Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R.
No. 93699 September 10, 1993RAMON PRIETO, PACIFICO CANILLO, and
WILFREDO AZUELA,petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
AR and SONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORP., SAUDI SERVICES and
OPERATING COMPANY, LTD., and SAUDI ARABIAN
MORRISON,respondents.Capuyan & Quimpo Law Office for
petitioners.Carag, Caballes, Jamora, Rodriguez & Somera Law
Offices for private respondent.CRUZ,J.:The petitioners seek
modification of the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission dated May 31, 1990, reversing the decision of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration dated July 24, 1989.
It is averred that the public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in ruling in favor of the private respondents, contrary
to the evidence on record.This case arose from a complaint filed by
Ramon Prieto, Pacifico Canillo and Wilfredo Azuela against AR and
Sons International Development Corporation, Saudi Services and
Operations Co. Ltd., and Saudi Arabian Morrison.1Their claim was
for non-payment of wages, illegal dismissal, illegal exaction of
placement fees, illegal imposition of performance bond,
substitution of contract and deployment of workers to an
unaccredited principal.The complainants alleged they were recruited
by AR and Sons International Development Corporation (AR and Sons)
for employment for a period of 24 months with Saudi Services and
Operating Co., Ltd. (SSOC) in Saudi Arabia. The corresponding
Agency Worker Agreements, which were duly approved by the POEA,
provided for their respective positions and salaries as
follows:Name Position Salary (per month inUS Dollars)Prieto
Mechanic A/C $370.00Azuela Mechanic A/C $370.00Canillo Clerk
$420.00Later, however, taking advantage of their need for
employment, the respondent placement agency coerced them into
signing another employment contract with Saudi Arabia Morrison
(SAM) without the knowledge and approval of the POEA. The second
contract gave all three of them the lower positions of assistant
cook with a salary of only SR625.00 per month for a period of three
years.2The complainants said that when they reached Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia, in November 1987, they were asked to sign still another
employment contract by a certain Muhammad Abbas, a representative
of SAM, which would further lower their salaries to SR250.00 a
month. When they refused, they were not assigned any work but were
confined in a small room in a villa and given spoiled food for
their sustenance. On December 22, 1987, they were summarily
dismissed and repatriated to the Philippines.3The respondents
denied the charges and said that the complainants entered into
separate uniform Agency Worker Agreements where it was stipulated
that they would be employed by SSOC for 24 months upon departure
from the Philippines. When the petitioners arrived in Jeddah, it
was discovered that Prieto and Azuela were not qualified as
mechanics and that Canillo was not qualified as clerk, so all three
of them were rejected. The complainants then requested SSOC to help
them secure employment as assistant cooks with SAM, which at that
time was also a foreign principal of AR and Sons. Taking pity on
them, SSOC referred them to the latter agency but they also failed
to pass the trade tests for assistant cooks. It was for this reason
that they were finally repatriated to the Philippines at the
expense of the latter agency.After considering the evidence and
arguments of the parties, the POEA held in favor of the
complainants. The dispositive portion of its decision decreed as
follows:WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered ordering AR & SONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and SAUDI ARABIAN MORRISON to pay jointly and severally
complainants Ramon Prieto, Pacifico Canillo and Wilfredo Azuela the
following amounts to be paid in Philippine Currency at the
prevailing rate of exchange at the rate of actual payment:1. for
Ramon Prietoa) SIX HUNDRED SIXTEEN US DOLLARS AND 67/100
(US$616.67) representing his salaries from November 2, 1987 to
December 22, 1987;b) EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY THREE US
DOLLARS AND 33/100 (US$8,263.33) representing his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract.2. for Pacifico
Canilloa) SIX HUNDRED TEN US DOLLARS (US$610.00) representing his
salaries from November 12, 1987 to December 22, 1987;b) NINE
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY US DOLLARS (US$9,470.00) representing
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract.3. for Wilfredo Azuelaa) SIX HUNDRED SIXTEEN US DOLLARS
AND 67/100 (US$616.67) representing his salaries from November 2,
1987 to December 22, 1987;b) EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SIXTY THREE
US DOLLARS AND 33/100 (US$8,263.33) representing his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract; and4. FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorney's fees.SO
ORDERED.The decision was reversed by the NLRC, which ordered the
dismissal of the complaint. The NLRC found that the complainants
had misrepresented themselves as mechanics and cooks when they were
not qualified for these positions and so had only themselves to
blame if they were subsequently rejected by a foreign employer.The
factual findings of administrative bodies are as a rule binding on
this Court, but this is true only when they do not come under the
established exceptions. One of these is where the findings of the
POEA and the NLRC are contrary to each other,4as in this case, and
there is a necessity to determine which of them should be preferred
as more conformable to the established facts.A study of the two
decisions, together with the evidence and the arguments adduced by
the parties, inclines the Court in favor of the POEA.We reject the
respondents' argument that the petitioners' services were
terminated because they were not qualified either as mechanics or
as assistant cooks. It is presumed that before their deployment,
the petitioners were subjected to the trade tests required by law
to be conducted by the recruiting agency to insure employment of
only technically qualified workers for the foreign principal. There
was no misrepresentation on the part of the petitioners. They had
applied as A/C mechanics and clerk, and we may assume that the
trade tests conducted on them were for these positions and not for
the position of assistant cook. If they fell short of the
employer's expectations, the fault lies not with the petitioners
but with the recruiting agency for deploying them even if they did
not possess the skills necessary for the positions they were
seeking.As we said in one case:5. . . Moreover, before the private
respondents were hired they were lengthily interviewed by a
representative of the foreign employer, Modern System. They must
have passed, otherwise, they would not have been hired. They must
also be subjected to a trade test because this is one of the
requirements for employment abroad. Thirdly, the private
respondents were not given sufficient time to prove their fitness
for the positions they were hired. Two weeks for this purpose is
not enough.The private respondents point to the petitioners'
allegation in their complaint that they were mere assistant cooks
and argue that this belies their representation that they did not
apply for these positions. The argument has no merit. The
petitioners were not assisted by lawyers when they filed their
complaint and must have had in mind the positions stipulated in the
second contract. In the amended complaint, this statement was
rectified. At any rate, the slight error must not be taken against
the petitioners. As we held inCuadra v.NLRC,6"our overseas workers
are mostly ordinary laborers not conversant with legal principles
and with the manner they can assert and protect rights. They have
no compatriot lawyers to consult and no labor unions to support
them in the foreign land. . . . The claims of our overseas workers
should therefore be received with sympathy and allowed, if
warranted, conformably to the constitutional mandate for the
protection of the working class."We find no basis either for the
conclusion of the NLRC that there was noemployer-employee
relationship between the parties. The record shows that the
petitioners became employees of Saudi Services and Operating
Company, Ltd., and later of Saudi Arabian Morrison, both entities
being represented by AR and Sons International Development
Corporation, which admitted in its Comment that the petitioners
were "hired and deployed abroad . . ." This relationship is even
more firmly supported by the Agency Worker Agreements between the
petitioners and AR and Sons acting for SSOC which were approved by
the POEA under Accreditation Certificate No 8181,7and by the second
contract under which the petitioners were deployed to SAM, its
other principal, by AR and Sons.8Article 279 of the Labor Code
provides:Art. 279. Security of Tenure In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this title.
An employee who was unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without lose of seniority rights and to his
backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld from
him up to the time of reinstatement.Where the employer-employee
relationship has been established, the burden of proof in
termination cases lies with the employer.9This burden was not
discharged by the private respondents. It is clear form the record
that the petitioners were hired as mechanics and clerk (or as
assistant cooks under the second contract) after presumably having
passed the corresponding trade tests conducted by the recruiting
agency prior to their deployment. If AR and Sons felt they were not
qualified for these positions, it should have rejected their
applications outright instead of accepting their recruitment fees
just the same and assuring them that their employment had already
been approved by the foreign principal. It was the fault of AR and
Sons for holding the petitioners to its foreign principal as
qualified when they were found later to be deficient. As a result
of its negligence, if not its deliberate misrepresentation, the
petitioners found themselves stranded in a foreign land, without
the employment and income that they hoped would give them a better
life.The principle of "no work, no pay" does not apply in this case
for, as correctly pointed out by POEA, the fact that the
complainants had not worked at the jobsite was not of their own
doing. If they were not able to work at all, it was because they
refused to sign the third contract providing for another lowering
of their salaries in violation of their first agreement as approved
by the POEA. They had a right to insist on the higher salaries
agreed upon in the original contract and to reject the subsequent
impositions of SAM, which obviously thought the petitioners would
have to accept because they had no choice.Rule V, Book I of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code defines the duties and
obligations of a duly licensed placement and recruitment agency.
Section 2(e) requires a private employment agency to assume all
responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of
employment of an overseas worker. Section 10(a) (2) provides that a
private employment agency can be sued jointly and severally with
the principal or foreign-based employer for any violation of the
recruitment agreement or the contract of employment.Book II, Rule
II, Section 1(f) (3) of the new Rules and Regulations Governing
Overseas Employment promulgated by the Governing Board of the POEA
substantially reiterates Rule II of Book II, Section 1(d) (3) of
1985 POEA Rules, which governs this case. It provides that a
private employment agency shall assume joint and solidary liability
with the employer for all claims and liabilities that may arise in
connection with the implementation of the contracts including but
not limited to payment of wages, health and disability compensation
and repatriation. There is no doubt that, under the facts
established in this case, AR and Sons is jointly and solidarily
liable with overseas employer SAM for the claims of the
petitioners.The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by
our overseas workers in the foreign land where they have ventured,
usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future.
Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment,
sub-human lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are only
a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by their
foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in
their own country. While these workers may indeed have relatively
little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that
disadvantage must not continue to burden them when they return to
their own territory to voice their muted complaint. There is no
reason why, in their very own land, the protection of our own laws
cannot be extended to them in full measure for the redress of their
grievances.WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the NLRC dated May
31, 1980 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The POEA decision dated July
24, 1989 is REINSTATED, with costs against the private
respondents.SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 106027 July 25, 1994BPI CREDIT
CORPORATION,Petitioner,v.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
BENJAMIN JOVELLANOS,Respondents.Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez &
Gatmaitan for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law librarySevero S.
Jovellanos for private respondent.PUNO,J.:The most frequently
assaulted right of workers is their right to security of tenure.
The Constitution shields this right against unjustified attacks.
The petition at bench represents another attempt to negate this
constitutional right of workers to security of tenure. It cannot
succeed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe
records show that private respondent Benjamin Jovellanos is the
Marketing Assistant of petitioner BPI Family Bank, Dagupan City
branch. Ricardo Torio worked as Credit Investigator Appraiser in
the same bank.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryOn July 8, 1987, a certain Alex Racimo executed an Affidavit
linking Jovellanos and Torio to certain anomalies,viz:(1) That I
obtained a loan from the BPI Family Bank, Dagupan City in the
amount of P200,000.00;chanrobles virtual law library(2) That in the
processing of my application for this loan I had dealt with RIC
TORIO, an old acquaintance;chanrobles virtual law library(3) That
in the beginning when I was still applying for a loan I was made to
believe by RIC TORIO that I will not pay any charges except the
application fee in the sum of P500.00, which still be refunded to
me upon release of my approved loan;chanrobles virtual law
library(4) That when my loan was released the above named person
approached me and demanded from me something which they termed it
for the boys and he mentioned the name of BEN JOVELLANOS a
co-employee at the BPI Credit Corporation, Dagupan City;chanrobles
virtual law library(5) That out of gratitude I was handling to him
the sum of P1,000.00 but he ignored it and instead he told me that
he ought to charge five (5%) of the total amount of the approved
loan, upon release, but considering that we were friends, 2% would
be enough;chanrobles virtual law library(6) That I tried to bargain
with him that he accepts the P1,000.00 and just as soon as I sell
my property in Dagupan, I will give him the remaining P3,000.00,
but he declined and turned his back towards me;chanrobles virtual
law library(7) That I found it very strange because instead of
being refunded the amount of P500.00 which I paid as application
fee, said person is collecting from me a certain percentage of my
approved loan; . . . .Upon receipt of the affidavit, petitioner
confronted respondent Jovellanos on August 12, 1987. According to
the petition, Gaspar Antonio de los Santos, AVP of petitioner ". .
. brought up the subject as he and Jovellanos wereon their way
homefrom a staff presentation at about 9:45 p.m."1It is also stated
that Santos ". . . confronted Jovellanos about the contents of the
affidavitwithout naming Racimo as its author."2Respondent
Jovellanos was also instructed to report to the head office of the
petitioner on August 17, 1987.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law libraryOn August 17, 1987, petitioner alleged that de
los Santos "once more brought up the matter of the reported
irregularities with Jovallanos."3On this occasion, according to
petitioner, de los Santos "named Racimo and readportionsof his
(Racimo's) affidavit."4Thereafter, de los Santos served the notice
of preventive suspension on Jovellanos signed by Socorro Lantin,
another AVP of petitioner.5The notice reads:Please be advised that
pending investigation of the reported irregular transactions
pertaining to Real Estate Mortgage Loans of which you are
CI-Appraiser with the end in view of ascertaining degree of
responsibility and/or extent of violation of Bank policies and
regulations as well as possible losses to the Bank, you are hereby
relieved of your duties and placed under preventive
suspensioneffective
immediately.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryIn the meantime, you are free to submit whatever
explanation/statement you may have about the incident or any
information that could held in the prove of the reported
anomally.Respondent Jovellanos denied the charge against him. He
said he did not know Racimo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law libraryOn August 20, 1987, respondent Jovellanos wrote
a letter to Lantin seeking to lift his preventive suspension.
Attached to the letter was his Affidavit which reads:That I was
made aware of the affidavit executed by Alex Racimo of Binalonan,
Pangasinan before the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, which contained among others, Alex Racimo's
statement.(a) that Ric Torio asked Alex Racimo some money in return
to the approval of his loan with BPI Credit Corporation;chanrobles
virtual law library(b) That in asking the money, Ric Torio
represented to Alex Racimo that I was the one who instructed Ric
Torio to make the demand;That I never instructed Ric Torio to ask
for money from Alex Racimo nor I ever connived with him to ask or
demand for money; and in fact and in truth I did not know that Ric
Torio asked for money from Alex Racimo;chanrobles virtual law
libraryThat if I had known that Ric Torio used my name, I would not
have consented to it;chanrobles virtual law libraryThat I have not
engaged myself in any irregular or anomalous transaction in
relation to my duties and responsibilities as marketing assistant
with BPI Credit Corporation.Likewise attached was the Sworn
Clarificatory Statement of Racimo,viz:That I previously executed an
affidavit before the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan;chanrobles virtual law libraryThat in said
affidavit, I stated that Ric Torio upon the instruction of Ben
Jovellanos asked me money in return to the approval of my loan with
BPI Credit Corporation;chanrobles virtual law libraryThat in
fairness to Ben Jovellanos, I should like to clarify my statement
as follows:chanrobles virtual law library(a) That Ben Jovellanos
never personally approached me or asked me for money;chanrobles
virtual law library(b) That I did not have any basis to tell
whether Ben Jovellanos really instructed or convinced (sic) with
Ric Torio in asking money; hence Ben Jovellanos might have just
been used by Ric Torio in asking money.Respondent Jovellanos
bewailed the failure of petitioner to give the details of the
"reported irregular transactions to real estate mortgage
loans."6chanrobles virtual law libraryRespondent's preventive
suspension was not lifted. Instead, it was extended as petitioner
formed a committee7to investigate the reported irregularities.
According to the petition, the result of the investigation is as
follows:8xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library7. The results of
the investigation, which were affirmed under oath by the head of
the audit/investigating team, revealed the following: On the
solicitation of a percentage of the approved loans, the team
visited ten (10) clients of BPI Credit other than Mr. Alex Racimo
to verify whether the employees were demanding for a percentage of
the approved loans. The team was able to talk to seven (7) clients
with the following results:(a) Five (5) clients said that the
employees did not ask them for any consideration for the approval
of their loans.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library(b) Two (2) clients said that they were approached by the
employees for certain considerations. They were, however, hesitant
to give their written statements, probably afraid that the
employees would avenge them.One of them, Imelda Ico, said that
Torio and Jovellanos asked her for a "blow out" on two separate
occasions; the first was when she filed her loan application, and
later, when her loan was approved. She, thus, tendered two "blow
outs" which Torio and Jovellanos, together with ten to thirteen of
their friends attended. The client also informed the team that
before she applied for a loan at BPI Credit, she was forewarned by
her friends of certain employees who reportedly demand a percentage
of the approved loan.The other, Angelita Reminguer, said that
Jovellanos asked for five percent of the approved loan
(P800,000.00) while the second release of her construction loan was
being processed. She complained to SAM PS Coquia of BPI Dagupan
Branch who advised her not to give in to the demand. SAM PS Coquia
relayed the client's complaint to the Manager of the Dagupan Branch
and the Business Center Head.8. With respect to the overvaluation
of properties, twelve (12) properties previously appraised, by
Torio were re-appraised by the appraiser of BPI Dagupan Business
Center. Torio's appraisal of two of these properties varied
considerably from the figures reached when these were re-appraised.
The first property which was owned by Pedro/Victoria Revote and
subject of a real estate mortgage as security for a P100,000.00
loan, was appraised by Torio on 3 July 1986 as follows:Land: 287
sq. m. @ 400/sq.m. P114,800,00Bungalow: 130.35 sq.m. @ 2,300/sq. m.
299,000.00-----Total: Appraised Value P413,800,00chanrobles virtual
law libraryTorio did not subject the property to depreciation since
the "Estimated Remaining Economic Life based on Present Physical
condition" equaled the "Normal Economic Life for Type of Building."
The bungalow, moreover, was reported to be
well-maintained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library9. On the other hand, Jorge Monje, Appraiser of BPI Dagupan
Branch submitted a markedly different appraisal of the property on
4 September 1987. He depreciated the bungalow based on the
estimated remaining life of seven years:Land: 287 sq. m. @ 400/sq .
m. P114,800.00Improvement:10.35 sq. m. @2,300/sq.m. 299,806.00Less:
72% depreciation(based on estimatedremaining life of7 years)
215,859.00 83,946.00Total Appraised value P198,746.00chanrobles
virtual law libraryMonje also found that the improvement, which was
built in 1969, was not properly maintained. Mr. John Cornel, an
appraiser of Dagupan Business Center who accompanied Monje during
the inspection, appraised the property at P222,729.00. The
difference of P23,983.00 from the appraisal of Jorge Monje was due
to the lower depreciation rated adopted by Cornel. Compared to the
appraisals made by Monje and Cornel, Torio appraised the property
at twice its value. Moreover, the fact that the property was
foreclosed by the Rural Bank of Malsiqui on 17 September 1984 and
redeemed by the borrowers on 1 October 1984, was not reflected on
the Loan Offering Memo addressed to the Credit Committee. This Loan
Offering Memo was signed by Marketing AssistantBenjamin Jovellanos.
That he signed the same was never denied by him. He likewise never
bothered to explain why he, knowing that the collateral had a
history of foreclosure and defaults, omitted mentioning this
important fact in the Loan Offering Memo.Respondent Jovellanos was
then served a Notice of Termination effective November 25, 1987 on
the ground of wilfull breach of trust. Jovellanos countered by
filing a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages. On September
5, 1990, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Respondent Jovellanos,
thus:Wherefore, consistent with the foregoing tenor, judgment is
hereby rendered, to wit:chanrobles virtual law library1. As to
complainant Benjamin Jovellanos, respondent is guilty of illegal
dismissal, accordingly, respondent BPI Credit Corporation is
ordered, as follows:chanrobles virtual law librarya) To reinstate
immediately complainant Benjamin Jovellanos to his former position
or equivalent thereto without loss of seniority rights or at the
option of respondent BPI CREDIT CORPORATION, payroll
reinstatement;chanrobles virtual law libraryb) To pay complainant
Benjamin Jovellanos two (2) years backwages without qualification
or deduction in the amount of SEVENTY SIX THOUSAND AND EIGHT
HUNDRED PESOS (P76,800.00); andchanrobles virtual law libraryc) To
pay attorney's fees ten percent (10%) of the judgment award in the
amount of P7,680.00.Petitioner appealed to the respondent NLRC. On
December 20, 1991, the Third Division of the respondent NLRC,
affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter except that it deleted the
award of attorney's fees in favor of respondent
Jovellanos.9Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by
the respondent commission on April 30, 1992.10chanrobles virtual
law libraryIn this petition forcertiorari, petitioner
argues:ARGUMENTSIchanrobles virtual law libraryTHE HONORABLE
COMMISSION COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS NO JUST CAUSE FOR THE DISMISSAL OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.IIchanrobles virtual law libraryTHE HONORABLE COMMISSION
COMMITTED A GROSS MISAPPRECIATION OF THE ATTENDANT FACTS AND OF THE
APPLICABLE LAW IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER DID NOT OBSERVE DUE
PROCESS BEFORE TERMINATING PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S SERVICES.We find no
merit in the petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law libraryPetitioner's submissions ignore the prosecution accorded
by our Constitution to the worker's precious right to security of
tenure. The enthronement of the worker's right to security of
tenure in our fundamental law was not achieved overnight. For all
its liberality towards labor, our 1935 Constitution did not elevate
the right as a constitutional right. For a long time, the worker's
security of tenure had only the protective mantle of statutes and
their interpretative rules and regulations. It was an uncertain
protection that sometimes yielded to the political permutations of
the times. It took labor nearly four decades of sweat and tears to
persuade our people thru their leaders, to exalt the worker's right
to security of tenure as a sacrosanct constitutional right. It was
Article II, section 2 of our 1973 Constitution that declared as a
policy that the State shall assure the right of workers to security
of tenure. The 1987 Constitution is even more solicitous of the
welfare of labor. Section 3 of its Article XIII mandates that the
State shall afford full protection to labor and declares that all
workers shall be entitled to security of tenure. Among the
enunciated State policies are the promotion of social justice11and
a just and dynamic social order.12In contrast, the prerogative of
management to dismiss a worker, as an aspect of property right, has
never been endowed with a constitutional
status.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryThe
unequivocal constitutional declaration that all workers shall be
entitled to security of tenure spurred our lawmakers to strengthen
the protective walls around this hard earned right. The right was
protected from undue infringement both by our substantive and
procedural laws. Thus, the causes for dismissing employees were
more defined and restricted;13on the other hand, the procedure of
termination was also more clearly delineated.14These substantive
and procedural laws must be strictly complied with before a worker
can be dismissed from his
employment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
libraryPrescinding from these premises, we affirm the ruling of the
NLRC that private respondent was dismissed; in violation of his
right to procedural due process. Article 277(b) of the Labor Code
provides the procedure for terminating a worker,viz:xxx xxx
xxxchanrobles virtual law library(b) Subject to the constitutional
right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be
protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause
and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article
283 of this Code the employer shall furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a
statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter
ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance
with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to
guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any
decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the
right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his
dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the
employer. The Secretary of the Department of a Labor and Employment
may suspend the effects of the termination pending resolution of
the dispute in the event of aprima faciefinding by the appropriate
official of the Department of Labor and Employment before whom such
dispute is pending that the termination may cause a serious labor
dispute or is in implementation of a mass lay-off.In the case at
bench, petitioner did not give fair notice to private respondent of
the charges against him. According to the petitioner, on August 12,
1987, its Assistant Vice President de los Santos ". . . brought up
the subject as he and Jovellanoswere on their way home from a staff
presentation at about 9:45 p.m." He also ". . . confronted
Jovellanos about the contents of the affidavitwithout naming g
Racimo as its author." Such casualness and incompleteness of
information cannot satisfy the requirements of due process. Neither
could the notice of preventive suspension served on private
respondent on August 17, 1987 have any curative effect. A reading
of said notice will show that it required private respondent to
explain his participation in certain ". . . reported irregular
transactions pertaining to Real Estate Mortgage Loans of which you
are CI-Appraiser . . ." The lack of specificity or the generality
of the charge speaks for itself. Worse still, petitioner thereafter
conducted its ownex parteinvestigation without the participation of
the private respondent. It interviewed a certain Imelda Ico who
revealed that Jovellanos and Torio asked her for a "blow out" when
she filed her loan application, and later when her loan was
approved. Another woman, Angelita Reminguer, also declared that
Jovellanos asked for five percent (5%) of her approved loan. The
two, however, refused to give any sworn statement. Private
respondent who was not aware of the investigation was never given
an opportunity to disprove their accusation. Yet, primarily on the
basis of the damaging statements of Ico and Reminguer, petitioner
dismissed private respondent effective November 25, 1987 on the
ground of willful breach of trust. The opportunity of private
respondent to defend himself was thus more chimerical than
real.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryWe
also affirm the ruling of the NLRC that the evidence on record does
not justify the dismissal of the private respondent. Alex Racimo
retracted his affidavit implicating private respondent. The charges
made by Imelda Ico and Angelita Reminguer hardly had any
evidentiary value. As ruled by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC:As
gleaned from the record, other charges made against complainant
Jovellanos accusing him of soliciting percentage fee by a certain
Angelita Reminguer and Imelda Ico could not also be given credit.
Firstly, because it is an unsworn statement; Secondly, being mere
allegation unsupportive (sic) by corroborative evidence; Thirdly,
complainant Jovellanos was not aware of such accusation during his
confrontation with the assistant Vice-President of BPI Credit,
Gaspar Centino de los Santos. Neither was it specified in his
suspension order leading to his termination. It is pertinent
further, to note the fact that the foreclosure and redemption of a
real property not having been reflected on the loan offering memo
addressed to the Credit Committee could have been done
intentionally by complainant Jovellanos. For such omission, We
believe that complainant could not be solely responsible, since the
memo was also signed by the Business Center Head Francisco Nery and
Assistant Vice-President Bienvenido Manangun who are higher in rank
than complainant Jovellanos being merely marketing assistant. This
omission therefore, should not be taken against him and charge of
cooperating or lending assistance to the Credit Investigator in the
overvaluation of the appraisal of the property of a client of the
Bank.All these notwithstanding, petitioner insists that on ground
of loss of trust and confidence it can dismiss private respondent
considering the nature of his position as Marketing Assistant. It
posits the thesis that the dismissal can be justified as long as it
has "some basis" since the position of private respondent calls for
trust. Time does not stand still and petitioner ought to know that
this thesis has long been entombed by our Constitution which has
elevated the security of tenure of our workers to a constitutional
right. We hold that this right cannot be eroded, let alone be
forfeited except upon a clear and convincing showing of a just and
lawful cause. In the case at bench, it is not disputed that private
respondent has served the petitioner from April 23, 1976 up to
September 18, 1987 starting as credit investigator until he rose to
the position of Marketing Assistant. His eleven (11) years of
service with the petitioner has not been tainted with any kind of
dishonesty. We cannot allow petitioner to disregard this long
length of faithful service on the basis of evidence that is
hearsay, uncorroborated, and untrustworthy, otherwise, the tenurial
right of our workers would have but a scrap
value.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law libraryIN
VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no showing of
grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent in its
Decision of December 20, 1991. Costs against
petitioner.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
librarySO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN
BANCG.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO
CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
IMELDA SALAZAR,respondents.Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for
petitioner.Gerardo S. Alansalon for private
respondent.ROMERO,J.:For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it
would seem that her close association with Delfin Saldivar would
mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was
employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as
general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner as manager for
technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom private
respondent was allegedly very close.Sometime in 1984, petitioner
GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare parts
worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were
missing, caused the investigation of the latter's activities. The
report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's internal
auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered
into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company
with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering
Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by
Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken
petitioner's missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own
personal use without authorization and also connived with Yambao to
defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was
recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin
against Saldivar.1It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's
investigation that Imelda Salazar violated company reglations by
involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's
interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the
articles of partnership between Yambao and Saldivar. It also
appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of
the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her
employer.Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984,
petitioner company placed private respondent Salazar under
preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984,
thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side.
But instead of submitting an explanations three (3) days later or
on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended
to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits,
13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in
writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered
dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove these
findings.2After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated
July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner company to reinstate private
respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full
backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not
for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also ordered to pay
private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00.3On appeal, public
respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned
resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision
with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited
the backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award
for moral damages.4Hence, this petition assailing the Labor
Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent
were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years'
backwages.On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for
petitioner GMCR.The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which
pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his position as
technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive
action on any employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The
suspension of Salazar was further impelled by th.e discovery of the
missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment private
respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances,
preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to
the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive
suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the
employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain.
Such disciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the
company's property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance or
misfeasance committed by the employee.5Thus, it is not correct to
conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due
process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay
with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of
October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side
to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor
Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without
giving her employer a chance to evaluate her side of the
controversy.But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's
preventive suspension, we hold that her eventual separation from
employment was not for cause.What is the remedy in law to rectify
an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim who has not
merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a
property right of which a person is not to be deprived without due
process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to her
during the period when she was unemployed?Art. 279 of the Labor
Code, as amended, provides:Security of Tenure. In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this
Title.An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to
the time of his actual reinstatement.6(Emphasis supplied)Corollary
thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code:Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. In cases
of regular employments, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the
Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws.Sec. 3.
Reinstatement. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall by entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and to backwages."7(Emphasis supplied)Before proceeding any
furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution
has gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social
and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including
labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate
Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not
surprising that a whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and
Human Rights designed, among other things, to "protect and enhance
the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good."8Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the
other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice,viz., Labor
ranks ahead of such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources
Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing, Health, Women, Role and
Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human Rights.9The opening
paragraphs on Labor statesThe State shall affordfull protection to
labor,local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote
full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.It
shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law.
They shall be entitled tosecurity of tenure, humane conditions of
work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits is
may be provided by law.10(Emphasis supplied)Compare this with the
sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article
an Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:Sec.
9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall ensure the
rights of workers to self-organization, collective baegaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The
State may provide for compulsory arbitration.11To be sure, both
Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of
labor which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no
gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the present
Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford
the sector "full protection," at least greater protection than
heretofore accorded them, regardless of the geographical location
of the workers and whether they are organized or not.It was then
CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who
substantially contributed to the present formulation of the
protection to labor provision and proposed that the same be
incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the
Article on Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the
light of the special importance that we are giving now to social
justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of
social justice in national development."12If we have taken pains to
delve into the background of the labor provisions in our
Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right
of an employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a just
or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance
under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor
enjoys under the article on Social Justice. And this transcendent
policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code. Under its
terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been
proved by the aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the
employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or justness of
his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies
provided in Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with
this liberalized stancevis-a-vislabor, the legislature even went
further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on
March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible
ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered down
the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection."13To
go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an
authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private
respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to
reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages."14The intendment of
the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and
payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed
employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary
meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state,
conditione positions etc. from which one had been removed"15and in
the latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of
unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce
make her "whole."Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times
been thwarted when reinstatement has not been forthcoming and the
hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking
in.Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court
for denying reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law
applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in
view of the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or
because of the realities of the situation;16or that it would be
"inimical to the employer's interest; "17or that reinstatement may
no longer be feasible;18or, that it will not serve the best
interests of the parties involved;19or that the company would be
prejudiced by the workers' continued employment;20or that it will
not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have
transpired which make execution on that score unjust or
inequitable21or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant
atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or
"irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the
employee.22In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously
ordered the payment of backwages and separation pay23or solely
separation pay.24In the case at bar, the law is on the side of
private respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor
Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from workshallbe entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to
his full backwages. . . ."25Under the principlesof statutory
construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule orverba legisderived from
the maximindexanimi sermo est(speech is the index of intention)
rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by, the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and
preclude the court from construing it differently.26The legislature
is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute.27Verba legis non est recedendum,
or from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the
wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for
non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way
of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible
due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the
employee.In such cases, it should be proved that the employee
concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and
confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if
reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be
generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of
the employee concerned.A few examples, will suffice to illustrate
the Court's application of the above principles: where the employee
is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full
trust and confidence of top management;28or is the
Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he
works;29or is an organizer of a union who was in a position to
sabotage the union's efforts to organize the workers in commercial
and industrial establishments;30or is a warehouseman of a
non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and
maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations
to the Philippines;31or is a manager of its Energy Equipment
Sales.32Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be
applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can never be
possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered
between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human
nature.33Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid
and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who
shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service,
by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his
relationship with his employer had already become strained.34Here,
it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as
systems analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of
trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to
strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does
not constitute an exception to the general rule mandating
reinstatement for an employee who has been unlawfully dismissed.On
the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by
engaging in transactions that may have created conflict of interest
situations? Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of company
policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves with
any company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently,
when private respondent Salazar signed as a witness to the
partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in turn is
also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in
an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.However,
on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a
circumstance did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a
systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations
involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved
around the development of systems and analysis of designs on a
continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position
of trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and
company assets.In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its
dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we have held
countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a
valid ground for terminations it must rest an some basis which must
be convincingly established.35An employee who not be dismissed on
mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that
since Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it
"presumed reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with
Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation although
unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's
test.36While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an
employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion
derived from speculative inferences.To rely on the Maramara report
as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous because
the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's
alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical
operations' support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in
view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might
have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities.
Direct evidence implicating private respondent is wanting from the
records.It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came
out after Saldivar had already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984.
Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute management's
findings, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main
evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged
culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a chance to voice
his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination
should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there
existed independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as
well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the
records, we find her to have been unlawfully dismissed.WHEREFORE,
the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda
Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a
period of two (2) years only.This decision is immediately
executory.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD
DIVISIONG.R. No. 201701 June 3, 2013UNILEVER PHILIPPINES,
INC.,Petitioner,vs.MARIA RUBY M. RIVERA,Respondent.D E C I S I O
NMENDOZA,J.:Subject of this disposition is the petition for review
on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Unilever Philippines, Inc. (Unilever) questioning the
June 22, 2011 Decision2and the April 25, 2012 Resolution3of the
Court of Appeals (CA)-Cagayan de Oro City, in CA G.R. SP No.
02963-MIN, an Illegal Dismissal case filed by respondent Maria Ruby
M. Rivera (Rivera). The CA affirmed with modification the March 31,
2009 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
finding Rivera's dismissal from work to be valid as it was for a
just cause and declaring that she was not entitled to any
retirement benefit. The CA, however, awarded separation pay in her
favor as a measure of social justice.The FactsUnilever is a company
engaged in the production, manufacture, sale, and distribution of
various food, home and personal care products, while Rivera was
employed as its Area Activation Executive for Area 9 South in the
cities of Cotabato and Davao. She was primarily tasked with
managing the sales, distribution and promotional activities in her
area and supervising Ventureslink International, Inc.
(Ventureslink), a third party service provider for the companys
activation projects. Unilever enforces a strict policy that every
trade activity must be accompanied by a Trade Development Program
(TDP) and that the allocated budget for a specific activity must be
used for such activity only.4Sometime in 2007, Unilevers internal
auditor conducted a random audit and found out that there were
fictitious billings and fabricated receipts supposedly from
Ventureslink amounting toP11,200,000.00. It was also discovered
that some funds were diverted from the original intended projects.
Upon further verification, Ventureslink reported that the fund
deviations were upon the instruction of Rivera.On July 16, 2007,
Unilever issued a show-cause notice to Rivera asking her to explain
the following charges, to wit: a) Conversion and Misappropriation
of Resources; b) Breach of Fiduciary Trust; c) Policy Breaches; and
d) Integrity Issues.Responding through an email, dated July 16,
2007, Rivera admitted the fund diversions, but explained that such
actions were mere resourceful utilization of budget because of the
difficulty of procuring funds from the head office.5She insisted
that the diverted funds were all utilized in the companys
promotional ventures in her area of coverage.Through a letter,
dated August 23, 2007, Unilever found Rivera guilty of serious
breach of the companys Code of Business Principles compelling it to
sever their professional relations. In a letter, dated September
20, 2007, Rivera asked for reconsideration and requested Unilever
to allow her to receive retirement benefits having served the
company for fourteen (14) years already. Unilever denied her
request, reasoning that the forfeiture of retirement benefits was a
legal consequence of her dismissal from work.On October 19, 2007,
Rivera filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal and other monetary
claims against Unilever.On April 28, 2008, the Labor Arbiter (LA)
dismissed her complaint for lack of merit and denied her claim for
retirement benefits, but ordered Unilever to pay a proportionate
13th month pay and the corresponding cash equivalent of her unused
leave credits. The decretal portion of the LA decision
reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing for lack of merit the illegal dismissal complaint.
However, UNILEVER PHILIPPINES, INC. is hereby ordered to pay
complainant the total amount of PESOS: FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHTY
TWO & 90/100 ONLY (P57,082.90) representing proportionate 13th
month pay and unused leave credits.The complaint against individual
respondents Recto Sampang and Alejandro Concha are likewise
dismissed for it was not shown that they acted in bad faith in the
dismissal of complainant. Moreover, their legal personality is
separate and distinct from that of the corporation.All other money
claims are dismissed for lack of basis.6On appeal, the NLRC
partially granted Riveras prayer. In its Resolution, dated November
28, 2008, the NLRC held that although she was legally dismissed
from the service for a just cause, Unilever was guilty of violating
the twin notice requirement in labor cases. Thus, Unilever was
ordered to pay herP30,000.00 as nominal damages, retirement
benefits and separation pay. The dispositive portion
reads:WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the appeal is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 28 April 2008 is
hereby MODIFIED in the sense that respondent UNILEVER PHILIPPINES,
INC. is hereby ordered to pay the following sums:1. The amount
ofP30,000.00 representing nominal damages for violation of
complainants right to procedural due process;2. Retirement benefits
under the companys applicable retirement policy or written
agreement, and in the absence of which, to pay complainant her
retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary
for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months
being considered as one whole year;3. Separation pay under the
companys applicable policy or written agreement, and in the absence
of which, to pay separation pay equivalent to at least one-half
(1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at
least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.The rest of
the Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.7Unilever asked for a
reconsideration of the NLRC decision. In its Resolution, dated
March 31, 2009, the NLRC modified its earlier ruling by deleting
the award of separation pay and reducing the nominal damages
fromP30,000.00 toP20,000.00, but affirmed the award of retirement
benefits to Rivera. The fallo reads:WHEREFORE, foregoing premises
considered, the instant Motion for Partial Reconsideration is
PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolution dated 28 November 2008 of the
Commission is herebyRECONSIDERED as follows:(1)The award of
separation pay is hereby deleted for lack of factual and legal
basis; and(2)The award of nominal damages is hereby tempered and
reduced to the amount ofP20,000.00.The rest of the award for
retirement benefits is affirmed in toto.SO ORDERED.8Unsatisfied
with the ruling, Unilever elevated the case to CA-Cagayan de Oro
City via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.On June 22, 2011, the CA affirmed with modification the NLRC
resolution. Justifying the deletion of the award of retirement
benefits, the CA explained that, indeed, under Unilevers Retirement
Plan, a validly dismissed employee cannot claim any retirement
benefit regardless of the length of service. Thus, Rivera is not
entitled to any retirement benefit. It stated, however, that there
was no proof that she personally gained any pecuniary benefit from
her infractions, as her instructions were aimed at increasing the
sales efficiency of the company and competing in the local market.
For said reason, the CA awarded separation pay in her favor as a
measure of social justice.9The decretal portion of the CA decision
reads:WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution dated March 31, 2009 of
the NLRC (Branch 5), Cagayan De Oro City is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Consequently, UNILEVER is directed to pay MARIA RUBY
M. RIVERA the following:a) Separation pay, to be computed based on
the companys applicable policy or written agreement, or in the
absence thereof, the equivalent of at least one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6)
months being considered as one whole year;b)P20,000.00 as nominal
damages; andc) Proportionate 13th month pay and unused leave
credits, to be computed based on her salary during the period
relevant to the case.The award of retirement benefits is hereby
DELETED.SO ORDERED.10Unilever filed a motion for partial
reconsideration,11but it was denied in a Resolution, dated April
25, 2012.Hence, this petition.12In support of its position,
Unilever submits for consideration the followingG R O U N D SI.THE
COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
IN GRANTING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEFS IN FAVOR OF RIVERA EVEN IF SHE DID
NOT FILE ANY PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO CHALLENGE THE NLRC
RESOLUTIONS.II.THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING SEPARATION PAY IN FAVOR OF RIVERA
CONSIDERING THAT THE LATTER WAS VALIDLY DISMISSED FROM EMPLOYMENT
BASED ON JUST CAUSES UNDER THE LAW.III.THE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT
THE COMPANY VIOLATED RIVERAS RIGHT TO PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS BEFORE
TERMINATING HER EMPLOYMENT, AND CONSEQUENTLY, IN AWARDING NOMINAL
DAMAGES.13Unilever argues that Rivera did not file any separate
petition for certiorari before the CA. Neither did she file any
comment on its petition. Hence, it was erroneous for the CA to
grant an affirmative relief because it was inconsistent with the
doctrine that a party who has not appealed cannot obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted
in the appealed decision. The petitioner stresses that Rivera
misappropriated company funds amounting to millions of pesos and
that granting her separation pay undermines the serious misdeeds
she committed against the company. Moreover, the length of her
service with Unilever does not mitigate her offense, but even
aggravates the depravity of her acts.14The petition is partly
meritorious.The pivotal issue in the case at bench is whether or
not a validly dismissed employee, like Rivera, is entitled to an
award of separation pay.As a general rule, an employee who has been
dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article
28215of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation
pay.16Section 7, Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code provides:Sec. 7. Termination of employment by
employer. The just causes for terminating the services of an
employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of the Code. The
separation from work of an employee for a just cause does not
entitle him to the termination pay provided in the Code, without
prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and privileges he
may have under the applicable individual or collective agreement
with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice.In
exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted separation pay to
a legally dismissed employee as an act of "social justice" or on
"equitable grounds." In both instances, it is required that the
dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not
reflect on the moral character of the employee.17The leading case
of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs. NLRC18is instructive
on this point:We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be
allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances
where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.
Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual
intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or
illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not
be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or
financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the
ground of social justice.A contrary rule would, as the petitioner
correctly argues, have the effect, of rewarding rather than
punishing the erring employee for his offense. And we do not agree
that the punishment is his dismissal only and the separation pay
has nothing to do with the wrong he has committed. Of course it
has. Indeed, if the employee who steals from the company is granted
separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is not unlikely
that he will commit a similar offense in his next employment
because he thinks he can expect a like leniency if he is again
found out.1wphi1This kind of misplaced compassion is not going to
do labor in general any good as it will encourage the infiltration
of its ranks by those who do not deserve the protection and concern
of the Constitution.The policy of social justice is not intended to
countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the
underprivileged. At best, it may mitigate the penalty but it
certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is
an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient
is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege. Social justice
cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can
equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who
invoke social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and
their motives blameless and not simply because they happen to be
poor. This great policy of our Constitution is not meant for the
protection of those who have proved they are not worthy of it, like
the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the blemishes
of their own character.19In the subsequent case of Toyota Motor
Philippines Corporation Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National
Labor Relations Commission,20it was further elucidated that "in
addition to serious misconduct, in dismissals based on other
grounds under Art. 282 like willful disobedience, gross and
habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach of trust, and
commission of a crime against the employer or his family,
separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed
employee."21In Reno Foods, Inc, v. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa
(NLM)-Katipunan,22the Court wrote that "separation pay is only
warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the
employees fault, such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of
the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which
reinstatement is no longer feasible. It is not allowed when an
employee is dismissed for just cause."23In this case, Rivera was
dismissed from work because she intentionally circumvented a strict
company policy, manipulated another entity to carry out her
instructions without the companys knowledge and approval, and
directed the diversion of funds, which she even admitted doing
under the guise of shortening the laborious process of securing
funds for promotional activities from the head office. These
transgressions were serious offenses that warranted her dismissal
from employment and proved that her termination from work was for a
just cause. Hence, she is not entitled to a separation pay.More
importantly, Rivera did not appeal the March 31, 2009 ruling of the
NLRC disallowing the award of separation pay to her. It was
Unilever who elevated the case to the CA. It is axiomatic that a
party who does not appeal, or file a petition for certiorari, is
not entitled to any affirmative relief.24Due process prevents the
grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal.25An
appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief
where his purpose is to maintain the judgment, but he cannot seek
modification or reversal of the judgment or claim affirmative
relief unless he has also appealed.26It was, therefore, erroneous
for the CA to grant an affirmative relief to Rivera who did not ask
for it.Lastly, Unilever questions the grant of nominal damages in
favor of Rivera for its alleged non-observance of the requirements
of procedural due process. It insists that she was given ample
opportunity "to explain her side, interpose an intelligent defense
and adduce evidence on her behalf."27The Court is not persuaded.
Section 2, Rule XXIII, Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor
Code expressly states:Section 2. Standard of due process:
requirements of notice. In all cases of termination of employment,
the following standards of due process shall be substantially
observed.I. For termination of employment based on just causes as
defined in Article 282 of the Code:(a) A written notice served on
the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and
giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side;(b) A hearing or conference during which the
employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee
so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present
his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and(c) A
written notice of termination served on the employee indicating
that upon due consideration of all the circumstance, grounds have
been established to justify his termination.In case of termination,
the foregoing notices shall be served on the employees last known
address.King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac28detailed the steps
on how procedural due process can be satisfactorily complied with.
Thus:To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating
the services of employees:(1) The first written notice to be served
on the employees should contain the specific causes or grounds for
termination against them, and a directive that the employees are
given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a
reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules
means every kind of assistance that management must accord to the
employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense.
This should be construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar
days from receipt of the notice to give the employees an
opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union
official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the
defenses they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order
to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation
and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the
facts and circumstances that will serve as basis for the charge
against the employees. A general description of the charge will not
suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which
company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds
under Art. 282 is being charged against the employees.(2) After
serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct
a hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the
opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their defenses to the
charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their
defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented against them by the
management. During the hearing or conference, the employees are
given the chance to defend themselves personally, with the
assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice.
Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by the parties
as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.(3) After
determining that termination of employment is justified, the
employers shall serve the employees a written notice of termination
indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the charge against
the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been
established to justify the severance of their employment.29In this
case, Unilever was not direct and specific in its first notice to
Rivera. The words it used were couched in general terms and were in
no way informative of the charges against her that may result in
her dismissal from employment. Evidently, there was a violation of
her right to statutory due process warranting the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages. Hence, the Court finds no
compelling reason to reverse the award of nominal damages in her
favor. The Court, however, deems it proper to increase the award of
nominal damages fromP20,000.00 toP30,000.00, as initially awarded
by the NLRC, in accordance with existing jurisprudence.30WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.1wphi1The June 22, 2011
Decision and the April 25, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA)-Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. SP No. 02963-MIN are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. The dispositive portion should read as
follows:WHEREFORE, the March 31, 2009 Resolution of the NLRC
(Branch 5), Cagayan de Oro City, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. UNILEVER PHILIPPINES, INC., is hereby directed to pay
MARIA RUBY M. RIVERA the following:a)P30,000.00 as nominal damages;
andb) Proportionate 13th month pay and unused leave credits, to be
computed based on her salary during the period relevant to the
case.The award of retirement benefit is DELETED.SO ORDERED.Republic
of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 157010
June 21, 2005PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,petitioner,vs.FLORENCE O.
CABANSAG,respondent.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:The Court
reiterates the basic policy that all Filipino workers, whether
employed locally or overseas, enjoy the protective mantle of
Philippine labor and social legislations. Our labor statutes may
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or
stipulations agreed upon, in a foreign country.The CaseBefore us is
a Petition for Review onCertiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the July 16, 2002
Decision2and the January 29, 2003 Resolution3of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 68403. The assailed Decision dismissed
the CA Petition (filed by herein petitioner), which had sought to
reverse the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)s June 29,
2001 Resolution,4affirming Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustrias January
18, 2000 Decision.5The assailed CA Resolution denied herein
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.The FactsThe facts are
narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows:"In late 1998, [herein
Respondent Florence Cabansag] arrived in Singapore as a tourist.
She applied for employment, with the Singapore Branch of the
Philippine National Bank, a private banking corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal
offices at the PNB Financial Center, Roxas Boulevard, Manila. At
the time, the Singapore PNB Branch was under the helm of Ruben C.
Tobias, a lawyer, as General Manager, with the rank of
Vice-President of the Bank. At the time, too, the Branch Office had
two (2) types of employees: (a) expatriates or the regular
employees, hired in Manila and assigned abroad including Singapore,
and (b) locally (direct) hired. She applied for employment as
Branch Credit Officer, at a total monthly package of $SG4,500.00,
effective upon assumption of duties after approval. Ruben C. Tobias
found her eminently qualified and wrote on October 26, 1998, a
letter to the President of the Bank in Manila, recommending the
appointment of Florence O. Cabansag, for the position.x x x x x x x
x x"The President of the Bank was impressed with the credentials of
Florence O. Cabansag that he approved the recommendation of Ruben
C. Tobias. She then filed an Application, with the Ministry of
Manpower of the Government of Singapore, for the issuance of an
Employment Pass as an employee of the Singapore PNB Branch. Her
application was approved for a period of two (2) years."On December
7, 1998, Ruben C. Tobias wrote a letter to Florence O. Cabansag
offering her a temporary appointment, as Credit Officer, at a basic
salary of Singapore Dollars 4,500.00, a month and, upon her
successful completion of her probation to be determined solely, by
the Bank, she may be extended at the discretion of the Bank, a
permanent appointment and that her temporary appointment was
subject to the following terms and conditions:1. You will be on
probation for a period of three (3) consecutive months from the
date of your assumption of duty.2. You will observe the Banks rules
and regulations and those that may be adopted from time to time.3.
You will keep in strictest confidence all matters related to
transactions between the Bank and its clients.4. You will devote
your full time during business hours in promoting the business and
interest of the Bank.5. You will not, without prior written consent
of the Bank, be employed in anyway for any purpose whatsoever
outside business hours by any person, firm or company.6.
Termination of your employment with the Bank may be made by either
party after notice of one (1) day in writing during probation, one
month notice upon confirmation or the equivalent of one (1) days or
months salary in lieu of notice."Florence O. Cabansag accepted the
position and assumed office. In the meantime, the Philippine
Embassy in Singapore processed the employment contract of Florence
O. Cabansag and, on March 8, 1999, she was issued by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, an Overseas Employment
Certificate, certifying that she was a bona fide contract worker
for Singapore.x x x x x x x x x"Barely three (3) months in office,
Florence O. Cabansag submitted to Ruben C. Tobias, on March 9,
1999, her initial Performance Report. Ruben C. Tobias was so
impressed with the Reportthat he made a notation and, on said
Report: GOOD WORK. However, in the evening of April 14, 1999, while
Florence O. Cabansag was in the flat, which she and Cecilia Aquino,
the Assistant Vice-President and Deputy General Manager of the
Branch and Rosanna Sarmiento, the Chief Dealer of the said Branch,
rented, she was told by the two (2) that Ruben C. Tobias has asked
them to tell Florence O. Cabansag to resign from her job. Florence
O. Cabansag was perplexed at the sudden turn of events and the
runabout way Ruben C. Tobias procured her resignation from the
Bank. The next day, Florence O. Cabansag talked to Ruben C. Tobias
and inquired if what Cecilia Aquino and Rosanna Sarmiento had told
her was true. Ruben C. Tobias confirmed the veracity of the
information, with the explanation that her resignation was
imperative as a cost-cutting measure of the Bank. Ruben C. Tobias,
likewise, told Florence O. Cabansag that the PNB Singapore Branch
will be sold or transformed into a remittance office and that, in
either way, Florence O. Cabansag had to resign from her employment.
The more Florence O. Cabansag was perplexed. She then asked Ruben
C. Tobias that she be furnished with a Formal Advicefrom the PNB
Head Office in Manila. However, Ruben C. Tobias flatly refused.
Florence O. Cabansag did not submit any letter of resignation."On
April 16, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again summoned Florence O. Cabansag
to his office and demanded that she submit her letter of
resignation, with the pretext that he needed a Chinese-speaking
Credit Officer to penetrate the local market, with the information
that a Chinese-speaking Credit Officer had already been hired and
will be reporting for work soon. She was warned that, unless she
submitted her letter of resignation, her employment record will be
blemished with the notation DISMISSED spread thereon. Without
giving any definitive answer, Florence O. Cabansag asked Ruben C.
Tobias that she be given sufficient time to look for another job.
Ruben C. Tobias told her that she should be out of her employment
by May 15, 1999."However, on April 19, 1999, Ruben C. Tobias again
summoned Florence O. Cabansag and adamantly ordered her to submit
her letter of resignation. She refused. On April 20, 1999, she
received a letter from Ruben C. Tobias terminating her employment
with the Bank.x x x x x x x x x"On January 18, 2000, the Labor
Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the Complainant and against
the Respondents, the decretal portion of which reads as
follows:WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered finding respondents guilty of Illegal dismissal and
devoid of due process, and are hereby ordered:1. To reinstate
complainant to her former or substantially equivalent position
without loss of seniority rights, benefits and privileges;2.
Solidarily liable to pay complainant as follows:a) To pay
complainant her backwages from 16 April 1999 up to her actual
reinstatement. Her backwages as of the date of the promulgation of
this decision amounted to SGD 40,500.00 or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency at the time of payment;b) Mid-year bonus in the
amount of SGD 2,250.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at
the time of payment;c) Allowance for Sunday banking in the amount
of SGD 120.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time
of payment;d) Monetary equivalent of leave credits earned on Sunday
banking in the amount of SGD 1,557.67 or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency at the time of payment;e) Monetary equivalent
of unused sick leave benefits in the amount of SGD 1,150.60 or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment.f)
Monetary equivalent of unused vacation leave benefits in the amount
of SGD 319.85 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time
of payment.g) 13th month pay in the amount of SGD 4,500.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of payment;3.
Solidarily to pay complainant actual damages in the amount of SGD
1,978.00 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of
payment, and moral damages in the amount of PhP 200,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 100,000.00;4. To pay
complainant the amount of SGD 5,039.81 or its equivalent in
Philippine Currency at the time of payment, representing attorneys
fees.SO ORDERED."6[Emphasis in the original.]PNB appealed the labor
arbiters Decision to the NLRC. In a Resolution dated June 29, 2001,
the Commission affirmed that Decision, but reduced the moral
damages toP100,000 and the exemplary damages toP50,000. In a
subsequent Resolution, the NLRC denied PNBs Motion for
Reconsideration.Ruling of the Court of AppealsIn disposing of the
Petition forCertiorari, the CA noted that petitioner bank had
failed to adduce in evidence the Singaporean law supposedly
governing the latters employment Contract with respondent. The
appellate court found that the Contract had actually been processed
by the Philippine Embassy in Singapore and approved by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), which then
used that Contract as a basis for issuing an Overseas Employment
Certificate in favor of respondent.According to the CA, even though
respondent secured an employment pass from the Singapore Ministry
of Employment, she did not thereby waive Philippine labor laws, or
the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter or the NLRC over her
Complaint for illegal dismissal. In so doing, neither did she
submit herself solely to the Ministry of Manpower of Singapores
jurisdiction over disputes arising from her employment. The
appellate court further noted that a cursory reading of the
Ministrys letter will readily show that no such waiver or
submission is stated or implied.Finally, the CA held that
petitioner had failed to establish a just cause for the dismissal
of respondent. The bank had also failed to give her sufficient
notice and an opportunity to be heard and to defend herself. The CA
ruled that she was consequently entitled to reinstatement and back
wages, computed from the time of her dismissal up to the time of
her reinstatement.Hence, this Petition.7IssuesPetitioner submits
the following issues for our consideration:"1. Whether or not the
arbitration branch of the NLRC in the National Capital Region has
jurisdiction over the instant controversy;"2. Whether or not the
arbitration of the NLRC in the National Capital Region is the most
convenient venue or forum to hear and decide the instant
controversy; and"3. Whether or not the respondent was illegally
dismissed, and therefore, entitled to recover moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees."8In addition, respondent assails, in
her Comment,9the propriety of Rule 45 as the procedural mode for
seeking a review of the CA Decision affirming the NLRC Resolution.
Such issue deserves scant consideration. Respondent miscomprehends
the Courts discourse inSt. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC,10which has
indeed affirmed that the proper mode of review of NLRC decisions,
resolutions or orders is by a special civil action
forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals haveconcurrentoriginaljurisdiction over
such petitions forcertiorari.Thus, in observance of the doctrine on
the hierarchy of courts, these petitions should be initially filed
with the CA.11Rightly, the bank elevated the NLRC Resolution to the
CA by way of a Petition forCertiorari.In seeking a review by this
Court of the CA Decision -- on questions of jurisdiction, venue and
validity of employment termination -- petitioner is likewise
correct in invoking Rule 45.12It is true, however, that in a
petition for review oncertiorari, the scope of the Supreme Courts
judicial review of decisions of the Court of Appeals is generally
confined only to errors of law. It does not extend to questions of
fact. This doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases.
Factual questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve.13In the
present case, the labor arbiter and the NLRC have already
determined the factual issues. Their findings, which are supported
by substantial evidence, were affirmed by the CA. Thus, they are
entitled to great respect and are rendered conclusive upon this
Court, absent a clear showing of palpable error or arbitrary
disregard of evidence.14The Courts RulingThe Petition has no
merit.First Issue:JurisdictionThe jurisdiction of labor arbiters
and the NLRC is specified in Article 217 of the Labor Code as
follows:"ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
Commission. (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the
Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without
extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following
cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or
non-agricultural:1. Unfair labor practice cases;2. Termination
disputes;3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those
cases that workers may file involving wage, rates of pay, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of employment4. Claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
the employer-employee relations;5. Cases arising from any violation
of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the
legality of strikes and lockouts; and6. Except claims for Employees
Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all
other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including
those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an
amount of exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of
whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.(b) The
commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
cases decided by Labor Arbiters.x x x x x x x x x."More
specifically, Section 10 of RA 8042 reads in part:"SECTION 10.Money
Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
worke