
judgment but has disregarded the laws and rules governing
preliminary investigation of criminal cases cognizable by the RTC.
Having thus determined a prima facie case for murder against
Echague, Judge Manalo has no legal justification toe release the
accused on a mere plea of the latter as the provision that it will
not frustrate the ends of justice no longer applies after the
conclusion of his preliminary investigation. Judge Manalo
deliberately set aside the aforementioned laws and rules on
preliminary investigation to accommodate the accused making him
liable for misconduct or grave abuse of authority or dereliction of
duty. He was fined and warned.
10. GREGO V COMELEC FACTS Basco was removed from his position as
Deputy Sheriff by the SC upon finding of serious misconduct, for
the second time, in an administrative complaint lodged by Nena
Tordesillas. His retirement benefits were forfeited and the
decision of the court included this statement: with prejudice to
reinstatement to any position in the national or local government,
including its agencies and instrumentalities or GOCCs. In 1988, he
ran as a candidate for Councilor in Manila and won.
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He sought re-election in 1992 and won again. However, his
victory was contested. Another candidate alleged his ineligibility
to be elected on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. This was
dismissed. Basco, for the third time, ran again for councilor in
1995. His right to office was contested by Grego who filed a
petition for disqualification against Basco and prayed for the
suspension of Bascos proclamation and Maranans declaration as the
citys 6th duly elected councilor. The COMELEC conducted a hearing
of the case. Before the parties were able to submit their
respective memoranda, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as a
duly elected councilor for the Second District of Manila (6th
place.) Due to the said proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion
seeking to annul what he considered to be an illegal and hasty
proclamation. COMELECs first division dismissed the petion for
disqualification ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by
the SC on Basco was wiped away and condoned by the electorate which
elected him. COMELEC en banc dismissed Gregos MR. ISSUE W/N the
Tordesillas decision barred Basco from running for any elective
position. HELD NO. Under the former Civil Service Decree, the law
applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was
administratively dismissed from office, the term reinstatement had
a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position.
Reinstatement is the reappointment of a person who was previously
separated from the service through no delinquency or misconduct on
his part from a position in the career service to which he was
permanently appointed, to a position for which he is qualified. In
light of this definition, there is no basis for holding that Basco
is likewise barred from running for an elective position inasmuch
as what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is
reinstatement to an appointive position.
11. CSC V. DACOYCOY
FACTS Pedro O Dacoycoy was charged of nepotism on two counts as
a result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy,
as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment
under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational
School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. The
Recommendation was made by Mr. Daclag, who was under the
supervision of Respondent Dacoycoy. ISSUE
1) W/N Respondent Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism? 2) W/N the
Civil Service Commission is the property party to appeal the
suit.
HELD 1) YES. Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of
nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within
the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the
following: a) appointing authority; b) recommending authority; c)
chief of the bureau or office; and d) person exercising immediate
supervision over the appointee. (see page 435 of the case for the
exceptions: not really important in the case) To constitute a
violation of the law, it suffices that an appointment is extended
or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree f
consanguinity or affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or
the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
Undoubtedly, Respondent can be held responsible for the appointment
of his 2 sons. Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O.
Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator, He authorized Mr.
Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under
his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag recommended the
appointment of respondents two sons and placed them under his
immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the
school. 2) YES, SC said that CSC was the proper party to appeal the
suit because it was impleaded in the case and that the exoneration
of Dcoycoy by the CA seriously prejudiced the civil service system.
In this case, the SC expressly abandoned the prior rulings that an
aggrieved party refers only to government employees adversely
affected by the decision. In other words, the SC overruled prior
decisions holding that the Civil Service Law does not contemplate a
review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from
administrative charges Summary of opinions MELO, J., Dissenting and
Concurring
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PD. 807 has disallowed appeals by the government in cases of
exoneration in an administrative case. Such has not yet been
amended. The prerogative to amend such belongs to the Legislature
and not to the Judiciary through its interpretations. ROMERO, J.,
Dissenting PD. 807 included only government employees, either the
one who filed the complaint or the one charged, is considered an
aggrieved party. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. The
express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the
exclusion of all others. In this case, CSC or government
instrumentalities was not included thus they are not the proper
party to appeal the case. Also CSC exercises quasi-judicial
function and by analogy a judge should detach himself from cases
where his decision is appealed to a higher court for review. PUNO,
J., Concurring CSC may appeal the case by certiorari to determine
if there was grave abuse of discretion in exonerating the
respondent (Judicial Review.) The question at bar is basically a
legal one, i.e., the proper interpretation of who can be convicted
of nepotism, and undoubtedly, this Court has the authoritative say
on how to interpret laws.
12. BONAFE V. ZUBANO
FACTS Petitioner, a policeman of Malilipot, Albay, was suspended
by respondent Mayor Marciano Bitara because of four criminal cases
filed against him in the Municipal Court of Tabaco, Albay, to wit:
assault upon an agent (another policeman) of a person in authority
with homicide less serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence; illegal passion of firearms and alarm and scandal.
Before the cases could be tried on the merits, the prosecution
moved for their provisional dismissal on account of the desistance
of the offended parties who had been paid by petitioner. The motion
was granted by the court. Petitioner later sought a modicfication
of the provisional dismissal to an absolute dismissal, which was
also granted by the court. Petitioner then filed with the CSC a
petition for reinstatement and payment of salaries he failed to
receive during his suspension invoking Police Act of 1966 which
basically says that he is entitled to such when he is acquitted
from the criminal case ISSUE W/N petitioner is entitled to
backwages based on acquittal HELD NO. Mere dismissal of the case
will not suffice to entitle him to backwages. Dismissal does not
necessarily amount to acquittal (except in 2 cases: demurrer of
evidence and violation of speedy trial.) SC elaborated more on the
difference which Im sure you still remember from crimpro. Also the
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
judicial relief. His petition for reinstatement was pending in CSC
when this case was filed.
13. GSIS V. CIVIL SERVICE FACTS The GSIS dismissed six
government employees on account of irregularities in the canvassing
of supplies. The employees appealed to the Merit Board. Said board
found for the employees and declared the dismissal as illegal
because no hearing took place. The GSIS took the issue to the Civil
Service which then ruled that the dismissal was indeed illegal. The
CSC thereafter ordered the reinstatement of the employees and
demanded the payment of backwages. The replacements of the
dismissed employees should then be released from service. The GSIS
remained unconvinced and raised the issue to the SC. SC affirmed
the Civil Service ruling saying
o The CSC acted within its authority o Reinstatement was proper
o However, the SC modified the requirement of backpay. Said backpay
should be made after the outcome of the
disciplinary proceedings. Heirs of the dismissed employees filed
a motion for execution of the Civil Service resolution so that
backwages can be paid. GSIS however denied the motion saying that
the SC modified that part of the ruling.
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CSC nonetheless thumbed its nose to the GSIS and granted the
motion. GSIS was made to pay. Backed against the wall, GSIS filed
certiorari with the SC asking that the CSC order be nullified. The
GSIS contends that the CSC has no power to execute its judgments.
ISSUE W/N the Civil Service has the power to enforce its judgments
HELD YES. The Civil Service Commission is a consitutional
commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only
with authority to administer the civil service, but also with
quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide
administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or
brought to it on appeal. It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to
promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before
it or before any of its offices, which rules should not however
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. In light of all
the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it would
appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission the power or
authority or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or
orders. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide
cases is inutile unless accompanied by the authority to see that
what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a
tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear
and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to
include the grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments
it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides. Therefore, the
GSIS must yield to the order of the CSC
14. LAYUG v QUISUMBING FACTS Teacher Layug filed charges against
Principal Presto for harassment. In counterclaim, Principal Presto
filed charges of incompetence and undesirability against Layug.
Both locked horns like angry bulls and ultimately Layug found
himself suspended. DECS Secretary Quisumbing affirmed the
suspension. Later on, the order of suspension was lifted and Layug
was reinstated. Unfortunately, he did not receive his old job as a
teacher of English and Biology. The poor fella was kicked into the
CAT/YDT department. Layug demanded his old job as an English/Bio
teacher and Principal Presto asserted that those positions were
filled. The petition was denied, and Layug then found himself
shuffled to temporary assignment in the Guidance Office. Layug
howled again. Presto chastised him saying that if he did not
accept, he will be terminated. Layug claims that the law mandates
that he be given back his job as a Bio/English teacher since this
was his appointment. ISSUE W/N Layug has the right to teach the old
subjects HELD NO. Layugs contention, that he should be reinstated
to his former assignment as a teacher of English and Biology
subjects, has no legal basis. The law only provides that he shall
be reinstated in the service, i.e., to his position as a high
school teacher appearing in his appointment. A teacher may not be
compelled to accept, and neither may he demand to be given, an
assignment not specified in his appointment. His appointment is
that of a TEACHER. That is all he may demand. The selection of the
subjects which Layug may teach is a matter for his principal and
the DECS regional director to determine based on his qualifications
and the prevailing conditions in the school. As explained by
Presto, the English and Biology subjects which Layug used to teach
had been assigned to other teachers after Layug's suspension, and,
since changing teachers in the middle of the school year would be
prejudicial to the students. Presto rightfully assigned Layug to
teach YDT/CAT subjects instead (which he rejected). Layugs petition
is denied.
15. GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS Abad, Bandigas, Somebang
and Margallo, private respondents, are public school teachers. Some
time in September and October 1990, during the teachers strikes,
they did not report for work. For this reason they were
administratively charged with 1) grave misconduct; 2) gross
violation of Civil Service Rules; 3) gross neglect of duty; 4)
refusal to perform official duty; 5) gross insubordination; 6)
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service and; 7) AWOL.
They were placed under
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preventive suspension. Investigation ended before the lapse of
the 90 day period. Margallo was dismissed from the service. The
three others were suspended for 6 months. On appeal to the CA, the
court mitigated the punishment to reprimand only. Hence their
reinstatement. Now the reinstated teachers are asking for back
wages during the period of their suspension and pending appeal
(before the CA exonerated them). ISSUE W/N the teachers are
entitled to backwages for the period pending their appeal if they
are subsequently exonerated. HELD YES, they are entitled to full
pay pending their appeal. To justify the award of back wages, the
respondent must be exonerated from the charges and his suspension
be unjust. Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually
punitive, and it is actually considered illegal if the respondent
is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is
reversed. Hence he should be reinstated with full pay for the
period of the suspension. Section 47 (4) of the Civil Service
Decree states that the respondent shall be considered as under
preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the
event he wins. On the other hand if his conviction is affirmed the
period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of
suspension or dismissal. In the case at bar the respondents won in
their appeal, therefore the period of suspension pending their
appeal would be considered as part of the preventive suspension,
entitling them to full pay because they were eventually exonerated
and their suspension was unjustified. They are still entitled to
back salaries even if they were still reprimanded.
16. DELA CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS Petitioners are public school teachers who were
simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually
dismissed by Sec. Carino in Oct. 1990. It was alleged that the
teachers participated in the mass action/ illegal strike on Sept.
1990. The teachers also violated the return-to-work order issued by
the DECS. Respondents failed to explain to the DECS despite the 5
day period given. Hence they were found guilty as charged, and
subsequently dismissed from office by Sec. Carino of the DECS. The
Civil Service Commission, upon appeal, found the teachers guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and imposed
upon them the reduced penalty of six months suspension. However in
view of the length of time that the teachers had been out of
service due to the dismissal issued by Sec. Carino, the CSC
likewise ordered their immediate reinstatement without back wages.
ISSUE
1. W/N the teachers conducts are prejudicial to the best
interest of service. 2. W/N the teachers are entitled to back wages
for the period of 3 years pending their appeal deducting the 6
months
suspension eventually meted out to them. HELD
1. YES, the mass actions amounted to a prohibited strike of
civil service servants. Although the right to peaceably assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances is guaranteed
by the Constitution, this liberty must be exercised within
reasonable limits. The public school teachers committed acts
prejudicial to the interest of the service by staging the mass
protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and
failing to return despite the return to work order.
2. NO, they are not entitled to backwages. The teachers were
neither exonerated nor unjustifiably suspended, the 2 circumstances
necessary for the grant of backwages in administrative disciplinary
cases.
17. KENNETH NEELAND V. ILDIFONSO VILLANUEVA
FACTS Sugarland Motor Sales placed the highest bid price of
P40,000 for a motor vehicle owned by Kenneth Neeland which was the
subject of an auction sale. The Sheriff who conducted the sale
turned over the amount of the mortgage obligation to Sugarland. The
Clerk of Court, Ildifonso Villanueva (respondent) issued a
certificate of sale but failed to turn over the balance to Neeland
thus an administrative complaint was filed against the Sheriff and
the Clerk of Court. The RTC ruled that both should be dismissed for
gross misconduct. Thus the case at bar. ISSUE W/N Villanueva should
be dismissed
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HELD NO. Although the SC did affirm that Villanueva indeed was
remiss in his duties in turning over the balance of the proceeds of
the auction sale and the payment of the sheriffs commission in
court and thus should be held accountable. However, for lack of
previous derogatory record, the penalty was reduced. He was only
fined P5,000 and was warned that a repetition of the same or
similar offense would be dealt with more severely.
18. ARMANDO BERNARDO V. COURT OF APPEALS/ CSC / LBP
FACTS Armando Bernardo entered the government service as Claims
Adjuster of Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and became the Head
of the Loans and Discount Divisions. He also maintained a Savings
Account with the LBP. He deposited P500,000 in his own account and
photocopied the page reflecting this in his passbook and on the
same day withdrew the same. He then executed, as Treasurer-in-Trust
of Markay Trading and Manpower Services (MTMSI) a treasurers
certificate certifying that 25% of the authorized capital stock has
been subscribed and 25% of the subscription, which was P500,000 had
been paid and received y him. He also executed a letter-authority
to the SEC authorizing their office to examine and verify the
deposit in the LBP in his name as Treasurer-in-Trust for MTMSI. The
Articles of Incorporation of MTMSI was signed by Bernardo and he
became one of its incorporators and was elected as member in the
Board of Directors and as Treasurer. He never opened an account
with the LBP for the corporation though he was elected Treasurer
and in the meantime he was promoted Assistant Branch Manager of
LBP. Because of this, LBP filed a formal charge against Bernardo
for gross neglect, grave misconduct, and serious violation of the
CSC rules namely engaging in a private business without the
permission and authority required by the CS rules and regulations.
After the formal investigation, the hearing officer issued a
resolution finding Bernardo guilty and be meted out with the
penalty of forced resignation. The LBP approved the recommendation
which was affirmed by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MPSB).
The CSC likewise affirmed the penalty but based its findings on a
different ground, that he made use of his being an employee of LBP
to do an irregular act of depositing and withdrawing the paid up
capital without the resolution of the Board of Directors of the
Company. Bernardo filed an MR alleging that the acts used as basis
for finding his guilt was not raised in the formal charge thus
violating his right to due process and that his acts were not
violative of the CSC rules and regulations. The CA dismissed the
petition for lack of merit thus the case at bar. ISSUE W/N Bernardo
violated the CSC rules and regulations HELD YES. The evidence on
record shows that not only was he an incorporator, he was also a
member of the Board of Directors and was the treasurer of MTMSI. He
and his wife even signed vouchers of the corporation. Before he can
do this, he must first secure a permit from a competent authority
of the LBP but failed to do so. However, the SC found that the CSC
erred in finding him guilty of grounds not alleged in the formal
charges thus violating his right to be informed of the charges
against him. But it did not err in finding him guilty of grave
misconduct. The constitution enunciates the policy of promoting a
high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public
service and these are not mere rhetorical words but must be taken
as working standards and attainable goals that should be matched
with actual deeds.
19. SANTIAGO V. COMELEC
FACTS Miriam Defensor Santiago was criminally charged before the
Sandiganbayan for allegedly approving applications for legalization
of the stay of a number of aliens in the Philippines. She was
charged in relation to her position as the Commissioner of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Pursuant to the
information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena suspended Miriam from her position as Senator of the
Philippines and from any govt position she was holding for 90 days.
This is in the form of a preventive suspension pending
investigation of the case before the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE Was the
act of the Sandiganbayan valid? RULING YES. RA 3019 does not state
that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the
office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he
has been charged.
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It is also the ministerial duty of the court to issue an order
of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information
filed before it. The court reiterated that the preventive
suspension is not a penalty since if acquitted, the accused is
reinstated to his previous position plus back wages. The order of
suspension under RA 3019 is different from the power of Congress to
discipline its members under the Constitution. The constitutional
provision is a punitive measure imposed by the Senate or HOR upon
an erring member. On the other hand, R.A. 3019 does not exclude
from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive
suspension order. V. AUTHORITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
1. SICHANGCO v BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION
FACTS The Bureau of Immigration recognized Benito Sichangco (Sy
Te) as a Filipino citizen by birth in an order dated February 19,
1960. He was married to Cheng Yok Ha and had 3 childrenSi Beng, Si
Son and Si Lunaall born in China and allegedly out of their
marriage. The Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration
admitted into the Philippines these 3 minor children from Hongkong
on the basis of the finding that they were children of Sichangco, a
Filipino citizen. When the decision was submitted to the Board of
Commissioners of Immigration (BCI), it noted the decision. The
Secretary of Justice (Diokno) issued an order (Memo Order No. 9)
setting aside all decisions of the BCI, since it had not been
collectively deliberating on the cases filed before it. Thus, the
BCI reversed the previous decision and ordered the exclusion from
the Philippines of the minor children. Thus, in behalf of these
minors, Sichangco filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary
injunction before the CFI of Manila to annul the decision of the
BCI excluding these minors from the Philippines. The CFI granted
the petition. The BCI appealed. ISSUE W/N the Secretary of Justice
may validly issue Memorandum Order No. 9, setting aside all
decisions purporting to have been rendered by the BCI HELD YES. The
BCI was and still is under the supervision and control of the DOJ.
By virtue of his power of control, the Secretary of Justice can
modify, nullify or set aside the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry, as well as the act of noting of the decision by the BCI.
He can even directly exercise the powers of the chief of the bureau
or office under him pursuant to Sec. 37, Act No. 4007, which
provides that:
The provisions of the existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding whenever a specific power, authority, duty,
function, or activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office,
division, or service, the same shall be understood as also
conferred upon the proper Department head who shall have authority
to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify or
revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office,
division, or service.
Moreover, BCIs act of noting the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry was NOT a valid decision of affirmance by the BCI
in the exercise of its power of review motu proprio under the
Immigration Act of 1940. The word noted simply meant that the
members of BCI had taken cognizance of the existence of the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
2. GONZALES v RAQUIZA
FACTS In 1967, the Commissioner of Public Highways (Baltazar
Aquino) entered into 2 separate contracts for the importation of
construction equipment with Continental Ore (Phil.) Inc., which
acted as the representative of Huber Corporation (contract #1), and
as agent of Allis-Chalmers International and General Motors
Corporation (contract #2). Under Contract #1, the Philippines was
obligated to pay Huber Corporation $13.39M in the form of
irrevocable, confirmed and divisible letters of credit in favor of
Continental Ore Corporation for the purchase of road construction
equipment and spare parts. Under Contract #2, the Philippines was
obligated to pay Continental Ore Corp. $21.08M in the form of
irrevocable, confirmed, and divisible letters of credit;
Allis-Chalmers International and General Motors Corporation would
sell, transfer and convey to the Philippines road construction
equipment and spare parts under the same terms and conditions
stated in the first contract. Both of these contracts were duly
approved by Secretary Raquiza (Public Works and Communications) and
the Auditor-General. Upon application of the Bureau of Public
Highways for the establishment of letters of credit with PNB, the
latter approved such letters of credit provided that these be
secured by the guaranty of the national government to be given by
the Secretary
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of Finance and upon approval by the Office of the President.
Accordingly, the Office of the President directed the Secretary of
Finance to extend the necessary guaranty for the letters of credit
in favor of these American corporations. Gonzales, as taxpayer and
stockholder of PNB, questioned the validity of the contracts on the
ground that there was no appropriation for the payments and no
certificate of availability of funds, as required by the Revised
Administrative Code (Sec. 606, 607, 608), and for being violative
of the PNB Charter since the accommodation or loan to the
Philippines was beyond the lending capacity of the bank. ISSUE W/N
the contracts are valid HELD YES. These contracts do NOT involve
directly the expenditure of public funds but a financing scheme
under different laws. Sections 606 and 607 of the Revised
Administrative Code are without question an implementation of Art.
VI, Sec 23, Clause 2 of the 1935 Constitution (then applicable),
which provides that: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Said provision
was restated in toto in the 1975 Constitution and in the present
Constitution. The contracts do not involve an immediate payment but
a repayment over a period of several years. In a strict sense,
appropriation has been defined as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution that money may be paid
out of the Treasury, while appropriation made by law refers to the
act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular
use a certain sum to be used in the payment of debt or dues from
the State to its creditors. Thus, no money can be taken out of the
Treasury without an appropriation, which must be made only for the
amounts demandable. These contracts constitute negotiated sale on
credit where the Bureau of Public Works is not required to make
direct or immediate payment. Without abandoning the constitutional
and legal safeguards against the indiscriminate disbursements of
the public funds, the Court takes judicial notice of the
imperatives of national development that demand immediate
implementation of programs, the funding of which cannot be
appropriated simply because there are no sufficient funds.
Moreover, under RA 4680, the President is authorized to contract
indebtedness to finance economic development projects, upon such
terms and conditions as may be agreed upon for the purpose of
financing economic development purposes or projects authorized by
law, including the construction and improvement of highways and
bridges. Indeed, RA 4680 authorizes procurement on credit when
there are no available funds or appropriation.
SESSION 3
VI. INHIBITIONS
1. MACARIOLA V ASUNCION FACTS Reyes siblings filed a complaint
for partition against Macariola, concerning the properties left by
their common father, Francisco Reyes. Asuncion was the judge who
rendered the decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. A
project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion after the
finality of the decision. This project of partition was only signed
by the counsel of the parties, who assured the judge that they were
given authorization to do so. One of the properties in the project
of partition was Lot 1184, which was subdivided into 5 lots. One of
these lots (Lot 1184-D) was sold to Anota, a stenographer of the
court, while another (Lot 1184-E) was sold to Dr. Galapon, who
later on sold a portion of the same lot to Judge Asuncion and his
wife. A year after, spouses Asuncion and Dr. Galapon sold their
respective shares over the lot to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries. At the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion and his wife
were both stockholders, with Judge Asuncion as President and his
wife as secretary of said company. A year after the companys
registration with the SEC, Macariola filed a complaint against
Judge Asuncion alleging:
that he violated Art. 1491 (5) of the Civil Code in acquiring a
portion of the lot, which was one of those properties involved in
the partition case; and
that he violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce, Sec 3
(H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and
Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics by associating himself
with a private company while he was a judge of the CFI of Leyte
This case was referred to Justice Palma of the CA for
investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said
Investigating Justice recommended that Judge Asuncion should be
reprimanded or warned in connection with the complaints filed
against him.
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ISSUE 1. W/N Judge Asuncion violated Art 1491 (5) of the Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E, which
was among those properties involved in the partition case. 2.
W/N Judge Asuncion violated Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of
Commerce, Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019, Sec 12, Rule XVIII
of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics when he associated himself with Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as stockholder and a
ranking officer
HELD
1. NO. Although Art 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibits
justices, judges among others from acquiring by purchase the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution
before the court, the SC has ruled, however, that for the
prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must
take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the
property. In this case, when Judge Asuncion purchased a portion of
Lot 1184-E, the decision in the partition case was already final
because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary
period. Thus, the lot in question was no longer subject of the
litigation. Moreover, Judge Asuncion did NOT buy the lot directly
from the plaintiffs in the partition case but from Dr. Galapon, who
earlier purchased the lot from the plaintiffs. The subsequent sale
from Dr. Galapon to Judge Asuncion is NOT a scheme to conceal the
illegal and unethical transfer of said lot as a consideration for
the approval of the project of partition. As pointed out by the
Investigating Justice, there is no evidence in the record showing
that Dr. Galapon acted as a mere dummy of Judge Asuncion. In fact,
Dr. Galapon appeared to be a respectable citizen, credible and
sincere, having bought the subject lot in good faith and for
valuable consideration, without any intervention of Judge
Asuncion.
Although Judge Asuncion did NOT violate Art 1491 (5) of the
Civil Code, it was IMPROPER for him to have acquired the lot in
question. Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that
judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety. It was unwise and indiscreet on the part of Judge
Asuncion to have purchased the property that was or had been in
litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a
corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the
time of such transfer. His actuations must not cause doubt and
mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice.
2. NO. Art 14 (1 and 5) of the Code of Commerce prohibits
justices of the SC, judges and officials of the department of
public prosecution in active service from engaging in commerce,
either in person or proxy or from holding any office or have an
direct, administrative or financial intervention in commercial or
industrial companies within the limits of the territory in which
they discharge their duties. However, this Code is the Spanish Code
of Commerce of 1885, which was extended to the Philippines by a
Royal Decree. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US
to the Philippines, Art 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed
to have been abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears to be no
affirmative act that continued the effectivity of said
provision.
Sec 3 (H) of RA 3019 provides for instances when public officers
are considered to have committed corrupt practices, which include
having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in
his official capacity or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest. Judge Asuncion
cannot be held liable under said provision because there is no
showing that he participated or intervened in his official capacity
in the business or transactions of Traders Manufacturing. In this
case, the business of the corporation in which he participated has
obviously no relation to his judicial office. Sec 12, Rule XVIII of
the Civil Service Rules does N