Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND
DIVISIONG.R. No. 124711 November 3, 1998MARICALUM MINING
CORP.,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC),
SIPALAY MINE FREE LABOR UNION and CECILIO T.
SALUDAR,respondents.PUNO,J.:Before us is a special civil action
oncertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering
Maricalum Mining Corporation1to reinstate Cecilio Saludar to his
former job or substantially equivalent position with three (3)
years backwages without qualification and deduction, or to pay the
sum of P52,010.55.The records show that on August 17, 1984 a
decision was rendered by Labor Arbiter Ethelwoldo Ovejera in RAB
Case No. 06-0610-83 entitled Sipalay Mine Free Labor Union and
Cecilio T. Saludar v. Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation
which ordered the reinstatement of illegally dismissed equipment
operator Cecilio Saludar. The decision was not executed as all the
assets of Marinduque had been foreclosed by the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). These
assets were subsequently acquired by petitioner Maricalum while
Marinduque had ceased its operations.Eight years later, Saludar
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against Maricalum. On
April 14, 1993, Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar Uy granted the
motion. Maricalum appealed to the NLRC contending that it is a
different entity from Marinduque which was the only party to the
original action. In its May 19, 1994 decision, the NLRC ruled:(t)he
records will show that Maricalum not only voluntarily recognized
and absorbed the services rendered by the workers under the
previous management of Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation, but it also assumed the obligation of Marinduque to
its employees.Besides, this issue was already settled in the
earlier and similar case ofMaricalum Mining and Industrial
Corporation v. Xerxes Mission, NLRC Case No. V-0233-91, where we
stated:Likewise, we note from the records that in the Deed of
Transfer from the PNB and DBP of the assets of Marinduque,
Maricalum shall assume liabilities due or owing to any other
person.Sec. 3, subsection 3.01 of the said deed states:1. From and
after the effectivity date, Maricalum shall be solely liable (I) .
. .; (II) for any other liability due or owing to any other person
(natural or corporate).The Deed of Transfer was made retroactive to
October 1984, when Maricalum was duly incorporated. Therefore,
under the above general stipulation there can be no doubt that the
awards adjudicated in favor of Leonardo Munion and Julian Montilla
in the NLRC decision of January 29, 1987 come within the purview of
the liabilities contemplated in the aforecited provision and is
enforceable against Maricalum. We find no merit in its contention
that it assumed only the assets, and not the liabilities of
Marinduque specially in the light of its having voluntarily
recognized and absorbed the services of the workers under the
previous management of Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation. It undertook to rehire the workers of Marinduque or to
pay those who cannot be rehired their corresponding benefits
pursuant to the applicable law or CBA. It is clearly pointless for
Maricalum to insist that it is not a successor-in-interest of
Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation, at least in relation
to the tenural rights of the latter's employees and the
satisfaction of the judgment under execution.Nonetheless, the NLRC
held that since more than five (5) years have elapsed the judgment
could be enforced against Maricalum, not by mere motion but by an
action for revival of judgment.On September 2, 1994, Saludar filed
an Action for Revival of Judgment before the NLRC Regional
Arbitration Branch (Bacolod City).2Maricalum again moved to dismiss
alleging that: (1) the complaint was not accompanied by a
certificate of non-forum shopping; (2) that the action was
cognizable only by regular courts; and (3) that it was not a party
to the original case.On December 14, 1994, Saludar filed an
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, attaching therewith an
Affidavit of Compliance with Supreme Court Circular 04-94 on
non-forum shopping. On December 21, 1994, Labor Arbiter Oscar Uy
denied Maricalum's Motion to Dismiss and directed the parties to
submit their position papers. On April 18, 1995, Labor Arbiter
Oscar Uy ruled3in favor of Saludar. He held that the certification
of non-forum shopping does not apply to cases falling within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and labor arbiters
because the NLRC is not a court but an agency performing
quasi-judicial functions. He also sustained the jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter over action to revive judgment involving illegal
dismissal. The dispositve portion of the Decision states:Wherefore,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering MARICALUM
MINING CORPORATION to reinstate complainant CECILIO T. SALUDAR to
his former job or substantially equivalent position with three (3)
years backwages without qualification and deduction, or the sum of
FIFTY TWO THOUSAND TEN and 55/100 PESOS (P52,010.55). (Emphasis
supplied.)On May 25, 1995, Maricalum appealed the decision of Labor
Arbiter Uy4. On October 27, 1995, the NLRC affirmed this decision.
It held:Aside from the fact that its liability as a successor
entity has already been settled in our decision on May 19, 1994,
which is already final and executory, the necessity of a hearing to
implead Maricalum Mining Corporation in order to enforce and
satisfy an award decreed by the NLRC had already been ruled by the
High Court in this wise:5Being an incident in the execution of the
final judgment award, NLRC retained jurisdiction and control over
the case and could issue such orders, as were necessary for the
implementation of that award. It is true that DBP was not an
original party and that it was ordered impleaded only after the
Writs of Execution were not satisfied because the properties levied
upon on execution had been foreclosed extrajudicially by it, DBP
had to be impleaded, however, for the proper satisfaction of a
final judgment. Being an incident in the execution of the final
judgment award, NLRC retained jurisdiction and control over the
case and could issue such orders as were necessary for the
implementation of the award. Its inclusion as a party could not
have been accomplished at the earlier stages of the proceedings
because at the time of the filing of the complaint, private
respondent's cause of action was only against Lirag.In the light of
the foregoing, the assertion of respondent Maricalum Mining
Corporation that impleading it at this stage of the proceedings
infringes upon its constitutional right to due process loses its
worth. Especially where as ruled earlier by this Commission,
Maricalum Mining Corporation "not only voluntarily recognized and
absorbed the service rendered by the workers under the previous
management of Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation, but it
also assumed the obligations of Marinduque to its employees,
Maricalum Mining Corporation did not even ask for a reconsideration
of the above ruling.Lastly, we are not persuaded by respondent's
version that the present action had already prescribed. It is
undisputed that the original decision dated August 17, 1984 became
final and executory on September 14, 1984 and when the complaint
subject hereof was instituted on September 2, 1994, it has not yet
prescribed.6Hence, this petition with the following issues for
resolution:1. Whether or not Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 is
mandatory and should apply to NLRC.2. Whether or not Saludar's
complaint for revival of judgment is fatally defective and null and
void, hence did not stop the running of the prescriptive period.3.
Whether or not complainant Saludar has cause of action against
petitioner in an action for revival of judgment directed against
another entity, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation
(MMIC).4. Whether or not the NLRC-Bacolod has jurisdiction over an
action for revival of judgment.7We now consider the issues.IThe
certificate of non-forum shopping as provided by this Court
Circular 04-94 is mandatory and should accompany pleadings filed
before the NLRC. Court Circular No. 04-94 is clear and needs no
further interpretation,viz:. . ., the following requirements, in
addition to those in pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and
other existing circulars, shall be strictly complied with in the
filing of complaints, petitions, applications or other initiatory
pleadings in all courts and agencies other than the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals, and shall be subject to the sanctions
provided hereunder:1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or
principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition,
application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath
in such original pleading, or in a sworn certificate annexed
thereto and simultaneously therewith, to the truth of the following
facts and undertakings: (a) he has not heretofore commenced any
other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b)
to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is
pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding
which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state
the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a
similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or
agency, he undertakes to report the fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and
sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed.xxx xxx
xxx2. Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the
dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other
initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing. . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)The NLRC is a quasi-judicial agency, hence,
initiatory pleadings filed before it should be accompanied by a
certificate of non-forum-shopping.Nevertheless, inLoyola v. Court
of Appeals8, we held that substantial compliance with the
requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is sufficient.
We explained:(s)ubstantial compliance with the Circular is
sufficient. This Circular expanded or broadened the applicability
of Circular No. 28-91 of this Court. InGabionza vs. Court of
Appeals[G.R. No. 112547, Resolution of July 1994, 234 SCRA 192]
this Court held that substantial compliance therewith is sufficient
for:It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be
so interpreted and applied to achieve the purposes projected by the
Supreme Court when it promulgated that Circular. Circular No. 28-91
was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate an
orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted
with absolute literalness as to subvert its ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure-which is to achieve
substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.xxx xxx xxxThe
fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with
merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be
dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it
does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its
provisions under justifiable circumstances.In the case at bar, it
is undisputed that respondent Saludar filed an affidavit of
compliance with SC Circular 04-94 on non-forum shopping albeit a
little delayed. This little delay should not defeat the action for
revival of judgment which undeniably was filed within the ten (10)
year prescriptive period. Also, the circumstance that respondent
had painstakingly tried to enforce the favorable judgment he
obtained against petitioner for almost ten (10) years but to no
avail, should deter us from strictly construing the provisions of
the Circular. A liberal interpretation of the Circular would be
more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to
"secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding."9IIWe do not agree with petitioner Maricalum's
contention that Saludar has no cause of action against it since the
judgment sought to be revived was obtained against Marinduque. The
records show that Maricalum voluntarily absorbed Marinduque's
obligations to its employees. The NLRC found that when the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) transferred Marinduque's assets to Maricalum, the
Deed of Transfer contained the proviso that "(f)rom and after the
effectivity date, Maricalum shall be solely liable for any
liability due or owing to any other person (natural or
corporate)."10Marinduque's liability to respondent Saludar for
unpaid backwages adjudicated in RAB Case No. 06-0610-83 way back in
1984 became final when no appeal was interposed by it. This final
judgment then formed part of the liabilities of Marinduque which
Maricalum assumed in the Deed of Transfer. Thus, it is futile for
Maricalum to deny liability it had voluntarily assumed.IIIFinally,
we reject the contention of Maricalum that NLRC-Bacolod has no
jurisdiction over an action for revival of judgment. InAldeguer v.
Gemelo11we held:The action in the present case is an original
action, and not a mere incident of the primitive suit or a mere
auxiliary and supplementary remedy. It is a new and independent
action for the recovery of a debt evidenced by the original
judgment. In other words, it is an action based on a judgment, or
what is called in English anaction upon a judgment. The American
doctrine is uniform in the sense that whereas the remedy ofscire
facias, which is a mere incident of the original suit, must be
instituted in the court where said suit was brought (34 C.J.
664-615; 23 Cyc., 1444-1445; 2 Freeman on Judgments, 2272-2273; 1
Black on Judgments, 578), an action upon a judgment must be brought
either in the same court where said judgment was rendered or in the
place where the plaintiff or defendant resides, or in any other
place designated by the statutes which treat of the venue of
actions in general.xxx xxx xxx. . . The owner of a judgment may . .
. use his judgment as a cause of action, and bring suit thereon in
the same court or any court of competent jurisdiction, and
prosecute such suit to final judgment. (Gould v. Hayden, 63 Ind.,
443; Palmer v. Glover, 73 Ind., 529; Campbell v. Martin, 87 Ind.,
577. (Becknellet al. v. Becknell, 110 Ind., 47).xxx xxx xxxAn
action on a judgment may be brought in the court which rendered it,
or in any other court having jurisdiction. Thus the action may be
brought in an inferior court on a judgment obtained in a superior
one; and, conversely, an action lies in a superior court upon a
judgment rendered in an inferior one. It was formerly thought that
such an action was a local one, and must be brought in the county
where the records remained; but it is now held that the action may
be brought in any county in which jurisdiction of defendant's
person can be obtained. (Emphasis supplied).Prescinding from the
above decision, private respondent Saludar properly instituted his
action for revival in the NLRC which rendered the judgment sought
to be revived. It is well established that regular courts are
bereft of jurisdiction to entertain disputes involving
employer-employee relationship.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the
NLRC in RAB Case No. 06-08-10512-94 is AFFIRMED. No costs.SO
ORDERED.Melo, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.Republic of the
PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 124013 June
5, 1998ROSARIO MANEJA,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and MANILA MIDTOWN
HOTEL,respondents.MARTINEZ,J.:Assailed in this petition
forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court are the
Resolution1dated June 3, 1994 of the respondent National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC NCR-00-10-05297-90, entitled "Rosario
Maneja,Complainant,vs. Manila Midtown Hotel,Respondent," which
dismissed the illegal dismissal case filed by petitioner against
private respondent company for lack of jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter over the case; and its Resolution2dated October 20, 1995
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.Petitioner Rosario
Maneja worked with private respondent Manila Midtown Hotel
beginning January, 1985 as a telephone operator. She was a member
of the National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied
Industries (NUWHRAIN) with an existing Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) with private respondent.In the afternoon of
February 13, 1990, a fellow telephone operator, Rowena Loleng
received a Request for Long Distance Call (RLDC) form and a deposit
of P500.00 from a page boy of the hotel for a call by a Japanese
guest named Hirota Ieda. The call was unanswered. The P500.00
deposit was forwarded to the cashier. In the evening, Ieda again
made an RLDC and the page boy collected another P500.00 which was
also given to the operator Loleng. The second call was also
unanswered. Loleng passed on the RLDC to petitioner for follow-up.
Petitioner monitored the call.On February 15, 1990, a hotel cashier
inquired about the P1,000.00 deposit made by Ieda. After a search,
Loleng found the first deposit of P500.00 inserted in the guest
folio while the second deposit was eventually discovered inside the
folder for cancelled calls with deposit and official receipts.When
petitioner saw that the second RLDC form was not time-stamped, she
immediately placed it inside the machine which stamped the date
"February 15, 1990." Realizing that the RLDC was filed 2 days
earlier, she wrote and changed the date to February 13, 1990.
Loleng then delivered the RLDC and the money to the cashier. The
second deposit of P500.00 by Ieda was later returned to him.On
March 7, 1990, the chief telephone operator issued a memorandum3to
petitioner and Loleng directing the two to explain the February 15
incident. Petitioner and Loleng thereafter submitted their written
explanation.4On March 20, 1990, a written report5was submitted by
the chief telephone operator, with the recommendation that the
offenses committed by the operatorsconcerned covered violations of
the Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Actions (OSDA): (1) OSDA 2.01:
forging, falsifying official document(s), and (2) OSDA 1.11:
culpable carelessness negligence or failure to follow specific
instruction(s) or established procedure(s).On March 23, 1990,
petitioner was served a notice of dismissal6effective April 1,
1990. Petitioner refused to sign the notice and wrote therein
"under protest."Meanwhile, a criminal case7for Falsification of
Private Documents and Qualified Theft was filed before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Manila by private respondent againts
Loleng and petitioner. However, the resolution recommending the
filing of a case for estafa was reversed by 2nd Asst. City
Prosecutor Virgilio M. Patag.On October 2, 1990, petitioner filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent before
the Labor Arbiter. The complaint was later amended to include a
claim for unpaid wages, unpaid vacation leave conversion and moral
damages.Position papers were filed by the parties. Thereafter, the
motion to set the case for hearing filed by private respondent was
granted by the Labor Arbiter and trial on the merits ensued.In his
decision8dated May 29, 1992, Labor Arbiter Oswald Lorenzo found
that the petitioner was illegally dismiised. However, in the
decision, the Labor Arbiter stated that:Preliminary, we hereby
state that on the face of the instant complaint, it is one that
revolves on the matter of the implementation and interpretation of
existing company policies, which per the last par. of Art. 217 of
the Labor Code, as amended, is one within the jurisdictional ambit
of the grievance procedure under the CBA and thereafter, if
unresolved, one proper for voluntary arbitration. This observation
is re-entrenched by the fact, that complainant claims she is a
member of NUWRAIN with an existing CBA with respondent hotel.On
this score alone, this case should have dismissed outright.9Despite
the aforequoted preliminary statement, the Labor Arbiter still
assumed jurisdiction "since Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the
same Labor Code, are conferred original and exclusive jurisdiction
of all termination case(sic.)." The dispositive portion of the
decision states that:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby renrdered as follows:(1) Declaring complainant's dismissal
by respondent hotel as illegally effected;(2) Ordering respondent
to immediately reinstate complainant to her previous position
without loss of seniority rights;(3) Ordering further respondent to
pay complainant the full backwages due her, which is computed as
follows:3/23/90 - 10/31/90 = 7.26/mos.P2.540 x 7.26/mos.
P18,440.4011/1/90 - 1/7/91 = 2.23/mos.P3,224.16 x 2.23/mos.
7,189.871/8/91 - 4/29/92 = 15.7/mos.P3,589.16 x 15.7/mos.
56,349.89P81,980.08(4) Moreover, respondent is ordered to pay the
13th month pay due the complainant in the amount of P6,831.67
including moral and exemplary damages of P15,000.00 and P10,000.00
respectively, as well as attorney's fees equivalent to ten (10)
percent of the total award herein in the amount of P11,381.17;(5)
Finally, all other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.SO
ORDERED.Private respondent appealed the decision to the respondent
commission on the groundinter aliathat the Laber Arbiter erred in
"assuming jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case after
finding that the case falls within the jurisdictional ambit of the
grievance procedure under the CBA, and if unresolved, proper for
voluntary arbitration."10An Opposition11was filed by petitioner.In
the assailed Resolution12dated June 3, 1994, respondent NLRC
dismissed the illegal dismissal case for lack of Jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter because the same should have instead been
subjected to voluntary arbitration.Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration13was denied by respondent NLRC for lack of merit.In
this petition forcertiorari, petitioner ascribes to respondent NLRC
grave abuse of discretion in 1. Ruling that the Labor Arbiter was
without jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case;2. Not ruling
that private respondent is estopped by laches from questioning the
jurisdiction of the illegal dismissal case;3. Reversing the
decision of the Labor Arbiter based on a technicality
notwithstanding the merits of the case.Petitioner contents that
Article 217(a)(2) and (c) relied upon by respondent NLRC in
divesting the labor arbiter of jurisdiction over the illegal
dismissal case, should be read in conjunction with Article 26114of
the Labor Code. It is the view of petitioner that termination cases
arising from the interpretation or enforcement policies pertaining
to violations of Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Actions (OSDA),
are under the jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator only if
these are unresolved in the plant-level grievance machinery.
Petitioner insists that her termination is not an unresolved
grievance as there has been no grievance meeting between the
NUWHRAIN union and the management. The reason for this, petitioner
adds, is that it has been a company practice that termination cases
are not anymore referred to the grievance machinery but directly to
the labor arbiter.In its comment, private respondent argues that
the Labor Arbiter should have dismissed the illegal dismissal case
outright after finding that it is within the jurisdictional ambit
of the grievance procedure. Moreover, private respondent states
that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any time and at any
stage of the proceedings even on appeal, and is not in estoppel by
laches as contended by the petitioner.For its part, public
respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, cited the
ruling of this Court in Sanyo Philippines Workers Union- PSSLU vs.
Caizares15in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter.The legal issue in this case is whether or not the
Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.The
respondent Commission, in holding that the Labor Arbiter lacks
jurisdiction to hear the illegal dismissal case, cited as basis
therefor Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 6715. It said:White it is conceded that under Article 217(a),
Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases involving "termination disputes," the Supreme Court, in a
fairy recent case ruled:The procedure introduced in RA 6715 of
referring certain grievances originally and exclusively to the
grievance machinery, and when not settled at this level, to a panel
of voluntary arbitrators outlined in CBAs does not only include
grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the
CBA but applies as well to those arising from the implementation of
company personnel policies. No other body shall take cognizance of
these cases. . . . (Sanyo vs. Caizares, 211 SCRA 361,372)16We Find
that the respondent Commission has erroneously interpreted the
aforequoted portion of our ruling in the case ofSanyo, as divesting
the Labor Arbiter of jurisdiction in a termination dispute.Art. 217
of the Labor Code gives us the clue as to the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter, to wit:Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and
the Commission. a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the
Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decided within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without
extension even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following
cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:1. Unfair labor practice cases;2. Termination
disputes;3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those
cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of employment;4. Claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
the employer-employee relations;5. Cases arising from any violation
of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the
legality of strikes and lockouts;6. Except claims for Employees
Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all
other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including
those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an
amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of
whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.b) The
commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
cases decided by Labor Arbiters.c) Cases arising from the
interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining
agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement
of company personel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor
Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements.As can
be seen from the aforequoted Article, termination cases fall under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. It
should be noted, however, that in the opening there appears the
phrase: "Except as otherwise provided under this Code . . . ." It
is paragraph (c) of the same Article which respondent Commission
has erroneously interpreted as giving the voluntary arbitrator
jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.However, Article 217
(c) should be read in conjunction with Article 261 of the Labor
Code which grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide allunresolvedgrievancesarising from
the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining
agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement
of company personel policies. Note the phrase "unresolved
grievances." In the case at bar, the termination of petitioner is
not an unresolved grievance.The stance of the Solicitor General in
theSanyocase is totally the reverse of its posture in the case at
bar. InSanyo, the Solicitor General was of the view that a
distinction should be made between a case involving "interpretation
or implementation of Collective Bargaining Agreement" or
interpretation or "enforcement" of company personel policies, on
the one hand and a case involving termination, on the other hand.
It argued that the dismissal of the private respondents does not
involve an "interpretation or implementation" of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement or "interpretation or enforcement" of company
personel policies but involves "termination." The Solicitor General
further said that where the dispute is just in the interpretation,
implementation or enforcement stage, it may be referred to the
grievance machinery set up the Collective Bargaining Agreement or
by voluntary arbitration. Where there was already actual
termination,i.e., violation of rights, it is already cognizable by
the Labor Arbiter.17We fully agree with the theory of the Solicitor
General in theSanyocase, which is radically apposite to its
position in this case.Moreover, the dismissal of petitioner does
not fall within the phrase "grievance arising from the
interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreement
and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personel policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to the
grievance machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or
panel of voluntary arbitrators. It is to be stressed that under
Article 260 of the Labor Code, which explains the function of the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator. "(T)he parties to a
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions
that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions.
They shall establish a machinery for the adjustment and resolution
of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of
their Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personel policies."
Article 260 further provides that the parties to a CBA shall name
or designate their respective representative to the grievance
machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall
automatically be refered to the voluntary arbitrators designated in
advance by the parties to a CBA of the union and the company. It
can thus be deduced that only disputes involving the union and the
company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary
arbitrators.18In the case at bar, the union does not come into the
picture, not having objected or voiced any dissent to the dismissal
of the herein petitioner. The reason for this, according to
petitioner is that "the practice in said Hotel in cases of
termination is that the latter cases are not referred anymore to
the grievance committee;" and that "the terminated employee who
wishes to question the legality of his termination usually goes to
the Labor Arbiter for arbitration, whether the termination arose
from the interpretation or enforcement of the company personnel
policies or otherwise."19As we ruled inSanyo,"Since there has been
an actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of
the labor Arbiter." The aforequoted doctrine is applicable
foursquare in petitioner's case. The dismissal of the petitioner
does not call for the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies but is a termination dispute which comes under
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.It should be explained that
"company personel policies" are guiding priciples stated in broad,
long-range terms that express the philosophy or beliefs of an
organization's top authority regarding personnel matters. They deal
with matters affecting efficiency and well-being of employees and
include, among others, the procedure in the administration of
wages, benefits, promotions, transfer and other personnel movements
which are usually not spelled out in the collective agreement. The
usual source of grievances, however, are the rules and regulations
governing disciplinary actions.20The case of Pantranco North
Express, Inc. vs. NLRC21sheds further light on the issue of
jurisdiction where the Court cited theSanyocase and quoted the
decision of therein Labor Arbiter Olairez in this manner:In our
honest opinion we have jurisdiction over the complaint on the
following grounds:First, this is a complaint of illegal dismissal
of which original and exclusive jurisdiction under Article 217 has
been conferred to the labor Arbiters. The interpretation of the CBA
or enforcement of the company policy is only corollary to the
complaint of illegal dismissal. Otherwise, an employee who was on
AWOL, or who committed offenses contrary to the personnel
policies(sic) can no longer file a case of illegal discharge is
premised on the interpretation or enforcement of the company
policies(sic).Second. Respondent voluntarily submitted tha case to
the jurisdiction of this labor tribunal. It adduced arguments to
the legality of its act, whether such act may be retirement and/or
dismissal, and prayed for reliefs on the merits of the case. A
litigant cannot pray for reliefs on the merits and at the same time
attacks(sic) the jurisdiction of the tribunal. A person cannot have
one's cake and eat it too. . . . .As to the second ground,
petitioner correctly points out that respondent NLRC should have
ruled that private respondent is estopped by laches in questioning
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.Clearly, estoppel lies. The
issue of jurisdiction was mooted by herein private respondent's
active participation in the proceedings below. In Marquez vs.
Secretary of Labor,22the Court said:. . . . The active
participation of the against whom the action was brought, coupled
with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or
quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to
an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide the
resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on
impugning the court or body's jurisdiction.In the assailed
Resolution,23respondent NLRC citedLa Naval Drug Corporation
vs.Court of Appeals24in holding that private respondent is not in
estopel. Thus,The operation of the principle of estoppel on the
question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower
court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction,
but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had
jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing
such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and
may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5
C.J.S., 861-863).However, if the lower court had jurisdiction,and
the case was heard and decided upon a given theory,such,for
instance,as that the court had no jurisdiction,the party who
induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted,on appeal, to
assume an inconsistent position that the lower court had
jurisdiction.Here,the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will
of the parties, has no bearing thereon. (Emphasis ours)Again, the
respondent NLRC has erroneously interpreted our ruling in theLa
Navalcase. Under the said ruling, estoppel lies in this case.
Private respondent is stopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter before the respondent NLRC having actively
participated in the proceedings before the former. At no time
before or during the trial on the merits did private respondent
assail the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Private respondent
took the cue only from the preliminary statement in the decision of
the Labor Arbiter, which was a mereobiter, and raised the issue of
jurisdiction before the Commission. It was then too late. Estoppel
had set in.Turning now to the merits of the case, We uphold the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was illegally
dismissed.The requisites of a valid dismissal are (1) the dismissal
must be for any of the causes expressed in the Article 282 of the
Labor Code,25and (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to
be heard and to defend himself.26The substantive and procedural
laws must be strictly complied with before a worker can be
dismissed from his employment because what is at stake is not only
the employee's position but his livelihood.27Petitioner's dismissal
was grounded on culpade carelessness, negligence and failure to
follow specific instruction(s) or established procedure(s) under
OSDA 1.11; and, having forged or falsified official document(s)
under OSDA 2.01.Private respondent blames petitioner for failure to
follow established procedure in the hotel on a guest's request for
long distance calls. Petitioner, however, explained that the usual
or established procedures are not followed by the operators and
hotel employees when circumstances warrant. For instance, the RLDC
forms and the deposits are brought by the page boy directly to the
operators instead of the cashiers if the latter are busy and cannot
attend to the same. Furthermore, she avers that the telephone
operators are not concious of the serial numbers in the RLDCs and
at times, the used RLDCs are recycled. Even the page boys do not
actually check the serial numbers of all RLDCs in one batch, except
for the first and the last.On the charge of taking of the money by
petitioner, it is to be noted that the second P500.00 deposit made
by the Japanese guest Ieda was later discovered to be inserted in
the folder for cancelled calls with deposit and official receipts.
Thus, there exists no basis for personal appropriation by the
petitioner of the money involved. Another reason is the alleged
tampering of RLDC No. 862406.28While petitioner and her co-operator
Loleng admitted that they indeed altered the date appearing therein
from February 15, 1990 to February 13, the same was purposely made
to reflect the true date of the transaction without any malice
whatsoever on their part.As pointed out by Labor Arbiter Oswald b.
Lorenzo, thus:The specifics of the grounds relied by respondent
hotel's dismissal of complainant are those stated in Annex "F" of
the latter's POSITION PAPER, which is the Notice of Dismissal,
notably:1. OSDA 2.01 Forging, falsifying official documents(s)2.
OSDA 1.11 Culpable negligence or failure to follow specific
instruction(s) or established procedure(s)On this score, we are
persuated by the complainant's arguments that under OSDA 1.11,
infractions of this sort is not without qualifications, which is,
that the alleged culpable carelessness, negligence or failure to
follow instruction(s) or established procedure(s), RESULTING IN
LOSS OR DAMAGE TO COMPANY PROPERTY. From the facts obtaining in
this case, there is no quantum of proof whatsoever, except the
general allegations in respondent's POSITION PAPER and other
pleadings that loss or damage to company property resulted from the
charged infraction. To our mind, this is where labor tribunals
should come in and help correct interpretation of company policies
which in the enforcement thereof wreaks havoc to the constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure. Apparently, the exercise of little
flexibility by complainant and co-employees which is predicated on
good faith should not be taken against them and more particularly
against the complainant herein. In this case, to sustain the
generalized charge of respondent hotel under OSDA 1.11 would unduly
be sanctioning the imposition of too harsh a penalty which is
dismissal.In the same tenor, the respondent's charge under OSDA
1.11 on the alleged falsification of private document is also with
a qualification, in that the alleged act of falsification must have
been done "IN SUCH A WAY AS TO MISLEAD THE USER(S) THEREOF." Again,
based on the facts of the complained act, there appeared no one to
have been misled on the change of date from RLDC #862406 FROM 15 TO
13 February 1990.As a matter of fact, we are in agreement with the
jurisprudence cited by VIRGILIO M. PATAG, the 2nd Asst. City
Prosecutor of the City of Manila, who exculpated complainant MANEJA
from the charges of falsification of private documents and
qualified theft under IS No. 90-11083 and marked Annex. "H" of
complainant's POSITION PAPER, when he ruled that an altercation
which makes the document speak the truth cannot be the foundation
of a criminal action. As to the charge of qualified theft, we too
are of the finding, like the city prosecutor above-mentioned that
there was no evidence on the part of MANEJA to have unlawfully
taken the P500.00 either from the hotel or from guest IEDA on 13
February 1990 and moreover, we too, find no evidence that
complainant MANEJA had intention to profit thereby nor had
misappropriated the P500.00 in question.29Given the factual
circumstances of the case, we cannot deduce dishonesty from the act
and omission of petitioner. Our norms of social justice demand that
we credit employees with the presumption of good faith in the
performance of their duties,30especially petitioner who has served
private respondent since 1985 up to 1990 without any tinge of
dishonesty and was even named "Model Employee" for the month of
April, 1989.31Petitioner has been charged with a very serious
offense dishonesty. This can irreparably wreck her life as an
employee for no employer will take to its bosom a dishonest
employee. Dismissal is the supreme penalty that can be meted to an
employee and its imposition cannot be justified where the evidence
is ambivalent.32It must, therefore, be based on a clear and not on
an ambiguous or ambivalent ground. Any ambiguity or ambivalence on
the ground relied upon by an employer in terminating the services
of an employee denies the latter his full right to contest its
legality. Fairness cannot countenance such ambiguity or
ambivalence.33An employer can terminate the services of an employee
only for valid and just causes which must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence. The employer has the burden of proving that
the dismissal was indeed for a valid and just cause.34Failure to do
so result in a finding that the dismissal wasunjustified.35Finding
that there was no just cause for dismissal of petitioner, we now
determine if the rudiments of due process have duly accorded to
her.Well-settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of notice
and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process in the
dismissal of employees. It is a cardinal rule in our jurisdiction
that the employer must furnish the employee with two written notice
before the termination of employment can be effected: (a) the first
apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which
his dismissal is sought; and, (b) the second informs the employee
of the employer's decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a
hearing, on the other hand, is complied with as long as there was
an opportunityto be heard, and not necessarily that an actual
hearing was conducted.36In the case at bar, petitioner and her
co-operator Loleng were issued a memorandum on March 7, 1990. On
March 11, 1990, they submitted their written explanation thereto.
On March 20, 1990, a written report was made with a recommendation
that the offences committed by them were covered by OSDA 1.11 and
2.01. Thereafter, on March 23, 1990, petitioner was served with a
notice of dismissal for said violations effective April 1, 1990.An
examination of the record reveals that no hearing was ever
conducted by private respondent before petitioner was dismissed.
While it may be true that petitioner submitted a written
explanation, no hearing was actually conducted before her
employment was terminated. She was not accorded the opportunity to
fully defend herself.Consultations or conferences may not be a
substitute for the actual holding of a hearing. Every opportunity
and assistance must be accorded to the employee by the management
to enable hom to prepare adequately for his defense, including
legal representation.37Considering that petitioner denied having
allegedly taken the second P500.00 deposit of the Japanese guest
which was eventually found; and, having made the alteration of the
date on the second RLDC merely to reflect the true date of the
transaction, these circumstances should have at least warranted a
separate hearing to enable petitioner to fully ventilate her side.
Absent such hearing, petitioner's right to due process was clearly
violated.38It bears stressing that a worker's employment is
properly in the constitutional sense. He cannot be deprived of his
work without due process of law.Substantive due processmandates
that an employee can only be dismissed based on just or authorized
causes.Procedural due processrequires further that he can only be
dismissed after he has been given an opportunity to be heard. The
import of due process necessitates the compliance of these two
aspects.Accordingly, we hold that the labor arbiter did not err in
awarding full backwages in view of this finding that petitioner was
dismissed without just cause and without due process.We ruled in
the case ofBustamante vs.NLRC39that the amount of backwages to be
awarded to an illegally dismissed employee must be computed from
the time he was dismissed to the time he is actually reinstated,
without deducting the earnings he derived elsewhere pending the
resolution of the case.Petitioner is likewise entitled to the
thirteenth-month pay. Presidential Decree No.851, as amended by
Memorandum Order No. 28, provides that employees are entitled to
the thirteenth-month pay benefit regardless of their designation
and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid.40The
award of moral and exemplary damages to petitioner is also
warranted where there is lack of due process in effecting the
dismissal.Where the termination of the services of an employee is
attended by fraud or bad faith on the part of the employer, as when
the latter knowingly made false allegations of a supposed valid
cause when none existed, moral and exemplary damages may be awarded
in favor of the former.41The anti-social and oppressive abuse of
its right to investigate and dismiss its employees constitute a
violation of Article 1701 of the New Civil Code which prohibits
acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other,
and Article 21 on human relations. The grant of moral damages to
the employees by reason of such conduct on the part of the company
is sanctioned by Article 2219, No. 10 of the Civil Code, which
allows recovery of such damages in actions reffered to in Article
21.42The award of attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of
the total award by the labor arbiter is justified under Article 111
of the Labor Code.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
GRANTED and the assailed resolutions of the respondent National
Labor Relations Commission dated June 3, 1994 and October 20, 1995
are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The decision dated May 29, 1992
of the Labor Arbiter is therefore REINSTATED.SO ORDERED.Regalado,
Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME
COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 100158 June 2, 1992ST.
SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE,petitioner,vs.HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his
capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, and SAMAHANG NG
MANGGAGAWANG PANG-EDUKASYON SA STA.
ESKOLASTIKA-NAFTEU,respondents.BELLOSILLO,J.:The principal issue to
be resolved in this recourse is whether striking union members
terminated for abandonment of work after failing to comply with
return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(SECRETARY, for brevity) should by law be reinstated.On 20 July
1990, petitioner St. Scholastica's College (COLLEGE, for brevity)
and private respondent Samahan ng Manggagawang Pang-Edukasyon sa
Sta. Eskolastika-NAFTEU (UNION, for brevity) initiated negotiations
for a first-ever collective bargaining agreement. A deadlock in the
negotiations prompted the UNION to file on 4 October 1990 a Notice
of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment (DEPARTMENT,
for brevity), docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-10-826.On 5 November 1990,
the UNION declared a strike which paralyzed the operations of the
COLLEGE. Affecting as it did the interest of the students, public
respondent SECRETARY immediately assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute and issued on the same day, 5 November 1990, a
return-to-work order. The following day, 6 November 1990, instead
of returning to work, the UNION filed a motion for reconsideration
of the return-to-work order questioninginter aliathe assumption of
jurisdiction by the SECRETARY over the labor dispute.On 9 November
1990, the COLLEGE sent individual letters to the striking employees
enjoining them to return to work not later than 8:00 o'clock A.M.
of 12 November 1990 and, at the same time, giving notice to some
twenty-three (23) workers that their return would be without
prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against them. In
response, the UNION presented a list of (6) demands to the COLLEGE
in a dialogue conducted on 11 November 1990. The most important of
these demands was the unconditional acceptance back to work of the
striking employees. But these were flatly rejected.Likewise, on 9
November 1990, respondent SECRETARY denied reconsideration of his
return-to-work order and sternly warned the striking employees to
comply with its terms. On 12 November 1990, the UNION received the
Order.Thereafter, particularly on 14 and 15 November 1990, the
parties held conciliation meetings before the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board where the UNION pruned down its demands to
three (3),viz.:that striking employees be reinstated under the same
terms and conditions before the strike; that no retaliatory or
disciplinary action be taken against them; and, that CBA
negotiations be continued. However, these efforts proved futile as
the COLLEGE remained steadfast in its position that any
return-to-work offer should be unconditional.On 16 November 1990,
the COLLEGE manifested to respondent SECRETARY that the UNION
continued to defy his return-to-work order of 5 November 1990 so
that "appropriate steps under the said circumstances" may be
undertaken by him.1On 23 November 1990, the COLLEGE mailed
individual notices of termination to the striking employees, which
were received on 26 November 1990, or later. The UNION officers and
members then tried to return to work but were no longer accepted by
the COLLEGE.On 5 December 1990, a Complaint for Illegal Strike was
filed against the UNION, its officers and several of its members
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as
NLRC Case No. 00-12-06256-90.The UNION moved for the enforcement of
the return-to-work order before respondent SECRETARY, citing
"selective acceptance of returning strikers" by the COLLEGE. It
also sought dismissal of the complaint. Since then, no further
hearings were conducted.Respondent SECRETARY required the parties
to submit their respective position papers. The COLLEGE prayed that
respondent SECRETARY uphold the dismissal of the employees who
defied his return-to-work order.On 12 April 1991, respondent
SECRETARY issued the assailed Order which,inter alia,directed the
reinstatement of striking UNION members, premised on his finding
that no violent or otherwise illegal act accompanied the conduct of
the strike and that a fledgling UNION like private respondent was
"naturally expected to exhibit unbridled if inexperienced
enthusiasm, in asserting its existence".2Nevertheless, the
aforesaid Order held UNION officers responsible for the violation
of the return-to-work orders of 5 and 9 November 1990 and,
correspondingly, sustained their termination.Both parties moved for
partial reconsideration of the Order, with petitioner COLLEGE
questioning the wisdom of the reinstatement of striking UNION
members, and private respondent UNION, the dismissal of its
officers.On 31 May 1991, in a Resolution, respondent SECRETARY
denied both motions. Hence, this Petition forCertiorari, with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.On 26 June
1991, We restrained the SECRETARY from enforcing his assailed
Orders insofar as they directed the reinstatement of the striking
workers previously terminated.Petitioner questions the assumption
by respondent SECRETARY of jurisdiction to decide on termination
disputes, maintaining that such jurisdiction is vested instead in
the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Art. 217 of the Labor Code, thus Art.
217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. (a) Except
as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the
parties for decision without extension, the following cases
involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: .
. . 2. Termination disputes . . . 5. Cases arising from any
violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions on the
legality of strikes and lock-outs . . .In support of its position,
petitioner invokes Our ruling inPAL v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment3where We held:The labor Secretary exceeded his
jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking disciplinary
measures against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the
Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the
strike but not the company's right to take action against union
officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed
illegal acts.Petitioner further contends that following the
doctrine laid down inSarmiento v. Tuico4andUnion of Filipro
Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc.,5workers who refuse to obey a
return-to-work order are not entitled to be paid for work not done,
or to reinstatement to the positions they have abandoned of their
refusal to return thereto as ordered.Taking a contrary stand,
private respondent UNION pleads for reinstatement of its dismissed
officers considering that the act of the UNION in continuing with
its picket was never characterized as a "brazen disregard of
successive legal orders", which was readily apparent inUnion
Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc., supra,nor was it a
willful refusal to return to work, which was the basis of the
ruling inSarmiento v. Tuico, supra.The failure of UNION officers
and members to immediately comply with the return-to-work orders
was not because they wanted to defy said orders; rather, they held
the view that academic institutions were not industries
indispensable to the national interest. When respondent SECRETARY
denied their motion for reconsideration, however, the UNION
intimated that efforts were immediately initiated to fashion out a
reasonable return-to-work agreement with the COLLEGE, albeit, if
failed.The issue on whether respondent SECRETARY has the power to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental
controversies, causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, was already
settled inInternational Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor
and Employment.6Therein, We ruled that:. . . [T]he Secretary was
explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the
authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or
likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to
the national interest, and decide the same accordingly.
Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said
labor dispute must include and extend to all questions and include
and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom,
including cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive
jurisdiction.And rightly so, for, as found in the aforesaid case,
Article 217 of the Labor Code did contemplate of exceptions thereto
where the SECRETARY is authorized to assume jurisdiction over a
labor dispute otherwise belonging exclusively to the Labor Arbiter.
This is readily evident from its opening proviso reading "(e)xcept
as otherwise provided under this Code . . .Previously, We held that
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was broad enough to give the
Secretary of Labor and Employment the power to take jurisdiction
over an issue involving unfair labor practice.7At first glance, the
rulings above stated seem to run counter to that ofPAL v. Secretary
of Labor and Employment, supra,which was cited by petitioner. But
the conflict is only apparent, not real.To recall, We ruled in the
latter case that the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment in assumption and/or certification cases is limited to
the issues that are involved in the disputes or to those that are
submitted to him for resolution. The seeming difference is,
however, reconcilable. Since the matter on the legality or
illegality of the strike was never submitted to him for resolution,
he was thus found to have exceeded his jurisdiction when he
restrained the employer from taking disciplinary action against
employees who staged an illegal strike.Before the Secretary of
Labor and Employment may take cognizance of an issue which is
merely incidental to the labor dispute, therefore, the same must be
involved in the labor disputed itself, or otherwise submitted to
him for resolution. If it was not, as was the case inPAL v.
Secretary or Labor and Employment, supra,and he nevertheless acted
on it, that assumption of jurisdiction is tantamount to a grave
abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the ruling inInternational
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,
supra,will apply.The submission of an incidental issue of a labor
dispute, in assumption and/or certification cases, to the Secretary
of Labor and Employment for his resolution is thus one of the
instances referred to whereby the latter may exercise concurrent
jurisdiction together with the Labor Arbiters.In the instant
petition, the COLLEGE in its Manifestation, dated 16 November 1990,
asked the "Secretary of Labor to take the appropriate steps under
the said circumstances." It likewise prayed in its position paper
that respondent SECRETARY uphold its termination of the striking
employees. Upon the other hand, the UNION questioned the
termination of its officers and members before respondent SECRETARY
by moving for the enforcement of the return-to-work orders. There
is no dispute then that the issue on the legality of the
termination of striking employees was properly submitted to
respondent SECRETARY for resolution.Such an interpretation will be
in consonance with the intention of our labor authorities to
provide workers immediate access to their rights and benefits
without being inconvenienced by the arbitration and litigation
process that prove to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially
burdensome in the long run. Social justice legislation, to be truly
meaningful and rewarding to our workers, must not be hampered in
its application by long-winded arbitration and litigation. Rights
must be asserted and benefits received with the least
inconvenience. For, labor laws are meant to promote, not defeat,
social justice (Maternity Children's Hospital v. Hon. Secretary of
Labor).8After all, Art. 4 of the Labor Code does state that all
doubts in the implementation and interpretation of its provisions,
including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved
in favor of labor.We now come to the more pivotal question of
whether striking union members, terminated for abandonment of work
after failing to comply strictly with a return-to-work order,
should be reinstated.We quote hereunder the pertinent provisions of
law which govern the effects of defying a return-to-work order:1.
Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and
lockouts. . . . (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of
Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and
decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect
of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or
lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order.If
one has already taken place at the time of assumption or
certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to workand the employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary
of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance
of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this
provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce
the same . . . (as amended by Sec. 27, R.A. 6715; emphasis
supplied).2. Article 264, same Labor Code Art. 264. Prohibited
activities. (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a
strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in
accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having
filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the
necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and
reported to the Ministry.No strike or lockout shall be declared
after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Ministeror
after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or
voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the
same grounds for the strike or lockout. . . (emphasis supplied).Any
worker whose employment has been terminated as consequence of an
unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back
wages.Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates
in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared
to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful
strike . . .(emphasis supplied).3. Section 6, Rule IX, of the New
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC (which took effect on 31 August
1990) Sec. 6. Effects of Defiance. Non-compliance with the
certification order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or a
return to work order of the Commission shall be considered an
illegal act committed in the course of the strike or lockout and
shall authorize the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the
Commission, as the case may be, to enforce the sameunder pain or
loss of employment statusor entitlement to full employment benefits
from the locking-out employer or backwages, damages and/or other
positive and/or affirmative reliefs, even to criminal prosecution
against the liable parties . . . (emphasis supplied).Private
respondent UNION maintains that the reason they failed to
immediately comply with the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990
was because they questioned the assumption of jurisdiction of
respondent SECRETARY. They were of the impression that being an
academic institution, the school could not be considered an
industry indispensable to national interest, and that pending
resolution of the issue, they were under no obligation to
immediately return to work.This position of the UNION is simply
flawed. Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code provides that if a strike
has already taken place at the time of assumption, "all striking .
. . employees shall immediately return to work." This means that by
its very terms, a return-to-work order is immediately effective and
executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for
reconsideration (University of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC).9It must be
strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition
questioning its validity (Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle
Philippines, Inc., supra). After all, the assumption and/or
certification order is issued in the exercise of respondent
SECRETARY's compulsive power of arbitration and, until set aside,
must therefore be immediately complied with.The rationale for this
rule is explained inUniversity of Sto. Tomas v. NLRC, supra,
citingPhilippine Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air
Lines, Inc.,10thus To say that its (return-to-work order)
effectivity must wait affirmance in a motion for reconsideration is
not only to emasculate it but indeed to defeat its import, for by
then the deadline fixed for the return to work would, in the
ordinary course, have already passed and hence can no longer be
affirmed insofar as the time element is concerned.Moreover, the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Secretary of Labor and Employment
over labor disputes involving academic institutions was already
upheld inPhilippine School of Business Administration v.
Noriel11where We ruled thus:There is no doubt that the on-going
labor dispute at the school adversely affects the national
interest. The school is a duly registered educational institution
of higher learning with more or less 9,000 students. The on-going
work stoppage at the school unduly prejudices the students and will
entail great loss in terms of time, effort and money to all
concerned. More important, it is not amiss to mention that the
school is engaged in the promotion of the physical, intellectual
and emotional well-being of the country's youth.Respondent UNION's
failure to immediately comply with the return-to-work order of 5
November 1990, therefore, cannot be condoned.The respective
liabilities of striking union officers and members who failed to
immediately comply with the return-to-work order is outlined in
Art. 264 of the Labor Code which provides that any declaration of a
strike or lockout after the Secretary of Labor and Employment has
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute is considered an
illegal. act. Any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in a strike defying a return-to-work order may,
consequently, "be declared to have lost his employment
status."Section 6 Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, which provides the penalties for defying a certification
order of the Secretary of Labor or a return-to-work order of the
Commission, also reiterates the same penalty. It specifically
states that non-compliance with the aforesaid orders, which is
considered an illegal act, "shall authorize the Secretary of Labor
and Employment or the Commission . . . to enforce the same under
pain of loss of employment status." Under the Labor Code,
assumption and/or certification orders are similarly treated.Thus,
we held inSarmiento v. Tuico, supra,that by insisting on staging
the restrained strike and defiantly picketing the company premises
to prevent the resumption of operations, the strikers have
forfeited their right to be readmitted, having abandoned their
positions, and so could be validly replaced.We recently reiterated
this stance inFederation of Free Workers v. Inciong,12wherein we
citedUnion of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc.,
supra,thus A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the
Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes
a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second
paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended . . . The union
officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their
employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal
act.Despite knowledge of the ruling inSarmiento v. Tuico,
supra,records of the case reveal that private respondent UNION
opted to defy not only the return-to-work order of 5 November 1990
but also that of 9 November 1990.While they claim that after
receiving copy of the Order of 9 November 1990 initiatives were
immediately undertaken to fashion out a return-to-work agreement
with management, still, the unrebutted evidence remains that the
striking union officers and members tried to return to work only
eleven (11) days after the conciliation meetings ended in failure,
or twenty (20) days after they received copy of the first
return-to-work order on 5 November 1990.The sympathy of the Court
which, as a rule, is on the side of the laboring classes (Reliance
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. NLRC),13cannot be extended to
the striking union officers and members in the instant petition.
There was willful disobedience not only to one but two
return-to-work orders. Considering that the UNION consisted mainly
of teachers, who are supposed to be well-lettered and
well-informed, the Court cannot overlook the plain arrogance and
pride displayed by the UNION in this labor dispute. Despite
containing threats of disciplinary action against some union
officers and members who actively participated in the strike, the
letter dated 9 November 1990 sent by the COLLEGE enjoining the
union officers and members to return to work on 12 November 1990
presented the workers an opportunity to return to work under the
same terms and conditions or prior to the strike. Yet, the UNION
decided to ignore the same. The COLLEGE, correspondingly, had every
right to terminate the services of those who chose to disregard the
return-to-work orders issued by respondent SECRETARY in order to
protect the interests of its students who form part of the youth of
the land.Lastly, the UNION officers and members also argue that the
doctrine laid down inSarmiento v. Tuico, supra,andUnion of Filipro
Employees v. Nestle, Philippines, Inc., supra,cannot be made
applicable to them because in the latter two cases, workers defied
the return-to-work orders for more than five (5) months. Their
defiance of the return-to-work order, it is said, did not last more
than a month.Again, this line of argument must be rejected. It is
clear from the provisions above quoted that from the moment a
worker defies a return-to-work order, he is deemed to have
abandoned his job. It is already in itself knowingly participating
in an illegal act. Otherwise, the worker will just simply refuse to
return to his work and cause a standstill in the company operations
while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the
management to fill (Sarmiento v. Tuico, supra).Suffice it to say,
inFederation of Free Workers v. Inciong, supra,the workers were
terminated from work after defying the return-to-work order for
only nine (9) days. It is indeed inconceivable that an employee,
despite a return-to-work order, will be allowed in the interim to
stand akimbo and wait until five (5) orders shall have been issued
for their return before they report back to work. This is absurd.In
fine, respondent SECRETARY gravely abused his discretion when he
ordered the reinstatement of striking union members who refused to
report back to work after he issued two (2) return-to-work orders,
which in itself is knowingly participating in an illegal act. The
Order in question is, certainly, contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence.WHEREFORE, the Petition forCertiorariis hereby
GRANTED. The Order of 12 April 1991 and the Resolution 31 May 1991
both issued by respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment are SET
ASIDE insofar as they order the reinstatement of striking union
members terminated by petitioner, and the temporary restraining
order We issued on June 26, 1991, is made permanent.No costs.SO
ORDERED.Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No.
L-26461November 27, 1968ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION,petitioner,vs.JUDGE
JOSE C. BORROMEO and ANTONIO LUA doing business under the name CEBU
HOME & INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY,respondents.Seno, Mendoza, Ruiz and
Associates for petitioner.Diores and Escareal Law Office for
respondents.CONCEPCION,C.J.:Original action forcertiorariand
prohibition, with preliminary injunction, to annul writs of
preliminary injunction issued in Case No. R-9414 of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Cebu Home and Industrial Supply
and Antonio Lua vs. Associated Labor Union", and to restrain the
Honorable Jose C. Borromeo, as Judge of that Court, from hearing
said case.Petitioner herein, Associated Labor Union hereinafter
referred to as ALU is a duly registered labor organization. Among
the members thereof are employees of Superior Gas and Equipment
Company of Cebu, Inc. hereinafter referred to as SUGECO a domestic
corporation with offices at Juan Luna Street, Cebu City and a
factory plant in Basak, Mandaue, province of Cebu. On January 1,
1965, ALU and SUGECO entered into a collective bargaining contract,
effective up to January 1, 1966. Negotiations for the renewal of
the contract between ALU and SUGECO were begun prior to the date
last mentioned. While said negotiations were going on, late in
February, 1966, twelve (12) SUGECO employees resigned from ALU.
Thereupon, the negotiations stopped. On March 1, 1966, ALU wrote
SUGECO requesting that the twelve (12) resigned employees be not
allowed to report for work unless they produced a clearance from
ALU;1but this request was immediately rejected by SUGECO, upon the
ground that it would cause irreparable injury, that the bargaining
contract had lapsed already, and that SUGECO could no longer demand
said clearance from its employees. SUGECO intimated, however, that,
should the twelve (12) men rejoin ALU, negotiations "for the
renewal of the collective bargaining contract" could be resumed.On
the same date, ALU wrote SUGECO charging that the latter was
bargaining in bad faith and that its supervisors had campaigned for
the resignation of ALU members, as well as serving notice that,
unless these unfair labor practice acts were stopped immediately
and a collective bargaining contract between SUGECO and ALU
forthwith entered into, the latter would declare a strike and
establish the corresponding picket lines "in any place where your
business may be found." Counsel for SUGECO replied to the ALU, on
March 3, 1966, stating that, with the resignation of the
aforementioned ALU members, ALU no longer represented the majority
of the SUGECO employees for purposes of negotiation and
recognition.On March 4, 1966, ALU struck and picketed the SUGECO
plant in Mandaue. The next day, March 5, SUGECO commenced Civil
Case No. R-9221 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, against
ALU, to restrain the same from picketing said plant and the SUGECO
offices at Cebu City and elsewhere in the Philippines. Forthwith,
the Honorable Amador E. Gomez, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch II, caused to be issued,ex parte, the writ
of preliminary injunction prayed for by SUGECO.On the same
date,2ALU preferred, in the Court of Industrial Relations
hereinafter referred to as CIR unfair labor practice charges
against SUGECO, its general manager, Concepcion Y. Lua hereinafter
referred to as Mrs. Lua and its two (2) supervisors, alleging,inter
alia, that these respondents had coerced and exerted pressure upon
the aforementioned ALU members to resign, as they did resign from
ALU, and that their resignations were seized upon by SUGECO to
refuse further negotiations with ALU. On April 29, 1966, an acting
prosecutor of the CIR filed therein against SUGECO the
corresponding complaint for unfair labor practice.3Meanwhile, ALU
had moved for a reconsideration of the order of Judge Gomez, dated
March 5, 1966, sanctioning the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against ALU. This motion was later denied by Judge Jose
C. Borromeo, who presided Branch IV of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu.4Hence, on May 9, 1966, ALU instituted Case No. L-25999 of
the Supreme Court, for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary
injunction, against Judges Gomez and Borromeo and the SUGECO, and
prayed therein that the CFI of Cebu be declared without
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of said Case No. R-9221; that
the writ of preliminary injunction therein issued be annulled; that
Judges Gomez and Borromeo be directed to dismiss said case; and
that, meanwhile, they be ordered to desist from further proceedings
in said case, and from enforcing the writ aforementioned. On May
16, 1966, we issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by
ALU in L-25999. Subsequently, or on February 9, 1967, we rendered
judgment therein in favor of ALU, annulling the writ of preliminary
injunction issued in said Case No. R-9221, on March 5, 1966,
directing respondent Judges to dismiss the same, and declaring
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued by us on May
16, 1966.Soon after the issuance of the latter writ, ALU resumed
the picketing of the SUGECO plant in Mandaue. Moreover, it began to
picket the house of Mrs. Lua, SUGECO's general manager, and her
husband Antonio Lua hereinafter referred to as Mr. Lua at Abellana
Street, Cebu City, and the store of the Cebu Home and Industrial
Supply hereinafter referred to as Cebu Home at Gonzalez Street,
Cebu City. The Cebu Home, which belongs to and is managed by Mr.
Lua, deals in general merchandise, among which are oxygen,
acetylene and cooking gas produced by SUGECO. On June 21, 1966,
Cebu Home and Mr. Lua hereinafter referred to as respondents filed
a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 9414 of the CFI of Cebu,
against ALU, to restrain the latter from picketing the store and
residence aforementioned and to recover damages. Thereupon, Judge
Borromeo issued an order requiring the ALU to show cause why the
writ sought should not be issued. In a memorandum filed on June 25,
1966 and a motion to dismiss dated June 29, 1966, the ALU assailed
the Court's jurisdiction to hear the case upon the ground that it
had grown out of a labor dispute. This, notwithstanding, on June
30, 1966, Judge Borromeo issued an order the dispositive part of
which reads:WHEREFORE, upon filing of a bond by the petitioners5in
the amount of P3,000.00 to answer for damages which the
respondent6may be entitled, let a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued, restraining the respondent, its officers, employees, agents
or persons acting in its behalf:1) From picketing the office of the
Cebu Home and Industrial Supply in Gonzales Street, Cebu City and
the residence of the petitioner Antonio Lua in Abellana Street,
Cebu City;2) From preventing the employees of the petitioners from
entering inside or going out the office of the Cebu Home and
Industrial Supply and the residence of the petitioner Antonio
Lua;3) From stopping the car, truck or other vehicles entering or
going out the office of Cebu Home and Industrial Supply and the
residence of Antonio Lua;4) From preventing the sale and
distribution by the petitioners of its merchandise in connection
with its business; and5) From performing acts which cause
disturbance of the tranquility and privacy of the petitioner and
his family.On July 4, 1966, respondents herein moved to amend the
foregoing order so as to broaden its scope. Upon the other hand, on
July 6, 1966, ALU sought a reconsideration of said order and the
lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued on June 30,
1966. Acting upon a motion to amend of respondents herein, Judge
Borromeo issued, on July 22, 1966, another order, from which we
quote:Considering the evidence presented and the facts stated in
the previous order of the Court, it is believed that the petition
is justified and that the acts complained of, if not restrained,
will render the writ of preliminary injunction
ineffective.WHEREFORE, in connection with the writ of preliminary
injunction which was previously issued, the respondent union, its
members, agents or persons acting in its behalf are hereby
restrained:a) From preventing the petitioners, their employees or
representatives from unloading their merchandise and other supplies
coming from Manila or other places and from hauling them from the
waterfront for the purpose of delivering them to the place of the
petitioners;b) From preventing the petitioners or their
representatives from delivering and loading their empty tanks and
other supplies to the boat or other means of transportation for
Manila or other places; andc) From preventing, obstructing or
molesting the petitioners, their employees or representatives from
performing acts in connection with their business.On July 25, 1966,
Judge Borromeo denied ALU's motion to dismiss Case No. R-9414 and
to reconsider his order and dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction of June 30, 1966. Thereupon, or on August 26, 1966, ALU
commenced the present action forcertiorariand prohibition with
preliminary injunction, to annul the writs of preliminary
injunction issued, on June 30 and July 22, 1966, in Case No. R-9414
and to restrain the lower court from hearing the same.ALU maintains
that the lower Court has no jurisdiction over Case No. R-9414
because it had grown out of a labor dispute, is intimately
connected with an unfair labor practice case pending before the CIR
and involves a strike the injunction against which had already been
lifted by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-25999.7Moreover, ALU
claims that even if the lower court had jurisdiction over Case No.
R-9414, the writs of preliminary injunction issued therein are null
and void, not only because of said lack of jurisdiction, but, also,
because it failed to observe the requirements of Sec. 9(f) of
Republic Act No. 875, as well as the provisions of Sec. 9 (d) (5)
of the same Act, requiring findings of facts on matters enumerated
therein.Upon the other hand, respondents argue that the issue in
the lower court does not fall within the jurisdiction of the CIR,
there being no employer-employee relationship and "no labor
dispute" between the ALU members and Cebu Home; and that, at any
rate, the SUGECO products distributed and sold by Cebu Home, came,
not from the SUGECO plant in Mandaue, but from other parts of the
Philippines. Respondents further deny that the residence of Mr. Lua
was being used as a place to store and refill SUGECO gas for
resale.Respondents' pretense is untenable. To begin with, Section 5
(a) of Republic Act No. 8758vests in the Court of Industrial
Relations exclusive jurisdiction over the prevention of any unfair
labor practice. Moreover, for an issue "concerning terms, tenure or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment"
to partake of the nature of a "labor dispute", it is not necessary
that "the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee."9Then, again, in order to apply the provisions of
Sec. 9 of Republic Act No. 875, governing the conditions under
which "any restraining order" or "temporary or permanent
injunction" may issue in any "case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute", it is not indispensable that the persons involved
in the case be "employees of the same employer", although this is
the usual case. Sec. 9,10likewise, governs cases involving persons:
1) "whoare engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or
occupation"; or 2) "who ... havedirect or indirect interests
therein", or 3) "who are members of the same or an affiliated
organization of employers or employees"; or 4) "when the case
involves any conflicting or competing interests in a "labor
dispute" (as hereinbefore defined) or "persons participating or
interested" therein (as hereinafter defined)". Furthermore, "a
person or association shall be held to be a person participating or
interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or
it" and "he or it isengaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or
occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has adirect or
indirectinterest therein, or is a member, officer, or agent of any
association composed in whole or in part of employees or employers
engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or occupation."11Now, then,
there is no dispute regarding the existence of a labor dispute
between the ALU and SUGECO-Cebu; that SUGECO's general manager,
Mrs. Lua, is the wife of the owner and manager of Cebu Home,
Antonio Lua; and that Cebu Home is engaged in the marketing of
SUGECO products. It is, likewise, clear that as managing member of
the conjugal partnership between him and his wife, Mr. Lua has an
interest in the management by Mrs. Lua of the business of SUGECO
and in the success or failure of her controversy with the ALU,
considering that the result thereof may affect the condition of
said conjugal partnership. Similarly, as a distributor of SUGECO
products, theCebu Home has, at least, an indirect interest in the
labor dispute between SUGECO and the ALUand in Case No. R-9221. In
other words, respondents herein have an indirect interest in said
labor dispute, for which reason, we find that Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 875 squarely applies to Case No. R-9414.Thus, in Goldfinger
v. Feintuch,12it was held:Within the limits of peaceful picketing,
however, picketing may be carried onnot only against the
manufacturerbut against a non-union product sold by onein unity of
interest with the manufacturerwho is in the same business for
profit. Where a manufacturer pays less than union wages, both it
and the retailers who sell its products are in a position to
undersell competitors who pay the higher scale, and this may result
in unfair reduction of the wages of union members. Concededly the
defendant union would be entitled to picket peacefully the plant of
the manufacturer. Where the manufacturer disposes of the product
through retailers in unity of interest with it,13unless the union
may follow the product to the place where it is sold and peacefully
ask the public to refrain from purchasing it, the union would be
deprived of afairandpropermeans of bringing its plea to the
attention of the public.Besides, the ALU introduced evidence to the
effect that the SUGECO products had been brought to Cebu Home and
were being distributed in the latter, as a means to circumvent,
defeat or minimize the adverse effects of the picketing conducted
in the SUGECO plant and offices in Mandaue and Cebu City
respectively by ALU. It is true that respondents averred that said
products were purchased by Cebu Homebeforethe strike was declared
against SUGECO and that some of said products were obtained from
SUGECO in other parts of the country; but, even if true, these
circumstances did not place the picketing of the Cebu Home beyond
the pale of the aforesaid Section 9 of Republic Act No. 875
because, as distributor of SUGECO products, Cebu Homewas engagedin
the same trade as SUGECO. Neither does the claim that some SUGECO
products marketed by Cebu Home had come, not from the Mandaue
plant, but from other parts of the Philippines, detract from the
applicability of said provisions, considering that ALU had struck
against SUGECO and had announced, as early as March 1, 1966 or
three (3) days before it struck its intent to picket "any place
where your business may be found" and that SUGECO in Cebu is a
sister company of SUGECO elsewhere in the Philippines.For, a
similar reason, in American Brake Shoe Co. v. District Lodge 9 of
International Association of Machinists,14the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania ruled:Where corporate employer hadseparate plantsin
Missouri and Pennsylvania, and labor dispute existed
atMissouriplant, but not at thePennsylvaniaplant, peaceful
picketing at Pennsylvania plant by members of union representing
employees atMissouriplant wasnotan unfair labor practice as defined
by Labor Management Relations Act....15In the language of the
American Jurisprudence:16It seems nowgenerally agreedthat a state
cannot either by its common law or by statute prohibit the peaceful
picketing of a place of business solely on the ground that the
picketing is carried on by personsnot employed therein. The United
States Supreme Court has held that the constitutional guaranty of
free speech is infringed by the judicial policy of a state to
forbid peaceful picketing on the ground that it is being conducted
by strangers to the employer affected, that is, by persons not in
the relation of employer and employee with him. Rules limiting
picketing to the occasion of a labor dispute arenotoffended by the
act of a union having a grievance against amanufacturerin picketing
a retail establishment in which its products are soldwhen there is
a unity of interestbetween the manufacturer and the retailer; this
is true even when the shopkeeper is the sole person required to run
his business. And the right of employees on strike at one plant of
an employer to picket another plant of the same employer has been
upheld even though some of the employees of the picketed plant as a
result refused to work despite a no-strike agreement. Also, a union
may picket a retail store selling goods made in anonunionfactory
between which and the union there is an industrial dispute,provided
there is a unity of interest between the retailer and the
manufacturer.17Apart from the foregoing, it will be recalled that,
prior to the expiration of the collective bargaining contract
between ALU and SUGECO, on January 1, 1966, negotiations had
started for the renewal of said contract; that during said
negotiations, late in February 1966, twelve (12) SUGECO employees
resigned from ALU, owing according to charges preferred by ALU and
confirmed by a complaint filed by a CIR prosecutor to unfair labor
practices allegedly committed by SUGECO and its supervisors who, it
was also claimed, had induced and coerced said employees to quit
the ALU, which they did; that, thereupon, SUGECO stopped
negotiating with ALU alleging that, with the resignation of
said