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u n i ve r s i t y o f co pe n h ag e n
Transcendental Philosophy and its Transformations
Heidegger and Nishida's critical engagements with transcendental
philosophy in thelate 1920sIshihara, Yuko
Publication date:2016
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Document license:CC BY-NC-ND
Citation for published version (APA):Ishihara, Y. (2016).
Transcendental Philosophy and its Transformations: Heidegger and
Nishida's criticalengagements with transcendental philosophy in the
late 1920s. Det Humanistiske Fakultet, KøbenhavnsUniversitet.
Download date: 01. Jul. 2021
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TranscendentalPhilosophyanditsTransformations:
HeideggerandNishida’scriticalengagementswithtranscendentalphilosophyinthelate1920s
APhDthesis
SubmittedtotheFacultyofHumanities,
UniversityofCopenhagen
by
YukoIshihara
August2016
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Contents
EnglishAbstract.......................................................................................................................................iv
DanishAbstract.........................................................................................................................................v
Acknowledgements................................................................................................................................vi
Abbreviations..........................................................................................................................................vii
Introduction................................................................................................................................................1
PartI:Whatistranscendentalphilosophy?
Chapter1:TranscendentalphilosophyinKantandHusserl........................................................................9Introduction.....................................................................................................................................................................................91
Kant’stranscendentalphilosophy..............................................................................................................................102
Husserl’stranscendentalphenomenology.............................................................................................................24
Chapter2:Theessenceoftranscendentalphilosophy..................................................................................46Introduction...................................................................................................................................................................................461.
Transcendentalreflectionandconditionsofpossibility..................................................................................462.
Alterationofourrelationtotheworld.....................................................................................................................493.
Transcendentalfoundationalism................................................................................................................................534.
Threecriteriaoftranscendentalphilosophy.........................................................................................................67
PartII:Heideggerandtranscendentalphilosophyinthelate1920s
Chapter3:Heidegger’sprojectinBeingandTime...........................................................................................69Introduction...................................................................................................................................................................................691.
Formulatingthequestionofbeing.............................................................................................................................702.
Thedemandforafundamentalontology................................................................................................................743.
TowardstheexistentialanalyticofDasein............................................................................................................774.
Thephenomenologicalmethod...................................................................................................................................805.
TheincompletenessoftheprojectinBT.................................................................................................................90Conclusion......................................................................................................................................................................................91
Chapter4:Heidegger’scriticalengagementwiththetranscendentalinBeingandTime..............93Introduction...................................................................................................................................................................................931.
ThetranscendentalorientationofBT......................................................................................................................962.
Heidegger’shermeneutictransformationoftranscendentalphilosophyinBT.................................129
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PartIII:Nishidaandtranscendentalphilosophyinthelate1920s
Chapter5:Nishida’searlytheoryofbashointhelate1920s...................................................................133Introduction................................................................................................................................................................................1331.
Towardsthetheoryofbasho.....................................................................................................................................1342.
TheoryofbashoinFromtheActingtotheSeeing(1927).............................................................................1443.
TheoryofbashoinTheSelf-awareSystemofUniversals(1930)................................................................162Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................................................169
Chapter6:Nishida’scriticalengagementwiththetranscendentalinhisearlytheoryofbasho.................................................................................................................................................................................171Introduction................................................................................................................................................................................1711.
Transcendentalorientationoftheearlytheoryofbasho..............................................................................1752.
Nishida’schorologicaltransformationoftranscendentalphilosophyinhisearlytheoryofbasho...............................................................................................................................................................................................206
Conclusion:Possibilitiesoftranscendentalphilosophy....................................................209
GlossaryofKeyJapaneseTerms..................................................................................................212
Bibliography.........................................................................................................................................213
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EnglishAbstract
Most comparative studies of Heidegger and Nishida have focused
on comparing and contrasting Nishida’s
philosophy with later Heidegger’s thought. This is not
surprising since, of all Western philosophers, Nishida probably
resonatesmostwiththe
laterHeideggerafterthe“turn”(Kehre).ButistherealsoacommongroundbetweenNishidaand
early,pre-turnHeidegger?The presentwork attempts to shed light
on this question by uncovering their earlier critical
engagementswith transcendentalphilosophyduring the
late1920s.Morespecifically, it aims toarticulate theextent to
whichtheystillworkwithinatraditionaltranscendentalframeworkandthewaysinwhichtheyattempttogobeyondthis
intheirtransformationsoftranscendentalphilosophy.ForHeidegger,myfocusishisprojectinBeingandTime(1927).For
Nishida,Ifocusonhistheoryofbashoasdevelopedintwoofhisworksfromthelate1920s,FromtheActingtotheSeeing
(1927) andTheSelf-aware SystemofUniversals (1930).My aim is to
show theways inwhich Heidegger’shermeneutic
transformation and Nishida’s chorological transformation of
transcendental philosophy resemble and differ from each
other.
Ibeginbyclarifyingtheessenceofthe“traditionaltranscendentalframework.”FromanexaminationofKantand
Husserl,Idrawthreecriteriaoftranscendentalphilosophy:(1)transcendentalphilosophyisasearchforthefoundationof
ourexperienceandknowledge,(2)itemploystranscendentalreflection,and(3)itentailsanalterationofourrelationtothe
worldfromthenaiverealistviewoftheworldasexistingindependentlyofustoseeingtheworldasexistingonlyinsofaras
it is constitutedby transcendental subjectivity. Taking these
criteria as a heuristic device, I thenquestion the extent to
which both Heidegger and Nishida work within a traditional
transcendental framework and the extent to which they
attempttogobeyondit.
Firstly,Iarguethattheybothsawtheimportanceofseekingakindoftranscendentalfoundation.ButwhileDasein
isstillakindoftranscendentalsubjectivitythat“constitutes”theworldinthesensethatitisworld-disclosing,Iarguethat
absolutenothingness isno “subjectivity” that “constitutes”
objects since there is absolutelyno-thing that canbe said to
constitute objects. Secondly, while they both seek a
transcendental ground through transcendental reflection, they
also
renderitamatterofdisclosingandawakeningtoone’sfacticalsituation.Yet,unlikeHeidegger,forNishida,transcendental
reflectionmust beginwith our facticity and historicity but
itmust not end there. Itmust delve deeper and reveal the
absoluteno-thingnessofourbeing.Thirdly,forboththinkers,transcendentalphilosophyessentiallyaltersthenaiverealist
view of the world. For Heidegger, we come to see the world
through transcendental subjectivity (Dasein), one whose
ontological constitution is articulated as disclosedness to the
world, factical, and is always already projecting its
possibilitiesupontheworld.Inotherwords,wecometoseetheworldthroughDasein’sbeing-in-the-world.ForNishida,
however,wecometoseetheworldthroughabsoluteno-thingness.Thisisnotatallequivalenttosayingthatwecometo
seetheworldasabsolutelynothingasiftoimplyanihilisticposition.Rather,wecometotheself-realizationthat“I”amthe
placeof absoluteno-thingnesswherein “reality” realizes itself.
In thisway, I argue that,whilehavingmuch in common,
Nishida’s chorological transformation is more radical than
Heidegger’s hermeneutic one. Ultimately, the radicalness of
Nishida’s transformation lies in its enigma, namely that
transcendental reflection brings us back in touchwith thenon-
reflectiveexperiencepriortothesubject-objectsplit.
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DanishAbstract
DeflestecomparativestudieromHeideggerogNishidaharfokuseretpåsammenfaldogforskellemellemNishidas
filosofiogdenseneHeideggerstænkning.DetteerikkeoverraskendedaNishida,blandtallevestligefilosoffer,nokminder
mestomdenseneHeideggerefterdennes“vending”(Kehre).MenkanderogsåfindeslighedermellemNishidaogdentidlige
Heidegger, altså før sidstnævntes ”Kehre”? Denne afhandling
forsøger at belyse dette spørgsmål ved at fremstille deres
tidligerearbejdermedtranscendentalfilosofiislutningenaf1920’erne.Merenøjagtigtforsøgerafhandlingenatbeskrivei
hvilkengraddetokansigesstadigvækatarbejdeindenforentraditioneltranscendental
forståelsesrammeogendvidere
måderne,påhvilkedeforsøgeratbrydeudafdengennemderestransformationeraftranscendentalfilosofien.IHeideggers
tilfældefokusererjegpåhovedværketVærenogTid(1927).INishidastilfældefokusererjegpåhansteoriombashosom
udvikletitoafhansværkerfradesene20’ere,FromtheActingtotheSeeing(1927)ogTheSelf-awareSystemofUniversals
(1930). Det er mit mål at vise, på hvilke måder Heideggers
hermeneutiske transformation og Nishidas “korologiske”
transformationafdentranscendentalefilosofilignerogadskillersigfrahinanden.
Jegbegyndermedenafklaringafessensenafden“traditionelle
transcendentale forståelsesramme.”Gennemen
undersøgelseafKantogHusserlopridserjegtrekriterierfortranscendentalfilosofi:(1)transcendentalfilosofierensøgen
eftergrundlagetforvorerfaringogviden,(2)denanvendertranscendentalreflektion,og(3)denledertilenforandringaf
voresforholdtilverdenfradennaiverealismesoverbevisningifølgehvilkenverdenanskuessomeksisterendeuafhængigt
afos,tilatdensessomeksisterendekunsåfremtdenerkonstitueretafentranscendentalsubjektivitet.Medudgangspunkt
idissekriterierspørgerjeg,ihvilkengradHeideggerogNishidakansigesatarbejdeindenforentraditioneltranscendental
forståelsesramme,ogihvilkengraddeforsøgeratbrydeudafden.
Fordetførsteargumenterer jeg foratdebeggesåvigtighedenafat
ledeefteretslagstranscendentaltgrundlag.
Men hvor Dasein stadigvæk forbliver en art transcendental
subjektivitet der ”konstituerer” verden, forstået som
verdensafdækkende,argumentererjegforatdenabsolutteintethedikkeeren”subjektivitet”der”konstituerer”objekter,
fordi der er absolut ingen-ting, der kan siges at konstituere
objekter. For det andet, altimens de begge leder efter et
transcendentaltgrundlaggennemtranscendentalrefleksion,gørdedetogsåtiletspørgsmålomatafdækkeogopvågnetil
ens faktiske situation. For Nishida, ulig Heidegger,må den
transcendentale refleksion begyndemed vores fakticitet og
historicitet,mendenkanikkeendeder.Denmådykkedybereogafslørevoresværensabsolutteintethed.Fordettredje,i
følge begge tænkere ændrer transcendental filosofi fundamentalt
den naive realismes verdensbillede. Ifølge Heidegger
begynderviatseverdengennemdentranscendentalsubjektivitet(Dasein),hvisontologiskekonstitutionartikuleressom
verdensafdækkende,faktiskogsomaltidalleredeudkastendesinemulighederiverden.Medandreord,begynderviatse
verdengennemDaseinsværen-i-verden.MenifølgeNishidabegynderviatseverdengennemdenabsolutteintethed.Dette
eroverhovedetikkedetsammesomatsige,atvibegynderatseverdensomabsolutintet,altsåsomenformfornihilistisk
position.Snarereopnårvidenindsigt,at”jeg”erdenabsolutteintethedssted,ihvilken”virkeligheden”realiserersigselv.
På denne vis argumenterer jeg for, at selvom de har meget til
fælles, så er Nishidas korologiske transformationmere
radikalendHeideggershermeneutiske.AltialtskalradikalitetenafNishidastransformationfindesidensgåde,nemligat
dentranscendentalerefleksiontagerostilbagetildenikke-refleksiveoplevelse,dereksisterførsubjekt-objektskellet.
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Acknowledgements
Iwouldliketofirstthankmysupervisor,ProfessorSørenOvergaard,forhiscontinuoussupport,
expertise, encouragement, and patience during the composition of
this dissertation. His careful and
critical reading of my writings, as well as comments and advice
on my presentations, has been truly
invaluable. I donot think I couldhave completed this
dissertationwithout his great supervision. I also
wanttothankProfessorDanZahaviforhisinsightfulcommentsandvaluablesuggestionsthroughoutmy
Ph.D.study.Iamespeciallygratefulforhisdeepunderstandingandsupportinengagingwiththedialogue
betweentheEasternandWesterntraditions.Myworkwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithouttheopenand
stimulatingenvironmentattheCenterforSubjectivityResearch.
I am also indebted to a number of people outside the Center. I
would like to express my
appreciation toProfessor
JeffMalpas,whohasreadandcommentedonearlierversionsof the first
two
chaptersduringmystayattheUniversityofTasmaniain2014.ThestimulatingdiscussionsIhadwithhim
hada lastingeffectonme, andhis comprehensiveworkon
transcendentalphilosophyandHeideggera
continuinginspiration.
IamdeeplyindebtedtothepeoplefromtheJapanesePhilosophyDepartmentatKyotoUniversity.
I express my gratitude to my former supervisors Professor Fujita
Masakatsu and Professor Uehara
Mayukofortheirwordsofencouragementthroughoutthisproject.Special
thanksareduetomyformer
colleagues,YasakaAkihiroandNagaokaTetsurō,forhelpingmegatherreferencesonNishidafromJapan.
I also want to thank my friend and former colleague, Erol
Copelj, for taking the time to read
throughthemanuscripts,bothearlierandlater.Hisconstructivecriticisms,stylisticsuggestions,anddeep
understanding of the topic have helped tremendously. I am also
very much indebted to the Heiwa
NakajimaFoundation forproviding funding from2013-2015. Finally,
Iwould like to thankmypartner,
FilipGurjanov,
forhisunderstandingandpatienceduringthefinalmonthsofwriting,andmyfamilyfor
theirsupportandencouragement.Especiallyduringthetoughtimes,mysiblingslivingaroundtheworld,
Reiko Ishihara-Brito, Takeki Ishihara, and Sachiko Ishihara
gaveme themotivation I needed. I cannot
thankmyparentsenough forgivingmetheirsupportandunderstanding
throughout themanyyearsof
mystudies.Idedicatethisworktomyparents,OsamuandYohkoIshihara.
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Abbreviations
WorksbyMartinHeidegger
AllworksbyHeideggerarecitedfromtheGesamtausgabe(abbreviatedas“GA”)exceptforSeinundZeit,
whereIcitefromthestandardMaxNiemeyeredition.Theabbreviationisfollowedbyvolumeandpage
number.Inthetext,IhavegiventhepaginationfromtheoriginalGermanfirstfollowedbyaslashand
paginationfromtheEnglishtranslation,whereveravailable.IhavefollowedtheavailableEnglish
translationsinmycitations.FullinformationabouttheworksisgivenintheBibliography.
GA10 DerSatzvomGrund
GA20 ProlegomenazurGeschichtedesZeitbegriffs
GA24 DieGrundproblemederPhänomenologie
GA26 MetaphysischeAnfangsgründederLogikimAusgangvonLeibniz
GA41
DieFragenachdemDing:ZuKantsLehrevondentranszendentalenGrundsätzen
(Wintersemester1935–1936)
GA56/57
ZurBestimmungderPhilosophie:1.DieIdeederPhilosophieunddas
Weltanschauungsproblem
GA63 Ontologie(HermeneutikderFaktizität)
GA65 BeiträgezurPhilosophie(VomEreignis)(1936–1938).
SZ SeinundZeit
WorksbyNishidaKitarō
AllworksbyNishidaarecitedfromtheNishidaKitarōZenshū[CompleteWorksofNishidaKitarō]
(abbreviatedas“NKZ”).Theabbreviationisfollowedbyvolumeandpagenumber.Inthetext,Ihavegiven
thepaginationfromtheoriginalJapanesefirstfollowedbyaslashandpaginationfromtheEnglish
translation,whereveravailable.IhaveoftenrevisedtheavailableEnglishtranslationsinmycitationsfor
thepurposeofliteralprecision.WhentheEnglishtranslationswerenotavailable,Ihavetranslatedthe
passagesmyself.FullinformationabouttheworksisgivenintheBibliography.
NKZ1
Zennokenkyū[AnInquiryintotheGood],Shisakutotaiken[ThoughtandExperience]
NKZ2
Jikakuniokeruchokkantohansei[IntuitionandReflectioninSelf-awareness]
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NKZ4 Hatarakumonokaramirumonoe[FromtheActingtotheSeeing]
NKZ5
Ippanshanojikakutekitaikei[TheSelf-awareSystemofUniversals]
NKZ7
Tetsugakunokonponmondaizokuhen(benshōhōtekisekai)[FundamentalProblemsof
PhilosophyContinued(TheDialecticalWorld)].
NKZ8 Tetsugakuronbunshūdaini[PhilosophicalEssays,Vol.2]
NKZ10 Tetsugakuronbunshūdaiyon[PhilosophicalEssays,Vol.4]
NKZ11 Tetsugakuronbunshūdairoku[PhilosophicalEssays,Vol.6]
NKZ12 Zokushisakutotaiken[SequeltoThoughtandExperience]
NKZ13 Shōhentonōto[ShortWritingsandNotes]
NKZ16 Shokisōkō[EarlyWritings]
NKZ18 Shokanshū[CollectionofLetters]
Squarebrackets(“[…]”)withinquotationsindicateadditionsorchangesmadebyme,andoftentimesthe
originalGermanorJapanesephrase.Anglebrackets(“”)indicateadditionsandchangesmadebythe
bytheEnglishtranslator.
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Introduction
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) andNishida Kitarō (1870-1945) are
two of themost influential
philosophers of the twentieth century. While coming from very
different cultural and intellectual
backgrounds,theybothtookupthetaskofovercomingtheWesternmetaphysicaltradition.Comparedto
Heidegger,Nishidahasyettogainacknowledgmentintheacademicworld.Sadlyenough,hisphilosophy
hasnotevengainedtheacknowledgement itdeserveswithin Japan,where
itoriginated.Onereasonfor
thisneglectisthedifficultyofunderstandingNishida’sphilosophy.IfHeideggerisdifficulttoread,Nishida
isalmostincomprehensibleformany,eveninJapanese.1ButoneshouldnottakethisasasignthatNishida
was confused. As Ueda Shizuteru2states in “The Difficulties of
Reading Nishida,” the difficulty is a
reflectionofthedifficultprojectNishidasetforhimself.3NotunlikeHeidegger,inordertobreakwiththe
Western metaphysical tradition, Nishida felt the need to create
his own language. But what makes
Nishida’s language particularly difficult is the fact that his
thinking developed between the two very
differenttraditionsoftheEastandWest.Ontheonehand,hewasfirmlyrootedintheEasternBuddhist
tradition and especially in Zen Buddhismwhere the practice of
“non-thinking” is said to be the key to
understanding reality. On the other hand, he was
“philosophizing” in the sense of engaging in the
reflectivepracticeofphilosophycarriedoutintheWesternphilosophicaltradition.AsUedanicelyputsit,
Nishidawas a Zen practitioner philosophizing and, at the same
time, a philosopher practicing Zen.4He
alsonotesthatsuchanattempttothinkbetweenthetwopolesiscomparabletolaterHeidegger’sattempt
to think the relationship between the two very different ways of
saying, “thinking” (Denken) and
“poetizing” (Dichten).5Indeed, of all Western philosophers,
Nishida probably resonates most with the
laterHeideggerafterthe“turn”(Kehre).
Itisnotsurprising,then,thatmostcomparativestudiesofHeideggerandNishidahavefocusedon
comparing and contrasting Nishida’s philosophy with later
Heidegger’s thought.6For example, Ōhashi
RyōsukehasarguedthatthelaterHeidegger’sideaof“Dasein”astheplaceofthe“event”or“happening”1KobayashiHideo,aJapaneseliterarycritic,famouslycriticizedNishida’swritingsin1939,sayingthatalthoughtheyareofcoursenotwritteninaforeignlanguage,theyarealsonotwritteninJapanese(1968,p.84).2AllJapanesenamesinthiswork(exceptinthebibliography)arewrittenintheJapaneseorderoffamilyname,followedbygivenname.3Ueda1994,pp.231-241.4Ibid.,p.194.5Ibid.,p.235.6Admittedly,mostofthecomparativestudieshavebeenattemptedbyNishidascholarsandnotbyHeideggerscholars.ThisfactalsoshowsthatNishidahasyettogainacknowledgmentoutsidethecircleofscholarsworkingwithinJapanesephilosophy.
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(Ereignis)ofbeingitselfiscomparabletoNishida’sideaof“theself-determinationoftheworld”(sekaino
jikogentei) developed from the mid-1930s.7More recently, John
Krummel has compared the “quasi-
religious”languagethatbothemployindiscussingthe“originalwherein”ofhumanexistence.Ontheone
hand,fromthe1930sonwards,Heideggerspeaksof“thesacred”thatclearsspaceforbeingstoappear.On
the other hand, in the 1940s, Nishida comes to relate this
place, what he calls “the place of absolute
nothingness,” to the “absolute” (zettai) or “god” that envelops
the world as its place through its own
“kenotic self-negation.”8Others have also noted the affinity
between Heidegger’s notions of “clearing”
(Lichtung)or“openness”(Offenheit)andNishida’sideaofthe“placeofnothingness”(munobasho).9Itis
worthnotingthatmostofthesestudiesalsofocusonthelaterperiodofNishida’sthought,fromthe1930s
onwards.
ButcanwealsofindcommongroundbetweenNishidaandearly,pre-turnHeidegger?Ōhashiseems
toanswerintheaffirmative,notingthatNishida’sthoughttookasimilarturntoHeidegger’s.ForŌhashi,
the significanceofNishida’s philosophy in thehistoryof
philosophy is tobe found inhis “bashoronteki
tenkai,”or “turn tobasho.”10According toŌhashi, thiswasa turn
from“seeing theworld fromtheself,”
which includedNishida’s earlier position, to “seeing theworld
from theworld,” developed in themid-
1930s.Indeedin1934,Nishidawritesthathisearlierwork,TheSelf-awareDeterminationofNothingness
of 1932, “still remained in the standpoint of seeing theworld
from the individual self.”11Thus, just as
Heideggerlaterturnedawayfrom“Dasein”astheplaceofthehumanunderstandingofbeing,Nishidaalso
turned away from “seeing theworld from the
individualself.”Heidegger later expressly stated that this
7Cf.Ōhashi1995,chapter2(“NishidatoHaidegaa”[NishidaandHeidegger]).8Krummel2010.9Seeforexample:AndrewFeenberg(1999)andElmarWeinmayr(2005).Foraconciseyetcomprehensiveoverviewofthecomparativestudiesuntilnow,see:Krummel(2010,note4).10ItisnoteasytotranslatewhatŌhashicalls“bashorontekitenkai.”Theissueconcerns,ontheonehand,howoneshouldtranslateNishida’s“basho”and,ontheotherhand,howoneshouldinterpretŌhashi’sunderstandingofNishida’sbasho.AswewillseeinChapters5and6,“basho”inJapaneseliterallymeans“place.”Inthiswork,Ihavesometimestranslated“basho”asplaceandothertimeskepttheoriginal,whenIfeltthatitwasbettertoemphasizethatitisNishida’sspecificterm.SomecommentatorswritinginEnglishhaverenderedthetermas“topos”(e.g.Yusa(1986&1987),Baek(2008),andMaraldo(2015)).Accordingly,wemighttranslateŌhashi’s“bashorontekitenkai”to“topologicalturn.”However,KrummelhaspointedoutthatthemeaningofNishida’s“basho”isclosertoPlato’s“chōra”thanto“topos.”AccordingtoKrummel,“fortheancientGreeks,toposisthephysicallocationthatamaterialthinghappenstooccupyatthemomentandthatisindependentofitsbeing.Chōra,ontheotherhand,isthefieldthatgivesroomforsuchlocalitiesandprovidesthecontextualsignificanceforthings”(2015,p.203).Ifwefollowhisinterpretation,whichIamsympathetictoandwhichIbelieveŌhashiwouldbealso,wemightrenderhis“bashorontekitenkai”as“chorologicalturn.”Butforthesakeofsimplicity,Ihaveheregivenasimplerenderingas“turntobasho.”11NKZ7,p.210.ThequotationistakenfromtheprefacetoFundamentalProblemsofPhilosophyContinued(TheDialecticalWorld)publishedin1934.
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turn was a turning away from transcendental thinking.12While
Nishida himself does not make such
statement, the same could be said of his turn. For both
Heidegger and Nishida, then, the turn in their
thinkingseemstohavebeenrelatedtotheengagementwiththetranscendentaltradition.
ThepresentstudygoesinthesamedirectionasŌhashi’sinthesenseofopeningupthecommon
groundbetweenHeideggerandNishida.Butinsteadofcomparingthenatureofthe“turn”intheirthought,
Ifocusontheirearly,“pre-turn”period.13Iattempttoshedlightonthisfurthercommongroundbetween
HeideggerandNishidabyuncoveringtheirearliercriticalengagementswithtranscendentalphilosophy.In
recentyears,Heideggerscholarshavebeguntospeakofthe“transcendentalHeidegger.”14Ithascometo
berecognizedthat,atleastduringtheMarburgperiod(1923-1928),Heideggerwasstill
largelyworking
withinthe frameworkof transcendentalphilosophy.Thus, thoughthere
isyet tobeaconsensusonthis
matter, it is nowadays less controversial to read Being and Time
(1927) as an attempt to critically
appropriate transcendental philosophy. Yet, “transcendental
Nishida” is still an undeveloped idea in
Nishidascholarship.Ontheonehand,itiswidelyacknowledgedthatearlyNishidacriticallyengagedwith
neo-KantianismandFichteaswell asHegel andKant.On
theotherhand,however, theextent towhich
Nishida’sideasofjikakuandbasho,bothdevelopedintheperiodofthisengagement,arecontinuouswith
thetranscendentaltraditionisstillamatterawaitingclarification.
Accordingly, in this work, I propose to articulate Heidegger and
Nishida’s critical engagements
withtranscendentalphilosophyduringthelate1920s.Morespecifically,Iaimtoarticulatetheextentto
whichtheystillworkwithinatraditionaltranscendentalframeworkandthewaysinwhichtheyattempt
togobeyond this in their transformationsof
transcendentalphilosophy.ForHeidegger,my focus ishis
projectinBeingandTime.ForNishida,Ifocusonhisearlytheoryofbashoasitwasdevelopedintwoof
his works from the late 1920s, From the Acting to the Seeing
(1927) and The Self-aware System of
12Cf.ContributionstoPhilosophy(FromEnowing),§§132-134(GA65,pp.250-254).13Infact,itiscontroversialwhethersucha“turn”reallyexistsinNishida’sthought.Ontheonehand,therecanbenodenyingthat,inthe1930sand‘40s,ashisconcernmovesawayfromepistemologicalproblemstowardsthesocio-historicalworld,Nishidacomestorevisehisearlierviews.Anditistruethathisstatementin1934pointstoanimportantchangeinhisthinking.Ontheotherhand,however,whetherthischangeamountstoa“turn”comparabletoHeidegger’sKehreasŌhashisuggestsissomewhatquestionable.ItseemstomethatNishida’s“topologicalturn”tookplacealreadyinthelate1920s.Perhapsitwasonlylaterthathecametofullyappreciatethenatureofthisturnas“seeingtheworldfromtheworld.”Nonetheless,Iwouldsubmitthatarevolutionary“topologicalturn”(orchorologicalturn)takesplaceinthelate1920sthatwasthenfurtherdevelopedinthe1930sand‘40s.ButIwillnotbeconcernedwiththisissueinthiswork.14Thecollectiveefforttobringattentiontothetopicgoesbacktoaconference,“HeideggerandTranscendentalPhilosophy,”heldatRiceUniversityin2003.Themanuscriptsfromtheconferencewerethencompiledinabookunderthetitle,TranscendentalHeidegger(2007),co-editedbyJeffMalpasandStevenCrowell.ThisvolumehasgreatlycontributedtotheacknowledgmentofthesignificanceofthetranscendentalinHeidegger’sthought.
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Universals(1930).15Bycomparingandcontrastingtheirengagements,Iattempttoshedlightontheways
inwhichtheirtransformationsoftranscendentalphilosophyresembleanddifferfromeachother.
But at this pointwemust clarifywhy examining this periodof their
thought isworthour time.
Afterall,onemaywonder,didn’tbothofthemcometoseethelimitsoftheirearlierapproach?Tobegin
with, both Heidegger’s project in Being and Time and Nishida’s
theory of basho in the late 1920s are
important,attheveryleast,forunderstandingthetrajectoryoftheirthought.Butapartfromthat,theyare
also significant for understanding the possibilities, as well as
possible limitations, of transcendental
philosophy itself.For,as
Iwillbearguing,bothHeideggerandNishidaattempt to
transformtraditional
forms of transcendental philosophy in important respects. Thus,
their critical engagements with
transcendentalphilosophyreflecttheirattemptstoovercometheWesternmetaphysicaltraditionbystill
working within but also going beyond the traditional
transcendental framework. In this way, at least
duringthisperiod,boththinkersbelievedinthepossibilitiesoftranscendentalphilosophy,namelythatit
could clear the way towards overcoming the Western metaphysical
tradition, if it were transformed.
Therefore, if the later period of their thought sheds light on
the possible limitations of transcendental
philosophy, the earlier period goes some way towards
illuminating its possibilities. Since the present
workfocusesonlyontheearlierperiod,thepossiblelimitationsoftranscendentalphilosophywillnotbe
thematized.
Before turning to an outline of the work, I will discuss its
approach. When one engages in
comparative philosophy that attempts to articulate a non-Western
tradition in light of someWestern
philosophicalconcept,onemustbeespeciallycarefulnottomakethefatalerrorof“recreatingtheother
traditionintheimageofone’sown,”asLittlejohnwritesintheentryon“ComparativePhilosophy”inThe
InternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.16This error is based on the
chauvinistic assumption that the other
traditionisjustdoingthesameorsimilarthingas“we”aredoing,thusfailingtounderstandtheotherfor
its own sake. Now, one may suspect that I am in danger of doing
this by interpreting Nishida as a
transcendental philosopher, which is certainly a Western
concept. However, such a worry can be
immediately dismissed since it simply fails to see what John
Krummel calls the “eclectic nature” of
Nishida’s philosophy.17Namely, one of the characteristic
features of Nishida’s philosophy is that it
developedoutofcriticalappropriationsofideasfromvarioussources,notonlyfromtheEasternBuddhist
15Thoughthisbookwaspublishedin1930,itisacollectionofessayspublishedbetween1928and1929.16Littlejohn:http://www.iep.utm.edu/comparat/#SH3a(accessedAugust15,2016).17Krummel2015,p.4.
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tradition but, in fact, especially from the Western
philosophical tradition.18Thus, we find Nishida
borrowingtermssuchas“pureexperience”(WilliamJames),“apriori”(Kantandneo-Kantians)19,“noesis-
noema”(Husserl),whileemployingtheminaratherpeculiarmanner for
thepurposeofarticulatinghis
own position. Nishida’s critical engagementwith transcendental
philosophy is also part of this eclectic
natureofhisphilosophy.Therefore,myattempttoarticulatethe“transcendentalNishida”isinessenceno
differentfromarticulatingthe“transcendentalHeidegger.”Atthesametime,however,itisalsoimportant
tonotethatIhavenointentionofclaimingthatNishidaandHeideggeralikewereonlyworkingwithinthe
bounds of a traditional transcendental framework. It is my aim
to articulate their critical (this is the
crucial word) engagements with transcendental philosophy.
Accordingly, the present work takes its
departure from the understanding that, in their critical
engagements during the late 1920s, both
Heidegger and Nishida work within but also attempt to go beyond
the traditional transcendental
framework through a kind of transformation. The study therefore
begins with a clarification of the
“traditionaltranscendentalframework.”
Thiswork isdivided into threeparts.The firstpart consistsof
apreliminary studyofKant and
Husserl’stranscendentalphilosophies(Chapters1and2);thesecondpartdealswithHeidegger’scritical
engagementwith transcendental philosophy (Chapters 3 and4); and
the third part examinesNishida’s
criticalengagementthereofincomparisonwithHeidegger’s(Chapters5and6).Iassumethatmostofmy
readersarelessacquaintedwithNishida’sthoughtthanwithHeidegger’s.Thus,IfirstpresentHeidegger
and thenNishida,making references to Heidegger’s ideaswhere the
associationmay be helpful to the
reader.ThemaincomparativepartofthestudyisundertakeninChapter6.
InPartI,Iposethequestion,whatistranscendentalphilosophy?InChapter1,Iexaminetwocases
of transcendental philosophy: Kant’s transcendental philosophy
and Husserl’s transcendental
phenomenology. In Chapter 2, I work out the essence of
transcendental philosophy based on the
investigations inChapter1. I chooseKantandHusserlnotonlybecause
theyare representativesof the
tradition but also because they are two key figures that both
Heidegger and Nishida engagedwith. In
Chapter1,IarguethatKant’scontributionliesinintroducinganewquestiontotheproblemofknowledge
(“How is synthetic a priori knowledge possible?”) and seeking
the answer through transcendental
18Seealso,Davis(2013and2014).19Seemyarticle,“Nishidaniokeru‘apriori’gainen”[Nishidaonthe“apriori”concept](2015b).There,IanalyzedNishida’sappropriationorreinterpretationof“apriori”duringtheperiodfrom1916to1926,whenthetermwasmostemployed.Iarguedthathereinterpretsthe(neo-)Kantianaprioriastheunifyingconstitutiveprincipleofourvariouskindsofexperience,whichisnotmerelypositedastheconditionsofpossibilityforourexperience,but,also,giveninourintuitiveexperience.
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reflection, namely a second-order reflection into the a priori
subjective conditions of possibility of our
knowledge of objects. I then identify Husserl’s main differences
from Kant in his insistence on the
phenomenological method, which is characterized by the
phenomenological reduction, its descriptive
nature and its appeal to intuitive evidence. I further
articulate the specific sense in which Husserl’s
transcendental-phenomenological method is reflective. I argue
that, for Husserl, the transcendental-
phenomenologicalepochéandreductionarethespecificmethodsthattogetherconstitutetranscendental
reflection.
InChapter2,Idrawoutthreecriteriaoftranscendentalphilosophybasedontheinvestigationsin
Chapter1.(1)Transcendentalphilosophyisasearchforthefoundationofourexperienceandknowledge.
Transcendental foundationalism differs from other kinds of
foundationalism in that the foundational
relationisunderstoodintermsoftranscendentalpriority,i.e.transcendentalsubjectivityhaspriorityover
theworld in the sense that it constitutes the latter’smeaning.
(2) It employs transcendental reflection.
Transcendentalreflection isasecond-orderreflectionthatdoesnot
thematizeobjectsstraightforwardly
todeterminetheirrealpropertiesbut,rather,thematizestheconditionsofpossibilityforourexperience
of objects. (3) It entails an alteration of our relation to the
world. One of the important metaphysical
implicationsoftranscendentalphilosophyisthatitawakensusfromthenaiverealistviewoftheworldas
existing independently of us to seeing the world as existing
only insofar as it is constituted by
transcendentalsubjectivity.
Parts II and III deal with Heidegger and Nishida’s critical
engagements with transcendental
philosophyrespectively.Thethreecriteriaareemployedasaheuristicdevicetodeterminetheextentto
whichtheyworkwithinatraditionaltranscendentalframeworkandthewaysinwhichtheyattempttogo
beyondit.
InPartII,IfirstarticulateHeidegger’sprojectinBeingandTime(Chapter3)andthenexaminehis
critical engagement with transcendental philosophy (Chapter 4).
I argue that the proposed project in
BeingandTimeistoclarifythemeaningofbeingingeneral(i.e.thetaskoffundamentalontology)byway
of first undertaking a hermeneutic phenomenology of the
existential analytic of Dasein. In Chapter 4, I
beginbyexaminingthetranscendentalorientationofBeingandTimeinlightofthethreecriteria.Iargue
thatHeidegger’sproject is transcendental insofar as: (1) it is
foundational in the sense thatDaseinhas
transcendentalpriorityovertheworld,(2)itemploystranscendentalreflectiontodisclosetheconditions
ofpossibilityforourexperience,and(3)itbringsaboutanalterationofourrelationtotheworldfromthe
naive-realistviewtoanunderstandingthatworld-disclosuredependsonDasein’sbeing.Iendbydrawing
out Heidegger’s hermeneutic transformation of transcendental
philosophy to see the ways in which he
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7
attempted to go beyond a traditional transcendental framework. I
argue that the core of this
transformationliesintheradicalnessofhermeneuticreflection.
In Part III, I present an outline of Nishida’s early theory of
basho (Chapter 5) and examine his
critical engagementwith transcendental philosophy (Chapter 6). I
argue that Nishida’s early theory of
basho in the late 1920swas an attempt to provide a theory of
knowledge that avoids various sorts of
subjectivism.Hesoughttosecuretheobjectivevalidityofknowledgebyshowingthatourknowledgeof
objects ultimately presupposes the place of absolute
nothingness, i.e. by grounding our knowledge of
objects in the experience of “transcendent objects,” that is,
the experience of oneself as absolute no-
thingnesswherein“reality”realizes itself. InChapter6, I
firstexaminethetranscendentalorientationof
Nishida’s early theory of basho. Then, I draw out his
chorological transformation of transcendental
philosophy. (I adopt Krummel’s rendering of “basho” as “chōra.”)
While the general structure of this
chapterparallels thatofChapter4,
IwillherecontrastNishida’spositionwithHeidegger’s. Iarguethat,
unlike Heidegger’s project in Being and Time, which still stays
close to the core of traditional
transcendentalphilosophy,Nishida’searlytheoryofbashoradicallytransformsallthreecriteria.(1)Itis
foundational,butonlyintheweaksensethatabsolutenothingnessisstillseenasatranscendentalground.
(2)Itemploysatranscendentalreflectionthatisradicallytransformedthroughchorologicalreflectionto
disclosetheconditionsofpossibilityforourexperience.(3)Itbringsaboutanalterationofourrelationto
the world from our naive belief in the independent existence of
objects and the world, to our direct
experience with the world in pure experience, rather than seeing
the world through transcendental
subjectivity. In the final part, I clarify the ways in which
Heidegger’s hermeneutic and Nishida’s
chorological transformationsof
transcendentalphilosophyarecomparablewhilstdifferent in
important
respects. I argue that, if Heidegger’s hermeneutic
transformation of transcendental philosophy was
ultimately the result of the acknowledgement of the facticity of
our being, Nishida’s chorological
transformationofitwastheresultoftheacknowledgementoftheabsoluteno-thingnessofourbeing.
In the Conclusion, I recapitulatemy findings by asking how their
hermeneutic and chorological
transformations shed light on the possibilities of
transcendental philosophy thatmay in fact reveal its
limitationsinlaterHeideggerandNishida.
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PartI:Whatistranscendentalphilosophy?
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9
Chapter1:TranscendentalphilosophyinKantandHusserl
Introduction
BeforewecanproceedtoaddressthequestionwhetherHeidegger’sprojectinBeingandTimeand
Nishida’searlytheoryofbasho is transcendentalornot,what
ismeantby ‘transcendental’must firstbe
clarified.Here,however,wearealreadyconfrontedwithahostofdifficulties.Firstofall,wedonothavein
hand a ready-made definition of the transcendental nor do we
have a general agreement as to what
transcendental philosophy is. The understanding of what it
attempts to do, its essential features, etc.
simply diverges amongst philosophers who identify themselves as
either working within or without
‘transcendental philosophy.’ Some historical figures that have
identified themselves as transcendental
philosophersincludeKant,theGermanidealists(e.g.Fichte,Schelling,Hegel),Neo-Kantians(e.g.Rickert,
Cohen) and some phenomenologists (e.g. Husserl). There are also
more recent defenders of
transcendentalphilosophycomingfromthephenomenologicaltradition(e.g.J.N.Mohanty,DavidCarr)as
wellastheanalytictradition,specificallyinthephilosophyofscience(e.g.MichaelFriedman).Theabove
brieflistofnamesalonesufficestoshowthattranscendentalphilosophyisanumbrellatermthatcoversa
wide-range of philosophers coming from various philosophical
backgrounds and specifically with very
different metaphysical views. Moreover, most of these thinkers
would probably not be happy being
categorizedunderthesamelabelwiththeothersinthelist.Thisleadsustothefollowingworry:Istherea
commonthread that runs throughoutsuchdiverseviews?Orare
theseviewsbound togetherby family
resemblance? In relation to this point, there is the further
difficulty: How should we even proceed to
pursuethequestionofwhetherthereisacommonthreadorifitisacaseoffamilyresemblance?Indeed,
there is even the possibility that the term is being applied to
wholly different phenomena and hence
nothingreallybindsthemtogether.Thefollowinginvestigation,however,proceedsundertheconviction
that there is in fact an essence pertaining to transcendental
philosophy. But needless to say, such
conviction cannot simplygowithout some sortof
justification.Accordingly, this chapterwill serveas a
waytowardsunravelingtheessenceoftranscendentalphilosophy.Howthenshouldweproceed?
Althoughitisidealtogothroughalloftheviewsraisedearlier,Iwillonlyfocusontwo.Yet,such
narrowingdownshouldnotatallbetakenasevidencefortheinadequacyoftheapproach.Foronething,
a comprehensive study of all the instances is impossible not
just practically but alsomethodologically.
Thisisbecausethecriteriarequiredforidentifyingtheinstancesisexactlywhatweareseeking.Butitis
also not necessary to do so for the purpose of our project. We
are not seeking a comprehensive all-
inclusivenotionoftranscendentalphilosophybutonlyonethat
issufficienttoseekoutHeidegger’sand
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10
Nishida’srelationtotranscendentalphilosophy.Therefore,forthesakeofourinvestigation,Iwilllimitthe
scopetotwocases:KantandHusserl.Ihavespecificallychosenthesetwocasesnotonlybecausetheyare
representativesof the traditionbutbecause theyare twokey figures
thatonenecessarilycomesacross
whencomparingHeidegger’sandNishida’srelationtotranscendentalthought.Thisisduetothefactthat
KantandHusserlwere influentialon themboth, though
indifferentways.RegardingNishida,however,
thereareotherfiguresinthetranscendentaltraditionthatarguablyhadmoreinfluenceonhim,suchas
HegelandFichte.IwilltouchontheirinfluenceonNishidainPartIIIwhenweexamineNishida’sproject
butforthepurposeofPartI,Ihavelimitedmyfocustothecommondenominators.Inthefollowing,we
willfirstlookatKant’stranscendentalphilosophyandthenproceedtoexamineHusserl’stranscendental
phenomenology. The aim of this chapter is to pave the way
towards unraveling the essence of
transcendental philosophy. The subsequent chapter will then
proceed to articulate the essence of
transcendentalphilosophybasedontheinvestigationsinthischapter.
1 Kant’stranscendentalphilosophy
1.1 Againstthewayofideas
Kant is generally regarded as the father of transcendental
philosophy due to his systematic
construction of a radically novel approach in philosophy. This
is not to say that he came up with a
completely new set of philosophical problems by ignoring the
tradition before him. Just like any good
philosopher(atleastinmydefinitionoftheterm),hefollowedthemindsofhispredecessorsandindoing
so,hesawtheimportanceoftheproblemsthattheyweregrapplingwith.Kant’snoveltyliesnotinsetting
forthnewproblemsbutinseeingtheoldproblemsinacompletelydifferentlight.
ThecardinalproblemthatKanthadinheritedwastheproblemofhowknowledgeoftheworldis
possible.Thisproblemofknowledgeisaspecificallymodernprobleminsofarasitarosefromthetheory
of ideas originatingwith Descartes. Philosophers before
Descartes naturally held the view thatwe are
directlyintouchwiththeworld.Withoutgoingintothedetails,itwastheskepticismregardingsuchnaive
realismthatledtoDescartes’discoveryoftheideas.Descartes’theoryofideas,atleasttraditionally,has
beeninterpretedasarepresentationalistview.1Accordingtothisinterpretation,Descartessubscribedto
theviewthatweareimmediatelyawareofideasandonlymediatelyawareofexternalobjects.Toputit1TherearerecentscholarswhohaveproposedanalternativereadingofDescartes’position.RatherthaninterpretingDescartesasarepresentationalist,theyhaveinterpretedhimasadirectrealist.Cf.Nadler(1989)andYolton(1975).Iwillleavethisissueaside.
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another way, the immediate objects of all forms of consciousness
are ‘ideas’ (which are eithermental
states or mental entities), and these ideas refer to something
beyond themselves, i.e. they represent
objects. Such a representationalist view of consciousness is
also commonly referred to as the “way of
ideas.”ThiswasaviewsharedbymanymodernphilosopherssuchasLocke,BerkeleyandHume,though
theydisagreedonthenatureoftheseideas.Now,sincetheseideasaresomehowgiventothesubjectand
itisonlyviaideasthatwebecomeawareofobjects,thecrucialproblemwastofigureouthowthiscould
becarriedout.Inotherwords,thepressingquestionwas:Howcanideasrepresentexternalobjects?Or
formulated differently: How can ideas or representations (I use
these terms interchangeably for my
purposeshere)correspondtoobjects?Themodernproblemofknowledgearoseinthiscontext.Namely,
whatjustifiesourknowledgeoftheexternalworldifthereisaveilbetweenusandtheworld?
MostcommentatorsonKantagreethatwhatdistinguishesKantfromhispredecessorsisthathe
breakswiththistradition.Butratherthandenyingtheexistenceofideasandrepresentationsaltogether
andreturningtothepre-modernnaiveviewthatwearesomehowdirectlyintouchwiththeworld,Kant
addressedacompletelydifferentquestionthantheproblemofrepresentation.Transcendentalphilosophy
begins with Kant’s discovery of this new question. As David Carr
puts it, transcendental philosophy
“attemptstorevampthephilosophicalproject,attemptstoposenewquestionsratherthanprovidenew
answerstooldquestions.”2Insteadofaskinghowrepresentationscancorrespondtoobjects,Kantasked:
How is representation possible at all? Here, it is important to
understand that the two questions are
radicallydifferent.Thetraditionalquestionaskshowamentalstateoramentalentitycancorrespondto
somethingcompletelydifferentfromitself,i.e.non-mentalobjects.Theproblemwiththisquestionisthat
itinevitablygivesrisetoskepticismregardingtheexternalworld,namelyCartesianskepticism.Ifweonly
have direct knowledge of ideas or representations and our
knowledge of the externalworld is always
indirectlyinferred,howcanwebecertainthatourrepresentationsreallycorrespondtoobjects?
Onewaytoreplytotheskepticistodismissthequestionasill-founded.Whenvariousattemptsto
solveaproblemhavefailedtosucceed,thenitisalwaysagoodtactictoaskwhetheritisn’ttheproblem
itselfthatisproblematic.ThisisindeedwherewefindKant’ssuccess.Ratherthanwardingofftheskeptic
by trying to come up with a good reply and thereby admitting the
legitimacy of the question, Kant
dismissed the question to begin with. In this sense, though
Kant’s argument can be understood as a
refutation of skepticism, it must be kept in mind that Kant was
not trying to prove what the skeptics
doubted,namelywhetherornotwehaveknowledgeoftheexternalworld.Toattemptsuchproofwould
betoadmitthatsuchproofiswanting.Rather,hesawthatsuchproofisunnecessaryforitwasbasedon2Carr1999,p.31.
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questionableassumptionsaboutthewaythemindworksinitsrelationtotheworld.Insteadofassuming
thatthemindisequippedwithrepresentationsthatsomehowreachouttotheworld,hebeganwiththe
lesscontroversialview thatweare inpossessionof
someaprioriknowledge, i.e.knowledge thatholds
universallyandnecessarily.Thesuccessofmathematicsandthenaturalsciencesatthetimewastakenas
evidence for this.Accordingly, granted that there is
syntheticaprioriknowledge,namelyuniversaland
necessaryknowledgethat
isnotmerelytautologicalbutaddstoourbodyofknowledge,thequestionto
askwashow this is possible.Moreover, in reorienting the problem
thisway,Kantwas questioning the
veryconceptionofknowledgeandrepresentation,i.e.whatknowledgeandrepresentationareinessence.
ToquoteCarragain:
Kantismoreconcernedwithwhatsuchknowledgeisratherthanwhetherwehaveit.Inthissensehisquestionwouldbepriortothatoftheskeptic.Thewhatquestionis,ifyouwill,aquestionofessenceratherthanexistence,ofpossibilityratherthanactuality.3
While this prima facie looks like Kant is avoiding what seems
like the most important issue,
namelytheactualityofrepresentationorknowledgeratherthantheirmerepossibility,thisissoonlyon
the faceof it. Firstly, inquestioning thepossibilityof
representation,Kantwas reconfiguringwhat isat
stake.Inotherwords,hewasredefiningwhat“representations”are.AsFrederickBeiserwrites:
For Kant, no idea is simply given, but all are constructed, the
products of more basic
syntheticactivities.[…]Representationisneversomethingsimple,basic,andgiven,butitisalwayssomethingcomplex,derived,andconstructed.4
ThisisnottosaythatKantclaimedthatourmindconstructsrepresentationsonitsownwithnoexternal
input.Onthecontrary,representationsareproductsofourmind’sspontaneityandreceptivity.Themind
activelyorganizes thematerial given tous fromoutside themind.As
the famousquotegoes, “thoughts
without content are empty, intuitionswithout concepts are blind”
(A51/B75)5. And, as Lee Braver has
rightly noted, Kant’s discovery does not lie in the rather
uninteresting claim that our mind makes a
contributiontoexperience.Noonewasdenyingthatthemindcontributestoourexperience.Forexample,
DescartesandLockebothtooksecondaryqualitiesasarisingfromourcontributiontoexperience.6What
marks Kant’s position is that,while all of these thinkers took
themind’s contribution to be a negative
3Ibid.,p.48.4Beiser2002,p.134.5IfollowthestandardpracticeofreferringtothepagesoftheAcademyEdition.ThesearegiveninboththeEnglishandtheGermanversionsonwhichIdraw.6Braver2007,p.36.
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contributionthatdistortsreality,Kanttookthistobeessentialforourknowledgeofreality.Namely,Kant
reversed the idearegardingwhat theminddoes: “Kant’srevolution is
to find thiscontributionnotonly
acceptable but in fact essential for knowledge.” 7 In this way,
in questioning the possibility of
representation,Kantwasaskinghowitispossiblethatknowledgeofobjectsessentiallyinvolvesthework
ofourminds.Furthermore,Kantwasspecificallyinterestedinaparticulartypeofknowledge:knowledge
ofobjectsthatholdsnecessarilyanduniversallyor,touseKantianlanguage,apriorisyntheticknowledge.
Hence,thequestion“Howisrepresentationpossibleatall?”isfurthertransformedinto,“Howissynthetic
aprioriknowledgepossible?”Therefore,itisnotcorrecttosaythatKantwasavoidingtheissueconcerning
theactualityof representationsincehewas
indeedgivingapositiveaccountof it, albeitadifferentone
fromthatofhispredecessors.8
Moreover, it is in this regard thatKanthasbeenacclaimed
tohavereconciled the twoopposing
schools, rationalism and empiricism. And it is common to hear
that this is where Kant’s greatest
accomplishment lies. To put the opposition rather crudely, while
rationalists demanded universal and
necessaryknowledgeapparentlyunattainablethroughexperience,empiricistsinsistedonthenecessityof
experience for knowledge. Kantwas able to reconcile these two
positions by claiming that knowledge
depends on experience but only to the extent that itwould lack
contentwithout thematerial given in
experience. Inotherwords,universalityandnecessityweregrantedby
themind’sapriori contribution
whilestillaffordingthemind’sopennesstotheworld.
Secondly, and related to the first point, it is not true that
Kant was avoiding the issue of the
actualityofrepresentationsince,inquestioningthepossibilityofrepresentation,heintroducedadifferent
dimensiontothepicture,sotosay,thatinfactrevealstheactualityoftherepresentationinanewlight.
Simplyput,whileKant’spredecessorswereworkingwithtwocategories,thesubjectiveandtheobjective
or the mental and the physical, Kant introduced a new category:
the transcendental. While his
predecessorswereconcernedwithhowasubjective(ormental)thingcancorrespondtoanobjective(or
physical) thing, Kant questioned how it is possible that the
subjective and the objective together
constituteourknowledge.Accordingly,hequestionedtheconditionsofpossibilityforthesynthesisofthe
subjective and the objective (or the mental and the physical)
and sought the answer in the newly
discovered transcendental realm. Put differently, in questioning
the possibility of representation, he
sought the answer in neither the subjective nor the objective
(or themental and the physical) but the
transcendentaldimension,sotosay.Tobesure,thisdoesnotyetclarifyhowtheintroductionofthisnew
7Ibid.,p.37.8ForadetaileddiscussionofhowKant’sviewofrepresentationsdiffersfromhispredecessors’,seeBeiser(2002).
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transcendental dimension reconfigures the actuality of
representations, but we will come back to this
pointlater.
HeretowehaveseenthatKantintroducedanewquestion(“Howissyntheticaprioriknowledge
possible?”) and a new dimension (the transcendental) in
addressing the problem of knowledge. But in
order to understandKant’s originality in full,wemust get a grip
onwhat this newdimension actually
amounts to. Namely, what is the transcendental? Moreover, I have
been freely using the word
“transcendental” toqualify “dimension”and“realm”upto
thispoint,but thewordqualifiesmanyother
things: knowledge, inquiry, argument, philosophy, etc. In fact,
there is one concept that is particularly
importantforclarifyingtheexactmeaningofthisterminsofarasitdefinesthespecificmethodemployed
intranscendentalphilosophy:transcendentalreflection.Accordingly,inthefollowing,letusseewhatKant
hastosayaboutthistranscendentalreflectioninrelationtootherkindsofreflection.
1.2 TranscendentalreflectioninKant
Reflection, as generally understood in philosophical discourse,
is the turning back of
consciousnessontoitself.Butreflectioncanbefurtherdistinguishedintovariouskindsdependingonhow
it turns back onto itself and what is thematized as a result. A
typical kind of this turning back of
consciousnessontoitself is
introspection,or“innersense”(innereSinn)asKantcalls it
intheCritiqueof
PureReason(Kritikder reinenVernunft, hereafterCritique).Whilewe
use our outer sense to represent
objectsthatareexternaltous,itiswithinnersensethatwerepresenttoourselvesourownmentalstates.
AccordingtoKant,whilstdistinguishedvis-à-vistheformsrequiredforprovidingrepresentations(space
foroutersenseandtimeforinnersense),bothsensesgiveusrepresentationsof“objects”inabroadsense.
Justasoutersensegivesusrepresentationsofexternalobjects,
innersenseprovidesrepresentationsof
ourselvesasobjects.Butthisisnottheonlywaywecanbecomeawareofourselves.AsKantsays,“this[i.e.
innersense]presentsevenourselves toconsciousnessonlyasweappear
toourselves,notasweare in
ourselves”(B152-153).WhatKantisalludingtohereisthedistinctionbetweenourselvesasobjects(“as
weappeartoourselves”)andourselvesassubjects(“asweareinourselves”).Innersensemakesusaware
ofourselvesonlyintheformerwaybutnotthelatter.Sinceinnersense,inasimilarveintooutersense,
makes us aware of ourselves as objects and only as objects, Kant
designates such consciousness of
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ourselvesas“merelyempirical,forevervariable”(A107).9Letuscallthiskindofreflection(introspection
or inner sense) “empirical reflection” as others havedone10since
it is consciousness turning back onto
itself and takes itself as objects for further empirical
investigation (e.g. it inquires about the real
properties ofmy perception, its causal origins, etc.).We can
also call this reflection,more specifically,
“psychological reflection” as it is in psychology that this kind
of reflection is typically employed to
investigatetherealpropertiesofthemind.
In the appendix to the Transcendental Analytic of theCritique
titled, “On the Amphiboly of the
Concepts of Reflection,” Kant introduces a different kind of
reflection to empirical or psychological
reflection (A260-263/B316-319). He calls it “transcendental
reflection” (transzendentaleÜberlegungor
Reflexion)andgivesthefollowingcharacterization:
The action throughwhich Imake the comparison of representations
in generalwith the
cognitivepowerinwhichtheyaresituated,andthroughwhichIdistinguishwhethertheyaretobecomparedto
one another as belonging to the pure understanding or to pure
intuition, I call
transcendentalreflection[transzendentaleÜberlegung].(A261/B317)
Sincethisdefinitionisnotverystraightforward,someexplanationisfitting.Kantbelievedthataspecific
kindofreflectionisrequiredpriortomakinganysortofjudgment.Ashesays:“alljudgments,indeedall
comparisons,requireareflection [Überlegung], i.e.distinctionof
thecognitivepowertowhichthegiven
conceptsbelong”(A261/B317).Whathe isreferringtobyreflectionhere
isnot theempiricalreflection
thatwe have seen earlier butwhat he calls transcendental
reflection. Let us say, for instance, thatwe
makethestatement,“Thiscupisblue.”Kantissayingthat,inordertobeabletomakethisjudgmentand,
indeed, in order to even be able to compare the two
representations “cup” and “blue,” we must first
deliberateandworkoutwhichcognitivefaculty,i.e.understandingorsensibility,eachbelongsto.Inother
words, it
isonlybecausewecometoknowthroughdeliberationthatcupsaresensibleobjectstowhich
colorconceptscanapplythatweareabletomakethisstatementinameaningfulway.Wewouldbefailing
toproperlyemploytranscendentalreflectionifweweretosay,
forexample,“Causesareblue,”sincewe
otherwise know that causes are non-sensible things and hence
cannot take on color. Transcendental
reflection, according to Kant, is thus the deliberation of
representations with regard to the cognitive
facultytowhichtheybelong.
9InthesamecontextKantcallsthis“empiricalapperception”anddistinguishesitfrom“transcendentalapperception”whichistheconsciousnessofourselvesassubjects.Sincemyfocushereisonthedistinctionbetweenempiricalandtranscendentalreflectionandnotsomuchonthemodesofself-consciousness,thoughcloselyrelated,Ihaveleftoutthediscussionaboutapperceptionhere.10E.g.Schnädelbach(1977)andMohanty(1985).
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16
Butthen,howexactlyisthisdifferentfromempiricalreflection?Kantexplains:
Reflection(reflexio)doesnothavetodowithobjectsthemselves,inordertoacquireconceptsdirectlyfrom
them, but rather is the state of mind in which we first prepare
ourselves to find out
thesubjectiveconditionsunderwhichwecanarriveatconcepts.(A260/B316)
Again,whatKant is referring towith “reflection”here is
specifically “transcendental reflection”andnot
anyotherkind.Forwehaveseenthatempiricalreflectionisindeedconcernedwithsomekindof“objects
themselves,”i.e.ourownmentalstates.Insteadoftakingadomainofobjectswithaviewtodetermining
its properties, transcendental reflection inquires into the
subjective conditions for the possibility of
representations with a view to determining its source, i.e.
whether it belongs to understanding or
sensibility.
Transcendentalreflection,understoodinthisway,isinaccordancewiththeoft-quoteddefinition
oftranscendentalknowledgegivenintheIntroductiontotheCritique:
Icallallcognitiontranscendentalthatisoccupiednotsomuchwithobjectsbutratherwithourmodeofcognitionofobjectsinsofarasthisistobepossibleapriori.(A11-12/B25)
Transcendentalknowledgeisnotaprioriknowledgeofobjectsthemselvesbutaprioriknowledgeofour
cognitionofobjects.Somehavegivenexpressiontothisdistinctionbyresortingtoaterminologyusedby
the neo-Kantians, Nicolai Hartmann and Theodor Adorno: intentio
recta and intentio obliqua. In the
contextofdistinguishingtranscendentalinquiryfromallfirst-orderinquires,forexample,StevenCrowell
makesuseofthisterminology:
First-order inquiries –whether empirical like physics
andpsychology or a priori
likemathematicsandmetaphysics–arecarriedoutinan
intentiorectaandtheyestablishtherealpropertiesoftheirobjects.Transcendentalcritique,incontrast,askshowitispossiblethatsuchfirst-orderthinkingcanyield
knowledge, and it dealswith objects and their properties only in a
reflective
intentioobliquaconcernedwithwhatmakesthemcognitivelyaccessible.11
Whateverelsethetermsmaysignify,ItakeitthatCrowellwithsomeothers12hasusedthetermintentio
rectatobasicallydenoteourconsciousnessofobjects(whethertheybephysical,psychical,mathematical
or metaphysical) while using intentio obliqua to signify the
consciousness of the subjective aspects of
cognitionor,morepreciselyput,thesubjectiveconditions
forthepossibilityofourcognitionofobjects.I
add the latter qualification since psychological reflection also
inquires into the subjective aspects of
11Crowell2013,p.11.12E.g.Mohanty1985,p.xviii.
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17
cognitionyetisaversionoftheintentiorectainsofarasitisaninvestigationintothemindunderstoodas
somekindofanobjectorentityexistingintheworld.Intentioobliqua,inthiscontext,specifiesasecond-
orderconsciousness that looks into
thesubjectiveconditionsofourcognitionofobjects.The important
observation to note is that, whether it be reflection,
knowledge, critique, inquiry or anything else,
whenever the qualification “transcendental” is added, it means
that the concern is not so much with
objects themselvesbutwith thesubjectiveconditions for
thepossibilityofourknowledgeofobjects. In
this sense (and Iwant to stress thispoint as it is important),
thetranscendentalessentiallydesignatesa
second-orderdiscourse.
Transcendentalknowledgeis,
furthermore,designatedastheaprioriknowledgeofourcognition
of objects. This means that transcendental knowledge is the
necessary and universal knowledge of our
cognition of objects. Importantly, however, a priority is not
sufficient to designate transcendental
knowledge.Mathematicalknowledge,forexample,isaprioributnottranscendental.Whatdistinguishes
transcendental knowledge from other a priori knowledge is that
it is essentially concerned with our
cognitionofobjects.Accordingly,torephraseourearlierformulation:transcendentalreflectionisasecond-
orderreflectionintotheapriorisubjectiveconditionsofthepossibilityofourknowledgeofobjects.
In the same sectionwhere Kant introduces transcendental
reflection, he raises another kind of
reflectionthatistobedistinguishedfrombothempiricalandtranscendentalreflection.Hecallsthisthird
kindofreflection,“logicalreflection.”Logicalreflectionis“amerecomparison”(A262/B318)inwhich“we
simply compareour conceptswith eachother in theunderstanding”
(A279/B335). It is through logical
reflection that we come to see, for example, that the concepts
“blue” and “color” are related through
inclusion, i.e. that “blue” is a concept that is contained in
the concept “color.” Therefore, in logical
reflection, “there is complete abstraction from the cognitive
power towhich the given representations
belong”(A262/B318).Logicalreflection,then,isamerelogicaldeliberationthatabstractsawayfromthe
sourceoftherepresentations.
HavinglaidoutthethreekindsofreflectiondiscussedbyKant,namelyempirical,transcendental
andlogicalreflection,wearenowinapositiontoseeinwhatwayKantwasoriginalwithhisanswertothe
problemofknowledgeandmorespecificallytothequestion,howissyntheticaprioriknowledgepossible?
To begin with, it is evident that the answer cannot be sought
through logical reflection, for a logical
analysis of the concepts, “synthesis,” “a priori,” and
“knowledge,” can yield no more than what the
conceptsalreadyentail,andthepossibilityofsyntheticaprioriknowledgeissimplynotentailedinanyof
the concepts, either taken individually or together.
Accordingly, the possibility of synthetic a priori
knowledgecanonlybeinvestigatedthroughempiricalortranscendentalreflection.Itisherethatwecan
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identifyKant’struecontribution.ForKantsoughttheanswertotheabovequestioninthetranscendental
andnottheempirical.Inotherwords,Kantwasspecificallyseekingtheaprioriconditions,whichwerenot
realpropertiesofobjectsbutthatwhichmakespossibleourknowledgeofobjectsand,hence,issecond-
order. Therefore, Kant’s originality lies in discovering
transcendental reflection as the specific kind of
methodtoseekouttheanswertothequestion,howissyntheticaprioriknowledgepossible.
1.3
Thestatusofthetranscendental:psychologicalvs.logicalinterpretation
Aswehaveseenabove,oneoftheimportantfacetsoftheKantianlegacyistohavedelineatedthe
transcendentaldimension incontrast tothe
logicalandtheempirical.Wehave,moreover,seenthatthe
transcendentaldesignates a second-order inquiry insofar as it
turnsaway fromobjects themselves and
inquiresintotheirconditionsofpossibility.Inthisway,Kantseemstohavesuccessfullyfoundanovelway
to dealwith the old problemof knowledge. Yet despite the alleged
discovery of the transcendental, its
exactnaturestillseemselusive.Thequestionremains:Whataretheseconditionsthatmakepossibleour
knowledgeofobjects?
Kantdidnotinfactgiveadecisiveanswerbutinsteadwaveredbetweentwoconceptions.These
tworatherdifferent conceptionsaremostnotable in
theTranscendentalDeductionwherehediscusses
thestatusof thecategoriesandthedifferencesarereflected
intheA-andB-editionsof thesection.The
two conceptions,moreover, have become a touchstone that
dividesKant’s successors. In theA-edition,
Kanttracestheoriginofthecategoriesinthethreefoldsynthesisofthemind,namelytheapprehensionof
representations in intuition, reproduction in imagination and
recognition in concepts. In the B-edition,
however, the spontaneity of understanding is emphasized at the
expense of the others. The first
interpretationtakesKant’sappealtothethreefoldsynthesisintheA-editiontoindicatethepsychological
origin of the categories. According to this interpretation,
often referred to as the psychological
interpretation, the conditions of possibility for our knowledge
of objects are nothing but our cognitive
operations. What makes possible knowledge of objects is what we
happen to be equipped with. This
would further imply that Kant is committed to the fallacy of
psychologism, i.e. the attempt to ground
logical laws on psychological laws. Yet this interpretation is
hardly in line with the description of the
transcendentalthatwehavealreadyseen,namelythatitisaprioriandthatitisasecond-orderinquiry.If
theconditionsofpossibilityforourknowledgeofobjectsarenothingbutourcognitiveoperations,then
transcendentalinquiryreducestopsychologicalinquiry,i.e.afirst-orderempiricalinquiryintoourminds.
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Furthermore,thepsychologicalinterpretationfailstoaccountfortheobjectivevalidityofthecategories.
The aim of the Transcendental Deduction was precisely to show
that the categories are not only the
necessary structures of ourmind but that they also hold for all
rational beings and are the necessary
structures of objects. As Beiser rightly notes, even if the
attempt in the Deduction is a failure, the
psychologicalinterpretationmustfirstcontendwiththeDeductionitselfandprovideanaccountofwhyit
wasafailure.13
Thesecondinterpretation,oftencalledthelogicalinterpretation,takestheB-editionseriouslyand
avoidsthesedifficultiesbymaintainingapurelylogicalreadingofthetranscendental.Theproponentsof
this interpretation see that so long as one is interested in how
cognitionmakes knowledge of objects
possible, one is stuck in a first-order inquiry since this
entails investigating the mind’s faculties and
activities.Asaresult,thequestionofcognitionisreplacedbythatofthejustificationofsomebeliefs.The
conditions for the possibility of our knowledge of objects then
amount to the truth-conditions of our
judgments.14This interpretation is supported by Kant’s famous
employment of the juridical distinction
betweenthequidjurisandquidfacti,thequestionofrightandquestionoffact(A84/B116).“Bywhatright
doconceptsrelateaprioritoobjects”(i.e.whatjustifiesourbeliefsabouttheworld)isadifferentquestion
fromthatwhichquestionsthefactualorcausaloriginofthoseconcepts.Onlytheformerisrelevanttothe
transcendentaldeductionofconcepts.AsKantexplains:
I therefore call the explanation of the way in which concepts
can relate to objects a priori
theirtranscendentaldeduction,anddistinguishthisfromempiricaldeduction,whichshowshowaconceptisacquiredthroughexperienceandreflectiononit,andthereforeconcernsnotthelawfulnessbutthefactfromwhichthepossessionhasarisen.(A85/B117)
This distinction between thequid jurisandquid factiwas later
emphasized byHermann Lotze and the
neo-Kantians.Lotzemaintainedthatwemustdistinguishbetweentherealmsofexistence(ormattersof
fact) and validity. To ask about the truth or validity of a
judgment is quite different fromasking about
mattersoffact.15FollowingLotze,boththeMarburgschoolandtheBadenschoolofneo-Kantiansagreed
thatthequestionsofbeing,factuality,andcausalityaredifferentsortsofquestionsfromthoseregarding
validity,valueandnormativity.Theybelievedthatpsychologisminlogiccouldonlybeavoidedbyseeing
that thetranscendental investigatesnot the formerbut the latter.
In thisway, theneo-Kantiansgavean
unambiguous characterizationof the transcendental by identifying
itwith thenormative.Reformulated
13Beiser2002,pp.168-169.14Cf.Ibid.,p.170.15Cf.Lotze1884,§§316-317.
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andrevivedbytheneo-Kantians,transcendentalinquirythereforedesignatedsecond-orderinquiryasthe
normative(andthusapriori)conditionsforthepossibilityofourknowledgeofobjects.
Perhapsthebiggestadvantagethelogicalinterpretationhasoverthepsychologicalisthatitdoes
justice to the defining aspect of the transcendental, namely its
second-order status. It is not surprising
then that this interpretation, specifically with its emphasis on
normativity, has gained much support
among contemporary Kantian scholars and transcendental
philosophers alike. Steven Crowell, for
example,supportsthisinterpretationinhisformulationofKant’stranscendentalproject:
Kant’s project is not concernedwith the real relation between a
representation and its object
butsolelywiththecognitiveclaimadvancedinit,andthequestionofhowknowledgeispossibleisnotafactualbutanormativeone.Itdoesnotlookforsomecausalconnectionbetweenmindandworldbutinvestigateshowaconceptcanholdofsomething–not“howcansomethingrepresentanobject?”but“howcanitdosocorrectly?”16
Whenthetranscendentalisfleshedoutintermsofjustificationandnormativity,however,transcendental
philosophy begins to look as if it deals exclusivelywith the
epistemological problematic. Onemay not
think this is aworry sincewhat prompted Kant to beginwithwas
nothing other than the problem of
knowledge. But one must be careful in characterizing Kant’s
transcendental philosophy as purely
epistemological.WhileitcanhardlybedoubtedthatKantwasinterestedintheproblemofknowledge,it
is controversialwhether thatwasKant’s sole interest.Or better
put, it is highly questionable thatKant
believed that the question regarding our knowledge of objects
can be separated from the question
regarding the ontological constitution of objects. This is an
important point that deserves a separate
sectionbelowsinceithasimplicationsforthescopeoftranscendentalphilosophy.
But before turning to this point, there is another point worth
mentioning regarding the two
interpretations. Although the logical interpretation is more
appealing than the psychological, there is
roomtoquestionwhetherwecandoawaywiththelattersidealtogetherindefiningthetranscendental.
For,grantingthatnormativityandfactualityaredifferentissues,theveryideaofnormativityonlymakes
senseagainstthebackdropofouractualactivities.Whatisanormifitisnotanormforourconduct?As
Beisersays:
16Crowell2013,p.11.
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21
Thevery ideaofanormis thatofaconstraintonactivity;andthevery
ideaofarule is thatwhichgoverns or imposes limits on conduct. So if
therewere no activity or conduct, therewould be
nopurposeininvokingtheideaofanormorruleinthefirstplace.”17
Ormoresuccinctlyput inadifferentpaper:“‘Ought’ implies
‘can’,sothat ifpeoplecannotactonnorms
theylosealltheirvalidity.18Indeed,theveryideaoftruth-conditionsofourjudgmentsisdependentonthe
fact that we can make true and false judgments. In other words,
the possibility of synthetic a priori
knowledgeentailsnotonlyitslogicalbutrealpossibility.
Beisersubsequentlyarguesthatneitherthelogicalnorthepsychologicalinterpretation,takenon
itsown,canprovideacompletepictureofthetranscendental.Theyarenotmutuallyexclusive:
We can consider the transcendental as both logical and
psychological, as laying down
constraintsbothabouthowweoughttothinkandabouthowwemustdoso[vis-à-vistheactivitiesofourmind].19
This is indeedthe lessonto learnfromtheone-sidednessof
thetwointerpretations: thetranscendental
must encompassboth transcendental logicand psychology.Tobe sure,
oneof themain challenges that
this then creates is to account for howwe can appeal to our acts
of cognitionwithout falling into the
pitfallsofthepsychologicalinterpretation.Transcendentalpsychology,inthewayKanthadenvisionedit,
alsohad itsownproblemssuchas theentirematterof the facultiesof
themind.Thesechallengeswere
takenupbyHusserlwhodevelopedthephenomenologicalversionoftranscendentalphilosophytowhich
wewillturnshortly.Butbeforewedoso,letusturntotheaforementionedquestionregardingthescope
ofKantiantranscendentalphilosophy.
1.4
Thescopeoftranscendentalphilosophy:epistemologicalvs.ontologicalreading
Ithasoftenbeenassumedthattranscendentalphilosophyisadisciplineinepistemologyandnot
ontology.LetusreciteKant’sfamousdefinitionofthetranscendental:
Icallallcognitiontranscendentalthatisoccupiednotsomuchwithobjectsbutratherwithourmodeofcognitionofobjectsinsofarasthisistobepossibleapriori.(A11-12/B25)
Primafacie,insofarastranscendentalphilosophyischaracterizedbyaturningawayfromobjectstooura
priori knowledge of them, the claim that transcendental
philosophy is essentially epistemological does
17Beiser2002,p.172.18Ibid.,p.16.19Ibid.,p.174.
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seem legitimate. Historically, what made this epistemological
reading dominant was the neo-Kantians’
logical interpretation and their identification of the
transcendental with normativity. On this account,
transcendental conditions are equivalent to normative conditions
and, as a corollary, transcendental
philosophy is primarily epistemological. Now, if the conditions
that make our knowledge of objects
possiblearemerelynormativeconditionswithnoontologicalcommitment,assomeneo-Kantianswould
supposedly contend, then these conditionswould determine our
knowledge of objects butnot theway
objectsare
inthemselves.Accordingtothisview,transcendentalphilosophyhasno
implicationsforthe
natureofobjects.Ontologywouldstandoutsidetherealmoftranscendentalphilosophy.
ThefollowingkeystatementinthebeginningoftheTranscendentalAnalytic,however,atteststhat
thisunderstandingofthescopeofthetranscendentalprovestoominimal:
The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are
at the same time conditions of thepossibility of the objects of
experience, and on this account have objective validity in a
syntheticjudgmentapriori.(A158/B197)
Here,Kant is clear that the transcendental
conditionsdeterminenotonlyourknowledgeofobjectsbut
alsotheobjectsofourknowledge.Moreover,thisshouldnotbetakenasindicativeofaninconsistencyon
Kant’spart.Rather,theseclaimssuggestthat,whenoneconsidersthefullimplicationsoftranscendental
inquiry,ithassignificantramificationsonthenatureofobjects.
Tobeginwith,insofarasthetranscendentalisaninquiryintotheconditionsforthepossibilityof
ourknowledgeofobjects, it is simply false that
ithasnobearingonobjects.Admittedly, transcendental
inquirydoesnotinquireintoobjectsinthesamewayasfirst-orderinquiriesdo.Aswehavestressed,the
second-orderstatusof thetranscendentalensuresthat it
isessentiallydistinguishedfromall first-order
inquiries of the empirical sciences as well as metaphysical
inquiries that similarly thematize objects
(empirical or metaphysical) with a view to determining their
first-order properties. But this does not
entailthattranscendentalinquiryisnotconcernedwithobjectsthemselves.WeshouldinfacttakeKant’s
wordingatfacevaluewhenhesaysthattranscendentalknowledgeisconcerned“notsomuchwithobjects
aswiththemodeofourknowledgeofobjectsinsofarasthismodeofknowledgeistobepossibleapriori.”
Kantisnotdenyingthatthetranscendentalisconcernedwithobjects;heisonlyassertingthattheconcern
ismorewithourknowledgeofobjectsthanwithobjects.Whilethisstillleavesopentheexactrelationthat
pertains between our knowledge of objects and objects
themselves, it does nevertheless suggest their
closerelationintranscendentaldiscourse.
Indeed,animportantpointtotakefromthisisthattranscendentalinquiryintotheconditionsfor
thepossibilityofourknowledgeofobjectsisnotcutofffrominquiryintoobjectsinawaythatmakesthe
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latterinquiryirrelevanttotheformerandviceversa.Thisisindeedoneofthemisunderstandingsofthe
exclusively epistemological reading. According to this
interpretation, the transcendental is a realm
independentoftherealmofobjects(bothempiricalandmetaphysical).20Whatisfatalaboutthiskindof
understandingisthatitlimitsthescopeofthetranscendentalinawaythatunderminesthecoreofKant’s
discovery.Aswehave seen, the transcendental questionwas
introducedbyKant inorder to tackle the
problem of knowledge in a way that evades the skeptics’ charge.
If we delimit the scope of the
transcendental to our knowledge of objects, leaving the realm of
objects unaffected by our question,
transcendental knowledgedeflates into subjectiveknowledge
thathasnoobjectivevalidity.Thiswould
allowCartesianskepticismto loomagain. In
fact,speakingofdifferent“realms” isaltogethermisleading
sincethedistinctionbetweenthetranscendentalandtheempirical(aswellasthemetaphysical)doesnot
implytwoontologicalrealmsbutismerelyadifferenceinthelevelsofdiscourse.Transcendentalinquiry
isdifferentfrommetaphysicalinquiryinthissensesincethedefiningtraitofthelatteristothematizea
distinctontologicalrealmfromtheempirical.Ratherthanspeakingofrealms,itmaybehelpfultospeak
metaphoricallyof“dimensions”asIhavedoneearlier.Infact,Husserlalsospeaksofthetranscendentalas
a“newdimension.”21Ananalogymaybehelpfultoclarifythispoint.Whenweputon3Dglassestowatch
athree-dimensionalfilm,wedonotbelievethattheglasseshavesomehowintroducedadifferentreality
from the two-dimensional reality. The third dimension enables us
to see the film with depth and so
perhapswith“morereality,”butitisontologicallythesamerealityastheonedepictedtwo-dimensionally.
Likewise,
thetranscendentaldimensionarticulatesthenatureofreality
inadifferentwayfromhowwe
observeobjectsempirically,butitdoesnottherebyintroduceanewreality.Accordingly,transcendental
inquiryintroducesnotadistinctrealmbutanotherdimensionthatshedslightonthewayobjectsare,not
justhowtheyappeartousbuthowtheyareinthemselves.
Itisduetothesereasonsthattranscendentalinquiryintotheconditionsforthepossibilityofour
knowledge of objects must also be an inquiry into the conditions
for the possibility of objects of our
knowledge.Theepistemologicalreading,therefore,canonlybeendorsedbybeingblindtothefullimport
ofthetranscendental.Transcendentalinquirynotonlyreconfigureswhatknowledgeconsistsofbutitalso
fundamentallyredefineswhatobjectsareinthemselves.Thisisalsowhytranscendentalidealismispart
20Forexample,ErnstCassirersays:“TheessentialcharacteristicofKant’stranscendentalmethodconsistsinthefactthatitoperatesnotintherealmofempiricallyrealthingsorevents,butpurelyandexclusivelyintherealmoftruthsandtheiridealmodeofvalidity.”(1923,pp.427-428[quotedinGardner2015,p.9;translationbyGardner])21HuaVI,§32.AllcitationsfromHusserlarefromtheHusserliana(abbreviatedasHua),followedbyvolumenumber(Romannumerals)andpagenumber(orsectionnumber).IhavegiventhepaginationfromtheoriginalGermanfirstfollowedbyaslashandpaginationfromtheEnglishtranslation,whereverthisisavailable.IhavefollowedtheavailableEnglishtranslationsinmycitations.
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andparcel ofKant’s transcendental project.One simply cannot
avoid transcendental idealism ifwe see
thatthetranscendentalessentiallyhasontologicalimplications.22
Having delineated Kant’s idea of transcendental philosophy, let
us now turn to Husserl’s
transcendentalphenomenology.
2 Husserl’stranscendentalphenomenology
2.1 Husserl’sevaluationofKantiantranscendentalphilosophy
HowdoesHusserl’stranscendentalphenomenologydifferfromKant’stranscendentalphilosophy?
WhatwasHusserl’srelationshiptoKant?Unlikehisneo-Kantiancontemporaries,Husserldidnotdevelop
his thought through an internal development of Kantian
philosophy. Owing much to the fact that his
mentor,FranzBrentano,wasananti-Kantian,hewasrathercriticaltothewholeKantianenterpriseinhis
earlier years. It was only after his turn to transcendental
phenomenology around 1913, when Ideas
Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological
Philosophy (Ideen zu einer reinen
Phänomenologie und phänomenologischenPhilosophie, hereafter
Ideas I) was published that he became
moreandmoreexpressiveabouthisdebttothegreatphilosopherandphenomenology’srelationshipto
Kant’stranscendentalphilosophy.Inthefollowing,letustakeasourstartingpointthepublishedversion
ofafamouslectureheldon1March1924inFreiburgincelebrationofthebicentenaryofKant’sbirth.In
this lecture titled, “Kant and the Idea of Transcendental
Philosophy,” Husserl articulates Kant’s
significanceasheunderstandsitaswellasthereasonswhyhebelievestranscendentalphilosophymust
necessarilytaketheshapeofatranscendentalphenomenology.Thislecturewillguideusinunderstanding
the crux of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, specifically
as it relates to Kant’s transcendental
philosophy.
Husserl’s basic attitude towards transcendental philosophy is
stated in the beginning of the
lecture:
[A]ny philosophy whatsoever, taken as a systematic whole, can
assume the form of an ultimatelyrigorous science only as a
universal transcendental philosophy, but also only on the basis
ofphenomenologyandinthespecificallyphenomenologicalmethod.23
22Furthermore,onceweseethatthescopeofthetranscendentalreacheswellintothedomainoftheontological,wecanseethatHeidegger’sontologicalinterpretationofKant’sCritiqueisnotascontroversialasitmayseem.SinceHeidegger’sinterpretationofKantisacontroversialtopicthatdeservesattentiononitsown,however,Iwillnotgointoanydetailhere.23HuaVII,pp.230-231/10.
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25
Acoupleof importantpoints canbe immediatelyextracted from
thisquotation: (1)Husserl seeksafter
philosophy as a rigorous science, (2) such philosophy is
possible only as a universal transcendental
philosophy, and (3) such universal transcendental philosophy is
possible only on the basis of
phenomenology.Withregard to the firstpoint,one
shouldrecallHusserl’sessay titled “Philosophyasa
RigorousScience”publishedin1910-11.Inthisessay,hearguesthatitisessentialforphilosophytofind
itsownfirmfoundationanddistanceitself
frombothnaturalismandhistoricisminordertoacquirethe
status of a strict and rigorous science. Not surprisingly, such
a firm foundation was to be sought in
phenomenology. In the 1924 lecture, Husserl explains how
phenomenology as an eidetic descriptive
science delineated in the Logical Investigations (Logische
Untersuchungen) soon blossomed into
transcendentalphenomenologicalphilosophyaroundthetimeofIdeasI.Cuttingalongstoryshort,itwas
Husserl’sstrongaspirationforafirstphilosophy(i.e.theaprioriscienceofallsciences)thatenactedthe
turn to pure transcendental consciousness as the fundamental
source of all knowledge and, thereby,
allowedthepurelydescriptivedisciplinetodevelopintoatranscendentalone.Whatthismeansandhow
thiswaspossiblewillbecomeclearerinthefollowingpages.Butmyconcernherewillnotbetotracethe
trajectory of Husserl’s thought. Rather, the aim is to
articulate the way in which transcendental
phenomenologyisacriticaldevelopmentofKantiantranscendentalphilosophy.Forthispurpose,Iwillbe
focusingonHusserl’sevaluati