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Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny
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Page 1: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny

Page 2: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Part 1: Introduction

Page 3: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Overview

There exists a free rider problem with corporate monitoring

This problem can be corrected with a large shareholder model.

Page 4: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Three Important Questions

• Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up?

• Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up?

• Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up?

• Under what circumstances will we observe a tender offer as opposed to a proxy fight or an internal management shake-up?

• How strong are the forces pushing toward increasing concentration of ownership of a diffusely held firm?

• Why do corporate and personal investors commonly hold stock in the same firm, despite their disparate tax preferences?

Page 5: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Shareholder Structure

Fortune 500 sample reveals typical composition

Who are the largest shareholders?

Role of the large shareholder in takeovers

Page 6: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Part 2: Value of Large Shareholders

Page 7: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Cash Tender Offers

Cash Tender offers made to replace inefficient management

Simplified example

Page 8: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

First Proposition

Impact of an increase in proportion of shares held by L

Larger shareholders are seen as more valuable

How does this impact small shareholders?

Page 9: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Second Proposition

Suppose there is an increase in legal costs

Williams Act of 1968

Other impact of takeovers facilitated by large shareholders

Page 10: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Part 3: Other Mechanisms for

Corporate Control

Page 11: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

More Mechanisms

The actions of L can serve as a signal for small shareholders

Proxy Contests

The “Jawboning” Mechanism

Page 12: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Pretakeover Trading

Trades by L have an impact on price

L would prefer secret buying

The large shareholder is unlikely to sell.

Page 13: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Pretakeover Trading

A 13-D disclosure form is required

Problems could get worse by time of filing

Why do large shareholders exist?

Page 14: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Part 4: Dividends as Subsidy to large shareholders

Page 15: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

What are tax implications?

Taxes mean different people will hold different valuations.

Small shareholders and large shareholders may support different payment forms.

Page 16: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Dividend Policies

Small shareholders may actually favor a dividend policy

Paying for monitoring is not permitted.

Page 17: Large Shareholders and Corporate Control By: Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny.

Conclusion and Questions