Art 12 Section 4 of Philippine Constitution. The Congress shall,
as soon as possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of
forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundaries
on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks
shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except
by law. The Congress shall provide for such period as it may
determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and
watershed areas.TIPTON VS ANDUEZAOn the 30th day of October, 1899,
Vicente Aguirre y Flores, as administrator of the San Lazaro
Hospital, leased to the defendant in this case a tract of land
belonging to the hospital. It was stipulated in the contract that
the lease should run for a period of ten years from the 1st day of
January, 1899. Aguirre, the administrator, was duly authorized to
execute such contracts, but his power was general in terms and
contained no provision specially authorizing him to make leases
with respect to the hospital property for a period of ten years or
any other specific term.
The plaintiff, as the present administrator of the hospital
property, claims that the contract made by his predecessor,
Aguirre, was null and void for want of power on his part to make
such contract, basing his contention upon the provisions of article
1548 of the Civil Code. That article reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The husband with respect to the property of his wife, the
father and guardian with regard to that of his children or minor,
and the administrator of property without a special power giving
him such authority, can not execute a lease for a period exceeding
six years."cralaw virtua1aw library
This provision plainly shows that Aguirre could not, as
administrator, have validly executed a lease of the land in
question for a period of ten years in the absence of special
authority to that effect. This, in our opinion, vitiated the
contract. This defect, however, did not affect the contract in its
entirety, but only in so far as it exceeded the six-year limit
fixed by law as the maximum period for which an administrator can
execute a lease without special power. The contract in question was
perfectly valid in so far as it did not exceed that limit, having
been executed by the administrator, Aguirre, within the scope of
the legal authority he had under his general power to lease. That
general power carried with it, under the article above quoted, the
authority to lease the property for a period not exceeding six
years. There was no excess of authority and consequently no cause
for nullification arising therefrom, as to the first six years of
the lease. As to the last four, the contract was, however, void,
the administrator having acted beyond the scope of his powers.
The trial court construed article 1548 of the Civil Code as
applying only to administrators of estates of deceased persons.
This construction is manifestly erroneous. The provisions of that
article are general and apply as well to administrators of property
of living as of deceased persons.
It is contended, on the other hand, by the defendant, that
article 1548 is not applicable to public lands such as the property
in question, nor to public officials as was Vicente Aguirre, the
administrator of the San Lazaro Hospital.
As to the first contention, it is not stated in defendants brief
in what sense the words "public lands" are used. It seems, however,
that the defendant refers to lands of the public domain. He
testified at the trial that the lands of the San Lazaro Hospital
belonged to the Government of the United States. If such were the
case his interpretation of these words would be erroneous. That
property belongs to the public domain which is destined to public
use or which belongs exclusively to the State without being devoted
to common use or which is destined to some public service or to the
development of the national resources and of mines until
transferred to private persons. (Art. 339 of the Civil Code.) The
land in question does not pertain to any of these classes. The best
proof of it is that the defendant himself had been using it for his
own personal and exclusive benefit. So that, assuming without
deciding that the land in question belonged to the Government of
the United States, it would be nevertheless private property under
the provisions of articles 340 and 345 of the Civil Code, and as
such, unless provided for by special legislation, is subject to the
provisions of those articles. The defendant has not called our
attention to any special law providing a method different from that
contained in the Civil Code for the leasing of the lands belonging
to the San Lazaro Hospital, and we do not know of the existence of
any such law.
As to public officials, the only reason given by defendant in
support of his contention that article 1548 does not apply to them
is that it would be impossible for the Government to make a lease
for a period, exceeding six years, because it has no legal capacity
and must necessarily transact all its business through the medium
of officials. This contention can not be sustained. It is a
manifest error to say that the Government has no legal capacity or
that if has no power to grant special authority to one of its
officials for the leasing of Government property for a period
exceeding six years, if deemed advisable. This is so apparent that
it certainly requires no argument.
It is claimed, however, that Government officials do not act by
virtue of any special power but under the law creating their
respective offices, and that for this reason they are no affected
by the provisions of article 1548, which refer to administrators
whose acts may be governed by the limitations of a power of
attorney. We think that this is a mere question of words. Power,
according to text writers, means the authority granted by one
person to another to do in his behalf the same thing which he would
do himself in the premises. This is the sense in which the word
power is used in that article and it refers to the private
individual who administers property belonging to another as well as
to the public official who administers patrimonial property or the
private property belonging to the State. Such property, whether
owned by the State or by a private citizen, is covered by the
provisions of the Civil Code. In either case the administrator, in
so far as he has the management of the property of another, is a
mere agent whose acts must be governed by the limitations of the
power which his principal may have conferred upon him. In neither
case can he exceed these limitations, but must discharge his trust
in accordance with his instructions. A public official is not, as
such, exempt from the operation of this rule. He can not assume
that he has the power to lease to others the patrimonial property
belonging to the State for such time as he may see fit, say, for
eighty or ninety years. He can not do so unless expressly
authorized. Whether the administrator derives his powers from a
legislative enactment, as in the case of a public official, or from
the terms of a public instrument where private parties only are
concerned, is immaterial. It is a mere question of form which does
not affect the provision of the code above cited. What the law
requires in order that the administrator may lease the property for
a period exceeding six years is special power giving him such
authority. The grant must be contained in a public document. (Art.
1280 of the Civil Code.) A public document may be either a public
instrument or a legislative enactment, for legislative acts are
also public documents under our code.
Furthermore it is very doubtful whether Aguirre was in fact a
public official as the administrator of the San Lazaro estate. This
question, however, was not raised in the court below, no evidence
bearing on the subject having been introduced. We have merely
assumed that he was such for the sake of argument.
It is further contended by the defendant that the complaint does
not state a cause of action. This is not true. A mere perusal of
the complaint will show the contrary. We hold that the facts
therein set forth constitute a sufficient cause of action.
It is also contended that there is no allegation with respect to
the interest of the plaintiff in this action. Without passing upon
the correctness of this allegation which refers to the legal
capacity of the plaintiff, it may be said that as no question was
raised as to this point in the court below it can not be urged on
appeal.
The court below expressly found that the Government had
collected rent for four years and held that it had thereby ratified
the contract. This question was not discussed in the court below
and, legally speaking, the court should not and could not have made
any such finding. We hold that this was error on the part of the
trial court.
The judgment of the court below is hereby modified so as to
declare that the lease in question was valid only for six years
from the 1st day of January, 1899, to the 31st of December, 1904,
and void as to the last four years of the contract term that is to
say, the effects of its nullity should date from the 1st day of
January, 1905. The defendant shall return the land in the form and
manner provided for in the lease together with the proceeds derived
from its possession since the last-mentioned date. The plaintiff
will return to the defendant the rent received during the same
period, provided the rent has in fact been paid to him, with legal
interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. No costs will
be allowed to either party in either instance. After the expiration
of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and
let the case be remanded to the court below for action in
conformity herewith. So ordered.
TDC VS MANILA (, MANILA LODGE NO. 761, BENEVOLENT AND PROTECTIVE
ORDER OF THE ELKS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, CITY OF MANILA, andTARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENTOF THE FACTSThese two cases are
petitions on certiorari to review the decision dated June 30, 1975
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51590-R entitled "Tarlac
Development Corporation vs. City of Manila, and Manila Lodge No.
761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks, Inc.," affirming the
trial court's finding in Civil Case No. 83009 that the property
subject of the decisiona quois a "public park or plaza."On June 26,
1905 the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. l360 which
authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay.
The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The
Act provided that the reclaimed area "Shall be the property of the
City of Manila" and that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized
to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the Luneta
extension x x x at the north end not to exceed five hundred feet by
six hundred feet in size, for a hotel site, and to lease the same,
with the approval of the Governor General, to a responsible person
or corporation for a term not exceed ninety-nine
years."Subsequently, the Philippine Commission passed on May 18,
1907 Act No. 1657, amending Act No. 1360, so as to authorize the
City of' Manila either to lease or to sell the portion set aside as
a hotel site.The total area reclaimed was a little over 25
hectares. The City of Manila applied for the registration of the
reclaimed area, and on January 20, 1911, O.C.T. No. 1909 was issued
in the name of the City of Manila. The title described the
registered land as "un terreno conocido con el nombre de Luneta
Extension, situato en el distrito de la Ermita x x x." The
registration was "subject, however to such of the incumbrances
mentioned in Article 39 of said law (Land Registration Act) as may
be subsisting" and "sujeto a las disposiciones y condiciones
impuestas en la Ley No. 1360; y sujeto tambein a los contratos de
venta, celebrados y otorgados por la Ciudad de Manila a favor del
Army and Navy Club y la Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and
Protective Order of Elks, fechados respectivamente, en 29 de
Diciembre de 1908 y 16 de Enero de 1909."1On July 13, 1911 the City
of Manila, affirming a prior sale dated January 16, 1909 cancelled
5,543.07 square meters of the reclaimed area to the Manila Lodge
No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks of the U.S.A.
(BPOE, for short) on the basis of which TCT No. 21952was issued to
the latter over the Marcela de terreno que es parte de la Luneta
Extension, Situada en el Distrito le la Ermita ... ." At the back
of this title vas annotated document 4608/T-1635, which in part
reads as follows: "que la citada Ciusdad de Manila tendra derecho a
su opcion, de recomparar la expresada propiedad para fines publicos
solamete in cualquier tiempo despues de cincuenta anos desde el 13
le Julio le 1911, precio de la misma propiedad, mas el valor que
entonces tengan las mejoras."For the remainder of the Luneta
Extension, that is, after segregating therefrom the portion sold to
the Manila Lodge No. 761, PBOE, a new Certificate of Title No.
21963was issued on July 17, 1911 to the City of Manila.Manila Lodge
No. 761, BPOE, subsequently sold the said 5,543.07 square meters to
the Elks Club, Inc., to which was issued TCT No. 67488. 4 The
registered owner, "The Elks Club, Inc.," was later changed by court
oder to "Manila Lodge No. 761, Benevolent and Protective Order of
Elks, Inc."In January 1963 the BPOE. petitioned the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch IV, for the cancellation of the right of
the City of Manila to repurchase the property This petition was
granted on February 15, 1963.On November 19, 1963 the BPOE sold for
the sum of P4,700,000 the land together with all the improvements
thereon to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC, for short)
which paid P1,700.000 as down payment and mortgaged to the vendor
the same realty to secure the payment of the balance to be paid in
quarterly installments.5At the time of the sale,, there was no
annotation of any subsisting lien on the title to the property. On
December 12, 1963 TCT No. 73444 was issued to TDC over the subject
land still described as "UNA PARCELA DE TERRENO, que es parte de la
Luneta Extension, situada en el Distrito de Ermita ... ."In June
1964 the City of Manila filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition for the reannotation of its right to repurchase;
the court, after haering, issued an order, dated November 19, 1964,
directing the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila to
reannotatein totothe entry regarind the right of the City of Manila
to repurchase the property after fifty years. From this order TDC
and BPOE appealed to this Court which on July 31, 1968 affirmed in
G.R. Nos. L-24557 and L-24469 the trial court's order of
reannotation, but reserved to TDC the right to bring another action
for the clarification of its rights.As a consequence of such
reservation, TDC filed on April 28, 1971 against the City of Manila
and the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, a complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. 83009 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, containing
three causes of action and praying -a) On the first cause of
action, that the plaintiff TDC be declared to have purchased the
parcel of land now in question with the buildings and improvements
thereon from the defendant BPOE for value and in good faith, and
accordingly ordering the cancellation of Entry No. 4608/T-1635 on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 73444 in the name of the
Plaintiff;b) On the second cause of action, ordering the defendant
City of Manila to pay the plaintiff TDC damages in the sum of note
less than one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00);c) On the third
cause of action, reserving to the plaintiff TDC the right to
recover from the defendant BPOE the amounts mentioned in par. XVI
of the complaint in accordance with Art. 1555 of the Civil Code, in
the remote event that the final judgment in this case should be
that the parcel of land now in question is a public park; andd) For
costs, and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem
just and equitable.6Therein defendant City of Manila, in its answer
dated May 19, 1971, admitted all the facts alleged in the first
cause of action except the allegation that TDC purchased said
property "for value and in good faith," but denied for lack of
knowledge or information the allegations in the second and third
causes of action. As, special and affirmative defense, the City of
Manila claimed that TDC was not a purchaser in good faith for it
had actual notice of the City's right to repurchase which was
annotated at the back of the title prior to its cancellation, and
that, assumingarguendothat TDC had no notice of the right to
repurchase, it was, nevertheless, under obligation to investigate
inasmuch as its title recites that the property is a part of the
Luneta extension.7The Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, in its answer
dated June 7, 1971, admitted having sold the land together with the
improvements thereon for value to therein plaintiff which was in
good faith, but denied for lack of knowledge as to their veracity
the allegations under the second cause of action. It furthermore
admitted that TDC had paid the quarterly installments until October
l5, 1964 but claimed that the latter failed without justifiable
cause to pay the subsequent installments. It also asserted that it
was a seller for value in good faith without having misrepresented
or concealed tacts relative to the title on the property. As
counterclaim, Manila Lodge No. 761 (BPOE) sought to recover the
balance of the purchase price plus interest and costs.8On June 15,
1971 TDC answered the aforesaid counterclaim, alleging that its
refusal to make further payments was fully justified.9After due
trial the courta quorendered on July 14, 1972 its decision finding
the subject land to be part of the "public park or plaza" and,
therefore, part of the public domain. The court consequently
declared that the sale of the subject land by the City of Manila to
Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was null and void; that plaintiff TDC
was a purchaser thereof in g faith and for value from BPOE and can
enforce its rights against the latter; and that BPOE is entitled to
recover from the City of Manila whatever consideration it had 'paid
the latter. 'The dispositive part of the decision
reads:+.wph!1WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares that the parcel
of land formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos 2195
and 67488 in the name of BPOE and now by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 73444 in the name of Tarlac Development Corporation is a
public' park or plaza, and, consequently, instant complaint is
dimissed, without pronouncement as to costs.In view of the
reservation made by plaintiff Tarlac Development Corporation to
recover from defendant BPOE the amounts mentioned in paragraph XVI
of the complaint in accordance with Article 1555 of the Civil Code,
the Court makes no pronouncement on this point.10From said decision
the therein plaintiff TDC as well as the defendant Manila Lodge No.
761, BPOE, appealed to the Court of Appeals.In its appeal docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 51590-R, the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, avers that
the trial court committed the following errors, namely:1. In
holding that the property subject of the action is not patrimonial
property of the City of Manila; and2. In holding that the Tarlac
Development Corporation may recover and enforce its right against
the defendant BPOE.11The Tarlac Development Corporation, on the
other hand, asserts that the trial court erred:(1) In finding that
the property in question is or was a public park and in
consequently nullifying the sale thereof by the City of Manila to
BPOE;(2) In applying the cases of Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas,
30 Phil. 602, and Government vs. Cabangis, 53 Phil. 112, to the
case at bar; and(3) In not holding that the plaintiff-appellant is
entitled to ,recover damages from the defendant City of
Manila.12Furthermore, TDC as appellee regarding the second
assignment of error raised by BPOE, maintained that it can recover
and enforce its rigth against BPOE in the event that the land in
question is declared a public park or part thereof.13In its
decision promulgated on June 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals concur
ed in the findings and conclusions of the lower court upon the
ground that they are supported by he evidence and are in accordance
with law, and accordingly affirmed the lower court's
judgment.Hence, the present petitions for review oncertiorari.G.R.
No. L-41001The Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, contends, in its
petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. L-41001,
that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) disregarding the very
enabling acts and/or statutes according to which the subject
property was, and still is, patrimonial property of the City of
Manila and could therefore be sold and/or disposed of like any
other private property; and (2) in departing from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings when it simply made a general
affirmance of the courta quo'sfindings and conclusions without
bothering to discuss or resolve several vital points stressed by
the BPOE in its assigned errrors.14G.R. No. L-41012The Tarlac
Development Corporation, in its petition for review on certiorari
docketed as G.R. No. L-41012, relies on the following grounds for
the allowance of its petition:1. that the Court of Appeals did not
correctly interpret Act No. 1360, as amended by Act No. 1657, of
the Philippine Commission; and2. that the Court of Appeals has
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings
in that it did not make its own findings but simply recited those
of the lower court.15ISSUES AND ARGUMENTSFIRST ISSUEUpon the first
issue, both petitioners claim that the property subject of the
action, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1360, as amended by
Act No. 1657, was patrimonial property of the City of Manila and
not a park or plaza.Arguments of PetitionersIn G.R. No. L-41001,
the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, admits that "there appears to be
some logic in the conclusion" of the Court of Appeals that "neither
Act No. 1360 nor Act No. 1657 could have meant to supply the City
of Manila the authority to sell the subject property which is
located at the south end not the north of the reclaimed area."16It
argues, however, that when Act No. 1360, as amended, authorized the
City of Manila to undertake the construction of the Luneta
extension by reclaimed land from the Manila Bay, and declared that
the reclaimed land shall be the "property of the City of Manila,"
the State expressly granted the ownership thereof to the City of
Manila which. consequently. could enter into transactions involving
it; that upon the issuance of O.C.T. No. 1909, there could he no
doubt that the reclaimed area owned by the City was its patrimonial
property;" that the south end of the reclaimed area could not be
for public use for. as argued by TDC a street, park or promenade
can be property for public use pursuant to Article 344 of the
Spanish Civil Code only when it has already been so constructed or
laid out, and the subject land, at the time it was sold to the
Elk's Club, was neither actually constructed as a street, park or
promenade nor laid out as a street, park or promenade;" that even
assuming that the subject property was at the beginning property of
public dominion, it was subsequently converted into patrimonial
property pursuant to Art. 422 of the Civil Code, inasmuch as it had
never been used, red or utilized since it was reclaimed in 1905 for
purpose other than this of an ordinary real estate for sale or
lease; that the subject property had never been intended for public
use, is further shown by the fact that it was neither included as a
part of the Luneta Park under Plan No. 30 of the National Planning
Commission nor considered a part of the Luneta National Park (now
Rizal Park) by Proclamation No. 234 dated December 19, 1955 of
President Ramon Magsaysay or by Proclamation Order No. 274 dated
October 4, 1967 of President Ferdinand E. Marcos;"19that, such
being the case, there is no reason why the subject property should
-not be considered as having been converted into patrimonial
property, pursuant to the ruling inMunicipality vs. Roa7 Phil. 20,
inasmuch as the City of Manila has considered it as its patrimonial
property not only bringing it under the operation of the Land
Registration Act but also by disposing of it;20and that to consider
now the subject property as a public plaza or park would not only
impair the obligations of the parties to the contract of sale
(rated July 13, 1911, but also authorize deprivation of property
without due process of law.21G.R. No. L-410112In L-41012, the
petitioner TDC stresses that the principal issue is the
interpretation of Act No. 1360, as amended by. Act No. 1657 of the
Philippine Commission,22and avers that inasmuch as Section 6 of Act
No. 1360, as amended by Act 1657, provided that the reclamation of
the Luneta extension was to be paid for out of the funds of the
City of Manila which was authorized to borrow P350,000 "to be
expended in the construction of Luneta Extension," the reclaimed
area became "public land" belonging to the City of Manila that
spent for the reclamation, conformably to the holding
inCabangis,23and consequently, said land was subject to sale and
other disposition; that the Insular Government itself considered
the reclaimed Luneta extension as patrimonial property subject to
disposition as evidenced by the fact that See. 3 of Act 1360
declared that "the land hereby reclaimed shall be the property of
the City of Manila;" that this property cannot be property for
public use for according to Article 344 of the Civil Code, the
character of property for public use can only attach to roads and
squares that have already been constructed or at least laid out as
such, which conditions did not obtain regarding the subject land,
that Sec. 5 of Act 1360 authorized the City of Manila to lease the
northern part of the reclaimed area for hotel purposes; that Act
No. 1657 furthermore authorized the City of Manila to sell the
same;24that the express statutory authority to lease or sell the
northern part of the reclaimed area cannot be interpreted to mean
that the remaining area could not be sold inasmuch as the purpose
of the statute was not merely to confer authority to sell the
northern portion but rather to limit the city's power of
disposition thereof, to wit: to prevent disposition of the northern
portion for any purpose other than for a hotel site that the
northern and southern ends of the reclaimed area cannot be
considered as extension of the Luneta for they lie beyond the sides
of the original Luneta when extended in the direction of the sea,
and that is the reason why the law authorized the sale of the
northern portion for hotel purposes, and, for the same reason, it
is implied that the southern portion could likewise be disposed
of.26TDC argues likewise that there are several items of
uncontradicted circumstantial evidence which may serve as aids in
construing the legislative intent and which demonstrate that the
subject property is patrimonial in nature, to wit: (1) Exhibits "J"
and "J-1", or Plan No. 30 of the National Planning Commission
showing the Luneta and its vicinity, do not include the subject
property as part of the Luneta Park; (2) Exhibit "K", which is the
plan of the subject property covered by TCT No. 67488 of BPOE,
prepared on November 11, 1963, indicates that said property is not
a public park; (3) Exhibit "T", which is a certified copy of
Proclamation No. 234 issued on December 15, 1955 is President
Magsaysay, and Exhibit "U" which is Proclamation Order No. 273
issued on October 4, 1967 by President Marcos, do not include the
subject property in the Luneta Park-, (4) Exhibit "W", which is the
location plan of the Luneta National Park under Proclamations Nos.
234 and 273, further confirms that the subject property is not a
public park; and (5) Exhibit "Y", which is a copy of O.C.T. No.
7333 in the name of the United States of America covering the land
now occupied by the America covering the land now occupied by the
American Embassy, the boundaries of which were delineated by the
Philippine Legislature, states that the said land is bounded on the
northwest by properties of the Army and Navy Club (Block No. 321)
and the Elks Club (Block No. 321), and this circumstance shows that
even the Philippine Legislature recognized the subject property as
private property of the Elks Club.27TDC furthermore contends that
the City of Manila is estopped from questioning the validity of the
sale of the subject property that it executed on July 13, 1911 to
the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, for several reasons, namely: (1)
the City's petition for the reannotation of Entry No. 4608/T-1635
was predicated on the validity of said sale; (2) when the property
was bought by the petitioner TDC it was not a public plaza or park
as testified to by both Pedro Cojuanco, treasurer of TDC, and the
surveyor, Manuel Aoneuvo, according to whom the subject property
was from all appearances private property as it was enclosed by
fences; (3) the property in question was cadastrally surveyed and
registered as property of the Elks Club, according to Manuel
Anonuevo; (4) the property was never used as a public park, for,
since the issuance of T.C.T. No. 2165 on July 17, 1911 in the name
of the Manila Lodge NO. 761, the latter used it as private
property, and as early as January 16, 1909 the City of Manila had
already executed a deed of sale over the property in favor of the
Manila Lodge No. 761; and (5) the City of Manila has not presented
any evidence to show that the subject property has ever been
proclaimed or used as a public park.28TDC, moreover, contends that
Sec. 60 of Com. Act No. 141 cannot apply to the subject land, for
Com. Act No. 141 took effect on December 1, 1936 and at that time
the subject land was no longer part of the part of the public
domain.29TDC also stresses that its rights as a purchaser in good
faith cannot be disregarded, for the mere mention in the
certificate of title that the lot it purchased was "part of the
Luneta extension" was not a sufficient warning that tile title to
the City of Manila was invalid; and that although the trial court,
in its decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals, found the TDC -to
has been an innocent purchaser for value, the court disregarded the
petitioner's rights as such purchaser that relied on Torrens
certificate of title.30The Court, continues the petitioner TDC
erred in not holding that the latter is entitled to recover from
the City of Manila damages in the amount of P100,000 caused by the
City's petition for- reannotation of its right to
repurchase.DISCUSSION AND RESOLUTION OF FIRST ISSUEIt is a cardinal
rule of statutory construction that courts must give effect to the
general legislative intent that can be discovered from or is
unraveled by the four corners of the statute,31and in order to
discover said intent, the whole statute, and not only a particular
provision thereof, should be considered.32It is, therefore,
necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360, as
amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent.Act No. 1360
which was enacted by the Philippine Commission on June 26, 1905, as
amended by Act No. 1657 enacted on May 18, 1907, authorized the
"construction of such rock and timber bulkheads or sea walls as may
be necessary for the making of an extension to the Luneta" (Sec. 1
[a]), and the placing of the material dredged from the harbor of
Manila "inside the bulkheads constructed to inclose the Luneta
extension above referred to" (Sec. 1 [a]). It likewise provided
that the plan of Architect D. H. Burnham as "a general outline for
the extension and improvement of the Luneta in the City of Manila"
be adopted; that "the reclamation from the Bay of Manila of the
land included in said projected Luneta extension... is hereby
authorized andthe land thereby reclaimed shall be the property of
the City of Manila" (Sec. 3); that "the City of Manila is hereby
authorized to set aside a tract of the reclaimed land formed by the
Luneta extension authorizedby this Actat the worth endof said
tract, not to exceed five hundred feet by six hundred feet in
size,for a hotel site, and to lease the samewith the approval of
the Governor General, ... for a term not exceeding ninety-nine
years; that "should the Municipal Board ... deem it advisable it is
hereby authorized to advertise for sale to sell said tract of land
... ;" "that said tract shall be used for hotel purposes as herein
prescribed, and shall not be devoted to any other purpose or object
whatever;" "that should the grantee x x x fail to maintain on said
tract a first-class hotel x x x then the title to said tract of
land sold, conveyed, and transferred, and shall not be devoted to
any other purpose or object whatever;" "that should the grantee x x
x fail to maintain on said tract a first-class hotel x x x then the
title to said tract of land sold, conveyed, and transferred to the
grantee shall revert to the City of Manila, and said City of Manila
shall thereupon become entitled to immediate possession of said
tract of land" (Sec. 5); that the construction of the rock and
timber bulkheads or sea wall "shall be paid for out of the funds of
the City of Manila, but the area to be reclaimed by said proposed
Luneta extension shall be filled, without cost to the City of
Manila, with material dredged from Manila Bay at the expense of the
Insular Government" (Sec. 6); and that "the City of Manila is
hereby authorized to borrow from the Insular Government ... the sum
of three hundred thousand pesos, to be expended in the construction
of Luneta extension provided for by paragraph (a) of section one
hereof" (Sec.7).The grant made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed
land to the City of Manila is a grant of "public" nature, the same
having been made to a local political subdivision. Such grants have
always beenstrictlyconstrued against the grantee.33One compelling
reason given for the strict interpretation of a public grant is
that there is in such grant a gratuitous donation of, public money
or resources which results in an unfair advantage to the grantee
and for that reason, the grant should be narrowly restricted in
favor of the public.34This reason for strict interpretation obtains
relative to the aforesaid grant, for, although the City of Manila
was to pay for the construction of such work and timber bulkheads
or sea walls as may be necessary for the making of the Luneta
extension, the area to be reclaimed would be filled at the expense
of the Insular Government and without cost to the City of Manila,
with material dredged from Manila Bay. Hence, the letter of the
statute should be narrowed to exclude maters which if included
would defeat the policy of the legislation.The reclaimed area, an
extension to the Luneta, is declared to be property of the City of
Manila. Property, however, is either of public ownership or of
private ownership. 35 What kind of property of the City is the
reclaimed land? Is it of public ownership (dominion) or of private
ownership?We hold that it is of public dominion, intended for
public use.Firstly, if the reclaimed area was granted to the City
of Manila as its patrimonial property, the City could, by virtue of
its ownership, dispose of the whole reclaimed area without need
ofauthorizationto do so from the lawmaking body. Thus Article 348
of the Civil Code of Spain provides that "ownership is the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing without further limitations than those
established by law."36The right to dispose (jus disponendi) of
one's property is an attribute of ownership. Act No. 1360, as
amended, however, provides by necessary implication, that the City
of Manila could not dispose of the reclaimed area without
beingauthorizedby the lawmaking body. Thus the statute provides
that "the City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a tract
... at the north end, for a hotel site, and to lease the same ...
should the municipal board ... deem it advisable, it ishereby
authorized...to sell said tract of land ... " (Sec. 5). If the
reclaimed area were patrimonial property of the City, the latter
could dispose of it without need of the authorization provided by
the statute, and the authorization to set aside ... lease ... or
sell ... given by the statute would indeed be superfluous. To so
construe the statute s to render the term "authorize," which is
repeatedly used by the statute, superfluous would violate the
elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that effect must be given to
every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and that a statute
should be so interpreted that no part thereof becomes inoperative
or superfluous.37To authorize means to empower, to give a right to
act.38Act No. 1360 furthermore qualifies the verb it authorize"
with the adverb "hereby," which means "by means of this statue or
section," Hence without the authorization expressly given by Act
No. 1360, the City of Manila could not lease or sell even the
northern portion; much less could it dispose of the whole reclaimed
area. Consequently, the reclaimed area was granted to the City of
Manila, not as its patrimonial property. At most, only the northern
portion reserved as a hotel site could be said to be patrimonial
property for, by express statutory provision it could be disposed
of, and thetitlethereto would revert to the City should the grantee
fail to comply with the terms provided by the statute.TDC however,
contends that the purpose of the authorization provided in Act No.
1360 to lease or sell was really to limit the City's power of
disposition. To sustain such contention is to beg the question. If
the purpose of the law was to limit the City's power of disposition
then it is necessarily assumed that the City had already the power
to dispose, for if such power did not exist, how could it be
limited? It was precisely Act 1360 that gave the City the power to
dispose for it was hereby authorized by lease of sale. Hence, the
City of Manila had no power to dispose of the reclaimed land had
such power not been granted by Act No. 1360, and the purpose of the
authorization was to empower the city to sell or lease the northern
part and not, as TDC claims, to limit only the power to dispose.
Moreover, it is presumed that when the lawmaking body enacted the
statute, it had full knowledge of prior and existing laws and
legislation on the subject of the statute and acted in accordance
or with respect thereto.39If by another previous law, the City of
Manila could already dispose of the reclaimed area, which it could
do if such area were given to it as its patrimonial property, would
it then not be a superfluity for Act No. 1360 toauthorizethe City
to dispose of the reclaimed land? Neither has petitioner TDC
pointed to any other law that authorized the City to do so, nor
have we come across any. What we do know is that if the reclaimed
land were patrimonial property, there would be no need of giving
special authorization to the City to dispose of it. Said
authorization was given because the reclaimed land was not intended
to be patrimonial property of the City of Manila, and without the
express authorization to dispose of the northern portion, the City
could not dispose of even that part.Secondly, the reclaimed area is
an "extension to the Luneta in the City of Manila."40If the
reclaimed area is an extension of the Luneta, then it is of the
same nature or character as the old Luneta. Anent this matter, it
has been said that a power to extend (or continue an act or
business) cannot authorize a transaction that is totally
distinct.41It is not disputed that the old Luneta is a public park
or plaza and it is so considered by Section 859 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila.42Hence the "extension to the
Luneta" must be also a public park or plaza and for public use.TDC,
however, contends that the subject property cannot be considered an
extension of the old Luneta because it is outside of the limits of
the old Luneta when extended to the sea. This is a strained
interpretation of the term "extension," for an "extension," it has
been held, "signifies enlargement in any direction in length,
breadth, or circumstance."43Thirdly,the reclaimed area was formerly
a part of the manila Bay. A bay is nothing more than an inlet of
the sea. Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law of Waters of 1866, bays,
roadsteads, coast sea, inlets and shores are parts of the national
domain open to public use. These are also property of public
ownership devoted to public use, according to Article 339 of the
Civil Code of Spain.When the shore or part of the bay is reclaimed,
it does not lose its character of being property for public use,
according toGovernment of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabangis.44The
predecessor of the claimants in this case was the owner of a big
tract of land including the lots in question. From 1896 said land
began to wear away due to the action of the waters of Manila Bay.
In 1901 the lots in question became completely submerged in water
in ordinary tides. It remained in such a state until 1912 when the
Government undertook the dredging of the Vitas estuary and dumped
the Sand and - silt from estuary on the low lands completely
Submerged in water thereby gradually forming the lots in question.
Tomas Cabangis took possession thereof as soon as they were
reclaimed hence, the claimants, his successors in interest, claimed
that the lots belonged to them. The trial court found for the
claimants and the Government appealed. This Court held that when
the lots became a part of the shore. As they remained in that
condition until reclaimed by the filling done by the Government,
they belonged to the public domain. for public use .4' Hence, a
part of the shore, and for that purpose a part of the bay, did not
lose its character of being for public use after it was
reclaimed.Fourthly, Act 1360, as amended, authorized the lease or
sale of the northern portion of the reclaimed area as a hotel
sites. The subject property is not that northern portion authorized
to be leased or sold; the subject property is the southern portion.
Hence, applying the rule ofexpresio unius est exlusio alterius, the
City of Manila was not authorized to sell the subject property. The
application of this principle of statutory construction becomes the
more imperative in the case at bar inasmuch as not only must the
public grant of the reclaimed area to the City of Manila be, as
above stated, strictly construed against the City of Manila, but
also because a grant of power to a municipal corporation, as
happens in this case where the city is author ized to lease or sell
the northern portion of the Luneta extension, is strictly limited
to such as are expressly or impliedly authorized or necessarily
incidental to the objectives of the corporation.Fifthly, Article
344 of the Civil Code of Spain provides that to property of public
use, in provinces and in towns, comprises the provincial and town
roads, the squares streets fountains, and public waters the
promenades, and public works of general service paid for by such
towns or provinces." A park or plaza, such as the extension to the
Luneta, is undoubtedly comprised in said article.The petitioners,
however, argue that, according to said Article 344, in order that
the character of property for public use may be so attached to a
plaza, the latter must be actually constructed or at least laid out
as such, and since the subject property was not yet constructed as
a plaza or at least laid out as a plaza when it was sold by the
City, it could not be property for public use. It should be noted,
however, that properties of provinces and towns for public use are
governed by the same principles as properties of the same character
belonging to the public domain.46In order to be property of public
domain an intention to devote it to public use is sufficient.47The,
petitioners' contention is refuted by Manresa himself who said, in
his comments", on Article 344, that:+.wph!1Las plazas, calles y
paseos publicos correspondent sin duda aiguna aldominio publico
municipal ), porque se hallan establecidos sobre suelo municipal y
estan destinadas al uso de todos Laurent presenta tratando de las
plazas, una question relativa a si deben conceptuarse como de
dominio publico los lugares vacios libres, que se encuenttan en los
Municipios rurales ... Laurent opina contra Pioudhon que toda vez
que estan al servicio de todos pesos lugares, deben considerable
publicos y de dominion publico. Realmente, pala decidir el punto,
bastara siempre fijarse en el destino real y efectivo de los
citados lugares, y si este destino entraa un uso comun de todos, no
hay duda que son de dominio publico municipal si no
patrimoniales.It is not necessary, therefore, that a plaza be
already constructed of- laid out as a plaza in order that it be
considered property for public use. It is sufficient that it be
intended to be such In the case at bar, it has been shown that the
intention of the lawmaking body in giving to the City of Manila the
extension to the Luneta was not a grant to it of patrimonial
property but a grant for public use as a plaza.We have
demonstratedad satietatemthat the Luneta extension as intended to
be property of the City of Manila for public use. But, could not
said property-later on be converted, as the petitioners contend, to
patrimonial property? It could be. But this Court has already said,
inIgnacio vs. The Director of Lands,49the executive and possibly
the legislation department that has the authority and the power to
make the declaration that said property, is no longer required for
public use, and until such declaration i made the property must
continue to form paint of the public domain. In the case at bar,
there has been no such explicit or unequivocal declaration It
should be noted, furthermore, anent this matter, that courts are
undoubted v not. primarily called upon, and are not in a position,
to determine whether any public land is still needed for the
purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters .50Having
disposed of the petitioners' principal arguments relative to the
main issue, we now pass to the items of circumstantial evidence
which TDC claims may serve as aids in construing the legislative
intent in the enactment of Act No. 1360, as amended. It is
noteworthy that all these items of alleged circumstantial evidence
are acts far removed in time from the date of the enactment of Act
No.1360 such that they cannot be considered contemporaneous with
its enactment. Moreover, it is not farfetched that this mass of
circumstantial evidence might have been influenced by the
antecedent series of invalid acts, to wit: the City's having
obtained over the reclaimed area OCT No. 1909 on January 20,1911;
the sale made by the City of the subject property to Manila Lodge
No. 761; and the issuance to the latter of T.C.T. No. 2195. It
cannot gainsaid that if the subsequent acts constituting the
circumstantial evidence have been base on, or at least influenced,
by those antecedent invalid acts and Torrens titles S they can
hardly be indicative of the intent of the lawmaking body in
enacting Act No. 1360 and its amendatory act.TDC claims that Exhs.
"J," "J-l" "K," "T," "U," "W" and "Y" show that the subject
property is not a park.Exhibits "J" and "J-1," the "Luneta and
vicinity showing proposed development" dated May 14, 1949, were
prepared by the National Urban Planning Commission of the Office of
the President. It cannot be reasonably expected that this plan for
development of the Luneta should show that the subject property
occupied by the ElksClub is a public park, for it was made 38 years
after the sale to the Elks, and after T.C.T. No. 2195 had been
issued to Elks. It is to be assumed that the Office of the
President was cognizant of the Torrens title of BPOE. That the
subject property was not included as a part of the Luneta only
indicated that the National Urban Planning Commission that made the
plan knew that the subject property was occupied by Elks and that
Elks had a Torrens title thereto. But this in no way proves that
the subject property was originally intended to be patrimonial
property of the City of Manila or that the sale to Elks or that the
Torrens-title of the latter is valid.Exhibit "K" is the "Plan of
land covered by T.C.T . No ----, as prepared for Tarlac Development
Company." It was made on November 11, 1963 by Felipe F. Cruz,
private land surveyor. This surveyor is admittedly a surveyor for
TDC.51This plan cannot be expected to show that the subject
property is a part of the Luneta Park, for he plan was made to show
the lot that "was to be sold to petitioner." This plan must have
also assumed the existence of a valid title to the land in favor of
Elks.Exhibits "T" and "U" are copies of Presidential Proclamations
No. 234 issued on November 15, 1955 and No. 273 issued on October
4, 1967, respectively. The purpose of the said Proclamations was to
reserve certain parcels of land situated in the District of Ermita,
City of Manila, for park site purposes. Assuming that the subject
property is not within the boundaries of the reservation, this
cannot be interpreted to mean that the subject property was not
originally intended to be for public use or that it has ceased to
be such. Conversely, had the subject property been included in the
reservation, it would mean, if it really were private property,
that the rights of the owners thereof would be extinguished, for
the reservations was "subject to private rights, if any there be."
That the subject property was not included in the reservation only
indicates that the President knew of the existence of the Torrens
titles mentioned above. The failure of the Proclamations to include
the subject property in the reservation for park site could not
change the character of the subject property as originally for
public use and to form part of the Luneta Park. What has been said
here applies to Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-3," and "W" which also
refer to the area and location of the reservation for the Luneta
Park.Exhibit "Y" is a copy of O.C.T. No. 7333 dated November 13,
1935, covering the lot where now stands the American Embassy
[Chancery]. It states that the property is "bounded ... on the
Northwest by properties of Army and Navy Club (Block No.321) and
Elks Club (Block No. 321)." Inasmuch as the said bounderies
delineated by the Philippine Legislature in Act No. 4269, the
petitioners contend that the Legislature recognized and conceded
the existence of the Elks Club property as a primate property (the
property in question) and not as a public park or plaza. This
argument is non sequitur plain and simple Said Original Certificate
of Title cannot be considered as an incontrovertible declaration
that the Elks Club was in truth and in fact the owner of such
boundary lot. Such mention as boundary owner is not a means of
acquiring title nor can it validate a title that is null and
void.TDC finally claims that the City of Manila is estopped from
questioning the validity of the sale it executed on July 13,'1911
conconveying the subject property to the Manila Lodge No. 761,
BPOE. This contention cannot be seriously defended in the light of
the doctrine repeatedly enunciated by this Court that the
Government is never estopped by mistakes or errors on the pan of
its agents, and estoppel does not apply to a municipal corporation
to validate a contract that is prohibited by law or its against
Republic policy, and the sale of July 13, 1911 executed by the City
of Manila to Manila Lodge was certainly a contract prohibited by
law. Moreover, estoppel cannot be urged even if the City of Manila
accepted the benefits of such contract of sale and the Manila Lodge
No. 761 had performed its part of the agreement, for to apply the
doctrine of estoppel against the City of Manila in this case would
be tantamount to enabling it to do indirectly what it could not do
directly.52The sale of the subject property executed by the City of
Manila to the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, was void and inexistent
for lack of subject matter.53It suffered from an incurable defect
that could not be ratified either by lapse of time or by express
ratification. The Manila Lodge No. 761 therefore acquired no right
by virtue of the said sale. Hence to consider now the contract
inexistent as it always has seen, cannot be, as claimed by the
Manila Lodge No. 761, an impairment of the obligations of
contracts, for there was it, contemplation of law, no contract at
all.The inexistence of said sale can be set up against anyone who
asserts a right arising from it, not only against the first vendee,
the Manila Lodge No. 761, BPOE, but also against all its
suceessors, including the TDC which are not protected the doctrine
of bona fide ii purchaser without notice, being claimed by the TDC
does not apply where there is a total absence of title in the
vendor, and the good faith of the purchaser TDC cannot create title
where none exists.55The so-called sale of the subject property
having been executed, the restoration or restitution of what has
been given is order56SECOND ISSUEThe second ground alleged in
support of the instant petitions for review on certiorari is that
the Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the
power of supervision. TDC in L-41012, argues that the respondent
Court did not make its own findings but simply recited those of the
lower court and made a general affirmance, contrary to the
requirements of the Constitution; that the respondent Court made
glaring and patent mistakes in recounting even the copied findings,
palpably showing lack of deliberate consideration of the matters
involved, as, for example, when said court said that Act No. 1657
authorized the City of Manila to set aside a portion of the
reclaimed land "formed by the Luneta Extension of- to lease or sell
the same for park purposes;" and that respondent Court. further
more, did not resolve or dispose of any of the assigned errors
contrary to the mandate of the Judiciary Act..57The Manila Lodge
No. 761, in L-41001, likewise alleges, as one of the reasons
warranting review, that the Court of Appeals departed from the
accepted and usual course of Judicial proceedings by simply making
a general affirmance of the courta quofindings without bothering to
resolve several vital points mentioned by the BPOE in its assigned
errors.58COMMENTS ON SECOND ISSUEWe have shown in our discussion of
the first issue that the decision of the trial court is fully in
accordance with law. To follows that when such decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the affirmance was likewise in
accordance with law. Hence, no useful purpose will be served in
further discussing the second issue.CONCLUSIONACCORDINGLY, the
petitions in both G.R. Nos. L-41001 and L-41012 are denied for lack
of merit, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 30,
1975, is hereby affirmed, at petitioner's cost.
1. WHAT LANDS CAPABLE TO
REGISTER?___________________________________2. HOW LANDS OF PUBLIC
DOMAIN OPENS FOR OWNERSHIP?ACT No. 2874As amended by Acts Nos.
3164, 3219, 3346, and 3517TO AMEND AND COMPILE THE LAWS RELATIVE TO
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 7.For the purpose of the government and disposition of
alienable or disposable public lands, the Governor-General, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this, Act.Section 8.Only those
lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited and classified and, when
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public
or quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in
any manner become private property, nor those on which a private
right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law
may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated,
have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-General may, for
reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open
to disposition before the same have had their boundaries
established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend
their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or
by Act of the Legislature.Section 9.For the purposes of their
government and disposition, the lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to
the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as
follows:(a) Agricultural(b) Commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes.(c) Educational, charitable, and other similar
purposes.(d) Reservations for town sites, and for public and
quasi-public uses.The Governor-General, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
time make the classification provided for in this section, and may,
at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class
to another.Section 10.The words "alienation,'' "disposition," or
"Concession" as used in this Act, shall mean any of the methods
authorized by this Act for the acquisition, lease, use or benefit
of the lands of the public domain other than timber or mineral
lands.
Section 3 Article 13 of Constitution.Section 3. The State shall
afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, andpromote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.It shall guarantee the rights of all workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law.The State shall
promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling
disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual
compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.The State shall
regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing
the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production
and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns to investments,
and to expansion and growth
Section 8 COMMONWEALTH ACT.141Section8.Only those lands shall be
declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable,
surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or
quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any
manner become private property, nor those on which a private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be
claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have
ceased to be so However, the President may, for reasons of public
interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition
before the same have had their boundaries established or been
surveyed, or may, for the same reason, suspend their concession or
disposition until they are again declared open to concession or
disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the
National Assembly.
DELIMITED AND CLASSIFIED?
BAGUNU VS AGGABAOThe present controversy stemmed from a protest
filed by the spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda Acerit
(respondents) against the petitioners free patent application over
a parcel of unregistered land located in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas,
Isabela (subject land), pending before the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan (DENR Regional Office).The subject land was previously
owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo
Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject
land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag.On December 12, 1961,
Atty. Binag applied for a free patent3over the subject land with
the Bureau of Lands (now Lands Management Bureau).4On November 24,
1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land (third sale) to the
petitioner,5who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent
applicant. The parties deed of sale states that the land sold to
the petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty. Binags pending free
patent application.6The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the
subject land, the Bureau of Lands survey,7and the free patent
applications uniformly identified the subject land asLot 322. The
deeds covering the second and third sale also uniformly identified
the boundaries of the subject land.8On December 28, 1992, the
respondents filed a protest against the petitioners free patent
application. The respondents asserted ownership overLot 322based on
the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale, dated June 23,
1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of
one Rafael Bautista.9The Office of the Regional Executive Director
of the DENR conducted an ocular inspection and formal
investigation. The DENR Regional Office found out that the
petitioner actually occupies and cultivates "the area in dispute
including the area purchased by [the respondents]."10On July 10,
1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully
included Lot 322 in his free patent application since this lot
belongs to the respondents. The DENR Regional Office ordered:1.
[The respondents to] file their appropriate public land application
covering Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D xxx;2. [The petitioners free patent
application] be amended by excluding Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D, as
included in Lot No. 258;3. [A] relocation survey xxx to determine
the exact area as indicated in [the parties] respective technical
description of x x x Lot Nos. 258 and 322, Pls-541-D.11The
petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office
denied the motion ruling that in determining the identity of a lot,
the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are
controlling. Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in
the petitioners favor correspond to the boundaries ofLot 258, what
the petitioner acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the erroneous
description of the lot sold as Lot 322.12On appeal, the DENR
Secretary affirmed13the ruling of the DENR Regional Office. After
noting the differences in the boundaries stated in the parties
respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR Secretary concluded that the
land claimed by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that
claimed by the respondents. The DENR Secretary ruled that based on
the parties respective deeds of sale, the Subdivision Plan of the
lot sold to the petitioner and Atty. Binags affidavit - claiming
that the designation of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the
petitioners favor is erroneous - what the petitioner really
acquired was Lot 258 and not Lot 322.14The petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA).COURT OF APPEALS RULINGThe CA affirmed
the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the CA ruled that since questions on the identity of
a land require a technical determination by the appropriate
administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR Regional
Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary, are entitled to great
respect, if not finality.15The petitioner assails this ruling
before the Court.Civil Case No. 751In the meantime, on November 22,
1994 (or during the pendency of the respondents protest), Atty.
Binag filed a complaint for reformation of instruments, covering
the second and third sale, against Bautista and the petitioner (the
civil case) with the Cabagan, Isabela Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Atty. Binag alleged that while the deeds evidencing the successive
sale of the subject land correctly identified theboundariesof the
land sold, the deeds, nevertheless, erroneously identified the
subject land as Lot 322, instead ofLot 258.16On December 9, 1994,
the petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC,
citing the pendency of the land protest before the Bureau of Lands.
The RTC held in abeyance its resolution on the motion to
dismiss.17After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR Regional
Office, the respondents joined Atty. Binag in the civil case by
filing a complaint-in-intervention against the petitioner. The
complaint-in-intervention captioned the respondents causes of
action as one for Quieting of Title, Reivindicacion and
Damages.18The respondents alleged that the petitioners claim over
Lot 322 is a cloud on their title and ownership of Lot 322. The
respondents also alleged that they were in peaceful, continuous,
public and adverse possession of Lot 322 from the time they fully
acquired it in 1979 until sometime in August of 1992, when the
petitioner, through stealth and strategy, ejected them from Lot 322
after transferring his possession from Lot 258.19The respondents
asked the RTC to declare them as owners of Lot 322.After the CA
affirmed the DENR Secretarys favorable resolution on the
respondents protest, the respondents asked the RTC to suspend the
civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretarys
ruling.20In their prayer, the respondents asked the RTC to:1.
[Adopt] the findings of the DENR as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals xxx thus, the cause of action xxx for reformation of
contracts be granted;2. [Order the petitioner] to vacate Lot 322
xxx and his [Free Patent Application] be amended to exclude Lot 322
xxx.3. [Set the case] for hearing to receive evidence on the claim
of the [respondents] for damages[.]THE PETITIONThe petitioner
argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR
Secretarysjurisdictionto resolve the parties conflicting claims
ofownershipover Lot 322, notwithstanding that the same issue is
pending with the RTC. By ruling that the petitioner bought Lot 258
(and not Lot 322) from Atty. Binag and for adjudicating Lot 322 to
the respondents, the DENR effectively reformed contracts and
determined claims of ownership over a real property matters beyond
the DENRs competence to determine.The petitioner faults the CA for
applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction since the issue of
who has a better right over Lot 322 does not involve the
"specialized technical expertise" of the DENR. On the contrary, the
issue involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of
evidence and the application of the pertinent Civil Code
provisions, which are matters within the competence of the
courts.The petitioner claims that the DENR Secretarys factual
finding, as affirmed by the CA,is contrary to the evidence. The
petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale in his favor clearly
identified the property sold as Lot 322, which was the same land
Atty. Binag identified in his free patent application; that the
area of Lot 322, as previously determined in a survey caused by the
vendor himself (Atty. Binag), tallies with the area stated in the
deed in his favor; that he has been in possession of Lot 322 since
1987, when it was sold to him; and that his present possession and
cultivation of Lot 322 were confirmed by the DENR Regional Office
during its ocular investigation.The petitioner also invites our
attention to the incredulity of the respondents claim of ownership
over Lot 322, based on Atty. Binags testimony during the hearing on
the respondents protest. According to the petitioner, the
respondents could not have expressed interest in buying Lot 322
from Atty. Binag had they already acquired Lot 322 from the heirs
of one Rafael Bautista. The petitioner adds that as early as 1979,
the respondents were already aware of Atty. Binags free patent
application over Lot 322. Yet, they filed their protest to the free
patent application only in 1992 when the petitioner had already
substituted Atty. Binag. The petitioner claims that the respondents
inaction is inconsistent with their claim of ownership.Lastly, the
petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322 in the respondents
favor by claiming that the respondents presented no sufficient
evidence to prove their (or their predecessor-in-interests)
title.In our April 13, 2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for
failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed
CA Decision and for raising substantially factual issues. The
petitioner moved for reconsideration, confining his arguments to
the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent applicability of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine.THE RULINGWe deny the motion for
reconsideration.Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45The
main thrust of the petitioners arguments refers to the alleged
error of the DENR and the CA inidentifyingthe parcel of land that
the petitioner bought an error that adversely affected his right to
apply for a free patent over the subject land. In his motion for
reconsideration, the petitioner apparently took a cue from our
April 13, 2009 Resolution, denying his petition, since his present
motion limitedly argues against the DENRs jurisdiction and the CAs
application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.The petitioner
correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are
generally barred under a Rule 45 petition. In the present case,
theidentityof Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The
determination of the identity of these lots involves the task of
delineating their actual boundaries in accordance with the parties
respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others. While there
are instances where the Court departs from the general rule on the
reviewable issues under Rule 45, the petitioner did not even
attempt to show that his case falls within the recognized
exceptions.21On top of this legal reality, the findings and
decision of the Director of Lands22on questions of fact, when
approved by the DENR Secretary, are generally conclusive on the
courts,23and even on this Court, when these factual findings are
affirmed by the appellate court. We shall consequently confine our
discussions to the petitioners twin legal issues.The determination
of the identity of a public land is within the DENRs exclusive
jurisdiction to manage and dispose of lands of the public domainThe
petitioner insists that under the law24actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation, to which a suit for reformation of contracts
belong, and those involving ownership of real property fall within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Since these
actions are already pending before the RTC, the DENR Secretary
overstepped his authority in excluding Lot 322 from the petitioners
free patent application and ordering the respondents to apply for a
free patent over the same lot.In an action for reformation of
contract, the court determines whether the parties written
agreement reflects their true intention.25In the present case, this
intention refers to theidentityof the land covered by the second
and third sale. On the other hand, in areivindicatoryaction, the
court resolves the issue of ownership of real property and the
plaintiffs entitlement to recover its full possession. In this
action, the plaintiff is required to prove not only his ownership,
but also theidentityof the real property he seeks to
recover.26While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC, the courts jurisdiction to resolve
controversies involving ownership of real property extends only to
private lands. In the present case, neither party has asserted
private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents acknowledged the
public character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the administrative
findings of the DENR in their complaint-in-intervention, instead of
asserting their own private ownership of the property. For his
part, the petitioners act of applying for a free patent with the
Bureau of Lands is an acknowledgment that the land covered by his
application is a public land27whose management and disposition
belong to the DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of
Lands. Section 4, Chapter 1, Title XIV of Executive Order No.
29228reads:Section 4.Powers and Functions.- The Department [of
Environment and Natural Resources] shall:x x x(4)
Exercisesupervision and control over forest lands, alienable and
disposable public lands, mineral resources and, in the process of
exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges,
rentals and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the
exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such
resources;x x x(15) Exerciseexclusive jurisdiction on the
management and dispositionofall lands of the public domainand serve
as the sole agency responsible for classification,
sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation
with appropriate agencies[.] (Underscoring supplied.)Under Section
14(f) of Executive Order No. 192,29the Director of the Lands
Management Bureau has the duty, among others, to assist the DENR
Secretary in carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
141 (C.A. No. 141)30by having direct executive control of the
survey, classification, lease, sale or any other forms of
concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public
domain.As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed
from the protest filed by the respondents against the petitioners
free patent application. In resolving this protest, the DENR,
through the Bureau of Lands, had to resolve the issue ofidentityof
the lot claimed by both parties. This issue of identity of the land
requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the
administrative agency with direct control over the disposition and
management of lands of the public domain. The DENR, on the other
hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to manage and dispose of
public lands, must likewise determine the applicants entitlement
(or lack of it) to a free patent. (Incidentally, the DENR Regional
Office still has to determine the respondents entitlement to the
issuance of a free patent31in their favor since it merely ordered
the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioners own application.)
Thus, it is the DENR which determines the respective rights of
rival claimants to alienable and disposable public lands; courts
have no jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly falling within
the powers of the DENR Secretary and the Director of Lands,32unless
grave abuse of discretion exists.After the DENR assumed
jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate, the RTC must
defer the exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues on the
same matter properly within its jurisdiction,33such as the distinct
cause of action for reformation of contracts involving the same
property. Note that the contracts refer to the same property,
identified as "Lot 322," - which the DENR Regional Office, DENR
Secretary and the CA found to actually pertain to Lot 258. When an
administrative agency or body is conferred quasi-judicial
functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter
pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within
its jurisdiction since the law does not sanction a split of
jurisdiction34The argument that only courts of justice can
adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil Code
is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of
administrative bodies now performing this function by virtue of a
valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial
function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of
the principal power entrusted to them of regulating certain
activities falling under their particular expertise.35The DENR has
primary jurisdiction to resolve conflicting claims of title over
public landsThe petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, claiming that the issue (of who
has a better right over Lot 322) does not require the "specialized
technical expertise" of the DENR. He posits that the issue, in
fact, involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of
evidence and application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions,
which are all within the competence of regular courts.We
disagree.Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must
refrain from determining a controversy involving a question which
is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to
its resolution by the latter, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal
to determine technical and intricate matters of fact36In recent
years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction] to cases involving matters that demand the
special competence of administrative agencies[. It may occur that
the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case,
which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character.
However, if the case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained
in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction
of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It
applies "where a claim isoriginally cognizable in the courts,and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution ofissues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in
such casethe judicial process is suspended pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view."37The application
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for
the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until
after the matters within the competence of [the Lands Management
Bureau] are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal
purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily
served.38(Emphases added.)The resolution of conflicting claims of
ownership over real property is within the regular courts area of
competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character.
However, regular courts would have no power to conclusively resolve
this issue of ownership given thepublic characterof the land, since
under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192,39the
disposition and management of public lands fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review
by the DENR Secretary.40While the powers given to the DENR, through
the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of public land do not
divest regular courts of jurisdiction overpossessoryactions
instituted by occupants or applicants (to protect their respective
possessions and occupations),41the respondents
complaint-in-intervention does not simply raise the issue of
possession whetherde jureorde facto but likewise raised the issue
of ownership as basis to recover possession. Particularly, the
respondents prayed for declaration of ownership of Lot
322.1avvphi1Ineluctably, the RTC would have to defer its ruling on
the respondentsreivindicatoryaction pending final determination by
the DENR, through the Lands Management Bureau, of the respondents
entitlement to a free patent, following the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretarys exclusion of Lot 322
from the petitioners free patent application and his consequent
directive for the respondents to apply for the same lot are within
the DENR Secretarys exercise of sound administrative discretion. In
the oft-cited case ofVicente Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et al,42which
involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and the then
Minister of Natural Resources, we stressed that the rationale
underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to
questions on the identity of the disputed public land since this
matter requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands.
Since this issue precludes prior judicial determination, the courts
must stand aside even when they apparently have statutory power to
proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the
administrative agency.WHEREFORE, we herebyDENYthe motion for
reconsideration. No costs
REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL VS LAOThis petition for review assails the
decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 56230, which
affirmed the judgment2of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City,
Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No. TG-719.On September 4,
1995, respondent Alexandra Lao filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, an application for the registration of
title over a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 3951, Cad. 452-D,
Silang Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-007770, consisting of nine thousand
three hundred forty nine (9,349) square meters under Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. Respondent alleged that she acquired the land by purchase
from the siblings Raymundo Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela,
who inherited it from Generosa Medina. The latter, in turn,
inherited the land from her father, Jose Medina, who acquired the
same from Edilberto Perido by transfer.In the alternative,
respondent prayed that the land be awarded to her under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, also known as
the Public Land Act, based on her and her predecessors open,
public, actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse
possession and occupancy under bona fide claim of ownership for
more than thirty (30) years.At the hearing in the lower court,
respondent presented the following witnesses: Candido Amoroso, who
testified on the ownership of the land by Edilberto Perido in 1932;
Vicente Laudato, who testified on respondents purchase of the
property from Raymundo and Ma. Victoria; and Fina Victoria
So-Liwanag, who assisted respondent in her application for
registration. Respondent likewise presented in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale3dated April 19, 1994 executed by Raymundo and
Victoria in her favor, the survey plan and technical description of
the property, and the tax declarations in the name of respondent as
well as her predecessors-in-interest.On June 28, 1996, the trial
court made the following findings, to wit:x x x the applicant
acquired the subject parcel of land by purchase from Raymundo
Noguera and Ma. Victoria A. Valenzuela in 1994, and that applicant
and her predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous,
uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and in the concept of an owner
possession of the subject parcel of land for more than thirty (30)
years now; and that the same parcel was declared for taxation
purposes; that the realty taxes due thereon have been duly paid;
that the land involved in this case is not covered by any land
patent. Likewise, this Court could well-discern from the survey
plan covering the same property, as well as technical description
and other documents presented, that the land sought to be
registered is agricultural and not within any forest zone or public
domain; and that tacking her predecessors-in-interests possession
to hers, applicant appears to be in continuous and public
possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years.4The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves
this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as
Property Registration Law, the land described in Plan Ap-04-007770
and containing an area of nine thousand three hundred forty-nine
(9,349) square meters as supported by its technical description now
forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other
proofs adduced in the name of ALEXANDRA A. LAO, of legal age,
married to NELSON O. LAO, Filipino citizen, with residence at 1648
Yakal Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.Once this Decision becomes final
and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.SO ORDERED.5Petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the
Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56230. On
October 15, 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the
trial court.6Hence, this petition for review raising the following
errors:THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION OF TITLE OF SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE NAME OF
RESPONDENT.7A. RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE LEGALLY
REQUIRED PERIOD AND ACTS OF POSSESSION.8B. THE TAX DECLARATIONS
PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT DO NOT CORROBORATE HER CLAIM OF THE LEGALLY
REQUIRED PERIOD OF POSSESSION.9C. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRESENT A
CERTIFICATION FROM THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AGENCY THAT THE LAND
SUBJECT OF HER APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.10In sum, the issues presented
before us are (a) whether or not respondent was able to prove, by
the quantum of evidence mandated by law, that she met the required
period of open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession, in
the concept of an owner, of the subject parcel of land; and (b)
whether or not respondent was able to show that the land subject of
her application was disposable and alienable land of the public
domain.Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:Who
may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessor-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.On the other hand, Section 48 (b)
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:The provisions of Section
48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only
to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.Thus, before one can register his
title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that (a) he,
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.Respondent
submits that Section 48 (b) of CA 141 was amended by Republic Act
No. 6940, which reduced the required period of possession to thirty
years immediately prior to the filing of the application. Said law
became effective on April 15, 1990. However, petitioner maintains
that the required period of possession remained the same. RA 6940
explicitly states that its provisions amended sections 44, 45 and
47 of CA 141. Nothing in RA 6940 amends Section 48 (b). In other
words, the requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title set forth therein remains the same, namely, (1)
possession of the subject land from June 12, 1945, and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. In Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals,11we
held that:Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of
imperfect title required possession en concepto de dueo since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141, this
requirement was retained. However, on June 22, 1957, Republic Act
No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141. This later enactment
required adverse possession for a period of only thirty (30) years.
On January 25, 1977, the President enacted P.D. No. 1073, further
amending C.A. No. 141, extending the period for filing applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
December 31, 1987. Under this decree, "the provisions of Section 48
(b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only
to alienable and disposable land of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945.The aforequoted ruling was
reiterated in Republic v. Court of Appeals,12thus:This Court has
held in Republic vs. Doldol [295 SCRA 359, (1998)] that,
originally, "Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894.
This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple
thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has
already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
January 25, 1977." As amended Section 48 (b) now reads:(b) Thos