Labor Union Strength and the Equality of Political Representation ∗ Patrick Flavin Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Baylor University One Bear Place #97276 Waco, TX 76798 (254) 710-7418 [email protected]∗ A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2016 meeting of the Southern Political Science Association in San Juan, Puerto Rico. I thank Nicholas Carnes, Michael Hartney, and Christopher Witko for helpful comments. Replication data/syntax files at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/BJPolS.
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Labor Union Strength and the Equality of Political Representation∗
Patrick Flavin Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science Baylor University
One Bear Place #97276 Waco, TX 76798 (254) 710-7418
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Table 1: Ranking the States by the Equality of Political Representation
Montana 4.51 (most equal) Virginia 0.22 Minnesota 3.23 Florida 0.22 Oregon 3.19 Massachusetts 0.19 South Dakota 2.60 Connecticut 0.08 Vermont 2.19 Texas 0.01 California 2.18 Nevada -0.06 New Mexico 2.12 North Carolina -0.18 Michigan 1.94 Kansas -0.25 Washington 1.82 Maryland -0.50 Wisconsin 1.64 Kentucky -0.68 Ohio 1.54 New York -1.07 Nebraska 1.29 Indiana -1.27 Iowa 1.24 Louisiana -1.46 Pennsylvania 1.23 Tennessee -1.53 West Virginia 1.20 South Carolina -1.79 Arizona 1.15 Delaware -1.85 Missouri 1.14 North Dakota -2.02 Idaho 1.10 New Hampshire -2.36 Rhode Island 1.06 Arkansas -2.47 New Jersey 1.03 Oklahoma -2.52 Maine 0.57 Wyoming -2.91 Colorado 0.55 Georgia -3.56 Illinois 0.40 Alabama -5.06 Utah 0.34 Mississippi -8.44 (most unequal)
Cell entries are factor scores from combining six coefficients for state specific regressions. Larger positive values indicate greater political equality (i.e. a weaker relationship between income and ideological proximity).
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Table 2: Labor Union Strength and the Equality of Political Representation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Labor Union 0.182** -- 0.234*** 0.53 Membership [0.070] [0.084]
Labor Union -- 0.032 -0.072 -0.19
Campaign Contributions [0.059] [0.066]
% Democrats in -0.009 0.008 -0.010 -0.06 State Legislature [0.026] [0.027] [0.026]
% Interest Groups -0.076 -0.098 -0.090 -0.19
For-Profit [0.063] [0.069] [0.064]
State Median -0.007 0.051 -0.004 -0.01 Income [0.057] [0.057] [0.057]
Dependent variable is the Equality of Political Representation Index (higher value indicates a more equal weighting of citizens’ political opinions). Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors reported beneath in brackets. * denotes p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 using a two-tailed test. Column 4 reports the standardized coefficients for the model in Column 3 (the predicted change in terms of standard deviations of the Equality of Political Representation Index when the independent variable in question is increased one standard deviation).
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Table 3: Robustness Check Using Alternative Measures of Labor Union Strength
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Union Household 0.090** -- 0.120** 0.44 Share of Electorate [0.043] [0.049]
Labor Union/Business Ratio -- -0.190 -1.835 -0.20 of Campaign Contributions [1.311] [1.404]
% Democrats in -0.003 0.010 -0.006 -0.03 State Legislature [0.026] [0.027] [0.026]
% Interest Groups -0.062 -0.112 -0.071 -0.15
For-Profit [0.067] [0.069] [0.067]
State Median 0.016 0.062 0.011 0.02 Income [0.056] [0.055] [0.056]
Dependent variable is the Equality of Political Representation Index (higher value indicates a more equal weighting of citizens’ political opinions). Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors reported beneath in brackets. * denotes p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 using a two-tailed test. Column 4 reports the standardized coefficients for the model in Column 3 (the predicted change in terms of standard deviations of the Equality of Political Representation Index when the independent variable in question is increased one standard deviation).
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Figure 1: Computing the Relationship For Income and Ideological Distance, by State
State A has more equal political representation than State B because the relationship (regression slope coefficient) between income and opinion-policy distance is weaker in State A compared to State B.
State A
State B
Respondent’s Income
Ideological Distance Between a Citizen’s Opinion and State Policy
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Online Appendix
Table A-1: Political Ideology and Specific Policy Opinions
Self-Reported Political Ideology
Very Conservative Conservative Moderate Liberal Very Liberal
Government should reduce income
differences between rich and poor (% yes)
38 45 58 70 77
Providing health care for people who do not
already have it (% spend more)
49 57 73 83 88
Providing assistance to poor mothers with young children (% spend more)
34 39 48 59 67
Financial assistance to public schools
(% spend more)
49 58 73 83 87
Laws making it more difficult for a woman to
get an abortion (% oppose)
28 42 66 78 81
Constitutional amendment banning gay
marriage (% oppose)
29 39 61 74 80
Restricting the kinds of guns that people can buy (% government should
do more)
42 52 67 76 76
Data source: 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election Surveys.
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Table A-2: Income and Ideological Distance Between Opinion and State Policy
N 177,043 177,043 177,043 177,043 177,043 177,043 Dependent variable: Linear distance between a citizen’s ideology and state policy (smaller distance indicates a citizen is better represented). Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by state reported beneath in brackets. * denotes p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 using a two-tailed test. GLFM = Gray et al. (2004), SMR = Sorens et al. (2008).
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Table A-3: Income and Ideological Distance Between Opinion and State Policy, by Survey Wave
N 48,615 48,615 48,615 48,615 48,615 48,615 Dependent variable: Linear distance between a citizen’s ideology and state policy (smaller distance indicates a citizen is better represented). Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by state reported beneath in brackets. * denotes p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 using a two-tailed test. GLFM = Gray et al. (2004), SMR = Sorens et al. (2008).
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Table A-4: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Regression Models in Tables 2 and 3
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Equality of Political Representation Index 47 -0.02 2.28 -8.44 4.51 Labor Union Membership 47 11.39 5.22 3.30 25.58
Union Household Share of Electorate 47 22.80 8.46 0 43.30 Labor Union Campaign Contributions 47 10.51 6.17 0.69 21.55
Labor/Business Ratio of Campaign Contributions 47 0.33 0.25 0.01 1.53 % Democrats in State Legislature 47 50.39 14.07 18.75 85.00
% Interest Groups For-Profit 47 72.82 4.92 61.70 81.60 State Median Income ($1000s) 47 41.01 6.23 29.69 55.14
State Income Inequality (Gini Coefficient) 47 0.44 0.02 0.41 0.50
Note: N=47 because Alaska and Hawaii were not surveyed in the NAES and Nebraska has a non-partisan legislature.
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Table A-5: Labor Union Lobbying and the Equality of Political Representation
(1) (2)
Labor Union -0.020 -0.075 Lobbying Expenditures [0.159] [0.168]
% Democrats in -- 0.054 State Legislature [0.053]
% Interest Groups -- -0.170*
For-Profit [0.090]
State Median -- -0.008 Income [0.079]
State Income -- -31.755
Inequality [19.941]
Constant 1.043 25.275** [0.653] [9.742]
R2 .01 .40 N 16 16
Dependent variable is the Equality of Political Representation Index (higher value indicates a more equal weighting of citizens’ political opinions). Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors reported beneath in brackets. * denotes p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 using a two-tailed test.
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Table A-6: Robustness Check with % Racial Minority Variable Added to Model
(1) (2) (3)
Labor Union 0.176** -- 0.225** Membership [0.077] [0.088]
Labor Union -- 0.009 -0.076
Campaign Contributions [0.062] [0.067]
% Democrats in -0.009 0.004 -0.010 State Legislature [0.026] [0.027] [0.026]
% Interest Groups -0.079 -0.119 -0.098
For-Profit [0.066] [0.072] [0.068]
State Median -0.001 0.079 0.008 Income [0.065] [0.063] [0.065]
Dependent variable is the Equality of Political Representation Index (higher value indicates a more equal weighting of citizens’ political opinions). Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors reported beneath in brackets. * denotes p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 using a two-tailed test.
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Table A-7: Running Feasible Generalized Least Squares Regression on the Six Separate Sets of State Income/Proximity Regression Coefficients
N 47 47 47 47 47 47 Dependent variable is the income/proximity slope coefficient for a state (higher value indicates a more equal weighting of citizens’ political opinions). Cell entries are feasible generalized least squares regression coefficients with standard errors reported beneath in brackets. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the income/proximity coefficient’s standard error in the first stage (state-level) regression. * denotes p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 using a two-tailed test. GLFM = Gray et al. (2004), SMR = Sorens et al. (2008).
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Table A-8: Equality of Political Representation Does Not Predict State Union Membership
Equality of Political 0.327 Representation Index [0.333]
Public Sector Collective 4.743***
Bargaining Law [1.741]
% Private Sector Employees in -0.727 Construction [0.630]
% Private Sector Employees in -0.030
Manufacturing [0.127]
Constant 14.306** [6.449]
R2 .42 N 48
Dependent variable is the average percentage of nonagricultural wage and salary employees (including employees in the public sector) in a state who are union members for 2000-2006. Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients with standard errors reported beneath in brackets. * denotes p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 using a two-tailed test.