LAND TITLES AND DEEDS 2015- CASES
FIRST DIVISION[G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998]
SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their
attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., petitioners, vs. LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J:
In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants
have been adjudged to have a registrable title, may the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) refuse to issue a decree of
registration if it has evidence that the subject land may already
be included in an existing Torrens certificate of title? Under this
circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to issue such
decree?The CaseThese are the questions confronting this Court in
this special civil action for mandamus[1] under Rule 65 which asks
this Court to direct the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue
the corresponding decree of registration in Land Registration Case
(LRC) No. N-11022.[2]The FactsPetitioners were the applicants in
LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372,
located in Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the trial court,
acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision
disposing thus:[3]
WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing
that the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada,
have a registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot
3A, Psd-1372, the Court declares, confirms and orders the
registration of their title thereto.
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the
corresponding decree be issued in the name of spouses Marciano
[sic] and Erlinda Laburada, both of legal age, married, with
residence and postal address at No. 880 Rizal Ave., Manila.
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion
of petitioners, issued an order[4] dated March 15, 1991 requiring
the LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However,
the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed this action for
mandamus.[5]
Attached to the LRAs comment on the petition is a report dated
April 29, 1992 signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA
Department of Registration, which explained public respondents
refusal to issue the said decree:[6]
In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by
Petitioners through counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the
above-noted case/record, the following comments are respectfully
submitted:
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a
parcel of land, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion
of Lot 3, Block No. 159, Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of
San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal was filed by Spouses Marciano
[sic] Laburada and Erlinda Laburada;
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our
Municipal Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of
the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR)
Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as per plotting of the subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said subdivision plan is Annex A
hereof;
The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos.
699, 875 & 917 were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on
August 25, 1904, September 14, 1905 and April 26, 1905,
respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the
Register of Deeds, Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex B hereof,
requesting for a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of
Title No. 355, issued in the name of Compania Agricola de
Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority,
a copy is Annex C hereof, per unsigned letter of the Register of
Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex D hereof;
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the
technical description of the parcel of land described therein is
not readable, that prompted this Authority to send another letter
dated April 15, 1992 to the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro
Manila, a copy is Annex E hereof, requesting for a certified
typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof a certified
copy of the subsisting certificate of title with complete technical
description of the parcel of land involved therein. To date,
however, no reply to our letter has as yet been received by this
Authority;
After verification of the records on file in the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the
subdivision plan Psd-1372 being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No.
159, Plan S.W.O. -7237, is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, a
copy is attached as Annex F hereof. Said TCT No. 29337 is a
transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the
title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be
located because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several sheets are [sic]
incomplete.
For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of
registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the Decision
dated January 8, 1991 and Order dated March 15, 1991, it would
result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land,
and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the Torrens
registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (G.R.
No. 63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrio, et al.,); x
x x.
In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general
prays that the petition be dismissed for being premature.
After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed
an urgent motion, dated September 4, 1995,[7] for an early
resolution of the case. To this motion, the Court responded with a
Resolution, dated October 23, 1995, which ordered:[8]
x x x Acting on the urgent motion for early resoon of the case
dated 04 September 1995 filed by petitioner Erlinda Laburada
herself, the Court resolved to require the Solicitor General to
report to the Court in detail, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this Resolution, what concrete and specific steps, if
any, have been taken by respondent since 19 May 1993 (the date of
respondents Memorandum) to actually verify whether the lot subject
of LRC Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68),
described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and situated in Mandaluyong City,
might be a portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land
Registration Case (CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917.
On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his
compliance with the above resolution, to which was attached a
letter dated November 27, 1997 of Felino M. Cortez, chief of the
LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division, which states:[9]
With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed
herewith is a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992 addressed to
Hon. Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of the
subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237
is really covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued
in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which was
transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6395, per
verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of
Rizal. However, the title issued for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of
the subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595
is incomplete.
It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners
pursuant to the decision dated January 9, 1991 and order dated
March 15, 1991, would result in the duplication of [the] title over
the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and
purposes of the torrens registration system, and destroy the
integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon.
Eutropio Migrio, et. al.).
Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to
avoid duplication of title over the same parcel of land.
Issue
Petitioners submit this lone issue:[10]
Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be
compelled to issue the corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-11022
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68).
The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy?
Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for
the LRA unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office x x x.
They cite four reasons why the writ should be issued. First,
petitioners claim that they have a clear legal right to the act
being prayed for and the LRA has the imperative duty to perform
because, as land registration is an in rem proceeding, the
jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication should be
complied with.[11] Since there was no showing that the LRA filed an
opposition in this proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the
corresponding decree. Second, it is not the duty of the LRA to take
the cudgels for the private persons in possession of OCT No. 355,
TCT No. 29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595. Rather, it is the sole
concern of said private person-holders of said titles to institute
in a separate but proper action whatever claim they may have
against the property subject of petitioners application for
registration. Third, petitioners contend that they suffered from
the delay in the issuance of their title, because of the failure of
the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish LRA of
[sic] the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No. 6595
notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said
titles.[12] Fourth, the State consented to its being sued in this
case[;] thus, the legislature must recognize any judgment that may
be rendered in this case as final and make provision for its
satisfaction.[13]
On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor
general, contends that the decision of the trial court is not
valid, considering that [the] Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land already
decreed in an earlier land registration case and [so] a second
decree for the same land is null and void.[14] On the question of
whether the LRA can be compelled to issue a decree of registration,
the solicitor general cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez[15] which
held:[16]
Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been
committed in the proceedings below, these may be ignored by the
Court in the interest of substantive justice. This is especially
true when, as in this case, a strict adherence to the rules would
result in a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a
decree of registration over land which has already been decreed to
and titled in the name of another.
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report
and only alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious,
without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No.
8816, however, having been issued under the Torrens system, enjoys
the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in an early
case, (t)he very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed
if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second action
for registration. The application for registration of the
petitioners in this case would, under the circumstances, appear to
be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under
Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (Underscoring supplied.)
We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is
not the proper remedy for three reasons.
First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory
Contrary to the petitioners allegations, the judgment they seek
to enforce in this petition is not yet executory and
incontrovertible under the Land Registration Law. That is, they do
not have any clear legal right to implement it. We have
unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does not become
executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of
the final decree of registration. We explained this in Gomez vs.
Court of Appeals:[17]
It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had
become final and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that
said decision having become final, it may no longer be reopened,
reviewed, much less, set aside. They anchor this claim on section
30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) which provides
that, after judgment has become final and executory, the court
shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land
Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and
certificate of title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be
read in relation to section 32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the
judgment becomes final and executory under section 30, the decree
of registration must issue as a matter of course. This being the
law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his
decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and
the order of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without
jurisdiction.
Petitioners contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil
actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land
registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of
incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year
after the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in
several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not
been entered by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and
the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of
such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision
in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control
and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is
understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in
the performance of its duty, the LRAs reaction is reasonable, even
imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the
same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and
the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens
system of registration.
In Ramos vs. Rodriguez,[18] this Court ruled that the LRA is
mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt it may have in
regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of
registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as
administrative officials but as officers of said court, and their
act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to
extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land
registration proceedings.
True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore,
the decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against
all persons including the government and its branches, irrespective
of whether they were personally notified of the application for
registration, and whether they filed an answer to said application.
This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act 496
which provides:
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or
adverse claimant has title as stated in his application or adverse
claim and proper for registration, a decree of confirmation and
registration shall be entered. Every decree of registration shall
bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the
exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and
all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the
application, notice, or citation, or included in the general
description To all whom it may concern. Such decree shall not be
opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of
any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for
reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of
any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent
Court of First Instance a petition for review within one year after
entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of said term of one year,
every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance with this
section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser,
the decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in
full force and effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal
herein before provided: Provided, however, That no decree or
certificate of title issued to persons not parties to the appeal
shall be cancelled or annulled. But any person aggrieved by such
decree in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages
against the applicant or any other person for fraud in procuring
the decree. Whenever the phrase innocent purchaser for value or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include
an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (As
amended by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD
1529, Sec. 39).
However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez
and Felino M. Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27, 1995,
respectively, clearly stated that, after verification from the
records submitted by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, the property
which petitioners are seeking to register -- Lot 3-A of Subdivision
Plan Psd-1372 -- is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan
S.W.O.-7237, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon
the other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337
was issued in lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRAs refusal to issue
a decree of registration is based on documents which, if verified,
may render the judgment of the trial court void.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction
to order the registration of land already decreed in the name of
another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for
the same land would be null and void,[19] since the principle
behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only
once.[20] Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are
seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905,
the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run
counter to said principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia:[21]
As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title
under the Land Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows
that the Court of First Instance has no power or jurisdiction to
entertain proceedings for the registration of the same parcels of
land covered by the certificates of title of the respondents. Such
has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et al. v. The
City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24,
1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the
part of the lower court. All the other contentions of respondent
regarding possession in good faith, laches or claims of better
right, while perhaps valid in an appropriate ordinary action, as to
which we here express no opinion, can not avail in the case at bar
if the court a quo, sitting as land registration court, had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957,
the registration, in favor of respondent city, of a lot already
previously decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners.
In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been
well-settled that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to
decree again the registration of land already decreed in an earlier
land registration case and a second decree for the same land is
null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is
already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings
being in rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding
(not based on fraud and within the statutory period) to adjudicate
the same title in favor of another person. Furthermore, the
registration of the property in the name of first registered owner
in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the world that
said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the latter
applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is
already covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to
apply for it. To declare the later title valid would defeat the
very purpose of the Torrens system which is to quiet title to the
property and guarantee its indefeasibility. It would undermine the
faith and confidence of the people in the efficacy of the
registration law.
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial
function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and
Jacinto vs. Nable: [22]
Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or
cadastral court, there remain many things to be done before the
final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of amended
plans and amended descriptions, especially where the decision
orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation therefrom of a
portion being adjudicated to another party, to fit the said
decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. De
Villa, 48 Phil., 227, 234:
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration
must be stated in convenient form for transcription upon the
certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical
description of the land. This requires trained technical men.
Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of
land included in an application are ordered registered and that the
limits of such portions can only be roughly indicated in the
decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and
sometimes additional surveys become necessary before the final
decree can be entered. That can hardly be done by the court itself;
the law very wisely charges the chief surveyor of the General Land
Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code, section
177).
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by
the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the
administrative officer, the issuance of the final decree can hardly
be considered a ministerial act for the reason that said Chief of
the General Land Registration Office acts not as an administrative
officer but as an officer of the court and so the issuance of a
final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative one
(De los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra). x x x (Underscoring
supplied.)
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is
not compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving
the exercise of discretion.[23] Likewise, the writ of mandamus can
be awarded only when the petitioners legal right to the performance
of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and
complete.[24] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal
right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is
inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is
meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be
disregarded.[25] But where the right sought to be enforced is in
substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot
issue.
A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a
question submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to
decide for or against one of the parties.[26] As stated earlier, a
judicial act is not compellable by mandamus.[27] The court has to
decide a question according to its own judgment and understanding
of the law.[28]
In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require
the LRA to issue a decree of registration. However, to avoid
multiplicity of suits and needless delay, this Court deems it more
appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its study, to determine
with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described
in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the court of
origin within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, after
which the said court shall act with deliberate speed according to
the facts and the law, as herein discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is
REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The Land
Registration Authority, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to
the court a quo a report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A
is included in the property described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty
(60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, the land
registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and
judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue
the decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as
herein discussed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ.,
concur.
[1] This case was filed prior to the issuance of Revised
Administrative Circular 1-95 which directs that actions against
quasi-judicial bodies in general should be filed in the Court of
Appeals.
[2] Per decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila (now Pasig City), Branch LXVIII.
[3] Rollo, p 5.
[4] Rollo, p 6.
[5] The case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 25,
1997, upon this Courts receipt of the public respondents reply in
compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 10,
1996.
[6] Rollo, pp. 48-49.
[7] Rollo, pp. 83-84.
[8] Rollo, p 85; original text in upper case.
[9] Rollo, p 113.
[10] Rollo, p 70; petitioners memorandum, p 2.
[11] Rollo, p 71; petitioners memorandum, p 3
[12] Rollo, p 72; petitioners memorandum, p 4.
[13] Rollo, p 73; petitioners memorandum, p 5.
[14] Rollo, p 63; the LRAs rejoinder, p 2; citing Rojas, et al.,
vs. City of Tagaytay and Hon. Jimenez, 106 Phil 512, November 24,
1959; Duran vs. Olivia, 3 SCRA 154, September 29, 1961.
[15] 244 SCRA 418, 423-424, May 29, 1995, per Romero, J.
[16] Rollo, p. 165; the LRAs reply, p. 5.
[17] 168 SCRA 503, December 15, 1988, per Padilla, J.; citing
Section 32, PD 1529; Capio vs. Capio, 94 Phil 113; Valmonte vs.
Nable, 85 Phil 256; Afalla and Pinanoc vs. Rosauro, 60 Phil 622;
Roman Catholic Bishops of Cebu vs. Phil Railway Co., 49 Phil 540;
De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil 227; Pamintuan vs. San Agustin,
43 Phil 558, June 22, 1922; Director of Lands vs. Busuego, 12 SCRA
678.
[18] Supra, at 422.
[19] Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems vs. Court of
Appeals, 215 SCRA 783, November 17, 1992, citing Pamintuan vs. San
Agustin, 43 Phil 558, June 22, 1922.
[20] PD 1529 provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. -- The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxx xxx xxx
[21] Supra, at pp 159-160, per Labrador, J; citing Pamintuan vs.
San Agustin, supra; Timbol vs. Diaz, 44 Phil 587, 590, March 5,
1923; Perez vs. Bolbon, 50 Phil 791, 795, September 30, 1927;
Singian vs. Manila Railroad Co., 60 Phil 192, 203, June 19, 1934;
Addison vs. Payatas Estate Improvement Co., 60 Phil 673, September
27, 1934; Sideco, et al. vs. Aznar, 92 Phil 952, April 24,
1953.
[22] 85 Phil 256, 260-261, December 29, 1949, per Tuason, J.
[23] Go vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 564, 567, January 29,
1996.
[24] Garces vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 99, July 17, 1996,
University of San Agustin, Inc. vs. CA, 230 SCRA 761, March 7,
1994; Tamano vs. Manglapus, 214 SCRA 567, October 13, 1992; Marcelo
vs. Tantuico, Jr., 142 SCRA 439, July 7, 1986; Samson vs. Barrios,
63 Phil 198, July 20, 1936.
[25] Pelileo vs. Ruiz Castro, 85 Phil 272, December 29,
1949.
[26] Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 280, 284, April 25,
1991; Diokno vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil 608,
July 11, 1952.
[27] Go vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[28] Lupisan vs. Alfonso and Arguieta, 78 Phil 842, July 31,
1947.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154409. June 21, 2004]
Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners, vs. ROMANA DE VERA,
respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered
under the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to (1)
the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor
in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith
presents the oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply
if the property is not registered under the Torrens system.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to set aside the March 21, 2002 Amended
Decision[2] and the July 22, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 62391. The Amended Decision disposed
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the original DECISION of this
case, promulgated on November 19, 2001, is SET ASIDE and another
one is entered AFFIRMING in part and REVERSING in part the judgment
appealed from, as follows:
1. Declaring [Respondent] Romana de Vera the rightful owner and
with better right to possess the property in question, being an
innocent purchaser for value therefor;
2. Declaring Gloria Villafania [liable] to pay the following to
[Respondent] Romana de Vera and to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and
Julie] Abrigo, to wit:
As to [Respondent] Romana de Vera:
1. P300,000.00 plus 6% per annum as actual damages;
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. P30,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5. Cost of suit.
As to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo:
1. P50,000.00 as moral damages;
2. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. P30,000.00 as attorneys fees;
4. Cost of suit.[4]
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
Quoting the trial court, the CA narrated the facts as
follows:
As culled from the records, the following are the pertinent
antecedents amply summarized by the trial court:
On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located
at Banaoang, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 1406 to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said sale
became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between the
vendor and the vendees.
On December 7, 1993, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 of
Dagupan City rendered judgment approving the Compromise Agreement
submitted by the parties. In the said Decision, Gloria Villafania
was given one year from the date of the Compromise Agreement to buy
back the house and lot, and failure to do so would mean that the
previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go
shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall voluntarily
vacate the premises without need of any demand. Gloria Villafania
failed to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees] declared the
lot in their name.
Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go,
Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land
involved [on March 15, 1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The
said free patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598 on April
11, 1996.
On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go,
sold the house and lot to the herein [Petitioner-Spouses Noel and
Julie Abrigo].
On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and
lot to Romana de Vera x x x. Romana de Vera registered the sale and
as a consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name.
On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an action for
Forcible Entry and Damages against [Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo]
before the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan docketed
as Civil Case No. 1452. On February 25, 1998, the parties therein
submitted a Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the
instant case that neither of them can physically take possession of
the property in question until the instant case is terminated.
Hence the ejectment case was dismissed.[5]
Thus, on November 21, 1997, [petitioners] filed the instant case
[with the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City] for the annulment
of documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order
and damages [against respondent and Gloria Villafania].
After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the
assailed Decision dated January 4, 1999, awarding the properties to
[petitioners] as well as damages. Moreover, x x x Gloria Villafania
was ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent] damages and
attorneys fees.
Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed
to the CA].[6]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its original Decision promulgated on November 19, 2001, the
CA held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and
hence dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent Romana de Vera.[7]
Since Gloria Villafania had already transferred ownership to
Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De
Vera was deemed void.
The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo
and found no sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.
On reconsideration, the CA issued its March 21, 2002 Amended
Decision, finding Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good
faith and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied
in good faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be
protected.[8]
Hence, this Petition.[9]
Issues
Petitioners raise for our consideration the issues below:
1. Whether or not the deed of sale executed by Gloria Villafania
in favor of [R]espondent Romana de Vera is valid.
2. Whether or not the [R]espondent Romana de Vera is a purchaser
for value in good faith.
3. Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better title
over the property in question.[10]
In the main, the issues boil down to who between
petitioner-spouses and respondent has a better right to the
property.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Main Issue:
Better Right over the Property
Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have
transferred the property to Respondent De Vera because it no longer
belonged to her.[11] They further claim that the sale could not be
validated, since respondent was not a purchaser in good faith and
for value.[12]
Law on Double Sale
The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a
double sale. On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania first sold the
disputed property to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, from
whom petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently, on
October 23, 1997, a second sale was executed by Villafania with
Respondent Romana de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale
thus:
Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may
have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be
movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to
the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in
the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.
Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of
immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good
faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3)
finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.[13]
There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect
to lands registered under the Torrens system.
This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 1529[14]
which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary
instrument -- except a will -- purporting to convey or affect
registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land
until its registration.[15] Thus, if the sale is not registered, it
is binding only between the seller and the buyer but it does not
affect innocent third persons.[16]
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent
registered the sale of the property. Since neither petitioners nor
their predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the
property was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their
respective sales under Act 3344.[17] For her part, respondent
registered the transaction under the Torrens system[18] because,
during the sale, Villafania had presented the transfer certificate
of title (TCT) covering the property.[19]
Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the
Torrens system should prevail over that of petitioners who recorded
theirs under Act 3344. De Vera relies on the following insight of
Justice Edgardo L. Paras:
x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act
(and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the
subsequent sale is registered not under the Land Registration Act
but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not considered
REGISTERED, as the term is used under Art. 1544 x x x.[20]
We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had
been issued a free patent registered as Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-30522.[21] The OCT was later cancelled by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 212598, also in Villafanias
name.[22] As a consequence of the sale, TCT No. 212598 was
subsequently cancelled and TCT No. 22515 thereafter issued to
respondent.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali[23] held that registration must be
done in the proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the
property in dispute in the present case was already registered
under the Torrens system, petitioners registration of the sale
under Act 3344 was not effective for purposes of Article 1544 of
the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of
Appeals,[24] the Court upheld the right of a party who had
registered the sale of land under the Property Registration Decree,
as opposed to another who had registered a deed of final conveyance
under Act 3344. In that case, the priority in time principle was
not applied, because the land was already covered by the Torrens
system at the time the conveyance was registered under Act 3344.
For the same reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale to
Respondent De Vera under the Torrens system was done in good faith,
this sale must be upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to
Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo.
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo[25] explained the difference
in the rules of registration under Act 3344 and those under the
Torrens system in this wise:
Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting
unregistered lands is without prejudice to a third party with a
better right. The aforequoted phrase has been held by this Court to
mean that the mere registration of a sale in ones favor does not
give him any right over the land if the vendor was not anymore the
owner of the land having previously sold the same to somebody else
even if the earlier sale was unrecorded.
The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals[26] is a case in point.
It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code has no
application to land not registered under Act No. 496. Like in the
case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of the same
unregistered land. The first sale was made by the original owners
and was unrecorded while the second was an execution sale that
resulted from a complaint for a sum of money filed against the said
original owners. Applying [Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court,[27] this Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil
Code cannot be invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution
sale though the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this
second sale was registered. It was explained that this is because
the purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriffs execution sale
only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely
acquires the latters interest in the property sold as of the time
the property was levied upon.
Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of
unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect because
the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor as of the time
of the said execution sale.[28]
Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently
misled into believing that the property was unregistered. A Torrens
title, once registered, serves as a notice to the whole world.[29]
All persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the
registration.[30]
Good-Faith Requirement
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second
buyer to acquire the immovable in good faith and to register it in
good faith.[31] Mere registration of title is not enough; good
faith must concur with the registration.[32] We explained the
rationale in Uraca v. Court of Appeals,[33] which we quote:
Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed
property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or
a better right over the property. Article 1544 requires that such
registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence teaches
us that (t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure
(first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first
buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyers rights
except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second
sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such
knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her
rights under the law, among them, to register first her purchase as
against the second buyer. But in converso, knowledge gained by the
second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is
first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his
prior registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by
Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able to
displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain
priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith
throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first
buyers rights) ---- from the time of acquisition until the title is
transferred to him by registration, or failing registration, by
delivery of possession.[34] (Italics supplied)
Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered
owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of
registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land
taking such certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated
in the certificate.[35] Thus, a person dealing with registered land
is not required to go behind the registry to determine the
condition of the property, since such condition is noted on the
face of the register or certificate of title.[36] Following this
principle, this Court has consistently held as regards registered
land that a purchaser in good faith acquires a good title as
against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not recorded
in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.[37]
Citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals,[38] petitioners contend
that their prior registration under Act 3344 is constructive notice
to respondent and negates her good faith at the time she registered
the sale. Santiago affirmed the following commentary of Justice
Jose C. Vitug:
The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in
time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the
second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the
second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale
(Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33). Conversely, knowledge gained
by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he
is first to register, since such knowledge taints his registration
with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No
58530, 26 December 1984) In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22
June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to
merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the
second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his deed
of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99,
Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992).
x x x x x x x x x
Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344, providing for
the registration of all instruments on land neither covered by the
Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System (Act 496), cannot
improve his standing since Act 3344 itself expresses that
registration thereunder would not prejudice prior rights in good
faith (see Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558).
Registration, however, by the first buyer under Act 3344 can have
the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that can
defeat his right as such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709,
Civil Code; see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480; Taguba
vs. Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). Art. 1544 has been held to be
inapplicable to execution sales of unregistered land, since the
purchaser merely steps into the shoes of the debtor and acquires
the latter's interest as of the time the property is sold (Carumba
vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558; see also Fabian vs. Smith, Bell
& Co., 8 Phil. 496) or when there is only one sale (Remalante
vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138).[39] (Emphasis supplied)
Santiago was subsequently applied in Bayoca v. Nogales,[40]
which held:
Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by
petitioners of the second sale in their favor. As stated in the
Santiago case, registration by the first buyer under Act No. 3344
can have the effect of constructive notice to the second buyer that
can defeat his right as such buyer. On account of the undisputed
fact of registration under Act No. 3344 by [the first buyers],
necessarily, there is absent good faith in the registration of the
sale by the [second buyers] for which they had been issued
certificates of title in their names. x x x.[41]
Santiago and Bayoca are not in point. In Santiago, the first
buyers registered the sale under the Torrens system, as can be
inferred from the issuance of the TCT in their names.[42] There was
no registration under Act 3344. In Bayoca, when the first buyer
registered the sale under Act 3344, the property was still
unregistered land.[43] Such registration was therefore considered
effectual.
Furthermore, Revilla and Taguba, which are cited in Santiago,
are not on all fours with the present case. In Revilla, the first
buyer did not register the sale.[44] In Taguba, registration was
not an issue.[45]
As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive notice to
the second buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not apply
if the property is registered under the Torrens system, as in this
case.
We quote below the additional commentary of Justice Vitug, which
was omitted in Santiago. This omission was evidently the reason why
petitioner misunderstood the context of the citation therein:
"The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to
refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration Act (now PD
1529) which considers the act of registration as the operative act
that binds the land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900,
Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). On lands covered by the Torrens
System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they
appear in the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or
encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not required to
explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face,
indicates. The only exception is where the purchaser has actual
knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the seller or of such
liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is equivalent to
registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R. 75336,
18 October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera vs.
Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March 1981),"[46]
Respondent
in Good Faith
The Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine whether
respondent was an innocent purchaser for value.[47] After its
factual findings revealed that Respondent De Vera was in good
faith, it explained thus:
x x x. Gloria Villafania, [Respondent] De Veras vendor, appears
to be the registered owner. The subject land was, and still is,
registered in the name of Gloria Villafania. There is nothing in
her certificate of title and in the circumstances of the
transaction or sale which warrant [Respondent] De Vera in supposing
that she need[ed] to look beyond the title. She had no notice of
the earlier sale of the land to [petitioners]. She ascertained and
verified that her vendor was the sole owner and in possession of
the subject property by examining her vendors title in the Registry
of Deeds and actually going to the premises. There is no evidence
in the record showing that when she bought the land on October 23,
1997, she knew or had the slightest notice that the same was under
litigation in Civil Case No. D-10638 of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City, Branch 40, between Gloria Villafania and
[Petitioners] Abrigo. She was not even a party to said case. In
sum, she testified clearly and positively, without any contrary
evidence presented by the [petitioners], that she did not know
anything about the earlier sale and claim of the spouses Abrigo,
until after she had bought the same, and only then when she bought
the same, and only then when she brought an ejectment case with the
x x x Municipal Court of Mangaldan, known as Civil Case No. 1452.
To the [Respondent] De Vera, the only legal truth upon which she
had to rely was that the land is registered in the name of Gloria
Villafania, her vendor, and that her title under the law, is
absolute and indefeasible. x x x.[48]
We find no reason to disturb these findings, which petitioners
have not rebutted. Spouses Abrigo base their position only on the
general averment that respondent should have been more vigilant
prior to consummating the sale. They argue that had she inspected
the property, she would have found petitioners to be in
possession.[49]
This argument is contradicted, however, by the spouses own
admission that the parents and the sister of Villafania were still
the actual occupants in October 1997, when Respondent De Vera
purchased the property.[50] The family members may reasonably be
assumed to be Villafanias agents, who had not been shown to have
notified respondent of the first sale when she conducted an ocular
inspection. Thus, good faith on respondents part stands.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-22.
[2] Id., pp. 24-31. Former Fifth Division. Penned by Justice
Bernardo P. Abesamis, with the concurrence of Justices Hilarion L.
Aquino (acting chairman) and Perlita J. Tria Tirona (member).
[3] Id., p. 33.
[4] CA Amended Decision, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 30-31.
[5] CA Decision dated November 19, 2001, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp.
163-164. Citations omitted.
[6] Id., pp. 3 & 164.
[7] Id., pp. 5 & 166.
[8] CA Amended Decision dated March 21, 2002, p. 7; rollo, p.
30.
[9] This case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 29,
2003, upon this Courts receipt of petitioners Memorandum signed by
Atty. Villamor A. Tolete. Respondents Memorandum, signed by Atty.
Daniel C. Macaraeg, was received by this Court on May 13, 2003.
[10] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 252.
[11] Id., pp. 6 & 253.
[12] Id., pp. 11 & 258.
[13] Gabriel v. Mabanta, 399 SCRA 573, 580, March 26, 2003;
Bayoca v. Nogales, 340 SCRA 154, 166, September 12, 2000; Balatbat
v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 858, 872, August 28, 1996.
[14] The Property Registration Decree, June 11, 1978.
[15] Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, 274 Phil. 516, May 20,
1991.
[16] Revilla v. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480, 484, March 30,
1960.
[17] 113 of Chapter XIII of the Property Registration Decree (PD
1529) provides:
SEC. 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered
lands. No deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary
instrument affecting land not registered under the Torrens system
shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, unless such
instrument shall have been recorded in the manner herein prescribed
in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city
where the land lies.
x x x x xx x x x.
The sale by Gloria Villafania to Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go was
registered on June 18, 1993, while the sale by Tigno-Salazar and
Cave-Go to the Spouses Abrigo was registered on October 30, 1997.
Petitioners Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 257.
[18] Formerly Act No. 496, The Land Registration Act, November
6, 1902; now PD 1529.
[19] Respondents Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 229.
[20] Id., pp. 13 & 236; citing Paras, Civil Code of the
Philippines Annotated (1990), Vol. V, p. 154.
[21] Id., pp. 4 & 227.
[22] Ibid.
[23] 8 SCRA 489, July 31, 1963.
[24] 395 SCRA 43, January 13, 2003.
[25] Supra.
[26] 31 SCRA 558, February 18, 1970.
[27] The second paragraph of this provision states: Upon the
expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or
redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights,
title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property
as of the time of the levy. x x x. (Italics supplied.)
[28] Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, supra, pp. 521-522, per
Gancayco, J.
[29] Alvarico v. Sola, 383 SCRA 232, 239, June 6, 2002; Legarda
v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 595, October 2, 1915.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Gabriel v. Mabanta, supra; Martinez v. Court of Appeals,
358 SCRA 38, 50, May 21, 2001; Bautista v. Court of Appeals, 230
SCRA 446, 454, February 28, 1994.
[32] Bautista v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[33] 344 Phil. 253, September 5, 1997.
[34] Id., p. 265, per Panganiban, J; citing Cruz v. Cebana, 129
SCRA 656, 663, June 22, 1984, per Teehankee, J (later CJ).
[35] Lu v. Manipon, 381 SCRA 788, 796, May 7, 2002.
[36] Bautista v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 456; Radiowealth
Finance Co. v. Palileo, supra, p. 518.
[37] Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo, supra.
[38] 247 SCRA 336, August 14, 1995.
[39] Id., p. 346, per Melo, J; citing Vitug, Compendium of Civil
Law and Jurisprudence (1993), pp. 604-605.
[40] Supra.
[41] Id., p. 167-168, per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.
[42] Supra, p. 339.
[43] Supra, p. 159.
[44] Supra, p. 484.
[45] 132 SCRA 722, 728, October 23, 1984.
[46] Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, supra, p.
604. This paragraph was originally between the two paragraphs cited
in Santiago.
[47] An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the
property of another, without notice that some other person has a
right or interest in such property and pays the full price for the
same, at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the
claims or interest of some other person in the property. De la Cruz
v. De la Cruz, GR No. 146222, January 15, 2004.
[48] CA Amended Decision, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 29-30.
[49] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 12; id., p. 259.
[50] Id., pp. 13 & 260.
EN BANC
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, - versus - REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 179987
Promulgated:April 29, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is
that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are
not titled and registered. This is a generalized phenomenon in the
so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from
Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title
these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One
reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin America
can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals have
means of proving property ownership to each other which are not the
same means developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals
have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own
systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in
the maps which they use for their own informal business
transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to
Peru, and you walk by field after field--in each field a different
dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property
is all about. The only one who does not know it is the government.
The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law"
which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to
recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in
possession of persons and entities other than the Philippine
government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was
accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive
clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration
proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the
relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but
also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of
untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it
has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect.
Yet our current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in
addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is primarily
to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the
legal principles that have developed our public land law, though
our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the
endemic problems.
I.On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for
land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot
9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3]
and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the
land for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC)
Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.[4]
Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and
his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco
testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two
hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino
had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth
being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons
inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by
1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all
the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father,
Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio
succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot
9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It
was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to
Malabanan.[5]
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not
cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he also
[knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given
by Mr. Velazco.[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not
present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a
Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that
the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established
under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982.[7]
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for
registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act
496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law,
the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and
containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty
Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN,
who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at
Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8]
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan. The
appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the
classification of the lots as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since
the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos possession prior to that date could not be factored in the
computation of the period of possession. This interpretation of the
Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v.
Herbieto.[9]
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of
Appeals;[10] hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of
the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our
ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four
months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion
in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum
since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the
registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place
since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the
hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the
controlling doctrine, especially when the property in question is
agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands,
any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property
as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession
to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property
Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11
November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court
formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of
June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at
any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable
be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character
either because of its use or because its slope is below that of
forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code
on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject
land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree or both?[13]
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective
positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the
analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of
the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in
Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum,
since the land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio
due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
Petitioners further point out that in Republic v. Bibonia,[14]
promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted
the same observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG
of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains
insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have
been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945.
Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in
Buenaventura v. Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v.
Republic[16] and Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation,[17] as
well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land
of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the
land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of
Section 14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the
land sought to be registered was previously classified as
agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of
the application, the property had already been converted into
private property through prescription. To bolster their argument,
petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic v.
T.A.N. Properties.[19]
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2)
are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the
Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State
refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of
private lands. It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case
that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for
registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to the
period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG
further submits that, assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period
can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from
the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the
particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject property
and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. For a full understanding of the provision, reference has to
be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act,
has, since its enactment, governed the classification and
disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is
authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public
domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20]
Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further
classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b)
residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;
or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her
name of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain?
Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial
legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that
right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording
in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant
amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term
agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted
the scope of the lands that may be registered.[23] This is not
actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act,
agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than only
agricultural lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from
possession for thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing
of the application to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The Court in Naguit explained: When the Public Land Act was first
promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to
vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the
public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period
was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide
claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years.
Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning
date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No,
141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative
to the registration of property, including lands of the public
domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration
of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree
and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has
remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may
have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy,
or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been
repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant
comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described
citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose
titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court
of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply.
The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 171514 July 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,vs.DOMINGO ESPINOSA,
Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the Decision1
dated November 11, 2004 and Resolution2 dated February 13, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72456.
On March 3, 1999, respondent Domingo Espinosa (Espinosa) tiled
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Consolacion, Cebu an
application3 for land registration covering a parcel of land with
an area of 5,525 square meters and situated in Barangay Cabangahan,
Consolacion, Cebu. In support of his application, which was
docketed as LRC Case No. N-81, Espinosa alleged that: (a) the
property, which is more particularly known as Lot No. 8499 of Cad.
545-D (New), is alienable and disposable; (b) he purchased the
property from his mother, Isabel Espinosa (Isabel), on July 4, 1970
and the latters other heirs had waived their rights thereto; and
(c) he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in possession of
the property in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30)
years.
Espinosa submitted the blueprint of Advanced Survey Plan
07-0008934 to prove the identity of the land. As proof that the
property is alienable and disposable, he marked as evidence the
annotation on the advance survey plan made by Cynthia L. Ibaez,
Chief of the Map Projection Section, stating that "CONFORMED PER
L.C. MAP NOTATION L.C. Map No. 2545 Project No. 28 certified on
June 25, 1963, verified to be within Alienable & Disposable
Area".5 Espinosa also presented two (2) tax declarations for the
years 1965 and 1974 in Isabels name Tax Declaration Nos. 013516 and
06137 to prove that she had been in possession of the property
since 1965. To support his claim that he had been religiously
paying the taxes due on the property, Espinosa presented a
Certification6 dated December 1, 1998 issued by the Office of the
Treasurer of Consolacion, Cebu and three (3) tax declarations for
the years 1978, 1980 and 1985 Tax Declaration Nos. 14010, 17681 and
010717.8
Petitioner opposed Espinosas application, claiming that: (a)
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 otherwise known as the
"Public Land Act" (PLA) had not been complied with as Espinosas
predecessor-in-interest possessed the property only after June 12,
1945; and (b) the tax declarations do not prove that his possession
and that of his predecessor-in-interest are in the character and
for the length of time required by law.
On August 18, 2000, the MTC rendered a Judgment9 granting
Espinosas petition for registration, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering for the registration and the confirmation of
title of Espinosa over Lot No. 8499, Cad 545-D (New), situated at
Barangay Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu, Philippines, containing an
area of 5,525 square meters and that upon the finality of this
decision, let a corresponding decree of registration be issued in
favor of the herein applicant in accordance with Section 39, P.D.
1529.
SO ORDERED.10
According to the MTC, Espinosa was able to prove that the
property is alienable and disposable and that he complied with the
requirements of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529. Specifically:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented in the
above-entitled case, the Court is convinced, and so holds, that
Espinosa was able to establish his ownership and possession over
the subject lot which is within the area considered by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.
The Court is likewise convinced that the applicant and that of
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, actual, public,
continuous, adverse and under claim of title thereto within the
time prescribed by law (Sec. 14, sub-par. 1, P.D. 1529) and/or in
accordance with the Land Registration Act.11
Petitioner appealed to the CA and pointed Espinosas failure to
prove that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest
were for the period required by law. As shown by Tax Declaration
No. 013516, Isabels possession commenced only in 1965 and not on
June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of the PLA.
On the other hand, Espinosa came into possession of the property
only in 1970 following the sale that transpired between him and his
mother and the earliest tax declaration in his name was for the
year 1978. According to petitioner, that Espinosa and his
predecessor-in-interest were supposedly in possession for more than
thirty (30) years is inconsequential absent proof that such
possession began on June 12, 1945 or earlier.12
Petitioner also claimed that Espinosas failure to present the
original tracing cloth of the survey plan or a sepia copy thereof
is fatal to his application. Citing Del Rosario v. Republic of the
Philippines13 and Director of Lands v. Judge Reyes,14 petitioner
argued that the submission of the original tracing cloth is
mandatory in establishing the identity of the land subject of the
application.15
Further, petitioner claimed that the annotation on the advance
survey plan is not the evidence admissible to prove that the
subject land is alienable and disposable.16
By way of the assailed decision, the CA dismissed petitioners
appeal and affirmed the MTC Decision dated August 18, 2000. The CA
ruled that possession for at least thirty (30) years, despite the
fact that it commenced after June 12, 1945, sufficed to convert the
property to private. Thus:
The contention of petitioner is not meritorious on the following
grounds:
a) The record of the case will show that Espinosa has
successfully established valid title over the subject land and that
he and his predecessor-in-interest have been in continuous,
adverse, public and undisturbed possession of said land in the
concept of an owner for more than 30 years before the filing of the
application. Established jurisprudence has consistently pronounced
that "open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30
years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same into
private property (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 214 SCRA 604). This means that occupation and cultivation
for more than 30 years by applicant and his predecessor-in-interest
vests title on such applicant so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land (National Power Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 218 SCRA 41); and
b) It is true that the requirement of possession since June 12,
1945 is the latest amendment of Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act (C.A. No. 141), but a strict implementation of the law would in
certain cases result in inequity and unfairness to Espinosa. As
wisely stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567:
"Following the logic of the petitioner, any transferee is thus
foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive
possession thereof for thirty (30) years or more."17
The CA also ruled that registration can be based on other
documentary evidence, not necessarily the original tracing cloth
plan, as the identity and location of the property can be
established by other competent evidence.
Again, the aforesaid contention of [the petitioner] is without
merit. While the best evidence to identify a piece of land for
registration purposes may be the original tracing cloth plan from
the Land Registration Commission, the court may sufficiently order
the issuance of a decree of registration on the basis of the blue
print copies and other evidence (Republic of the Philippines vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70594, October 10, 1986).
The said case provides further:
"The fact that the lower court finds the evidence of the
applicant sufficient to justify the registration and confirmation
of her titles and did not find it necessary to avail of the
original tracing cloth plan from the Land Registration Commission
for purposes of comparison, should not militate against the rights
of the applicant. Such is especially true in this case where no
clear, strong, convincing and more preponderant proof has been
shown by the oppositor to overcome the correctness of said plans
which were found both by the lower court and the Court of Appeals
as conclusive proofs of the description and identities of the
parcels of land contained therein."
There is no dispute that, in case of Del Rosario vs. Republic,
supra the Supreme Court pronounced that the submission in evidence
of the original tracing cloth plan, duly approved by the Bureau of
Lands, in cases for application of original registration of land is
a mandatory requirement, and that failure to comply with such
requirement is fatal to ones application for registration. However,
such pronouncement need not be taken as an iron clad rule nor to be
applied strictly in all cases without due regard to the rationale
behind the submission of the tracing cloth plan.
x x x:
x x x x
As long as the identity of and location of the lot can be
established by other competent evidence like a duly approved
blueprint copy of the advance survey plan of Lot 8499 and technical
description of Lot 8499, containing and identifying the boundaries,
actual area and location of the lot, the presentation of the
original tracing cloth plan may be excused.18
Moreover, the CA ruled that Espinosa had duly proven that the
property is alienable and disposable:
Espinosa has established that Lot 8499 is alienable and
disposable. In the duly approved Advance Survey Plan As-07-0000893
(sic) duly approved by the Land Management Services, DENR, Region
7, Cebu City, it is certified/verified that the subject lot is
inside the alienable and disposable area of the disposable and
alienable land of the public domain.19
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the
CA in its Resolution20 dated February 13, 2006.
Petitioners Case
Petitioner entreats this Court to reverse and set aside the CAs
assailed decision and attributes the following errors: (a) Espinosa
failed to prove by competent evidence that the subject property is
alienable and disposable; (b) jurisprudence dictates that a survey
plan identifies the property in preparation for a judicial
proceeding but does not convert the property into alienable, much
less, private; (c) under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the
submission of the original tracing cloth plan is mandatory to
determine the exact metes and bounds of the property; and (d) a
blueprint copy of the survey plan may be admitted as evidence of
the identity and location of the property only if it bears the
approval of the Director of Lands.
Issues
The resolution of the primordial question of whether Espinosa
has acquired an imperfect title over the subject property that is
worthy of confirmation and registration is hinged on the
determination of the following issues:
a. whether the blueprint of the advanced survey plan
substantially complies with Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529; and
b. whether the notation on the blueprint copy of the plan made
by the geodetic engineer who conducted the survey sufficed to prove
that the land applied for is alienable and disposable.
Our Ruling
The lower courts were unanimous in holding that Espinosas
application is anchored on Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in
relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA and the grant thereof is
warranted in view of evidence supposedly showing his compliance
with the requirements thereof.
This Court is of a different view.
Based on Espinosas allegations and his supporting documents, it
is patent that his claim of an imperfect title over the property in
question is based on Section 14(2) and not Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529 in relation to Section 48(b) of the PLA. Espinosa did not
allege that his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest
commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier as prescribed under the two
(2) latter provisions. On the contrary, Espinosa repeatedly alleged
that he acquired title thru his possession and that of his
predecessor-in-interest, Isabel, of the subject property for thirty
(30) years, or through prescription. Therefore, the rule that
should have been applied is Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, which
states:
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
x x x x
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
Obviously, the confusion that attended the lower courts
disposition of this case stemmed from their failure to apprise
themselves of the changes that Section 48(b) of the PLA underwent
over the years. Section 48(b) of the PLA originally states:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
x x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
or ownership, except as against the Government, since July
twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the