Kris' Dissteration Chapter 2 Literature Review

Chapter 2 Literature Review

Chapter 2 introduces the literature on verbal irony, moving from general to specific

background research. This begins with the theory of discourse analysis, followed with

conversational analysis, and the sub-component with which this study is concerned:

speech act theory. The literature review provides a thorough examination of speech act

theory and the contributions made by various scholars for the purpose of understanding

the concept of verbal irony within these theories. The discussion then turns to an

introduction to figurative language, beginning with verbal irony. This section gives an

overview of figurative language used in discourse analysis, and touches on the

differences in satire, verbal irony, and humor. Within figurative language theories of

verbal irony, specifically the echoic account of verbal irony, are explicated. Humorology

as a major conception related to the framework of the study is included to examine verbal

irony as figurative language before giving the functions of verbal irony. The remainder of

the chapter focuses on the previous studies and direct research on verbal irony.

2.1 Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is “fundamentally concerned with the relationship between

language and the contexts of its use” (McCarthy, 2002: 10). Schiffrin (2003) [1994]

contends discourse is comprised of utterances. Although the meaning of utterance is

contested amongst linguists, this paper proffers Schiffrin’s definition of utterances as

“contextualized sentences, i.e. they are context bound (as well as text bound)” (2003

[1994]: 39). Utterances are “units of language production… related to sentences (or, in

fact, to other units such as propositions, turns, or tone units)” (Schiffrin: 2003 [1994]:

41). An utterance may be a short interjection or longer segment, which contains a single

thought and may not be confined to one sentence. For this reason, one utterance may span

the length of an entire conversation, and “thus some apparently formally unconnected

utterances go together in conversational discourse to form a coherent sequence” (Brown

& Yule, 2011 [1983]: 233). Therefore, utterances can be considered the fundamental units

of language.

Language can be said to have two main functions—transactional and interactional.

Transactional language is intended to express some specific content, or relay a message.

In the case of transactional language, it is pertinent that the hearer (H) understand the

message that is being conveyed. Interactional language is intended to contribute to some

conversation, is interpersonal and not merely a transaction of information (Brown &

Yule, 2011 [1983]: 1-4). Interactional language is contingent upon “preceding discourse

and by the beliefs and assumptions which are the result of what has taken place earlier in

communication” (Archer, Aijmer, & Wichmann, 2012: 8). The two functions have

instances of overlap, so language intended solely to convey information is called

“primarily transactional language” (Brown & Yule, 2011 [1983]: 2). This study is

concerned with interactional language, which is the foundation of discourse and

conversational analysis.

Discourse analysis encompasses both written and spoken textual interactions

(McCarthy, 2002: 12). While written and spoken interactions serve the same

communicative function, each has its own merits. In written interactions, the writer is

under less pressure than the speaker (S) because he or she has time to carefully formulate

sentences or utterances (Brown & Yule, 2011 [1983]: 4). In written language, the writer

has time to conscript utterances that are structured to lack spontaneity and interruptions

from others while featuring cohesion, linking sentences smoothly (McCarthy, 2002: 25-

26).

However, in spoken language, the S is offered more power with words, as the S is

allowed paralinguistic cues, for example mannerisms or body language to accompany his

or her verbal message (Brown & Yule, 2011 [1983]: 4). Sinclair and Coulthard developed

a model for spoken discourse, characteristically different from the written kind, which

features adjacency pairs that are functional units of language containing at least two

utterances contributed by two different parties (in McCarthy, 2002: 15, 24; Coulthard,

1977: 69-70; Schiffrin, 2003 [1994]: 236). This area studies the way in which topics are

entered and are removed from the conversation, how conversations are opened and how

they finish, and how conversationalists know when it is their turn to speak.

Understanding spoken discourse requires a discussion on conversational analysis, which

is utilized by this study in the analysis of the data later in Chapter 5.

Conversational analysis is performed upon communication through discourse and

text (Leech & Short, 2007: 168). Thus, conversational analysis is concerned with speech;

in this study, the speech is found within a novel. Speech can be both direct and indirect,

where direct speech is literally a quotation and indirect speech is more of a paraphrase, an

interpretation of what someone has said. Free direct speech is employed by novelists to

show the characters’ spoken utterances, but without any interruption by the narrator. The

character seems to be speaking more directly to the reader instead of the narrator simply

relaying the conversation to the reader. Free indirect speech, on the other hand, is indirect

speech in a free form, where there are no quotations or introductions by the narrator.

Other methods of representing speech include narrated report of an action, or of a speech

act, which is more indirect (Leech & Short, 2007: 255-262). In Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy’s

conversations, the emphasis of this study is on direct speech, as these utterances are

literally spoken by the characters.

In conversational analysis, the utterances are analyzed together as discourse.

Utterances in an adjacency pair are referred to as moves; they are related in the effect that

the first pair part, the first utterance, will set up an expectation for the next pair part, or

second utterance, which the next S fulfills (Coulthard, 1977: 69-70). Not all second pair

parts are appropriate to follow the first pair part, thus the “first part of a pair predicts the

occurrence of the second” (Coulthard, 1977: 70). In certain cases the first pair part may

even select the next S, as in order for there to be cohesion there must not only be an

appropriate response but also an appropriate respondent (Coulthard, 1977: 70). This

method of conversational analysis is useful when examining Pride and Prejudice; once

applied, one can see how adjacency pairs are used by Austen to make the characters of

her hero and heroine more perceptible to both each other and to the reader. This study

views the spoken discourse of Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy as interaction initiated by social

propriety which is necessary for determining each other’s characters. Therefore, the

social context of the discourse between Elizabeth and Mr. Darcy is vital to understanding

their interactions.

Broadly speaking, discourse analysts investigate the use of language in context; they

are interested in what speakers and writers do, and not only the formal semantics and

grammar. Discourse analysis, then, has a social dimension, and for many analysts it is a

method for studying how language “gets recruited ‘on site’ to enact specific social

activities and social identities” (Gee, 1999: 1). Even when a discipline is difficult to

delimit, such as discourse analysis, we can learn if and how figurative or literal language

is employed by observing what characters do.

The next part of the discussion gives a thorough review of speech acts. Beginning

with Austin’s revolutionary idea that speech does as much as it says, speech acts as a

complex theory of text and context exhibits successful undertaking of intent by the S. For

the purpose of this paper, speech acts are a necessary basis for conversational analysis

because in the transaction of language, the communicative acts contain the force by

which communication can proceed. As Schiffrin points out, “by focusing upon the

meanings of utterances as acts, speech act theory offers an approach to discourse analysis

in which what is said is chunked (or segmented) into units that have communicative

functions that can be identified and labeled” (2003 [1994]: 90). This kind of analysis tells

what communicative language is doing, giving clues as to how readers should react.

Thus, in the identification of verbal irony, the concept of infelicity within speech act

theory from discourse analysis is used to illustrate the figurative meaning of verbal irony.

This study forms, via avenues of theoretical criticism and support, a detailed

representation of verbal irony, which will lead to new developments that will be

incorporated into the analytical framework.

2.2 Speech Act Theory and Its Connection to Verbal Irony

2.2.1 Introduction to Speech Act Theory

The speech act theory begins with Austin and his assertion that statements do more

than just say something—that they do something in saying (Austin, 2002 [1962]; in

Searle, 2001a [1969]; in Gorman, 1999). Searle expanded on speech act theory to give a

better basis for understanding the composition and taxonomic identification of speech

acts. Speech acts are, according to Searle (2001a) [1969], the most fundamental elements

of communication, thus every utterance performs an act. Searle’s theory stems from that

of Austin, whose original theory emerged from a problem he saw in the definitions and

limits of statements (in Schiffrin, 2003 [1994]). The problem, as Austin wrote,

theoretically speaking, statements “can only be to ‘describe’ some state of affairs, or to

‘state some fact’, which it must do either truly or falsely,” rendering utterances that

maintain no such value of truth, for example a request like “please pass the salt”, to be

bogus or as Austin calls them, “pseudo-statements” (2002 [1962]: 1-2). He proposed that

those pseudo-statements that do not just say something are actually utterances that do or

perform something.

From this, two categorizations of utterances arise from Austin: the first, constative,

refers to any utterance that has a truth-value; the second case he calls performative (in

Schiffrin, 2003 [1994]: 50). Performatives may be either implicit or explicit, depending

upon whether or not the utterances “contain explicit pointers to the performative (I

pronounce you, I sentence you . . .)” (Archer, Aijmer, & Wichmann, 2012: 36). When a

performative is implicit, typically in less formal settings, confusion over the meaning

may occur. Take for example the phrase “You’ll get what you deserve.” This statement

could be taken as hopeful encouragement, or it could be construed as a threat. In an

implicit performative, the meaning can be ambiguous compared to an explicit

performative because there is no direct performative verb in the utterance, such as

“promise” or “declare” (Kissine, 2012). Austin’s (2002) [1962] distinction between

explicit and inexplicit performatives remains ambiguous, and does not provide direct

support for the speech act taxonomy. For instance, take the issue of authority in

declarations (discussed later in section 2.2.2 under illocutionary acts). A declaration can

be either implicit or explicit, illustrated in the following example of a marriage ceremony.

When the judge states “I now pronounce you husband and wife,” he is stating an explicit

performative. If the judge were to say, “You are now husband and wife,” then he is

stating an implicit performative, and both statements are supported by the judge’s

institutional authority. Therefore, Austin’s performative does not offer clarification for

this study in regards to speech act taxonomy; however the implicit/explicit distinction is a

useful concept for understanding the use of language.

Speech act theory’s major contribution is that contextual factors are highly

significant components of discourse (Gorman, 1999: 94; Saeed, 2000: 204-205). A speech

act will succeed in its performance if it fulfills certain conditions with regard to its force

when given within a meaningful context. Austin distinguishes the meaning of an

utterance and its force as characteristically different. Austin provides the example of

someone saying “there is a bull in the field” (2002 [1962]: 33). The meaning of this could

be interpreted simply as a statement, for example a comment upon the scenery. However,

if one considers the force behind the statement, the intention could well be to provide a

warning, and then one can see the differences between meaning and force.

Grice defines S meaning and force as “semantic and pragmatic meaning” (qtd. in

Schiffrin, 2003 [1994]: 191). The semantic meaning of the utterance is as it appears on

the surface, and the pragmatic meaning is what the S intends to convey by the utterance.

The full outcome of the utterance is dependent on the H understanding the pragmatic

meaning, or force. Based upon Searle’s analysis of Austin, Searle expands the definition

of illocutionary force as determining, “how [the propositional content of an utterance] is

supposed to relate to the world” (2001b [1979]: 4). In other words, how the H recognizes

the intention of the utterance according to circumstances of sense and reference, such as

the statuses of the S and the H as well as the pertaining “extra-linguistic institutions”

involved in those statuses (Searle, 1989: 549).

He differentiates between linguistic and extralinguistic declarations, both referred to

as speech acts, but with linguistic declarations lacking the same force. According to

Searle (2001b) [1979], a speech act gains true force when backed by an extra linguistic

institution, such as the state, the church, a company hierarchy and other such

organizations (as one of the five speech acts is declaration, further discussion will be

found on all aspects of Searle’s speech act taxonomy in section 2.2.2). For example, a

sentence spoken by a priest could have a very different meaning than one spoken by a

convict. Thus meaning, is in part, as Austin states, relative to some force behind the

words by which utterances are conveyed, so the illocutionary force, to some degree,

explains the meaning via context (Austin, 2002 [1962]: 100; Searle, 2001b [1979]: 46).

Taken into context, speech acts are executed according to certain conventions. These

conventions are put forth into conditions which any given speech act must follow in order

to be considered working, or otherwise “felicitous” (Saeed, 2000: 208); the speech act

accomplishes what it intends to achieve. When the speech act fails in one or more of

these felicity conditions it is “infelicitous” (Austin qtd. in Schiffrin, 2003 [1994]: 51);

Austin calls this situation either a misfire or an abuse (2002 [1962]: 16). This study has

discovered and develops later in the theoretical framework that these so-called infelicities

are useful in the explication of verbal irony. Thus as shown below the outline of Austin’s

felicity conditions are as follows:

(A.1) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain

conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by

certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,

(A.2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate

for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.

(B.1) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and

(B.2) completely.

(Γ.1) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain

thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on

the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the

procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants

must intend so to conduct themselves, and further,

(Γ.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.

(Austin, 2002 [1962]:14-15)

A brief explanation of Austin’s scheme detailing these conditions is that conditions

A and B are a class of felicities that when broken cause an act to become “purported” but

“void” with A denoting conditions which allow or disallow the act and B denoting

conditions which make the act acceptable or unacceptable (Austin, 2002 [1962]: 16). Γ

conditions are another class of conditions of which when broken the act is “professed but

hollow,” like in cases with insincerity (Austin, 2002 [1962]: 18). Therefore, failure of any

one of these conditions could disrupt a successful uptake, or comprehension, of any given

utterance. Uptake, Austin argues, is essential for a speech act to work because it is the

successful comprehension of the utterance to bring out an effect or change in the H and

thus evoke reaction or contrarily result in either a misfire when breaking conditions A or

B or an abuse when Γ conditions are broken (2002 [1962]: 118, 139).

An example of infelicity in the echoic account of verbal irony (see section 2.4.2 for

an explanation of verbal irony within echoic theory) can be seen in the ironical

interjection, when in Rome while used in the context of subjugation to a cultural practice

during a travel in Fiji. This utterance is a kind of misfire because the proposition is not

complete (breaking conditions B.1 and B.2) nor is it appropriately matched for the

geographical location in which it is uttered (breaking condition A.1). However, it echoes

a well-known proverb to behave as those around do.

The concept of infelicity can be further illustrated in light of the following example

of an ironical echoic account:

(1) A man says to his spouse while eating a club sandwich, “I love clubs.”

The spouse then says to her husband, “I now pronounce you husband and wife.”

Referring to the “club” sandwich it is a good example of echoic allusion (see section

2.4.2 for echoic theory). It also provides cases of both misfire and abuse. Misfire can be

found in breaking the convention in multiple sites: The inappropriateness of the woman

conducting her own husband’s wedding ceremony (A.1, A.2); and only partially as

opposed to performing the whole ceremony correctly and completely (B.1, B.2). Abuse

comes from the woman’s insincerity assuming that she would thereafter not divorce her

husband and go on the rest of her days believing that her partner left her for a sandwich

(Γ.1, Γ.2).

Thus, it is vital to understand these felicity conditions and how they work. Briefly,

let us provide an explanation on how speech acts come to break those conventions. The

case of misfire occurs when any of the conditions A.1 through B.2 are violated. Take for

example the following utterance:

(2) You are hired!

If the utterance breaks A.1, it may be that the utterance is made against convention, such

as if one goes in search of a job and is hired the same moment he or she meets the

manager without providing any stated purpose for their application or giving resume or

credentials. In A.2, the act is invalid when either the S is not in authority to hire or for

example, the person to whom it is directed is already employed by that business. For B.1,

the utterance may misfire if the H never intended to take a position for work or in B.2 if

the H were to decline the appointment at that very moment he was hired. In all cases of

misfire, an intended speech act fails because it is either not allowed according to

convention or the outcome itself is nullified by other means.

In the remaining two conditions, Γ.1 and Γ.2, a degree of sincerity of the S is

required for the utterance to be felicitous. The act, although fully acceptable according to

its circumstances, may fail because the S is not fully committed to the outcome of the act

or in other words abuses the expectation of the H when making an insincere

acknowledgement. Taking another utterance for example:

(3) I gratefully accept the appointment.

The S breaks Γ.1 when he or she produces this utterance while harboring thoughts or

beliefs which contradict the literal meaning, such not feeling grateful or not intending to

show up for work; the abuse continues further if Γ.2 is broken, such that the S inevitably

avoids attending the appointment he or she accepted. The breaking of these conditions

ultimately renders the speech act infelicitous, which will prove to be vital in the analysis

of verbal irony.

Infelicitous speech acts viewed literally through a conventional lens fundamentally

fail, but in verbal irony, they could produce an outcome of a S upon an initiated H, in that

the initiated H and S both share contextual assumptions which allow an infelicitous

outcome to succeed. In example (3) the S states in such a way that, in the context, it

seems out of the ordinary. The H may wonder why the S is being so enthusiastic or

formal and may think the S is triggering an abuse against the felicity conditions.

Foremost, how the H understands the S’s infelicitous utterance hinges on the S’s intention

for the H’s uptake, and the conversational developments which have unfolded thus far in

their relationship will set up the triggers, which enable the H to identify the irony.

Contextual assumptions are formed around a mutual understanding of an oppositional

duality between what the S says and the S’s intention. How do the S and H come to such

an understanding? The explanation is linked to relevance from Wilson and Sperber

(2002). When a S “wants to achieve some particular effect” he can provide specific

linguistic indicators to aid the H in understanding the utterance based on “the form of the

utterance, the H’s accessible assumptions and the principle of relevance” (Sperber &

Wilson, 1995: 249).

Thus, an utterance’s interpretation can give a variety of effects, for example

conventional effects versus ironical effects (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 249). In the

example above, the conventional interpretation of example (3) will follow a range of

effects that would conversationally prepare the S to follow through on that act. The

effects of an ironical interpretation on the other hand will be followed by the reaction to

the S’s actual attitude. Thus ordinary interpretations, which describe circumstances

literally, need only rely on the context of the H’s preexisting assumptions to convey

meaning. However, for verbal irony, an utterance may be interpreted to some second

degree and may not be able to maintain the principles of speech act analysis, thus “the

traditional typology of speech-act types is abandoned” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 247).

This study contends infelicitous utterances provide a locale for verbal irony. Therefore,

the uptake of verbal irony as intentional irony used by an ironist can be from an

unconventional perspective. Austin raises the point that his analysis of speech acts is

“said to be conventional, in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the

performative formula,” (2002 [1962]: 103) meaning they must obey the six felicity

conditions to be working speech acts. Thus, it can be understood that irony is not always

conventional language.

2.2.2 Illocutionary Act: Emphasizing Speaker Intent

The characteristic breaking of felicity conditions can be used to identify irony and

infer what kind of illocutionary force it possesses in relation to irony’s location within the

perlocutionary act of an utterance, as exemplified in this study. The undertaking of

breaking down speech acts works to further the understanding of the rationale behind the

use of such figurative language in the first place. Austin segments speech acts into three

parts: locutionary acts, uttering words with sense (sounds) and reference (semantic

meaning); illocutionary acts, the acts performed in saying and the intention of the acts,

which works according to the rules of a “performative formula” (context and text); and

perlocutionary acts, the consequences of the utterances on an interlocutor (in Schiffrin,

2003 [1994]: 53-54). When discussing speech acts it is necessary to refer to the

illocutionary component of the act explained, as Austin puts it, to be in a sense the

“performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance of an act of

saying something” (2002 [1962]: 99-100). Although Austin identifies three components

to an utterance, it is the illocutionary act that carries the force of the action that the

utterance performs. The illocutionary act takes particular importance as it illustrates the

force of the utterance. For Austin, there were five categories of performance from the

illocutionary act but the value of those categories was lost in Searle’s reformulation of the

taxonomy (Searle, 1976: 7). According to Searle, the weakness of Austin’s classification

of speech acts was that each act was structured to stem from an illocutionary verb, and all

synonymous verbs would fall under the same illocutionary act. The illocutionary verb is

the gerund of the illocutionary point. Non-synonymous illocutionary verbs can have the

same illocutionary point but offer a different way of presenting it, for example asking and

demanding are “stylistically” different (i.e. in the form of a question verses an imperative

statement) with the same illocutionary point which is for S to get H to do something

(Searle, 2001b [1979]: 7-8).

Utterances perform illocutionary acts within certain textual and contextual

conditions, meaning they follow semantic and pragmatic rules that lead the H to

understand what the S’s intention may be in saying. For Austin, meaning references

illocutionary force, and he distinguishes them stating traditionally “meaning is equivalent

to sense and reference” (2002 [1962]: 100). However despite this he admits that meaning

is blurred between the locutionary and illocutionary acts of an utterance, and that

illocutions are a reference of the locution according to convention of the context in which

an utterance is spoken (Austin, 2002 [1962]: 103, 109). In accordance with the close

relationship between semantics and pragmatics, meaning, according to Searle, builds

upon the relationship of reference and intention. According to his design meaning is a

concept that within an utterance (U) a S gives a “descriptor” within context, which

assumedly a H can use to identify the object (X) intended within that particular context,

thus meaning in an U tethers reference together with intention according to the rules

governing language (Searle, 2001a [1969]: 43-49).

Both Austin and Searle build upon the proposal that language rules allow for the

possibility that any given speech act involves a contextually derived linguistic meaning

which communicators use to support whether or not an utterance should be taken

conventionally (Schiffrin, 2003 [1994]: 54-55). They share the concept of categorizing

illocutionary acts into five types, although each does so according to his own

determination; their support of a speech act’s classification is derived from some

circumstance or condition found in the text and context of the utterance. It should be

noted however, the following discussion is focused on Searle’s taxonomy because he has

illustrated a clearer route for identifying the illocutionary act by the point for which an

utterance counts as. Searle’s speech act theory and taxonomy will be utilized for this

research to classify and define ironical speech acts. Due to speech act theory’s intricate

conception, part of this rule-governed process of determining speech acts involves an

understanding of the speech act’s complexity in terms of smaller, more specific

conditions. Searle breaks Austin’s locutionary act into two acts, utterance and

proposition. Firstly, the utterance act simply involves phonetic and semantic coding; in

other words, it is merely a semantic aspect of meaning. The second part of the locutionary

act, is proposition, and is one of the four definitive conditions that are used to

characterize a speech act as felicitous. The four rules are the propositional content, the

preparatory condition, the sincerity condition, and the essential condition. These rules are

Searle’s felicity conditions, of which the propositional act is distinguished by textual

interpretation of the utterance’s content according to two concepts.

The first concept refers to the U’s reference, some X existing which the S intends

within its utterance and the H can successfully recognize because the H knows the rules

of reference by which the X is identified in the H’s understanding of context (Searle,

2001a [1969]: 94-95). The second concept for the propositional act is in the U’s

predication, the acting content, which represents what, is to be determined as the

illocutionary force (Searle, 2001a [1969]: 127). It is important to note that the predication

is to be determined by the illocutionary force of the utterance, but the force cannot be

determined without first attempting an analysis of the content given in the predication. In

the determination of these, the propositional act and the illocutionary act occur in mutual

succession where each one complements the other. In sum, the utterance act and

propositional act are the materials of the illocutionary act, and their interpretation will

move the H to understand the function of the illocutionary force (Searle, 2001a [1969]:

125-126).

Moving on from the utterance and propositional acts, this discussion approaches the

basis for the speech act, the illocutionary act (Austin, 2002 [1962]: 109-121; Searle,

2001a [1969]: 48); this is the component of the speech act which allows one to realize

what a S intends in saying. Illocutionary acts are issued forth through conventional types

of communication to give force to some utterance. Any given illocutionary act can fulfill

a number of performances (ways of doing in saying) via primary (intended) and literal

inferences (Schiffrin, 2003 [1994]: 59-60). For example, take the question “Can you pass

me the pepper?” The illocutionary act of the utterance is that the S wants to get the H to

do something for her and it is customarily used to comply with a socially accepted

manner as its intended meaning is to request for pepper. However, this utterance can also

perform its literal meaning as a question to inquire the H’s physical ability to be able to

pass the S the pepper. Therefore, an utterance may contain multiple illocutionary acts.

The illocutionary act, a component of the speech act, is characteristically rule-

governed, with conditions offered by Searle (2001a) [1969]; intentional on the part of the

S; and named according to the S and H’s relationship where the speech act purports to

fulfill some proposition conveyed, as the above example illustrated, in the predication of

the utterance. Searle’s framework of speech acts is dichotomous, consisting of five

classes of illocutionary points coupled with three main principles whose conditions are

used to differentiate utterances among the classes. According to Searle (2001b) [1979],

the first aspect is that every utterance has an illocutionary point—a purpose for being

communicated, and it is upon those points that Searle establishes his five classifications

of illocutionary acts:

(ASR) Assertives have the “point or purpose of committing a speaker . . . to

something’s being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition.”

(DIR) Directives are “attempts . . . by the speaker to get the hearer to do

something.”

(COM) Commissives have a point which “is to commit the speaker . . . to some

future course of action.”

(EXP) Expressives hold the point “to express the psychological state specified in

the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional

content” of an utterance.

(DEC) Declarations, backed by some authority, are used with the purpose to “bring

about some alteration in the status or condition of [an utterance’s] referred to

object or objects solely in virtue of the fact that the declaration has been

successfully performed”

(Searle, 2001b [1979]: 12-17)

Assertive speech acts indicate a statement with a factual characteristic, such as “it is

raining.” Directives are often found in the form of a question or an imperative which

expresses a request or a demand: “Don’t drive your car beyond the speed limit.”

Commissives essentially commit the S to some future action, such as in a threat or

promise; for example, “I promise not to tell anyone your secret.” Expressives express a

grateful attitude or feeling, as “I am sorry to have missed your birthday party.” And

declarations bring something into existence, for example when a judge exclaims “I now

pronounce you husband and wife” he creates a married couple. Declarations are typically

backed by a formal “institutional authority” in order to bring some fact into existence

(Saeed, 2000: 212; Archer, Aijmer, & Wichmann, 2012: 39; Searle, 1989: 548-549). The

necessity of authority for declarations can be a deficiency of Searle’s speech act theory,

according to this paper, and the issue will be addressed in the framework in Chapter 3.

It is important not to confuse the number of speech acts with their classifications;

there are numerous speech acts, all of which can be classified and they fall into one of

five different types. Thus, each classification could be associated with any number of

illocutionary forces. The illocutionary act is the main effect of the speech act, and it is

comprised of a force, a point, and a verb. The force is also regarded as the intention, the

point is what the utterance counts as doing, and the verb is simply the gerund of the

illocutionary point.

Searle states that illocutionary points are “the best basis for taxonomy” but warns

against confusing them with illocutionary verbs and illocutionary force, of which the

point is only a part (2001b [1979]: 2-3). The second aspect of speech act theory, with a

set of criteria, determines the illocutionary force of the act. The three main principles of

which are: (1) the essential condition of the act, what the act means to do e.g. directives

with different forces such as request, order, challenge, or dare; (2) the relationship of the

word to the world; (3) the psychological state, known as the sincerity condition (Schiffrin,

2003 [1994]: 57-58).

Referring back to principle number (2) the relationship of the word to the world,

consider that direction of fit is used in the following ways: The first is words-to-world,

when the words describe some circumstance preexisting within the world (ASR). Second,

the direction of world-to-words means the words propose the world to change according

to the words’ design (DIR and COM). A third approach is the lack of directional fit,

where the words do not propose any changes or claim any circumstances of existence

within the world (EXP). The final direction is a simultaneous emersion of the worldly

circumstance when the word is uttered, bringing about a change within the world at the

moment of speech that commits the world to some new situation (DEC).

The illocutionary act is primarily scrutinized through a corresponding set of felicity

conditions, which Searle names:

(1) Propositional content, the action of the statement regarding some past, present or

future activity, or state (Searle, 2001a [1969]: 66-67).

(2) Preparatory rule, referring to some preexisting assumptions held by both the

speaker and the hearer prior to and possibly developed by the performance of the

utterance’s act (in Schiffrin, 2003 [1994]: 56).

(3) Sincerity rule, involving the speaker’s subconscious attitude according to its

intention in performing the act (Searle, 2001a [1969]: 66-67).

(4) Essential rule, focusing on what the act counts as, in other words, the

illocutionary point or purpose of the utterance (Searle, 2001a [1969]: 66-67).

To illustrate how a speech act can violate these four rules, take the following utterance:

“That thief is a very kind person.” The propositional content is violated because the

statement is blatantly false in regards to the present state that he is a thief and therefore

unkind. The preparatory rule is violated, for the S does not have evidence or reasons to

support his assertion (for by referring to the thief, the S affirms a negative disposition of

the person, and therefore provides evidence to the contrary that he is “a very kind

person”). The sincerity rule is violated if the S does not believe that the thief is a kind

person. The essential rule is violated because the statement is inaccurate; the S’s

illocutionary act counts as an undertaking to affirm an actual state of affairs. However,

this utterance can be construed as verbal irony, and it is in violation of all the felicity

rules. Therefore, this utterance indicates the breaking of the felicity conditions for

identifying verbal irony because the S’s intention can be seen through the site of

infelicity. Austin’s (2002) [1962] and Searle’s (2001b) [1979] felicity conditions will

prove essential for classifying speech acts in this research. When an utterance’s

illocutionary act fulfills all of the rules, it is dubbed felicitous and works according to its

proper design (Zhang, 2001: F28; Schiffrin, 2003 [1994]: 71). Nevertheless, this effect

does not happen automatically; the perlocutionary effect of a speech act greatly relies on

how the H determines the force and therein how the S intends for the H to interpret an

utterance.

2.3 Verbal Irony as a Perlocutionary Act

It has been noted that every utterance accomplishes some act, and speech acts allow

discourse to identify sites of meaning and intention. Recall that Austin (2002) [1962] and

Searle (2001b) [1979] have each outlined a performative formula by which utterances can

achieve some doing, and that those formulae, outlined for conventional speech acts

consisted of rules the S must follow in order for the doing to be carried out successfully.

Both Austin’s and Searle’s rules for speech acts are strictly constitutive, requiring that all

rules be fulfilled for a speech act to be manifest (Hancher, 1977: 1085). For example, if a

S were to ask the H “What would you like for dinner?” the H receiving the greeting

would be expected to respond with a food-related answer to satisfy the rules of speech act

theory in order to be construed by his H and therefore felicitous. However, for

unconventional acts, an inference like one used in an ironical utterance could be far

distant from the felicity conditions of the speech act theory. The formulaic approach of

speech acts is insufficient to explain the radical differences between explicit utterances

and those with “extra meanings” (Leech & Short, 2007: 236), which is inferred in

accordance with its contextual design.

Grice’s explanation of the cooperative principle is a great contribution to this cause.

According to the cooperative principle, meaning is logically derived through the concept

of implicature, where a word signifies a semantic meaning but also relates that word to a

context dependent upon the S’s use according to conversational conventions (Schiffrin,

2003 [1994]: 193). These conventions of conversation, whether ruled by maxims or

felicity conditions, are commonly broken in conversation; yet the implicature within

those utterances allows the speech act to come to fruition.

The cooperative principle is the proposal that human communication is based on a

common purpose or direction between the participants to it. Grice’s maxims based upon

this principle are: quantity—provide adequate information; quality—“be genuine and not

spurious;” relation—make relevant contributions; and manner—“make it clear . . . and

execute . . . with reasonable dispatch” (1975: 47).

Grice proposes in the cases where the conventions of speech acts are deliberately

disobeyed as sites where a “gap between overt sense and pragmatic force” requires a H to

infer some meaning that is not explicitly available (Leech & Short, 2007: 236). Sense

means basic logic and pragmatic force “is not so much a function of the situation itself…

as of the way participants construe the situation” (Leech & Short, 2007: 240). Therefore,

the space between logic and context needs a rule that conversationalists may follow in

order for their uptake to summon the appropriate images to the descriptors encountered in

language. Grice’s principles can be referenced as the basis of the rhetoric of text and

discourse, although often only when the principle of cooperation is violated. The

violation provides the effect of verbal irony and other tropes which allow discourse to

achieve its communicative goals effectively and tactfully.

Using the cooperative principle, inferences can still be made even if cooperative

maxims are not followed. Hancher says that the maxims “are all regulative, not

constitutive; they are as apt to be honored in the breach as in the observance” (1977:

1090). When the maxims are broken on purpose, it could be for any of four reasons: to

clandestinely “violate” a maxim, to “opt out” and refuse to offer information, to handle a

“clash” of maxims where fulfilling one would break another, or to “flout a maxim . . .

blatantly” (Grice, 1975: 49).

Breaching maxims is the perfect opportunity to exploit an utterance that houses

different illocutionary acts. Leech and Short give an example of a conversation between a

detective and a criminal suspect where this kind of breach occurs; the detective tries to

entrap the suspect with questioning but the suspect breaks the maxim of relevance by

answering with more questions (2007: 239). The speech acts on the detective’s account

are failures because they are met with improper responses; for example, the responses

break with Austin’s felicity condition B.1 for accuracy and do not complete Searle’s

preparatory rule for questioning. The preparatory rule for questioning includes the S not

knowing an answer and seeking information to complete the S’s true proposition, and it is

not obvious that the S and the H can expect that the H will provide information without

prompting. The suspect’s speech acts are infelicitous because the suspect knows his own

guilt but refuses to admit to his crime by deliberately violating the maxim of relation in

order to mislead his inquisitor by breaking all of Austin’s felicity conditions and Searle’s

preparatory and sincerity conditions for questioning. The sincerity rule for questioning

being that the S wants the information in the proposition (Searle, 2001a [1969]: 66).

The detective’s intentions are entirely frustrated, and although the speech acts are

sensibly void, the effect is that the suspect’s break from felicity proved successful in the

act to avoid the investigator’s trap. The suspect may use verbal irony in order to save

himself because “impersonal factors” impel the S to be uncooperative; these factors

include any kind of “attitude, tension and conflict” that motivates two participants in

conversation into breaking with the maxims (Leech & Short, 2007: 240). The pragmatic

force of the suspect’s purposefully ironical statements hinders the detective’s intention,

construing a contextual relationship where “characters are at cross-purposes;” their

implicature then models a reality and context in disagreement with each other (Leech &

Short, 2007: 240). This effect is an unconventional maneuver of speech acts to get the H

to do something by saying.

Earlier, it was noted that Searle’s speech acts were broken down into parts; the

illocutionary act, as part, illustrates the force behind the performance of the act as a

whole. However, not much discussion has occurred on the final part, the perlocutionary

act. The perlocutionary act is construed as the consequence of the illocutionary act

(Searle, 2001a [1969]: 25). To offer an example, take the ironic instance: A student walks

into class thirty minutes late, and the teacher exclaims “Oh! You’re just in time for the

final discussion.” The student reacts by blushing and quickly walking to her seat. The S’s

intention was to warn the H she was late. From the H’s uptake intended by the S, the

perlocutionary act of the utterance when spoken is that the H must know that being late to

class is not acceptable. The student’s uptake is shown through her embarrassed reaction

to the teacher’s comment. Within this utterance one finds the S’s illocutionary point as a

commissive speech act (warning) committing the S to a future action (e.g. the teacher will

implement consequences for the student’s being late); and the perlocutionary act, the S’s

intention of the speech act upon the H, herein is realized when the student acknowledges

her wrongdoing. Therefore, the perlocutionary act can be described as the S’s intention

for the effect upon the H to recognize the infelicity (incongruity) in the verbal irony. The

above example of verbal irony shows the necessity of the perlocutionary act in

combination with the illocutionary act. However, neither Austin nor Searle give much

detail on the perlocutionary act; their discussions focus on conventional speech acts, the

illocutionary acts.

This means speaking because it is “the real production of real effects and what

[they] regard as mere conventional consequences” and “said to be conventional, in the

sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula” (Austin, 2002

[1962]: 103). Austin purports that perlocutionary acts are not conventional, and Searle

believes that “saying something and meaning it is a matter of intending to perform an

illocutionary, not necessarily perlocutionary act” (Austin, 2002 [1962]: 103; Searle,

2001a [1969]: 44). To conclude, Austin and Searle fail to provide an explanation for

verbal irony.

Verbal irony as figurative language is paradoxical in the understanding of

conventional speech acts as it has a conveyed implicature, thereby unconventional in its

execution. Yet the ironist who uses it does so with utmost intention. The rules of speech

acts should be more flexible than what Austin and Searle will allow—so that discourses

involving figurative language such as verbal irony can be productively explained and

recognized along with their own principles of felicity. It is necessary to point out that

while the rigid rules of speech acts cannot account for unconventional illocutionary acts,

they do offer a location for verbal irony in the perlocutionary act. The H’s uptake relies

on the perlocutionary act, rather than the single effect of the illocutionary act of the

utterance. Pragmatically speaking, irony requires a special effect on the part of the H’s

ability to infer any incongruity in an utterance according to their understanding of the

illocutionary force and the content given by the S (Simpson, 2003: 62-70). Incongruities

are related to a reader’s (H’s) special knowledge according to some preexisting

assumptions, which enable the H to identify irony. Sinex refers to Booth’s influential

model:

This issue of the reader’s special knowledge (of authorial beliefs and intentions, for

example) is a particular weakness of the communications model of irony . . . an

ironic utterance implies a set of assumptions held by the historical author. The

successful reader must first recognize the incongruity between the assumptions

apparently embraced by the speaker and those of the historical author. (Sinex, 2002:

289)

Those assumptions provide a context for the H to achieve a pragmatic sense of the

ironical intention of the language, as the ironist has provided a scene in which a

“pragmatic understanding . . . in the face of challenges to common sense” occurs

(Neiman, 1991: 372).

The pragmatic effect of irony involves reason which “becomes a process within

which members of a community of shared speech negotiate among themselves ways of

speaking that will meet their various purposes” (Neiman, 1991: 377). The task of this

kind of pragmatic dialogue requires inquiry, which Neiman describes as the process of a

community to solve their problems by enacting a change in its “vocabularies and beliefs”

(1991: 378). Verbal irony exhibits this change in vocabulary, for example when an ironist

says sunny day she means rainy day, and a H understands this irony via the process of

pragmatic understanding when an utterance challenges common sense. Communities

make revisions according to their doubts and their sense of wonder allows them to

transcend the truth for a higher understanding of sense (Neiman, 1991: 379-380).

This notion seems much akin to relevance, where a H must decide for himself

whether the S’s assertions are formed suitably amidst a preexisting design, and extends to

credit H with creating a reality for that assumption to reasonably take place. Like satire

according to Simpson, this study finds that irony could be regarded as having “a

‘perlocutionary’ status which arises as a pragmatic reflex of the impact of its illocutionary

force on a projected humour community” (2003: 62). The H’s reaction to ironical

statements requires a change in the perception of the language itself. In the case of irony,

an abuse or misfire does not nullify or hollow a speech act. This is because the H has

decided to disregard any conventional forces purported by the act’s proposition and

regard it as unequivocally different.

For further explanation of how pragmatic understanding transpires, turn again to

Grice’s account for meaning, where he details the difference between “what a sentence

means and what someone means by uttering that sentence” (Short, 1996: 167). Grice puts

forth the concept of implicature, referred to by Short as a “kind of indirect, context-

determined meaning” in which the circumstances surrounding an utterance will require a

S to establish the reference of the utterances’ meaning (Short, 1996: 167). This textual-

contextual relationship is in accordance with Austin’s and Searle’s accounts of meaning,

discussed earlier in this chapter and is crucial for unfolding the intricacies of the purpose

for verbal irony.

Leech notes that the field of pragmatics, which studies the meaning of utterances in

context, places special importance on Austin’s and Searle’s speech act theory and Grice’s

cooperative principle (2008: 88). Yet the concept of verbal irony as unconventional does

not satisfactorily fit into either paradigm—speech act theory alone cannot account for

unconventional acts that break with sincerity, and the cooperative principle comes into

conflict with standards which heavily govern the conditions of carrying out politeness in

English speech. Leech gives criticism against these two theories, saying that speech acts

are too “regimented,” and the cooperative principle does not “explain why people are so

often indirect in the way they talk” (2008: 93). Leech proposes that analysts could

faithfully use his politeness principle in turn with Grice’s cooperative principle to achieve

unconnected goals in communicating irony (2008: 96). For example, a newly married

woman cooks dinner for her husband and his colleagues, but she forgets to add sugar to

the pie. When the colleagues taste the unsweetened pie, one claims, “Just the way I like to

eat it, unsweetened so I can add the sugar to my taste.” The S is displaying politeness on

the surface in his remark regarding the pie which was cooked improperly. The S’s

intended meaning is that the pie did not taste good the way she prepared it. Leech’s

politeness principle fulfills one end of the spectrum of utilizing politeness to carry out

verbal irony. On the other end of the spectrum, Leech shows how the banter principle

(see section 2.4.3.3 for the banter principle), which is impoliteness that would break

Grice’s maxims, is actually used to be polite; it is impoliteness used as a form of

politeness, a contradiction in essence. Therefore, Leech proposes two opposing

principles, politeness principle (polite on the surface) versus banter principle (impolite on

the surface), as useful strategies for conveying ironical meanings (1983: 80-82; 144).

Kotthoff (2003) provides evidence in her own study to present examples of criticism

given politely through friendly ironical conversation. Utterances are always

contextualized, “in a specific way in order to control conversational inference,” and a S is

always assumedly making a frame for that context via conversation (Kotthoff, 2003:

1391). Therefore, to keep a polite contextual frame, utterances are produced in

accordance with maintaining a friendly environment. The reason being that different

connotations of verbal irony (friendly and critical) elicit different responses; for example

in friendly irony, “people react more to what is said in the ironic act” whereas in critical

irony “they react more to what is meant by the ‘critical’ ironic act” (Kotthoff, 2003:

1388). In continuous conversation, friendly participants may produce a range of

responses to verbal irony from playfully literal reactions, to ironical retorts, and even

simple laughter. Irony, as Kotthoff puts it, is a method of communicating an “evaluation

gap,” which can be understood as the same kind of gap between overt sense and

pragmatic force mentioned earlier, where S can express positive evaluations under the

guise of negative ones and vice versa (2003: 1387-1393). In the successful execution of

this style of friendly verbal irony, a target of irony recognizing a joke could respond with

further self-directed irony; therein the target of the irony also participates in self-ridicule.

The contextualization of the utterances in “conversational inference is an ongoing process

which works with assumptions that are continually readjusted” so that “ironic activities

are always interpreted in connection with the ongoing conversation, not as isolated acts”

(Kotthoff, 2003: 1408). Therefore, each subsequent S’s illocutionary force must respond

and even perpetuate the perlocutionary effect of verbal irony, so that the contextual

assumptions of each new utterance will satisfy and prolong the procession of ironical

inferences created earlier in conversation.

This necessity of the perlocutionary effect is also supported by Amante who

recognizes that perlocutionary acts are strongly connected to the illocution of an utterance

(1981: 77). Perlocutionary force should be understood as the S’s intention of the speech

act upon the H, contrasted with the illocutionary force, which is the intention of the

speech act from the S’s perspective. According to Amante, speech acts with irony have

power to make a H do something, a “quasi-perlocutionary force,” this occurs when the

perlocutions and illocutions are blended to create what he calls an “affective force”

(1981: 88). It is worth noting that the effects of utterances that have a quasi-

perlocutionary force are not linear in their time frame. A literal utterance is to alert the H

to the existence of a future event, or to gain his cooperation in bringing it about. Instead

an utterance with a quasi-perlocutionary force will draw the attention of the H back to the

illocutionary act. Amante claims that in all instances of irony affective force can be

found. The affective force in instances of irony is explained in detail by Warning and

Morton as a pragmatic level inference in which the H can realize that the descriptor the S

proposes is being evaluated by the S ironically instead of the opposing (literal) identity,

thus appraising the descriptor of the S’s figurative implicature (1982: 259). The work of

the perlocutionary act has an effect upon the H helping determine the understanding of an

utterance. One could also argue using Amante’s deduction that every utterance is

produced to bring about some effect in a H such as in his example of an indirect

perlocution derived from an utterance lacking an illocutionary element, like a scream

(1981: 90). Through an evaluation of comparing direct versus ironical readings according

to context set forth in the illocutionary act, a H makes the determination to acknowledge

the utterance appropriately (Holdcroft, 1983: 496). Thus a H’s uptake and inference, the

perlocutionary effect upon the H, is of the utmost importance in corroborating the S’s

intention, the illocutionary act.

Speech act theory and its specific connection with verbal irony have been

thoroughly discussed, and the section above gave an introduction to how verbal irony can

function as a perlocutionary act. The following section provides a cursory look at

figurative language to further explicate the understanding of verbal irony as a type of

figurative language. Broader theories of figurative language will be analyzed in an effort

to contribute to the existing theories utilized by our analytical framework in Chapter 3.

2.4 Verbal Irony: Definition and Scope

Before discussing verbal irony in depth, one must follow the age-old rhetoric of

identifying the classic definition of irony according to Gricean pragmatics. For Grice,

verbal irony was not simply a semantically derived instance of using figurative language

to mean the opposite of what is uttered, but rather an implicature according to a

pragmatic domain of relating the utterance to a contextual interpretation (Sperber &

Wilson, 1981: 296; Schiffrin, 2003 [1994]: 191-194).

Another view postulated by Muecke, in his work The Compass of Irony (1980)

[1969], defines irony according to three requisite components and two general types.

Muecke’s three components of irony are:

(1) it is double-layered: there is always, whether implied or explicit, observer and

observed; (2) there is opposition of some sort between the layers; (3) there is ‘an

element of ‘innocence’; either a victim is confidently unaware of the very possibility

of there being an upper level or point of view that invalidates his own, or an ironist

pretends not to be aware of it. (qtd. in Wright, 1969: 324)

The duality and opposition of irony are also supported by Leech and Short who define

irony “as a double significance which arises from the contrast in values associated with

two different points of view” (2007: 223). Leech and Short hint at what Muecke

determines as an existence of contrasted views evident between the ironist and the object

of irony. For example, Jonathan Swift’s A Modest Proposal (2013) [1729] is a classic

example of irony with duality and opposition in meaning. In his essay, Swift proposes

that in order to alleviate the destitute population, people should sell their children as food

to the wealthy. The duality in Jonathan Swift’s ironical message is that children of course

should not be eaten, but “the contrast in values associated with two different points of

view” (Leech & Short, 2007: 223) highlights Swift’s sardonic attitude toward the high

economic inequality in Ireland at the time of his publication in the early 18th century.

Bryant and Fox Tree provide a useful definition when they state that “verbal irony is

classically defined as the use of words to convey a meaning that is something other than,

and especially the opposite of the literal meaning of the words” (2002: 100).

Furthermore, while verbal irony is language-related it cannot be discussed outside of a

situation; there has to be context for the verbal irony to exist within (Utsumi, 2000:

1778). Muecke says verbal irony is executed to be “momentarily misleading” and “not

immediately apparent” (1980 [1969]: 38), and this effect could be used to make

utterances humorous, usually at the expense of the object against which it is directed.

Another important characteristic of verbal irony is that the ironist, i.e. the S performing

ironical utterances is aware of the act. He or she knowingly brings the technique into play

to sneakily convey his or her true feelings underlying the literal impression.

This concept is enlarged when one considers Hutchens’ statement that “deception in

some form” is always existent in irony (1960: 353). The conversations between the

novel’s protagonists, Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth, attest to the deception in their verbal

irony; the characters’ dialogues suggest dualities which provoke incongruous meanings

between what is said and the figurative meanings implied. Hutchens has further defined

the ironist as “one who arranges a series of facts or appearances along a line intended to

mislead” (1960: 354). This concept of the ironist as the deceiver is one that is common in

literature. The ironist can therefore not only be an ironical character within the novel or

the author himself as ironical narrator, but also the author as “arranger” as observed by

Thirlwall (qtd. in Hutchens, 1960: 357). Thirlwall posits that as author the ironist is able

to use not just ironical utterances of characters but also employ situational irony within

drama and literature.

The most familiar distinction of irony is that which separates it into two general

classifications: Verbal (also termed as Intentional) Irony and Situational Irony. This

distinction serves as one of the most basic classifications of irony:

Verbal Irony implies an ironist, someone consciously and intentionally employing a

technique. Situational Irony does not imply an ironist but merely ‘a condition of

affairs’ or ‘outcome of events’ which, we add, is seen and felt to be ironic. In both

there is such a confrontation or juxtaposition of incompatibles, but whereas in Verbal

Irony it is the ironist who presents, or evokes, or puts us in the way of seeing, such a

confrontation, in Situational Irony something which we see as ironic happens or

comes to our notice. . . . An ironist [is] being ironical by showing us something ironic

happening. (Muecke, 1980 [1969]: 42)

This study specifically focuses on identifying verbal irony in particular and not irony in

general or other specific classifications. Verbal irony is defined as containing an ironist

who provokes the object of the irony to realize a contradiction in his or her ironical

statements. Muecke has counted at least 19 different kinds of irony (1980 [1969]: 4). The

type(s) which one chooses to use is dependent on one’s specific research purposes. In the

case of our research, the study is limited to one type, verbal irony; anything beyond

verbal irony is outside the scope of this paper. However, this paper requires a cursory

examination of aspects of irony introduced by portions of Muecke’s study, i.e. grades and

modes.

Verbal irony is intentional; therefore the three grades of irony are necessary for

understanding the presentation of irony within an utterance. The three grades of verbal

irony encompass irony from its most blatant to least transparent forms; they are “the

degree to which the real meaning [of the ironist] is concealed” (Muecke, 1980 [1969]:

53). The “complexity and subtlety in being ironic do not lend themselves to theoretical

distinctions” (Muecke, 1980 [1969]: 53), but simply define to what degree irony appears.

In other words, they determine whether the ironist intends to be blatantly obvious or more

secretive, for example aiming to mock someone unaware, or take advantage of the

obliviousness of the target of their ironical utterances.

Muecke (1980) [1969] identified three grades of irony and posited that these grades

build on one another, ranging as they do from evident to gradually understated to almost

obscure. The usage of the first grade, Overt Irony, renders the meaning behind the irony

entirely unconcealed to allow the intended meaning of the ironist to be seen with full

transparency. Certain techniques employed to convey irony in this fashion are: rhetorical

questions, pretending agreement with the victim of the ironist, innuendo and insinuation,

and misrepresentation, to name but a few (Wright, 1969: 325). Thus ironic meaning is

known to all through the utterance’s obvious “ironic contradiction or incongruity”

(Muecke, 1980 [1969]: 54). Sarcasm is a perfect example of Overt Irony; listeners

identify such statements so their literal meaning is ineffective as the figurative meaning

present in the irony is exceedingly evident.

The second grade of irony, Covert, is not intended to be apparent, but rather meant

to be detected. Characteristic of this sort of irony is that the more understated it is, the

higher chance it has an ironical utterance may remain undetected. A covert ironist does

not use “any tone or manner or any stylistic indication that would immediately reveal his

irony” (Muecke, 1980 [1969]: 56). In such, successful detection of contradiction

essentially occurs “only when the ironist thinks he can rely upon his audience [H] having

the requisite prior knowledge” of the duplicity in his or her meaning (Muecke, 1980

[1969]: 59). The H must already be aware of some inner assumptions on the part of the

ironist that are contradicted outwardly in the S’s utterance. In order for the irony to truly

exist, it must be deliberately employed to present contradiction and allow the intended

meaning to be discerned. If there is a lack of discernment it is not necessarily the fault of

the H, Muecke points out unless a person has “in some oblique manner . . . signaled his

intentions and we have seen his signal he has not been ironical for us” (1980 [1969]: 57).

In Pride and Prejudice, this is most certainly the type of irony best tailored to Elizabeth’s

needs: usually she stays away from overt irony in order to avoid disapproval as such

behavior would be un-ladylike, and employs covert irony to be detected by her intended

H, often intended for Mr. Darcy, when the third party present in their conversation.

The final grade, Private, renders irony the most heavily concealed; in this case, it is

the least apparent as it is not intended to be perceived by anyone outside of the ironist.

Pride and Prejudice’s Mr. Bennet has been mentioned frequently in ironic accounts, and

Muecke specifically cites this character as a private ironist. This character employs his

ironical statements which may be perceived or shared by the reader, but the purpose

remains that it serves more as private amusement meant to be enjoyed exclusively by the

executor himself. It is important to note that the rationale for private irony is likely to

differ greatly depending on the character of the ironist themselves. In the case of

Elizabeth in Pride and Prejudice, it may be as “a means of release” as she struggles

against the gender boundaries laid down by Regency propriety (Muecke, 1980 [1969]:

59-60).

Muecke (1980) [1969] continues by further classifying irony into four modes:

Impersonal, Self-disparaging, Ingénu, and Dramatized. The purpose of these modes is to

show the ways a text can be ironical according to the roles of the ironists themselves and

their relation to their ironical utterances. The different modes give explanation for how

irony is employed. Impersonal Irony is characterized by the ironical utterance itself, and

Impersonal Irony is recognized in part by how it ultimately conveys mockery on the part

of the target. An example of Impersonal irony can be a comment upon an author’s

society, such as in the previously cited example of Swift. His essay A Modest Proposal

satirizes his own country which is pervaded by economic inequality (Swift, 2013 [1729]).

Self-disparaging Irony, on the other hand, centers upon the ironist’s persona as a principle

factor. Self-disparaging ironists are much like Socrates; they confess their ignorance

while their superiority in argument is made apparent by their ability to force their

supposed superiors into contradicting themselves (Muecke, 1980 [1969]: 87-89). Self-

disparaging irony can be characterized by an ironist feigning to overestimate or

underestimate his ability to comprehend an argument of a target who perceives himself to

be superior. Socrates engages in self-deprecation in order to assert his wisdom over

others.

In the remaining two modes of irony, the role of the ironist is solely given to the

author and the characters become either discoverers or victims of a situational irony. In

the third mode, Ingénu Irony, the character charms the reader with his naivety and

incomprehension of the world’s ways, often leading them to see what others cannot or

discover the irony in situations. Within Pride and Prejudice Jane Bennet can be described

as an ingénu who through her placement in certain situations allows the reader to see the

ridiculous. For example, upon hearing of Mr. Wickham’s previous malicious behavior she

attempts to explain it away, allowing the reader to see the irony (Austen, 2003: 218). The

final mode, Dramatized Irony, the irony is found to be played around the characters

unbeknownst to them. This mode of irony is no more than ‘the presentation in drama or

fiction of such ironic situations or events as we may find in life’ (Muecke, 1980 [1969]:

63). For example, in Pride and Prejudice Austen utilizes dramatized irony by making

Elizabeth unaware of her new love for Mr. Darcy until it appears he is unavailable to her.

Certainly, literature can employ any of the four modes by grades concurrently or in

part. Verbal irony can be difficult to classify and identify through only one theory due to

its implicit nature, as no one model is able to fully account for all instances of verbal

irony (Pexman, Glenwright, Krol, & James, 2005: 260). The following section aids in the

identification of verbal irony through a comparison and contrast to satire and humor.

Often the lines between these three types of figurative language can become blurred, and

thus we find it necessary to distinguish verbal irony from satire and humor.

2.4.1 Comparing Verbal Irony, Satire, and Humor

This study is centered on the analysis of verbal irony in discourse, and a discussion

of figurative language is necessary to elucidate the distinction of verbal irony from other

types of figurative language. Figurative language contributes to this discussion as a type

of communication that allows a S to speak creatively albeit indirectly. It requires the

faculties of human ingenuity and linguistic knowledge to conceive how figurative

language is interpreted. Verbal irony is a common type of figurative language used to

indirectly convey the ideas of a S. This section provides an overview of figurative

language, in order to better elucidate how satire, irony, and humor often intertwine in

language. These three concepts of figurative language may appear in combination, and at

times are difficult to differentiate. Therefore, an overview of each is necessary for the

continuation of the study. These three concepts are relatively connected, and in order to

show where irony stands in respect to humor and satire a comparison is required. Despite

the use of humor as one of the major linguistic aspects, the primary focus of this work is

on the use of verbal irony within Pride and Prejudice; expounding on the humor present

within the work and analyzing it using discourse analysis is outside the scope of this

paper.

For the sake of discussing figurative language, first consider the definition of literal

meaning. Searle states that literal meaning establishes a “set of truth conditions… relative

to a particular context” (2001b [1979]: 79). Literal meaning is associated with a stated

illocutionary force that obliges the S to believe the statement with full sincerity.

Furthermore, Searle gives three features of literal meaning:

First, in literal utterance the speaker means what he says; that is, literal sentence

meaning and speaker’s utterance meaning are the same; second, in general the literal

meaning of a sentence only determines a set of truth conditions, relative to a set of

background assumptions, which are not part of the semantic content of the sentence;

and third, the notion of similarity plays an essential role in any account of literal

predication (Searle 2001b [1979]: 81).

Therefore an utterance meant literally is one where the S speaks with full sincerity, the H

can clearly see literal indexical relationships between the semantic elements and the

contextually dependent elements available in the utterance, and the assumption the S

makes is generally true in respect to all similar objects (Searle 2001b [1979]: 79-81).

Figurative language is understood to be antithetical to literal claims. It provides a

distortion, an intentional vagueness, which allows a S’s implicit meaning to be poetically

inferred from an otherwise literally explicit statement (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 56).

Irony, as a subset of satire, is often communicated through humorous utterances. Pride

and Prejudice can be viewed as a seminal example of the combination of humor, irony

and satire. These three types of figurative language are often construed to share

similarities as well as differences, and similarities are interwoven in several ways, shown

in the following discussion. This study contends that verbal irony is defined as when a S

intentionally aims to relay an intended meaning for the H’s uptake through duality. This

understanding of verbal irony is based on the demarcations from prominent scholars

discussed in section 2.4 on verbal irony (e.g. Muecke, 1980 [1969]; Hutchens 1960;

Leech & Short, 2007). Take the case of the following illustration: There are two close

friends, and one is a vegetarian. One day, the vegetarian went to her friend’s home to

have dinner. When the vegetarian arrived, the friend, aware of her vegetarianism, asked:

“We have two options tonight, chicken or pork. Which do you prefer?” The S is using

verbal irony because he is aware that his friend is a vegetarian, yet the S offers only meat

for dinner options. This particular verbal irony is intended as humor between the two

friends, therefore the figurative meaning intended for the H from the S will be construed

by the H as a joke.

Humorology, the study of humor has defined attempted definition of humor as akin

to seeing something as laughable or amusing and it has a variety of uses (Simpson, 2003).

Simpson notes humor’s various functions according to two different taxonomies of

humor. One is Basu’s classification, that humor is at first a “social lubricant” designed to

ease tension between people. Secondly, humor acts as a social “friction” to make

bluntness and criticism less antagonistic. Thirdly, it serves as social “glue” which binds

people together through its construction of an uninhibited and stimulating environment

(Basu qtd. in Simpson, 2003: 3-4). It allows taboo subjects to be communicated in a safe

way, and the S to retreat from what they have been saying should the topic appear

incommunicable among the present company. In another categorization taken from Ziv,

humor has five functions: aggressive, sexual, social, defensive, and intellectual, of which

three in combination provide satire (in Simpson, 2003: 3).

Satire is a discourse which is used to expose the follies and vices of others and is

often communicated through humor and irony. Simpson notes that satire manages to

combine three of Ziv’s functions of humor, the aggressive, the social and the intellectual,

and carry them out simultaneously (Simpson, 2003: 3-4, 52). The aggressive function

occurs through the fact that a “victim” is singled out and targeted by a satirist along with

generated feelings of superiority (Simpson, 2003: 3). In fact Ajtony notes that those who

employ satire, humor, and irony are “usually acknowledged to occupy higher hierarchical

positions” (2010: 249). This effect is observed in Mr. Darcy, who holds a higher position

in society. His verbal irony exerts his perceived superiority over others for their lack of

social station. However, our research of Pride and Prejudice suggests Atjony’s argument

is not always the case, as seen in Elizabeth. Elizabeth is lower in social standing than Mr.

Darcy, yet she does not hesitate in directing verbal irony and humor towards him from the

perspective of a higher moral standard. Thus, Mr. Darcy asserts his social superiority and

Elizabeth establishes her moral superiority.

Satire is also characterized by Ziv’s social function, for satire may be employed for

maintaining “intra- and inter-group bonds” (Simpson, 2003: 3). As noted, humor provides

an intellectual function; by being nonsensical, satire provides relaxation from everyday

rationality, along with a release of inhibition through laughter (Simpson, 2003: 17). For

satire to work, four pre-conditions must be met, setting, method, uptake, and target.

Simpson lays out four model components of satire:

Setting: Refers to the potential knowledge base of the satirist’s audience, referred to

as the “satiree,” which is generally derived from a principle reference point involving

culture, beliefs, knowledge, or attitude (Simpson, 2008: 188).

Method: The way in which the utterance is delivered; once the locus of the humor

has been identified, it can be delivered through over exaggeration, the ridiculing of

current assumptions, a reversal of values or any of a number of methods such as

irony (Simpson, 2003: 70).

Uptake: The effect that the satirical utterance will have on the satiree, partially

dependent on the ability of the satiree to infer the meaning of the satirist’s address

(Simpson, 2003: 70).

Target: An event, person, experience, or text which a satiree identifies in uptake as

the victim of the attack (Simpson, 2003: 71).

In this model, the setting element recognized is the context, which frames the target and

method. The supporting components of the semantic aspect of an utterance and its

content are derived from the context. Finally, the uptake is exacted by the satiree, with

successful completion of the satiree’s inference, exacted through the means of the

satirist’s target and intention.

It may suffice to say that the satirist’s skill at setting is of particular importance in

order to secure the satiree’s successful uptake. This notion of pre-conditions and the

model itself suggests that the setting has significant applications for its use in humor,

particularly when humor is being displayed through allusions (Simpson, 2003: 70). The

focus on allusion and uptake renders this model valuable for both humor and verbal

irony, for the uptake is an essential element in figurative language. Without the

knowledge of what the humorist is alluding to, the statement will not have any impact on

the H, suggesting that humor, and thus verbal irony and satire, will experience challenges

to successful uptake among uninitiated H(s) (Simpson, 2008: 188). To elucidate the

uptake of verbal irony by a H, the primary interest for this study, the SMUT model is

useful in that it necessitates the rationale of the perlocutionary act of an ironical

utterance, hinging upon the S’s allusion (for echoic allusions, see section 2.4.2).

Mentioned previously, humor, irony and satire can appear in conjunction; the use of

one form of figurative language may also display another, either advertently or

inadvertently. Simpson states satire is “ultimately an ironic, non-literal reading of a text,”

thus suggesting, but not concluding, that without irony satire is non-existent (2008: 188).

Furthermore, satire is considered a form of verbal humor, from which one can extrapolate

that satire is non-existent without either humor or irony. Ajtony notes that when ironical

utterances contain humorous connotations, criticism, communicated through the ironical

utterance, is displayed in a milder form (2010: 253), thus making it more palatable to the

one it has been perpetrated upon. Juez refers to the work of Brown and Levinson who

suggested that when irony is used in this way it can be thought of as an Off Record

politeness strategy (1995: 25). Ajtony (2008; 2010) also references Brown and

Levinson’s work asserting that the combination of irony and humor allows the ironist to

claim common ground with the interlocutor, while still showing aggression, albeit in a

limited form.

These three forms of communication are entwined and contain beguiling

similarities, but these similarities can also be the point of difference among the three.

First, verbal irony and satire are intentional, while verbal humor may be unintentional, for

example through a slip-of-the-tongue, or an unintentional allusion to something that

amuses listeners (Simpson, 2003: 17). However, humor can also be intentionally overt; it

is meant to be detected by the H, while verbal irony, and in certain cases satire, can

employ a mask of clandestineness. From this concept the paper concludes that verbal

irony, satire, and humor can all be intentional at times, showing their similarity. Among

these three, humor could be construed as the most encompassing or broadest form, due to

its intentional manifestation and inclusion of distinct phenomena such as irony. Humor is

often considered generic and the phenomena of which it is composed are all lumped

under that general term humor, despite differentiations. In all, most scholars consider

humor complex and even ineffable (Attardo, 2001: 167).

Due to humor’s generality, satirists often create fictional worlds containing

assumptions that either parody or contrast the audience’s assumptions about the real

world for the sake of amusement (Thornborrow & Wareing, 2000: 136). Particularly

comic and absurd works can center on entirely satirical worlds that have been created to

make fun of our own. The novel Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (Twain, 1994) [1885]

provides a prime example of a satirical work that does not parody society to an extreme

extent, although the satirizing of society is evident in the juxtaposition of the two main

characters, Huck Finn and Jim. Mark Twain’s famous novel attempts to comment upon

the hypocrisy of society for holding slaves captive against their own will, yet the same

treatment of a white child is considered immoral. Twain does not stray far from the real

world in which he writes his story, yet emphasizes this particular aspect of society in

order to mock those antiquated views of slavery, carrying ironical connotations. While

satire typically makes a mockery of the world, irony is more dualistic in its

interpretations.

Irony’s complexities render it difficult to be defined within “the formula of a

satirical reversal of values” (Leech & Short, 2007: 225), suggesting that satire is simply a

reversal of thinking about the world while irony is dualistically layered (Muecke, 1980

[1969]; Wilson & Sperber, 1992). In short, “irony can be pressed into service for satirical

purposes” yet remains apart from satire in its nature (Simpson, 2003: 52). This thinking

posits that while irony can be looked upon as a subset of satire, and by implication

humor, it is perhaps the most complex. This could be construed as being due to the fact

that as with humor, satire is meant to be noticed by the H, yet it may be that irony is

intended for the private enjoyment of the ironist. Thus, irony’s simultaneous infusion and

separation with satire and humor makes for an intricate subject for observation.

The following sections provide an explication of the central theories identified by

this study for the analysis of verbal irony through the H’s uptake meant by the S.

Therefore the H’s uptake of verbal irony must be verified through the perlocutionary act,

the effect on the interlocutor. According to the theories of verbal irony explained below,

the echoic account offers echoic allusions to assess the impact of the verbal irony on the

H and determine how the H understands the figurative meaning. Echoic theory is an

integral part of the data analysis and an overview of the theory is provided, but further

explanation of the utilization of echoic theory for the analytical framework is presented in

Chapter 3. Theories borrowed from humorology for the analysis of verbal irony will also

be included after the explication of echoic theory in section 2.4.3. Humorology is a

discipline which incorporates valuable theories applicable to verbal irony; these theories’

ability to successfully analyze verbal irony will be discussed in the last part of this

section.

2.4.2 Echoic Theory: Corroborating Hearer Uptake

The echoic theory from Wilson and Sperber (2012) is crucial for substantiating the

H’s uptake of irony, analyzing the echo found within the effect upon the H intended by

the S, the perlocutionary act. Comprehension of echoic theory necessitates an

understanding of a concept of verbal irony also put forth by Wilson and Sperber (2002),

relevance theory. Often a S uses relevance in a manner so as to interpret his idea towards

something that was previously thought or said. Sperber and Wilson claim that “when

interpretations achieve relevance in this way, we will say that they are echoic, and . . .

cases of echoic interpretation” (1995: 238). Sperber and Wilson (1995) assert only that

which is relevant should be communicated to ensure understanding. Relevance theory is

further enhanced by Wilson and Sperber’s (2002) claim that the most advantageous form

of communication to both parties is that of optimal relevance; the S will constrain his or

her utterances only to those ideas which cannot be independently inferred by the H. The

necessity for relevance is supported by Giora and Fein, who find that ironies which are

familiar have less processing time than unfamiliar ironies that are not in the H’s “mental

lexicon” (1999: 253). Distinguishing between verbal irony and literal speech acts requires

a greater cognitive understanding than some other types of figurative language (Wilson,

2009: 190). The thought of the S should be expressed in a way that requires the least

processing effort by the H (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 233). This minimized processing

effort should then have a greater cognitive effect of enhancing the mutual cognitive

environment between the S and H and provide better understanding to lead the H to the

next necessary action.

By making the utterance less explicit, a S “invites the hearer to search for an

interpretation of possible relevance,” as when the S uses verbal irony he invites the H to

discern his true meaning (Juez, 1995: 27). Although Grice contends that such figurative

language breaks the maxim of relevance, in that a H will have to search for the intended

meaning, this paper also gives weight to Sperber and Wilson’s alternative view. Their

viewpoint is that provided the seemingly irrelevant utterances are truly in themselves

expressive of opinion or thought of the S then the utterance itself is still relevant (Sperber

& Wilson in Juez, 1995: 27). Consequently the relevance maxim is not violated by

figurative language or implicatures. It is therefore note-worthy that the most optimally

relevant utterance of a thought is not necessarily its most literal one. Alternatively, a

metaphorical or ironical utterance may allow the H to infer the thoughts of the S more

easily.

Relevance is often achieved through informing one person what another says or

thinks; in many cases the information conveyed by the S is more of an interpretation of

someone else’s thought or speech, which is relevant to the S’s own meaning. Verbal irony

is often displayed through such interpretation, which Wilson and Sperber (2012) deem

echoic. Wilson and Sperber (2012) call irony a kind of echoic allusion of which an

ironical utterance is credited to some previously existing idea, such as another’s thought

or utterance or even a social norm. Consider the utterance “when in Rome” as an echoic

allusion. This interjection is part of a statement, “When in Rome do as the Romans do,”

but it can be construed in various contexts outside of Rome. The S re-expresses the idea

using a similar verbal substance, but the idea is implicitly dissociated from the S at that

present time or accredited to someone else entirely. However, the utterance is spoken in

such a way to convey that the ironist believes it to be ridiculous in its untruthfulness,

deficiency, or otherwise unreasonably suited moment when it is said (Wilson, 2006:

1724).

In their discussion of verbal irony, Wilson and Sperber (1992) suggest echoic theory

works better than the traditional interpretation of irony to explain the rationale for irony

as a figurative form. The findings of Giora et al. support the echoic account, for the

authors discover that the most easily understood ironies are those in which the echoes are

the most “accessible” for the H, whether or not the verbal irony is relayed explicitly or

implicitly (2005: 35). Thus, echoic irony may be the most relevant way to express irony

in order for a S to convey his or her figurative meaning to the H (Giora et. al., 2005;

Hussein, 2009: 801-802). Wilson and Sperber identify three problematic situations,

ironical under/overstatement, ironical quotation, and ironical interjection as locations

where irony exists but cannot be explained in the traditional sense as saying the opposite

of what is meant (1992: 54-56). Remember that overstatement is often related to

hyperbole, meaning the S’s description of something is tougher or more robust than is

called for, whereas understatement is often related to litotes, meaning the S’s description

is less robust or weaker than it should be (Habermann, 2003: 30). The ironical quotation

may be a direct or indirect quotation of an original utterance, utilized to emphasize the

figurative meaning (Lennon, 2011: 81-82). The solution to this view is echoic theory,

where irony is defined as mentioning or interpreting some previously existing assumption

in an utterance but truly conveying some meaning which conflicts with its literal

understanding. So, how does echoic theory work to explicate what traditional accounts of

irony cannot?

Part of the echoic account, mention, for example, serves to convey a viewpoint

credited to someone other than the S and apply it to ironical quotations, which can seem

ironical without inferring opposites. Ironical quotations can devise their irony from using

an utterance to echo a remark about some ideal circumstance which in effect is

understood to express disappointment on the part of the S. Ironical quotations do not so

much “deny a claim” but act “to make fun of the sentiments that gave rise to it” (Wilson

& Sperber, 1992: 55). Echoic mention also works in this way to give reason on how to

understand ironical interjections, which contain no proposition or element with which

opposition can be measured (Wilson & Sperber, 1992: 55). Where traditional accounts of

irony fail, echoic theory provides compelling rationale.

Echoic mention is a narrow aspect under the broader concept of echoic

interpretation, which works to illustrate how ironical utterances disclose what Wilson and

Sperber call an interpretive resemblance to an existing assumption that the S holds but

which is characteristically exaggerated (1992: 63). This definition ideally explains

ironical understatements and overstatements. When a S utters an under/overstatement, it

is not to convey an opposite view, but to draw some emphasis around an event; the S’s

meaning is actually quite similar to the literal meaning of the utterance although not to

the same degree or extreme. Herein, echoic allusion dissociates the S from an utterance,

proving through context that the utterance does not carry a literal meaning but refers to

some alternate state of mind without necessarily meaning the opposite (Wilson, 2006:

1722).

In line with this study, claimants of the echoic account purport that all verbal ironies

convey echoic allusion, and that the primary assumptions are found in abstract

conceptions or concrete evidential conversation (Lennon, 2011: 80-81). These primary

assumptions are composed of ideas or utterances, available everywhere, and referred to at

any chronological point preceding the echoic utterance. Sperber and Wilson state these

“many different degrees and types” of echo are:

immediate echoes, and others delayed; some have their source in actual utterances,

others in thoughts or opinions; some have a real source, others an imagined one;

some are traceable back to a particular individual, whereas others have a vaguer

origin. When the echoic character of the utterance is not immediately obvious, it is

nevertheless suggested. (1981: 309-310)

According to this theory, ironical utterances are those which allude to some previously

existing state or assumption, which could be as tangible as an articulated statement or as

abstract as a social conception. Echoic theory features a S’s dissociative attitude toward

an ironical utterance through “direct and indirect echo[es]” (Sperber & Wilson, 1998:

289). In saying the utterance, one can sense the S’s position expresses a kind of rejection

or cynicism (Wilson, 2006: 1730). The H’s ability to sense the S’s position rests fully on

an understanding of relevance; the H will form an interpretation of an utterance spoken

by the S’s reference regarding something the S has in mind or has heard someone say and

the S holds a certain attitude to that utterance which thus is interpreted by the H. The S’s

interpretation of the referent utterance can be a relevantly implicit expression dependent

upon the meaning it conveys about the S’s opinion (Sperber & Wilson, 1995: 238-239). In

these cases of echoic interpretation, comprehension of verbal irony relies on the relevant

attitude of the S at the moment of the utterance compared to the assumptions the

utterance literally alludes to and in turn the uptake of the H. Therefore, this study

proposes that in an ironical utterance an echoic allusion is the perlocutionary act, the S’s

intention of the speech act upon the H. Study of echoic theory will enhance the

identification of verbal irony in Pride and Prejudice with regard to some of the

originating predications, where notions of social standing and gender roles within the

Regency-era society contribute to echoic allusions in the speech acts of the characters.

2.4.3 Theories of Humorology: Relief, Incongruity, Superiority

Moving on with the focus of verbal irony, this study examines verbal irony through

theories of humorology. Humorology is a distinctive discipline relevant to identifying

irony’s multidimensional characteristics and the manifold ways in which it manifests. The

comprehensiveness of humorology provides an ideal assessment of verbal irony, with

which other apparatuses cannot equate. Humor’s general particularities fall specifically

under the broad scope of humorology, an applicable approach from which we will

specifically analyze verbal irony.

Figurative language in its many forms crosses paths. Pride and Prejudice carries out

its verbal irony often in conjunction with humor. Humor is an elusive but tangible feeling

that many have attempted to force into taxonomies and define (Buijzen & Valkenburg,

2004: 147). Hitherto the one thing that all scholars have agreed on is that humor is nearly

impossible to define other than abstractly; as Attardo notes, humor is an “all-

encompassing category, covering any event or object that elicits laughter” (1994: 4). He

also warns of the complexities, although some scholars classify humor as a simplistic

form of figurative language. He provides a “definition of humor as a competence, that is,

something that speakers know how to do, without knowing how and what they know”

and that dividing humor into sub-classifications is futile (Attardo, 1994: 2).

Nevertheless, scholars have tried to disambiguate what humor is and does. The

academic community holds a common view of characteristics inherent within humor, one

in particular being laughter; Polimeni and Reiss describe it can be seen as an individual to

have a tendency to be amused by cognitive experiences and often provokes laughter and

smiles (2006: 347-348). Researchers have taken humor to be classified into “three

branches”: “relief,” “incongruity,” and “superiority” (Krikmann, 2006: 28). This section

illuminates the three theories and emphasizes the definitional problems with trying to use

any of them as a coverall. Attardo says that humor and irony as differentials point out that

they are difficult to define: “in neither case can the subclasses of these phenomena be

kept distinct” (2001: 165).

Humor can be considered like a forest where all you can see are the individual trees

within (figurative linguistic phenomena found in humor); one must step back to see the

whole forest (humor) through the trees. Note that the ambiguity of humor is a unique tool

that is not confined to a specific model or theory, and by substitution can be considered

unadulterated by bias, thus its ability to approach discourse analysis without a rigid

model works in a truly pragmatic manner.

2.4.3.1 Relief Theory

Relief theory uses physiological parameters that point to laughter as a biological

control mechanism, particularly a homeostatic mechanism, which reduces tension and

stress. In other words, humor provides cathartic relief. Relief theory posits that humor

may serve to relieve fear and that laughter and mirth work together in conjunction to

relieve the cognitive and physical tensions and stresses, literally in a physiological

manner when caused by fear (Bardon, 2005: 9). Relief theory also conjectures that humor

allows for the expression of societal taboos and other social norms hidden or otherwise

concealed desires inherent in the human nature (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004: 147-148).

To provide an example of relief theory’s argument of why humor is used, take a macabre

subject in which social taboos and norms are crossed such as mentioning suicide.

Typically, suicide is considered outside of social bounds for discussion, yet a person who

holds a strong opinion against going to a crowded store on a Saturday might say, “I

would rather kill myself than go to the store today.” The humor makes light of a typically

serious reference, suicide, to display an exaggerated meaning that a person does not wish

to go to the store.

2.4.3.2 Incongruity theory

The incongruity theory of humor posits that humor is perceived in a situation when

the realization or understanding (an epiphany) brings to light an incongruity between one

entity or conception involved in a specific context and another which in connection to

that entity or conception has a certain type of contradictory relation. In other words, there

is an inconsistency, oddness, fallacy, insincerity, etc. that in its incongruity activates

humor within us. The concept of incongruity can be traced back to philosophers Aristotle

and Kant. Kant viewed humor as the realization of an inherent incongruity between an

original perspective and a newly realized perspective (in Norrick, 2003). The laughter

that arises from the realization of the incongruity is simply an expression of the

understood incongruity (Schopenhauer in Morreall, 1987).

This paper recognizes that irony shares this characteristic of incongruity found in

humor, and thus the theory will be applied to the analysis of verbal irony. Scholars such

as Muecke (1980) [1969] and Wright (1969) posit that the concept of incongruity is a

necessary condition for verbal irony. Simpson concurs that irony can be considered

“incongruity-inducing” to create a form of “oppositional irony” (2003: 94-95). The

duality is created through the juxtaposition of the figurative and literal meanings that are

at odds. When a H realizes the apparent incongruity in a S’s utterance, the H can respond

accordingly to show the S the figurative meaning was realized. For example, when Julie’s

husband ate six slices of pie after eating dinner, Julie asked him “Do you like my pie?”

Her husband responded, “It’s not too bad. I think I would like to have another slice.” In

this example, observe the perlocutionary effect of Julie’s verbal irony through the

husband’s response, acknowledging his uptake of the irony in the wife’s rhetorical

intention of the question.

Incongruity-resolution theory is an extension of incongruity theory, proposing two

stages of the incongruity, discernment and resolution (Shultz, 1976; Suls, 1972). The

incongruity-resolution theory argues that the humor is not found in the incongruity itself,

but in the resolution of the perceived incongruity. The resolution phase is vital to the

recognition of humor, as the acknowledgment of incongruity alone is insufficient to

create humor expected in a text or statement. Through recognition of its existence and

purpose of the incongruity, and by indirect means how the dilemma can be resolved is

how incongruity theory works (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004: 148). These incongruities as

concurrent combinations brought about with sudden understanding of a problem’s

resolution, which can be seen as a cognitive shift is the solution to the incongruity

perceived. Incongruity-resolution theory, as an advanced explication of the original

incongruity theory, emphasizes the perlocutionary act of an ironical utterance, making it

more valuable for this study. Therefore, take note that any reference to “incongruity

theory” in this paper includes the concepts from incongruity-resolution theory as well, in

essence utilizing the inherent idea of the perlocutionary act within the incongruity of an

ironical utterance.

2.4.3.3 Superiority theory

The superiority theory of humor can be attributed to Socrates, through his Socratic

Method of teaching by posing questions to those who believe themselves wise. Socrates

feigned ignorance as a way to make his pupils understand that their own logic could

indeed be proven illogical, therefore illuminating the pupils’ ignorance (Muecke, 1980

[1969]: 87-88; Ferrari, 2008: 10-11). The gist of superiority theory is that a person laughs

and finds humor in the misfortunes and hardships of others (Buijzen & Valkenburg, 2004:

147-148). Laughter has been considered a societal disruption, according to Morreall, and

it is based on the notion of superiority to serve as a method of social correction (2009: 8).

Irony within different contexts can often take the form of sarcastic remarks and humorous

undertones. The theory of superiority has ties especially with ironic humor due to the fact

that there is often a person in a position of power that has a victim who is inferior,

whether it be socially, economically, intelligently, educationally, materialistically, or

emotionally (Juez, 1995: 25–29). Ajtony supports this view that satire, humor and irony

are all manifestations of affirming superiority over another person (2010: 249). This idea

is also in line with Muecke’s explanation of self-disparaging irony, or in essence the

ironist “is present . . . in disguise” in order to position the object of his irony as flawed

(1980 [1969]: 87). Superiority theory holds weight in the analysis of verbal irony, for

critical irony in essence is a method for imposing superiority over the H (Dynel, 2013:

312-313). A specific manifestation of the principles of superiority theory provides a more

in-depth analysis considering the dynamic nature of ironical exchange within a dialogue,

particularly the nature of ironical exchange between the two characters in this study, Mr.

Darcy and Elizabeth.

Banter Principle

Leech conceptualized the “banter principle,” which has explanatory power for

verbal irony (1983: 144). The banter principle for verbal irony is parallel with superiority

theory for humor in that humor is made at the expense of the H. The banter principle, as

observed in this research, falls under the umbrella of the Superiority Theory of Humor,

for it is used to target individuals at their own expense. However, the case of the banter

principle is an example of how such negative utterances can be used in a polite manner

rather than impolite. Leech illustrates that Grice’s communicative principle may be

violated for the purpose of politeness (in Habermann, 2003: 30). One such specific form

that is closely tied to irony is what Leech has termed the banter principle. He defines it as

such: “a form of under-politeness or mock-impoliteness. It is an offensive way of being

friendly, typically used in conversation with those to whom one is close. In banter

utterances we have two layers of meaning: the surface layer of impoliteness and the

proper layer of politeness” (Leech, 1983: 144). Leech’s explanation reveals how verbal

irony and his banter principle are closely related.

Nowik points out that although banter may be connected with irony it does not

necessarily have to always be ironical (2005: 157). The common ground between

superiority theory and the banter principle is that the ironist has some type of supremacy

over their inferior object. Within Pride and Prejudice, Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth have

many conversations in which their banter entails irony, and Mr. Darcy’s ironic banter

nonetheless is still composed of egotistical superior speech. For instance, we find banter

in Mr. Darcy’s response to Elizabeth when she asks him about revealing their engagement

to Lady Catherine de Bourgh: “I am more likely to want more time than courage,

Elizabeth. But it ought to be done, and if you will give me a sheet of paper, it shall be

done directly” (Austen, 2003: 361). Besides, one can also see superiority in their ironical

conversations without banter, especially when Mr. Darcy uses his social class as a way to

show he is superior to others through his ironies. For instance, when Elizabeth accuses

Mr. Darcy of being vain and proud, he retorts: “Yes, vanity is a weakness indeed. But

pride—where there is a real superiority of mind, pride will be always under good

regulation” (Austen, 2003: 56). The superiority theory functions as a way to examine

verbal irony when the two characters express their opposition upfront, while the

comparable banter principle manages to capture the characteristics of Elizabeth and Mr.

Darcy’s civil and friendly irony.

The superiority theory and the banter principle each work well in the explication of

Mr. Darcy’s and Elizabeth’s verbal irony, for each encapsulates a particular characteristic

of their ironical exchanges throughout the plot. Superiority theory, although intended for

humor, this study contends, is also essential for analyzing verbal irony. Verbal irony can

be characterized by the S attempting to exert his or her dominance over a H(s), or the

banter principle which utilizes impoliteness on the surface to execute politeness. Irony

can be found within all three theories of humorology: relief, incongruity, and superiority.

However, relief theory is not utilized in this paper’s framework due to its generality in

terms of explanatory power. Relief theory is concerned only with humor and laughter at

the expense of another, and does not offer the dynamic view of verbal irony that

incongruity and superiority theories do.

Now, the discussion turns to the functions of verbal irony. Understanding the

functions of verbal irony helps to explain how ironical utterances can be used to achieve

a particular goal or end, and the data analysis will incorporate some of the functions to

explain ways in which characterization occurs.

2.5 Functions of Verbal Irony

This paper provides explanations of verbal irony’s various functions, including the

positive and negative associations with each function. The positive or negative

connotations of a particular ironical utterance may be in part subjective, depending on

whether the person applying the opinion is the ironist or the object that the ironical

utterance is directed towards. In its simplest form, irony acts purely as a means of

emphasis, even potentially providing greater clarity in communication (Hutcheon, 1992:

222). Where irony activates the literal meaning of the utterance it can be informative,

allowing the H to discern the underlying intention of the utterance beyond semantics

(Giora, 1998: 11). For example, a suggestion to a good friend to change her same old hair

style over years by stating, “You should wear that hairstyle more often.” This emphatic

function of irony is associated with rhetorical irony—an answer is not requisite

(Hutcheon, 1992: 222). Irony used in this way is often considered to contain positive

connotations, often being used for witty purposes, to display surprise and humor (Giora,

1998: 11).

By contrast Kotthoff states that irony can also function in the opposite way to that

mentioned above, thus praise uttered as criticism appears somewhat muted (2003: 1390).

This function of irony may also contain humorous mechanisms, for example if a dinner

guest, having just enjoyed a wonderful meal, were to describe the food as “something

simple out of a can again” it would not only show their praise to their host/cook but also

provide humor at the dinner party (Kotthoff, 2003: 1390). However, certain functions of

irony are context-dependent and more likely to be understood within similar cultural

backgrounds or social groupings. Thus one function of irony is to create a sense of social

cohesion, and to reinforce a sense of social grouping (Giora, 1998: 11; Kotthoff, 2003:

1400; Hutcheon, 1992: 230). This theory would observe that irony does not create the

social grouping itself—it simply reinforces it, and irony is made possible by the existence

of communities (Hutcheon, 1992: 230). However, irony may create a sense of community

between the S and H (Xia Dengshan, 2011; Booth, 1974; Hutcheon, 1994; Gibbs &

Colston, 2001: 190-191). In Pride and Prejudice, Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth began their

volatile relationship as two antagonistic parties battling against each other, forming a

community between themselves from the onset, reinforced over time through verbal

irony.

The positive connotation of irony in this function is not to be underestimated;

Straehle has suggested that we often “tease people who we know quite well” and seem to

prefer the company of these people (qtd. in Kotthoff, 2003: 1400). Irony’s reinforcement

of this social grouping, possibly giving rise to such social markers as in-jokes, is an

important indicator of human social activities. It also provides social groups with a way

to criticize others’ opinions without being apparent and causing social division (Kotthoff,

2003: 1400). However, muted criticism or criticism uttered within socially acceptable

bounds are often said to display the irony in its function as a distancing mechanism.

Hutcheon remarks that this air of detachment on the part of the ironist often carries

negative nuances, as it can suggest either a desire for control or a lack of commitment

and engagement. However, distancing could also be interpreted as seeking to display a

new perspective on a situation where only distance can provide a new angle (Hutcheon,

1992: 223). Distancing also offers the ironist the means to remove himself from the

utterance, and either claim the utterance as having humorous intent or being

misunderstood should it prove to be controversial. This is also referred to by Hutcheon as

an “evasive” function of irony (1992: 224).

Irony in its evasive function can be divided into an attacking and a defensive

function. The attacking function has long been used by those marginalized in society to

present contentious or subversive ideas. Giora (1998) observed that women regularly use

irony, particularly apparent within literature, in order to challenge cultural assumptions

about gender norms. Through such tropes criticism can be indirectly transmitted,

protected by a guise, which allows the criticism to be disowned should it become

necessary (Giora, 1998: 10). The evasive function of irony at times could be difficult to

categorize as either a positive or negative form due to the “transideological” nature of the

irony (Hutcheon, 1992: 228). Transideological refers to the notion that contingent upon

the cause, ideology will shift depending on the person whose opinion is applied for. Thus,

a feminist female may have very different views on an ironical utterance that appears to

criticize the way women are perceived in her society than the views that a man may hold.

Hutcheon defines the views surrounding an ideology as “oppositional” and “offensive”

(1992: 228). However she states that oppositional is a positive label attached to our own

ironical utterances regarding things of which we disapprove; conversely offensive is often

the “negative way of referring to ironies which are aimed at things we support”

(Hutcheon, 1992: 228).

Oppositional irony in itself can be said to have positive connotations. In this case the

aim of the irony is normally to correct, or “at least it suggests a positive set of values that

one is correcting towards” (Hutcheon, 1992: 226). Hutcheon offers satire as prime

example of this, which has aims towards correction of the shortcomings of society and

human nature. She also mentions that in this case there is often a use of irony in order to

draw attention to and mock shortcomings, in the hope of their correction. Offensive irony,

by contrast may often appear in a “bitter and scornful” form, because it is not expected to

yield a result and thus transmits as unpleasant (Hutcheon, 1992: 228). Jane Austen as

observed uses oppositional irony as a positive way to satirize society and draw attention

to its shortcomings, highlighting the need for change.

Finally the defensive aspect of the evasive function of irony is also regularly used by

marginalized groups (Hutcheon, 1992: 225). Powerless groups have sometimes resorted

to using self-deprecating irony as a form of defense. This irony will signal their self-

positioning, often in accordance with the views of the rest of the world, in order to avoid

criticism. This paper offers as an example a woman who holds the view of gender

inequality, where she may ironically claim that she is unable to walk as quickly as a man

in order to emphasize the societal bias against women. Thus, as Hutcheon states, self-

deprecation and self-protection could be said to be “two sides of the same coin” (1992:

225).

The final section of the literature review below focuses on previous research related

to this study specifically on verbal irony and analyses of verbal irony within Pride and

Prejudice. The previous research section begins with a broader look at the utilization of

theories of verbal irony for the purposes of this study. The second part focuses on studies

of the verbal irony found within Pride and Prejudice, and how the verbal irony functions

for both Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth to carry out Jane Austen’s purposes of characterization

for her two protagonists.

2.6 Previous Research on Verbal Irony

This section will survey previous research relevant to our focus on verbal irony. The

previous studies are focused on understanding verbal irony and verbal humor, a central

concept under which verbal irony can be found. The methodological approaches offer a

valuable look into the utilization of existing theories for defining an often-elusive

concept, verbal humor, which is similarly subjective and difficult to identify as verbal

irony. Several studies discussed below in the second section are directly related to our

study of verbal irony in Pride and Prejudice, and are useful for understanding the

purpose of this research and the analytical methods employed. Our comments and

criticisms of the previous research that lead to the analytical framework will be included

in the discussion.

2.6.1 Elucidating Verbal Irony

According to Gorman, many scholars have contributed to the rich repertoire of

literary analysis that utilizes the techniques of speech act theory in the study of discourse

(1999: 94-95). Kumon-Nakamura, Glucksburg and Brown’s (1995) study on discourse

irony attempted to classify verbal irony through speech act theory. The authors combine

echoic and pretense theories of verbal irony to form the new allusional pretense theory

for discourse irony. The main elements of pretense theory build upon the ironist as a

pretender, someone who feigns a positive posturing when masking a negative one (or

vice versa), creating an “asymmetry of affect” (Clark & Gerrig, 1984: 122). The

figurative meaning of the irony comes forth through an utterance which is spoken with

insincerity, where the S is pretending to be something that is not really the case. The

allusional pretense theory posits that ironical statements allude to a failed expectation of

some event or situation, and is characterized by pragmatic insincerity (Kumon-Nakamura

et al., 1995: 7). Thus, ironical utterances may be identified by their allusions, or

references to the failed expectation held by the S. Their study asserts that echoic

allusions, derived from echoic theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1981), can regularly be found

in verbal irony, although not all verbal ironies are characterized by an explicit echo, a

concept also supported by Morini (2010). Both Kumon-Nakamura et al. and Morini claim

that the echoic theory of verbal irony was limited; Kumon-Nakamura et al. specifically

criticized echoic theory in that it only allowed for the analysis of assertive speech acts.

Kumon-Nakamura et al. claim that declarations may in fact be ironical “when it violates

the felicity condition that a declaration can only be made by someone with the authority

to make it” (1995: 20). This contention supports our argument that the declaration

classification should be expanded for reclassification (see section 3.1.1 for our new

classification).

In order to resolve the exclusiveness of the existing echoic theory, Kumon-

Nakamura et al.’s (1995) study adapted the theory of discourse irony by innovatively

formulating a hybrid theory which incorporated pretense and echoic theories to classify

verbal irony using multiple categories of speech acts, not only assertive speech acts. Our

research attempts to incorporate a modified speech act theory to offer a more inclusive

understanding of verbal irony, expanding upon Kumon-Nakamura et al.’s study. Kumon-

Nakamura et al. use speech act theory to classify ironical utterances but they do not offer

any clear explanation of how to examine irony through speech act techniques. We seek to

take their research a step further and explain why an expanded speech act theory is useful

for addressing the deficiencies of Searle’s original taxonomy.

Livnat (2003) focuses her study of verbal irony on echoic interpretation depicted by

the appositional structure of an utterance. For example, “Her brother, a straight-A

student, was disappointed to find he only got a B+ on his blood type test.” The

appositional structure is characterized by the phrase offset by two commas, highlighting

the echoic allusion within the utterance, which is to the brother’s typical straight-A marks

on tests. Livnat analyzes ironical utterances from Hebrew newspapers, which were

translated into English for the purpose of analysis in her paper (2003: 73). Through the

echoic interpretations and incongruences of the ironical utterances, Livnat shows echoic

interpretations may explicitly or implicitly allude to some previous concept, statement, or

situation. She notes that the echoic interpretation may be in reference to something of

recent history, or a vague allusion to an ancient concept. Her study contends that the

syntactic structure of an utterance is vital to understanding its verbal irony. We support

the understanding that the appositional structure of an utterance can aid in the

comprehension of verbal irony as an echo. The appositional structure emphasizes the

echoic allusion within the utterance, making echoic theory significant in the interpretation

of discourse irony.

Liu’s (2005) and Wu’s (2009) doctoral research on verbal humor provides an

important forefront for research on verbal irony, a manifestation of verbal humor. Each

scholar’s research centers on creating an enhanced method for analyzing verbal humor,

specifically through incorporating multiple existing theories to improve current

methodological approaches to analysis. Each study utilizes analytical methods rooted in

mathematics and statistics, offering a distinctive approach to understanding verbal humor.

Liu and Wu concentrate on jokes taken from textbooks for data analysis, however the

purposes of each study differs.

Liu’s research seeks to contribute to an overarching theory of humor, using a

mathematical approach to address the insufficiencies of two existing models, the

Semantic Script Theory of Humor (SSTH) from Raskin and the General Theory of Verbal

Humor (GTVH) from Attardo and Raskin, which come from the three main theories of

humorology: incongruity theory, release (relief) theory, and superiority theory (2005: 20).

SSTH is built from the incongruity-resolution concept by purporting that the

“oppositeness” and “overlap” of the scripts, or knowledge base, are necessary conditions

for incongruity (Liu, 2005: 27). The GTVH is an expansion of SSTH, expanding the

concept of script to incorporate six different knowledge bases to create the context for

humor, which are language, narrative strategy, target, situation, logical mechanism, and

script opposition (Liu, 2005: 36-38). Incorporating elements of these two existing

theories, Liu offers a new approach to understanding humor through a graph-theoretic

account of humor which he calls the Reduced Graph Model of Jokes (RGMJ) (2005: 11).

By utilizing mathematical and graphic methods, Liu aimed at a more inclusive

methodology for accurately classifying humor, specifically jokes. The limitations of

SSTH according to Liu were that it could only account for the distinction between jokes

and non-jokes, it was unable to identify degrees of humor, and it was only applicable to

jokes. As for GTVH, it is better equipped than its predecessor SSTH but still lacks a

deeper understanding of its main element of inclusiveness, the knowledge resources (Liu,

2005: 41).

Liu’s (2005) new model, RGMJ, incorporates the strengths of graph theory for the

interpretation of jokes; however Liu claims the model may easily be adapted for other

types of humorous texts, showcasing its utility. Each part of the graph (vertices and

edges) is representative of the joke, as vertices represent the main elements of the joke

and edges represent the inferences made from the information within the joke (Liu, 2005:

79-82). Although Liu’s test results demonstrate that verbal humor cannot easily be

understood through one methodological approach and attempts to further clarify humor

present additional questions, the usefulness of Liu’s work is that it highlights the

importance of quantitative methods of analysis for understanding figurative language.

From Liu’s study, we recognize the benefits of quantitative tests in addition to the

qualitative modes of analysis used to study verbal irony.

Wu’s (2009) study aims to identify how humor is interpreted; and specifically what

types of utterances can be considered humorous. The importance her study stresses is the

framework for classification of the data. Verbal humor in particular as a figurative form

of language is understood subjectively, and requires a clarification of how to correctly

classify jokes from literal utterances. Wu classifies jokes using the incongruity-resolution

method (IRM), accentuating that incongruity is an “indispensable element of humor” and

that humor is shown through the incongruities between the situation and reality (2009:

39). Incongruity is also an inherent element in verbal irony; therefore her use of the

incongruity-resolution theory will be applicable to the analysis of verbal irony and adds

value to our research. Wu collects data from Chinese students learning English as a

foreign language (EFL) through questionnaires about jokes taken from a textbook, and

subsequently tests the data using SPSS to analyze the results of the questionnaire. The

data analyzed assessed both the study subjects’ comprehension and appreciation of the

jokes to test for a correlation between the two variables. The results showed that there

was a correlation between the comprehension and appreciation of a joke, meaning for the

Chinese EFL students, the easier a joke was to understand, the funnier it was (Wu, 2009:

160). The Pearson’s Chi-squared test revealing correlation between two variables

suggests the usefulness of quantitative tests for examining figurative language, so this

concept is applied in our research for verbal irony. In Wu’s and Liu’s studies of verbal

humor, incongruity is also a main component of verbal irony (see section 2.4.3.2 for a

discussion of incongruity in humorology). Recognizing verbal irony through its

incongruity is a crucial element of our research on interpretation of verbal irony, and

Wu’s research highlights the necessity of this inclusion.

Xia’s (2011) study also provides great value to our research as it offers significance

for how to utilize conversational analysis. Xia’s work focuses on triadic conversations,

positing that traditional methods which overlook the role of a third party that is not

included in a dialogue fail to stress the effects of considering multiple H(s). Xia seeks to

modify the Communicative Responsibilities Theory (CRT), which explains the respective

roles of a S and H(s) within a conversation, and how much responsibility for levels of

communication each interlocutor has. The revised model of the CRT Xia proposes in his

study allows for the alternative roles played by multiple parties within a conversation,

and his data are taken from the renowned Chinese novel HongLouMeng (2011: 7). His

results show that the S in a conversation involving three parties still retains

responsibilities in order to ensure each H understands what the S intends him or her to

hear. Thus, Xia’s research highlights the role of third parties in determining how the S

will attempt to convey his or her meaning to the intended H(s) for the varying uptakes.

Xia’s concept is observed in our research; the use of dialogues including third parties is

essential to the understanding of characterization and plot development where the bond

found between Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth illustrates their community within verbal irony.

Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth speak with each other as their intended H(s), excluding the third

party’s presence to prolong their use of verbal irony in their own community.

2.6.2 Verbal Irony in Pride and Prejudice

Pride and Prejudice has garnered much attention for its thematic juxtaposition of

paradigms regarding marriage and gender, including the significance of Elizabeth’s

verbal irony to display the thematic views of Jane Austen (Moses, 2013). More attention

has been given to the satirical emphasis placed on those thematic ideals surrounding

notions of traditional gender roles and marriage (Bochman, 2005). Naturally, these

intrinsic themes which Austen utilizes provide the bases for the “moral transformation”

which takes place in the main protagonists, Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth (Geng, 1999: 138).

The character developments of both Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth are reflected in their

ironical exchange (Morini, 2009: 9). One proposition observed is the physical locations

of Mr. Darcy and Elizabeth that symbolize their developing relationship, which is the

closer Elizabeth moves to Mr. Darcy physically (i.e. towards his home at Pemberly), the

more she is able to realize his true character (McKenzie, 1980: 43). Elizabeth, the female

protagonist, has also attracted much attention from linguistic scholars for her pervasive

use of verbal irony and wit (Cai, 2010; Morgan, 1975; Greenfield, 2006). The symbolic

juxtaposition of the characters and settings in the novel has engendered scholarly interest

in the verbal irony Austen employs to carry out plot and characterization of Mr. Darcy

and Elizabeth (Phelan, 1987; Anderson, 1975; McCann, 1964). Pride and Prejudice has

become a prime case for the study of verbal irony (Fu, 2013; Jiang, 2011).

Other scholars have conducted studies on verbal irony which are directly related to

our research. These studies also utilize speech act theory, or concepts of relevance and

echoic allusion, with data drawn from Pride and Prejudice (e.g. Cai, 2010; Cook, 2005;

Zhao, 2010). Cai utilizes speech act theory in order to analyze Elizabeth’s direct and

indirect speech acts (verbal irony) to determine Elizabeth’s attitudes toward gender

norms. Several of the scholars address the deficiencies of Grice’s pragmatic theory—it is

too narrow in scope to allow for certain degrees of verbal irony as Grice’s irony is based

on its violation of the maxim of truthfulness. Using an approach including relevance

theory (Wilson & Sperber, 2002) and Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) echoic theory, Cook

highlights how verbal irony can be construed from the “relevance-theoretic perspective”

(2005: 20). Cook combines the fundamental concept that relevance is an essential

element of communication with the argument that irony is an echoic interpretation of a

S’s thought in order to elucidate the verbal irony within Pride and Prejudice. Zhao also

stresses the importance of relevance theory for the study of verbal irony in Pride and

Prejudice. Similar to Cook, Zhao contends that relevance theory is better suited for the

analysis of irony due to its assertion that context is crucial to the understanding of irony.

Cook’s (2005) study analyzes ironical utterances found within Pride and Prejudice

using three steps: first, acknowledging an utterance is echoing some preexisting idea;

second, finding the origination of the idea being echoed; and third, understanding the S’s

attitude toward the idea being echoed. Cook’s study is useful to show the analytical

strengths of echoic theory and the essential element of relevance. Although Zhao (2010)

and Cook’s studies both address concepts of echo and relevance, Zhao’s study displays

the relevance-theoretic perspective at work by merely illustrating the theory is functional.

Their research attempts to stretch relevance theory for application to situational irony, an

innovative approach. Pride and Prejudice contains an abundant amount of verbal irony

for data analysis, and the expansion of the scope of such to include situational irony may

be useful but would be better in a separate study for further development. The relevant literature surveyed above offers a basis for our research methodology and focus. When examining verbal irony, Pride and Prejudice has been a prominent source of data for researchers seeking to illuminate innovative methods for identifying and analyzing verbal irony. Our own research seeks to enhance the understanding of verbal irony by illustrating how the understanding of verbal irony is not the only answer to be sought, but that through understanding and interpreting verbal irony one may also become aware of its functionality within characterization, which offers significant clues to a text. The following chapter synthesizes the major theories discussed throughout Chapter 2 as the theoretical basis to form our analytical framework.