POLICE POWER OF THE STATE
G.R. No. 162053 March 7, 2007ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER
EMPLOYEE'S ASSOCIATION-AFW (SLMCEA-AFW) AND MARIBEL S.
SANTOS,Petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC)
AND ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA,J.:Challenged in this petition for review oncertiorariis
the Decision1of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 29, 2004 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 75732 affirming the decision2dated August 23, 2002
rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC
CA No. 026225-00.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Maribel S. Santos was hired as X-Ray Technician in
the Radiology department of private respondent St. Luke's Medical
Center, Inc. (SLMC) on October 13, 1984. She is a graduate of
Associate in Radiologic Technology from The Family Clinic
Incorporated School of Radiologic Technology.
On April 22, 1992, Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No.
7431 known as the "Radiologic Technology Act of 1992." Said law
requires that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a
radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines without
having obtained the proper certificate of registration from the
Board of Radiologic Technology.On September 12, 1995, the Assistant
Executive Director-Ancillary Services and HR Director of private
respondent SLMC issued a final notice to all practitioners of
Radiologic Technology to comply with the requirement of Republic
Act No. 7431 by December 31, 1995; otherwise, the unlicensed
employee will be transferred to an area which does not require a
license to practice if a slot is available.
On March 4, 1997, the Director of the Institute of Radiology
issued a final notice to petitioner Maribel S. Santos requiring the
latter to comply with Republic Act. No. 7431 by taking and passing
the forthcoming examination scheduled in June 1997; otherwise,
private respondent SLMC may be compelled to retire her from
employment should there be no other position available where she
may be absorbed.
On May 14, 1997, the Director of the Institute of Radiology,
AED-Division of Ancillary Services issued a memorandum to
petitioner Maribel S. Santos directing the latter to submit her PRC
Registration form/Examination Permit per Memorandum dated March 4,
1997.
On March 13, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology
issued another memorandum to petitioner Maribel S. Santos advising
her that only a license can assure her of her continued employment
at the Institute of Radiology of the private respondent SLMC and
that the latter is giving her the last chance to take and pass the
forthcoming board examination scheduled in June 1998; otherwise,
private respondent SLMC shall be constrained to take action which
may include her separation from employment.
On November 23, 1998, the Director of the Institute of Radiology
issued a notice to petitioner Maribel S. Santos informing the
latter that the management of private respondent SLMC has approved
her retirement in lieu of separation pay.
On November 26, 1998, the Personnel Manager of private
respondent SLMC issued a "Notice of Separation from the Company" to
petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective December 30, 1998 in view of
the latter's refusal to accept private respondent SLMC's offer for
early retirement. The notice also states that while said private
respondent exerted its efforts to transfer petitioner Maribel S.
Santos to other position/s, her qualifications do not fit with any
of the present vacant positions in the hospital.
In a letter dated December 18, 1998, a certain Jack C. Lappay,
President of the Philippine Association of Radiologic
Technologists, Inc., wrote Ms. Judith Betita, Personnel Manager of
private respondent SLMC, requesting the latter to give "due
consideration" to the organization's three (3) regular members of
his organization (petitioner Maribel S. Santos included) "for not
passing yet the Board of Examination for X-ray Technology," "by
giving them an assignment in any department of your hospital
awaiting their chance to pass the future Board Exam."
On January 6, 1999, the Personnel Manager of private respondent
SLMC again issued a "Notice of Separation from the Company" to
petitioner Maribel S. Santos effective February 5, 1999 after the
latter failed to present/ submit her appeal for rechecking to the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) of the recent board
examination which she took and failed.
On March 2, 1999, petitioner Maribel S. Santos filed a complaint
against private respondent SLMC for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of salaries, allowances and other monetary benefits.
She likewise prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages
plus attorney's fees.
In the meantime, petitioner Alliance of Filipino Workers (AFW),
through its President and Legal Counsel, in a letter dated
September 22, 1999 addressed to Ms. Rita Marasigan, Human Resources
Director of private respondent SLMC, requested the latter to
accommodate petitioner Maribel S. Santos and assign her to the
vacant position of CSS Aide in the hospital arising from the death
of an employee more than two (2) months earlier.
In a letter dated September 24, 1999, Ms. Rita Marasigan replied
thus:
Gentlemen:
Thank you for your letter of September 22, 1999 formally
requesting to fill up the vacant regular position of a CSS Aide in
Ms. Maribel Santos' behalf.
The position is indeed vacant. Please refer to our Recruitment
Policy for particulars especially on minimum requirements of the
job and the need to meet said requirements, as well as other
pre-employment requirements, in order to be considered for the
vacant position. As a matter of fact, Ms. Santos is welcome to
apply for any vacant position on the condition that she possesses
the necessary qualifications.
As to the consensus referred to in your letter, may I correct
you that the agreement is, regardless of the vacant position Ms.
Santos decides to apply, she must go through the usual application
procedures. The formal letter, I am afraid, will not suffice for
purposes of recruitment processing. As you know, the managers
requesting to fill any vacancy has a say on the matter and
correctly so. The manager's inputs are necessarily factored into
the standard recruitment procedures. Hence, the need to undergo the
prescribed steps.
Indeed we have gone through the mechanics to accommodate Ms.
Santos' transfer while she was employed with SLMC given the
prescribed period. She was given 30 days from issuance of the
notice of termination to look for appropriate openings which
incidentally she wittingly declined to utilize. She did this
knowing fully well that the consequences would be that her
application beyond the 30-day period or after the effective date of
her termination from SLMC would be considered a re-application with
loss of seniority and shall be subjected to the pertinent
application procedures.
Needless to mention, one of the 3 X-ray Technologists in similar
circumstances as Ms. Santos at the time successfully managed to get
herself transferred to E.R. because she opted to apply for the
appropriate vacant position and qualified for it within the
prescribed 30-day period. The other X-ray Technologist, on the
other hand, as you may recall, was eventually terminated not just
for his failure to comply with the licensure requirement of the law
but for cause (refusal to serve a customer).
Why Ms. Santos opted to file a complaint before the Labor Courts
and not to avail of the opportunity given her, or assuming she was
not qualified for any vacant position even if she tried to look for
one within the prescribed period, I simply cannot understand why
she also refused the separation pay offered by Management in an
amount beyond the minimum required by law only to re-apply at SLMC,
which option would be available to her anyway even (if she) chose
to accept the separation pay!
Well, here's hoping that our Union can timely influence our
employees to choose their options well as it has in the past.
(Signed)RITA MARASIGAN
Subsequently, in a letter dated December 27, 1999, Ms. Judith
Betita, Personnel Manager of private respondent SLMC wrote Mr.
Angelito Calderon, President of petitioner union as follows:
Dear Mr. Calderon:
This is with regard to the case of Ms. Maribel Santos. Please
recall that last Oct. 8, 1999, Ms. Rita Marasigan, HR Director,
discussed with you and Mr. Greg Del Prado the terms regarding the
re-hiring of Ms. Maribel Santos. Ms. Marasigan offered Ms. Santos
the position of Secretary at the Dietary Department. In that
meeting, Ms. Santos replied that she would think about the offer.
To date, we still have no definite reply from her. Again, during
the conference held on Dec. 14, 1999, Atty. Martir promised to talk
to Ms. Santos, and inform us of her reply by Dec. 21, 1999. Again
we failed to hear her reply through him.
Please be informed that said position is in need of immediate
staffing. The Dietary Department has already been experiencing
serious backlog of work due to the said vacancy. Please note that
more than 2 months has passed since Ms. Marasigan offered this
compromise. Management cannot afford to wait for her decision while
the operation of the said department suffers from vacancy.
Therefore, Management is giving Ms. Santos until the end of this
month to give her decision. If we fail to hear from her or from you
as her representatives by that time, we will consider it as a
waiver and we will be forced to offer the position to other
applicants so as not to jeopardize the Dietary Department's
operation.
For your immediate action.
(Signed)JUDITH BETITAPersonnel Manager
On September 5, 2000, the Labor Arbiter came out with a Decision
ordering private respondent SLMC to pay petitioner Maribel S.
Santos the amount of One Hundred Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P115,500.00) representing her separation pay. All other
claims of petitioner were dismissed for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied, petitioner Maribel S. Santos perfected an appeal
with the public respondent NLRC.
On August 23, 2002, public respondent NLRC promulgated its
Decision affirming the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. It likewise
denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners in its
Resolution promulgated on December 27, 2002.
Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA which, as previously mentioned, affirmed the decision of the
NLRC.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I. Whether the CA overlooked certain material facts and
circumstances on petitioners' legal claim in relation to the
complaint for illegal dismissal.
II. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion and erred
in not resolving with clarity the issues on the merit of
petitioner's constitutional right of security of tenure.3For its
part, private respondent St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC)
argues in its comment4that: 1) the petition should be dismissed for
failure of petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration; 2) the
CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiter's ruling that petitioner was legally
dismissed; 3) petitioner was legally and validly terminated in
accordance with Republic Act Nos. 4226 and 7431; 4) private
respondent's decision to terminate petitioner Santos was made in
good faith and was not the result of unfair discrimination; and 5)
petitioner Santos' non-transfer to another position in the SLMC was
a valid exercise of management prerogative.
The petition lacks merit.
Generally, the Court has always accorded respect and finality to
the findings of fact of the CA particularly if they coincide with
those of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and are supported by
substantial evidence.5True this rule admits of certain exceptions
as, for example, when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts, or the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence on
record6or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse
of discretion.7None of these exceptions, however, has been
convincingly shown by petitioners to apply in the present case.
Hence, the Court sees no reason to disturb such findings of fact of
the CA.
Ultimately, the issue raised by the parties boils down to
whether petitioner Santos was illegally dismissed by private
respondent SLMC on the basis of her inability to secure a
certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic
Technology.
The requirement for a certificate of registration is set forth
under R.A. No. 74318thus:
Sec. 15. Requirement for the Practice of Radiologic Technology
and X-ray Technology. - Unless exempt from the examinations under
Sections 16 and 17 hereof, no person shall practice or offer to
practice as a radiologic and/or x-ray technologist in the
Philippines without having obtained the proper certificate of
registration from the Board.
It is significant to note that petitioners expressly concede
that the sole cause for petitioner Santos' separation from work is
her failure to pass the board licensure exam for X-ray technicians,
a precondition for obtaining the certificate of registration from
the Board. It is argued, though, that petitioner Santos' failure to
comply with the certification requirement did not constitute just
cause for termination as it violated her constitutional right to
security of tenure. This contention is untenable.
While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed
by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably regulated
pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health,
morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of
the people. Consequently, persons who desire to engage in the
learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may
be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in
their chosen careers.9The most concrete example of this would be in
the field of medicine, the practice of which in all its branches
has been closely regulated by the State. It has long been
recognized that the regulation of this field is a reasonable method
of protecting the health and safety of the public to protect the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance among those who would practice medicine.10The same
rationale applies in the regulation of the practice of radiologic
and x-ray technology. The clear and unmistakable intention of the
legislature in prescribing guidelines for persons seeking to
practice in this field is embodied in Section 2 of the law:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. - It is the policy of the State to
upgrade the practice of radiologic technology in the Philippines
for the purpose of protecting the public from the hazards posed by
radiation as well as to ensure safe and proper diagnosis, treatment
and research through the application of machines and/or equipment
using radiation.11In this regard, the Court quotes with approval
the disquisition of public respondent NLRC in its decision dated
August 23, 2002:
The enactment of R.A. (Nos.) 7431 and 4226 are recognized as an
exercise of the State's inherent police power. It should be noted
that the police power embraces the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, educations, good order, safety or
general welfare of the people. The state is justified in
prescribing the specific requirements for x-ray technicians and/or
any other professions connected with the health and safety of its
citizens. Respondent-appellee being engaged in the hospital and
health care business, is a proper subject of the cited law; thus,
having in mind the legal requirements of these laws, the latter
cannot close its eyes and [let] complainant-appellant's private
interest override public interest.
Indeed, complainant-appellant cannot insist on her "sterling
work performance without any derogatory record" to make her qualify
as an x-ray technician in the absence of a proper certificate of
Registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology which can only
be obtained by passing the required examination. The law is clear
that the Certificate of Registration cannot be substituted by any
other requirement to allow a person to practice as a Radiologic
Technologist and/or X-ray Technologist (Technician).12No malice or
ill-will can be imputed upon private respondent as the separation
of petitioner Santos was undertaken by it conformably to an
existing statute. It is undeniable that her continued employment
without the required Board certification exposed the hospital to
possible sanctions and even to a revocation of its license to
operate. Certainly, private respondent could not be expected to
retain petitioner Santos despite the inimical threat posed by the
latter to its business. This notwithstanding, the records bear out
the fact that petitioner Santos was given ample opportunity to
qualify for the position and was sufficiently warned that her
failure to do so would result in her separation from work in the
event there were no other vacant positions to which she could be
transferred. Despite these warnings, petitioner Santos was still
unable to comply and pass the required exam. To reiterate, the
requirement for Board certification was set by statute. Justice,
fairness and due process demand that an employer should not be
penalized for situations where it had no participation or
control.13It would be unreasonable to compel private respondent to
wait until its license is cancelled and it is materially injured
before removing the cause of the impending evil. Neither can the
courts step in to force private respondent to reassign or transfer
petitioner Santos under these circumstances. Petitioner Santos is
not in the position to demand that she be given a different work
assignment when what necessitated her transfer in the first place
was her own fault or failing. The prerogative to determine the
place or station where an employee is best qualified to serve the
interests of the company on the basis of the his or her
qualifications, training and performance belongs solely to the
employer.14The Labor Code and its implementing Rules do not vest in
the Labor Arbiters nor in the different Divisions of the NLRC (nor
in the courts) managerial authority.15While our laws endeavor to
give life to the constitutional policy on social justice and the
protection of labor, it does not mean that every labor dispute will
be decided in favor of the workers. The law also recognizes that
management has rights which are also entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of fair play.16Labor laws, to be sure,
do not authorize interference with the employer's judgment in the
conduct of the latter's business. Private respondent is free to
determine, using its own discretion and business judgment, all
elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases of
unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. None
of these exceptions is present in the instant case.
The fact that another employee, who likewise failed to pass the
required exam, was allowed by private respondent to apply for and
transfer to another position with the hospital does not constitute
unlawful discrimination. This was a valid exercise of management
prerogative, petitioners not having alleged nor proven that the
reassigned employee did not qualify for the position where she was
transferred. In the past, the Court has ruled that an objection
founded on the ground that one has better credentials over the
appointee is frowned upon so long as the latter possesses the
minimum qualifications for the position.17Furthermore, the records
show that Ms. Santos did not even seriously apply for another
position in the company.
WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIEDfor lack of merit. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CBA[G.R. No. 146650.January 13, 2003]
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC.,petitioner,vs.PAWIS NG MAKABAYANG OBRERO
(PAMAO-NFL),respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA,J.:
Before us is a petition for review filed under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the January 9, 2001
resolution of the Court of Appeals which denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration of its September 22, 2000 decision[1]which in
turn upheld the Order issued by the voluntary arbitrator[2]dated 12
October 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the complainant.Respondent is hereby directed to extend
the free meal benefit as provided for in Article XVIII, Section 3
of the collective bargaining agreement to those employees who have
actually performed overtime works even for exactly three (3) hours
only.
SO ORDERED.[3]The core of the present controversy is the
interpretation of the provision for free meals under Section 3 of
Article XVIII of the 1996-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) between petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc. and private
respondent labor union PAMAO-NFL.Simply put, how many hours of
overtime work must a Dole employee render to be entitled to the
free meal under Section 3 of Article XVIII of the 1996-2001 CBA?Is
it when he has rendered (a) exactly, or no less than, three hours
of actual overtime work or (b) more than three hours of actual
overtime work?
The antecedents are as follows:
On February 22, 1996, a new five-year Collective Bargaining
Agreement for the period starting February 1996 up to February
2001, was executed by petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc., and
private respondent Pawis Ng Makabayang Obrero-NFL (PAMAO-NFL).Among
the provisions of the new CBA is the disputed section on meal
allowance under Section 3 of Article XVIII on Bonuses and
Allowances, which reads:
Section 3.MEAL ALLOWANCE.The COMPANY agrees to grant a MEAL
ALLOWANCE of TEN PESOS (P10.00) to all employees who render at
least TWO (2) hours or more of actual overtime work on a workday,
and FREE MEALS, as presently practiced, not exceeding TWENTY FIVE
PESOS (P25.00)after THREE (3) hoursof actual overtime
work.[4]Pursuant to the above provision of the CBA,some departments
of Dole reverted to the previous practice of granting free meals
after exactly three hours of actual overtime work.However, other
departments continued the practice of granting free meals only
after more than three hours of overtime work.Thus, private
respondent filed a complaint before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board alleging that petitioner Dole refused to comply
with the provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA because it granted free
meals only to those who rendered overtime work for more than three
hours and not to those who rendered exactly three hours overtime
work.
The parties agreed to submit the dispute to voluntary
arbitration.Thereafter, the voluntary arbitrator, deciding in favor
of the respondent, issued an order directing petitioner Dole to
extend the free meal benefit to those employees who actually did
overtime work even for exactly three hours only.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above order but the
same was denied.Hence, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court
of Appeals by way of a petition for review on certiorari.
On September 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision upholding the assailed order.
Thus, the instant petition.
Petitioner Dole asserts that the phrase after three hours of
actual overtime work should be interpreted to meanafter more than
three hoursof actual overtime work.
On the other hand, private respondent union and the voluntary
arbitrator see it as meaningafter exactly three hoursof actual
overtime work.
The meal allowance provision in the 1996-2001 CBA is not new.It
was also in the 1985-1988 CBA and the 1990-1995 CBA.The 1990-1995
CBA provision on meal allowance was amended by the parties in the
1993-1995 CBA Supplement.The clear changes in each CBA provision on
meal allowance were in the amount of the meal allowance and free
meals, and the use of the words after and after more than to
qualify the amount of overtime work to be performed by an employee
to entitle him to the free meal.
To arrive at a correct interpretation of the disputed provision
of the CBA, a review of the pertinent section of past CBAs is in
order.
The CBA covering the period 21 September 1985 to 20 September
1988 provided:
Section 3.MEAL ALLOWANCE. The COMPANY agrees to grant a MEAL
ALLOWANCE of FOUR (P4.00) PESOS to all employees who render at
least TWO (2) hours or more of actual overtime work on a workday,
and FREE MEALS, as presently practiced, after THREE (3) hours of
actual overtime work.[5]The CBA for 14 January 1990 to 13 January
1995 likewise provided:
Section 3.MEAL ALLOWANCE.The COMPANY agrees to grant a MEAL
ALLOWANCE of EIGHT PESOS (P8.00) to all employees who render at
least TWO (2) hours or more of actual overtime work on a workday,
and FREE MEALS, as presently practiced, not exceeding SIXTEEN PESOS
(P16.00)after THREE (3) hoursof actual overtime work.[6]The
provision above was later amended when the parties renegotiated the
economic provisions of the CBA pursuant to Article 253-A of the
Labor Code.Section 3 of Article XVIII of the 14 January 1993 to 13
January 1995 Supplement to the 1990-1995 CBA reads:
Section 3.MEAL ALLOWANCE.The COMPANY agrees to grant a MEAL
SUBSIDY of NINE PESOS (P9.00) to all employees who render at least
TWO (2) hours or more of actual overtime work on a workday, and
FREE MEALS, as presently practiced, not exceeding TWENTY ONE PESOS
(P21.00)after more than THREE (3) hoursof actual overtime work
(Section 3, as amended).[7]We note that the phrase more than was
neither in the 1985-1988 CBA nor in the original 1990-1995 CBA.It
was inserted only in the 1993-1995 CBA Supplement.But said phrase
is again absent in Section 3 of Article XVIII of the 1996-2001 CBA,
which reverted to the phrase after three (3) hours.
Petitioner asserts that the phrase after three (3) hours of
actual overtime work does not meanafter exactly three hoursof
actual overtime work; it meansafter more than three hoursof actual
overtime work.Petitioner insists that this has been the
interpretation and practice of Dole for the past thirteen
years.
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that after three (3)
hours of actual overtime work simply meansafter rendering exactly,
or no less than, three hoursof actual overtime work.
The Court finds logic in private respondents interpretation.
The omission of the phrase more than between after and three
hours in the present CBA spells a big difference.
No amount of legal semantics can convince the Court that after
more than means the same as after.
Petitioner asserts that the more than in the 1993-1995 CBA
Supplement was mere surplusage because, regardless of the absence
of said phrase in all the past CBAs, it had always been the policy
of petitioner corporation to give the meal allowanceonly after more
than 3 hoursof overtime work.However, if this were true, why was it
included only in the 1993-1995 CBA Supplement and the parties had
to negotiate its deletion in the 1996-2001 CBA?
Clearly then, the reversion to the wording of previous CBAs can
only mean that the parties intended that free meals be given to
employeesafter exactly, or no less than, three hoursof actual
overtime work.
The disputed provision of the CBA is clear and unambiguous.The
terms are explicit and the language of the CBA is not susceptible
to any other interpretation.Hence, the literal meaning of free
meals after three (3) hours of overtime work shall prevail, which
is simply that an employee shall be entitled to a free meal if he
has rendered exactly, or no less than, three hours of overtime
work, not after more than or in excess of three hours overtime
work.
Petitioner also invokes the well-entrenched principle of
management prerogative that the power to grant benefits over and
beyond the minimum standards of law, or the Labor Code for that
matter, belongs to the employer x x x.According to this principle,
even if the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees, it
must also protect the right of the employer to exercise what
clearly are management prerogatives.[8]Petitioner claims that,
being the employer, it has the right to determine whether it will
grant a free meal benefit to its employees and, if so, under what
conditions.To see it otherwise would amount to an impairment of its
rights as an employer.
We do not think so.
The exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited.It is
subject to the limitations found in law, a collective bargaining
agreement or the general principles of fair play and
justice.[9]This situation constitutes one of the limitations. The
CBA is the norm of conduct between petitioner and private
respondent and compliance therewith is mandated by the express
policy of the law.[10]Petitioner Dole cannot assail the voluntary
arbitrators interpretation of the CBA for the supposed impairment
of its management prerogatives just because the same interpretation
is contrary to its own.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,andCarpio-Morales, JJ.,concur.ART.4 Construction
of Labor Code (Interpretation, Rationale and Intent)
G.R. No. 71813 July 20, 1987ROSALINA PEREZ ABELLA/HDA.
DANAO-RAMONA,petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, ROMEO QUITCO and RICARDO DIONELE, SR.,respondents.
PARAS,J.:This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
April 8, 1985 Resolution of the Ministry of Labor and Employment
affirming the July 16, 1982 Decision of the Labor Arbiter, which
ruled in favor of granting separation pay to private
respondents.
On June 27, 1960, herein petitioner Rosalina Perez Abella leased
a farm land in Monteverde, Negros Occidental, known as Hacienda
Danao-Ramona, for a period of ten (10) years, renewable, at her
option, for another ten (10) years (Rollo, pp. 16-20).
On August 13, 1970, she opted to extend the lease contract for
another ten (10) years (Ibid, pp. 26-27).
During the existence of the lease, she employed the herein
private respondents. Private respondent Ricardo Dionele, Sr. has
been a regular farm worker since 1949 and he was promoted to Cabo
in 1963. On the other hand, private respondent Romeo Quitco started
as a regular employee in 1968 and was promoted to Cabo in November
of the same year.
Upon the expiration of her leasehold rights, petitioner
dismissed private respondents and turned over the hacienda to the
owners thereof on October 5, 1981, who continued the management,
cultivation and operation of the farm (Rollo, pp. 33; 89).
On November 20, 1981, private respondents filed a complaint
against the petitioner at the Ministry of Labor and Employment,
Bacolod City District Office, for overtime pay, illegal dismissal
and reinstatement with backwages. After the parties had presented
their respective evidence, Labor Arbiter Manuel M. Lucas, Jr., in a
Decision dated July 16, 1982 (Ibid, pp. 29-31), ruled that the
dismissal is warranted by the cessation of business, but granted
the private respondents separation pay. Pertinent portion of the
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
In the instant case, the respondent closed its business
operation not by reason of business reverses or losses.
Accordingly, the award of termination pay in complainants' favor is
warranted.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is hereby ordered to pay the
complainants separation pay at the rate of half-month salary for
every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being
considered one (1) year. (Rollo pp. 29-30)
On appeal on August 11, 1982, the National Labor Relations
Commission, in a Resolution dated April 8, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 3940),
affirmed the decision and dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit.
On May 22, 1985, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(Ibid, pp. 41-45), but the same was denied in a Resolution dated
June 10, 1985 (Ibid, p. 46). Hence, the present petition (Ibid, pp.
3-8).
The First Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated
September 16, 1985, resolved to require the respondents to comment
(Ibid, p. 58). In compliance therewith, private respondents filed
their Comment on October 23, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 53-55); and the
Solicitor General on December 17, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 71-73-B).
On February 19, 1986, petitioner filed her Consolidated Reply to
the Comments of private and public respondents (Ibid, pp.
80-81).
The First Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated March
31, 1986, resolved to give due course to the petition; and to
require the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda (Ibid., p.
83). In compliance therewith, the Solicitor General filed his
Memorandum on June 18, 1986 (Ibid, pp. 89-94); and petitioner on
July 23, 1986 (Ibid, pp. 96-194).
The petition is devoid of merit.
The sole issue in this case is
WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO SEPARATION
PAY.
Petitioner claims that since her lease agreement had already
expired, she is not liable for payment of separation pay. Neither
could she reinstate the complainants in the farm as this is a
complete cessation or closure of a business operation, a just cause
for employment termination under Article 272 of the Labor Code.
On the other hand, the legal basis of the Labor Arbiter in
granting separation pay to the private respondents is Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130, amending the Labor Code, Section 15 of which,
specifically provides:
Sec 15 Articles 285 and 284 of the Labor Code are hereby amended
to read as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
Art. 284.Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel.
The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due
to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of
operation of the establisment or undertaking unless the closing is
for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this title, by
serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor
and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date
thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of
labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby
shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his
one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year
of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent
losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or
financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one
(1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year
of service whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered one (1) whole year.1avvphi1There is no
question that Article 284 of the Labor Code as amended by BP 130 is
the law applicable in this case.
Article 272 of the same Code invoked by the petitioner pertains
to the just causes of termination. The Labor Arbiter does not argue
the justification of the termination of employment but applied
Article 284 as amended, which provides for the rights of the
employees under the circumstances of termination.
Petitioner then contends that the aforequoted provision violates
the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and
contracts, because when she leased Hacienda Danao-Ramona on June
27, 1960, neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of
the obligation to pay separation pay to workers at the end of the
lease.
Such contention is untenable.
This issue has been laid to rest in the case of Anucension v.
National Labor Union (80 SCRA 368-369 [1977]) where the Supreme
Court ruled:
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to
impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified.
The prohibition is general, affording a broad outline and requiring
construction to fill in the details. The prohibition is not to read
with literal exactness like a mathematical formula for it prohibits
unreasonable impairment only. In spite of the constitutional
prohibition the State continues to possess authority to safeguard
the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate to
safeguard said interest may modify or abrogate contracts already in
effect. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order
to fix the obligations as between the parties but the reservation
of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. All contracts made
with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation under
the police power must be understood as made in reference to the
possible exercise of that power. Otherwise, important and valuable
reforms may be precluded by the simple device of entering into
contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise maybe
prohibited. ...
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally
impairs contract of obligations, no unchanging yardstick,
applicable at all times and under all circumstances, by which the
validity of each statute may be measured or determined, has been
fashioned, but every case must be determined upon its own
circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts
can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the
general good of the people, and when the means adopted must be
legitimate, i.e. within the scope of the reserved power of the
state construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of
that power. (Citing Basa vs. Federacion Obrera de la Industria
Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas [FOITAF] [L-27113],
November 19, 1974; 61 SCRA 93,102-113]).
The purpose of Article 284 as amended is obvious-the protection
of the workers whose employment is terminated because of the
closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. Without said
law, employees like private respondents in the case at bar will
lose the benefits to which they are entitled for the thirty three
years of service in the case of Dionele and fourteen years in the
case of Quitco. Although they were absorbed by the new management
of the hacienda, in the absence of any showing that the latter has
assumed the responsibilities of the former employer, they will be
considered as new employees and the years of service behind them
would amount to nothing.
Moreover, to come under the constitutional prohibition, the law
must effect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to
each other and not with reference to non-parties.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Article 284 as
amended refers to employment benefits to farm hands who were not
parties to petitioner's lease contract with the owner of Hacienda
Danao-Ramona. That contract cannot have the effect of annulling
subsequent legislation designed to protect the interest of the
working class.
In any event, it is well-settled that in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the
primordial and paramount consideration. (Volshel Labor Union v.
Bureau of Labor Relations, 137 SCRA 43 [1985]). It is the kind of
interpretation which gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the
New Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation
and interpretation of the provisions of this Code including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor." The policy is to extend the applicability of the decree to
a greater number of employees who can avail of the benefits under
the law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State
to give maximum aid and protection to labor. (Sarmiento v.
Employees Compensation Commission, 144 SCRA 422 [1986] citing
Cristobal v. Employees Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 329;
Acosta v. Employees Compensation Commission, 109 SCRA 209).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
and the July 16, 1982 Decision of the Labor Arbiter and the April
8, 1985 Resolution of the Ministry of Labor and Employment are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernando, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.FERNANDO G. MANAYA, Petitioner,VS
ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INCORPORATED, Respondent.G.R.
No.168988Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,J., Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA,JJ.Promulgated: June
19, 2007D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:
This is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Fernando
G.Manaya(petitioner) assailing: (1) the Decision[1]of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75417, dated 9 May 2005, granting the
Petition ofAlabangCountry Club Inc. (respondent) and setting aside
the Resolutions dated 30 August 2002 and 30 October 2002 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC); and (2) the
Resolution[2]of the Court of Appeals dated 21 July 2005 denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of its earlier Decision.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals reversed the
Resolution of the NLRC dismissing the appeal of the respondent for
failure to perfect its appeal within the statutory period.Instead,
the Court of Appeals ordered the NLRC to give due course to the
appeal of the respondent.
The antecedent facts are:
Petitioner alleged that on21 August 1989, he was initially hired
by the respondent as a maintenance helper[3]receiving a salary
ofP198.00 per day.He was later designated as company electrician.He
continued to work for the respondent until22 August 1998when the
latter, through its Engineering and Maintenance Department
Manager,Engr. Ronnie B. de la Cruz, informed him that his services
were no longer required by the company.[4]Petitioner alleged that
he was forcibly and illegally dismissed without cause and without
due process on22 August 1998.[5]Hence, he filed a
Complaint[6]before the Labor Arbiter.He claimed that he had not
committed any infraction of company policies or rules and that he
was not paid his service incentive leave pay, holiday pay and
13thmonth pay.He further asserted that with his more or less nine
years of service with the respondent, he had become a regular
employee.He, therefore, demanded his reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights with full backwages and all monetary benefits due
him.[7]In its Answer, respondent denied that petitioner was its
employee.It countered by saying that petitioner was employed by
First Staffing Network Corporation (FSNC), with which respondent
had an existing Memorandum of Agreement dated21 August 1989.Thus,
by virtue of a legitimate job contracting, petitioner, as an
employee of FSNC, came to work with respondent, first, as a
maintenance helper, and subsequently as an electrician.Respondent
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint insisting that petitioner
had no cause of action against it.
In a Decision, dated20 November 2000, the Labor Arbiter
held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainant Fernando G.Manayais
hereby found to be a regular employee of respondentAlabangCountry
Club, Inc., asaforediscussed.His dismissal from the service having
been effected without just and valid cause and without the due
observance of due process is hereby declared illegal.Consequently,
respondentAlabangCountry Club, Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate
complainant to his former position without loss of seniority rights
and other benefits appurtenant thereto with full backwages in the
partial amount ofP160,724.48 as computed by Ms.
Ma.ConcepcionManliclicand duly noted by Ms. Ma. Elena L.Estadilla,
OIC-CEU, NCR-South Sector which computation has been made part of
the records.
Furthermore, respondentAlabangCountry Club, Inc. and First
Staffing Network Corporation are hereby ordered to pay complainant,
jointly and severally the following amounts by way of the
following:
1.Service Incentive Leave2,961.75
2.13thMonth Pay15,401.10, and
3.Attorneys fees of ten (10%) percent of the total
monetary award herein adjudged due him, within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof.[8]
Respondent filed an Appeal with the NLRC which dismissed the
same.[9]In a Resolution dated30 August 2002, the NLRC held:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, instant appeal from the Decision ofNovember
20, 2000is hereby DISMISSED for failure to perfect appeal within
the statutory period of appeal.The Decision is now final
andexecutory.[10]
The NLRC found that respondents counsel of record Atty. Angelina
A.MailonofMonsod,Valenciaand Associates received a copy of the
Labor Arbiters Decision on or before11 December 2000as shown by the
postal stamp or registry return card.[11]Said counsel did not file
a withdrawal of appearance.Instead, a Memorandum of
Appeal[12]dated26 December 2000was filed by the respondents new
counsel, Atty.Arizalaof Tierra and Associates Law Office.Reckoned
from11 December 2000, the date of receipt of the Decision by
respondents previous counsel, the filing of the Memorandum of
Appeal by its new counsel on26 December 2000was clearly made beyond
the reglementary period.The NLRC held that the failure to perfect
an appeal within the statutory period is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional.The appeal having been belatedly filed, the Decision
of the Labor Arbiter had become final andexecutory.[13]
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[14]which the NLRC
denied in a Resolution dated30 October 2002.[15]The NLRC held that
the decision of the Labor Arbiter has become final andexecutoryon28
November 2002; thus, Entry of Judgment, dated8 January 2003[16]was
issued.
Respondent filed a Petition forCertiorari[17]under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals.In a Decision dated9
May 2005,[18]the Court of Appeals granted the petition and ordered
the NLRC to give due course to respondents appeal of the Labor
Arbiters Decision.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution[19]dated21
July 2005.
Not to be dissuaded, petitioner filed the instant petition
before this Court.
The issue for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR WHEN IT
ORDERED THE NLRC TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO THE APPEAL OF RESPONDENT
ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB, INCORPORATED EVEN IF THE SAID APPEAL WAS
FILED BEYOND THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF TEN (10) DAYS FOR
PERFECTING AN APPEAL.[20]
Essentially, the issue raised by the respondent before the NLRC
in assailing the decision of the Labor Arbiter pertains to the
finding of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner was a regular employee
of the respondent.
In granting the petition, the Court of Appeals relied mainly on
the case ofAguamv. Court of Appeals,[21]where this Court held that
litigation must be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities.The appellate court further justified the grant of
respondents petition by saying that the negligence of its counsel
should not bind the respondent.[22]
The Court of Appeals gave credence to respondents claim that its
lawyer abandoned the case; hence, they were not effectively
represented by a competent counsel.It further held that the
respondent, upon its receipt of the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
on15 December 2000, filed its appeal on26 December 2000through a
new lawyer.The appeal filed by respondent through its new lawyer
on26 December 2000was well within the reglementary period,25
December 2000being a holiday.
It is axiomatic that when a client is represented by counsel,
notice to counsel is notice to client.In the absence of a notice of
withdrawal or substitution of counsel, the Court will rightly
assume that the counsel of record continues to represent his client
and receipt of notice by the former is the reckoning point of the
reglementary period.[23]As heretofore adverted, the original
counsel did not file any notice of withdrawal.Neither was there any
intimation by respondent at that time that it was terminating the
services of its counsel.
For negligence not to be binding on the client, the same must
constitute gross negligence as to amount to a deprivation of
property without due process.[24]This does not exist in the case at
bar.Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and
the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a
ground for setting aside a judgment, valid and regular on its
face.[25]Even more, it is respondents duty as a client to be in
touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted about the
case.It is mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status
and progress of the case from time to time and cannot expect that
all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the
case.[26]
On this score, we hold that the notice to respondents counsel,
Atty. Angelina A.Mailonon11 December 2000is the controlling date of
the receipt of the decision.
We now come to the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals
properly gave due course to the petition of the respondent before
it.
Of relevance is Section 1, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of
the NLRC
Section 1.PERIODS OF APPEAL. Decisions, resolutions or orders of
the Labor Arbiter shall be final andexecutoryunless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt thereof; and in case of decisions, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and
Employment pursuant to Article 129 of the Labor Code, within five
(5) calendar days from receipt thereof.If the 10thor 5thday, as the
case may be, falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the last day
to perfect the appeal shall be the first working day following such
Saturday, Sunday or holiday.
No motion or request for extension of the period within which to
perfect an appeal shall be allowed.
Remarkably, in highly exceptional instances, we have allowed the
relaxing of the rules on the application of the reglementary
periods of appeal.[27]Thus:
InRamos v.Bagasao, 96 SCRA 395, we excused the delay of four
days in the filing of a notice of appeal because the questioned
decision of the trial court was served upon appellant Ramos at a
time when her counsel of record was already dead.Her new counsel
could only file the appeal four days after the prescribed
reglementary period was over.InRepublic v. Court of Appeals, 83
SCRA 453, we allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic
despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage of
justice since the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of
land already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for
educational purposes.InOlacaov. National Labor Relations
Commission, 177 SCRA 38, 41, we accepted a tardy appeal considering
that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judicially
settled, with finality, in another case.The dismissal of the appeal
would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered twice to
make the same reparation to theappellee.[28]
We pronounced in those cases that technicality should not be
allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving
the rights and obligations of the parties.
In all these, the Court allowed liberal interpretation given the
extraordinary circumstances that justify a deviation from an
otherwise stringent rule.[29]
Clearly, emphasized in these cases is that the policy of liberal
interpretation is qualified by the requirement that there must be
exceptional circumstances to allow the relaxation of the
rules.[30]
Absent exceptional circumstances, we adhere to the rule that
certain procedural precepts must remain inviolable, like those
setting the periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition
for review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to
appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail oneself of
that right must comply with the statute or rules.The rules,
particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the
reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly followed
as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless
delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.Furthermore,
the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and
the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment of the court
final andexecutory.Just as a losing party has the right to file an
appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of
his/her case.[31]In this particular case, we adhere to the strict
interpretation of the rule for the following reasons:
Firstly, in this case, entry of judgment had already been
made[32]which rendered the Decision of the Labor Arbiter as final
andexecutory.
Secondly, it is a basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying
out and in interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the workingmans welfare should be the
primordial and paramount consideration.The interpretation herein
made gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate
spirit of the law enunciated in Article 4 of the Labor Code that
all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.[33]
In the case ofBunaganv. Sentinel[34]we declared that:
[T]hat the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or
reglementary period is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and
failure to do so renders the questioned decision final
andexecutoryand deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to
alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal.The
underlying purpose of this principle is to prevent needless delay,
a circumstance which would allow the employer to wear out the
efforts and meager resources of the worker to the point that the
latter is constrained to settle for less than what is due him.This
Court has declared that although the NLRC is not bound by the
technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the
interpretation of the rules in deciding labor cases, such
liberality should not be applied where it would render futile the
very purpose for which the principle of liberality is adopted.The
liberal interpretation stems from the mandate that the workingmans
welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.We see
no reason in this case to waive the rules on the perfection of
appeal.[35]
The Court is aware that the NLRC is not bound by the technical
rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the
interpretation of rules in deciding labor cases.However, such
liberality should not be applied in the instant case as it would
render futile the very purpose for which the principle of
liberality is adopted.The liberal interpretation in favor of labor
stems from the mandate that the workingmans welfare should be the
primordial and paramount consideration.xxx.[36](Emphases
supplied.)
Indeed, there is no room for liberality in the instant case as
it would render futile the very purpose for which the principle of
liberality is adopted.As so rightfully enunciated, the liberal
interpretation in favor of labor stems from the mandate that the
workingmans welfare should be the primordial and paramount
consideration.This Court has repeatedly ruled that delay in the
settlement of labor cases cannot be countenanced.Not only does it
involve the survival of an employee and his loved ones who are
dependent on him for food, shelter, clothing, medicine and
education; it also wears down the meager resources of the workers
to the point that, not infrequently, they either give up or
compromise for less than what is due them.[37]
Without doubt, to allow the appeal of the respondent as what the
Court of Appeals had done and remand the case to the NLRC would
only result in delay to the detriment of the petitioner.InNaragv.
National Labor Relations Commission,[38]citingVir-Jen Shipping and
Marine Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,[39]we
held that delay in most instances gives the employers more
opportunity not only to prepare even ingenious defenses, what with
well-paid talented lawyers they can afford, but even to wear out
the efforts and meager resources of the workers, to the point that
not infrequently the latter either give up or compromise for less
than what is due them.[40]
Nothing is more settled in our jurisprudence than the rule that
when the conflicting interest of loan and capital are weighed on
the scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter
must be counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law
must accord the under-privileged worker.[41]
Thirdly, respondent has not shown sufficient justification to
reverse the findings of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the
NLRC.
Pertinent provision of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 223.APPEAL. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final andexecutoryunless appealed to the Commission by
any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
such decisions, awards, or orders.Such appeal may be entertained
only on any of the following grounds:
(a)If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on
the part ofthe Labor Arbiter;
(b)If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud
orcoercion, including graft an corruption;
(c)If made purely on question of law; and
(d)If serious errors in the finding of facts are raised which
wouldcause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the
appellant.
Under the above provision, to obtain a reversal of the decision
of the Labor Arbiter, the respondent must be able to show in his
appeal that any one of the above instances exists.
Respondent failed to show the existence of any of the above.A
more than perfunctory reading of the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
shows that the same is supported by the evidence on record.
Respondent narrates that it had a contract of services,first,
with Supreme Construction (Supreme).Supreme assigned petitioner to
work with the respondent starting as a painter and moving on to
perform electrical jobs.Respondent terminated its contract with
Supreme and entered into another contract of services with another
job-contracting agency, First Staffing Network
Corporation.Petitioner continued to work for the respondentwhich
claimed that the former was supplied by FNSC to it as part of its
contract to supply the manpower requirements of the
respondent.Petitioner is not the employee of the respondent.He was
directly hired first by Supreme then later by FNSC and deployed to
work with the respondent based on the contract of services between
respondent and these job-contracting agencies.All these considered,
respondent insists that petitioner is therefore not its
employee.
We do not agree to this submission of the respondent.The Labor
Arbiter concluded otherwise and this finds support from the
evidence, thus:
[R]espondentwas not able to convincingly disprove complainants
claims that at the outset, he was directly hired by it as a
maintenance helper on21 August 1989.Although said respondent
alleges that complainant was hired by its job contractor, Supreme
Construction, it failed to submit in evidence the Contract of
Service it had entered into in order to establish the entry of
complainant as deployed by said company for his duties
atAlabangCountry Club, Inc. pursuant to the said Agreement.It can
therefore be readily presumed that said respondent did not produce
the said document because the production of the same will readily
prove complainants assertion of having been hired long before said
contractor Supreme Construction entered into the picture.We have
noted complainants admission of having been later coerced to sign
up with said Supreme Construction by respondentAlabangCountry Club,
Inc. which he did as he was told in his fear of losing his job.
As shown by respondentAlabangCountry Club, Inc.s own evidence,
it later terminated its contract of service or Memorandum of
Agreement with Supreme Construction and entered into a new contract
of service with respondent First Staffing Network Corporation
effective on16 June 1994.However by said respondents own
allegation, even with the absence of complainants supposed direct
employer Supreme Construction, he still remained in its employ
until he signed up with respondent First Staffing Network
Corporation on11 February 1996.This indeed runs counter to the
normal course of human experience such that when a contractor
losses (sic) his contract of service he packs up along with all his
employees, but in this case, complainant was not terminated from
the service notwithstanding the expiration/termination of the
contract of service of his alleged direct employer.Complainant
remained working with respondentAlabangCountry Club, Inc. despite
the severance of the contractual relations between itself and
Supreme Construction.
The initial Memorandum of Agreement entered into by
respondentsAlabangCountry Club, Inc. and First Staffing Network
Corporation was dated, 16June 1994, and was apparently renewed
thereafter providing under Article III On Compensation thereof, the
following,viz:
3.01 For and in consideration of the performance by FIRST
STAFFING of its obligations under this AGREEMENT, the CLIENT agrees
to pay the former based on the schedule of billing rates which
shall be specified in the Personnel Requisition Form signed by the
CLIENT.The schedule of billing rates is as follows, to wit:
BILLING RATES/HOUR PLUS 10% VALUE ADDED TAX
Covered Pos.
ABC
WaitersAccountingSupervisor
JanitorsData Encoders
Bag BoyGen. Clerks
StewardsSecretary
Cook HelpersReceptionist
MessengersSecretary
Cashier
xxx.
Nowhere, does complainants position of electrician appear as
covered in the said contract.Finally, suffice it for Us to stress
that the said contract covers almost all of
respondentsAlabangCountry Club, Inc.s workforce including those
whose jobs or activities are directly related to said respondents
business, emphasizing in no uncertain terms that respondent First
Staffing Network Corporation was not a trulybonafidejob contractor,
as it did not contract out specific service but merely supplied
work personnel, a clear indication, that it was engaged in a job
only contractingwhich is prohibited by law.
Besides, the said respondent First Staffing Network Corporation
failed to prove that it is abonafidejob contractor by showing that
it had an adequate capital or investment in tools, equipments and
machineries and premises for that matter, and so did
respondentAlabangCountry Club, Inc. fail to establish the same.For
that matter, respondent First Staffing Network Corporation had
waived its right to present any evidence in its favor in this
case.
Obviously, herein respondentAlabangCountry Club, Inc. actually
resorted to contracting out all the positions for its workforce in
violation of law in its desire to circumvent said employees rights
as regular employees under the law.[42]
The existence of an employer-employee relationship between
petitioner and respondent is fortified by the fact that during his
stint with the respondent, petitioner was given the opportunity to
attend a seminar/training on refrigeration and air conditioning
from16 January 1995to18 February 1995.[43]A certificate of
participation signed by three of respondents officials was issued
to the petitioner.
Equally significant is Article 106 of the Labor Code, as
amended, which provides that legitimate job contracting is
permitted, but labor-only contracting is prohibited.The said
provision reads:
Art. 106.CONTRACTOR OR SUBCONTRACTOR. Whenever an employer
enters into a contract with another person for the performance of
theformerswork, the employees of the contractor and of the latters
subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the
provisions of this Code.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay
the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the
employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor
or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work
performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he
is liable to employees directly employed by him.
The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict
or prohibit the contracting out of labor to protect the rights of
workers established under the Code.In so prohibiting or
restricting, he may make appropriate distinctions between labor
only contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations
within these types of contracting and determine who among the
parties involved shall be considered the employer for purposes of
this Code, to prevent any violation or circumvention of any
provision of this Code.
There is laboronly contracting where the person supplying
workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by
such person are performing activities which are directly related to
the principal business of such employer.In such cases, the person
or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the
employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner
and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.
Rule VIII-A, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 18, distinguishes
between legitimate and labor only contracting:
Section 3.Trilateral Relationship in Contracting Arrangements.
-In legitimate contracting, there exists a trilateral relationship
under which there is a contract for a specific job, work or service
between the principal and the contractor or subcontractor, and a
contract of employment between the contractor and subcontractor and
its workers.Hence, there are three parties involved in these
arrangements, the principal which decides to farm out a job or
service to a contractor or subcontractor, the contractor or
subcontractor which has the capacity to independently undertake the
performance of the job, work or service, and the contractual
workers engaged by the contractor or subcontractor to accomplish
the job, work or service.
Section 5.Prohibition against laboronly contracting. Labor-only
contracting is hereby declared prohibited.For this purpose, labor
only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor
or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to
perform a job, work or service for a principal, and any of the
following elements are present:
i)The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial
capital or investment which relates to the job, work or service to
be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by
such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which
are directly related to the main business of the principal, or
ii)The contractor does not exercise the right to control over
the performance of the work of the contractual employee.
The foregoing provisions shall be without prejudice to the
application of Article 248(c) of the Labor Code, as amended.
Substantial capital or investment refers to capital stocks and
subscribed capitalization in the case of corporations, tools,
equipments, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and
directly used by the contractor or subcontractor in the performance
or completion of the job, work or service contracted out.
The right to control shall refer to the right reserved to the
person for whom the services of the contractual workers are
performed, to determine not only the end to be achieved, but also
the manner and means to be used in reaching that end.
The test to determine the existence of
independentcontractorshipis whether one claiming to be an
independent contractor has contracted to do the work according to
his on methods and without being subject to the control of the
employer, except only as to the results of the work.
In legitimate labor contracting, the law creates an
employer-employee relationship for a limited purpose,i.e.,to ensure
that the employees are paid their wages.The principal employer
becomes jointly and severally liable with the job contractor, only
for the payment of the employees wages whenever the contractor
fails to pay the same.Other than that, the principal employer is
not responsible for any claim made by the employees.[44]
Despite respondents disavowal of the existence of the
employer-employee relationship between it and petitioner and its
insistence that petitioner is an employee first, of Supreme and
subsequently, of FSNC, the totality of the facts and surrounding
circumstances of the case convey otherwise.
On this point, the law is clear-cut.In laboronly contracting,
the statute creates an employeremployee relationship for a
comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws.The
contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer
and the latter is responsible to the employees of the laboronly
contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the
principal employer.
The Labor Code and its implementing rules empower the Labor
Arbiter to be thetrierof facts in labor cases.Much reliance is
placed on findings of facts of the Arbiter having had the
opportunity to talk to and discuss with the parties and their
witnesses the factual matters of the case during the conciliation
phase.[45]We, thus, give full credence to the findings of facts of
the labor arbiter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition isGRANTED.The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated9 May 2005and its Resolution
dated21 July 2005isREVERSED.The Decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated20 November 2000isREINSTATED.Let the records of the
above-entitled case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for immediate
execution of the Decision.No costs. SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-47521
July 31, 1987CAROLINA CLEMENTE,petitioner,vs.GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM Department of Health (Dagupan City) and EMPLOYEES'
COMPENSATION COMMISSION,respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:This is a petition to review the decision of
the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0509 which
affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and denied the claim for death benefits filed by Carolina
Clemente, widow of the late Pedro Clemente,
The undisputed facts of the case are summarized in the
memorandum for the respondent Government Service Insurance System,
as follows:
Petitioner's husband, the late Pedro Clemente, was for ten (10)
years a janitor in the Department of Health (Dagupan City),
assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Laoag City. He was
hospitalized from November 3 to 14, 1976 at the Central Luzon
Sanitarium, Tala Sanitarium, Tala, Caloocan City, due to his
ailment of "nephritis," as per medical certification of his
attending physician, Dr. Winifredo Samson. He was also found to be
suffering from such ailments as portal cirrhosis and leprosy,
otherwise known as Hansen's Disease.
On November 14, 1976, Pedro Clemente died of uremia due to
nephritis. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the GSIS a claim for
employees' compensation under the Labor Code, as amended.
On February 4, 1977, the GSIS denied the claim of the petitioner
because the ailments of her husband are not occupational diseases
taking into consideration the nature of his work and/or (sic) or
were not in the least causally related to his duties and conditions
of work.
On March 9, 1977, petitioner requested for reconsideration of
the GSIS' denial of her claim, stating that the ailments of her
husband were contracted in the course of employment and were
aggravated by the nature of his work. Petitioner alleged that her
husband, as janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic (Laoag City),
worked in direct contact with persons suffering from different skin
diseases and was exposed to obnoxious dusts and other dirt which
contributed to his ailment of Hansen's disease. Citing further the
cases ofSeven-Up Bottling Co., of the Phil. v. Rimerata, L-24349,
December 24, 1968 andAvana v. Quisumbing, L-23489, March 27, 1968.
Petitioner stated that her husband's ailment recurred in the course
of employment presumably due to his direct contact with persons
suffering from this ailment.
Acting upon petitioner's request for reconsideration, the GSIS,
on April 11, 1977, reiterated its previous denial of her claim.
On April 14, 1977, treating the request for reconsideration as
an appeal, the GSIS forwarded the records of the petitioner' claim
for review by the ECC.
On October 26, 1977, respondent ECC affirmed the GSIS' action of
denial and rendered its own decision dismissing petitioner's claim
(ECC Case No. 0509).
Respondent ECC's decision was anchored upon the findings that
the ailments are not listed as occupational diseases; that there
was no substantial evidence of causal connection; and that, in
fact, the evidence was that the deceased had already contracted the
Hansen's disease before his employment. In the exact words of the
ECC:
In the case at bar, since the deceased's ailments are not listed
as occupational diseases, appellant herein must prove that such
ailments were caused by deceased's employment and that the risk of
contracting the same was increased by his working conditions in
order to be compensable.
A mere cursory reading of the evidences on record, however, will
disclose that appellant failed to submit the required proof of
causation. There is no substantial proof in the record from which
we could draw the conclusion that indeed the nature of deceased's
employment as Janitor of Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic could be traced
as the direct cause of his ailment. Hence, in the absence of such
evidence, we are not disposed to disturb on appeal the findings of
the respondent System.
On the contrary, we find the records that the deceased, prior to
his employment in this office, was already suffering from his
ailment of Hansen's disease. This proves that his working
conditions did not increase the risk of his contracting the same.
If at all, his employment merely aggravated his ailments.
Unfortunately, however, aggravation of a preexisting illness, a
rule under the old law, is not anymore a ground for compensation
under the new law. Thus, the cases cited by the appellant cannot be
raised as authorities to support her claim.
Petitioner now seeks a review of the ECC decision. (pp. 76-78,
Rollo)
There is no question that the claim falls under the provisions
of the Labor Code, as amended. Under Article 167(L) of the Labor
Code and Section 1 (b) Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation, for the sickness and the resulting disability or
death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an
occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules with the
conditions therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that
the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions (De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142
SCRA 92, 96).
As the illnesses of the deceased are admittedly, not listed
under Annex "A" of the Rules as occupational diseases, the
petitioner bases her claim under the theory of increased risk. She
alleges that the deceased, as janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin
Clinic, was exposed to patients suffering from various kinds of
skin diseases, including Hansen's disease or leprosy. She avers
that for ten years, the deceased had to clean the clinic and its
surroundings and to freely mix with its patients. She claims that
it was during this time that he was attacked by other dreadful
diseases such as uremia, cancer of the liver, and nephritis.
On the other hand, the respondent Employees' Compensation
Commission contends that the petitioner failed to prove by
substantial evidence that the deceased's ailments were indeed
caused by his employment. It maintains that the deceased merely had
a recurrence of a pre-existing illness aggravated possibly by the
nature of his employment and that there is no evidence on record
showing that the nature of the deceased's employment was the direct
cause of any of his illnesses.
The respondent Government Service Insurance System concurs with
the views of the respondent Commission. It, however, argues that it
should be dropped as a party respondent in this case. It claims
that the petitioner has no cause of action against it, the subject
of judicial review being the adverse decision of the respondent
Commission.
We rule for the petitioner.
InSarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission(144 SCRA 421,
46) we held that:
Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for
compensation (San Valentin v. Employees' Compensation Commission,
118 SCRA 160; Better Building, Inc., v. Puncan, 135 SCRA 62). There
are no stringent criteria to follow. The degree of proof required
under P.D. 626; is merely substantial evidence, which means, "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion" (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, supra, citing Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635; and Acosta
v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 109 SCRA 209). The claimant
must show, at least, by substantial evidence that the development
of the disease is brought largely by the conditions present in the
nature of the job. What the law requires is a reasonable
work-connection and not a direct causal relation (Cristobal v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, supra; Sagliba v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 723; Neri v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 127 SCRA 672; Juala v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 128 SCRA 462; and De Vera v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 133 SCRA 685). It is enough that the
hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable.
Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where
there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection
(Delegente v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 118 SCRA 67; and
Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra).
Probability not certainty is the touchstone (San Valentin v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, supra).
In this case, we find sufficient evidence on record to sustain
the petitioner's view. The records disclose that in resisting the
petitioner's claim, the respondent Commission cited the following
medical authorities:
Uremia refers to the toxic clinical condition associated with
renal insufficiency and retention in the blood of nitrogenous
urinary waste products (azotemia). Renal insufficiency may be due
to (1) nephritis, bilateral pyelonephritis, polycystic kidney
disease, uretral or bladder obstruction, SLE, polyarteritis,
amyloid disease, or bilateral cortical necrosis; (2) acute tubular
necrosis resulting from transfusion reaction, shock, burns,
crushing injuries, or poisons; (3) sulfonamides precipitated in the
kidneys or ureters; (4) nephrocalcinosis resulting from extreme
alkalosis, diabetic acidosis, dehydration, or congestive heart
failure may result in azotemia, or may predipitate (sic) severe
uremia in the presence of already damages kidneys.
Reference: Lyght, Charles E.:The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and
Therapy;M.S. & D. Research Lab.; 11th Edition, 1966, pp.
257-258.
Portal Cirrhosis: A chronic disease characterized by incresed
connective tissue that spreads from the portal spaces, distorting
liver architecture and impairing liver functions. Etiology,
Incidence and pathology: Portal cirrhosis occurs chiefly in males
in late middle life. Malnutrition is believed to be a predisposing
if not a primary etiology factor. The role of alcohol is not
clearly established. Alcohol probably exerts a direct toxic effect
on the liver, and also increases malnutrition by providing calories
without essential nutrients. Cirrhosis has been produced in animals
by diets low in protein and specifically low in choline. The
addition of choline to these diets prevents cirrhosis. Chronic
poisoning with carbon tetrachloride or phosphorus produces changes
similar to those from portal cirrhosis. The liver is diffusely
nodular, scarred and dense. Microscopic section shows parenchymal
degeneration cellular infiltration, proliferation or scar tissue
and areas of regeneration. Fatty changes are present in the early
states.
Reference: Lyght, C.E.:The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and
Therapy: M.S. & D. N.J. 11th Edition, 1966, p. 928.
Hepatoma(Liver cancer) refers to malignant primary tumor of the
liver destroying the parenchyma arise (sic) from both liver cell
and bile duct elements. It develops most frequently in the previous
cirrhosis liver. A higher fraction of patients with post necrotic
cirrhosis develop hepatoma than those with portal alcoholic
cirrhosis. This may reflect the more active necrotic and
regenerative processes in the post necrotic cirrhosis liver. Most
large series indicate that 60% or more of hepatomas develop in a
previously cirrhotic liver. The cirrhosis of hemochromatosis seems
particularly liable to hepatomas as high a fraction as 20% of
patients with hemochromatosis die from this cause.
Reference: Harrison, T.R.:Principles of Internal Medicine;
McGraw Hill; N.Y., 5th Ed.; 1966, p. 1072.
Leprosyis a chronic, mildly contagious, infectious disease
characterized by both cutaneous and constitutional symptoms and the
production of various deformities and mutilations. The causative
organism is an acid fast rod. Mycobacterium leprae, first described
by Hansen in 1874. The mode of transmission is obscure, although
infection by direct contact appears likely. The disease is found
predominantly in tropical and sub-tropical Asia, Africa, and South
America. It is endemic in the Gulf States of the USA, Hawaii, the
Philippines and Puerto Rico.
Reference: Lyght, C.E.:The Merk Manuel of Diagnosis and Therapy;
" M.S. & D.; 11th Ed.; 1966, p. 847.
The nature of nephritis, however, was discussed by Mr. Daniel
Mijares, GSIS Manager, Employees' Compensation Department, in his
letter dated February 4, 1977, denying petitioner's claim, as
follows:
Nephritis is an acute, diffuse inflammation of the glomeruli or
kidneys. It usually follows previous streptoccocal infection mostly
in the upper respiratory tract. Because of this, it is always
thought that nephritis is the result of an auto-immune or allergic
reaction to infection, usually streptococcal. (Rollo, p. 20)
The foregoing discussions support rather than negate the theory
of increased risk. We note that the major ailments of the deceased,
i.e. nephritis, leprosy, etc., could be traced from bacterial and
viral infections. In the case of leprosy, it is known that the
source of infection is the discharge from lesions of persons with
active cases. It is believed that the bacillus enters the body
through the skin or through the mucous membrane of the nose and
throat (Miller and Keane, Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine
and Nursing, (1972), p. 530).
On the other hand, infectious diseases which give rise to
nephritis are believed to be as follows:
Table 294-1
Causes of acute glomerulonephritis
Infectious diseases
A. Post streptococcal glumerulonephritis
B. Non-Post streptococcal glumerulonephritis
1. Bacterial: Infective endocarditis, "Shunt nephritis," sepsis,
pneumococcal pneumonia, typhoid fever, secondary syphilis,
meningococcemia
2. Viral: Hepatitis B, infectious menoneucleosis, mumps,
measles, varicella, vaccinia, echovirus, and coxsackievirus
3. Parasitic: Malaria, taxoplasmosis
(Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 10th edition, p.
1633)
The husband of the petitioner worked in a skin clinic. As
janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Mr. Clemente was exposed
to different carriers of viral and bacterial diseases. He had to
clean the clinic itself where patients with different illnesses
come and go. He had to put in order the hospital equipments that
had been used. He had to dispose of garbage and wastes that
accumulated in the course of each working day. He was the employee
most exposed to the dangerous concentration of infected materials,
and not being a medical practitioner, least likely to know how to
avoid infection. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to conclude
that Mr. Clemente's working conditions definitely increased the
risk of his contracting the aforementioned ailments. This Court has
held in appropriate cases that the conservative posture of the
respondents is not consistent with the liberal interpretation of
the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee embodied in the
Constitution in favor of the workers (Cabanes v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, et al., L-50255, January 30, 1982; and
Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., supra). It
clashes with the injunction in the Labor Code (Article 4, New Labor
Code) that, as a rule, doubts should be resolved in favor of the
claimant-employee (Mercado, Jr., v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 139 SCRA 270, 277).
The respondents admit there may have been aggravation of an
existing ailment but point out that aggravating is no longer a
ground for compensation under the present law. They contend that
the compensable factor of increased risks of contracting the
disease is not present in this case.
The fallacy in this theory lies in the failure to explain how a
sick person was able to enter the government service more than ten
years before he became too ill to work and at a time when
aggravation of a disease was compensable. There is no evidence to
show that Mr. Clemente was hired inspite of having an existing
disease liable to become worse.
The petitioner's arguments of recurrence of an already cured
disease or the contracting of the disease due to increased risks
become more plausible. When there are two or more possible
explanations regarding an issue of compensability that which favors
the claimant must be chosen.1avvphi1We also do not find merit in
the respondent GSIS' contention that it should be dropped as a
party in this case. This Court has passed upon this issue on
several occasions. Thus, in the case of Cabanero v. Employees'
Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413, 419), this Court citing Lao
v. Employees' Compensation Commission (97 SCRA 782), held:
x x x x x x x x x
... This Court is of the opinion that respondent System, as the
ultimate implementing agency of the ECC's decision, is a proper
party in this case. The fact that this Court chose to require
respondent GSIS to comment is an indication that it is a necessary
party. It must be noted that the law and the rules refer to the
said System in all aspects of employee compensation (including
enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules.) (at
p. 793).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from
is hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Government Service Insurance
System is hereby ordered to pay the petitioner:
1) The sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) as death
benefits; and
2) The sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) as
attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.G.R.
No. 73681 June 30, 1988
COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, Inc.,petitioners,vs.HON. BLAS F.
OPLE, COLGATE PALMOLIVE SALES UNION,respondents.
PARAS,J.:Before Us is a Petition for certiorari seeking to set
aside and annul the Order of respondent Minister of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) directly certifying private respondent as the
recognized and duly-authorized collective bargaining agent for
petitioner's sales force and ordering the reinstatement of three
employees of petitioner.
Acting on the petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary
restraining order, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining respondents from enforcing and/or carrying out the
assailed order.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On March 1, 1985, the respondent Union filed a Notice of Strike
with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of unfair labor
practice consisting of alleged refusal to bargain, dismissal of
union officers/members; and coercing employees to retract their
membership with the union and restraining non-union members from
joining the union.
After efforts at a