G.R. No. 115402 July 15, 1998 LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, and LEE TEKSHENG, respondents. MARTINEZ, J.: After his mother's death, petitioner 1 filed a complaint against his father, herein private respondent, to partition the conjugal properties of his parents. 2 In his answer with counterclaim, private respondent alleged that four (4) parcels of land registered solely in petitioner's name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278 are conjugal properties. Private respondent contends that the lots are owned by the conjugal regime but was registered in petitioner's name only as a trustee considering that at that time, the latter was then the only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly, private respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner — the conjugal regime. Meantime, to protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the case, private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278. Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation which was denied by the trial court ruling that (a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court pending litigation. 3 Petitioner assailed the denial of his motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens via petition for certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals (CA), but to no avail. 4 Resorting to this Court, petitioner primarily contends that in the resolution of an incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens (a) it was improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case, otherwise, (b) it would amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago. He argues that his sole ownership as shown in the TCT would be improperly assailed in a partition case and should be done through a separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent posits that evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land registration proceedings where the court's jurisdiction is limited. Though the postulates respectively proffered by both parties are not at point, luckily for private respondent, petitioner's claim is not legally tenable. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked 5 but that rule is not material to this case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land. The concept of no collateral attack of title is based on Section 48 of P.D. 1529 which states that: Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack . — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. 6 (Emphasis Supplied).
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G.R. No. 115402 July 15, 1998
LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, and LEE TEKSHENG, respondents.
MARTINEZ, J.:
After his mother's death, petitioner 1 filed a complaint against his father, herein private respondent, to partition the conjugal properties of his parents. 2 In his answer with counterclaim, private respondent alleged that four (4) parcels of land registered solely in petitioner's name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) 8278 are conjugal properties. Private respondent contends that the lots are owned by the conjugal regime but was registered in petitioner's name only as a trustee considering that at that time, the latter was then the only Filipino citizen in the family. Accordingly, private respondent prayed for the dismissal of the partition case and for the reconveyance of the lots to its rightful owner — the conjugal regime.
Meantime, to protect the interest of the conjugal regime during the pendency of the case, private respondent caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on TCT 8278. Petitioner moved for the cancellation of said annotation which was denied by the trial court ruling that (a) the notice was not for the purpose of molesting or harassing petitioner and (b) also to keep the property within the power of the court pending litigation. 3 Petitioner assailed the denial of his motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens via petition for certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals (CA), but to no avail. 4
Resorting to this Court, petitioner primarily contends that in the resolution of an incidental motion for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens (a) it was improper to thresh out the issue of ownership of the disputed lots since ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case, otherwise, (b) it would amount to a collateral attack of his title obtained more than 28 years ago. He argues that his sole ownership as
shown in the TCT would be improperly assailed in a partition case and should be done through a separate suit. On the contrary, private respondent posits that evidence of ownership is admissible in a partition case as this is not a probate or land registration proceedings where the court's jurisdiction is limited.
Though the postulates respectively proffered by both parties are not at point, luckily for private respondent, petitioner's claim is not legally tenable. There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked 5 but that rule is not material to this case. The annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not in any case amount nor can it be considered as equivalent to a collateral attack of the certificate of title for a parcel of land. The concept of no collateral attack of title is based on Section 48 of P.D. 1529 which states that:
Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.6 (Emphasis Supplied).
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate with title. Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. 7 Besides, the certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. 8 Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used. In this case, contrary to
petitioner's fears, his certificate of title is not being assailed by private respondent. 9What the latter disputes is the former's claim of sole ownership. Thus, although petitioner's certificate of title may have become incontrovertible one year after issuance, 10 yet contrary to his argument, it does not bar private respondent from questioning his ownership. 11
It should be noted that what is being challenged in this case is the denial of the motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens. But whether as a matter of procedure 12 or substance, 13 a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled only on two grounds, which are: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party, or, (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. Neither ground for cancellation of the notice was convincingly shown to concur in this case. It would not even be fair to justify the cancellation of the notice on the legally untenable grounds that such annotation amounts to a collateral attack of petitioner's certificate of title or that ownership cannot be adjudicated in a partition case. It must be emphasized that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is only for the purpose of announcing "to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property." 14 Here, the parties are still locked in a legal battle to settle their respective claims of ownership. The lower court allowed the annotation pending litigation only for the purpose of giving information to the public that parcel of land is involved in a suit and that those who deal with the property is forewarned of such fact.
On the contention that ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case, suffice it to say that until and unless ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect partition of the property. 15 For purposes of annotating a notice of lis pendens, there is nothing in the rules which requires the party seeking annotation to prove that the land belongs to him. 16 Besides, an action for partition is one case where the annotation of a notice of lis pendens is proper. 17
Further, contrary to petitioner's argument, one of the issues agreed upon by the parties at pre-trial is to determine what are the properties acquired by the
spouses during their marriage. 18 In addition, private respondent in his answer with counterclaim prayed for the reconveyance of the disputed lots. Accordingly, the issue of ownership has been put in issue and each claimant must present their respective evidence to substantiate their respective allegations. 19 Considering that this is a partition case, the court is required to inquire into the "nature and extent of title" of the supposed claimant. 20 The title referred to by the rule is the purported ownership of the claimants and not the certificate of title mentioned in Section 48 of P.D. 1529, although the latter may be considered in the determination of the former.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
G.R. Nos. L-46626-27 December 27, 1979
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, A & A TORRIJOS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, FRANCISCA S. BOMBASI, HERCULINO M. DEO, FRUCTUOSA LABORADA and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CALOOCAN CITY,respondents-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Gonzalo D. David for respondents.
AQUlNO, J.:
These two cases are about the cancellation and annulment of reconstituted Torrens titles whose originals are existing and whose reconstitution was, therefore, uncalled for.
1. Lots Nos. 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, with areas of more than twenty-five and twenty-four hectares, respectively, located at Novaliches, Caloocan, now Quezon City, are registered in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal both dated April 30, 1938.
The originals of those titles are on file in the registry of deeds in Pasig, Rizal. They were not destroyed during the war. Even the originals of the preceding cancelled titles for those two lots, namely, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 15832 and 15834 in the name of the Philippine Trust Company, are intact in the registry of deeds.
2. The reconstitution proceeding started when Fructuosa Laborada, a widow residing at 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street, Paco, Manila, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Caloocan City a petition dated November, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title covering the above-mentioned Lot No. 915. She alleged that she was the owner of the lot and that the title covering it, the number of which she
could not specify, was "N.A." or not available (Civil Case No. C-677). The petition was sworn to on November 16, 1967 before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino (48-52, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
3. On April 2, 1968, the lower court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on June 14, 1968. The notice of hearing was published in the Official Gazette. Copies thereof were posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and were furnished the supposed adjoining owners (53-54, Consolidated Record on Appeal). The registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal were not served with copies of the petition and notice of hearing.
4. State Prosecutor Enrique A. Cube, as supposed counsel for the Government, did not oppose the petition. Laborada presented her evidence before the deputy clerk of court. Judge Serafin Salvador in his "decision" dated July 6, 1968 granted the petition.
He found that Lot No. 915 was covered by a transfer certificate of title which was not available and which was issued to Maria Bueza who sold the lot to Laborada. The transfer certificate of title covering the lot was allegedly destroyed during the war. The plan and technical description for the lot were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration who recommended favorable action on the petition (pp. 53-56, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
5. The lower court directed the register of deeds of Caloocan City to reconstitute the title for Lot No. 915 in the name of Laborada. The order of reconstitution was not appealed. It became final and executory.
6. Acting on the court's directive, the register of deeds issued to Laborada on August 14, 1968 Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) 3-(R) Lot No. 915 was later subdivided into seven lots, Lots Nos. 915-A to 915-G. The Acting Commissioner of Land Registration approved the subdivision plan. The register of deeds cancelled TCT No. (N.A.) 3-(R) and issued on October 15, 1968 seven titles to Laborada, namely, TCT Nos. 30257 to 30263 (pp. 56-59, 61-83, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
7. In another and later case, Civil Case No. C-763 of the lower court, one Francisco S. Bombast, single,
residing at 2021 San Marcelino Street, Malate, Manila filed in the lower court a petition dated November 16, 1967 for the reconstitution of the title of another lot, the aforementioned Lot No. 918.
She could not specify the number of the title. She alleged that the title was "N.A" or not available. She claimed to be the owner of the lot and that the title covering it was destroyed during the war. Like the first petition, the second petition was sworn to on the same date, November 16, 1967, before Manila notary Domingo P. Aquino. Why it was not filed simultaneously with Laborada's petition was not explained. (17-21, Consolidated Record on Appeal.)
8. The lower court set the second petition for hearing on January 31, 1969. As in Laborada's petition, the notice of hearing for Bombast's petition was published in the Official Gazette. It was posted in three conspicuous places in Caloocan City and copies thereof were sent to the supposed adjoining owners (22, Consolidated Record on Appeal). But no copies of the petition and notice of hearing were served upon the registers of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal, the officials who would be interested in the reconstitution of the supposed lost title and who could certify whether the original of the title was really missing.
9. Bombast's petition was assigned also to Judge Salvador. It was not opposed by the government lawyers, Enrique A. Cube and Conrado de Leon, Judge Salvador in his order of April 3, 1969 granted the petition.
The court found from the evidence that the allegedly missing or "not available" title was issued to Regino Gollez who sold the land to petitioner Bombast. The owner's duplicate of Gollez's title was supposedly destroyed during the war. Taxes were paid for that land by Gollez and Bombast. The technical description of the land the plan were approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration who submitted a report recommending the reconstitution of the title (pp. 22-25, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
10. The lower court ordered the register of deeds to reconstitute the missing title of Lot No. 918 in the name of Bombast. Acting on that directive, the
register of deeds issued to Bombast Transfer Certificate of Title No. N.A. 4(R) dated August 27, 1969(pp. 24-27, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
11. On March 25, 1969 or five months before the issuance of the reconstituted title, Francisca Bombast, now Identified as single (not widow) and a resident of 1665 Interior 12 Dart Street Paco, Manila, which was the same address used by Fructuosa Laborada (Bombast used first the address 2021 San Marcelino Street) sold Lot No. 918 to Herculano M. Deo allegedly for P249,880. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34146R was issued to Deo.
On October 28, 1969, Deo sold the lot to A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation allegedly for P250,000. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34147-R was issued to the corporation (pp. 10-11, 29-34, Consolidated Record on Appeal).
12. On May 25 and 26, 1970, the State filed two petitions for the cancellation and annulment of the reconstituted titles and the titles issued subsequent thereto (Civil Cases Nos. 1784 and 1785). Judge Salvador, who had ordered the reconstitution of the titles and to whom the two cases for cancellation were assigned, issued on June 5, 1970 restraining orders enjoining the register of deeds, city engineer and Commissioner of Land Registration from accepting or recording any transaction regarding Lots Nos. 915 and 918.
13. The respondents in the two cases, through a common lawyer, filed separate answers containing mere denials. The Commissioner of Land Registration filed pro forma answers wherein he interposed no objection to the issuance of the preliminary injunction sought by the State. After a joint trial of the two cases, respondents corporation and Laborada filed amended answers wherein they pleaded the defense that they were purchasers in good faith and for value.
14. On June 22, 1972, Judge Salvador (who did not bother to inhibit himself) rendered a decision in the two cases holding that the State's evidence was insufficient to establish its ownership and possession of Lots Nos. 915 and 918 and that Laborada and A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation were purchasers
in good faith and for value and, consequently, their titles are not cancellable and annullable.
Judge Salvador further held that the titles, whose reconstitution he had ordered allegedly in conformity with law, could not be attacked collaterally and, therefore, "the reconstituted titles and their derivatives have the same validity, force and effect as the originals before the reconstitution" (pp. 160-161, Consolidated Record on Appeal). The State appealed.
15. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the lower court's judgment, held that the orders of reconstitution dated July 6, 1968 and April 3, 1969 could no longer be set aside on May 26, 1970, when the petitions for annulment and cancellation of the reconstituted titles were filed, and that if there were irregularities in the reconstitution, then, as between two innocent parties, the State, as the party that made possible the reconstitution, should suffer the loss. The Court of Appeals cited section 101 of Act 496 to support its view that a registered owner may lose his land "by the registration of any other person as owner of such land".
The State appealed to this Court. We hold that the appeal is justified. The Appellate Court and the trial court grievously erred in sustaining the validity of the reconstituted titles which, although issued with judicial sanction, are no better than spurious and forged titles.
In all candor, it should be stated that the reconstitution proceedings, Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763, were simply devices employed by petitioners Laborada and Bombast for landgrabbing or for the usurpation and illegal appropriation of fifty hectares of State-owned urban land with considerable value.
The crucial and decisive fact, to which no importance was attached by the lower court and the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals (Reyes, L.B., Domondon and Ericta, JJ.), is that two valid and existing Torrens titles in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines were needlessly reconstituted in the names of Laborada and Bombast on the false or
perjurious assumption that the two titles were destroyed during the war.
That kind of reconstitution was a brazen and monstrous fraud foisted on the courts of justice. It was a stultification of the judicial process. One and the same judge (1) allowed the reconstitution and then (2) decided the two subsequent cases for the cancellation and annulment of the wrongfully reconstituted titles.
The existence of the two titles of the Government for Lots Nos. 915 and 918 ipso facto nullified the reconstitution proceedings and signified that the evidence in the said proceedings as to the alleged ownership of Laborada and Bombast cannot be given any credence. The two proceedings were sham and deceitful and were filed in bad faith. Such humbuggery or imposture cannot be countenanced and cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits.
Republic Act No. 26 provides for a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens certificates of title that are missing and not fictitious titles or titles which are existing. It is a patent absurdity to reconstitute existing certificates of title that are on file and available in the registry of deeds. The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C- 763 are void because they are contrary to Republic Act No. 26 and beyond the purview of that law since the titles reconstituted are actually subsisting in the registry of deeds and do not require reconstitution at all. As a rule, acts executed against the provisions of mandatory laws are void (Art. 5, Civil Code).
To sustain the validity of the reconstituted titles in these cases would be to allow Republic Act No. 26 to be utilized as an instrument for landgrabbing (See Republic vs. Court of Appeals, Ocampo and Anglo, L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453, 480, per J. G.S. Santos) or to sanction fraudulent machinations for depriving a registered owner of his land, to undermine the stability and security of Torrens titles and to impair the Torrens system of registration. The theory of A & A Torrijos Engineering Corporation that it was a purchaser in good faith and for value is indefensible because the title of the lot which it purchased unmistakably shows that such title was
reconstituted. That circumstance should have alerted its officers to make the necessary investigation in the registry of deeds of Caloocan City and Rizal where they could have found that Lot 918 is owned by the State.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed and set aside. The reconstitution proceedings in Civil Cases Nos. C-677 and C-763 are declared void and are set aside. The reconstituted titles, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. N.A. 3-(R) and N.A. 4-(R) and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34146-R, 34147-R and 30257 to 30263 and the survey plans and subdivision plan connected therewith are likewise declared void. The register of deeds is directed to cancel the said titles.
The Republic of the Philippines, as the successor of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is hereby declared the registered owner of Lots 915 and 918 of the Tala Estate, as shown in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 34594 and 34596 of the registry of deeds of Rizal. Costs against the private respondents-appellees.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
My vocabulary is inadequate to express my disgust and indignation at this brozen landgrabbing.
BARREDO, (Chairman), J., concurring:
I concur fully in the well-reasoned main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, if only because it is to me inconceivable how any court can order the reconstitution of a supposed lost torrens title when
the record shows beyond doubt that the land in question, per its technical description and location, is covered already by another title actually subsisting in the office of the corresponding register of deeds.
I am writing this separate opinion only to underscore my considered view that considering the records that the various offices of the government having to do with the matter should keep regularly, like the Land Registration Commission, the Bureau of Lands and the corresponding Register of Deeds, only bad faith and bad faith alone can give occasion to occurrences like what happened in this case. The Torrens system of land registration was conceived to give every duly registered owner complete peace of mind as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the same in the manner allowed by law that he would be safe in his ownership and its consequent rights. The provision about recourse to the Assurance Fund was not included in the Act for the benefit of scoundrels who might ingeniously "steal" lands nor to open opportunities for chicanery of any shade or mode.
Nor is the judiciary without any responsibility in the premises. Judges must bear in mind that. the reconstitution of torrens titles after a war or other national catastrophe is a function that deserves the most careful and scrupulous attention, certainly not a perfunctory, much less ministerial chore to be performed on the basis simply of easily obtainable pro forma certificates of other officials concerned. I would go as far as to require oral testimony of the said official, unless this be very inconvenient, subject to closest scrutiny as to the veracity of his records. There is absolutely no excuse for a judge to ignore the actual existence of a title in the office of the Register of Deeds covering the same land claimed by another who alleges his title thereto his been lost, absent any showing of voluntary transfers or other lawful transmission by the registered owner in favor of a person from whom the petitioner could have obtained his right.
There are too many fake titles being peddled around and it behooves every official of the government whose functions concern the issuance of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has made a mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through
their loyalty, devotion, honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at large.
# Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
My vocabulary is inadequate to express my disgust and indignation at this brozen landgrabbing.
BARREDO, (Chairman), J., concurring:
I concur fully in the well-reasoned main opinion of Mr. Justice Aquino, if only because it is to me inconceivable how any court can order the reconstitution of a supposed lost torrens title when the record shows beyond doubt that the land in question, per its technical description and location, is covered already by another title actually subsisting in the office of the corresponding register of deeds.
I am writing this separate opinion only to underscore my considered view that considering the records that the various offices of the government having to do with the matter should keep regularly, like the Land Registration Commission, the Bureau of Lands and the corresponding Register of Deeds, only bad faith and bad faith alone can give occasion to occurrences like what happened in this case. The Torrens system of land registration was conceived to give every duly registered owner complete peace of mind as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the same in the manner allowed by law that he would be safe in his ownership and its consequent rights. The provision about recourse to the Assurance Fund was not included in the Act for the benefit of scoundrels who might ingeniously "steal" lands nor to open opportunities for chicanery of any shade or mode.
Nor is the judiciary without any responsibility in the premises. Judges must bear in mind that. the reconstitution of torrens titles after a war or other national catastrophe is a function that deserves the most careful and scrupulous attention, certainly not a perfunctory, much less ministerial chore to be
performed on the basis simply of easily obtainable pro forma certificates of other officials concerned. I would go as far as to require oral testimony of the said official, unless this be very inconvenient, subject to closest scrutiny as to the veracity of his records. There is absolutely no excuse for a judge to ignore the actual existence of a title in the office of the Register of Deeds covering the same land claimed by another who alleges his title thereto his been lost, absent any showing of voluntary transfers or other lawful transmission by the registered owner in favor of a person from whom the petitioner could have obtained his right.
There are too many fake titles being peddled around and it behooves every official of the government whose functions concern the issuance of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has made a mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty, devotion, honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at large.
G.R. No. L-8936 October 2, 1915
CONSUELO LEGARDA, with her husband MAURO PRIETO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.N.M. SALEEBY, defendant-appellee.
Singson, Ledesma and Lim for appellants.D.R. Williams for appellee.
JOHNSON, J.:
From the record the following facts appear:
First. That the plaintiffs and the defendant occupy, as owners, adjoining lots in the district of Ermita in the city of Manila.
Second. That there exists and has existed a number of years a stone wall between the said lots. Said wall is located on the lot of the plaintiffs.
Third. That the plaintiffs, on the 2d day of March, 1906, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of their lot. After a consideration of said petition the court, on the 25th day of October, 1906, decreed that the title of the plaintiffs should be registered and issued to them the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. Said registration and certificate included the wall.
Fourth. Later the predecessor of the defendant presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the registration of the lot now occupied by him. On the 25th day of March, 1912, the court decreed the registration of said title and issued the original certificate provided for under the torrens system. The description of the lot given in the petition of the defendant also included said wall.
Fifth. Several months later (the 13th day of December, 1912) the plaintiffs discovered that the wall which had been included in the certificate granted to them had also been included in the certificate granted to the defendant .They immediately presented a petition in the Court of Land
Registration for an adjustment and correction of the error committed by including said wall in the registered title of each of said parties. The lower court however, without notice to the defendant, denied said petition upon the theory that, during the pendency of the petition for the registration of the defendant's land, they failed to make any objection to the registration of said lot, including the wall, in the name of the defendant.
Sixth. That the land occupied by t he wall is registered in the name of each of the owners of the adjoining lots. The wall is not a joint wall.
Under these facts, who is the owner of the wall and the land occupied by it?
The decision of the lower court is based upon the theory that the action for the registration of the lot of the defendant was a judicial proceeding and that the judgment or decree was binding upon all parties who did not appear and oppose it. In other words, by reason of the fact that the plaintiffs had not opposed the registration of that part of the lot on which the wall was situate they had lost it, even though it had been theretofore registered in their name. Granting that theory to be correct one, and granting even that the wall and the land occupied by it, in fact, belonged to the defendant and his predecessors, then the same theory should be applied to the defendant himself. Applying that theory to him, he had already lost whatever right he had therein, by permitting the plaintiffs to have the same registered in their name, more than six years before. Having thus lost hid right, may he be permitted to regain it by simply including it in a petition for registration? The plaintiffs having secured the registration of their lot, including the wall, were they obliged to constantly be on the alert and to watch all the proceedings in the land court to see that some one else was not having all, or a portion of the same, registered? If that question is to be answered in the affirmative, then the whole scheme and purpose of the torrens system of land registration must fail. The real purpose of that system is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. That being the purpose of the law, it would seem that once a title is
registered the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the "mirador de su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Of course, it can not be denied that the proceeding for the registration of land under the torrens system is judicial (Escueta vs. .Director of Lands, 16 Phil. Rep., 482). It is clothed with all the forms of an action and the result is final and binding upon all the world. It is an action in rem. (Escueta vs. Director of Lands (supra); Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. rep., 49 Roxas vs. Enriquez, 29 Phil. Rep., 31; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 51 American Land Co.vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)
While the proceeding is judicial, it involves more in its consequences than does an ordinary action. All the world are parties, including the government. After the registration is complete and final and there exists no fraud, there are no innocent third parties who may claim an interest. The rights of all the world are foreclosed by the decree of registration. The government itself assumes the burden of giving notice to all parties. To permit persons who are parties in the registration proceeding (and they are all the world) to again litigate the same questions, and to again cast doubt upon the validity of the registered title, would destroy the very purpose and intent of the law. The registration, under the torrens system, does not give the owner any better title than he had. If he does not already have a perfect title, he can not have it registered. Fee simple titles only may be registered. The certificate of registration accumulates in open document a precise and correct statement of the exact status of the fee held by its owner. The certificate, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of title and shows exactly the real interest of its owner. The title once registered, with very few exceptions, should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged, or diminished, except in some direct proceeding permitted by law. Otherwise all security in registered titles would be lost. A registered title can not be altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateralproceeding and not even by a direct proceeding, after the lapse of the period prescribed by law.
For the difficulty involved in the present case the Act (No. 496) providing for the registration of titles under
the torrens system affords us no remedy. There is no provision in said Act giving the parties relief under conditions like the present. There is nothing in the Act which indicates who should be the owner of land which has been registered in the name of two different persons.
The rule, we think, is well settled that the decree ordering the registration of a particular parcel of land is a bar to future litigation over the same between the same parties .In view of the fact that all the world are parties, it must follow that future litigation over the title is forever barred; there can be no persons who are not parties to the action. This, we think, is the rule, except as to rights which are noted in the certificate or which arise subsequently, and with certain other exceptions which need not be dismissed at present. A title once registered can not be defeated, even by an adverse, open, and notorious possession. Registered title under the torrens system can not be defeated by prescription (section 46, Act No. 496). The title, once registered, is notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
The question, who is the owner of land registered in the name of two different persons, has been presented to the courts in other jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, where the "torrens" system has been adopted, the difficulty has been settled by express statutory provision. In others it has been settled by the courts. Hogg, in his excellent discussion of the "Australian Torrens System," at page 823, says: "The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title, purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate. (Oelkers vs. Merry, 2 Q.S.C.R., 193; Miller vs. Davy, 7 N.Z.R., 155; Lloyd vs. Myfield, 7 A.L.T. (V.) 48; Stevens vs. Williams, 12 V.L. R., 152; Register of Titles, vs. Esperance Land Co., 1 W.A.R., 118.)" Hogg adds however that, "if it can be very clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of construction relating to written documents, that the inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be conclusive." (See Hogg on the "Australian torrens System," supra, and
cases cited. See also the excellent work of Niblack in his "Analysis of the Torrens System," page 99.) Niblack, in discussing the general question, said: "Where two certificates purport to include the same land the earlier in date prevails. ... In successive registrations, where more than one certificate is issued in respect of a particular estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificates is entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof. While the acts in this country do not expressly cover the case of the issue of two certificates for the same land, they provide that a registered owner shall hold the title, and the effect of this undoubtedly is that where two certificates purport to include the same registered land, the holder of the earlier one continues to hold the title" (p. 237).
Section 38 of Act No. 496, provides that; "It (the decree of registration) shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern." Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree (of registration), provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.
It will be noted, from said section, that the "decree of registration" shall not be opened, for any reason, in any court,except for fraud, and not even for fraud, after the lapse of one year. If then the decree of registration can not be opened for any reason, except for fraud, in a direct proceeding for that purpose, may such decree be opened or set aside in a collateral proceeding by including a portion of the land in a subsequent certificate or decree of registration? We
do not believe the law contemplated that a person could be deprived of his registered title in that way.
We have in this jurisdiction a general statutory provision which governs the right of the ownership of land when the same is registered in the ordinary registry in the name of two persons. Article 1473 of the Civil Code provides, among other things, that when one piece of real property had been sold to two different persons it shall belong to the person acquiring it, who first inscribes it in the registry. This rule, of course, presupposes that each of the vendees or purchasers has acquired title to the land. The real ownership in such a case depends upon priority of registration. While we do not now decide that the general provisions of the Civil Code are applicable to the Land Registration Act, even though we see no objection thereto, yet we think, in the absence of other express provisions, they should have a persuasive influence in adopting a rule for governing the effect of a double registration under said Act. Adopting the rule which we believe to be more in consonance with the purposes and the real intent of the torrens system, we are of the opinion and so decree that in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail.
In reaching the above conclusion, we have not overlooked the forceful argument of the appellee. He says, among other things; "When Prieto et al. were served with notice of the application of Teus (the predecessor of the defendant) they became defendants in a proceeding wherein he, Teus, was seeking to foreclose their right, and that of orders, to the parcel of land described in his application. Through their failure to appear and contest his right thereto, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against them, they became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to Teus. They had their day in court and can not set up their own omission as ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. To decide otherwise would be to hold that lands with torrens titles are above the law and beyond the jurisdiction of the courts".
As was said above, the primary and fundamental purpose of the torrens system is to quiet title. If the
holder of a certificate cannot rest secure in this registered title then the purpose of the law is defeated. If those dealing with registered land cannot rely upon the certificate, then nothing has been gained by the registration and the expense incurred thereby has been in vain. If the holder may lose a strip of his registered land by the method adopted in the present case, he may lose it all. Suppose within the six years which elapsed after the plaintiff had secured their title, they had mortgaged or sold their right, what would be the position or right of the mortgagee or vendee? That mistakes are bound to occur cannot be denied, and sometimes the damage done thereby is irreparable. It is the duty of the courts to adjust the rights of the parties under such circumstances so as to minimize such damages, taking into consideration al of the conditions and the diligence of the respective parties to avoid them. In the present case, the appellee was the first negligent (granting that he was the real owner, and if he was not the real owner he can not complain) in not opposing the registration in the name of the appellants. He was a party-defendant in an action for the registration of the lot in question, in the name of the appellants, in 1906. "Through his failure to appear and to oppose such registration, and the subsequent entry of a default judgment against him, he became irrevocably bound by the decree adjudicating such land to the appellants. He had his day in court and should not be permitted to set up his own omissions as the ground for impugning the validity of a judgment duly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction." Granting that he was the owner of the land upon which the wall is located, his failure to oppose the registration of the same in the name of the appellants, in the absence of fraud, forever closes his mouth against impugning the validity of that judgment. There is no more reason why the doctrine invoked by the appellee should be applied to the appellants than to him.
We have decided, in case of double registration under the Land Registration Act, that the owner of the earliest certificate is the owner of the land. That is the rule between original parties. May this rule be applied to successive vendees of the owners of such certificates? Suppose that one or the other of the parties, before the error is discovered, transfers his original certificate to an "innocent purchaser." The
general rule is that the vendee of land has no greater right, title, or interest than his vendor; that he acquires the right which his vendor had, only. Under that rule the vendee of the earlier certificate would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificate.
We find statutory provisions which, upon first reading, seem to cast some doubt upon the rule that the vendee acquires the interest of the vendor only. Sections 38, 55, and 112 of Act No. 496 indicate that the vendee may acquire rights and be protected against defenses which the vendor would not. Said sections speak of available rights in favor of third parties which are cut off by virtue of the sale of the land to an "innocent purchaser." That is to say, persons who had had a right or interest in land wrongfully included in an original certificate would be unable to enforce such rights against an "innocent purchaser," by virtue of the provisions of said sections. In the present case Teus had his land, including the wall, registered in his name. He subsequently sold the same to the appellee. Is the appellee an "innocent purchaser," as that phrase is used in said sections? May those who have been deprived of their land by reason of a mistake in the original certificate in favor of Teus be deprived of their right to the same, by virtue of the sale by him to the appellee? Suppose the appellants had sold their lot, including the wall, to an "innocent purchaser," would such purchaser be included in the phrase "innocent purchaser," as the same is used in said sections? Under these examples there would be two innocent purchasers of the same land, is said sections are to be applied .Which of the two innocent purchasers, if they are both to be regarded as innocent purchasers, should be protected under the provisions of said sections? These questions indicate the difficulty with which we are met in giving meaning and effect to the phrase "innocent purchaser," in said sections.
May the purchaser of land which has been included in a "second original certificate" ever be regarded as an "innocent purchaser," as against the rights or interest of the owner of the first original certificate, his heirs, assigns, or vendee? The first original certificate is recorded in the public registry. It is never issued until it is recorded. The record notice to all the world.
All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains. All persons dealing with the land so recorded, or any portion of it, must be charged with notice of whatever it contains. The purchaser is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which the record discloses .This rule is so well established that it is scarcely necessary to cite authorities in its support (Northwestern National Bank vs. Freeman, 171 U.S., 620, 629; Delvin on Real Estate, sections 710, 710 [a]).
When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. (Grandin vs. Anderson, 15 Ohio State, 286, 289; Orvis vs. Newell, 17 Conn., 97; Buchanan vs. Intentional Bank, 78 Ill., 500; Youngs vs. Wilson, 27 N.Y., 351; McCabe vs. Grey, 20 Cal., 509; Montefiore vs. Browne, 7 House of Lords Cases, 341.)
Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such presumption is irrebutable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute. Any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
While there is no statutory provision in force here requiring that original deeds of conveyance of real property be recorded, yet there is a rule requiring mortgages to be recorded. (Arts. 1875 and 606 of the Civil Code.) The record of a mortgage is indispensable to its validity. (Art .1875.) In the face of that statute would the courts allow a mortgage to be valid which had not been recorded, upon the plea of ignorance of the statutory provision, when third
parties were interested? May a purchaser of land, subsequent to the recorded mortgage, plead ignorance of its existence, and by reason of such ignorance have the land released from such lien? Could a purchaser of land, after the recorded mortgage, be relieved from the mortgage lien by the plea that he was a bona fide purchaser? May there be a bona fide purchaser of said land, bona fide in the sense that he had no knowledge of the existence of the mortgage? We believe the rule that all persons must take notice of what the public record contains in just as obligatory upon all persons as the rule that all men must know the law; that no one can plead ignorance of the law. The fact that all men know the law is contrary to the presumption. The conduct of men, at times, shows clearly that they do not know the law. The rule, however, is mandatory and obligatory, notwithstanding. It would be just as logical to allow the defense of ignorance of the existence and contents of a public record.
In view, therefore, of the foregoing rules of law, may the purchaser of land from the owner of the second original certificate be an "innocent purchaser," when a part or all of such land had theretofore been registered in the name of another, not the vendor? We are of the opinion that said sections 38, 55, and 112 should not be applied to such purchasers. We do not believe that the phrase "innocent purchaser should be applied to such a purchaser. He cannot be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" because of the facts contained in the record of the first original certificate. The rule should not be applied to the purchaser of a parcel of land the vendor of which is not the owner of the original certificate, or his successors. He, in nonsense, can be an "innocent purchaser" of the portion of the land included in another earlier original certificate. The rule of notice of what the record contains precludes the idea of innocence. By reason of the prior registry there cannot be an innocent purchaser of land included in a prior original certificate and in a name other than that of the vendor, or his successors. In order to minimize the difficulties we think this is the safe rule to establish. We believe the phrase "innocent purchaser," used in said sections, should be limited only to cases where unregistered land has been wrongfully included in a certificate under the torrens system. When land is once brought under the torrens
system, the record of the original certificate and all subsequent transfers thereof is notice to all the world. That being the rule, could Teus even regarded as the holder in good fifth of that part of the land included in his certificate of the appellants? We think not. Suppose, for example, that Teus had never had his lot registered under the torrens system. Suppose he had sold his lot to the appellee and had included in his deed of transfer the very strip of land now in question. Could his vendee be regarded as an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Would his vendee be an "innocent purchaser" of said strip? Certainly not. The record of the original certificate of the appellants precludes the possibility. Has the appellee gained any right by reason of the registration of the strip of land in the name of his vendor? Applying the rule of notice resulting from the record of the title of the appellants, the question must be answered in the negative. We are of the opinion that these rules are more in harmony with the purpose of Act No. 496 than the rule contended for by the appellee. We believe that the purchaser from the owner of the later certificate, and his successors, should be required to resort to his vendor for damages, in case of a mistake like the present, rather than to molest the holder of the first certificate who has been guilty of no negligence. The holder of the first original certificate and his successors should be permitted to rest secure in their title, against one who had acquired rights in conflict therewith and who had full and complete knowledge of their rights. The purchaser of land included in the second original certificate, by reason of the facts contained in the public record and the knowledge with which he is charged and by reason of his negligence, should suffer the loss, if any, resulting from such purchase, rather than he who has obtained the first certificate and who was innocent of any act of negligence.
The foregoing decision does not solve, nor pretend to solve, all the difficulties resulting from double registration under the torrens system and the subsequent transfer of the land. Neither do we now attempt to decide the effect of the former registration in the ordinary registry upon the registration under the torrens system. We are inclined to the view, without deciding it, that the record under the torrens system, supersede all other registries. If that view is correct then it will be sufficient, in dealing with land
registered and recorded alone. Once land is registered and recorded under the torrens system, that record alone can be examined for the purpose of ascertaining the real status of the title to the land.
It would be seen to a just and equitable rule, when two persons have acquired equal rights in the same thing, to hold that the one who acquired it first and who has complied with all the requirements of the law should be protected.
In view of our conclusions, above stated, the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby revoked. The record is hereby returned to the court now having and exercising the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the land court, with direction to make such orders and decrees in the premises as may correct the error heretofore made in including the land in the second original certificate issued in favor of the predecessor of the appellee, as well as in all other duplicate certificates issued.
Without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torrens, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
G.R. No. L-13479 October 31, 1959
MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.PEOPLE'S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for appellee UP.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land located in Quezon City containing an area of about 430 hectares.
On October 11, 1957, plaintiffs filed an action before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City alleging that for many years prior to March 25, 1877 and up to the present they and their ancestors have been in actual, adverse, open, public, exclusive and continuous possession as owners of the land in litigation; that they have been cultivating the land and enjoying its fruits exclusively; that from time immemorial up to the year 1955, they have been paying the land taxes thereon; that in 1955 defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation began asserting title thereto claiming that its Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 embraces practically all of plaintiff's property, while the other defendant University of the Philippines began also asserting title thereto claiming that its Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 9462 covers the remaining portion; that defendants are not innocent purchasers for value, having had full notice of plaintiff's actual possession and claim for ownership thereof; and that the inclusion of plaintiff's property within the technical boundaries set out in defendants' titles was a clear mistake and that at no time had defendants' predecessors in-interest exercised dominical rights over plaintiff's property.
On October 31, 1957, defendant University of the Philippines filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that it is barred by the statute of limitations; that the court has no jurisdiction over the case; and that in the event the
motion is not granted, defendant is separated from the case and be impleaded in a separate action. To this motion plaintiffs filed a reply alleging that the complaint on its faces alleges a valid and sufficient cause of action upon which the court could render a valid judgment. Defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, on the other hand, filed a motion for bill of particulars to which plaintiffs filed also a reply. On November 20, 1957, Leonila G. de Perucho and Jose Peñaranda filed a motion for intervention which was likewise opposed by plaintiffs. On December 11, 1957, the trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action and that it is already barred by the statute of limitations, leaving unresolved the other points raised in the pleadings for being unnecessary. From this order plaintiffs took the present appeal.
Appellants contend that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of sufficient cause of action for the reason that on its face said complaint alleges sufficient facts on which a valid judgment could be rendered against defendants. Thus, it is claimed that the complaint alleges the following facts: that plaintiffs are the sole heirs of Eladio Tiburcio who died intestate in 1910; that upon his death Eladio Tiburcio left to plaintiffs as his sole heirs a tract of land located in Quezon City; that said plaintiffs have always been actual, open, notorious and exclusive possession of the land as owners pro indiviso; that sometime in 1955 defendants began asserting title to the land claiming that the same is embraced and covered by their respective certificates of title; that defendants acquired their respective titles with full notice of the actual possession and claim of ownership of plaintiffs, and as such they cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value.
It appears, however, that the land in question has been placed under the operation of the Torrens system since 1914 when it has been originally registered in the name of defendant's predecessor-in-interest. It further appears that sometime in 1955 defendant People's Homesite & Housing Corporation acquired from the original owner a parcel of land embracing practically all of plaintiff's property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its favor, while defendant University of the
Philippines likewise acquired from the same owner another portion of the land which embraces the remainder of the property for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was issued in its favor. It is therefore, clear that the land in question has been registers in the name of defendant's predecessor-in-inters since 1914 under the Torren's system and that notwithstanding what they now claim that the original title lacked the essential requirements prescribed by law for their validity, they have never taken any step to nullify said title until 1957 when they instituted the present action. In other words, they allowed a period of 43 years before they woke up to invoke what they now claim to be erroneous when the court decreed in 1914 the registration of the land in the name of defendant's predecessor-in-interest. Evidently, this cannot be done for under our law and jurisprudence, a decree of registration can only be set aside within one year after entry on the ground of fraud provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired the property (Section 38, Act No. 496; Apurado vs. Apurado, 26 Phil., 581; Salmon vs. Bacando, 40 Off. Gaz., 13th Supp. 1607; Rivera vs. Moran, 48 Phil., 836).
On the other hand, our law is clear that upon the expiration of the one-year period within to review the decree of registration, the decree as well as the title issued in pursuance thereof becomes incontrovertible (Section 38 Act No. 496). The purpose of the law in limiting to one year the period within which the decree may be reviewed is to put a limit to the time within which a claimant may ask for its revocation. If after title to property is decreed an action may be instituted beyond the one-year period to set aside the decree, the object of the Torrens system which is to guarantee the indefeasibility of the Title would be defeated (Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil., 520).
Plaintiffs likewise contend that since the complaint alleges that defendants acquired their respective titles with full notice of the actual possession and claim of ownership of plaintiffs with respect to the land in question, it is error to dismiss the complaint for such averment is sufficient to establish a cause of action against defendants. This contention overlooks the fact that the land in question is covered by Torrens title. Thus, it appears that defendant People's
Homesite & Housing Corporation bought the portion of the property in question from its predecessor-in-interest sometime in 1955 for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1356 was issued in its favor. There is nothing in the complaint to show that when it acquired the property said defendant knew of any defect in the title appearing on its face in the form of any lien or encumbrance. The same thing is true with regard to defendant University of the Philippines. It likewise acquired the portion of the property on question sometime in 1955 from its predecessor-in-interest for which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 was issued in its favor. There is also nothing in the complaint to show that when it acquired the property it knew of any defect in the title appealing on its face in the form of any lien or incumbrace. Said defendants are therefore, presumed to be purchasers for value and in good faith and as such are entitled to protection under the law.
The foregoing finds support in the following well-settled principle: "A person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens System." (William H. Anderson vs. Garcia, 64 Phil., 306; Castillo vs. Sian, 105 Phil., 622; Paraiso vs. Camon, supra, p. 187, 1959).
Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs' action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed as contended, their right however to bring the instant action may be considered barred by laches for not having taken the action seasonably after title to the property had been issued under the Torrens system. It appears that the property in question was originally registered on May 3, 1914 and it was only on October 11, 1957 that appellants asserted their claim thereto when they brought the present action. In the recent case of Domingo vs. Mayon Realty Corporation, 102 Phil., 32; 54 Off. Gaz., 4954), September 30, 1957 this Court said: "Like Ciriaco Allingag in the previous case, appellants herein could have raised the issue of the validity of the certificate of title issued to Valle Cruz since 1928, when the foreclosure sale in her favor was confirmed. They failed to do so until 18
years afterwards, and their action (if any) now should be held by their own laches and negligence."
Appellants finally claim that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata by taking judicial notice of its own records in Land Registration Case No. L-3 invoking in support of their contention the principle that a court cannot take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other case even when such case had been tried by the same court and notwithstanding the facts that both cases may have been tried before the same judge. While the principle invoked is considered to be the general rule, the same is not absolute. There are exceptions to this rule. Thus, as noted by former Chief Justice Moran:
In some instance, courts have taken judicial notice of proceedings in other causes, because of their close connection with the matter in the controversy. Thus, in a separate civil action against the administrator of an estate arising from an appeal against the report of the committee on claims appointed in the administration proceedings of the said estate, to determine whether or not the appeal was taken on time, the court took judicial notice of the record of the administration proceedings. Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration.
Moreover, appellants' objection to the action of the trial court on this matter is merely technical because they do not dispute the fact that appellant Marcelino Tiburcio, who instituted the present case, is the same person who filed the application in Land Registration Case No. L-3 for the registration of the same parcel of land which application was denied by the court. It appears that in the registration case the oppositors were the People's Homesite & Housing Corporation, Tuason and Co., and the Bureau of Lands. Although the University of the Philippines was not an oppositor in that case, in effect it was represented by its predecessor-in-interest, Tuason and Co. from which it acquired the property. It may therefore be said that in the two case there is not only identity of subject matter but identity of parties and causes of action.
Indeed, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
G.R. No. 165427 March 21, 2011
BETTY B. LACBAYAN, Petitioner, vs.BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR., Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This settles the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Betty B. Lacbayan against respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. assailing the September 14, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596. The CA had affirmed the February 10, 2000 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 224, of Quezon City declaring respondent as the sole owner of the properties involved in this suit and awarding to him P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
This suit stemmed from the following facts.
Petitioner and respondent met each other through a common friend sometime in 1978. Despite respondent being already married, their relationship developed until petitioner gave birth to respondent’s son on October 12, 1979.3
During their illicit relationship, petitioner and respondent, together with three more incorporators, were able to establish a manpower services company.4 Five parcels of land were also acquired during the said period and were registered in petitioner and respondent’s names, ostensibly as husband and wife. The lands are briefly described as follows:
1. A 255-square meter real estate property located at Malvar St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 303224 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan."5
2. A 296-square meter real estate property located at Main Ave., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 23301 and registered in the name of "Spouses Bayani S. Samoy and Betty Lacbayan."6
3. A 300-square meter real estate property located at Matatag St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. RT-38264 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty Lacbayan Samoy."7
4. A 183.20-square meter real estate property located at Zobel St., Quezon City covered by TCT No. 335193 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."8
5. A 400-square meter real estate property located at Don Enrique Heights, Quezon City covered by TCT No. 90232 and registered in the name of Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. "married to Betty L. Samoy."9
Initially, petitioner lived with her parents in Mapagbigay St., V. Luna, Quezon City. In 1983, petitioner left her parents and decided to reside in the property located in Malvar St. in Project 4, Quezon City. Later, she and their son transferred to Zobel St., also in Project 4, and finally to the 400-square meter property in Don Enrique Heights.10
Eventually, however, their relationship turned sour and they decided to part ways sometime in 1991. In 1998, both parties agreed to divide the said properties and terminate their business partnership by executing a Partition Agreement.11 Initially, respondent agreed to petitioner’s proposal that the properties in Malvar St. and Don Enrique Heights be assigned to the latter, while the ownership over the three other properties will go to respondent.12However, when petitioner wanted additional demands to be included in the partition agreement, respondent refused.13 Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partition14 of the said properties before the RTC in Quezon City on May 31, 1999.
In her complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent started to live together as husband and wife in 1979 without the benefit of marriage and worked together as business partners, acquiring real properties amounting toP15,500,000.00.15 Respondent, in his Answer,16 however, denied petitioner’s claim of cohabitation and said that the properties were acquired out of his own personal funds without any contribution from petitioner.17
During the trial, petitioner admitted that although they were together for almost 24 hours a day in 1983 until 1991, respondent would still go home to his wife usually in the wee hours of the morning.18 Petitioner likewise claimed that they acquired the said real estate properties from the income of the company which she and respondent established.19
Respondent, meanwhile, testified that the properties were purchased from his personal funds, salaries, dividends, allowances and commissions.20 He countered that the said properties were registered in his name together with petitioner to exclude the same from the property regime of respondent and his legal wife, and to prevent the possible dissipation of the said properties since his legal wife was then a heavy gambler.21 Respondent added that he also purchased the said properties as investment, with the intention to sell them later on for the purchase or construction of a new building.22
On February 10, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.23 In resolving the issue on ownership, the RTC decided to give considerable weight to petitioner’s own admission that the properties were acquired not from her own personal funds but from the income of the manpower services company over which she owns a measly 3.33% share.24
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA asserting that she is the pro indiviso owner of one-half of the properties in dispute. Petitioner argued that the trial court’s decision subjected the certificates of title over the said properties to collateral attack contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that it is improper to thresh out the issue on ownership in an action for partition.25
Unimpressed with petitioner’s arguments, the appellate court denied the appeal, explaining in the following manner:
Appellant’s harping on the indefeasibility of the certificates of title covering the subject realties is, to say the least, misplaced. Rather than the validity of said certificates which was nowhere dealt with in the appealed decision, the record shows that what the trial court determined therein was the ownership of
the subject realties – itself an issue correlative to and a necessary adjunct of the claim of co-ownership upon which appellant anchored her cause of action for partition. It bears emphasizing, moreover, that the rule on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title applies only to original and not to subsequent registration as that availed of by the parties in respect to the properties in litigation. To our mind, the inapplicability of said principle to the case at bench is even more underscored by the admitted falsity of the registration of the selfsame realties in the parties’ name as husband and wife.
The same dearth of merit permeates appellant’s imputation of reversible error against the trial court for supposedly failing to make the proper delineation between an action for partition and an action involving ownership. Typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners, an action for partition may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues, i.e., first, the issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned and, second – assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first – the issue of how the property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s). Otherwise stated, the court must initially settle the issue of ownership for the simple reason that it cannot properly issue an order to divide the property without first making a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. This is precisely what the trial court did when it discounted the merit in appellant’s claim of co-ownership.26
Hence, this petition premised on the following arguments:
I. Ownership cannot be passed upon in a partition case.
II. The partition agreement duly signed by respondent contains an admission against respondent’s interest as to the existence of co-ownership between the parties.
III. An action for partition cannot be defeated by the mere expedience of repudiating co-ownership based on self-serving claims of exclusive ownership of the properties in dispute.
IV. A Torrens title is the best evidence of ownership which cannot be outweighed by respondent’s self-serving assertion to the contrary.
V. The properties involved were acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.27
Noticeably, the last argument is essentially a question of fact, which we feel has been squarely threshed out in the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts. We deem it wise not to disturb the findings of the lower courts on the said matter absent any showing that the instant case falls under the exceptions to the general rule that questions of fact are beyond the ambit of the Court’s jurisdiction in petitions under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The issues may be summarized into only three:
I. Whether an action for partition precludes a settlement on the issue of ownership;
II. Whether the Torrens title over the disputed properties was collaterally attacked in the action for partition; and
III. Whether respondent is estopped from repudiating co-ownership over the subject realties.
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Our disquisition in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia28 is definitive. There, we explained that the determination as to the existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a
partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event[,] partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x29 (Emphasis supplied.)
While it is true that the complaint involved here is one for partition, the same is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties. Petitioner insists she is a co-owner pro indiviso of the five real estate properties based on the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) covering the subject properties. Respondent maintains otherwise. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed properties.30 More importantly, the complaint will not even lie if the claimant, or petitioner in this case, does not even have any rightful interest over the subject properties.31
Would a resolution on the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not.
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked,32 but that rule is not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.33 The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that document.34 Petitioner apparently
confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.35
Moreover, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.36In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.37 Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may be the best evidence thereof. 1avvphi1
Finally, as to whether respondent’s assent to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission against interest, in that the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative.
An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by him.38 Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. – The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.39
A careful perusal of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of law, basic of which is a determination as
to whether the parties have the right to freely divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow petitioner’s argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.40
Curiously, petitioner herself admitted that she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
As to the award of damages to respondent, we do not subscribe to the trial court’s view that respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Unlike the trial court, we do not commiserate with respondent’s predicament. The trial court ruled that respondent was forced to litigate and engaged the services of his counsel to defend his interest as to entitle him an award of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees. But we note that in the first place, it was respondent himself who impressed upon petitioner that she has a right over the involved properties. Secondly, respondent’s act of representing himself and petitioner as husband and wife was a deliberate attempt to skirt the law and escape his legal obligation to his lawful wife. Respondent, therefore, has no one but himself to blame the consequences of his deceitful act which resulted in the filing of the complaint against him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67596 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Bayani S. Samoy, Jr. is hereby declared the sole owner of the disputed properties, without prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against him. The award of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees in respondent’s favor is DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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