Republic of the PhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaTHIRD DIVISIONPIO
MODESTO and CIRILA RIVERA-MODESTO, Petitioners,- versus - CARLOS
URBINA, substituted by the heirs of OLYMPIA MIGUEL VDA. DE URBINA
(Surviving Spouse) and children, namely: ESCOLASTICA M. URBINA, ET
AL., Respondents. G.R. No. 189859 Present: [footnoteRef:1]NACHURA,
J., [1: Designated Additional Member of the Third Division, per
Special Order No. 907 dated October 13, 2010.]
[footnoteRef:2]BRION, Acting Chairperson, [2: Designated Acting
Chairperson of the Third Division, per Special Order No. 906 dated
October 13, 2010.]
VILLARAMA, JR., [footnoteRef:3]MENDOZA, and [3: Designated
Additional Member of the Third Division, per Special Order No. 911
dated October 15, 2010.]
SERENO, JJ. Promulgated: October 18, 2010
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
R E S O L U T I O N
BRION, J.:We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners Pio Modesto and Cirila Rivera Modesto (Modestos or
petitioners) dated March 1, 2010,[footnoteRef:4][1] seeking to
reverse our January 11, 2010 Resolution, which denied their
petition for review on certiorari for lack of
merit.[footnoteRef:5][2] [4: [1] Rollo, pp. 97-118.] [5: [2] Id. at
95.]
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTSCivil Case No. 53483This case stems from a
complaint for recovery of possession filed by respondent Carlos
Urbina (Urbina) against the petitioners with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 53483. In his
complaint, Urbina alleged that he is the owner of a parcel of land
situated at Lower Bicutan, Taguig, designated as Lot 56, PLS 272.
According to Urbina, the Modestos, through stealth, scheme, and
machination, were able to occupy a portion of this property,
designated as Lot 356, PLS 272. Thereafter, the Modestos negotiated
with Urbina for the sale of this lot. However, before the parties
could finalize the sale, the Modestos allegedly cancelled the
transaction and began claiming ownership over the lot. Urbina made
several demands on the Modestos to vacate the property, the last of
which was through a demand letter sent on July 22, 1983. When the
Modestos still refused to vacate, Urbina filed the present action
against them. In their answer, the Modestos claimed that Urbina
could not be the lawful owner of the property because it was still
government property, being a part of the Fort Bonifacio Military
Reservation. After the resolution of various procedural
issues,[footnoteRef:6][3] the RTC of Pasig City rendered a decision
in favor of Urbina on April 24, 2000, ordering the petitioners to
immediately vacate and surrender the lot to Urbina and to pay him
P200.00 monthly as compensation for the use of the property from
July 22, 1983 until they finally vacate.[footnoteRef:7][4] [6: [3]
On February 17, 1989, the RTC issued a ruling based solely on the
pleadings in favor of Urbina, and ordered the Modestos to vacate
the lot. The RTC also ordered the Modestos to pay Urbina the amount
of P200.00 a month as reasonable rental from the time of their
occupation in July 1983 until they finally vacated the premises,
and to pay P3,000.00 as attorneys fees. On appeal, the CA set aside
the RTC judgment on the pleadings, and ordered a remand of the case
to the lower court for further proceedings or trial on the merits,
as the case may be. After conducting trial on the merits, the RTC
rendered a decision dated March 4, 1996 which dismissed Urbinas
complaint without prejudice on the ground that the proper
government office in charge of the Fort Bonifacio Military
Reservation, being an indispensable party, should be impleaded
under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Urbina moved for
reconsideration, which the RTC thereafter granted in its Order
dated May 21, 1996. In the same order, it ordered Urbina to include
Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation in its complaint. Urbina then
filed an amended complaint, impleading the Bases Conversion
Development Authority as party defendant. The RTC admitted the
amended complaint. The parties, however, subsequently agreed to
drop the Bases Conversion and Development Authority as party
defendant since the assailed lot is no longer within the
supervision of the BCDA but within the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Lands. Id. at 63-65.] [7: [4] Rollo, pp. 62-69.]
The RTC noted that the petitioners recognized Urbinas possessory
rights over the property when they entered into a negotiated
contract of sale with him for the property. Thus, the Modestos were
estopped from subsequently assailing or disclaiming Urbinas
possessory rights over this lot. The petitioners appealed this
decision with the Court of Appeals (CA). LMB Conflict No.
110Urbinas claim of ownership over Lot 56 is based primarily on his
Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (III-1) 460 (Miscellaneous
Sales Application), which he filed on July 21,
1966.[footnoteRef:8][5] [8: [5] Id. at 65.]
While Urbinas accion publiciana complaint was pending before the
RTC, the Modestos filed a letter-protest against Urbinas
Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Land Management Bureau
(LMB) on January 29, 1993, claiming that: (a) they are the owners
of Lot 356, PLS 272;[footnoteRef:9][6] (b) they have been occupying
this lot for almost 33 years; and (c) their house is constructed on
this lot. [9: [6] The portion of Lot 56 that the Modestos were
occupying.]
The Modestos also alleged that they filed an unnumbered sales
application for Lot 356 with the LMB, based on their actual
occupancy of the property, pursuant to Proclamations 2476 and 172,
on February 10, 1993. On January 31, 2008, the LMB denied with
finality the Modestos unnumbered sales application/protest against
Urbinas application, in turn upholding Urbinas Miscellaneous Sales
Application. Refusing to give up, the Modestos filed a motion for
reconsideration. They also filed an Insular Government Patent Sales
Application over Lot 356 on January 27, 2009.[footnoteRef:10][7]
[10: [7] Rollo, p. 122.]
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONThe CA affirmed in toto the RTC
decision in Civil Case No. 53483 on January 26,
2009.[footnoteRef:11][8] The CA agreed with the RTCs observation
that the Modestos were estopped from challenging Urbinas right to
possess the property after they acknowledged this right when they
entered into the negotiated contract of sale. The CA also gave
credence to the January 31, 2008 LMB order in LMB Conflict No. 110,
ruling that this LMB order bolstered Urbinas possessory rights over
the subject property. [11: [8] Penned by Associate Justice Arturo
G. Tayag, with the concurrence of Presiding Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr., and Associate Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid. Id. at
45-60. ]
At the time the CA decision was issued, respondent Carlos Urbina
had already passed away and had been substituted by his surviving
heirs, his spouse, Olympia Miguel Vda. de Urbina, and his children,
Escolastica, Cecilia, Efren, Manolito, and Purificacion, all
surnamed Urbina (respondents). THE PETITIONThe petitioners
subsequently filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court, asserting that the CA committed reversible error in finding
that Urbina had possessory rights over the property. The Modestos
mainly argued that at the time Urbina filed his MSA and acquired
tax declarations over the subject property, the property was still
government property, being part of a military reservation. The
property was thus not alienable and disposable, and could not
legally be possessed by a private individual. Accordingly, Urbina
could not use the MSA and the tax declarations as proof of a better
right to possess the property as against the Modestos. The Modestos
further claimed that the CA committed grievous error when it held
that they were estopped from challenging Urbinas right to possess
the subject property. While they admitted to negotiating with
Urbina for the sale of the property, they alleged that they did so
based on Urbinas misrepresentation that he had a legal claim of
ownership over the property. Since their offer to buy the property
from Urbina was based on his false assertions, the principle of
estoppel cannot apply. Additionally, the Modestos alleged that
since the property is covered by Proclamation No. 172 and
Memorandum Order No. 119, the lower courts should have given due
consideration to the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Director of Lands (of the Bureau of Lands, now Director of the Land
Management Bureau) over these parcels of public lands. Lastly, the
Modestos questioned Urbinas qualifications to possess the property,
claiming that Urbina was not in actual, adverse, public and
continuous possession of the property. According to the Modestos,
from the time that Urbina filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application
in 1966 until the present, Urbina was a resident of Makati City,
and did not actually occupy the property. In our Order dated
January 11, 2010, we denied the Modestos petition for failing to
sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed CA
decision.THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIONOn March 3, 2010, the
Modestos filed their motion for reconsideration, raising
essentially the same grounds already brought up in their petition
for review on certiorari. Notably, the Modestos attached LMB Order
dated February 19, 2010 (February 19, 2010 LMB Order), which
resolved their motion for reconsideration of the LMBs January 31,
2008 order in LMB Conflict No. 110. This Order held that the
subject property had indeed been a part of the Fort Bonifacio
Military Reservation, and only became alienable and disposable
after October 16, 1987. Thus, Urbinas Miscellaneous Sales
Application over the property was improper and could not be the
source of possessory rights over the property. The order also noted
that Urbina failed to comply with the requirements of an applicant
for ownership of the property, as set forth in Memorandum No. 119,
the implementing guidelines of Proclamation No. 172. Responding to
this motion, the respondents, in their Comment dated May 31, 2010,
reiterated that the petitioners are estopped from assailing Urbinas
possessory rights over the property after they entered into a
negotiated sales contract with him over the subject property. They
also accused the Modestos of employing dilatory tactics in filing
the present motion. THE RULINGWe GRANT the motion for
reconsideration.Procedural issue An accion publiciana is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of realty independently of title.[footnoteRef:12][9]
Accion publiciana is also used to refer to an ejectment suit where
the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for
more than one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court. The objective of a plaintiff in accion
publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership.[footnoteRef:13][10] [12: [9] Bejar v. Caluag, G.R. No.
171277, February 17, 2007, 516 SCRA 84, 90; Sps. Cruz v. Torres,
374 Phil. 529, 533 (1999); Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286,
291 (1906); Ledesma v. Marcos, 9 Phil. 618, 620 (1908).] [13: [10]
Spouses Padilla v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169956, January 19, 2009, 576
SCRA 219.]
In asking us to determine which of the parties has a better
right to possess the property, we are asked to resolve a factual
issue, involving as it does the weighing and evaluation of the
evidence presented by the parties in the courts below. Generally,
such an exercise is not appropriate in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to
resolve only questions of law. Moreover, the factual findings of
the CA, when supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive and
binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless
the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures;(2) When the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;(3) Where there is a
grave abuse of discretion;(4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;(5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;(7) When the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court;(8) When the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based;(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.[footnoteRef:14][11] [14:
[11] Ontimare, Jr. v. Elep, G.R. No. 159224, January 20, 2006, 479
SCRA 257, 265.]
Since the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC, we would
normally be precluded from re-examining the factual circumstances
of this case. However, it appears that the RTC and the CA, in
concluding that Urbina has the right to lawfully eject the Modestos
from the lot in question, have greatly misapprehended the facts of
this case. In finding for Urbina, both the RTC and the CA mainly
relied on the principle of estoppel, and focused on the Modestos
admission that they entered into a negotiated contract of sale with
Urbina. In the process, they injudiciously ignored the other
material issues that the Modestos raised regarding the validity of
Urbinas possession of the property, specifically the Modestos
allegation that at the time Urbina began staking his claim over the
property, it was still government land. This error on the part of
the lower courts is made more evident when we take into account an
intervening event which significantly affects the resolution of
this case the issuance by the LMB of its order dated February 19,
2010, which expressly stated that Urbina did not acquire any
possessory rights over the lot. For these reasons, we find the
review of the evidence on record proper. Jurisdiction of the Court
The authority of the courts to resolve and settle questions
relating to the possession of property has long been
settled.[footnoteRef:15][12] This authority continues, even when
the land in question is public land. As we explained in Solis v.
Intermediate Appellate Court:[footnoteRef:16][13] [15: [12] See
Omandam v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128750, January 18, 2001, 349
SCRA 483; Heirs of Sabanpan v. Comorposa, G.R. No. 152807, August
12, 2003, 408 SCRA 692; City of Baguio v. Nino, G.R. No.161811,
April 12, 2006, 487 SCRA 216; Estrella v. Robles, Jr., G.R. No.
171029, November 22, 2007, 538 SCRA 60. ] [16: [13] G.R. No. 72486,
June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 267.]
We hold that the power and authority given to the Director of
Lands to alienate and dispose of public lands does not divest the
regular courts of their jurisdiction over possessory actions
instituted by occupants or applicants against others to protect
their respective possessions and occupations. While the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands [now the Land Management
Bureau] is confined to the determination of the respective rights
of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve
disposition of public lands, the power to determine who has the
actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of
possession over public lands remains with the courts.The rationale
is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the wherewithal to
police public lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent
disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its power is
clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while it may
decide disputes over possession, this is but in aid of making the
proper awards. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of
possession is recognized to be within the legal competence of the
civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual
possessors and occupants with a view to quell social
unrest.Consequently, while we leave it to the LMB to determine the
issue of who among the parties should be awarded the title to the
subject property, there is no question that we have sufficient
authority to resolve which of the parties is entitled to rightful
possession. On the issue of possessory rightsPrefatorily, we
observe that the subject property has not yet been titled, nor has
it been the subject of a validly issued patent by the LMB.
Therefore, the land remains part of the public domain, and neither
Urbina nor the Modestos can legally claim ownership over it. This
does not mean, however, that neither of the parties have the right
to possess the property. Urbina alleged that he is the rightful
possessor of the property since he has a pending Miscellaneous
Sales Application, as well as tax declarations over the property.
He also relied, to support his claim of a better right to possess
the property, on the admission on the part of the Modestos that
they negotiated with him for the sale of the lot in question.On the
other hand, the Modestos anchored their right to possess the same
on their actual possession of the property. They also questioned
the legality of Urbinas Miscellaneous Sales Application, and his
tax declarations over the property, arguing that since these were
obtained when the land was still not alienable and disposable, they
could not be the source of any legal rights. After reviewing the
records of this case, we find the reasoning of the Modestos to be
more in accord with applicable laws and jurisprudence. The February
19, 2010 LMB Order Factual findings of administrative agencies are
generally respected and even accorded finality because of the
special knowledge and expertise gained by these agencies from
handling matters falling under their specialized
jurisdiction.[footnoteRef:17][14] Given that the LMB is the
administrative agency tasked with assisting the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the
management and disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain,[footnoteRef:18][15] we defer to its specialized
knowledge on these matters. In this regard, we quote with approval
the observations made by the Director of the LMB in the February
19, 2010 LMB Order: [17: [14] Lim v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
130325, March 11, 2003, citing Mapa v. Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76, 81
(1989).] [18: [15] Section 14, Executive Order No. 192, provides:
There is hereby created the Lands Management Bureau which shall
absorb functions and powers of the Bureau of Lands except those
line functions and powers which are transferred to the regional
field office. The Lands Management Bureau to be headed by a
Director and assisted by an Assistant Director shall advise the
Secretary on matters pertaining to rational land classification
management and disposition and shall have the following functions,
but not limited to: a. Recommend policies and programs for the
efficient and effective administration, surveys, management and
disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
and other lands outside the responsibilities of other government
agencies; such as reclaimed areas and other areas not needed for or
are not being utilized for the purposes for which they have been
established; b. Advise the Regional Offices on the efficient and
effective implementation of policies, programs and projects for
more effective public lands management; c. Assist in the monitoring
and evaluation of land surveys, management and disposition of lands
to ensure efficiency and effectiveness thereof; d.Issue standards,
guidelines, regulations and orders to enforce policies for the
maximization of land use and development; e. Develop operating
standards and procedure to enhance the Bureau's objectives and
functions; f. Assist the Secretary as Executive Officer charged
with carrying out the provisions of the Public Land Act [C.A. 141,
as amended], who shall have direct executive control of the survey,
classification, lease, sale, or any other forms of concessions or
disposition and management of the lands of the public domain; and
g. Perform other functions as may be assigned by the Secretary
and/or provided by law. ]
Movants [the Modestos] have anchored their Motion for
Reconsideration on three (3) assigned errors, to wit:I. THIS OFFICE
ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT THE AREA IS NOT COVERED BY PROCLAMATION
NO. 172, AS IMPLEMENTED BY MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 119;II. THIS OFFICE
ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT CARLOS T. URBINA WAS IN ACTUAL, ADVERSE,
PUBLIC AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION;III.
THIS OFFICE ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT A NEW SURVEY OF THE AREA IN
QUESTION SHOULD BE DONE AND CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE THE TRUE
BOUNDARIES OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION VIS--VIS THE CLAIMS OF EACH
PARTY.In order to clarify the issues raised in the Motion for
Reconsideration, this Office ordered that another ocular inspection
and investigation on the subject premises be conducted by Special
Investigator Danilo Lim. After said investigation, Special
Investigator, Danilo Lim, submitted his Report to the Regional
Technical Director, Lands Management Services, thru the Chief, Land
Management Division, DENR-NCR.In his Report, Special Investigator,
Danilo Lim made the following findings:The Miscellaneous Sales
Application filed by Carlos Urbina is not appropriate because Lot
356 had ceased to be public land as it had become part of the Fort
Bonifacio Military Reservation, and hence, no one can claim
possessory rights over the said property since it is within said
Military Reservation. The subject area which is located in Lower
Bicutan, Taguig, only became alienable and disposable upon the
issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 172 and its implementing
guidelines Memorandum Order No. 119 on October 16, 1987.After a
judicious evaluation of the arguments raised in the instant motion,
and taking into account the findings and recommendations of Special
Investigator Danilo Lim as contained in his Report, this Office
finds the same to be not entirely without merit. Anent the first
assigned error, Special Investigator Danilo Lim has found that the
area is indeed a part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation
and is covered by Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum Order No.
119. Upon a thorough research of the origin of the subject
property, it turned out that the area was originally part of the
vast parcel of land known as Hacienda De Maricaban. Sometime in
1902, the United States of America purchased said vast tract of
land with an area of Seven Hundred and Twenty Nine and Fifteenth
Hundred (729.15) Hectares and spanning the Municipalities of Pasig,
Taguig, Paranaque and Pasay, from its original owner, Dona Dolores
Pacual Casal Y Ochoa, for the purpose of establishing a US Military
Reservation which they later named Fort William Mc Kinley. On July
12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423,
reserving for military purposes, the parcels of land identified as
Parcel No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4, Psu-2031, on which parcels of land
excluding Parcel No. 2, the present Fort Bonifacio was established
for the Republic of the Philippines. Parcel No. 3, Psu-2031 is
covered by T.C.T. No. 61524 registered in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines. On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C.
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 in order to exclude from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 which established Fort Bonifacio,
certain portions of land embraced therein known as Barangays Lower
Bicutan, Upper Bicutan, Western Bicutan and Signal Village, all
situated in the Municipality of Taguig, and to declare the same
open for disposition to actual occupants and qualified applicants
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 274 and Republic Act No.
730 in relation to the Public Land Act as amended; and under
Memorandum Order No. 119 issued by President Corazon Aquino. In
Proclamation No. 172, Lower Bicutan is described as Lot 3 situated
in the Municipality of Taguig, M.M., and containing an area of One
Million Eighty Four Thousand Three Hundred Eleven (1,084,311) sqm
more or less or 108.43 hectares. In view of all the above recitals,
it appears that the parcel of land subject of this case (Lot 356)
which is located in Barangay Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig is
covered by Proclamation No. 172 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino, and hence, the same only became alienable and disposable to
qualified applicants after October 16, 1987, the date of its
issuance, contrary to what is believed in the assailed Order of
this Office. With respect to the second assigned error, the issue
can be resolved by the application of the legal provisions covering
the subject property, which is Proclamation No. 172 and its
implementing guidelines. Under its implementing guidelines,
Memorandum No. 119, the following are the qualifications for an
applicant to be qualified to apply for and acquire a lot under
Proclamation No. 172, among others, to wit:(1)He/She must be a bona
fide resident of the proclaimed areas. To be considered a bona fide
resident, the applicant must have the following qualifications:a)A
Filipino citizen of legal age and/or a head of the family;b)Must
have constructed a house in the area proclaimed for disposition on
or before January 6, 1986 and actually residing therein;c)Must not
own any other residential or commercial lot in Metro Manila;d)Must
not have been a registered awardee of any lot under the
administration of the NHA, MHS, or any other government agency, nor
the AFP Officers village; e)Must not be a professional squatter. A
professional squatter, for purposes of this Order, is one who
engages in selling lots in the areas proclaimed for disposition;
andf)Has filed the proper application to purchase.Based on the
Report of Special Investigator Lim and the other Land Inspectors
who investigated this case, namely: Jose P. Antonio and Jose P.
Parayno, it was found that Pio Modesto and his family are the
actual occupants of the area with a residential house and chapel
made of light materials and Pio Modesto and his family are actually
residing in the said residential house. On the other hand, it was
established that Carlos Urbina has been a resident of Pasay Road or
4929 Pio Del Pilar, Makati City. Applying the qualifications
provided for in Memorandum Order No. 119, we find that Spouses
Modesto are to be qualified to apply for the subject lot as they
have been in occupation thereof and have constructed their
residential house thereon. Hence, they satisfy the requirements in
order to be considered a Bonafide Resident as defined in the
guidelines. As per our records, Spouses Pio and Cirila Modesto have
also filed an unnumbered I.G.P.S.A. Application for the subject lot
on January 27, 2009. Carlos Urbina, however, never constructed any
house on the subject lot and neither did he actually reside
therein. Besides, he already owns a residential lot in Makati City
where he had been residing all this time. Hence, he cannot be
considered a bonafide resident of the subject lot. He likewise
failed to file his I.G.P.S.A application for the lot. Instead, what
he had filed on January 20, 1966 was a Miscellaneous Sales
Application. At that time, however, the area of Barangay Lower
Bicutan, where the subject lot is located, was still part of the
Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, and the same had not yet been
segregated and declared to be alienable and disposable. Hence, no
possessory rights could have been acquired by his over the subject
lot.[footnoteRef:19][16] [19: [16] Rollo, pp. 120-122. ]
From this LMB order, we consider the following facts
established:First, the lot in question, situated in Barangay Lower
Bicutan, was part of the Fort Bonifacio Military Reservation, and
only became alienable and disposable after October 16, 1987,
pursuant to Proclamation No. 172. This factual finding finds
further support in the testimony, before the RTC, of Jose Exequiel
Vale, Special Investigator and Assisting Hearing Officer of the
DENR.[footnoteRef:20][17] [20: [17] Id. at 64.]
Second, the Modestos are bona fide residents of the lot in
question, being the actual residents of the lot and having built a
house and chapel on the property.Third, the Modestos have a pending
Insular Government Patent Sales Application over the lot in
question, filed after the property became alienable and disposable.
Taking these facts into account, we now make a distinction, based
on the corresponding legal effects, between: (a) possession of the
property before October 16, 1987, when the land was still
considered inalienable government land, and (b) possession of the
property after October 16, 1987, when the land had already been
declared alienable and disposable. Possession prior to October 16,
1987 Unless a public land is shown to have been reclassified as
alienable or actually alienated by the State to a private person,
that piece of land remains part of the public
domain,[footnoteRef:21][18] and its occupation in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory
rights.[footnoteRef:22][19] It is only after the property has been
declared alienable and disposable that private persons can legally
claim possessory rights over it. [21: [18] Seville v. National
Development Company, G.R. No. 129401,February 2, 2001, 351 SCRA
112.] [22: [19] Spouses de Ocampo v. Arlos, G.R. No.135527, October
19, 2000, 343 SCRA 716.]
Accordingly, even if we recognize that Urbina had been in
possession of the property as early as July 21, 1966, when he filed
his Miscellaneous Sales Application, his occupation was unlawful
and could not be the basis of possessory rights, in keeping with
Section 88 of the Public Land Act, that states:Section 88.The tract
or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section
eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to
occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again
declared alienable under the provisions of this Act or by
proclamation of the President.The same holds true for Urbinas tax
declarations. Absent any proof that the property in question had
already been declared alienable at the time that Urbina declared it
for tax purposes, his tax declarations over the subject property
cannot be used to support his claim of possession. Similarly, while
the Modestos claim to have been in possession of Lot 356 for almost
33 years,[footnoteRef:23][20] this occupation could not give rise
to possessory rights while the property being occupied remain
government land that had not yet been declared alienable and
disposable. [23: [20] Counted from January 29, 1993, when the
Modestos filed their protest to Urbinas miscellaneous sales
application in LMB Conflict No. 110. ]
Possession after October 16, 1987 The different land
investigators[footnoteRef:24][21] sent by the LMB to survey the
subject property have consistently held that the Modestos are the
actual occupants of the lot in question. This actual occupation is
not denied by Urbina. As a matter of fact, we know from Urbinas
final demand letter that the Modestos have been in open and
continuous possession of the property since July 22,
1983.[footnoteRef:25][22] We also consider established that the
Modestos built a house on the subject property, a fact that Urbina
affirmed in his testimony before the RTC.[footnoteRef:26][23] From
these circumstances, we consider as settled the fact that the
Modestos were the actual possessors of the property when it was
declared alienable and disposable on October 16, 1987, and
continued to possess the property until the present time. [24: [21]
Special Investigator Danilo Lim, Land Inspectors Jose P. Antonio
and Jose P. Parayno. ] [25: [22] Rollo, p. 62.] [26: [23] Id. at
63.]
Furthermore, the Modestos have a valid Insular Government Patent
Sales Application over the property pending with the LMB, which
they filed on January 27, 2009.[footnoteRef:27][24] In contrast,
Urbina has a Miscellaneous Sales Application filed in 1966, which
the LMB considered invalid since it was filed when the property
still formed part of a military reservation. [27: [24] Id. at 122.
]
As for the Certification from the City Treasurer of Taguig that
the respondents presented,[footnoteRef:28][25] which certified that
Carlos Urbina had paid real estate taxes on real property
describe[d] in the name of Carlos Urbina, with property located at
Lower Bicutan, Taguig City from 2009 and prior years, we note that
the certification contains no description of the property subject
of the tax declaration, leaving us to wonder on the identity of the
property covered by the declaration. [28: [25] Attached to
respondent Urbinas Comment dated May 31, 2010; id. at 140.]
In any case, even if we consider this certification as
sufficient proof that Urbina declared the subject property for tax
declaration purposes, it must be stressed that the mere declaration
of land for taxation purposes does not constitute possession
thereof nor is it proof of ownership in the absence of the
claimants actual possession.[footnoteRef:29][26] And in light of
our categorical finding that the Modestos actually occupied the
property in question from the time that it was declared alienable
and disposable until the present time, the tax declaration fails to
convince us that Urbina has a right to legally possess it. [29:
[26] See de Luna vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94490, August 6,
1992, 212 SCRA 276. ]
For these reasons, we find that Urbina utterly failed to prove
that he has a better right to possess the property. Thus, we cannot
sustain his complaint for ejectment against the Modestos and,
perforce, must dismiss the same for lack of merit. On the finding
of estoppelLastly, we find the CAs reliance on the principle of
estoppel against the Modestos to be misplaced. Through estoppel, an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying on it.[footnoteRef:30][27] This doctrine is based on the
grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and
its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act,
representations, or commitments to the injury of one to whom they
were directed and who reasonably relied on it.[footnoteRef:31][28]
It bears noting, however, that no estoppel arises where the
representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due
to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake.[footnoteRef:32][29]
[30: [27] CIVIL CODE, Article 1431.] [31: [28] Rockland
Construction Company v. Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 164587, February 04, 2008, citing Philippine National Bank
v. Court of Appeals, Nos. L-30831 & L-31176, November 21, 1979,
94 SCRA 357, 368.] [32: [29] Ramiro v. Grano, 54 Phil. 744 (1930),
citing 21 C.J., 1125, 1126.]
Here, the Modestos do not deny that they negotiated with Urbina
for the sale of the subject property. However, because they entered
the negotiated sales contract with Urbina on the mistaken belief,
based on Urbinas erroneous assertion, that he was the lawful
owner-possessor of the property in question, we do not consider
them bound by this action. Consequently, the principle of estoppel
finds no application in this case. WHEREFORE, premises considered,
we GRANT the motion and REINSTATE the petition. Consequently, we
REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated January 26, 2009 and
Resolution dated October 5, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68007. We DISMISS the complaint for Recovery of Possession
filed by Carlos T. Urbina for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice WE CONCUR:ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENOAssociate JusticeATTESTATIONI attest
that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division. ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
Acting ChairpersonCERTIFICATIONPursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No.
179987 September 3, 2013HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by
Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.R E S O L U T I O NBERSAMIN, J.:For our consideration
and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties
who both assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby
we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the
application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of
land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that
they had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the
registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section
14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree).AntecedentsThe property subject of the application for
registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang
Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with
an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant
Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the
property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City,
Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the
land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title.1To prove that the property was an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued
by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
which reads:This is to certify that the parcel of land designated
as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr.
Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite
containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on
the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established
under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982.2After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered
judgment granting Malabanans application for land registration,
disposing thusly:WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this
application for registration and thus places under the operation of
Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot
9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred
Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in
addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN,
who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at
Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.Once this Decision becomes final and
executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith
issue.SO ORDERED.3The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed
to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that
he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect
title.On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision
reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for registration
of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto
(Herbieto),4 the CA declared that under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR certification
stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable
only on March 15, 1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982
could not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanans period of
possession.Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal
in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs decision of February 23, 2007
to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.The
petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit) remains the controlling doctrine
especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this
regard, Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior
to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in
the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under
the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property
Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to
the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the
application for registration as alienable and disposable should
also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a mere obiter
dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein
were in fact found and declared void ab initio for lack of
publication of the notice of initial hearing.The petitioners also
rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to
support their argument that the property had been ipso jure
converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession by their
predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain
for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was
that the property had been "converted" into private property
through prescription at the time of the application without regard
to whether the property sought to be registered was previously
classified as agricultural land of the public domain.As earlier
stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because
Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and
occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his
predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.Petitioners Motion for ReconsiderationIn their motion for
reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere
classification of the land as alienable or disposable should be
deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the
State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7
Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9
they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or
disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil
Code; that Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with
the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that
consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when
Malabanan filed the application for registration on February 20,
1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16
years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared
alienable and disposable by the State.The Republics Motion for
Partial ReconsiderationThe Republic seeks the partial
reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference
to the application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.Chiefly
citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has
enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It
reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration
only when the land subject of the application had been declared
alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.RulingWe
deny the motions for reconsideration.In reviewing the assailed
decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different
classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land
registration laws of the Philippines.Classifications of land
according to ownershipLand, which is an immovable property,10 may
be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11 Land is considered of public dominion if it either:
(a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State,
without being for public use, and is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land
belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although
of such character but no longer intended for public use or for
public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property
of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private
ownership if it belongs to a private individual.Pursuant to the
Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced
into the country from the West by Spain through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the public domain
belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16All lands not appearing to be
clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of
the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or
alienated them to private persons.17Classifications of public
landsaccording to alienabilityWhether or not land of the public
domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under
the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the public domain were classified
into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public
domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest,
and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide
other classifications. The 1987 Constitution adopted the
classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural,
forest or timber, and mineral, but added national parks.20
Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to
the uses to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of
lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively
by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22Based
on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of
public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain
may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.Alienable
and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit:
(a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of
private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without
limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands
as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the
lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as
forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of
alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as
agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to
enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to
classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the
Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public land
will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth,
thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public
dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form
of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that
effect.27 Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or
the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to
be used for public service or for the development of national
wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.Disposition of
alienable public landsSection 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No.
141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to
wit:Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can
be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:(1) For homestead
settlement;(2) By sale;(3) By lease; and(4) By confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles;(a) By judicial legalization; or(b)
By administrative legalization (free patent).The core of the
controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section
11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which
expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:Section 48. The
following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:x x x x(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Bold
emphasis supplied)Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that
lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or
national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are
outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not
include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable
and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to
only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind
such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must
satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to
come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,28 to
wit:1. The applicant, by himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of
the property subject of the application;2. The possession and
occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;3.
The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership;4. The possession and occupation must have
taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and5. The property
subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the
public domain.Taking into consideration that the Executive
Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the
public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that
the land subject of the application for registration must have been
already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in
order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land
is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain,
the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that
the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification of a
public land as agricultural.The dissent stresses that the
classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable agricultural land should likewise have been made on June
12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to
such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects.
It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by
judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full
legislative intent be respected.We find, however, that the choice
of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession
and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the
determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the
lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession
and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945.
Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal
meaning of the law as written by the legislators.Moreover, an
examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that
Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the
registration should have been classified as agricultural since June
12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or
incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of
the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility
for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.Alienable
public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively
during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact,
by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of
the public domain for as long as the lands were already converted
to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of
satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the
Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject
of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land of the public domain for the
entire duration of the requisite period of possession.To be clear,
then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as
alienable and disposable agricultural land at the time of the
application for registration is necessary only to dispute the
presumption that the land is inalienable.The declaration that land
is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at
which prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or
incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants
possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with
through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public
possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of
law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by the Government,
because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued
in order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31If one
follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to
adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands in favor of
qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and
cultivation thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32
will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such
objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative
development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic
Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements and
procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to
qualified applicants, particularly residential lands, subject to
area limitations.34On the other hand, if a public land is
classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the
President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private
land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition
and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run
against the State.To sum up, we now observe the following rules
relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public
domain, namely:(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian
Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State and
are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership
are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be
alienated or disposed;(2) The following are excepted from the
general rule, to wit:(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain
are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive
modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the
mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the
application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable
as of the time of the application, provided the applicants
possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945,
or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant
has performed all the conditions essential to a government grant
arises,36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land by virtue
of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has
already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become
private property.37(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently
classified or declared as no longer intended for public use or for
the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of
public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands
or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed
through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary
or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive
period is a condition sine qua non in observance of the law
(Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.To
reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without
satisfying the requisite character and period of possession -
possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be
considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the
land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues
to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the
President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.1wphi1WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R.
No. 182913 November 20, 2013REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner, vs.ANTONIO, FELIZA, NEMESIO, ALBERTO, FELICIDAD,
RICARDO, MILAGROS AND CIPRIANO, ALL SURNAMED BACAS; EMILIANA
CHABON, SATURNINO ABDON, ESTELA, CHABON, LACSASA DEMON, PDERITA
CHABON, FORTUNATA EMBALSADO, MINDA J. CASTILLO, PABLO CASTILLO,
ARTURO P. LEGASPI, and JESSIE I. LEGASPI, Respondents.D E C I S I O
NMENDOZA, J.:This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeks to review, reverse and set aside the
November 12, 2007 Decision1 and the May 15, 2008 Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64142, upholding the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cagayan de Oro
City (RTC) , which dismissed the consolidated cases of Civil Case
No. 3494, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Antonio, et al.
and Civil Case No. 5918, entitled Republic of the Philippines v.
Emiliana Chabon , et al. Said civil cases were filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) for the cancellation and
annulment of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-358 and OCT
No. O-669, covering certain parcels of land occupied and utilized
as part of the Camp Evangelista Military Reservation, Misamis
Oriental, presently the home of the 4th Infantry Division of the
Philippine Army.The Antecedents:In 1938, Commonwealth President
Manuel Luis Quezon (Pres. Quezon) issued Presidential Proclamation
No. 265, which took effect on March 31, 1938, reserving for the use
of the Philippine Army three (3) parcels of the public domain
situated in the barrios of Bulua and Carmen, then Municipality of
Cagayan, Misamis Oriental. The parcels of land were withdrawn from
sale or settlement and reserved for military purposes, "subject to
private rights, if any there be."Land Registration Case No.
N-275[Antonio, Feliza, Nemesio, Roberto, and Felicidad, all
surnamed Bacas, and the Heirs of Jesus Bacas, Applicants (The
Bacases)]The Bacases filed their Application for Registration3 on
November 12, 1964 covering a parcel of land, together with all the
improvements found thereon, located in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City,
more particularly described and bounded as follows:A parcel of
land, Lot No. 4354 of the Cadastral Survey of Cagayan, L.R.C.
Record No. 1612, situated at Barrio Carmen, Municipality of
Cagayan, Province of Misamis Oriental. Bounded on the SE., along
lines 1-2-3-4, by Lot 4357; and alongline 4-5, by Lot 3862; on the
S., along line 5-6, by Lot 3892; on the W. and NW., along lines
6-7-8, by Lot 4318; on the NE., along line 8-9, by Lot 4319, along
line 9-10, by Lot 4353 and long line 10-11, by Lot 4359; and on the
SE., along line 11-1, by Lot 4356, all of Cagayan Cadastre;
containing an area of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN (354,377) square meters, more or less, under
Tax Declaration No. 35436 and assessed at P3,540.00.4They alleged
ownership in fee simple of the property and indicated in their
application the names and addresses of the adjoining owners, as
well as a statement that the Philippine Army (Fourth Military Area)
recently occupied a portion of the land by their mere
tolerance.5The Director of the Bureau of Lands, thru its Special
Counsel, Benito S. Urcia (Urcia) , registered its written
Opposition6 against the application. Later, Urcia, assisted by the
District Land Officer of Cagayan de Oro City, thru the Third
Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, Pedro R. Luspo
(Luspo) , filed an Amended Opposition.7On April 10, 1968, based on
the evidence presented by the Bacases, the Land Registration Court
(LRC) rendered a decision8 holding that the applicants had
conclusively established their ownership in fee simple over the
subject land and that their possession, including that of their
predecessor-in-interest, had been open, adverse, peaceful,
uninterrupted, and in concept of owners for more than forty (40)
years.No appeal was interposed by the Republic from the decision of
the LRC. Thus, the decision became final and executory, resulting
in the issuance of a decree and the corresponding certificate of
title over the subject property.Land Registration Case No. N-521
[Emiliana Chabon, Estela Chabon and Pedrita Chabon, Applicants (The
Chabons)]The Chabons filed their Application for Registration9 on
May 8, 1974 covering a parcel of land located in Carmen-District,
Cagayan de Oro City, known as Lot 4357, Cagayan Cadastre, bounded
and described as:A parcel of land (Lot 4357, Cagayan Cadastre, plan
Ap-12445), situated in the District of Carmen, City of Cagayan de
Oro. Bounded on the NE. by property of Potenciano Abrogan vs.
Republic of the Philippines (Public Land); on the SE. by properties
of Geronimo Wabe and Teofilo Batifona or Batipura; on the SW. by
property of Teofilo Batifona or Batipura; and on the NW. by
property of Felipe Bacao or Bacas vs. Republic of the Philippines
(Public Land). Point "1" is N. 10 deg. 39W., 379.88 M. from
B.L.L.M. 14, Cagayan Cadastre. Area SIXTY NINE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
THIRTY TWO (69,632) SQUARE METERS, more or less.10They alleged
ownership in fee simple over the property and indicated therein the
names and addresses of the adjoining owners, but no mention was
made with respect to the occupation, if any, by the Philippine
Army. The Chabons likewise alleged that, to the best of their
knowledge, no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affecting said
land with the exception of 18,957 square meters sold to Minda J.
Castillo and 1,000 square meters sold and conveyed to Atty. Arturo
R. Legaspi.11On February 18, 1976, there being no opposition made,
even from the government, hearing on the application ensued. The
LRC then rendered a decision12 holding that Chabons evidence
established their ownership in fee simple over the subject property
and that their possession, including that of their
predecessor-in-interest, had been actual, open, public, peaceful,
adverse, continuous, and in concept of owners for more than thirty
(30) years.The decision then became final and executory. Thus, an
order13 for the issuance of a decree and the corresponding
certificate of title was issued.The present casesAs a consequence
of the LRC decisions in both applications for registration, the
Republic filed a complaint for annulment of titles against the
Bacases and the Chabons before the RTC. More specifically, on
September 7, 1970 or one (1) year and ten (10) months from the
issuance of OCT No. 0-358, a civil case for annulment, cancellation
of original certificate of title, reconveyance of lot or damages
was filed by the Republic against the Bacases, which was docketed
as Civil Case No. 3494. On the other hand, on April 21, 1978 or two
(2) years and seven (7) months after issuance of OCT No. 0-669, the
Republic filed a civil case for annulment of title and reversion
against the Chabons, docketed as Civil Case No. 5918.Civil Case No.
3494 against the BacasesThe Republic claimed in its petition for
annulment before the RTC14 that the certificate of title issued in
favor of the Bacases was null and void because they fraudulently
omitted to name the military camp as the actual occupant in their
application for registration. Specifically, the Republic, through
the Fourth Military Area, was the actual occupant of Lot No. 4354
and also the owner and possessor of the adjoining Lots Nos. 431815
and 4357. Further, the Bacases failed to likewise state that Lot
No. 4354 was part of Camp Evangelista. These omissions constituted
fraud which vitiated the decree and certificate of title
issued.Also, the Republic averred that the subject land had long
been reserved in 1938 for military purposes at the time it was
applied for and, so, it was no longer disposable and subject to
registration.16Civil Case No. 5918 against the ChabonsIn this case,
the Republic claimed that it was the absolute owner and possessor
of Lot No. 4357. The said lot, together with Lots 431817 and 4354,
formed part of the military reservation known as Camp Evangelista
in Cagayan de Oro City, which was set aside and reserved under
Presidential Proclamation No. 265 issued by President Quezon on
March 31, 1938.18In its petition for annulment before the RTC,19
the Republic alleged that OCT No. 0-669 issued in favor of the
Chabons and all transfer certificates of titles, if any, proceeding
therefrom, were null and void for having been vitiated by fraud
and/or lack of jurisdiction.20 The Chabons concealed that the fact
that Lot 4357 was part of Camp Evangelista and that the Republic,
through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was its actual
occupant and possessor.21 Further, Lot 4357 was a military
reservation, established as such as early as March 31, 1938 and,
thus, could not be the subject of registration or private
appropriation.22 As a military reservation, it was beyond the
commerce of man and the registration court did not have any
jurisdiction to adjudicate the same as private property.23Decision
of the Regional Trial CourtAs the facts and issues in both cases
were substantially the same and identical, and the pieces of
evidence adduced were applicable to both, the cases were
consolidated and jointly tried. Thereafter, a joint decision
dismissing the two complaints of the Republic was rendered.In
dismissing the complaints, the RTC explained that the stated fact
of occupancy by Camp Evangelista over certain portions of the
subject lands in the applications for registration by the
respondents was a substantial compliance with the requirements of
the law.24 It would have been absurd to state Camp Evangelista as
an adjoining owner when it was alleged that it was an occupant of
the land.25 Thus, the RTC ruled that the respondents did not commit
fraud in filing their applications for registration.Moreover, the
RTC was of the view that the Republic was then given all the
opportunity to be heard as it filed its opposition to the
applications, appeared and participated in the proceedings. It was,
thus, estopped from contesting the proceedings.The RTC further
reasoned out that assuming arguendo that respondents were guilty of
fraud, the Republic lost its right to a relief for its failure to
file a petition for review on the ground of fraud within one (1)
year after the date of entry of the decree of registration.26
Consequently, it would now be barred by prior judgment to contest
the findings of the LRC.27Finally, the RTC agreed with the
respondents that the subject parcels of land were exempted from the
operation and effect of the Presidential Proclamation No. 265
pursuant to a proviso therein that the same would not apply to
lands with existing "private rights." The presidential proclamation
did not, and should not, apply to the respondents because they did
not apply to acquire the parcels of land in question from the
government, but simply for confirmation and affirmation of their
rights to the properties so that the titles over them could be
issued in their favor.28 What the proclamation prohibited was the
sale or disposal of the parcels of land involved to private persons
as a means of acquiring ownership of the same, through the modes
provided by law for the acquisition of disposable public
lands.29The Republic filed its Notice of Appeal before the RTC on
July 5, 1991. On the other hand, the Bacases and the Chabons filed
an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of the Writ of Execution and
Possession on July 16, 1991. An amended motion was filed on July
31, 1991. The RTC then issued the Order,30 dated February 24, 1992,
disapproving the Republics appeal for failure to perfect it as it
failed to notify the Bacases and granting the writ of
execution.Action of the Court of Appeals and the Court regarding
the Republics AppealThe Republic filed a Notice of Appeal on April
1, 1992 from the February 24, 1992 of the RTC. The same was denied
in the RTC Order,31 dated April 23, 1992. The Republic moved for
its reconsideration but the RTC was still denied it on July 8,
1992.32Not satisfied, the Republic filed a petition before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28647, entitled Republic vs. Hon. Cesar
M. Ybaez,33 questioning the February 24, 1992 Order of the RTC
denying its appeal in Civil Case No. 3494. The CA sustained the
government and, accordingly, annulled the said RTC order.The
respondents appealed to the Court, which later found no commission
of a reversible error on the part of the CA. Accordingly, the Court
dismissed the appeal as well as the subsequent motions for
reconsideration. An entry of judgment was then issued on February
16, 1995.34Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe appeal allowed, the CA
docketed the case as CA G.R. CV No. 64142.On November 12, 2007, the
CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It explained that once a decree
of registration was issued under the Torrens system and the
reglementary period had passed within which the decree may be
questioned, the title was perfected and could not be collaterally
questioned later on.35 Even assuming that an action for the
nullification of the original certificate of title may still be
instituted, the review of a decree of registration under Section 38
of Act No. 496 [Section 32 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529]
would only prosper upon proof that the registration was procured
through actual fraud,36 which proceeded from an intentional
deception perpetrated through the misrepresentation or the
concealment of a material fact.37 The CA stressed that "[t]he fraud
must be actual and extrinsic, not merely constructive or intrinsic;
the evidence thereof must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant, because the proceedings which are assailed as having
been fraudulent are judicial proceedings which by law, are presumed
to have been fair and regular."38Citing the rule that "[t]he fraud
is extrinsic if it is employed to deprive parties of their day in
court and, thus, prevent them from asserting their right to the
property registered in the name of the applicant,"39 the CA found
that there was none. The CA agreed with the RTC that there was
substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. The
allegation of the respondent that Camp Evangelista occupied
portions of their property negated the complaint that they
committed misrepresentation or concealment amounting to fraud.40As
regards the issue of exemption from the proclamation, the CA deemed
that a discussion was unnecessary because the LRC already resolved
it. The CA stressed that the proceeding was one in rem, thereby
binding everyone to the legal effects of the same and that a decree
of registration that had become final should be deemed conclusive
not only on the questions actually contested and determined, but
also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the
land registration proceeding.41Not in conformity, the Republic
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on May 15, 2008
for lack of merit.Hence, this petition.GROUNDS RELIED
UPONWARRANTING REVIEW OF THEPETITION1. THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT
HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION FILED BY
RESPONDENTS DESPITE THE LATTERS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE
MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF INDICATING ALL THE ADJOINING OWNERS OF THE
PARCELS OF LAND SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE A
REGISTRABLE RIGHT OVER THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND WHICH ARE WITHIN
THE CAMP EVANGELISTA MILITARY RESERVATION.3. IN G.R. NO. 157306
ENTITLED "REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ANATALIA ACTUB TIU
ESTONILO, ET AL.," WHICH INVOLVES PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS CLAIMING
RIGHTS OVER PORTIONS OF THE CAMP EVANGELISTA MILITARY RESERVATION,
THIS HONORABLE COURT HELD THAT THESE INDIVIDUALS COULD NOT HAVE
VALIDLY OCCUPIED THEIR CLAIMED LOTS BECAUSE THE SAME WERE
CONSIDERED INALIENABLE FROM THE TIME OF THEIR RESERVATION IN 1938.
HERE, THE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE BEING SUSTAINED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS WERE ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE DECISIONS OF THE LAND
REGISTRATION COURT IN APPLICATIONS FOR REGISTRATION FILED IN 1964
AND 1974. VERILY, THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ISSUING THE HEREIN
ASSAILED DECISION DATED NOVEMBER 15, 2007 AND RESOLUTION DATED MAY
15, 2008, HAS DECIDED THAT INSTANT CONTROVERSY IN A MANNER THAT IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.42Position of the RepublicIn
advocacy of its position, the Republic principally argues that (1)
the CA erred in holding that the LRC acquired jurisdiction over the
applications for registration of the reserved public lands filed by
the respondents; and (2) the respondents do not have a registrable
right over the subject parcels of land which are within the Camp
Evangelista Military Reservation.With respect to the first
argument, the Republic cites Section 15 of P.D. No. 1529, which
requires that applicants for land registration must disclose the
names of the occupants of the land and the names and addresses of
the owners of the adjoining properties. The respondents did not
comply with that requirement which was mandatory and
jurisdictional. Citing Pinza v. Aldovino,43 it asserts that the LRC
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. Moreover, such
omission constituted fraud or willful misrepresentation. The
respondents cannot invoke the indefeasibility of the titles issued
since a "grant tainted with fraud and secured through
misrepresentation is null and void and of no effect
whatsoever."44On the second argument, the Republic points out that
Presidential Proclamation No. 265 reserved for the use of the
Philippine Army certain parcels of land which included Lot No. 4354
and Lot No. 4357. Both lots were, however, allowed to be
registered. Lot No. 4354 was registered as OCT No. 0-0358 and Lot
No. 4357 as OCT No. O-669.The Republic asserts that being part of
the military reservation, these lots are inalienable and cannot be
the subject of private ownership. Being so, the respondents do not
have registrable rights over them. Their possession of the land,
however long, could not ripen into ownership, and they have not
shown proof that they were entitled to the land before the
proclamation or that the said lots were segregated and withdrawn as
part thereof.Position of the RespondentsThe BacasesThe Bacases
anchor their opposition to the postures of the Republic on three
principal arguments:First, there was no extrinsic fraud committed
by the Bacases in their failure to indicate Camp Evangelista as an
adjoining lot owner as their application for registration
substantially complied with the legal requirements. More
importantly, the Republic was not prejudiced and deprived of its
day in court.Second, the LRC had jurisdiction to adjudicate whether
the Bacases had "private rights" over Lot No. 4354 in accordance
with, and therefore exempt from the coverage of, Presidential
Proclamation No. 265, as well as to determine whether such private
rights constituted registrable title under the land registration
law.Third, the issue of the registrability of the title of the
Bacases over Lot No. 4354 is res judicata and cannot now be subject
to a re-litigation or reopening in the annulment
proceedings.45Regarding the first ground, the Bacases stress that
there was no extrinsic fraud because their application
substantially complied with the requirements when they indicated
that Camp Evangelista was an occupant by mere tolerance of Lot No.
4354. Also, the Republic filed its opposition to the respondents
application and actively participated in the land registration
proceedings by presenting evidence, through the Director of Lands,
who was represented by the Solicitor General. The Republic,
therefore, was not deprived of its day in court or prevented from
presenting its case. Its insistence that the non-compliance with
the requirements of Section 15 of P.D. No. 1529 is an argument that
is at once both empty and dangerous.46On jurisdiction, the Bacases
assert that even in the case of Republic v. Estonilo,47 it was
recognized in Presidential Proclamation No. 265 that the
reservation was subject to private rights. In other words, the LRC
had authority to hear and adjudicate their application for
registration of title over Lot No. 4354 if they would be able to
prove that their private rights under the presidential proclamation
constituted registrable title over the said lot. They claim that
there is completely no basis for the Republic to argue that the LRC
had no jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate their application for
registration of their title to Lot No. 4354 just because the
proclamation withdrew the subject land from sale and settlement and
reserved the same for military purposes. They cited the RTC
statement that "the parcels of land they applied for in those
registration proceedings and for which certificates of title were
issued in their favor are precisely exempted from the operation and
effect of said presidential proclamation when the very same
proclamation in itself made a proviso that the same will not apply
to lands with existing private rights therein."48The Bacases claim
that the issue of registrability is no longer an issue as what is
only to be resolved is the question on whether there was extrinsic
or collateral fraud during the land registration proceedings. There
would be no end to litigation on the registrability of their title
if questions of facts or law, such as, whether or not Lot No. 4354
was alienable and disposable land of the public domain prior to its
withdrawal from sale and settlement and reservation for military
purposes under Presidential Proclamation No. 265; whether or not
their predecessors-in-interest had prior possession of the lot long
before the issuance of the proclamation or the establishment of
Camp Evangelista in the late 1930s; whether or not such possession
was held in the concept of an owner to constitute recognizable
"private rights" under the presidential proclamation; and whether
or not such private rights constitute registrable title to the lot
in accordance with the land registration law, which had all been
settled and duly adjudicated by the LRC in favor of the Bacases,
would be re-examined under this annulment case.49The issue of
registrability of the Bacases title had long been settled by the
LRC and isres judicata between the Republic and the respondents.
The findings of the LRC became final when the Republic did not
appeal its decision within the period to appeal or file a petition
to reopen or review the decree of registration within one year from
entry thereof.50To question the findings of the court regarding the
registrability of then title over the land would be an attempt to
reopen issues already barred by res judicata. As correctly held by
the RTC, it is estopped and barred by prior judgment to contest the
findings of the LRC.51The ChabonsIn traversing the position of the
Republic, the Chabons insist that the CA was correct when it stated
that there was substantial compliance52 with the requirements of
the P.D. No. 1529 because they expressly stated in their
application that Camp Evangelista was occupying a portion of it. It
is contrary to reason or common sense to state that Camp
Evangelista is an adjoining owner when it is occupying a portion
thereof.And as to the decision, it was a consequence of a
proceeding in rem and, therefore, the decree of registration is
binding and conclusive against all persons including the Republic
who did not appeal the same. It is now barred forever to question
the validity of the title issued. Besides, res judicata has set in
because there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action.53The Chabons also assailed the proclamation because when it
was issued, they were already the private owners of the subject
parcels of land and entitled to protection under the Constitution.
The taking of their property in the guise of a presidential
proclamation is not only oppressive and arbitrary but downright
confiscatory.54The IssuesThe ultimate issues to be resolved are: 1)
whether or not the decisions of the LRC over the subject lands can
still be questioned; and 2) whether or not the applications for
registration of the subject parcels of land should be allowed.The
Courts RulingThe Republic can question even final and executory
judgment when there was fraud.The governing rule in the application
for registration of lands at that time was Section 21 of Act 49655
which provided for the form and content of an application for
registration, and it reads:Section 21. The application shall be in
writing, signed and sworn to by applicant, or by some person duly
authorized in his behalf. x x x It shall also state the name in
full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and
addresses of all adjoining owners and occupants, if known; and, if
not known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. x
x xThe reason behind the law was explained in the case of Fewkes
vs. Vasquez,56 where it was written:Under Section 21 of the Land
Registration Act an application for registration of land is
required to contain, among others, a description of the land
subject of the proceeding, the name, status and address of the
applicant, as well as the names and addresses of all occupants of
the land and of all adjoining owners, if known, or if unknown, of
the steps taken to locate them. When the application is set by the
court for initial hearing, it is then that notice (of the hearing),
addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the lot
being registered and the adjoining owners, and indicating the
location, boundaries and technical description of the land being
registered, shall be published in the Official Gazette for two
consecutive times. It is this publication of the notice of hearing
that is considered one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction
of the court in land registration cases, for the proceedings being
in rem, it is only when there is constructive seizure of the land,
effected by the publication and notice, that jurisdiction over the
res is vested on the court. Furthermore, it is such notice and
publication of the hearing that would enable all persons concerned,
who may have any rights or interests in the property, to come
forward and show to the court why the application for registration
thereof is not to be granted.Here, the Chabons did not make any
mention of the ownership or occupancy by the Philippine Army. They
also did not indicate any efforts or searches they had exerted in
determining other occupants of the land. Such omission constituted
fraud and deprived the Republic of its day in court. Not being
notified, the Republic was not able to file its opposition to the
application and, naturally, it was not able to file an appeal
either.The Republic can also question a final and executory
judgment when the LRC had no jurisdiction over the land in
questionWith respect to the Bacases, although the lower courts
might have been correct in ruling that there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of law when they alleged that Camp
Evangelista was an occupant, the Republic is not precluded and
estopped from questioning the validity of the title.The success of
the annulment of title does not solely depend on the existence of
actual and extrinsic fraud, but also on the fact that a judgment
decreeing registration is null and void. In Collado v. Court of
Appeals and the Republic,57 the Court declared that any title to an
inalienable public land is void ab initio. Any procedural
infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of
judgment are immaterial since the LRC never acquired jurisdiction
over the property. All proceedings of the LRC involving the
property are null and void and, hence, did not create any legal
effect. A judgment by a court without jurisdiction can never attain
finality.58 In Collado, the Court made the following citation:The
Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable
properties, such as public navigable rivers which are parts of the
public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the registration of title
in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate
of Title No. 15856 in the name of petitioners may be attacked at
any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is
not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statut