LatintAmericaPeacemaking

The International Community:Its Role in Promoting Peace

In Latin America

Motivations, Purposes, Strategies, and Objectives:

WhoWhat When Where

International Facilitation, Mediation, and Peacemaking in Latin America

Major Actors and Strategies

United Nations United States Individual European Nations The European Union OAS Individual NGOs NGO “Clusters” Faith-Based Organizations Ad Hoc Committees

Economic Aid Humanitarian Aid Providing Neutral Venues for

Negotiations Providing Neutral Mediators for

Negotiations Providing Third-Party Monitoring

of Treaties Providing Technical Assistance Military Aid Threats and Assurances Withholding or Reducing Aid

The United Nations Lays the Ground Rules An Agenda for Peace

for Its Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-KeepingPolicies

Adopted by the Security Council31 January 1992

United Nations Principles and Definitions

in its Peacemaking and Peace-KeepingFunctions

Respect for the State Commitment to Human Rights Respect relationship between Nationalism

and Globalism Encourage balancing internal governance

within an Interdependent World Violence prevention through diplomacy is

first priority Resolve issues that have led to conflict Preserve peace and help implement

agreements Address deepest causes of conflict, i.e.,

economic despair, social injustice, and political oppression.

Promote a common moral code among nations

Preventative Diplomacy: Prevent disputes from arising; prevent existing disputes from escalating

Peacemaking: Bring hostile parties to agreement through peaceful means

Peace-Keeping: Deploy UN presence in the field

Post-Conflict Peace-Building: Identify and support structures that will consolidate peace and advance confidence and well-being within a population.

Preventative Deployment: Respond with UN presence when a country feels threatened and requests aid.

Financing Peace: Establish and maintain a fund to 1) to pay for peace-keeping operations and conflict resolution; and 2) to respond to humanitarian emergencies.

Lofty Idealism versus Messy Reality

International Efforts to Bring Peaceto Colombia, El Salvador, & Nicaragua

• Colombian Soldier Standing Guard • Colombian Police Spraying Coca Field

Colombian Conflict: The Fog of War

Unlike many Latin American conflicts, the one in Colombia often has overlapping and multiple antagonists. As a result, International Efforts to bring peace to the country

have, at times, been contradictory, ineffectual, and at cross-purposes.

The Major Antagonists in the Conflict

The Government: President elected every four years. Strategies change depending on the leader’s ideology. Official military follows orders of the President.

FARC and ELN: Revolutionary movements at war with government to effect social, political, and economic change.

Paramilitary: Unauthorized private “self-defense” groups that commit murder and other violence to “assist” government intervention.

“Narco-Terrorists”: Presumably large drug cartels that use violence and intimidation to assure profits.

“Lost in a Tangle of Wars”

James Jones referring to U.S. Policy Towards Colombia

President Uribe FARC Soldiers

Paramilitary Unit Pablo Escobar

The European Union vs. the United StatesDifferences in Policy and Philosophy

Towards the Colombian Conflict

• EU idea of security based on “human security,” not simply absence of conflict

• EU emphasizes economic development, shared responsibility between producer and consumer countries, view drug industry as connected to international organized crime.

• EU supports Colombian human rights groups, human rights education, strengthening judiciary, promote rule of law.

• EU focus on history and root causes of conflict: underdevelopment; reverse damage to environment; promote “islands of civility.”

• EU encourages negotiation with illegal groups willing to negotiate.

• Promotion of “neutral space” by Norway to allow opposing groups to meet in non-threatening environments.

• US considers drug-traffickers and guerrillas interchangeable and a common enemy

• US appropriated $1.3 billion toward military operations and coca eradication

• US minimized role of demand and ignored demand reduction.

• US communicates mixed-message regarding ‘Plan Colombia’—ostensibly a peace/human rights effort, but in fact allowed for local government to ignore human rights issues.

• US State Department introduces concept of “counter-terrorism” strategy for Latin America after 9/11

• “Patriot Plan” of 2003 launched a military “anti-terrorism” offensive against FARC with U.S. advisors assisting the Colombian army.

Colombian and International NGOs Efforts in the Colombian Conflict:

• U.S. NGOs addressing the Colombia Conflict include Think Tanks, Grassroots Organizations, Religious Organizations

• Colombia Steering Committee is a consortium of 40 NGOs that include the Latin America Working Group, Washington Office on Latin America, Center for International Policy, Catholic Relief Services. Focus is on negotiation and economic development.

• Inter-American Dialogue and Heritage Foundation represent NGOs that seek a military solution.

• Both NGO clusters support respect for human rights and rule of law.

• NGOs active in producing blueprints and strategies

• Colombian NGOs develop alliances to promote peacemaking

• Colombian NGOs raise awareness of the Colombia Conflict among members of the U.S. Congress, resulting in letter sent to Pres. Uribe by 23 Senators concerning violence towards NGOs in Colombia

• U.S. NGOs complement and work in conjunction with Colombian counterparts i.e., U.S. Catholic Relief Services works with the Catholic National Secretariat (Colombia)

• U.S. NGOs often have similar policies to the EU stance on Colombia, providing the EU policy with more legitimacy.

• NGOs help create channels of communication between Colombian civil society and U.S. policymakers.

• NGOs organize trips to D.C. for civilian-led Colombian peace building initiatives.

• NGOs help foster interest in Colombia among local U.S. groups and communities.

International Mediation and Peacemaking in El Salvadorand Nicaragua: Europe vs. the United States

U.S. fear of “the spread of communism” influences its strategy in El Salvador and Nicaragua

U.S. channels large sums of military assistance to the El Salvador military to battle the FLMN and to anti-communist forces (Contras) in Nicaragua to overthrow “Sandanistas.”

U.S. policy follows the “domino principle” theory, i.e., as one country turns to communism, its neighbors will follow

U.S. uses pretext of arms flow between Nicaragua and El Salvador to develop hard line

European countries (France, Germany, Spain, and others) support the Sandinista Revolution as a positive step for Latin America

Europe fears Soviet military aid to Central America could threaten a Europe/Soviet confrontation

Europe encourages Sandanistas and FMLN to follow principle of non-alignment, thereby reducing Soviet threat to Central America and Europe

Europe recommends mediation, social justice, and economic development in region—at odds with the U.S.

The United Nations as Mediator

The United Nations Takes on Prominent Role in Central American Peace Negotiations as Europe and U.S. Actions Remain Ineffective

• President George Bush replaces Reagan as President and reduces Central American conflict as a major U.S. concern.

• Human Rights violations reported by El Salvadoran military, including the murder of six Priests. U.S. ends military funding.

• Direct European proposals for humanitarian peace process fails to solve conflict, but cautions and weakens U.S. hard-line policy.

• Insufficient democratic processes among El Salvador politicians to negotiate with FLMN; FLMN insists it’s fighting for social justice; Creates local vacuum in negotiations.

• Peace plan introduced by President Arias of Costa Rica and President Cerezo of Guatamala in 1987 encourage U.N. to serve as negotiatior.

• Esquipulas Declaration in 1987 made by the U.N., the OAS, and El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, C.R., and Honduras agree to international verification of peace process.

• Military stalemate between El Salvador government and FMLN make conflict ripe for negotiation.

• U.N. secretaries-general de Cuellar and Boutros Boutro-Ghali create negotiation team during 1990 and 1991.

• Alvaro de Soto becomes chief negotiator for the U.N. and representative of de Cuellar.

• U.S. skeptical about FLMN participation and wants to maintain El Salvador army as part of peace negotiations, but relents.

• U.N. enters two years of negotiations between El Salvador and FLMN to iron out differences in each party’s demands.

• Agreement reached in October 1992.

Ten Principles for Successful International Negotiation Recommended by Alvaro De Soto, Chief U.N. Negotiator in Central American Conflict

1. Inclusivity: All warring parties are included 6. Avoid collective mediation

2. Unity and integrity of mediation 7. Use caution with mediators with stakes

3. Eliminate preconditions during negotiation in process

4. Continuing the war by other means during 8. Create reasonable deadlines

negotiations is unacceptable 9. Beware of quick fixes or unfinished

5. Mediator should develop “friends” who will business

Discourage rival mediators during process 10. Negotiation of a deep-rooted conflict

using force does not bring peace

De Soto’s basic advice for international negotiations

• Just because something is obvious doesn’t mean it’s not important.

• 50% of negotiation is having every participant show up.