Land Cases

ANASTACIO T. TEODORO, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ARMANDO

MIRASOL, Defendant-Appellee.

D E C I S I O N

LABRADOR, J.:

Appeal against an order dismissing the complaint.

On November 20, 1952, Defendant leased to Plaintiff a parcel of land

situated along Taft Avenue, Ermita, Manila, for a monthly rental of P490,

payable on or before the fifth day of each month. The contract provides that

the term of the lease is two years, beginning on October 1, 1952, which

may be extended for another period not exceeding two years with the

written consent of both parties. (Par. 2, Exh. A of Exh. 1, p. 24, Record on

Appeal.)

On October 15, 1954, Defendant wrote Plaintiff that the lease expired on

October 1, 1954, and that as the latter has lost interest in renewing the

same and the retention by the lessee will mean a great financial loss to the

owner, Defendant is giving Plaintiff notice of the termination of the contract.

(Par. 2, Complaint, p. 2, Record on Appeal.

It is alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint that it is not true that Plaintiff has lost

interest in the renewal of the lease contract; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat

as Defendant allowed Plaintiff to choose to continue the lease for another

two years, Defendant is now estopped from denying that the said period

had actually been extended for another period of two years; chan

roblesvirtualawlibraryand that Plaintiff has already paid Defendant a

considerable sum of money, besides spending another big sum for the

improvements on the land. Plaintiff prays that the court fix a longer term for

the lease, or rather extend the lease for another period of two years and

that Defendant be also required to pay Plaintiff P10,000 as indemnity for

moral damages, because Defendant’s wife had stated that a check issued

by the Plaintiff had been dishonored, such statement having been made for

the purpose of affecting adversely Plaintiff’s business.

Upon receipt of the summons, Defendant promptly filed a motion to dismiss

the complaint on the following grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary that the

court has no jurisdiction to grant the remedy prayed for in the complaint;

chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat there is another action pending between the

same parties and for the same cause; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the

complaint states no cause of action against Defendant; chan

roblesvirtualawlibraryand that Plaintiff’s claim cannot be enforced because

the same is barred by the Statute of Frauds. In connection with the

allegation that another action is pending between the same parties and for

the same cause, a copy of a complaint for ejectment filed by the Defendant

against Plaintiff in the Municipal Court of Manila on December 20, 1954,

was attached as Exhibit 1. The complaint for ejectment alleges that the

lease was terminated on October 1, 1954, and that even if the contract

could be extended for another period of two years the same had already

expired on December 20, 1954.

In his reply to the motion for dismissal, Plaintiff argues that as the ejectment

suit in the Municipal Court of Manila was filed later than Plaintiff’s action in

the Court of First Instance, the former must be dismissed; chan

roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the Plaintiff is claiming moral damages for

P10,000, and this must be determined in the Court of First Instance; chan

roblesvirtualawlibraryand that by the letter that the Defendant has sent

Plaintiff, the Defendant is estopped from denying that the contract of lease

has been extended for another period of two years.

The trial court, after considering a rejoinder of Defendant to Plaintiff’s reply,

sustained the motion for dismissal on the ground that in view of the filing of

the action for ejectment or unlawful detainer, all matters alleged in the

Plaintiff’s complaints could be decided therein. After the denial of Plaintiff’s

motion for the reconsideration of the order, Plaintiff appealed to this Court.

There is no doubt in our mind that the order of dismissal appealed from

should be sustained. The real issue between the parties is whether or not

the Plaintiff-Appellant should be allowed to continue occupying the land

under the terms of the lease contract. This is the subject matter of the

action for unlawful detainer filed by Defendant in the Municipal Court, and it

is also the main or principal purpose of this Action. As we have held in the

case of Pue, et al. vs. Gonzales, 87 Phil., 81 and in the recent case of Lim

Si vs. Lim, 98 Phil., 856, the right of a lessee to occupy the land leased

against the lessor should be decided under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.

The mere fact that the unlawful detainer or ejectment case was filed later

did not deter us from applying this ruling in the case of Lim vs. Lim, supra.

In case at bar, we are led to the belief that the present action in the Court of

First Instance was prompted by a desire on Plaintiff’s part to anticipate the

action for unlawful detainer, the probability of which was apparent from the

letter of the Defendant to the Plaintiff advising the latter that the contract of

lease expired on October 1, 1954. The Defendant evidently desired to give

Plaintiff sufficient time to leave the premises because no action for unlawful

detainer was filed immediately after the giving of the notice of the expiration

of the lease. But Plaintiff took advantage of Defendant’s delayed unlawful

detainer suit to file this case in the Court of First Instance of anticipation of

the action for unlawful detainer, in order perhaps that he may claim that the

action in the Court of First Instance was prior to the unlawful detainer case,

and, therefore, should enjoy preference over the action filed in the

Municipal Court.

It is to be noted that the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a

complaint that there is a prior pending action. They provide that there is a

pending action, not a pending prior action. The fact that the unlawful

detainer suit was of a later date is no bar to the dismissal of the present

action. We find, therefore, no error in the ruling of the court a quo that

Plaintiff’s action should be dismissed on the ground of the pendency of

another more appropriate action between the same parties and for the

same cause.

It is also asserted by Appellant that there is no identity between the

unlawful detainer case filed by Defendant and the case at bar, first because

this one is for specific performance or for declaratory relief and second, this

suit also includes a demand for moral damages in the sum of P10,000, both

of which remedies may not be within the municipal court’s jurisdiction to try

and decide. In answer it may be stated that, be that as it may, Plaintiff’s

action for declaratory relief is improper; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythis

action is mean only for those cases where a contract is desired to be

construed prior to its breach because of an impending controversy, that the

parties thereto may be informed of their rights thereunder. In the case at

bar, the lease contract had already expired and there has already been a

breach thereof, hence the action for a declaratory judgment is no longer

proper.

“SEC 2.  Before Breach — A contract or statute may be construed before

there has been a breach thereof.” (Rule 66, Rules of Court.)

Besides, cognizance of actions for declaratory relief is vested in the sound

discretion of the court, which may dismiss the action if a declaration is no

longer necessary.

“SEC. 6.  Discretionary. — The court may refuse to exercise the power to

declare rights and to construe instruments in any case where a decision

under it would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy which gave rise

to the action, or in any case where the declaration, or construction is not

necessary and proper at the time under all the circumstances.” (Id.)

There is no longer any need for the action, even if proper, because the

matter could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit that the

Defendant had instituted in the municipal court.

It is not true that Plaintiff’s supposed rights to an extension cannot be

decided in the unlawful detainer suit. If the Plaintiff has any right to the

extension of the lease at all, such right is a proper and legitimate issue that

could be raised in the unlawful detainer case, because it may be used as a

defense to the action. Plaintiff suit, therefore, violates the principle

prohibiting multiplicity of suits, as the court a quo correctly ruled.

The claim for damages is also invoked as a ground for allowing the

continuance of the action. We note that this supposed cause of action is

merely an incident of the main question of whether or not Plaintiff should be

allowed to continue the lease for two years more. It is not alleged as an

independent cause of action. It is not set forth in a paragraph different from

the others as the Rules require. If Plaintiff wants to insist on these

damages, he may do so clearly and plainly in another action; chan

roblesvirtualawlibraryhe may not assert it in the action for declaratory relief,

as an excuse or reason for continuing his said suit for declaratory relief,

which is improper under the circumstances.

The order of dismissal may also be sustained on another ground, namely,

that on the face of the complaint the Plaintiff has no cause of action against

Defendant. The contract expressly provides that the lease is for two years

from October 1, 1952, but may be extended by written consent of both

parties for another two years. But there is no allegation in the complaint that

this period of time was extended by the written consent of the parties.

The allegation in the complaint that the Defendant’s assumption that

Plaintiff was no longer interested in renewing the lease is false and estops

Defendants from claiming that the lease has been terminated is either a

conclusion of law or it does not create any right of action in favor of Plaintiff

for the extension of the lease. As the contract of lease can be extended,

according to its terms, only by written consent of the parties, no right for

extension can arise without such written consent. There is no allegation

that such written consent was ever given. Hence there is no sufficient

ground alleged in the complaint for the Plaintiff to be entitled to the

extension. The order of dismissal was, therefore, further justified by the fact

that Plaintiff’s complaint alleges no cause of action against Defendant.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby

affirmed, with costs against Plaintiff-Appellant.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Concepcion, Reyes,

J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-41377             July 26, 1935

ANGELA BLONDEAU and FERNANDO DE LA CANTERA Y UZQUIANO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.AGUSTIN NANO and JOSE VALLEJO, defendants-appellees.

John R. McFie, Jr., for appellants.Evangelista and Santos for appellee Vallejo.No appearance for the other appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This action was brought in the Court of First Instance of Manila to foreclose a mortgage alleged to have been made by the defendants Agustin Nano and Jose Vallejo to the plaintiff Angela Blondeau, bearing date November 5, 1931, to secure the payment of the sum of P12,000, and covering property situated on Calle Georgia, Manila. Nano, purporting to represent both defendants, after filing an answer, was found in contempt of court. The other defendant Vallejo thereupon presented an amended answer in which it was alleged that his signature to the mortgage was a forgery. Following the trial, judgment was rendered against Nano but not against Vallejo. From this judgment the plaintiffs have taken an appeal.

With all due deference to the findings of the trial judge, now an honored member of this court, we are inclined to the view, first, that the accessorias bearing Nos. 905A to 905F, Calle Georgia, Manila, were as indicated in the mortgage, the property of the defendant Agustin Nano, and second, that the purported signature of the defendant Vallejo to the mortgage was not a forgery. In support of the first of our statements, attention need only be invited to a series of documents, including the transfer certificate of title, showing that Vallejo was considered the owner of the land only. As to the second statement, it needs be recalled that the mortgage was executed in the home of the plaintiffs, and that of those present, the principal plaintiff Angela Blondeau and her husband Fernando de la Cantera, together with the instrumental witness Pedro Jimenez Zoboli, identified Vallejo as the person who signed the document. As against their testimony stands the alibi of Vallejo, partially corroborated by

the testimony of the notary public Gregorio Bilog. It is expecting a great deal to have us believe that not only the mortgage but the power of attorney of Vallejo in favor of Nano and a series of documents were the product of the evil machinations of Nano, and that although Nano and Vallejo, members of same family, lived together, Vallejo was entirely unacquainted with the activities of Nano in dealing with their joint property. It is significant that the proper cedulas of Vallejo were presented for the accomplishment of the documents, and that if there was fraud, not one but a number of notaries public were deceived thereby.

We repeat that upon its face, the mortgage appears to be regular and to have been duly executed and accepted by Vallejo on November 5, 1931. The evidence then resolves itself into a question of the execution of the mortgage by Vallejo on the one hand, and the denial of its execution on the other hand. That there was a conflict between experts as to the handwriting, one being of the opinion that the signatures of Vallejo were genuine, and the other being of the opinion that they were not genuine, is not unexpected. Under such conditions, the question is, which side produced the weightier testimony, and as hereinbefore indicated, we are of the opinion that the balance inclined in favor of the plaintiffs.

But there is a narrower ground on which the defenses of the defendant-appellee must be overruled. Agustin Nano had possession of Jose Vallejo's title papers. Without those title papers handed over to Nano with the acquiescence of Vallejo, a fraud could not have been perpetrated. When Fernando de la Cantera, a member of the Philippine bar and the husband of Angela Blondeau, the principal plaintiff, searched the registration records, he found them in due form, including the power of attorney of Vallejo, in favor of Nano. If this had not been so and if thereafter the proper notation of the encumbrance could not have been made, Angela Blondeau would not have lent P12,000 to the defendant Vallejo.

The Torrens system is intended for the registration of title, rather than the muniments of title. It represents a departure from the orthodox principles of property law. Under the common law, if the pretended signature of the mortgagor is a forgery, the instrument is invalid for every purpose and will pass on the title or rights to anyone, unless the spurious document is ratified and accepted by the mortgagor. The Torrens Act on the contrary permits a forged transfer, when duly entered in the registry, to become the root of a valid title in a bona fide purchaser. The act erects a safeguard against a forged transfer being registered, by the requirement that no transfer shall be registered unless the owner's certificate was produced along with the instrument of transfer. An executed transfer of registered lands placed by the registered owner thereof in the hands of another operates as a representation to a third party that the holder of the transfer

is authorized to deal with the lands. (53 C.J., 1141, 1142; Act No. 496, as amended, secs. 47, 51, 55.)

With respect to the conclusiveness of the Torrens title and the binding force and effect of annotations thereon even when through a forged deed the land passes into the possession of an innocent purchaser for value, the basic rule is found in the opinion delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Arellano in De la Cruz vs. Fabie ( [1916], 35 Phil., 144). The history of the case was as follows:

Vedasto Velazquez was attorney in fact of Gregoria Hernandez. Gregoria Hernandez registered her title of ownership to the land in question in the property registry and was issued certificate of title No. 121. Vedasto Velazquez, being the attorney in fact of Gregoria Hernandez, had in his possession all the muniments of title of the land, including the certificate of title No. 121, and, abusing her confidence in him, a few days after the registration of the land, forged a notarial instrument wherein he made it appear that she had sold the said land to him for the price of P8,000.

Vedasto Velazquez then went to the register of deeds and applied for the registration of the land in his own name, presenting Gregoria Hernandez' certificate of title No. 121 for cancellation, and the deed of conveyance which was purported to have been made by Gregoria Hernandez in his favor in order that he might be registered as the true owner of the land. All this was done; Gregoria Hernandez' title was cancelled and certificate of title No. 43 was issued to Vedasto Velazquez.

x x x           x x x           x x x

On May 31, 1907, Vedasto Velazquez sold the land finally and absolutely to Ramon Fabie, who presented to the register of deeds the notarial instrument executed for the purpose and was thereupon furnished with the certificate of title No. 766." On these facts, it was held that Fabie was an innocent holder of a title for value and that, under section 55 of the Land Registration Law, he was the absolute owner of the land.

The decision above cited has repeatedly been reexamined by this court, one of the most recent instances being found in the case of El Hogar Filipino vs. Olviga ( [1934], 60 Phil., 17). While counsel for the appellee is undoubtedly correct in his contention that neither the case of Fabie nor the case of Olgiva nor any other case relied upon by the appellants is on all

fours with the present facts, the principle on which these cases rest should here be carried forward and given application.

The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Eliason vs. Wilborn ( [1930], 281 U.S., 457), is of enlightening interest. Plaintiffs in this case, purchasers of land previously brought under the Illinois Torrens Act, delivered the certificate of title to a party under an agreement to sell, who forged a deed to himself, had a certificate issue in his name, and then conveyed to defendants who were good faith purchasers for value. Plaintiffs informed the register of the forgery after the defendants had bought, and demanded the cancellation of the deeds and certificates, and the reissue of a certificate to themselves. The register refused, and a petition was brought to compel such action. The Circuit Court for Cook County, Illinois, the Supreme Court of Illinois, and the United States Supreme Court, united in dismissing the petition. Mr. Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the latter court, said:

. . . The statute requires the production of the outstanding certificate, as a condition to the issue of a new one. The appellants saw fit no entrust it to Napletone and they took the risk. They say that according to the construction of the act adopted the registrar's certificate would have had the same effect even if the old certificate had not been produced. But that, if correct, is no answer. Presumably the register will do his duty, and if he does he will require the old certificate to be handed in. It does not justify the omission of a precaution that probably would be sufficient, to point out that a dishonest official could get around it. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that Napletone would have got a certificate on which the Wilborns could rely, without the delivery of the old one by the appellants. As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss.

Vargas & Mañalac in their treatise on the Philippine Land Registration Law quote with approval the comment of Mr. Powell in his book on Land Registration, section 213. The question which the author propounded was: Why does the law say that the person who had no title at all and only a forged deed as a color of title should become the true owner of the land by merely continuing to occupy and enjoy the land which in fact does not belong to him, but which belongs to the victim of the forgery? His answer was:

. . . that public policy, expediency, and the need of a statute of repose as to the possession of land, demand such a rule. Likewise, public policy, expediency, and the need of repose and certainty as to land titles demand that the bona fide purchaser of a certificate of title to registered land, who, though he buys on a forged transfer, succeeds in having the land registered in his name, should nevertheless hold an unimpeachable title. There is more natural justice in recognizing his title as being valid than there is in recognizing as valid the title of one who has succeeded in ripening a forged color of title by prescription.

In the first place, a forger cannot effectuate his forgery in the case of registered land by executing a transfer which can be registered, unless the owner has allowed him, in some way, to get possession of the owner's certificate. The Act has erected in favor of the owner, as a safeguard, against a forged transfer being perpetrated against him, the requirement that no voluntary transfer shall be registered unless the owner's certificate is produced along with the instrument of transfer. Therefore, if the owner has voluntarily or carelessly allowed the forger to come into possession of his owner's certificate he is to be judged according to the maxim, that when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the wrongful act of a third person the loss fall on him who put it into the power of that third person to perpetrate the wrong. Furthermore, even if the forger stole the owner's certificate, the owner is up against no greater hardship than is experienced by one whose money or negotiable paper payable to bearer is stolen and transferred by the thief to an innocent purchaser.

Other incidental facts might be mentioned and other incidental legal propositions might be discussed, but in its final analysis this is a case of a mortgagee relying upon a Torrens title, and loaning money in all good faith on the basis of the title standing in the name of the mortgagors only thereafter to discover one defendant to be an alleged forger and the other defendant, if not a party to the conspiracy, at least having by his negligence or acquiescence made it possible for the fraud to transpire. Giving to the facts the most favorable interpretation for Vallejo, yet, as announced by the United States Supreme Court, the maxim is, as between two innocent persons, in this case Angela Blondeau and Jose Vallejo, one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss, in this case Jose Vallejo. Accordingly, the four errors assigned will be sustained, the judgment reversed, and in the court of origin a new one entered sustaining plaintiff's mortgage and granting her the relief prayed for in her complaints .So ordered, without special pronouncement as to the costs in either instance.

Villa-Real, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3133            January 2, 1908

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH, ET AL., plaintiffs, vs.THE MUNICIPALITIES OF CUYAPO, ALIAGA, SAN ANTONIO, SAN ISIDRO, CABANATUAN, TALAVERA, AND LUCAB, Province of Nueva Ecija, ET AL., defendants.

Hartigan, Rohde and Gutierrez, fro plaintiffs. Buencamino and Diokno, Benito Natividad, and Pedro Carmen, for defendants.

WILLARD, J.:

This is an original action brought in this court by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 1376. It is in all respects similar to the case of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, et al., vs. The Municipalities of Tarlac and Victoria, in the Province of Tarlac, et al.1

The complaint was duly served upon all the defendants, and an answer was filed on behalf of Gregorio Aglipay, and other answers were presented by some of the municipalities who were made defendants. After the evidence was taken in the case, there was the same agreement made therein between the plaintiffs and the Attorney-General in reference to the public squares and streets as was made in the case above cited, relating to the municipalities of Tarlac.

In the brief filed by the plaintiffs they say that the matter in dispute in the case is reduced to the church, convent, and cemetery of Cuyapo, the church and cemetery of Zaragoza in the municipality of Talavera.

As to the property in Cuyapo, the municipality made an answer in which it disclaimed any interest whatever in any of the property described in the complaint, stating, however, that it was occupying certain apartments in the convent by permission of the priest of the Independent Filipino Church, who was in possession of the whole thereof. The evidence offered at the trial also showed that the municipality made no claim in its own right to any of

the property in question, but that it was occupying, as stated in its answer, certain parts of the convent. The only defendants interested in this property in Cuyapo are, therefore, the municipality of Cuyapo and Gregorio Aglipay.

The municipality of Aliaga filed an answer relating to the church and cemetery of Zaragoza in which it disclaimed any interest whatever therein and expressed its willingness to deliver the property to anyone to whom the court might direct its delivery.

As to the cemetery in the municipality of Talavera, that municipality filed an answer claiming to be the owner thereof.

It appears that the only persons, therefore, interested in any of the property now in controversy in this case are the three municipalities of Cuyapo, Talavera, and Aliaga and the defendant, Gregorio Aglipay.

The evidence in this case is similar to the evidence presented in the case referred to relating to the municipalities of the Province of Tarlac, and it shows that the plaintiff church had been in possession of the property for many years when it lost its possession about 1902. As to the church property in Cuyapo, the evidence shows that it is in the possession of the Independent Filipino Church.

There are the same reasons for entering judgment for the plaintiffs in this case as appeared in the case above mentioned.

It is therefore by the court adjudged and decreed that this action be dismissed, without costs as to all the defendants except Gregorio Aglipay, the municipality of Cuyapo, and the municipality of Talavera.

It is further adjudged and decreed that all of the land described in the complaint, as amended, be eliminated therefrom except that relating to the church, convent, and cemetery of Cuyapo, the church and cemetery of Zaragoza, barrio of Aliaga, and the cemetery of Talavera; and as to the property thus eliminated, this court makes no determination in regard to the rights of the parties to this action thereto.

It is further adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, is entitled to the immediate possession of the following-described property, situated in the municipality of Cuyapo, in the Province of Nueva Ecija, to wit:

The church and the convent built of strong materials and with corrugated iron roof, known as the church and convent of Cuyapo.

The cemetery known as the cemetery of Cuyapo.

In the municipality of Aliaga, in the said Province of Nueva Ecija, the following described property, to wit:

A church building situated in the former municipality of Zaragoza, now a barrio of Aliaga, and known as the cemetery of Zaragoza.

A cemetery situated in the former municipality of Zaragoza, now a barrio of Aliaga, and known as the cemetery of Zaragoza.

And in the municipality of Talavera, in said Province of Nueva Ecija, the following-described property, to wit:

The cemetery known as the cemetery of Talavera.

It is further adjudged and decreed that neither the said municipality of Cuyapo, nor the said municipality of Aliaga, nor the said municipality of Talavera, nor Gregorio Aglipay, obispo maximo of the Independent Filipino Church, has any right, title, or interest in or to any of the property hereinbefore described.

It is further adjudged and decreed that the property hereinbefore mentioned be returned to the plaintiffs and that the said defendants be ousted from the possession thereof and that said possession be awarded to the plaintiffs.

And it is further adjudged and decreed that a writ of possession issue out of this court against the defendant Gregorio Aglipay, obispo maximo of the Independent Filipino Church, in the manner and form prescribed in Act No. 190, for the recovery of the church, cemetery, and convent hereinbefore described as situated in the municipality of Cuyapo, and against the municipality of Cuyapo for the recovery of the possession of the convent in said municipality, hereinbefore described; and against Gregorio Aglipay, obispo maximo of the Independent Filipino Church, and the municipality of Aliaga for the recovery of the church and cemetery of Zaragoza; and against Gregorio Aglipay, obispo maximo of the Independent Filipino Church, and the municipality of Talavera for the recovery of the cemetery in Talavera. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. So ordered.Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Tracey, JJ., concur.  Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-2832    November 24, 1906

REV. JORGE BARLIN, in his capacity as apostolic administrator of this vacant bishopric and legal representative of the general interests

of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the diocese of Nueva Caceres, Plaintiff-Appellee , vs. P. VICENTE RAMIREZ, ex-rector of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Parochial Church of Lagonoy, AND THE

MUNICIPALITY OF LAGONOY, Defendants-Appellants.

WILLARD, J.: 

There had been priests of the Roman Catholic Church in the pueblo of Lagonoy, in the Province of Ambos Camarines, since 1839. On the 13th of January, 1869, the church and convent were burned. They were rebuilt between 1870 and 1873. There was evidence that this was done by the order of the provincial governor. The labor necessary for this reconstruction was performed by the people of the pueblo the direction of the cabeza de barangay. Under the law then in force, each man in the pueblo was required to work for the government, without compensation, for forty days every year. The time spent in the reconstruction of these buildings was counted as a part of the forty days. The material necessary was brought and paid for in part by the parish priest from the funds of the church and in part was donated by certain individuals of the pueblo. After the completion of the church it was always administered, until November 14, 1902, by a priest of a Roman Catholic Communion and all the people of the pueblo professed that faith and belonged to that church.

The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff parish priest, took possession of the church on the 5th of July, 1901. he administered it as such under the orders of his superiors until the 14th day of November, 1902. His successor having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this defendant for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other property of the church. The defendant, by a written document of that date, refused to make such delivery. That document is as follows:

At 7 o'clock last night I received through Father Agripino Pisino your respected order of the 12th instant, wherein I am advised of the appointment of Father Pisino as acting parish priest of this town, and directed to turn over to him this parish and to report to you at the vicarage. In reply thereto, I have the honor to inform you that the town of Lagonoy, in conjunction with the parish priest thereof, has seen fit to sever connection

with the Pope at Rome and his representatives in these Islands, and join the Filipino Church, the head of which is at Manila. This resolution of the people was reduced to writing and triplicate copies made, of which I beg to inclose a copy herewith.

For this reason I regret to inform you that I am unable to obey your said order by delivering to Father Agripino Pisino the parish property of Lagonoy which, as I understand, is now outside of the control of the Pope and his representatives in these Islands. May God guard you many years.

Lagonoy, November 14, 1902. (Signed) VICENTE RAMIREZ. RT. REV. VICAR OF THIS DISTRICT.

The document, a copy of which is referred to in this letter, is as follows:

LAGONOY, November, 9, 1902. chanrobles virtual law library

The municipality of this town and some of its most prominent citizens having learned through the papers from the capital of these Islands of the constitution of the Filipino National Church, separate from the control of the Pope at Rome by reason of the fact that the latter has refused to either recognize or grant the rights to the Filipino clergy which have many times been urged, and it appearing to us that the reasons advanced why such offices should be given to the Filipino clergy are evidently well-founded, we have deemed it advisable to consult with the parish priest of this town as to whether it would be advantageous to join the said Filipino Church and to separate from the control of the Pope as long as he continues to ignore the rights of the said Filipino clergy, under the conditions that there will be no change in the articles of faith, and that the sacraments and other dogmas will be recognized and particularly that of the immaculate conception of the mother of our Lord. But the moment the Pope at Rome recognizes and grants the rights heretofore denied to the Filipino clergy we will return to his control. In view of this, and subject to this condition, the reverend parish priest, together with the people of the town, unanimously join in declaring that from this date they separate themselves from the obedience and control of the Pope and join the Filipino National Church. This assembly and the reverend parish priest have accordingly adopted this resolution written in triplicate, and resolved to send a copy thereof to the civil government of this province for its information, and do sign the same below. Vicente Ramirez, Francisco Israel, Ambrosio Bocon, Florentino Relloso, Macario P. Ledesma, Cecilio Obias, Balbino Imperial, Juan Preseñada, Fernando Deudor, Mauricio Torres, Adriano Sabater.

At the meeting at which the resolution spoken of in this document was adopted, there were present about 100 persons of the pueblo. There is testimony in the case that the population of the pueblo was at that time 9,000 and that all but 20 of the inhabitants were satisfied with the action there taken. Although it is of no importance in the case, we are inclined to think that the testimony to this effect merely means that about 100 of the principal men of the town were in favor of the resolution and about 20 of such principal men were opposed to it. After the 14th of November, the defendant, Ramirez, continued in the possession of the church and other property and administered the same under the directions of his superior, the Obispo Maximo of the Independent Filipino Church. The rites and ceremonies and the manner of worship were the same after the 14th day of November as they were before, but the relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the defendant had been entirely severed.

In January, 1904, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, Ramirez, alleging in his amended complaint that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church building, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and other property belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the possession thereof and that the defendant render an account of the property which he had received and which was retained by him, and for other relief.

The answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in addition to a general denial of the allegation of the complaint, admitted that he was in the possession and administration of the property described therein with the authority of the municipality of Lagonoy and of the inhabitants of the same, who were the lawful owners of the said property. After this answer had been presented, and on the 1st day of November, 1904, the municipality of Lagonoy filed a petition asking that it be allowed to intervene in the case and join with the defendant, Ramirez, as a defendant therein. This petition been granted, the municipality of the 1st day of December filed an answer in which it alleged that the defendant, Ramirez, was in possession of the property described in the complaint under the authority and with the consent of the municipality of Lagonoy and that such municipality was the owner thereof.

Plaintiff answered this complaint, or answer in intervention, and the case was tried and final judgment in entered therein in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. The defendants then brought the case here by a bill of exceptions.

That the person in the actual possession of the church and other property described in the complaint is the defendant, Ramirez, is plainly established by the evidence. It does not appear that the municipality, as a corporate

body, ever took any action in reference to this matter until they presented their petition for intervention in this case. In fact, the witnesses for the defense, when they speak of the ownership of the buildings, say that they are owned by the people of the pueblo, and one witness, the president, said that the municipality as a corporation had nothing whatever to do with the matter. That the resolution adopted on the 14th of November, and which has been quoted above, was not the action of the municipality, as such, is apparent from an inspection thereof.

The witnesses for the defenses speak of a delivery of the church by the people of the pueblo to the defendant, Ramirez, but there is no evidence in the case of any such delivery. Their testimony in regard to the delivery always refers to the action taken on the 14th of November, a record of which appears that in the document above quoted. It is apparent that the action taken consisted simply in separating themselves from the Roman Catholic Church, and nothing is said therein in reference to the material property then in possession of the defendant, Ramirez.

There are several grounds upon which this judgment must be affirmed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 

(1) As to the defendant, Ramirez, it appears that he took possession of the property as the servant or agent of the plaintiff. The only right which he had to the possession at the time he took it, was the right which was given to him by the plaintiff, and he took possession under the agreement to return that possession whenever it should be demanded of him. Under such circumstances he will not be allowed, when the return of such possession is demanded by him the plaintiff, to say that the plaintiff is not the owner of the property and is not entitled to have it delivered back to him. The principle of law that a tenant can not deny his landlord's title, which is found in section 333, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure, and also in the Spanish law, is applicable to a case of this kind. An answer of the defendant, Ramirez, in which he alleged that he himself was the owner of the property at the time he received it from the plaintiff, or in which he alleged that the pueblo was the owner of the property at that time, would constitute no defense. There is no claim made by him that since the delivery of the possession of the property to him by the plaintiff he has acquired the title thereto by other means, nor does he is own behalf make any claim whatever either to the property or to the possession thereof.

(2) The municipality of Lagonoy, in its answer, claims as such, to be the owner of the property. As we have said before, the evidence shows that it never was in the physical possession of the property. But waiving this point and assuming that the possession of Ramirez, which he alleges in his

answer is the possession of the municipality, gives the municipality the rights of a possessor, the question still arises, Who has the better right to the present possession of the property? The plaintiff, in 1902, had been in the lawful possession thereof for more than thirty years and during all that time its possession had never been questioned or disturbed. That possession has been taken away from it and it has the right now to recover the possession from the persons who have so deprived it of such possession, unless the latter can show that they have a better right thereto. This was the preposition which was discussed and settled in the case of Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron, 1 No. 1748, decided June 1, 1906. That decision holds that as against one who has been in possession for the length of the plaintiff has been in possession, and who had been deprived of his possession, and who can not produce any written evidence of title, the mere fact that the defendant is in possession does not entitle the defendant to retain that possession. In order that he may continue in possession, he must show a better right thereto.

The evidence in this case does not show that the municipality has, as such, any right of whatever in the property in question. It has produced no evidence of ownership. Its claim of ownership is rested in its brief in this court upon the following propositions: That the property in question belonged prior to the treaty of Paris to the Spanish Government; that by the treaty of Paris the ownership thereof passed to the Government of the United States; that by section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, such property was transferred to the Government of the Philippine Islands, and that by the circular of that Government, dated November 11, 1902, the ownership and the right to the possession of this property passed to the municipality of Lagonoy. If, for the purposes of the argument, we should admit that the other propositions are true, there is no evidence whatever to support the last proposition, namely that the Government of the Philippine Islands has transferred the ownership of this church to the municipality of Lagonoy. We have found no circular of the date above referred to. The one of February 10, 1903, which is probably the one intended, contains nothing that indicates any such transfer. As to the municipality of Lagonoy, therefore, it is very clear that it has neither title, ownership, nor right of possession.

(3) We have said that it would have no such title or ownership ever admitting that the Spanish Government was the owner of the property and it has passed by the treaty of Paris to the American Government. But this assumption is not true. As a matter of law, the Spanish Government at the time the treaty of peace was signed, was not the owner of this property, nor of any other property like it, situated in the Philippine Islands.

It does not admit of doubt that from the earliest times the parish churches in the Philippine Islands were built by the Spanish Government. Law 2, title 2, book 1, of the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies is, in part, as follows:

Having erected all the churches, cathedrals, and parish houses of the Spaniards and natives of our Indian possessions from their discovery at the cost and expense of our royal treasury, and applied for their service and maintenance the part of the tithes belonging to us by apostolic concession according to the division we have made.

Law 3 of the same title to the construction of parochial churches such as the one in question. That law is as follows:

The parish churches which was erected in Spanish towns shall be of durable and decent construction. Their costs shall be divided and paid in three parts: One by our royal treasury, another by the residents and Indian encomenderos of the place where such churches are constructed, and the other part by the Indians who abide there; and if within the limits of a city, village, or place there should be any Indians incorporated to our royal crown, we command that for our part there be contributed the same amount as the residents and encomenderos, respectively, contribute; and the residents who have no Indians shall also contribute for this purpose in accordance with their stations and wealth, and that which is so given shall be deducted from the share of the Indians should pay.

Law 11 of the same title is as follows:

We command that the part of the tithes which belongs to the fund for the erection of churches shall be given to their superintendents to be expended for those things necessary for these churches with the advice of the prelates and officials, and by their warrants, and not otherwise. And we request and charge the archbishops and bishops not to interfere in the collection and disbursement thereof, but to guard these structures.

Law 4, title 3, book 6, is as follows:

In all settlements, even though the Indians are few, there shall be erected a church where mass can be decently held, and it shall have a donor with a key, notwithstanding the fact that it be the subject to or separate from a parish.

Not only were all the parish churches in the Philippines erected by the King and under his direction, but it was made unlawful to erect a church without

the license of the King. This provision is contained in Law 2, title 6, book 1, which is as follows:

Whereas it is our intention to erect, institute, found, and maintain all cathedrals, parish churches, monasteries, votive hospitals, churches, and religious and pious establishments where they are necessary for the teaching, propagation, and preaching of the doctrine of our sacred Roman Catholic faith, and to aid to this effect with out royal treasury whenever possible, and to receive information of such places where they should be founded and are necessary, and the ecclesiastical patronage of all our Indies belonging to us: 

We command that there shall not be erected, instituted, founded, or maintained any cathedral, parish church, monastery, hospital, or votive churches, or other pious or religious establishment without our express permission as is provided in Law 1, title 2, and Law 1, title 3, of this book, notwithstanding any permission heretofore given by our viceroy or other ministers, which in this respect we revoke and make null, void, and of no effect.

By agreement at an early date between the Pope and the Crown of Spain, all tithes in the Indies were given by the former to the latter and the disposition made the King of the fund thus created is indicated by Law 1, title 16, book 1, which is as follows:

Whereas the ecclesiastical tithes from the Indies belong to us by the apostolic concessions of the supreme pontiffs, we command the officials of our royal treasury of those provinces to collect and cause to be collected all tithes due and to become due from the crops and flocks of the residents in the manner in which it has been the custom to pay the same, and from these tithes the churches shall be provided with competent persons of good character to serve them and with all ornaments and things which may be necessary for divine worship, to the end that these churches may be well served and equipped, and we shall be informed of God, our Lord; this order shall be observed where the contrary has not already been directed by us in connection with the erection of churches.

That the condition of things existing by virtue of the Laws of the Indies was continued to the present time is indicated by the royal order of the 31st of January, 1856, and by the royal order of the 13th of August, 1876, both relating to the construction and repair of churches, there being authority for saying that the latter order was in force in the Philippines.

This church, and other churches similarly situated in the Philippines, having been erected by the Spanish Government, and under its direction, the next question to be considered is, To whom did these churches belong? 

Title 28 of the third partida is devoted to the ownership of things and, after discussing what can be called public property and what can be called private property, speaks, in Law 12, of those things which are sacred, religious, or holy. That law is as follows:

Law XII. - HOW SACRED OR RELIGIOUS THINGS CAN NOT BE OWNED BY ANY PERSON.

No sacred, religious, or holy thing, devoted to the service of God, can be the subject of ownership by any man, nor can it be considered as included in his property holdings. Although the priests may have such things in their possession, yet they are not the owners thereof. They, hold them thus as guardians or servants, or because they have the care of the same and serve God in or without them. Hence they were allowed to take from the revenues of the church and lands what was reasonably necessary for their support; the balance, belonging to God, was to be devoted to pious purposes, such as the feeding and clothing of the poor, the support of orphans, the marrying of poor virgins to prevent their becoming evil women because of their poverty, and for the redemption of captives and the repairing of the churches, and the buying of chalices, clothing, books, and others things which they might be in need of, and other similar charitable purposes.

And then taking up for consideration the first of the classes in to which this law has divided these things, it defines in Law 13, title 28, third partida, consecrated things. That law is as follows:

Sacred things, we say, are those which are consecrated by the bishops, such as churches, the altars therein, crosses, chalices, censers, vestments, books, and all other things which are in tended for the service of the church, and the title to these things can not be alienated except in certain specific cases as we have already shown in the first partida of this book by the laws dealing with this subject. We say further that even where a consecrated church is razed, the ground upon which it formerly stood shall always be consecrated ground. But if any consecrated church should fall into the hands of the enemies of our faith it shall there and then cease to be sacred as long as the enemy has it under control, although once recovered by the Christians, it will again become sacred, reverting to its condition before the enemy seized it and shall have all the right and privileges formerly belonging to it.

That the principles of the partida in reference to churches still exist is indicated by Sanchez Roman, whose work on the Civil Law contains the following statement:

First Group. Spiritual and corporeal or ecclesiastical. A. Spiritual. - From early times distinction has been made by authors and by law between things governed by divine law, called divine, and those governed by human law, called human, and although the former can not be the subject of civil juridical relations, their nature and species should be ascertained either to identify them and exclude them from such relations or because they furnish a complete explanation of the foregoing tabulated statement, or finally because the laws of the partida deal with them.

Divine things are those which are either directly or indirectly established by God for his service and sanctification of men and which are governed by divine or canonical laws. This makes it necessary to divide them into spiritual things, which are those which have a direct influence on the religious redemption of man such as the sacrament, prayers, fasts, indulgences, etc., and corporeal or ecclesiastical, which are those means more or less direct for the proper religious salvation of man.

7. First Group. Divine things. B. Corporeal or ecclesiastical things (sacred, religious, holy, and temporal belonging to the church). - Corporeal or ecclesiastical things are so divided.

(a) Sacred things are those devoted to God, religion, and worship in general, such as temples, altars, ornaments, etc. These things can not be alienated except for some pious purpose and in such cases as are provided for in the laws, according to which their control pertains to the ecclesiastical authorities, and in so far as their use is concerned, to the believers and the clergy. (2 Derecho Civil Español, Sanchez Roman, p. 480; 8 Manresa, Commentaries on the Spanish Civil Code, p. 636; 3 Alcubilla, Diccionario de la Administracion Española, p. 486.)

The partidas defined minutely what things belonged to the public in general and what belonged to private persons. In the first group churches are not named. The present Civil Code declares in article 338 that property is of public or private ownership. Article 339, which defines public property, is as follows:

Property of public ownership is - chanrobles virtual law library

1. That destined to the public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports, and bridges constructed by the State, and banks, shores, roadsteads, and that of similar character.

2. That belonging exclusively to the state without being for public use and which is destined to some public service, or to the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until their concession has been granted.

The code also defines the property of provinces and of pueblos, and in defining what property is of public use, article 344 declares as follows:

Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by the said towns or provinces.

All other property possessed by either is patrimonial, and shall be governed by the provisions of this code, unless otherwise prescribe in special laws.

It will be noticed that in either one of these articles is any mention made of churches. When the Civil Code undertook to define those things in a pueblo which were for the common use of the inhabitants of the pueblo, or which belonged to the State, while it mentioned a great many other things, it did not mention churches.

It has been said that article 25 of the Regulations for the Execution of the Mortgage Law indicates that churches belong to the State and are public property. That article is as follows:

There shall be excepted from the record required by article 2 of the law: chanrobles virtual law library

First. Property which belongs exclusively to the eminent domain of the State, and which is for the use of all, such as the shores of the sea, islands, rivers and their borders, wagon roads, and the roads of all kinds, with the exception of railroads; streets, parks, public promenades, and commons of towns, provided they are not lands of common profit to the inhabitants; walls of cities and parks, ports, and roadsteads, and any other analogous property during the time they are in common and general use, always reserving the servitudes established by law on the shores of the sea and borders of navigable rivers.

Second. Public temples dedicated to the Catholic faith.

A reading of this article shows that far from proving that churches belong to the State and to the eminent domain thereof, it proves the contrary, for, if they had belonged to the State, they would have been included in the first paragraph instead of being placed in a paragraph by themselves.

The truth is that, from the earliest times down to the cession of the Philippines to the United States, churches and other consecrated objects were considered outside of the commerce of man. They were not public property, nor could they be subjects of private property in the sense that any private person could the owner thereof. They constituted a kind of property distinctive characteristic of which was that it was devoted to the worship of God.

But, being material things was necessary that some one should have the care and custody of them and the administration thereof, and the question occurs, To whom, under the Spanish law, was intrusted that possession and administration? For the purposes of the Spanish law there was only one religion. That was the religion professed by the Roman Catholic Church. It was for the purposes of that religion and for the observance of its rites that this church and all other churches in the Philippines were erected. The possession of the churches, their care and custody, and the maintenance of religious worship therein were necessarily, therefore, intrusted to that body. It was, by virtue of the laws of Spain, the only body which could under any circumstances have possession of, or any control over, any church dedicated to the worship of God. By virtue of those laws this possession and right of control were necessarily exclusive. It is not necessary or important to give any name to this right of possession and control exercised by the Roman Catholic Church in the church buildings of the Philippines prior to 1898. It is not necessary to show that the church as a juridical person was the owner of the buildings. It is sufficient to say that this right to the exclusive possession and control of the same, for the purposes of its creation, existed.

The right of patronage, existing in the King of Spain with reference to the churches in the Philippines, did not give him any right to interfere with the material possession of these buildings.

Title 6 of book 1 of the Compilation of the laws of the Indies treats Del Patronazgo Real de las Indias. There is nothing in any one of the fifty-one laws which compose this title which in any way indicates that the King of Spain was the owner of the churches in the Indies because he had constructed them. These laws relate to the right of presentation to

ecclesiastical charges and offices. For example, Law 49 of the title commences as follows:

Because the patronage and right of presentation of all archbishops, bishops, dignitaries, prevents, curates, and doctrines and all other beneficiaries and ecclesiastical offices whatsoever belong to us, no other person can obtain or possess the same without our presentation as provided in Law 1 and other laws of this title.

Title 15 of the first partida treats of the right of patronage vesting in private persons, but there is nothing in any one of its fifteen laws which in any way indicates that the private patron is the owner of the church.

When it is said that this church never belonged to the Crown of Spain, it is not intended to say that the Government and had no power over it. It may be that by virtue of that power of eminent domain which is necessarily resides in every government, it might have appropriated this church and other churches, and private property of individuals. But nothing of this kind was ever attempted in the Philippines.

It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the treaty of Paris, the Roman Catholic Church had by law the exclusive right to the possession of this church and it had the legal right to administer the same for the purposes for which the building was consecrated. It was then in the full and peaceful possession of the church with the rights aforesaid. That these rights were fully protected by the treaty of Paris is very clear. That treaty, in article 8, provides, among other things, as follows:

And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, can not in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, or provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, or whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.

It is not necessary, however, to invoke the provisions of that treaty. Neither the Government of the United States, nor the Government of these Islands, has ever attempted in any way to interfere with the rights which the Roman Catholic Church had in this building when Spanish sovereignty ceased in the Philippines. Any interference that has resulted has been caused by private individuals, acting without any authority from the Government.

No point is made in the brief of the appellant that any distinction should be made between the church and the convent. The convent undoubtedly was annexed to the church and, as to it, the provisions of Law 19, title 2, book 1, of the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies would apply. That law is as follows:

We command that the Indians of each town or barrio shall construct such houses as may be deemed sufficient in which the priests of such towns or barrios may live comfortably adjoining the parish church of the place where that may be built for the benefit of the priests in charge of such churches and engaged in the education and conversion of their Indian parishioners, and they shall not be alienated or devoted to any other purpose.

The evidence in this case makes no showing in regard to the cemetery. It is always mentioned in connection with the church and convent and no point is made by the possession of the church and convent, he is not also entitled to recover possession of the cemetery. So, without discussing the question as to whether the rules applicable to churches are all respects applicable to cemeteries, we hold for the purpose of this case that the plaintiff has the same right to the cemetery that he has to the church.

(4) It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with reference to an institution which antedates by almost a thousand years any other personality in Europe, and which existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in Antioch, and when idols were still worshiped in the temple of Mecca," does not require serious consideration. In the preamble to the budget relating to ecclesiastical obligations, presented by Montero Rios to the Cortes on the 1st of October 1871, speaking of the Roman Catholic Church, he says:

Persecuted as an unlawful association since the early days of its existence up to the time of Galieno, who was the first of the Roman emperors to admit it among the juridicial entities protected by the laws of the Empire, it existed until then by the mercy and will of the faithful and depended for such existence upon pious gifts and offerings. Since the latter half of the third century, and more particularly since the year 313, when Constantine, by the edict of Milan, inaugurated an era of protection for the church, the latter gradually entered upon the exercise of such rights as were required for the acquisition, preservation, and transmission of property the same as any other juridical entity under the laws of the Empire. (3 Dictionary of Spanish Administration, Alcubilla, p. 211. See also the royal order of the 4th of December, 1890, 3 Alcubilla, 189.)

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days thereafter the record be remanded to the court below for execution. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Tracey, JJ., concur. Johnson, J., reserves his vote. chanrobles virtual law library

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1748  June 1, 1906

THE BISHOP OF CEBU, REPRESENTING THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, Plaintiff-Appellee , vs. MARIANO MANGARON, Defendant-Appellant.

PER CURIAM: chanrobles virtual law library

The plaintiff in this case relates to a tract of land in the district of Ermita of this city, it is alleged is at present occupied by the defendant. The object of the original complaint was to recover the possession of the said land, while in the amended complaint the plaintiff prays that the said land be declared to be the property of the Catholic Church and that it be restored to the latter. Counsel for appellant admits in his brief that the object of the action is the recovery of possession when he refers to the judgment of the court below as being "in favor of the plaintiff in an action to recover the possession of certain real estate." (Record, p. 1.)chanrobles virtual law library

Neither party has exhibited any title papers to the land in question nor pay other documentary proof. They have only offered certain parol evidence as to the former possession of the land and as to certain acts of ownership exercised by the parties over the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The court below found (a) "that the defendant's parents and brothers had been in possession of the land in question until about the year 1887;" (b) "that it had not been clearly shown in what capacity they had occupied the lands;" (c) "that about the year 1887 the defendant and his relatives vacated the land by the virtue of an order from the municipality, which declared that the land was included within the zone of materiales fuertes (fire zone) and the houses in which they lived upon the said land without objection;" (d)"that after the land was vacated the parish priest of the Ermita Church fenced the land and cleaned the same without any objection whatsoever on the part of anyone; that the plaintiff claimed that this property had belonged to the Catholic Church from the time immemorial, the defendant, his parents and brothers having occupied a part thereof by the mere tolerance of the Catholic Church," (e) "that in the year 1898 the defendant, without the consent of anyone, entered upon the land in question and built thereon a nipa house and continued to live thereon without the consent of the parish priest of the Ermita Church or the plaintiff in third case." (Bill of exceptions, p. 11.) The court then ordered

"that the defendants vacate the land described in the complaint and pay the costs of this action" (p. 12).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Counsel appellant says in his brief "that the defendant claims to be owner of the land by inheritance." (Brief, p. 8.) It is not necessary for this court to apply to the present case the well-settled doctrine that it is not sufficient to allege a universal title of inheritance without showing the manner and form in which such title was converted into a singular title in favor of the person invoking the same, particularly where, as in the present, case, the question involved does not relate to the ownership of the property but rather to who has the better right to the possession of the same. But the court below suggest that there are several brothers of the defendant who might also claim the same right to occupy the land but who, however, had not done so. The court says "from the evidence introduced at the trial and from the fact that the defendant's brothers do not claim any right to the land in question, it seems that the claim of the plaintiff is the more credible." (Bill of exceptions, p. 11.)chanrobles virtual law library

The complaint is directed against the illegal act of spoliation committed by the defendant in October, 1898, while as he himself says there was no priest in Ermita who could take care of the church and of the land in question, the American troops having occupied the parish house according to the defendant, and the Filipino troops having occupied it according to other witness. This is one of the points as to which there is no dispute between the parties, the defendant and the witnesses of both important details relating to this matter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Counsel for appellant sums up his brief in the following paragraph:

The defendant was the legal owner of the property when he was unlawfully ejected by the plaintiff in 1879, and we insist that he had a right to reenter upon the land when he did so, the time for prescription not having expired since he was ejected in 1879 (p. 8).

Upon this point the court below said: "The occupation of the land by the defendant in the year 1898 was illegal, for, if her brought he had a right to the land, he should have applied to the courts for the possession of what belonged to him, and not proceed to occupy property claimed (he should have said possessed) by another against the will of the latter."chanrobles virtual law library

The conclusion of law of the trial court is entirely in conformity with the conclusion would sanction the recovery of possession through violence or other unlawful and arbitrary means, and would permit a person to take the law into his own hands. "If a person thinks that he is entitled to the property which another possesses he should claim the same from the person in possession. If the latter accedes and voluntarily returns possession and acknowledges that the property does not belong to him, there is no necessity of any one interfering, but if the person in possession refuses to deliver the property, the one who believes himself to be entitled to it, however well founded his belief may be, can not take the law into his own hands but must seek the aid of the competent authorities." (4 Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, p. 163.) The action of the defendant in 1898 was therefore absolutely unlawful.

This possession held by the defendant in 1898 can not be added to the former possession, which was interrupted in 1877 by the order of the municipality, so as to consider such possession continous, the time intervening not being of sufficient duration to cover the statutory period of "a person who recovers possession according to law, which was improperly lost, is considered as having enjoyed it redound to his benefit." But in this case it appears (1) that it can not be affirmed that the possession enjoyed by the defendant was improperly lost; that possession ceased by virtue of an order from the municipality and no proof to the contrary has been offered on this point; (2) that it is impossible to say what was the nature of the possession prior to the year 1877 - that is to say, whether it was held by right or by the mere tolerance of the plaintiff in this case. The code refers to the recovery of the possession, according to law, which was improperly lost, and to "recover according to law means through the proper writs and actions, or by requesting the aid of competent authorities in the special cases where the provisions of article 441 may apply." (4 Manresa, Commentaries on the Civil Code, p. 329.) "Of course," continues Manresa "the acts of violence or secrecy or mere tolerance can not affect the right of possession." Consequently the defendant in this case could never have lawfully and legally done what he did, to wit, to reenter upon the land which he had been ejected by the city of Manila. If the order of the municipality was illegal, and the possession was improperly lost, the defendant should have requested the assistance of the competent authorities to recover it. He should have applied to the executive or administrative officials, as the case might have been, or to the courts of justice in a plenary action for possession, for a year having elapsed since he was ejected from the premises, he could not maintain a summary action for possession.

The legal provisions hereinbefore quoted would be sufficient ground upon which to base the confirmation of the decision of the trial court, but on account of the facts involved in this case a question of law has been raised

by the members of this court which has not been urged by the parties themselves. It is absolutely necessary to decide this question, which naturally arises from the facts alleged in the complaint. The question is whether, after the promulgation of the Civil Code, the accion publiciana, which had for its object the recovery of possession in a plenary action before an action for the recovery of title could be instituted, still existed. It is well known that under the legislation prior to the Civil Code, both substantive and adjective, there were three remedies which a party unlawfully dispossessed could avail himself of, to wit: The accion interdictal, which could be brought within a year, in a summary proceeding; the plenary action for possession in an ordinary proceeding, which could only be brought after the expiration of a year; and the action for title in an ordinary proceeding, which was brought in case the plenary action for possession failed. The accion interdictal had for its object the recovery of thephysical possession; the plenary action for possession, the better right to such possession; and the action for title, the recovery of the ownership.

We lay down as a conclusion that if the plaintiff, when he was deprived in October, 1898, of the possession which he had enjoyed quietly and peacefully for twenty years, more or less, had within a year instituted the accion interdictal, or summary action for possession, he would have been, necessarily and undoubtedly, restored to the possession of the land. It would have availed the defendant nothing to allege, as he now alleges, that he had merely recovered the possession which he improperly lost in 1877, when he dispossessed the plaintiff as he did. Any tribunal, in the same arbitrary manner in which the defendant dispossessed the party in possession, would have condemned the said defendant to return the possession to that party.

But a year elapsed and the plaintiff brought this summary action for possession, and we also lay down as a conclusion that such summary action for possession could not be maintained, either under the old Code of Civil Procedure or under the new Code of Procedure in Civil Actions. (Laws 1 and 2, title 34 of the Novisima Recopilacion; art. 1635 of the Spanish Code of Civil Procedure and sec. 80 of the present Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.) chanrobles virtual law library

This quiet and peaceful possession of twenty years, more or less, thus lost in a moment, could not be recovered in a summary action for possession after the expiration of one year, but possession could still be recovered through the accion publiciana, which involved the right to possess. This latter action would be then based upon the fact that he, having been in possession for twenty years, could not lose the same until he had been given an opportunity to be heard and had been defeated in an action in

court by another with a better right. (The same laws.) This fact of itself would have been sufficient to recover the possession, not in summary, but in a plenary action, in which it would likewise have availed the defendant nothing to allege that all that he did was to recover a possession improperly lost in 1877. In one way or the other the plaintiff would have recovered such possession, in the first case the physical possession and in the second case the right to possess, which is not lost by the mere occupation of a third person, whether such occupation was effected violently, secretly, or arbitrarily.

But the doubt which now exists is whether, after the promulgation of the Civil Code, the accion publiciana continued to exist.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The doubt arises from the provisions of article 460 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows: chanrobles virtual law library

The possessor may lose his possession -

1. By the abandonment of the thing.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. By transfer to another for a good or valuable consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing or by the thing becoming unmarketable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

4. By the possession of another, over against the will of the former possessor, if the new possession has lasted more than one year.

The last provision of this article has given rise to the doubt whether possession which is lost by the occupation of another against the will of the former possessor is merely possession de facto or possession de jure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The most powerful reason why it is thought that it refers to possession both de facto and de jure is that, whereas the two are equally lost in the manner indicated in the first three provisions of this article, it would be rather strange that the fourth provision should only refer to possession de facto.

This, however, is not convincing because not only can the right of possession of any kind be lost in the aforesaid three ways, but the right of ownership as well. It could not be inferred from this, however, that the right of ownership can be lost in the fourth manner indicated. The legislation and the jurisprudence of all countries will allow a party after he has lost possession to bring an action to recover the ownership of the property - that is to say, to recover what belongs to him - except where he is barred by the statute of limitations. There is no law fixing one year and one day as the period of prescription of such actions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 

Manresa expressly propounds this question and says:

Meditation upon the nature of possession, being convinced as we are of the fact that possession constitutes a right, a rightin rem, whenever it is exercised over real property or property rights, has merely served to strengthen as far as possible our conviction of the existence of the accion publiciana. We confess, willing to rely only upon a sound basis, that a doubt has occurred to us as to whether or not such action should be exercised by the possessor, as we find nothing definite upon which to place such reliance, although we have noticed that most of the authors admit that he should, and we know that where there is a right there is a cause of action.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We have later seen this question raised and the proposition advanced that, although, as an exception to the general rule, such action is based upon equity, but as equity is not sufficient to allow the exercise of such action, it would be necessary to have a legal provision, an article in the code, establishing the same, a provision and an article which do not exist, and their nonexistence shows that there is no such thing as the accion publiciana.

That we have no knowledge of the existence of any legal text or recent provisions which expressly relate to such action, is true. The same thing is true in France. However, the majority of the authors admit its existence. Among us it existence is also generally admitted by the authorities on civil and procedural law. But we do not desire to base our conclusions upon the arguments of the authorities, particularly when we note that Sanchez Roman is the only one who has attempted to support in any way his conclusions. It is sufficient, says this author, that the right existing, there should be an action to protect it. There is no necessity of any special declaration in the Civil Code.

We are of the same opinion as the author in question, but certainly not because we believe that if the possessor is deprived of the accion

publiciana his right ceases to be a right in rem. In regard to this matter we refer to what we have already said in our preliminary consideration of the question of possession.

In regard to this matter the idea is present in the code that possession should be considered as an actual right and it is so stated in various articles of that code, as for instance in article 438. It would be impossible to admit that a mere physical act would confer all the rights which a possessor ordinarily enjoys.

Article 445 presupposes that possession may be considered either as de facto or de jure, for when it refers to controversies arising from the possession de facto, it clearly indicates that other controversies may arise which would not relate to the possession de facto. Further it can not be conceived that had its intent been different it should have preferred actual possession to any other possession. The article in question ends with the following significant words: "The thing shall be placed in deposit or judicial keeping until the possession or ownership thereof is decided in the proper manner." That is to say, the question of fact can not be determined until the question of law has been decided either in regard to the ownership or in regard to the possession (pp. 220-221).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Further, let us take another subject, for instance, the subject for easements. It was generally believed that the accion confesoria existed. Vain delusion! We have carefully examined all the provisions of the code relating to easements and we find absolutely nothing in regard to such an action. Then the accion confesoria is another error. It does not really exist. Then, if the owner of the dominant estate is denied the use of the easement, it would not be because he has not a right to such use of it. The only thing that he has not is the action.

No; such an absurdity can not be admitted. It is impossible to conceive that a person has a right which need not be respected by others, and such respect can not be exacted unless the law provides an adequate remedy for its enforcement. If a person has aright over any kind of property, such right would not be complete unless it could be enforced as against the whole world. The action is the recognition of the right; it is the weapon for its protection; the right certainly does not arise from the action, but on the contrary the action arises from the right. There is a right recognized by the code - then this is sufficient! That right necessarily carries with it the action to enforce it, the life-giving force. The action is, under this aspect, the actual enforcement of the right, and these two things are so closely allied that if the action is denied the right is also virtually and actually denied. the accion

publiciana, therefore, exists, not for the sake of equity, but because it must necessarily exist if the right to possession exists or can exist as provided in article 445, and as is inferred from the other articles of the code dealing with this subject.

There are not, in reality, any practical difficulties, for the courts consider as owners many who are simply possessors, and actions for title are maintained upon evidence which appears to be proof of ownership, but which in reality is not, for the reason that the title under which such ownership is claimed is not always in question, but merely its superiority over the claim of title of another. In a word, it is necessary to state the nature of the action but not the name by which it is known, and the claim being a just one, it is allowed in an action for title which in a multitude of cases would be nothing but an accion publiciana (plenary action for possession). Do not give the name of the action because it is not necessary; merely ask that the right be enforced. Who can reject the claim ? (Pages 223-224.)

Paragraph 4 of article 460 is not an innovation in the Civil Code, nor does it mean the modification or reformation of the old law. Law 17, title 30 of the third Partida contains the same provision: "One who holds property can not lose the possession thereof except in one of the following manners: (1) If he is ejected from it by force; (2) if another person occupies in while he is absent and upon his return refuses him admission. . . . But although he may lose the possession in either of the aforesaid manners, he can, however, recover the same, and even the title thereto by an action in court." There is no doubt that paragraph 4 of article 460 is nothing but a repetition of the law in force prior to the Civil Code. He who loses possession in either of these ways may demand the return of the same in an action in court, as well as the ownership of the property, the glossator in expanding the word juizio which appears in the law, saying, "by means of an action, unde vi, namely, that of recovery, or by any such restorative means." So that the possession thus lost may be recovered not only in an action unde vi but some other restorative means, such as the accion publiciana or a penal action; this aside from an action for title.

Law 2, title 34, book 11 of the "Novisima Recopilacion" contains in its title the following prohibitive provision: "No one shall be deprived of his possession until he has had an opportunity to be heard and his right is defeated in accordance with the law." 

As a legal precedent to paragraph 4 of article 460 we have law 3, title 8, of the same book 11, which says: "The laws of some cities provide that he who has been in possession of a building, vineyard, or other land for one

year and one day, peacefully and adversely to the person claiming to be entitled to such possession who travels in and out of the village, shall not be held responsible therefor. There being doubt as to whether such possession for the period of one year and one day requires title in good faith, we, to dispell this doubt, do hereby order that he who holds such possession for the period of one year and one day shall not be exempt from liability therefor while in possession unless such possession of one year and one day was accompanied by title in good faith." 

If the whole provision of article 460, paragraph 4, was contained in the old law and such was the meaning and efficacy that possession of one year and one day had under the said old law, the courts must give some satisfactory and convincing explanation why the meaning and efficacy of such possession of one year and one day referred to in the code should be different. We are unable to give such explanation, because in the act which was the basis of the present code nothing new was provided upon this subject, nor was any rule or procedure specified by which the various sections of the new law should be governed. Therefore the provisions of the code should be construed, as to the possession of one year and one day, as they were construed in the prior legislation, unless it appears that the intention of the legislature was otherwise - that is to say, unless it appears that the said legislature intended exactly the contrary of what had been established preceding the enactment of the code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The right acquired by the person who has been in possession for one year and one day is the right that the former possessor lost by allowing the year and one day to expire. The right is lost by the prescription of the action. And the action which prescribes upon the expiration of the year is "the action to recover or to retain possession; " that is to say, the interdictory action. (Art. 1968, par. 1.) then the only right that can be acquired now, as before, by the person who was in possession for one year and one day is that he can not be made to answer in an interdictory action, but this is not so in a plenary action unless he had some title in good faith. The former possessor who had been in possession for twenty years, more or less, was considered as owner, and unless he was given an opportunity to be heard, and was defeated in law, he could not be deprived of such possession; and notwithstanding all this, and in spite of such prohibition, the maintenance of a possession wrongfully taken from the former possessor by a willful act of the actual possessor had to be sustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The lessee, the depositary, the pledgee, the intruder, the usurper, the thief himself, after the expiration of a year would not be responsible for the possession of which the lawful possessor was wrongfully deprived, and if

the latter could produce no evidence of his right of ownership - the only thing that he could do according to the contrary theory - it would be impossible for him to recover such possession thus lost by any other means.

If, in addition to the fact of possession, the action for the enforcement of which prescribes after the expiration of one year and one day, there exists without any doubt whatsoever the right to possess (or more properly speaking in the case at bar, to continue to possess, which said right of possession would be a right in rem, such possession would not be on a less favorable footing than a mere possessionde facto; and, if in the latter case the interdictory action lies, the action which existed prior to the enactment of the code, to wit, the accion publiciana, should continue to lie in the former case. The code establishes rights and the Law of civil Procedure prescribes actions for the protection of such rights, and we can not look to the code to find any provision defining the action which every civil right carries with it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This is the reason why as a title of chapter 3 of the code in which article 460 is included, and a sanction of the whole of title 5, book 2, which deals with possession, article 446 provides that every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession, and should he be disturbed therein, he must be protected or possession must be restored to him by the means established in the laws of procedure.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The code refers to the laws of procedure enacted in Spain in 1881 and extended to the Philippines in 1888. Article 1635 of the old Code of Civil Procedure makes provision for summary proceedings to retain or to recover, to protect or to restore, possession, provided the action is brought within a year, but after the expiration of this period the party may bring such action as may be proper. This latter action, as has been explained before, may be either the plenary action for possession referred to or an action for title. This assumed, and reading article 1635 of the old Code of Civil Procedure immediately before article 446 of the Civil Code, we are unable to conceive how that could be successfully denied after the 8th of December, 1889, when the Civil code went into effect, which could not be denied prior to that date, to wit, the existence of the accion publiciana to recover the right of possession, to enforce the right to possess, which although it could not be brought within the year as a mere interdictory action for the protection of the mere physical possession, there can be no valid reason why it could not be brought after the expiration of the year in order to protect the right and not the mere physical possession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Article 1635 of the old Code of Civil Procedure not having been repealed by the Civil Code, if the accion publiciana existed prior to its enactment, it must necessarily exist after such enactment. We consequently conclude that the action brought by the plaintiff in this case to recover the possession of which he was unlawfully deprived by the defendant can be properly maintained under the provisions of the present Civil Code considered as a substantive law, without prejudice to any right which he may have to the ownership of the property, which ownership he must necessarily establish in order to overcome the presumption of title which exist in favor of the lawful possessor, the plaintiff in this case, who had been in the quiet and peaceful possession of the land for twenty years, more or less, at the time he was wrongfully dispossessed by the defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Having reached this conclusion, the judgment of the court below is accordingly affirmed, with the cost of this action against the appellant. So ordered.

SECOND DIVISION 

[G.R. Nos. 85991-94, July 03, 1991] 

REPUBLIC CEMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, MOISES CORREA AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF

BULACAN, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N 

REGALADO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent court,

promulgated on September 20, 1988 in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 07824-88,

ordering the registration of Lot No. 2880 of the Cadastral Survey

of Norzagaray, Bulacan in the name of petitioner Republic Cement

Corporation but excluding the portions thereof described in Plans PSU

229592, 227659 and 225872 of the Norzagaray Cadastre which were

ordered registered in the name of private respondent Moises Correa.[1]

As found by respondent court, petitioner Republic Cement Corporation filed

a petition in the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch V at Sta.

Maria, docketed therein as Land Registration Case No. (SM) N-093, for the

registration in its name of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2880 of the

Cadastral Survey of Norzagaray,Bulacan, Plan Ap-16404, located in

barrio Minuyan, Norzagaray, Bulacan, with an area of 207,996 square

meters, more or less.  It is alleged that said applicant purchased the parcel

of land from persons who, by themselves or through their predecessors in

interest, had occupied and cultivated it continuously since the Spanish

regime to the present and had been in open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious possession and occupation of said parcel of land under

a bona fide claim of ownership, except against the Government, since July

26, 1894.

The application was opposed by spouses Jose Rayo and

Susana Mangahas and one Pedro Legaspi.  According to

the oppositor spouses, they are the owners of the east central portion of the

parcel of land, title to which is sought to be registered by petitioner, covered

by Plans PSU 229592 and 227659, with a total area of 68,389 square

meters, having been in actual, open, public, adverse, peaceful and

uninterrupted possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner

for a period of over sixty (60) years and having acquired ownership thereof

by donation on the occasion of their marriage from the parents of

Jose Rayo.  Oppositor Pedro Legaspiclaims that he is the owner of the

eastern portion of the same parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-225872,

with a total area of 31,887 square meters, having been in actual, open,

public, adverse, peaceful and uninterrupted possession and occupation

thereof in the concept of owner for a period of over sixty (60) years and

having acquired ownership thereof by purchase from its original owner.

Accordingly, the spouses Jose Rayo and Susana Mangahas and

Pedro Legaspi sought to register title to the respective portions of the

parcel of land in question subject of and based on the allegations in their

respective oppositions to the application of petitioner, which counter-

applications were docketed therein as Land Registration Cases Nos.

(SM) N-146 and (SM) N-147.  Petitioner duly filed an opposition to said

applications on the grounds alleged in its application and the Solicitor

General likewise opposed said applications.

Applicants/oppositors Pedro Legaspi and the spouses Jose Rayo and

SusanaMangahas were later substituted by private

respondent Moises Correa as subsequent purchaser of the aforesaid

portions of said parcel of land.

By agreement of the parties the three cases were jointly tried.  On August

25, 1982, the lower court, acting on eleven (11) land registration cases the

applicants wherein were corporations and one of which was the application

of petitioner in Land Registration Case No. (SM) N-093, issued an order the

pertinent part of which reads:

"In view of the recent ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R.No. L-

49623 (Manila Electric Company, Petitioner-

Appellant vs. JudgeFloreliana Castro-Bartolome of the Court of First

Instance of Rizal,Makati, Br. XV, & Republic of the Philippines,

Respondents-Appellees) promulgated on June 29, 1982 affecting

applications for land registration by juridical entities and it appearing that in

the above-cited cases juridical parties are involved and therefore falling

under the same category, said cases are hereby dismissed.[2]

On August 29, 1983, judgment was rendered in Land Registration Cases

Nos. (SM) N-146 and (SM) N-147, the dispositive portion of which provides:

“WHEREFORE, confirming the Order of Special default entered on

September 16, 1971 for these two registration cases, the Court hereby

orders the registration of Psu-225872, Norzagaray Cadastre, depicted in

the plan which was surveyed for Pedro Legaspi on March 13, 1977 and

Psu-229592 and Psu-227659 as depicted in the plan which was surveyed

for spouses Jose Rayo and Susana Mangahas on March 12, 1966 and May

15, 1966, respectively, together with its corresponding technical description

and all improvements existing thereon, in the name of substituted

applicant Moises Correa, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rosario N.

Correa, with residence at Poblacion, Norzagaray,Bulacan.

"After this decision shall have become final, the corresponding decree shall

issue."[3]

Herein petitioner appealed from the order of dismissal of its application, the

denial of its motion for the reconsideration thereof and the judgment

rendered by the trial court.  The Solicitor General, in behalf of the Director

of Lands, also appealed from the aforesaid judgment.

On August 13, 1984, herein private respondent Correa filed an action for

recovery of possession and damages (accion publiciana) against petitioner

in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch XVII, involving the same

parcel of land subject of the aforesaid three cases for registration of title,

which action was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 7678-M.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against it on the ground that the

order of dismissal of its application and the judgment rendered in the land

registration cases have not yet become final as they were the subject of its

appeal.

The court below granted petitioner's motion and dismissed the complaint

on February 1, 1985.  The motion for reconsideration of the order of

dismissal having been denied, on July 1, 1985, herein respondent Correa

took an appeal therefrom to respondent Court of Appeals where it was

docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 07088.

In  its own appeal to respondent court, herein petitioner charges that the

trial court erred -

1)   in ordering the registration of the three (3) parcels of land covered by

PSU-225872, PSU-229592 and PSU-227659 in the name of Correa;

2)   in not declaring Jose Rayo, Susana Mangahas, and Pedro Legaspi as

usurpers of the lot applied for by petitioner;

3)   in holding that petitioner surveyed, encroached upon, and developed

the disputed three (3) parcels of land to the prejudice of Correa;

4)   in holding that petitioner through its workers and employees, forcibly

entered into the disputed three (3) parcels of land in 1970;

5)   in not recognizing petitioner's vested rights to the land and

dismissing motu proprio LRC Case No. (SM) N-093; and

6)   in not allowing petitioner to submit an "amended petition to conform to

evidence" or to file the proper motion for substitution by the qualified

assignee of petitioner.[4]

On his part, the Solicitor General faults the trial court with error (in CA-G.R.

CV No. 07825) for -

1)   not denying the application for registration for failure of the applicant to

adduce clear and convincing evidence of possession and occupation of the

nature and for the length of time required by law;

2)   granting the application for registration despite the failure of

theappellee to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan; and

3)   finding that appellee has a registerable title over the subject property.

and (in CA-G.R. No. 07826) for -

1)   confirming applicant-appellee's alleged title over the two parcels of land

shown in Plans PSU-229592 and PSU-227659, consisting of 38,290 and

30,099 square meters, respectively, despite absence of proof that said

lands have been released as alienable and disposable;

2)   confirming applicant-appellee's alleged title over the above two parcels

of land despite absence of adequate proof that applicant-appellee and his

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and

notorious possession thereof since June 12, 1945 or earlier;

3)   confirming applicant-appellee's alleged title over the subject parcels of

land despite absence of the requisite reports of the Commissioner of Land

Registration and the Director of Lands pursuant to Section 29 of PD 1529;

and

4)   granting the application despite the failure of applicant to submit the

original tracing cloth plan of the lands applied for, the submission of which

is a statutory requirement of mandatory character.[5]

On September 20, 1988, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision

upholding the right of herein petitioner to file an application for registration

of the land in question pursuant to the doctrine in The Director of Lands vs.

Intermediate   AppellateCourt, et al .,[6] which overruled the holding in Manila

Electric   Company vs. Castro -Bartolome  relied upon and cited by the

trial court, supra; and ordering the registration of Lot No. 2880 in the name

of petitioner, but excluding portions thereofas described in Plans PSU-

229592, 227659 and 225872 which were ordered registered in the name of

private respondent Correa, more particularly as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the orders dated August 25, 1982 and February 8, 1984,

appealed from by Republic Cement Corporation (Land Registration Case

No. SM-093, now CA-G.R. CV No. 07824) are REVERSED; the judgment

rendered on August 29, 1983, appealed from by Republic Cement

Corporation (Land Registration Cases Nos. SM-146 and SM-147, now CA-

G.R. CV Nos. 07825 and 07826) is MODIFIED in the manner as hereafter

provided; and the orders dated February 1, 1985 and July 1, 1985,

appealed from by Moises R. Correa (Civil Case No. 7678-M, now CA-G.R.

CV No. 07088), are AFFIRMED.

"Title to the parcels of land covered by Plans PSU-229592 and PSU-

227659 (Exhibits 1 and 1-A, Rayo-Mangahas, pp. 10-11, rec., Vol. IV), the

technical description of which are on pages 7 and 8, rec., supra, and the

parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-225872 (Exhibit 1-Legaspi, p. 9, rec.,

Vol. III), the technical description of which are on pages 6 and 7,

rec., supra, is confirmed in the name of Moises R. Correa.  Said parcels of

land excluded from Lot No. 2280, Norzagaray Cadastre, Plan AP-16404

(Exhibit D, p. 10, rec., Vol. I), the technical description of which are on

pages 7 and 8, rec. supra, title to the remaining portion thereof (Lot No.

2280) is confirmed in the name of Republic Cement

Corporation.  Accordingly, upon finality of this judgment, the corresponding

adjustment in the technical description of Lot No. 2280 shall be made

before issuance of the corresponding decrees and certificates of title to and

in the names of the proper parties.

"No pronouncement as to costs in these instances.

SO ORDERED."[7]

Herein petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied

by respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution dated November 22,

1988.  In its aforesaid resolution, respondent court expressly noted therein

that the Solicitor General did not file a motion for reconsideration of its

judgment nor a petition for its review before this Court.[8] Hence, the present

recourse is now of petitioner by itself.

Before us, petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in

ordering the registration of the three parcels of land covered by Plans PSU-

225872, 229592 and 227659 in the name of private respondent Correa, as

purchaser of the properties from Jose Rayo, Susana Mangahas and

Pedro Legaspi, allegedly because:

1.  Private respondent failed to prove the genuineness of his title and the

identity of the lands he claims for his own in the manner and with the

degree of evidence required by law;

2. Jose Rayo, Susana Mangahas and Pedro Legaspi have not proven

exclusive, continuous, open and adverse possession of  these parcels of

land to justify a finding of ownership;

3. The whole of Lot No. 2280 is duly covered by deeds of sale in petitioner's

favor and amply supported by surveyor's certificates, the contents of

which prevail over private respondent's doubtful allegations; and

4.  The disputed parcels of land are specifically described by boundaries,

putting their identity and extant beyond doubt.[9]

We find the petition at bar to be without merit.

It may readily be seen that the issues raised by herein petitioner are

questions of fact which are not within the province of the present

recourse.  Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are

final and binding upon the Supreme Court if borne out by the evidence on

record.[10] A review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals is not a

function ordinarily undertaken by the Supreme Court, the rule admitting of

only a few exceptions recognized under decisional law, which exceptions

are not obtaining in the case at bar.[11]

Contrary to the claim of petitioner, private respondent, through his

predecessors ininterest, was able to establish the identity of and title to the

land sought to be registered in his name.  The technical description and the

survey plan duly approved by the Director of Lands submitted in evidence

by private respondent fully describes the metes and bounds of the parcels

of land involved, thus:

"Psu-229592

(Jose Rayo)

A parcel of land as shown on plan Psu-229592, L.R.C. Record No.         ),

situated in the Barrio of Minuyan, Municipality of Norzagaray, Province

of Bulacan.  Bounded on the W., along line 1-2 by property of the Heirs of

Felix Mangahas (Lot 2880, Norzagaray Cadastre); on the N., along line 2-3

by property of Amado Enriquez and Pedro Rayo (Lot

2881,Norzagaray Cadastre); on the NE., along line 3-4 by property of

PedroLegaspi (Lot 8019, Norzagaray Cadastre); and on the SE., along line

4-1 by property of Susana Mangahas (Lot

7300, Norzagaray Cadastre).  x xx; containing an area of THIRTY EIGHT

THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY (38,290) square meters.  All points

referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground

as follows:  Point 1 by cross marked on stone boulder, point 2 by Old cross

on Cupang tree, point 3 by Cross on natural stone, and point 4 by Old

Cross on Balite tree; Bearings true; date of survey, March 12, 1966 and

that of the approval, February 6, 1967."[12]

"Psu-227659

(Susana Mangahas)

A Parcel of land (as shown on plan Psu-227659, L.R.C. Record No.        ,

situated in the Barrio of Minuyan,

Municipality of Norzagaray, Bulacan. Bounded on the S., SW.,

and NW., along lines 1-2-3-4-5 by property of the Heirs of Felix Mangahas;

and on the NE., along line 5-1 by propertyof Pedro Legaspi (Psu-

225872).  x x x; containing an area of THIRTY THOUSAND NINETY NINE

(30,099) Square Meters.  All points referred to are indicated on the plan

and are marked on the ground as follows: Point 1 by Old cross on natural

stone, point 2 by Cross marked on boulder, point 3 by Cross marked on

boulder stone, point 4 by Cross marked on stone, and point 5 by Old cross

with nail on Balite tree; Bearings true; date of survey, May 15, 1966 and

that of the approval, December 5, 1966."[13]

"Psu-225872

(Pedro Legaspi)

A parcel of land (as shown on plan Psu-225872, L.R.C. Record No.        ,

situated in the Barrio of Alagae, Municipality of Norzagaray, Province

of Bulacan.  Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2 by property

of CamiloLegaspi (Lot 8016, Norzagaray Cadastre); on the SE., along line

2-3 by property of Andres San Pedro (Lot 2877, Norzagaray Cadastre); on

the SW., along lines 3-4-5 by property of the Heirs of Felix Mangahas (Lot

2880, port. Norzagaray Cadastre); on the N., along line 5-6 by property of

Pedro Rayo and Amado Enriquez (Lot 2881, Norzagaray Cadastre); on the

NE., along line 6-7 by property of Amado Banez (Lot

2883,Norzagaray Cadastre); and on the E., along lines 7-8-1 by property

ofCamilo Legaspi (Lot 8016, Norzagaray Cadastre) x x x; containing an

area of THIRTY ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN

(31,887) Square Meters.  All points refered to are indicated on the plan and

are marked on the ground as follows:  Points 2 and 7 by Old nail

onAlibangbang trees, point 1 by Old B.L. on Natural stone; point 3 by cross

on natural stone, point 4 by Cross on nail on Balite tree, point 5 by cross on

Boulder stone, point 6 by Old cross on Malacamias tree, and point 8 by Old

nail on Daling lalaki tree; Bearings true; date of survey, March 13, 1966 and

that of the approval, September 2, 1966."[14]

As we ruled in Director of Lands, et al. vs.   Funtillar, et al .:[15]

"x x x Survey Plan Psu-215779 of the property, showing its boundaries and

total area, clearly identifies and delineates the extent of the land. The

petitioners overlook the fact that no survey would at all be possible where

the identity of the land is not first properly established.  More importantly,

without such identification, no opposition, even its own, to the application

for registration could be interposed.  Encroachment on or adverse

possession of property could not be justly claimed."

Regarding petitioner's title over the said parcels of land, the trial court made

the following factual findings, which are also the bases of the decision of

respondent Court of Appeals, to wit:

"It appears that parcel of land (Psu-225872) under LRC No. 146 consisting

of 31,887 square meters was originally in open, peaceful, adverse,

exclusive and uninterrupted possession of Silverio Tolentino in the concept

of owner since 1934 who cleared the land, and planted thereon trees and

upland rice.  That in October, 1943 he sold the same to his nephew

Pedro Legaspi (Exh. I) who took immediate possession thereof and

introduced additional improvements thereon by building his house and

planting palay and other fruit-bearing trees.  That said

PedroLegaspi declared the land for taxation purposes in 1967 and had paid

the real estate taxes from 1962 to 1967 (Exhibit J-l); and caused the

property to be surveyed preparatory to the filing of an application for

registration (Exhibit D).  That from October 1943 to January 1970, said

original applicant Pedro Legaspi continued with the same kind of

possession as his predecessor-in-interest until January 1970

whenoppositor Republic Cement Corporation through its workers and

employees forcibly entered his property and dispossessed him thereof; and

the same later became the subject of a forcible entry case before the

Municipal Court of Norzagaray, but was dismissed on the ground of

jurisdiction since the question of ownership was put in issue.  That

onSeptember 30, 1972 said Pedro Legaspi sold his rights and interests

over the parcel of land to and in favor of substituted

applicant MoisesCorrea (Exhibit L) who concentrated his efforts to recover

the land already the subject of a registration case.  The oral testimony of

original applicant Pedro Legaspi, insofar as concerns location, character

and continuity of possession, was corroborated by the testimony of

witnesses Silverio Tolentino and Amado Enriquez both of them claiming to

have known this parcel of land for more than 30 years, as the former owner

and the adjoining owner thereof, respectively.

"With respect to the parcels of land (Psu-229592 and Psu-227659) under

LRC No. 147 consisting of 38,290 and 30,099 square meters, respectively,

it appears that the same were originally in open, peaceful, adverse,

exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession by Fidel Enriquez in

the concept of owner since 1932, who introduced improvements thereon by

planting fruit-bearing trees.  That in 1943 said Fidel Enriquez donated the

two parcels of land to his grandson JoseRayo and his spouse

Susana Mangahas on occasion of their marriage. That the document

evidencing the transfer was burned during the second world

war.  That applicant-donees took immediate possession of the donated

property and introduced additional improvements by building their house

and planting palay and other fruit-bearing trees on the land.  That said

spouses declared the property for taxation purposes since 1962 and had

been paying the real estate taxes until 1974 (Exhibit 12), and caused the

parcels of land to be surveyed preparatory to the filing of an application for

registration (Exhibits 3 and 3-a).  That from 1943 to January 1970, the

original applicant-spouses continued with the same kind of possession as

their predecessor-in-interest until in January 1970, when oppositor Republic

Cement Corporation, through its workers and employees forcibly entered

their property and dispossessed them of their land.  That the same later

became the subject of a forcible entry case, but was dismissed since the

question of ownership was put in issue before the Municipal Court

of Norzagaray.  That on September 30, 1972 said spouses sold their rights

and interests over said parcels of land to and in favor of substituted

applicant Moises Correa (Exhibit LL) who sought to recover the property

already the subject of a registration case.  The oral testimony of original

applicant-spouses Jose Rayo and Susana Mangahas insofar as concerns

the location, character and continuity of possession, was corroborated by

the testimony of witnesses Pedro Legaspi and Amado Enriquez, both

claiming to have known these parcels of land for more than 30 years as the

adjoining owners thereof."[16]

We defer to the above factual findings, there being no showing that it was

arrived at with grave abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis.  We

have carefully scrutinized and reviewed the records and we find ample

evidentiary support for the above findings.

The contention of petitioner that it has the right it claims over Lot No. 2880

in its entirety, on the bases of the deeds of sale executed in its favor and

the surveyor's certificate, is untenable and cannot be upheld.

As found by respondent Court of Appeals, the land under consideration,

now known as Lot No. 2880, was previously owned by spouses Felix and

Maria Mangahas.  After the death of Felix Mangahas, one-half (1/2) of said

land was adjudicated and partitioned among his five (5) daughters, namely,

Francisca, Oliva, Susana, Agatona andRemedios, in a deed of extrajudicial

partition.  Later, the shares of each of said heirs was transferred to herein

petitioner by virtue of deeds of absolute sale executed either by the heirs

themselves or their successors in interest.

Based on said transfers, petitioner is now seeking the registration of the

whole of Lot No. 2880 in its name.  This we cannot allow.  The deeds of

sale relied upon by petitioner do not constitute sufficient legal justification

for petitioner's claim over all ofLot No. 2880.  Petitioner's title over said lot,

as the successor in interest of said heirs, is limited only to whatever rights

the latter may have had therein.  It is elementary that a grantor can convey

no greater estate than what he has or in which he has an alienable title or

interest.

As aptly and correctly observed by respondent court:

"It might be that what Republic Cement had actually acquired out of the

one-half portion pertaining to Felix Mangahas was more than 34,804

square meters (the totality of what had been adjudicated to Francisca,Oliva,

Susana, Agatona and Remedios), because the said parcel of land was still

unregistered, their exact boundaries still undetermined.  But what it must

have acquired out of Felix Mangahas’ one-half portion cannot be the whole

of the property that he owned in common with his wife Maria de la Cruz

with a total area of 207,996 square meters (20.7996 hectares), now known

as Lot No. 2880, Plan Ap-16404, title to which it seeks to register.  To

uphold Republic Cement's claim to the entire portion of Lot No. 2880 would

be to include the portions pertaining to Felix 'Mangahas' two sons Marcelo

and Jose, as well as the Portion pertaining to his wife Maria de la Cruz,

which do not appear to have been the subject of an extrajudicial settlement

and/or sale."[17]

Petitioner's claim over the excess area is premised on the survey allegedly

made by private surveyor Arsenio Villaruz, but the resultant areas depicted

in said survey do not tally with, but supposedly consist of expanded areas

very much larger than, those indicated for the lots involved in their

respective tax declarations, viz:  Tax Declaration No. 6831 of the spouses

Esmeraldo Reyes and Esperanza Balagtas, successors in interest

of Agatona Mangahas; Tax Declaration No. 6829 of the spouses Francisco

Reyes and Magdalena Joaquin, successors in interest of

Susana Mangahas; and Tax Declaration No. 6830 of Oliva, Francisca

and Remedios Mangahas.  These facts are expressly stated by the

foregoing parties in the deeds of sale they executed in favor of petitioner

over the lots covered by the aforestated tax declarations.[18] We do not find

satisfactory the stilted explanation advanced to justify the glaringly

excessive disparity of areas resulting after the supposed survey.

Moreover, it does not appear from our scrutiny of the records, despite

petitioner's representations in its written offer of evidence filed in the

court a quo, that the purported survey plans of the lots involved were

actually submitted in evidence therein.  Neither was it alleged and proved

that they were approved by the Director of Lands.  It has long been held

that unless a survey plan is duly approved by the Director of Lands, the

same is of dubious value and is not acceptable as evidence. [19]Indubitably,

therefore, the reputed survey and its alleged results are not entitled to

credit and should be rejected.

An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing

his title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of said title but also

the identity of the land therein referred to.  If he only claims a portion of

what is included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought

to be registered is included in that title.[20]

With respect to the appeal of private respondent Correa in CA-G.R. CV No.

07088, respondent Court affirmed the order of the lower court dismissing

said private respondent's complaint for recovery of possession of the

parcels of land in question as being premature in view of

the pendency before respondent court of the appeals subject of CA-G.R.

CV Nos. 07825 and 07826.  With this decision in the latter two cases, there

is no need for us to pass upon the case first mentioned.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.  The

challenged decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3212 December 28, 1907

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC APOSTOLIC CHURCH, ET AL., plaintiff, vs.THE MUNICIPALITIES OF TARLAC AND VICTORIA, Province of Tarlac, ET AL., defendants.

Hartigan, Rohde and Gutierrez, for plaintiffs.

Buencamino and Diokno, for defendants.

WILLARD, J.:

This is an original action brought in this court by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 1376. The construction of certain sections of this act has been twice before us in The Roman Catholic Church vs. The Municipality of Badoc, et al. (6 Phil. Rep., 345) and The Roman Catholic Church vs. The Municipality of Badoc, et al. (7 Phil. Rep., 566).

The complaint as amended alleged that the Roman Catholic Church was the owner of, and till within a few years before the filing of the complaint had been in possession of, the following described lands:

V. lawphi1.net

(a) In the said municipality of Tarlac:

1. The open square known as the plaza of the church of Tarlac, situated within the area which formerly constituted the pueblo of Tarlac.

2. In the territory which formerly constituted the pueblo of La Paz and is now the barrio of La Paz in the municipality of Tarlac:

The grounds of the old church of La Paz, known as the grounds of the old church and convent of La Paz;

The grounds of the old cemetery of La Paz, known as the old cemetery of La Paz;

The new cemetery of La Paz, known as the new cemetery of La Paz.lawphi1.net

The above mentioned lands are at present in the possession of and under the administration of the defendants, Gregorio Aglipay and the municipality of Tarlac.

(b) In the said municipality of Victoria:

1. The grounds of the church of Victoria, bounded by the four streets called procesionales and known as the plaza of the church of Victoria;

2. The chapels and their corresponding grounds, situated in the barrios of Calibungan, San Andres, Balbaloto, and Bantog.

The above-mentioned properties are at present in the possession of and under the administration of the defendants, Gregorio Aglipay, Antonio Mariano, Canuto Aglipay, Geronimo Velasco, municipal president of Victoria, and the municipality of Victoria.

The prayer of the amended complaint was that the Roman Catholic Church be declared to be the owner of the property described therein and that no one of the defendants had any right or interest therein. It also asked for the appointment of a receiver and a preliminary injunction prohibiting the use of the property, during the pendency of the action, by the Independent Filipino Church.

The complaint was duly served on all of the defendants except Antonio Mariano. The only answer which was filed purported to be the answer of la parte demandada. In the case above cited, reported in Volume VI, Philippine Reports, page 345, we said that on its face this was an answer of all the defendants. Whether in this particular case it was intended as such is rendered doubtful by other circumstances which appear therein. However, as it was the only answer filed in the case, if it is to be considered as the answer only of Gregorio Aglipay, all the other defendants would be in default, and by the terms of section 4 of said act judgment could be

entered against them without proof of any of the allegations of the complaint.

A commissioner was appointed to take evidence and such evidence was taken and reported to the court. Thereafter the plaintiffs and the Attorney-General, acting by direction of Governor-General, as the representative of the defendant municipalities of Tarlac and Victoria, made an agreement as follows:

That the plaintiff's complaint herein, so far as it alleges ownership and right of occupation of all public highways and plazas, and especially the plazas in the municipalities of Tarlac and Victoria, in the Province of Tarlac, shall be dismissed without prejudice and all claim on the part of the plaintiffs thereto shall be eliminated from said action.

In the brief filed by the plaintiffs, they say that the matter in dispute in the case is reduced to the lands described in Paragraph V, (a) 2 — that is to say, to the lot on which the church of the former pueblo of La Paz, now a barrio of the municipality of Tarlac, was situated, and the old cemetery and the new cemetery of the same barrio.

The only questions to be considered, thereto, relate to this property in the barrio of La Paz, in the municipality of Tarlac, and the only defendants interested therein are the defendants Gregorio Aglipay and the municipality of Tarlac.

The evidence presented by the plaintiffs in regard to this property showed that the church in the barrio of La Paz had been destroyed during the revolution, and that prior to its destruction it, and the two cemeteries, had been for more than twenty-five years under the control of, and administered by, the Roman Catholic priest of that pueblo. The defendants presented before the commissioner no evidence at all relating to this property.

In the answer above referred to it is alleged that the property described in the complaint is public property belonging to the Government of the Philippine Islands; that the possession enjoyed by the plaintiff church of the property was only for the purpose of administration, and that all its rights thereto ceased when the Spanish sovereignty ceased in these Islands. It also alleged that the Independent Filipino Church took possession of the property by virtue of the circular of the Insular Government of the 10th of January, 1903, for the purpose of administering it for the benefit of the inhabitants of the municipality.

It will thus be seen that upon this branch of the case the only question presented either by the answer or by the brief is the question as to whether the property in controversy is or is not owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands, and the brief is devoted principally to an argument of this question, a question which has been discussed and decided adversely to the claim of the defendants in the cases of Barlin vs. Ramirez (7 Phil. Rep., 41), Roman Catholic Church vs. Santos (7 Phil. Rep., 66), and the City of Manila vs. The Roman Catholic Church (8 Phil. Rep., 763).

It was there held that the King of Spain was not the owner of the property involved in those cases, and that the title thereto did not, therefore, pass by the treaty of Paris to the Government of the United States. It was further held that the municipalities were not the owners of such property and had no right or interest therein. Applying the principle of those cases to this case, the result is that the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment for possession as prayed for in the complaint.

There is, moreover, another line of reasoning by which the same result is reached, without taking into consideration the peculiar nature of the property here in controversy, and without considering that it is property devoted to religious worship.

It was proven at the trial that the plaintiff church had been in possession of this property for more than twenty-five years. It was admitted in the answer and in the briefs that such possession had existed up to at least 1898. The defendants, in or after that year, took possession of the property. As we have seen, they did so without any right whatever. Under such circumstances, we have held that the plaintiff church can maintain an action to recover the possession of which it has thus been deprived, notwithstanding the fact that it did not commence such action within one year from the time when it lost possession. In other words, where the defendant is able to show no title or interest in himself, a plaintiff who has been in possession of the property for the great number of years may recover such possession of the defendant, although the plaintiff has no written evidence of ownership. This was held in the case of the Bishop of Cebu vs. Mangaron (6 Phil. Rep., 286). In that case it was said, at page 299:

Article 1635 of the old Code of Civil Procedure not having been repealed by the Civil Code, if the accion publiciana existed prior to its enactment, it must necessarily exist after such enactment. We consequently conclude that action brought by the plaintiff in this case to recover the possession of which he was unlawfully deprived by the defendant can be properly maintained under the

provisions of the present Civil Code considered as a substantive law, without prejudice to any right which he may have to the ownership of the property, which ownership he must necessarily establish in order to overcome the presumption of title which exist in favor of the lawful possessor, the plaintiff in this case, who had been in the quiet and peaceful possession of the lands for twenty years, more or less, at the time he was wrongfully dispossessed by the defendant.

During the progress of this case the defendant, Gregorio Aglipay, made a motion to dismiss the same of the ground that Act No. 1376 was void because it was inconsistent with the provisions of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, relating to the Philippine Islands.

We held in the case reported in Volume VI, Philippine Reports, page 345, above cited, that this objection could not be raised by motion, but must be considered when the case was decided upon its merits. The same question has been presented by the answer and argued in the brief.

The particular ground on which this claim is based is that the law denies to the Independent Filipino Church and the municipalities the equal protection of the laws, and is therefore in violation of the first paragraph of section 5 of the act of Congress above cited, which provides:

That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.

Act No. 1376 gives original jurisdiction to this court of controversies between the Roman Catholic Church and the Filipino Independent Church and the municipalities of the Islands relating to the ownership of church property therein. It provides that the Roman Catholic Church may commence an action in this court against the Independent Filipino Church and the municipalities in relation to the property above mentioned. It also provides that the municipalities may commence such action in this court against the Roman Catholic Church. But it is said that the law discriminates against the municipalities in that it does not allow them to commence such actions without the consent of the Attorney-General and that the municipalities are thereby deny the equal protection of the laws. We see nothing whatever in this point, nor in any other of the suggestions made in the motion and brief of the defendants. In the case of the United States vs. The Union Pacific Railroad Co. (98 U. S., 569) there was under discussion an act of Congress which directed the Attorney-General to commence suit in equity in any circuit court of the United States against the

Union Pacific Railroad Company and other defendants. That law gave to the plaintiff in that case rights which were not enjoyed by other plaintiffs suing in the same court and imposed obligations upon the defendants which were not imposed upon other persons sued as defendants therein. It was claimed that the act was void as being in violation of the fifth amendment to the Constitution, and it was also said that it violated "the fundamental right of citizens under a free government to equality before the law." In holding the law constitutional, the court said, at page 608:

We are of opinion, therefore, that the act in question was intended not to change the substantial rights of the parties to the suit which it authorized, but to provide a specific method of procedure, which, by removing restrictions on the jurisdiction, process, and pleading in ordinary cases, would give a larger scope for the action of the court, and a more economical and efficient remedy than before existed, and that it is a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power.

By section 9 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, above cited, it is provided as follows:

That the Supreme Court and the Court of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided, and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the Government of said Islands, . . . .

This provision did not take away from the Commission the power to pass the act in question.

It is therefore by the court adjudged and decreed that this action be dismissed without costs as to the defendants Canuto Aglipay, Geronimo Velasco, and the municipality of Victoria.

It is further adjudged and decreed that all of the property described in the complaint, as amended, be eliminated therefrom, except that relating to the land upon which the church of the barrio of La Paz, in the municipality of Tarlac, was situated, and the old cemetery of said barrio and the new cemetery of said barrio, and as to the property thus eliminated this court makes no determination in regard to the rights of the parties to this action in relation thereto.

It is further adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, is entitled to the immediate possession of the following-described property situated in the municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac,

to wit: The grounds of the old church of La Paz, known as the grounds of the old church and convent of La Paz; the grounds of the old cemetery of La Paz, known as the old cemetery of La Paz, and the new cemetery of La Paz, known as the new cemetery of La Paz; and that neither the municipality of Tarlac nor the defendant, Gregorio Aglipay, obispo maximo of the Independent Filipino Church, has any right, title, or interest therein.

It is further adjudged and decreed that the property last hereinbefore mentioned be returned to the plaintiffs and that the said defendants be ousted from the possession thereof, and that such possession be awarded to the plaintiffs.

It is further adjudged and decreed that a writ of possession issue out of this court against the defendants, the municipality of Tarlac and Gregorio Aglipay, obispo maximo of the Independent Filipino Church, in the manner and form prescribed by Act No. 190. No costs will be allowed to any party. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Tracey, JJ., concur.