Labor Standard Case Set 2

G.R. No. 90273-75 November 15, 1989FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORP.,petitioner,vs.WILLIAM INOCENCIO, ET AL. AND EDWIN CARDONES, THE ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS AND EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,respondents.David I. Unay, Jr. for petitioner.R E S O L U T I O NFELICIANO,J.:Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting Services, Inc. ("Pan Pacific") is a private, fee-charging, recruitment and employment agency. T in accordance with the requirements of Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), Pan Pacific posted a surety bond issued by petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation ("Finman") and was granted a license to operate by the POEA.Private respondents William Inocencio, Perfecto Palero, Jr., Edwin Cardones and one Edwin Hernandez filed with the POEA separate complaints against Pan Pacific for violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended and for refund of placement fees paid to Pan Pacific. The complainants alleged that Pan Pacific charged and collected such fees from them but did not secure employment for them.Acting on the complaints, the POEA Administratormotu proprioimpleaded petitioner Finman as party respondent in its capacity as surety for Pan Pacific. Separate summonses were served upon Finman and Pan Pacific. The return of the summons served on Pan Pacific at its official address registered in the POEA records, showed that Pan Pacific had moved out therefrom; no prior notice of transfer or change of address was furnished by Pan Pacific to the POEA as required under POEA rules. The POEA considered that constructive service of the complaints had been effected upon Pan Pacific and proceeded accordingly.For its part, petitioner Finman filed an answer denying liability and pleading, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (1) the POEA had no "jurisdiction over surety bonds," that jurisdiction being vested in the Insurance Commission or the regular courts; (2) it (Finman) had not violated Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code and complainants' claims had accrued during the suspension of the principal obligor, Pan Pacific; (3) complainants had no cause of action against Finman, since it was not privy to the transactions between them and Pan Pacific and had not received any moneys from them; and (4) the amounts claimed by complainants had been paid by them as deposits and not as placement fees.A hearing was held by the POEA on 14 April 1988, at which time complainants presented their evidence. Petitioner Finman, though notified of this hearing, did not appear.On 30 May 1989, the POEA Administrator issued an Order which, in its dispositive portion, said:WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally complainants' claims as follows:1. William Inocencio P6,000 .002. Perfecto Palero, Sr. P5,500 .003. Edwin Cardones P2,000 .00Respondent agency is ordered to release Cardones' passport, the expenses or obtaining the same of which (sic) shall be deducted from the amount of P2,000.00 as it appears that it was respondent agency who applied for the processing thereof. The claim of Edwin Hernandez is dismissed without prejudice.For the established violations respondent agency is hereby imposed a penalty fine in the amount of P60,000.00. Further, the ban earlier imposed upon it is herein reiterated.SO ORDERED.Petitioner Finman went on appeal to the Secretary of Labor insisting that: (1) the POEA had no authority to implead petitioner as party respondent in the proceedings before the POEA; and that (2) the POEA had no authority to enforce directly the surety bond against petitioner. In an Order dated 3 August 1989, the Secretary of Labor upheld the POEA Order appealed from and denied the appeal for lack of merit.Petitioner Finman now comes before this Court on a Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, raising much the same issues it had already ventilated before the POEA and the Secretary of Labor. It is contended once again by petitioner Finman that the POEA had no authority to implead petitioner in the proceedings commenced by private respondents: and that the POEA was not authorized to require, in those same proceedings, petitioner to pay private respondents' claims for refund against Pan Pacific on the basis of the surety bond issued by petitioner.Petitioner's contentions are interrelated and will be dealt with together. They are, however, quite bereft of merit and must be rejected.Petitioner cannot seriously dispute the direct and solidary nature of its obligations under its own surety bond. Under Section 176 of the Insurance Code, as amended, the liability of a surety in a surety bond is joint and several with the principal obligor. Petitioner's bond was posted by Pan Pacific in compliance with the requirements of Article 31 of the Labor Code, which states that Art. 31. Bonds. All applicants for license or authority shall post such cash and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor toguarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and, conditions of employment as appropriate.The Secretary of Labor shall have the exclusive power to determine, decide, order or direct payment from, or application of, the cash and surety bond for any claim or injury covered and guaranteed by the bonds. (Emphasis supplied).The tenor and scope of petitioner Finman's obligations under the bond it issued are set out in broad ranging terms by Section 4, Rule II, Book I of the POEA Rules and Regulations:Section 4. Payment of Fees and Posting of Bonds. Upon approval of the application by the Minister, the applicant shall pay an annual license fee of P6,000.00. It shall also post a cash bond of P100,000.00 and asurety bondof P150,000.00 from a bonding company acceptable to the Administration duly accredited by the Office of the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer forall valid and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license or authority and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of the Ministry and all liabilities which the Administration may impose.The surety bonds shall include the condition that notice of garnishment to the principal is notice to the surety.1(Emphasis supplied).While petitioner Finman has refrained from attaching a copy of the bond it had issued to its Petition for Certiorari, there can be no question that the conditions of the Finman surety bond Pan Pacific had posted with the POEA include the italicized portions of Section 4, Rule 11, Book I quoted above. It is settled doctrine that the conditions of a bond specified and required in the provisions of the statute or regulation providing for the submission of the bond, are incorporated or built into all bonds tendered under that statute or regulation, even though not there set out in printer's ink.2In the case at bar, the POEA held, and the Secretary of Labor affirmed, that Pan Pacific had violated Article 32 of the Labor Code, as amendedArticle 32. Fees to be paid by workers. Any person applying with a private fee charging employment agency for employment assistanceshall not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees. (Emphasis supplied).as well as Article 34 (a) of the same Code:Article 34. Prohibited practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:(a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than actually received by him as a loan or advance. (Emphasis supplied)There is, hence, no question that, both under the Labor Code3and the POEA Rules and Regulations,4Pan Pacific had violated at least one of the conditions for the grant and continued use of the recruitment license granted to it. There can, similarly, be no question that the POEA Administrator and the Secretary of Labor are authorized to require Pan Pacific to refund the placement fees it had charged private respondents without securing employment for them and to impose the fine of P60,000.00 upon Pan Pacific. Article 36 of the Labor Code authorizes the Secretary of Labor "to restrict and regulate" the recruitment and placement activities of agencies like Pan Pacific and "to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of [Title I on "Recruitment and Placement of Workers]," including of course, Article 32 on "Fees to be paid by workers," quoted earlier. Upon the other hand, Section 13 of Rule VI, Book I of the POEA Rules and Regulations expressly authorize the POEA Administrator or the Secretary of Labor to impose fines "in addition to or in lieu of the penalties of suspension or cancellation" of the violator recruitment agency's license.If Pan Pacific is liable to private respondents for the refunds claimed by them and to the POEA for the fine of P60,000.00, and if petitioner Finman is solidarily liable with Pan Pacific under the operative terms of the bond, it must follow that Finman is liable both to the private respondents and to the POEA. Petitioner Finman asserts, however, that the POEA had no authority to implead it in the proceedings against Pan Pacific.We are not persuaded by this assertion. Clearly, petitioner Finman is a party-in-interest in, certainly a proper party to, the proceedings private respondents had initiated against Pan Pacific the principal obligor. Since Pan Pacific had thoughtfully refrained from notifying the POEA of its new address and from responding to the complaints, petitioner Finman may well I be regarded as an indispensable party to the proceedings before the POEA. Whether Finman was an indepensable or merely a proper party to the proceedings, we believe and so hold that the POEA could properly implead it as party respondent either upon the request of the private respondents or, as it happened,motu propio. Such is the situation under the Revised Rules of Court5and the application thereof, directly or by analogy, by the POEA can certainly not be regarded as arbitrary, oppressive or capricious.The fundamental argument of Finman is that its liability under its own bond must be determined and enforced, not by the POEA or the Secretary of Labor, but rather by the Insurance Commission or by the regular courts. Once more, we are not moved by petitioner's argument.There appears nothing so special or unique about the determination of a surety's liability under its bond as to restrict that determination to the Office of the Insurance Commissioner and to the regular courts of justice exclusively. The exact opposite is strongly stressed by the second paragraph of Article 31 of the Labor Code:Art. 31.Bonds. ... ...The secretary of Labor shall have the exclusivepower to determine, decide, order or direct payment from, or application of, the cash or surety bond for any claim or injury covered and guaranteed by the bonds. (Emphasis supplied)We believe and so hold that to compel the POEA and private respondents the beneficiaries of Finman's bond-to go to the Insurance Commissioner or to a regular court of law to enforce that bond, would be to collide with the public policy which requires prompt resolution of claims against private recruitment and placement agencies. The Court will take judicial notice of the appealing frequency with which some, perhaps many, of such agencies have cheated workers avid for overseas employment by, e.g., collecting placement fees without securing employment for them at all, extracting exorbitant fees or "kickbacks" from those for whom employment is actually obtained, abandoning hapless and unlettered workers to exploitative foreign principals, and so on. Cash and surety bonds are required by the POEA and its predecessor agencies from recruitment and employment companies precisely as a means of ensuring prompt and effective recourse against such companies when held liable for applicants or workers' claims. Clearly that public policy will be effectively negated if POEA and the Department of Labor and Employment were held powerless to compel a surety company to make good on its solidary undertaking in the same quasi-judicial proceeding where the liability of the principal obligor, the recruitment or employment agency, is determined and fixed and where the surety is given reasonable opportunity to present any defenses it or the principal obligor may be entitled to set up. Petitioner surety whose liability to private respondents and the POEA is neither more nor less than that of Pan Pacific, is not entitled to another or different procedure for determination or fixing of that liability than that which Pan Pacific is entitled and subject to.WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. This Resolution is immediately executory.G.R. No. L-79436-50 January 17, 1990EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.SECRETARY OF LABOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, ELVIRA VENTURA, ESTER TRANGUILLAN, et al.,respondents.Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & San Vicente for petitioner.NARVASA,J.:In connection with the application with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) of J & B Manpower Specialist, Inc. for a license to engage in business as a recruitment agency, a surety bond was filed on January 2, 1985 by the applicant and the Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation, herein petitioner, in virtue of which they both held themselves . . . firmly bound unto (said) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Ministry of Labor in the penal sum of PESOS ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND ONLY . . . (Pl50,000.00) for the payment of which will and truly to be made, . . . (they bound themselves, their) heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally . .The bond stipulated that:a) it was "conditioned upon the true and faithful performance and observance of the . . . principal (J & B Manpower Specialist, Inc.) of its duties and obligations in accordance with all the rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Labor Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and with the terms and conditions stipulated in the License;b) the liability of the . . . Surety (petitioner) shall in no case exceed the sum of PESOS ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) ONLY, PHILIPPINE CURRENCY;1c) notice to the Principal is also a notice to the Surety; andd) LIABILITY of the surety . . . shall expire on JANUARY 02, 1986 and this bond shall be automatically cancelled ten (10) days after its expiration and the surety shall not be liable for any claim not discovered and presented to it in writing within said period of . . . from expiration and the obligee hereby expressly waives the rights to file any court action against the Surety after termination of said period of . . . . above cited.2As narrated by respondent Secretary of Labor, the facts are as follows:3From June 1983 to December 1985 . . . thirty three (33) . . . (persons) applied for overseas employment with . . . (J & B). In consideration of promised deployment, complainants paid respondent various amounts for various fees. Most of' the receipts issued were sighed by Mrs. Baby Bundalian, Executive Vice-President of . . . (J & B).Because of non-deployment . . . (the applicants) filed separate complaints with the Licensing and Regulation Office of POEA against . . . (J & B) for violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code between the months of April to October 1985.Despite summons/notices of hearing,, . . . (J & B) failed to file Answer nor appear in the hearings conducted.In its separate Answer, . . . EASCO essentially disclaimed liability on the ground that the claims were not expressly covered by the bond, that POEA had no jurisdiction to order forfeiture of the bond, that some of the claims were paid beyond or prior to the period of effectivity of the bond.On September 8, 1986, the POEA Administrator issued the Order in favor of complainants ruling thus:After careful evaluation, we find that the receipts and testimonies of complainants, in the absence of controverting evidence substantially establish that respondent charged and collected fees from them in amounts exceeding what is prescribed by this Administration. Complainants' non-deployment strongly indicates that there was no employment obtained for them. Hence, violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, is established against respondent. The claims of complainants having arose (arisen) out of acts of the principal covered under the surety (bond), the respondent surety is equally liable therefor.Except for complainants Ramos, Samson, de Leon and Rizada, whose claims were transacted prior to the effectivity of the bond, . . . EASCO was declared jointly and severally liable with . . . (J & B) to twenty-nine (29) complainants.(The dispositive portion of the POEA Administrator's Order also contained the following statement and direction,viz.:Respondent was suspended on May 23, 1985, June 26, 1985 and January 17, 1986 all for illegal exaction. Considering its track record of illegal exaction activities and considering further the gross violation of recruitment rules and regulations established against it in the instant cases, and the expiration of its license on February 15, 1985, it is hereby forever banned from participation in the overseas employment program. It is ordered to cease and desist from further engaging in recruitment activities otherwise it shall be prosecuted for illegal recruitment.')(J & B filed a motion for reconsideration). On December 19, 1986, the then deputy Minister of Labor and Employment denied the . . . Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed the findings in the Order of the POEA Administrator finding no reversible error therein.On appeal by EASCO J & B having as aforestated taken no part in the proceeding despite due service of summons the judgment was modified by the Secretary of Labor, by Order dated July 1, 1987, disposing as follows:4WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Resolution of the then Deputy Minister of Labor dated December 19, 1986 affirming the Order of the POEA Administrator dated September 8, 1986 is hereby MODIFIED. Respondent J & B Manpower Specialist is directed to refund all thirty-three (33) complainants as listed in the Order of September 8, 1986 in the amounts listed thereto with the modification that complainants Lucena Cabasal and Felix Rivero are both entitled only to P15,980 and not P15,980 each.Respondent Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation is hereby found jointly and severally liable with respondent J & B Manpower Specialist to refund nineteen (19) complainants in the modified amounts. . .(particularly specified).The other findings in the Order of the POEA Administrator dated September 8, 1986 affirmed in the Resolution of the then Deputy Minister . . . are also hereby AFFIRMED. This Order is FINAL. No further Motion for Reconsideration hereof shall be entertained.It is noteworthy that EASCO's liability for the refund, jointly and severally with its principal, was limited to 19 named complainants (in contrast to verdicts of the POEA and the Deputy Minister which both ordered payment to no less than 33 complainants) and was correspondingly reduced from P308,751.75 and US $ 400.005to the aggregate amount of P 140,817.75.6The special civil action ofcertiorariat bar was thereafter instituted by EASCO7praying for the nullification of the POEA Administrator's Order of September 8, 1986, the Resolution of the Deputy Minister of Labor of' December 19, 1986, and the Order of the Secretary of Labor of July 1, 1987, It theorizes that:1) the POEA had no jurisdiction over the claims for refund filed by non-employees;2) neither did the Secretary of Labor have jurisdiction of the claims;3) assuming they had jurisdiction, both the POEA and Secretary of Labor also committed legal errors and acted with grave abuse of discretion when they ruled that petitioner is liable on the claims.EASCO contends that the POEA had no "adjudicatory jurisdiction" over the monetary claims in question because the same "did not arise from employer-employee relations." Invoked in support of the argument is Section 4 (a) of EO 797 providing in part8that the POEA has . . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims,involving employer-employee relationsarising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment including seamen . . .The complaints are however for violation of Articles 32 and 34 a) of the Labor Code. Article 32 and paragraph (a) of Article 34 read as follows:Art. 32. Fees to be paid by workers.Any person applying with a private fee-charging employment agency for employment assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees.Art. 34. Prohibited practices.It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority:a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than actually received by him as a loan or advance; . . .The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the above quoted provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only, to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions" governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA9"on its own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person, . . . (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity" for certain enumerated offenses including 1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, and2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and regulations.10The Administrator was also given the power to "order the dismissal of the case or the suspension of the license or authority of the respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof."11Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate relief to the victims of the offenses committed by the respondent agency or contractor, specially the refund or reimbursement of such fees as may have been fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or such money, goods or services imposed and accepted in excess of what is licitly prescribed. It would be illogical and absurd to limit the sanction on an offending recruitment agency or contractor to suspension or cancellation of its license, without the concomitant obligation to repair the injury caused to its victims. It would result either in rewarding unlawful acts, as it would leave the victims without recourse, or in compelling the latter to litigate in another forum, giving rise to that multiplicity of actions or proceedings which the law abhors.Even more untenable is EASCO's next argument that the recruiter and its victims are inpari delicto the former for having required payment, and the latter for having voluntarily paid, "prohibited recruitment fees" and therefore, said victims are barred from obtaining relief. The sophistical, if not callous, character of the argument is evident upon the most cursory reading thereof; it merits no consideration whatever.The Court is intrigued by EASCO's reiteration of its argument that it should not be held liable for claims which accruedprior toor after the effectivity of its bond, considering that the respondent Secretary had conceded the validity of part of said argument, at least. The Secretary ruled that EASCO's "contention that it should not be held liable for claims/payments made to respondent agency before the effectivity of the surety bond on January 2, 1985 is well taken." According to the Secretary:12. . . A close examination of the records reveal(s) that respondent EASCO is not jointly and severally liable with respondent agency to refund complainants Lucena Cabasal, Felix Rivero, Romulo del Rosario, Rogelio Banzuela, Josefina Ogatis, Francisco Sorato, Sonny Quiazon, Josefina Dictado, Mario del Guzman and Rogelio Mercado (10 in all).These complainants paid respondent agency in 1984,or before the effectivity of the bond on January 2,1985 as evidence by the reciept and their testimonies.The related argument, that it is also not liable for claims filed after the expiry (on January 2, 1986) of the period stipulated in the surety bond for the filing of claims against the bond, must however be rejected, as the Secretary did. The Court discerns no grave abuse of discretion in the Secretary's statement of his reasons for doing so, to wit:. . . While it may be true that respondent EASCO received notice of their claims after the ten (10) day expiration period from cancellation or after January 12, 1986 as provided in the surety bond, records show that . . . EASCO's principal, respondent agency, was notified/ summoned prior to the expiration period or before January 12, 1986. Respondent agency received summons on July 24, 1985 with respect to claims of complainants Penarroyo, dela Cruz and Canti. It also received summons on November 26, 1985 with respect to Giovanni Garbillons' claim. Respondent agency was likewise considered constructively notified of the claims of complainants Calayag, Danuco Domingo and Campena on October 6, 1985. In this connection, it may be stressed that the surety bond provides that notice to the principal is notice to the surety. Besides, it has been held that the contract of a compensated surety like respondent EASCO is to be interpreted liberally in the interest of the promises and beneficiaries rather than strictly in favor of the surety (Acoustics Inc. v. American Surety, 74 Nev-6, 320 P2d. 626, 74 Am. Jur. 2d).So, too, EASCO's claim that it had not been properly served with summons as regards a few of the complaints must be rejected, the issue being factual, and the Court having been cited to no grave error invalidating the respondent Secretary's conclusion that summons had indeed been duly served.Finally, EASCO's half-hearted argument that its liability should be limited to the maximum amount set in its surety bond,i.e., P150,000.00, is palpably without merit, since the aggregate liability imposed on it, P140,817.75,supra, does not in fact exceed that limit.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and this decision is declared to be immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 98273 October 28, 1991CLARITA V. CRUZ,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), EMS MANPOWER & PLACEMENT SERVICE (PHIL.), ABDUL KARIM AL YAHYA, and TRAVELLERS INSURANCE,respondents.Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.Manuel T. Collado for private respondent.CRUZ,J.:pClarita V. Cruz**went abroad pursuant to an employment contract that she hoped would improve her future. Although a high school graduate, she agreed to work as a domestic helper in Kuwait in consideration of an attractive salary and vacation leave benefits she could not expect to earn in this country. But her foreign adventure proved to be a bitter disappointment. On March 18,1988, after completing her two-year engagement, she was back home in the Philippines with her dead dreams and an angry grievance.On March 23,1988, she filed a complaint against EMS Manpower and Placement Services (Phil.) and its foreign principal, Abdul Karim Al Yahya, for underpayment of her salary and non-payment of her vacation leave. She also claimed that she was charged a placement fee of P7,000.00 instead of the legal maximum of only P5,000.00. She alleged that her foreign employer treated her as a slave and required her to work 18 hours a day. She was beaten up and suffered facial deformity, head trauma and decreased sensation in the right portion of her body. On top of all this, she was paid only $120 per month and her total salaries were given to her only three hours before her flight back to Manila. This was after the plane she was supposed to take had left and she had to stay in the airport for 24 hours before her employer finally heard her pleas and delivered her passport and ticket to her.In its answer and position paper, the private respondent raised the principal defense of settlement as evidenced by the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the complainant on June 21, 1988. In this document, she declaredinter aliathat xxx xxx xxx2. Thereafter going thoroughly over the facts of the case by reconciling our records, we came to discover that it was only a plain case of misunderstanding on our part, and that we have already settled our differences;3. That I am no longer interested in further continuance of the above case against EMS Manpower & Placement Services either criminal, civil or administrative or whatever nature as I hereby desist now and hereafter;4. That I am executing this affidavit of desistance to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and circumstances and for the purpose of asking the dismissal of my said complaint against EMS Manpower & Placement Services.On the basis of this affidavit, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) dismissed her complaint in a decision dated May 16, 1989. This was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in its resolution dated December 28, 1990, reconsideration of which was denied on February 21, 1991.The petition now before us faults the POEA and the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for having upheld the Affidavit of Desistance. Cruz rejects the settlement as having been obtained from her under duress and false pretenses and insists on her original claim for the balance of her salaries and vacation- leave pay at the agreed rate of P250.00 per month.Her contention is that she was inveigled into signing the Affidavit of Desistance without the assistance of counsel. The "Attorney" Alvarado who assisted her was not really a lawyer but only a helper in the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration. Atty. Biolena, on the other hand, merely acknowledged the document. Moreover, when she signed the affidavit, she was under the impression when she was agreeing to settle only her claim for one month unpaid vacation leave, as the wording of the receipt she issued on the same date showed, to wit:June 21, 1988ReceiptThis is to certify that I received the amount of P2,400.00 from EMS Manpower & Placement Services in settlement of 1 month unpaid vacation leave.(Sgd.) CLARITA V. CRUZIN THE PRESENCE OF:(Sgd.) O.G. ALVARADOOWWA Legal Dept.For its part, the private respondent argues that the petitioner is bound by her Affidavit of Desistance, which she freely and knowingly executed. After all, she was not an ignorant and illiterate person but a high school graduate who understood what she was signing. The due execution of the instrument must also be sustained on the basis of the presumptions of regularity of official functions and of good faith.Significantly, neither the private respondent nor the Solicitor General refuted the petitioner's submission that the person who allegedly assisted her in the execution of the Affidavit of Desistance and explained to her its content and meaning was not a lawyer but a mere employee in the OWWA. His status was merely assumed but not established by the respondents although it was directly questioned. The comments of the public and private respondents did not meet this challenge squarely.It is no less noteworthy that the receipt the petitioner issued on the same day was only for "P2,400.00 . . . in settlement of 1 month unpaid vacation." This clearly shows that she was not waiving the rest of her demands in exchange for that measly amount (which did not even really represent the commutable value of the 1 month vacation leave at the rate of $250.00). In fact, the total claim of the petitioner is for P88,840.00, itemized as follows:a) P84,240.00, representing the salary differentials of $130 for 24 months (US $3,120.00 x P27.00).b) P2,600.00, representing the balance of her vacation leave pay.c) P2,000.00, representing her excess placement fee.InPrincipe v. Philippine-Singapore Transport Service, Inc.,1this Court held:Even assuming for the sake of argument that the quitclaim had foreclosed petitioner's right over the death benefits of her husband,the fact that the consideration given in exchange thereof was very much less than the amount petitioner is claiming renders the quitclaim null and void for being contrary to public policy. The State must be firm in affording protection to labor. The quitclaim wherein the consideration is scandalously low and inequitable cannot be an obstacle to petitioner's pursuing her legitimate claim. Equity dictates that the compromise agreement should be voided in this instance. (Emphasis supplied.)The following guidelines were likewise set inPeriquet v. NLRC:2Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.(Emphasis supplied.)The Court is convinced that the petitioner was not fully aware of the import and consequences of the Affidavit of Desistance when she executed it, allegedly with the assistance of counsel. Except for the disputable presumptions invoked by the private respondent, such assistance has not been established against the petitioner's allegation that the "Attorney" Alvarado who supposedly counseled her was not even a lawyer. Indeed, even assuming that such assistance had been duly given, there is still the question of the intrinsic validity of the quitclaim in view of the gross disparity between the amount of the settlement and the petitioner's original claim. It is difficult to believe that the petitioner would agree to waive her total claim of P88,840.00 for the unseemly settlement of only P2,400.00. And even if she did, the waiver would still be null and void as violative of public policy.It remains to state that, contrary to the contention of the private respondent in the proceedings below that it has no privity of contract with the petitioner, we have held in a long line of cases that the local recruiter is solidarily liable with the foreign principal for all damages sustained by the overseas worker in connection with his contract of employment. Such liability is provided for in Section 1, Rule II, Book II, of the POEA Rules and Regulations, which we have consistently sustained.This decision demonstrates once again the tenderness of the Court toward the worker subjected to the lawless exploitation and impositions of his employer. The protection of our overseas workers is especially necessary because of the inconveniences and even risks they have to undergo in their quest for a better life in a foreign land away from their loved ones and their own government.The domestic helper is particularly susceptible to abuse because she usually works only by herself in a private household unlike other workers employed in an open business concern who are able to share and discuss their problems and bear or solve them together. The domestic helper is denied that comfort. She has no companions in her misery. She usually broods alone. There is no one to turn to for help. That is why we must carefully listen to her when she is finally able to complain against those who would rob her of her just rewards and even of her dignity as a human being.WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the NLRC dated December 28, 1990, and February 21, 1991, are SET ASIDE, and the Affidavit of Desistance is DECLARED null and void. POEA Case No. 88-03-255 is REMANDED to the POEA for further proceedings and expeditious resolution.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 109583 September 5, 1997TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, ROSELLE CASTIGADOR, JOSEFINA MAMON, JENELYN CASA, PEACHY LANIOG, VERDELINA BELGIRA, ELMA FLORES, RAMONA LITURCO, GRACE SABANDO, GLORIA PALMA, AVELYN ALVAREZ, CANDELARIA NONO, NITA BUSTAMANTE, CYNTHIA ARANDILLO, SANDIE AGUILAR, DIGNA PANAGUITON, VERONICA BAYOGOS, JULIANITA ARANADOR, LEONORA CABALLERO, NANCY BOLIVAR, NIMFA BUCOL, ZITA GALINDO, ESTELITA BIOCOS, MARJORIE MACATE, RUBY SEPULVIDA, ROSALIE SONDIA, NORA MAQUILING, PAULINA CORDERO, LENIROSE ABANGAN, SELFA PALMA, ANTONIA NAVARRO, ELSIE PENARUBIA, IRMA SOBREQUIL, SONY JAMUAT, CLETA MAYO,respondents.ROMERO,J.:The issue presented in the case at bar is whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has jurisdiction to cancel or revoke the license of a private fee-charging employment agency.From July 24 to September 9, 1987, petitioner Trans Action Overseas Corporation, a private fee-charging employment agency, scoured Iloilo City for possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong. Private respondents sought employment as domestic helpers through petitioner's employees, Luzviminda Aragon, Ben Hur Domincil and his wife Cecille. The applicants paid placement fees ranging from P1,000.00 to P14,000.00, but petitioner failed to deploy them. Their demands for refund proved unavailing; thus, they were constrained to institute complaints against petitioner for violation of Articles 32 and 34(a)1of the Labor Code, as amended.Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from respondents, and averred that Aragon, whose only duty was to pre-screen and interview applicants, and the spouses Domincil were not authorized to collect fees from the applicants. Accordingly, it cannot be held liable for the money claimed by respondents. Petitioner maintains that it even warned respondents not to give any money to unauthorized individuals.POEA Regional Extension Unit Coordinator Edgar Somes testified that although he was aware that petitioner collected fees from respondents, the latter insisted that they be allowed to make the payments on the assumption that it could hasten their deployment abroad. He added that Mrs. Honorata Manliclic, a representative of petitioner tasked to oversee the conduct of the interviews, told him that she was leaving behind presigned receipts to Aragon as she cannot stay in Iloilo City for the screening of the applicants. Manliclic, however, denied this version and argued that it was Somes who instructed her to leave the receipts behind as it was perfectly alright to collect fees.On April 5, 1991, then Labor Undersecretary Nieves R. Confesor rendered the assailed order, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the following claims:1. Rosele Castigador P14,000.002. Josefina Mamon 3,000.003. Jenelyn Casa 3,000.004. Peachy Laniog 13,500.005. Verdelina Belgira 2,000.006. Elma Flores 2,500.007. Ramona Liturco 2,500.008. Grace Sabando 3,500.009. Gloria Palma 1,500.0010. Avelyn Alvarez 1,500.0011. Candelaria Nono 1,000.0012. Nita Bustamante 5,000.0013. Cynthia Arandillo 1,000.0014. Sandie Aguilar 3,000.0015. Digna Panaguiton 2,500.0016. Veronica Bayogos 2,000.0017. Sony Jamuat 4,500.0018. Irma Sobrequil 2,000.0019. Elsie Penarubia 2,000.0020. Antonia Navarro 2,000.0021. Selfa Palma 3,000.0022. Lenirose Abangan 13,300.0023. Paulina Cordero 1,400.0024. Nora Maquiling 2,000.0025. Rosalie Sondia 2,000.0026. Ruby Sepulvida 3,500.0027. Marjorie Macate 1,500.0028. Estelita Biocos 3,000.0029. Zita Galindo 3,500.0030. Nimfa Bucol 1,000.0031. Nancy Bolivar 2,000.0032. Leonora Caballero 13,900.0033. Julianita Aranador 14,000.00The complaints of Ma. Luz Alingasa, Nimfa Perez, and Cleta Mayo are hereby dismissed in view of their desistance.The following complaints are hereby dismissed for failure to appear/prosecute:1. Jiyasmin Bantillo 6. Edna Salvante2. Rosa de Luna Senail 7. Thelma Beltiar3. Elnor Bandojo 8. Cynthia Cepe4. Teresa Caldeo 9. Rosie Pavillon5. Virginia CastroverdeThe complaints filed by the following are hereby dismissed for lack of evidence:1. Aleth Palomaria 5. Mary Ann Beboso2. Emely Padrones 6. Josefina Tejero3. Marybeth Aparri 7. Bernadita Aprong4. Lenia Biona 8. Joji LullRespondent agency is liable for twenty eight (28) counts of violation of Article 32 and five (5) counts of Article 34 (a) with a corresponding suspension in the aggregate period of sixty six (66) months. Considering however, that under the schedule of penalties, any suspension amounting to a period of 12 months merits the imposition of the penalty of cancellation,the license of respondent TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION to participate in the overseas placement and recruitment of workers is hereby ordered CANCELLED, effective immediately.SO ORDERED.2(Emphasis supplied)On April 29, 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Temporary Lifting of Order of Cancellation alleging, among other things, that to deny it the authority to engage in placement and recruitment activities would jeopardize not only its contractual relations with its foreign principals, but also the welfare, interests, and livelihood of recruited workers scheduled to leave for their respective assignments. Finally, it manifested its willingness to post a bond to insure payment of the claims to be awarded, should its appeal or motion be denied.Finding the motion to be well taken, Undersecretary Confesor provisionally lifted the cancellation of petitioner's license pending resolution of its Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1991. On January 30, 1992, however, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was eventually denied for lack of merit, and the April 5, 1991, order revoking its license was reinstated.Petitioner contends that Secretary; Confesor acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed orders on alternative grounds,viz.: (1) it is the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) which has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal recruitment cases, including the authority to cancel recruitment licenses, or (2) the cancellation order based on the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties is not valid for non-compliance with the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 regarding its registration with the U.P. Law Center.Under Executive Order No. 7973(E.O. No. 797) and Executive Order No. 247 (E.O. No. 247),4the POEA was established and mandated to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB), the National Seamen Board (NSB), and the overseas employment function of the Bureau of Employment Services (BES). Petitioner theorizes that when POEA absorbed the powers of these agencies, Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, was rendered ineffective.The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is vested upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides:Art. 5. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License or Authority The Minister of Labor shall have the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment for violation of rules and regulations issued by the Ministry of Labor, the Overseas Employment Development Board, and the National Seamen Board, or for violation of the provisions of this and other applicable laws, General Orders and Letters of Instructions.In the case ofEastern Assurance and Surety Corp.v.Secretary ofLabor,5we held that:The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the above quoted provisions, among others.And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions" governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA,6"on its own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person, . . (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity" for certain enumerated offenses including 1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, and2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and regulations.7The Administrator was also given the power to "order the dismissal of the case of the suspension of the license or authority of the respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof."8(Emphasis supplied)This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed inPeople v.Diaz,9viz.:A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor,or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. (Emphasis supplied)In view of the Court's disposition on the matter, we rule that the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is concurrently vested with the POEA and the Secretary of Labor.As regards petitioner's alternative argument that the non-filing of the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties with the UP Law Center rendered it ineffective and, hence, cannot be utilized as basis for penalizing them, we agree with Secretary Confesor's explanation, to wit:On the other hand, the POEA Revised Rules on the Schedule of Penalties was issued pursuant to Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended. The same merely amplified and particularized the various violations of the rules and regulations of the POEA and clarified and specified the penalties therefore (sic). Indeed, the questioned schedule of penalties contains only a listing of offenses. It does not prescribe additional rules and regulations governing overseas employment but only detailed the administrative sanctions imposable by this Office for some enumerated prohibited acts.Under the circumstances, the license of the respondent agency was cancelled on the authority of Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, and not pursuant to the 1987 POEA Revised Rules on Schedule of Penalties.10WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the decision of the Secretary of Labor dated April 5, 1991, is AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990HORTENCIA SALAZAR,petitioner,vs.HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ,respondents.Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.SARMIENTO,J.:This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.The facts are as follows:xxx xxx xxx1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar,viz:04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito atnagbibigay ng salaysay.S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ayayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. HortySalazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko saiyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuhaang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ngbooking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ayhindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibangcompany pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Cardko.2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:HORTY SALAZARNo. 615 R.O. Santos St.Mandaluyong, Metro ManilaPursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:Gentlemen:On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizuresof whatever nature and for any purpose."3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are theprivate residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to protect our client's interests.We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836.1On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are alreadyfait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one forcertiorariin view of the grave public interest involved.The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution.Under the new Constitution, which states:. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.2it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest.3In one case, it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power:xxx xxx xxxBut it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, renderedfunctus officioby the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants.4Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.5Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment.6On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so.7On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so.8The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.The Solicitor General's reliance on the case ofMorano v.Vivo9is not well-taken.Vivoinvolved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid.10It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held:11xxx xxx xxxThe State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956).12The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming,ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.13We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void, thus:xxx xxx xxxAnother factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/ recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."InStanford v.State of Texas,the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.14For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.No costs.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 121777 January 24, 2001THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant.KAPUNAN,J.:Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime.The Court affirms the constitutionality of the law and the conviction of the accused, but reduces the penalty imposed upon her.The accused was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City in an information alleging:That on or about January 30, 1994, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without having previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a license or authority to engage in recruitment and overseas placement of workers, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, offer and promise for a fee employment abroad particularly in Singapore thus causing Maria Lourdes Modesto [y] Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, all qualified to apply, in fact said Maria Lourdes Modesto had already advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of the promised employment which did not materialized [sic] thus causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the said sum; furthermore, the acts complained of herein tantamount [sic] to economic sabotage in that the same were committed in large scale.1Arraigned on June 20, 1994, the accused pleaded not guilty2to these charges.At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto. The succeeding narration is gathered from their testimonies:On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in the morning, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go to No. 26-D, Tetuan Highway, Sta. Cruz, Zamboanga City, where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the house's sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Fegueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand.On February 1, 1994, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. Also present were other members of the CIS, including Col. Rodolfo Almonte, Regional Director of the PNP-CIS for Region IX, Eileen Fermindoza, and a certain SPO3 Santos. The group planned to entrap the illegal recruiter the next day by having Fermindoza pose as an applicant.3On February 2, 1994, at around 8:00 p.m., Col. Almonte directed the case to SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, a member of the Philippine National Police who was assigned as an investigator of the CIS, to conduct a surveillance of the area to confirm the report of illegal recruitment. Accordingly, he, along with Eileen Fermindoza, immediately proceeded to Tetuan Highway. The two did not enter the house where the recruitment was supposedly being conducted, but Fermindoza interviewed two people who informed them that some people do go inside the house. Upon returning to their office at around 8:30 a.m., the two reported to Capt. Mendoza who organized a team to conduct the raid.The raiding team, which included Capt. Mendoza, SPO2 Manalopilar, Fermindoza and a certain Oscar Bucol, quickly set off and arrived at the reported scene at 9:30 that morning. There they met up with Erlie Ramos of the POEA. Fermindoza then proceeded to enter the house while the rest of the team posted themselves outside to secure the area. Fermindoza was instructed to come out after she was given a bio-data form, which will serve as the team's cue to enter the house.4Fermindoza introduced herself as a job applicant to a man and a woman, apparently the owners of the house, and went inside. There, she saw another woman, later identified as Jasmine, coming out of the bathroom. The man to whom Fermindoza earlier introduced herself told Jasmine that Fermindoza was applying for a position. Jasmine, who was then only wearing a towel, told her that she would just get dressed. Jasmine then came back and asked Fermindoza what position she was applying for. Fermindoza replied that she was applying to be a babysitter or any other work so long as she could go abroad. Jasmine then gave her an application form.A few minutes later, a certain Carol arrived. Jasmine informed Carol that Fermindoza was an applicant. Fermindoza asked Carol what the requirements were and whether she (Fermindoza) was qualified. Carol told Fermindoza that if she had a passport, she could fill up the application papers. Fermindoza replied that she had no passport yet. Carol said she need not worry since Jasmine will prepare the passport for her. While filling up the application form, three women who appeared to be friends of Jasmine arrived to follow up the result of their applications and to give their advance payment. Jasmine got their papers and put them on top of a small table. Fermindoza then proceeded to the door and signaled to the raiding party by raising her hand.Capt. Mendoza asked the owners of the house, a married couple, for permission to enter the same. The owners granted permission after the raiding party introduced themselves as members of the CIS. Inside the house, the raiding party saw some supposed applicants. Application forms, already filled up, were in the hands of one Mrs. Carol Figueroa. The CIS asked Figueroa if she had a permit to recruit. Figueroa retorted that she was not engaged in recruitment. Capt. Mendoza nevertheless proceeded to arrest Figueroa. He took the application forms she was holding as the raiding party seized the other papers5on the table.6The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a certain Jasmine Alejandro, and the three women suspected to be applicants, to the office for investigation.7In the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra. The accused was not able to present any authority to recruit when asked by the investigators.8A check by Ramos with the POEA revealed that the acused was not licensed Page 35 of 46

or authorized to conduct recruitment.9A certification10dated February 2, 1994 stating thus was executed by Renegold M. Macarulay, Officer-in-Charge of the POEA.The CIS likewise interviewed the supposed applicants, Lourdes Modesto, Nancy Araneta and Jennelyn Baez, all registered nurses working at the Cabato Medical Hospital, who executed their respective written statements.11At the trial, Nancy Araneta, 23, recounted that she was at Jasmine Alejandro's house in the afternoon of January 30, 1994. Araneta had learned from Sandra Aquino, also a nurse at the Cabato Medical Hospital, that a woman was there to recruit job applicants for Singapore.Araneta and her friends, Jennelyn Baez and Sandra Aquino, arrived at Jasmine's house at around 4:30 p.m. Jasmine welcomed them and told them to sit down. They listened to the "recruiter" who was then talking to a number of people. The recruiter said that she was "recruiting" nurses for Singapore. Araneta and her friends then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. They were also told to pay P2,000, and "the rest will be salary deduction." Araneta submitted her bio-data form to Carol that same afternoon, but did not give any money because she was "not yet sure."On the day of the raid on February 2, 1994, Araneta was again at the Alejandro residence to submit her transcript of records and her picture. She arrived at the house 30 minutes before the raid but did not witness the arrest since she was at the porch when it happened.12Maria Lourdes Modesto, 26, was also in Jasmine Alejandro's house on January 30, 1994. A friend of Jasmine had informed her that there was someone recruiting in Jasmine's house. Upon arriving at the Alejandro residence, Lourdes was welcomed by Jasmine.1wphi1.ntLourdes recalled that Carol Figueroa was already briefing some people when she arrived. Carol Figueroa asked if they would like a "good opportunity" since a hospital was hiring nurses. She gave a breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction.Lourdes filled up the application form and submitted it to Jasmine. After the interview, she gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured Lourdes that she was authorized to receive the money. On February 2, 1994, however, Lourdes went back to the house to get back the money. Jasmine gave back the money to Lourdes after the raid.13Denial comprised the accused's defense.Carol dela Piedra, 37, is a housewife and a resident of Cebu City. Her husband is a businessman from Cebu, the manager of the Region 7 Branch of the Grollier International Encyclopedia. They own an apartment in Cebu City, providing lodging to students.The accused claimed that she goes to Singapore to visit her relatives. She first traveled to Singapore on August 21, 1993 as a tourist, and came back to the Philippines on October 20 of the same year. Thereafter, she returned to Singapore on December 10, 1993.On December 21, 1993, while in Singapore, the accused was invited to a Christmas party sponsored by the Zamboanga City Club Association. On that occasion, she met a certain Laleen Malicay, who sought her help. A midwife, Malicay had been working in Singapore for six (6) years. Her employer is a certain Mr. Tan, a close friend of Carol.According to the accused, Malicay sent P15,000 home for her father who was then seriously ill. Malicay was not sure, however, whether her father received the money so she requested the accused to verify from her relatives receipt thereof. She informed the accused that she had a cousin by the name of Jasmine Alejandro. Malicay gave the accused Jasmine's telephone number, address and a sketch of how to get there.The accused returned to the country on January 21, 1994. From Cebu City, the accused flew to Zamboanga City on January 23, 1994 to give some presents to her friends.On January 30, 1994, the accused called up Jasmine Alejandro, Laleen Malicay's cousin, to inform her that she would be going to her house. At around noon that day, the accused, accompanied by her friend Hilda Falcasantos, arrived at the house where she found Jasmine entertaining some friends. Jasmine came down with two of her friends whom she introduced as her classmates. Jasmine told them that the accused was a friend of Laleen Malicay.The accused relayed to Jasmine Malicay's message regarding the money the latter had sent. Jasmine assured her that they received the money, and asked Carol to tell Malicay to send more money for medicine for Malicay's mother. Jasmine also told her that she would send something for Malicay when the accused goes back to Singapore. The accused replied that she just needed to confirm her flight back to Cebu City, and will return to Jasmine's house. After the meeting with Jasmine, the accused went shopping with Hilda Falcasantos. The accused was in the house for only fifteen (15) minutes.On February 2, 1994, the accused went to the Philippine Airlines office at 7:30 in the morning to confirm her 5:30 p.m. flight to Cebu City. She then proceeded to Jasmine's residence, arriving there at past 8 a.m.Inside the house, she met a woman who asked her, "Are you Carol from Singapore?" The accused, in turn, asked the woman if she could do anything for her. The woman inquired from Carol if she was recruiting. Carol replied in the negative, explaining that she was there just to say goodbye to Jasmine. The woman further asked Carol what the requirements were if she (the woman) were to go to Singapore. Carol replied that she would need a passport.Two (2) minutes later, three (3) girls entered the house looking for Jasmine. The woman Carol was talking with then stood up and went out. A minute after, three (3) members of the CIS and a POEA official arrived. A big man identified himself as a member of the CIS and informed her that they received a call that she was recruiting. They told her she had just interviewed a woman from the CIS. She denied this, and said that she came only to say goodbye to the occupants of the house, and to get whatever Jasmine would be sending for Laleen Malicay. She even showed them her ticket for Cebu City.Erlie Ramos then went up to Jasmine's room and returned with some papers. The accused said that those were the papers that Laleen Malicay requested Jasmine to give to her (the accused). The accused surmised that because Laleen Malicay wanted to go home but could not find a replacement, one of the applicants in the forms was to be her (Malicay's) substitute. Ramos told the accused to explain in their office.The accused denied in court that she went to Jasmine's residence to engage in recruitment. She claimed she came to Zamboanga City to visit her friends, to whom she could confide since she and her husband were having some problems. She denied she knew Nancy Araneta or that she brought information sheets for job placement. She also denied instructing Jasmine to collect P2,000 from alleged applicants as processing fee.14The accused presented two witnesses to corroborate her defense.The first, Jasmine Alejandro, 23, testified that she met the accused for the first time only on January 30, 1994 when the latter visited them to deliver Laleen Malicay's message regarding the money she sent. Carol, who was accompanied by a certain Hilda Falcasantos, stayed in their house for 10 to 15 minutes only. Carol came back to the house a few days later on February 2 at around 8:00 in the morning to "get the envelope for the candidacy of her daughter." Jasmine did not elaborate.Jasmine denied that she knew Nancy Araneta or Lourdes Modesto. She denied that the accused conducted recruitment. She claimed she did not see Carol distribute bio-data or application forms to job applicants. She disclaimed any knowledge regarding the P2,000 application fee.15The other defense witness, Ernesto Morales, a policeman, merely testified that the accused stayed in their house in No. 270 Tugbungan, Zamboanga City, for four (4) days before her arrest, although she would sometimes go downtown alone. He said he did not notice that she conducted any recruitment.16On May 5, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused, thus:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration[s][,] this Court finds the accused Carol dela Piedra alias Carol Llena and Carol Figueroa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P100,000.00, and also to pay the costs.Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is entitled to the full time of the period of her detention during the pendency of this case under the condition set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.SO ORDERED.17The accused, in this appeal, ascribes to the trial court the following errors:IWITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING SEC. 13 (B) OF P.D. 442[,] AS AMENDED[,] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL.IIWITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE APPREHENDING TEAM COMPOSED OF POEA AND CIS REPRESENTATIVES ENTERED INTO [sic] THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, AND ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF, SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING AS PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE III, SECTION 3, (2) OF THE SAME CONSTITUTION;IIIWITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THAT WHEN SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA ENTERED THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO, THERE WAS NO CRIME COMMITTED WHATSOEVER, HENCE THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL;[IV]WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED;VWITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DETECTING THAT NANCY ARANETA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED SHOULD BE EXONERATED;VIWITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REALIZING THAT MARIA LOURDES MODESTO WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE EXCULPATED;VIIWITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS CHARGED WITH LARGE SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ON JANUARY 30, 1994, THE DATE STATED IN THE INFORMATION AS THE DATE OF THE CRIME, BUT ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED ON FEB. 2, 1994 AND ALL THE EVIDENCES [sic] INDICATED [sic] THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME WERE [sic] COMMITTED ON FEB. 2, 1994, HENCE, THE INFORMATION IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE;VIIIWITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT WAS COMMITTED NOT ON [sic] LARGE SCALE, HENCE, THE PENALTY SHOULD NOT BE LIFE IMPRISONMENT;IXWITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THOSE EVIDENCES [sic] SEIZED AT THE HOUSE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO AND PRESENTED TO THE COURT WERE PLANTED BY A BOGUS ATTORNEY[,] ERLIE S. RAMOS OF THE POEA;XWITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT EVEN A SINGLE CENTAVO FROM THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WHO DID NOT SUFFER DAMAGE IN ANY MANNER, YET SHE WAS CONVICTED TO SERVE HER ENTIRE LIFE BEHIND PRISON BARS. SUCH PUNISHMENT WAS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, HENCE, A WANTON VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.18In the first assigned error, appellant maintains that the law defining "recruitment and placement" violates due process. Appellant also avers, as part of her sixth assigned error, that she was denied the equal protection of the laws.We shall address the issues jointly.Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining "recruitment and placement" is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process clause.19Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.20A criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness.21The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.22We reiterated these principles inPeople vs. Nazario:23As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.We added, however, that:x x x the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, inCoates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by." Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because one may never know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.'"Coateshighlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise languagebut which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrasedin which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.Here, the provision in question reads:ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.x x x.When undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, recruitment activities are punishable as follows:ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.x x x.Art. 39. Penalties. (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein:(b) Any licensee or holder of authority found violating or causing another to violate any provision of this Title or its implementing rules and regulations, shall upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than five years or a fine of not less than P10,000 nor more than P50,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;(c) Any pe