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The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the name of Koha Ditorë. With the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org. - 1 - Koha Digest # 106 FRONT PAGE: THE RESOLUTION OF THE ELECTIONS DATE: 5 June 1996 EDITORIAL THE DEMOCRACY OF THE THIRD WORLD by VETON SURROI Democracy won, the West won and the Albanians won. Thus were the elections commented, with capital letters, hundreds of times during these past days, from the ordinary apparatchiks who under different conditions, if ordered differently, would celebrate the victory of the Socialists - up to the people who claimed the above deeply convinced in. Partly, all of these can be true. The Democratic Party is indeed responsible for an accelerated development of the democratic state that has the most totalitarian heritage in Europe, and there are no doubts that it will continue towards the liberalization of the economic relations, changing of the property relations and the integration in the international market. In firm lines, and thanks to the past mandate, there is no reason to doubt in the continuation of building the modalities of freedom of expression, different opinions and its inclusion in the Western security system. Looked upon in this way, all, Democracy, the West and the Albanians, won. However, from the other angle, the elections in Albania reveal the enforced image of some Third World Western model of insecure and impoverished states having no democratic tradition, where the chief, trying to apply his project of democratization, employs authoritarian methods. The disapproval of the international observers regarding the elections in Albania, the OSCE and various NGOs and finally the EU, prove the attempt of the Leaders of the country to win the elections by all means, starting from the control of the Television and up to the irregularities at the polling stations. Moreover, the dragging of the opposition celebrities by the special police, with the use of fists and feet in the middle of the mere Skënderbej Square, illustrates more than any other assertion, the readiness of the regime to allow the expression of the opposition opinions only in places determined for it, in the mouse's hole. Thus, the victory could evolve worst. Democracy does not win, on the contrary, a regression in the directions of the democratic development of the country takes place. The victory is not of the Western European model, but of the authoritarian multi-party model noticed during the Cold War in Latin America, Africa and finally in Turkey, and definitely, Albanians do not win. Albanians in Albania will probably experience the rule of economic freedoms with permanent political limitations, while those in Kosova and Macedonia will be happy because
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Page 1: Koha Digest 106 (1996)

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton

Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha

soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the

name of Koha Ditorë. With the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on

http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.

- 1 -

Koha Digest # 106FRONT PAGE: THE RESOLUTION OF THE ELECTIONSDATE: 5 June 1996

EDITORIAL

THE DEMOCRACY OF THE THIRD WORLD

by VETON SURROI

Democracy won, the West won and the Albanians won. Thus were the elections commented,with capital letters, hundreds of times during these past days, from the ordinary apparatchikswho under different conditions, if ordered differently, would celebrate the victory of theSocialists - up to the people who claimed the above deeply convinced in.

Partly, all of these can be true. The Democratic Party is indeed responsible for an accelerateddevelopment of the democratic state that has the most totalitarian heritage in Europe, andthere are no doubts that it will continue towards the liberalization of the economic relations,changing of the property relations and the integration in the international market. In firmlines, and thanks to the past mandate, there is no reason to doubt in the continuation ofbuilding the modalities of freedom of expression, different opinions and its inclusion in theWestern security system.

Looked upon in this way, all, Democracy, the West and the Albanians, won.

However, from the other angle, the elections in Albania reveal the enforced image of someThird World Western model of insecure and impoverished states having no democratictradition, where the chief, trying to apply his project of democratization, employsauthoritarian methods. The disapproval of the international observers regarding the electionsin Albania, the OSCE and various NGOs and finally the EU, prove the attempt of the Leadersof the country to win the elections by all means, starting from the control of the Televisionand up to the irregularities at the polling stations. Moreover, the dragging of the oppositioncelebrities by the special police, with the use of fists and feet in the middle of the mereSkënderbej Square, illustrates more than any other assertion, the readiness of the regime toallow the expression of the opposition opinions only in places determined for it, in themouse's hole.

Thus, the victory could evolve worst. Democracy does not win, on the contrary, a regressionin the directions of the democratic development of the country takes place. The victory is notof the Western European model, but of the authoritarian multi-party model noticed during theCold War in Latin America, Africa and finally in Turkey, and definitely, Albanians do notwin. Albanians in Albania will probably experience the rule of economic freedoms withpermanent political limitations, while those in Kosova and Macedonia will be happy because

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the regime's hand in Albania is strengthening, although it shouldn't be forgotten that this handlacks the national consensus. If scenes alike those that took place at the Tirana central squarecontinue, we will be facing a negative spiral: the regime has to increase the exertion ofrepression over the opposition that holds radical positions, be it radical silence or be it radicalarticulation.

The parliament controlled by only one party could be very efficient. It could adopt theConstitution and the best laws possible, it can achieve miracles. Even, after four years, we canconclude that Albania has gotten closer to the European development than ever before.However, the price for this will be very high. For those ruling in Albania it will not soundexcessive to repeat words stated in every book about government: every rule is corruptible,and the absolute government is absolutely corruptible.

ALBANIA

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/HELSINKI STATEMENT OF CONCERN: VIOLATIONS INTHE ALBANIAN ELECTIONS

On May 26, 1996, Albanians voted in parliamentary elections --the third multi-party elections since the fall of the communistgovernment in 1991.

Unfortunately, numerous human rights violations before, duringand after the vote have undermined the democratic process andthreatened the legitimacy of the elections. Physical attacks,ballot stuffing and voter list manipulation have violated theright of the Albanian people to elect their government in a freeand fair manner.

Extreme cases of police violence after the elections have createda tense atmosphere throughout the country.

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls on the Albanian government andthe international community, specifically the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union,the Council of Europe, the United Nations and the United Statesgovernment, to declare these elections invalid. Those responsiblefor abuses of the electoral law should be held accountable, andconditions should be established for new elections to take placein an atmosphere that is free and fair. The Albanian uniformedand secret police should allow citizens to peacefully expresstheir political views.

Even before the elections, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki warnedthat the ruling party might try to manipulate the vote. In a156-page report, Human Rights in Post-Communist Albania, releasedon March 14, 1996, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki concluded: Theclosing months of 1995 saw renewed efforts by the state to

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silence independent voices in the judiciary and media, as well asthose of opposition politicians. Human Rights Watch/Helsinkifears that these actions are an attempt by the government toeliminate its political rivals, thereby jeopardizing the fairnessof the forthcoming elections. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki takesno position on the political contest in Albania, and recognizesthat some of the accusations made by the opposition parties maybe exaggerated. However, it is the responsibility of the Albaniangovernment to abide by the rule of law and ensure that the votingprocess, the basis of any democracy, proceeds in conformity withAlbanian and international law.

At the same time, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki condemns theinternational community's unwillingness to criticize human rightsviolations committed by the Democratic Party of Sali Berishasince it came to power in 1992. The United States and Europeangovernments have repeatedly turned a blind eye to human rightsabuses that undermine the rule of law and democratic reformbecause Albania is an "ally" in the region.

PRE-ELECTION VIOLATIONS

A number of developments in recent months threatened thelegitimacy of the elections before the vote had taken place.

"Decommunization" Laws

Two laws passed in late 1995 established a seven-personcommission to review the files of the communist-era secretpolice. Those found to have "collaborated" with the former regimewere banned from holding public office until the year 2002. Sixof the commission members, however, were appointed by thegovernment. The head of the commission was elected by theparliament, which is strongly influenced by the ruling DemocraticParty.

Altogether, the commission banned 139 individuals fromparticipating in the elections. Of these, forty-five were fromthe Socialist Party (former communists), twenty-three from theSocial Democratic Party, eleven from the Democratic Alliance,thirteen from the Republican Party and three from the DemocraticParty. The remaining individuals were from smaller parties.According to law, these individuals had the right to appeal thecommission's decision to the Supreme Court (Court of Cassation).Fifty-seven people availed themselves of this right, and seven ofthem had their "verdicts" overturned. The entire process,however, violated Albanian and international law by failing togrant prospective candidates the right to due process. All of thecourt's sessions were closed to observers and the media, and noneof the defendants was allowed to see the evidence against him.

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The Albanian government defends this process as a means of"decommunizing" Albanian politics.

However, many of the former communist officials guilty of pastcrimes have already been convicted by Albanian courts and areserving time in prison. Three of them were sentenced to death for"crimes against humanity" two days before the elections. Incontrast, some of those banned from the elections playedimportant roles in Albania's democratic transition.

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), aU.S.- based elections monitoring institute, conducted apre-election assessment in Albania in March 1996. Theorganization's final report stated: "Because of the potential forabuse and denial of human rights, it is recommended that theverification process used to screen candidates for the 1996Assembly elections be ended. If such a process is kept, thedefinition of ineligibility should be narrowed, more time shouldbe permitted for candidacies, and a greater time for appeal ofadverse decisions should also be allowed". The OSCE ParliamentaryAssembly also expressed its disagreement with the laws, stating:"... the Delegation also discussed the "Law on Genocide" andconsiders that the law includes procedures which are not entirelytransparent. It also includes stipulations which limit theelectorate's possibilities to choose freely their candidates".

Restrictions on Free Expression

Despite numerous promises from President Sali Berisha, nolegislation exists to allow for the transmission of privatetelevision or radio, leaving the state-run programs that favorthe government as the main provider of news for the majority ofthe population.

Attempts to open private local radio stations have been thwartedby the police.

While there are many private newspapers throughout the country,they are restricted by a repressive press law and obstacles totheir distribution. Since 1992, a large number of journalists,including foreign correspondents, have been harassed, arrested orbeaten by unknown assailants after writing articles that werecritical of the government.

In the months leading up to the elections, the country's largestdaily, KOHA JONË, was repeatedly harassed and intimidated by theauthorities. In January, the paper was publicly accused ofcollaborating with the Serbian secret police, although nosupporting evidence was made public. On February 26, policedetained the entire staff of the paper, including the publisher,

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editors, journalists, computer operators, drivers and a cleaner,in order to question them about a bomb that had exploded thatmorning in Tirana. Other journalists were arbitrarily detainedand, on occasion, physically abused.

Harassment of the Political Opposition

Since coming to power in March 1992, the Democratic Party, led byPresident Sali Berisha, has used a variety of means to promoteitself and stifle the opposition. The secret police, thestate-owned media and the judicial system are all used to silencepolitical opponents.

There have been numerous violations of the right to association,peaceful assembly, freedom of speech and freedom of the pressdirected against the political opposition and other initiativesthat express views critical of the state.

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki recognizes that all political forcesin Albania, including the opposition, have used questionablemeans on occasion in the struggle for power. However, it is theresponsibility of the government to respect the principles it haspromised to uphold in both Albanian and international law, aswell as to prosecute fairly all those found to have broken thelaw.

In addition to physical attacks against opposition politiciansand activists like Gjovalin Cekini, Teodor Keko and Gjergji Zefi,Human Rights Watch/Helsinki is concerned about restrictions onparty meetings and slanderous attacks in the state media. Also ofconcern is the imprisonment of Fatos Nano, leader of theSocialist Party, who was convicted in April 1994 to twelve yearsimprisonment for corruption after a trial fraught with dueprocess violations. The Inter-Parliamentary Union, Council ofEurope and many human rights organizations have expressed theirconcern that Nano was imprisoned for political reasons.

The Electoral Law

In February 1996, a new electoral law was rushed throughparliament despite protests by opposition parties. The law isproblematic since it restructured the electoral commissions tothe advantage of the government and gave the president the solepower to approve changes to the voting districts. PresidentBerisha ordered changes to the electoral zones on April 5.The government said the changes were needed to ensure more equalvoting districts but the opposition claimed that districts wereredrawn to the advantage of the government. Human RightsWatch/Helsinki has not been able to confirm whethergerrymandering to the advantage of the ruling party took place,

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but is concerned that the president has the sole right to makesuch changes.

The electoral law also allocated a disproportionate amount oftime on television to the ruling party. According to Article 53of the law, the parties with seats in the previous parliament aregranted four hours of air time. But half of this time isallocated to the parties in the government (i.e. the DemocraticParty).

The biggest problem with the electoral law, however, was how itrestructured the composition of the electoral commissions to thefavor of the government, thereby opening the door formanipulation of the vote on the local level, especially in thesecond round of voting.

Three levels of election commissions were established underArticle 34 of the law: the Central Election Commission (CEC), theZonal Election Commission (ZEC) and the Voting Center ElectionCommission (VCC). The CEC has fourteen members appointed by thepresident upon the recommendation of the parliament and thepolitical parties. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki heard numerouscomplaints that the proposals from the opposition parties werelargely disregarded and the CEC was heavily slanted in favor ofthe government.

Under the electoral law, the ZECs are composed of a chairman,deputy chairman, secretary and a representative from each partythat is fielding candidates in the zone. The chairman and thedeputy chairman are appointed by the CEC, while the secretary isappointed by the local prefect (a position appointed by thenational government).

In the case when there is an even number of people on the ZEC,then the prefect appoints an additional non-party person.Finally, the VECs are composed of a chairman, secretary and onemember from each party with candidates in that zone, as well as anon-party person when the number is even. The chairman isselected by the chairman of the ZEC, the secretary and non-partyperson by the prefect.

International monitors confirmed that the electoral commissionswere controlled by the government appointed chairmen andsecretaries.

A statement made by eleven OSCE monitors from the United Kingdomand Norway after the elections said: "The key positions in theelection commissions at all levels were occupied by the rulingparty which did not assure an atmosphere of trust and reliabilityduring the polling. Decisions were in many instances taken only

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by the government appointed chairmen and secretaries. Theopposition party representatives in the commissions were oftennot allowed to participate in the process, if not outrightevicted from the premises. This pattern was also visible in thezone commissions". The post-election statement of the OSCE Officefor Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which hadfifty-three monitors throughout the country, also concluded thatthe "decisions of the polling station commissions were not madeby majority vote, but by the arbitrary decisions of thegovernment appointed chairman and secretary."

Opposition politicians and election monitors told Human RightsWatch/Helsinki that there was a great danger for manipulation inthe second round of voting, scheduled for June 2. In the run-offelection, held between the two candidates who received the mostvotes in the first round, only representatives of those partiesare on the commission, in addition to the chairman and secretaryappointed by the government. Therefore, a run-off with aDemocratic Party candidate would have a commission with threegovernment appointees versus one opposition member.

Election Monitors

International monitors were present from a large number ofgovernmental and non governmental organizations, including theEuropean Union, OSCE and the U.S.-based National DemocraticInstitute and International Republican Institute. The level ofcooperation these monitors received from the government wasmixed. The OSCE-ODIHR mission, which had some members in thecountry two months prior to the elections, said that "the levelof official co-operation offered to its representatives was ofsuch a limited nature."

Moreover, the Albanian Helsinki Committee, the country's mostprominent human rights organization, was denied permission tomonitor voting in Tirana polling stations. The InternationalFoundation for Electoral Systems was denied permission to send anexpert monitor to the Central Electoral Commission.

Violations on Election Day

Polls opened at 7:00 a.m. on May 26.

Shortly thereafter, reports of voter fraud filtered in fromdistricts throughout the country.

Around 6:00 p.m., the largest opposition party, the SocialistParty, declared that it would not acknowledge the results of theelections because of widespread manipulation. The SocialDemocratic Party, Democratic Alliance, Party for Human Rights,

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National Unity Party and Democratic Right Party joined theboycott shortly thereafter.

According to a statements issued by the opposition parties, thefollowing violations took place: Non-government appointed membersof the local electoral commissions were intimidated and, in somepolling places, beaten by police. Many others were expelled fromthe polling station.

Opposition party observers were prohibited from monitoring manypolling stations, as is allowed under Article 66. In some cases,police removed monitors by force.

Some opposition candidates were harassed, physically attacked ordetained by members of the secret police. The governmentresponded that the elections had proceeded in a generally freeand fair manner, and that the "red front" was trying to provoketrouble. A number of violations committed by the Socialist Partywere cited by Tritan Shehu, head of the Democratic Party, andATA, the state-run news agency. By the next morning, theDemocratic Party claimed a large-scale victory. On May 30, theCentral Elections Commission announced that the Democratic Partyhad won ninety-five of the 115 seats in parliament. The SocialistParty won five seats, and the Party for Human Rights won twoseats. The ten remaining seats would be contested in the secondround of voting.

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki is not in a position to confirm allof the specific allegations made by the opposition parties or thegovernment. There is reason to believe that some accusations byboth sides are exaggerated. Some election monitors, for example,told Human Rights Watch/Helsinki that some of the SocialistParty's allegations had proven to be false.

However, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki interviews withinternational election observers and foreign journalistscorroborate the general claims of manipulation made by thepolitical opposition. Taken together, they establish that in manyinstances the uniformed police, secret police and governmentappointees of the electoral commissions acted in violation of theelectoral law. Anders Eriksson, a Swedish monitor with theOSCE-ODIHR delegation, told Human Rights Watch/Helsinki: Theelections were not free or fair according to internationalstandards or Albanian law. So, they failed to meet their owncriterion. ... The opposition pulled out around five or six, butthere had not yet been any results. They saw how the election wasrun.

They had no contact with the electoral commission. They were nottreated as observers, but as school boys. It was a pattern all

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over the country, from day to night. It was quite obvious thatjust the two government appointees on the electoral commissionswere in charge and made decisions without the whole commission.The opposition representatives were not involved at all.And we [the monitors] were not allowed to speak with the partyrepresentatives. A journalist for an international news agencywho asked to remain nameless said that non-government appointedcommission members were not present in many of the pollingstations: I went to Kuçovë and Berat, and I saw stations withoutanyone from the opposition there. Only a policeman with a gun. Inone station in Berat, the Socialist Party observer had beenbeaten at 8:00 in the morning.

Bob Hand, an American observer with the OSCE, told Human RightsWatch/Helsinki: The counting of ballots was clearlydiscriminatory against the Socialist Party. It was clear thatmany ballots were being declared invalid. On ballots where ajudgment call was required, those with Socialist votes werealmost always declared invalid.... After the elections, thepolice were celebrating by driving up and down the boulevard inTirana with civilians in the cars, the sirens on and DP flagsflying out the window. I didn't see, but heard them firing gunsinto the air. It was a disgusting display, especially when thecars were waving American flags. Paskal Milo, a former member ofparliament and candidate for the Social Democratic Party,monitored a polling station in Lushnje. He said: Many peoplevoted twelve to fifteen times. Even the observers from Europe sawthis. I personally saw the police force people to vote for theDemocratic Party, especially old people. Sometimes a member ofthe commission pretended to help the old person and said, "Youmust vote for the DP." The elections were organized not by thestate but by the secret police.

They surrounded all the voting centers. Sometimes they wentinside, removed members of the commission and stuffed the boxes.Or they said: "You must vote for the DP because, if you don't,the communists will come to power." Other international monitorsreported similar violations. On May 28, the OSCE-ODIHR delegationmembers from Norway and the United Kingdom issued a statement inTirana which concluded that "the will of the Albanian people wasnot expressed in a free manner in the election of 26 May, 1996."The statement cited a number of violations, including: ... ballotcases were altered and invalidated. The number of void votes werein a large number of polling stations extremely high, up to fiftypercent. In some places, ballots bundled together inside theboxes indicated that the boxes had been tampered with and votesadded. The presence of armed police and unauthorized personsaround and inside the polling stations in many cases made anatmosphere of intimidation and coercion. Observers also witnessedcases of beatings and threats. The general pattern of

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intimidation had a significant impact on the election process.

Press reports from major newspapers and news agencies cited otherviolations. According to an article in the May 28 edition of theNew York Times: Election monitors from the European Union and theUnited States said they witnessed instances of policeintimidation, open ballot boxes and voters casting more than oneballot. In a district in the capital, the voting was held in theliving room of the local leader of Dr. Berisha's DemocraticParty. One election monitor, Fabrizio Migliaccio of Italy, saidhe was stunned that in seven districts he visited in the seasidetown of Durrës, "basic violations" of the electoral process weremade in front of him. They included more than one person being inthe voting booth, unsecured ballot boxes and the stuffing of theboxes with ballots. The next day, The New York Times quoted aDutch observer, Yuraj Atabaki, who has monitored nine electionsin the region since 1991, as saying, "I have never seen thetotalitarian face like this, people being beaten, cameras taken."According to the article, forty of fifty-three OSCE observerssaid they witnessed electoral abuses at the polls.

International monitors told a journalist from the Open MediaResearch Institute (OMRI) that they had observed many violations.The monitors, who asked not to be named, said that votingirregularities were severe enough to affect the ballot's outcomein twelve of the fifteen stations they had observed.

Post-Election Violations

On Monday, May 27, the leading opposition parties called for ademonstration in Tirana's central Skënderbej Square to protestthe manipulation of the vote. The Interior Ministry declared thegathering illegal, and said the government would use force, ifnecessary, to prevent it from happening.

Opposition leaders gathered nevertheless, and the police broke upthe demonstration with force far beyond the amount necessary tobring the situation under control. According to Human RightsWatch/Helsinki interviews with foreign journalists andinternational election monitors present in the square, policeswinging truncheons attacked opposition leaders and theirfollowers, beating people indiscriminately. Hospitals reported atleast seven serious injuries, including one person with a skullfracture and another with a broken leg. Five opposition leaderswere beaten by the police in front of journalists andinternational monitors, and were then hauled off to local policestations. Bob Hand, an American observer with the OSCE, toldHuman Rights Watch/Helsinki: First it looked like the police weretrying to talk to people, pleading with them to go away. And theywere trying to push them back. The police starting hitting, and

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then the riot police arrived, from which point it got worse. Thenthey were clobbering everybody without regard. Gramoz Pashko, aleading member of the Democratic Alliance who co-founded theDemocratic Party with Sali Berisha, told Human RightsWatch/Helsinki: They beat us and detained us for one and halfhours in the police station. [Endre] Legisi, [Sevret] Pëllumbi,[Arben] Imami, [Blendi] Gonxha and Namik Dokle. They isolated theleaders and we were heavily beaten in the square and in thepolice station without any accusation being made.

Then we were released. Arben Imami lost three teeth and is invery bad condition. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki spoke with theImami family and confirmed that he had been dragged forapproximately two hundred meters on his head, and then detained.He lost his front teeth and was temporarily in a coma.

Paskal Milo was also beaten and told Human Rights Watch/Helsinki:Today we had a meeting in Skënderbej Square. The oppositionparties were there to protest the manipulation of the election bythe DP. Six or seven thousand people came and they beat us....They beat us with everything. Some of them [oppositionleaders] were in jail for about two hours. The police also beatforeign and Albanian journalists who were present in the square,including Gianfranco Stara and Spiro Ilo from Associated PressTelevision and Eduardo del Campo from Spain's El Mundo. Stara andIlo's professional Beta camera was smashed and the filmdestroyed. The Interior Ministry denied that anyone had beenbeaten and said the gathering was 30 percent former secret policeagents who "called for war, violence and massive exodus toneighboring countries."

Following the police action, President Berisha issued thefollowing statement: The President of Albania calls on Albaniancitizens to be cool-headed and not to fall prey to the decisionsof the Albanian former secret police leaders, today's SocialistParty leaders, who, after their total defeat, withdrew from thefree elections three hours before they were closed, and in activecooperation with other extreme groups intend to stir up fightsamong the people and to destabilize democracy.

Role of the International Community

Since coming to power in 1992, President Berisha has enjoyed thestrong support of the international community, especially theAmerican, German and Austrian governments. In return, Berisha hasopened up Albania's ports and airstrips for NATO use andencouraged ethnic Albanians in neighboring Kosovo and Macedoniato avoid calls for independence.

At times, western governments have criticized human rights abuses

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in the country. But Albania still became a member of the Councilof Europe and receives substantial foreign aid. A number oftop-ranking western officials visited Albania in the weekspreceeding the elections, thereby lending credence to thegovernment.

Recommendations

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls on the Albanian government to:Establish an independent commission with representatives from allthe major political parties to investigate the electoralviolations and make recommendations on how to create conditionsfor a new election that is free and fair. Prosecute thoseindividuals responsible for violating the electoral law.Investigate the cases of police violence and abuse in detentioncommitted on May 28 and hold accountable those found responsible.

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki calls on the United Nations, OSCE,the Council of Europe, European Union and the United Statesgovernment to: Declare the Albanian parliamentary electionsinvalid due to the numerous electoral violations. Help createdemocratic conditions under which free and fair elections canoccur.

ALBANIA

TWO DAYS IN KORÇA

by SELADIN XHEZAIRI / Korça

Saturday, 25 May

At seven in the morning, I see from the distance the semi-constructed building of the Albanian customs office at Qafëthanëborder-cross. An impressive feat: it has already started to coverthe mud that was so common earlier. I start to bargain with thetaxi drivers and, who knows why, I choose the oldest one. I showhim the purpose of my trip and he answers directly that he is a"socialist". He talks with a vocabulary that makes you realize hehad not spent his entire life inside Enver Hoxha's "castle"alone: "I used to be chauffeur in the Albanian Embassy inVienna", he notices while explaining the local geography on theway to Korça. While parting, the old man expressed his beliefthat "democracy, headed by the Socialists, will win."

The area of Korça has some 200.000 residents, numberingapproximately the same number of voters as a prefecture ofPogradec, Devoll and Kolonja. Some 89 candidates represent 13

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political forces, although only ten of them will represent thePrefecture at the National Parliament. Graffiti and the numerousposters witness the non-compromised pre-electoral battle.In Korça, one could feel the breeze of democracy, as they use tosay. At its very center a new church is being built. Hotel-tourism is privatized since quite some time now, and this seemsto be the main reason why there is no telephone line. My only wayout, if needed, was to go the post-office and make an urgentcall...

I'm headed towards the Prefecture: there is a group of peoplewaiting. The employee on duty (guard) explains that they arewaiting for the Prefect. They are the representatives of the fourmain political opposition parties: "We request seeing the prefectdue to the two main and very concerning problems. The first oneis related to the submitting of the report regarding allpolitical subjects, in accordance to Article 75 of the ElectoralLaw - which they refuse by stating that they will submit only twocopies; and the second, due to the participation of partyobservers, in accordance to Article 66 of Law, that allows theobservers provided with an authorization by the Zonal ElectoralCommissions, over what we got rejected as well. Surely, we havecomplains" - states Edmond Rako. After six hours of waiting, theprefecture general secretary, Budjon Xhuti acknowledges us withthe content of the talks with the opposition representatives bydeclaring that "the prefect assured them of the strictapplication of the Law..."

At the seats of the two main forces, the Democratic Party and theSocialist Party of Albania, but also at the Union for HumanRights, all claim that real possibilities for the victory oftheir candidates really exist: "The Victory is Ours", expresseshimself one Korçan democrat, dr Bujar Isaku, while the Socialistpart wishes only "for decent elections..."

Sunday, 26 May

The democrats claim that during the first hours of the day,Socialists exerted a provocation: they have beaten two of theirfollowers. The trace of this information leads to Korça TV. Afterrequesting my ID, the policeman assures me that he willacknowledge the manager on my presence, who, while walking meout, informs of the team that will visit the house of one of thevictims - Pandeli Bodo. In the house, his wife wipes the bloodfrom his mouth: "I asked for help, but it was late at night, andno doctor was around" - says Pandeli. "I was walking near theseat of the Socialist Party when an unidentified person came upfrom the darkness, asking me what party I belonged to. Then hehit me. As I fainted, I fell and hit the side-walk." Due to thisaggressive atmosphere, dr Bujar adds: "there are persons from the

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Socialist Party that come by at three in the morning and startprovocations. One person was asked whom will he vote for, andafter replying: "the Democrats", he got stabbed. Personssuspected of being implicated in this act, were arrested by theDistrict Commissariat". However, the head of the Socialists forthe city of Korça, Niko Pandeli, claims that this ugly case is a"severe incident against our supporters. There is no politicalsense in this".

The surge at the polling stations comes very vivid. There arepolicemen (!?) who seem to be engaged in calming of the mood. Iwas disallowed to have an interview with any of commissionmembers in all three voting centers. I was recommended to ask thepermission at the prefecture, but the persons in charge thereexplained that "they do not issue such permissions". They wereunable to explain at least who could do this instead. Thejournalist ID was obviously far from being a strong evidence...

There is an increased concern among Korçan socialists in thefirst hours of afternoon, regarding the development of elections:"they are taking place under an extreme physical andpsychological pressure towards the population, our supporters andmembers", complains Niko, a socialist, while Bujar from thedemocrats expresses a totally opposite opinion: "the votingstarted on time, in accordance with the law, and until now wereceived no discontent from the electoral units. Voting isproceeding regularly, peacefully and honestly". However, thevice-president of the Human Rights Party - Gjergji Leka "denies"the above: "irregularities started at the very beginning. I amvery concerned, among others, also because of a ratherprejudicial fact: the commission chairman and the vice-chairmanhave, during the voting, come several times to the seat of theDemocratic Party. This illustrates their one-sidedness towardsthe elections: this should be taken seriously, because they arethe one to exercise justice over the elections" - says Gjergji,explaining that he himself has seen this, since democrats are, asort to say, neighbors.

The most wanted person in Korça during these two days remains theprefect of Korça, Pjerin Kiri: "the claims coming from theopposition due to 'the manipulations with the elections' areuntrue, they are used to create an image of irregular elections",he assures me. In the meantime, while at the dinner, theopposition announced their clarion call: the opposition withdrawsfrom the elections!

Late at night, the taxi driver that drove me to the border-crossof Tushemishti, said: "We are a nation of distinctive history.During his time, Scanderbeg built churches, Hoxha built bunkers,and you could see what Berisha does..." He said to be one of the

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democrats...

ALBANIA

KOSOVAN CHEERFUL CHORUS

by ASTRIT SALIHU / Prishtina

Elections in Albania concluded with results that were contestednot only by country's political opposition - they started ahunger strike - but it seems that in fact, voting signifiesmerely the beginning of a new crisis with an ending that is quitedifficult to predict. The comment of the electoral results couldbe reduced to a simple phrase: the Democratic Party won.

At least, such an inference should not be added any pathetic, onecould say. However, the reactions in Kosova were far from this.Almost all of our party leaders, in their comments on the victoryof the Democratic Party expressed a unique sort of intemperatehappiness and apolitical affection. As for the Albanian media inKosova and in Albania, there is no need to allude to. Titles insome of the local media express clearly that "All of us won withthem!", "The epochal victory of Albanians", "The destruction ofthe Socialists", "Vote to Democracy of the New-Age Albania","Victory of Democracy in Albania - victory of all Albanians","There were defects, but they were democratic", etc.Was it really Democracy that won in Albania, or it was theDemocratic Party only? This question should accentuate what isoften forgotten in our media. Perhaps it is not forgotten, whatitself appears exceedingly wicked, since thus we do notcontribute to democracy, only to the Democratic Party. Therefore,the first thing to be clarified in Kosova was the differentiationof two notions: Democracy and Democratic Party. This neverhappened, and this is the reason of the uniform mood of thepublic throughout Kosova.

However, this should have been done, if not by the publicopinion, then by the Kosova political party leaders, who in theirreactions mystify further the very answer to the question: whatdoes democracy represent for Albanians, in fact? Is it theDemocratic Party or the established system in the aftermath ofCommunism - under which Albanians should be able to elect theirgovernment for the next four years to come?

In one of his statements, one of the political leaders in Kosovanotices: "the victory of the Democratic Party is the victory ofall Albanians, particularly Kosova Albanians" (Mark Krasniqi);another leader states that "the victory of Democratic Party is a

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victory for the Albanian nation in general, and for Kosovans inparticular..." (Gjergj Dedaj), not to mention the followingsentence of this statement remarking that "this was a seriousblow to the 'Red Front' in Albania, but also to the ex-Communistsin Kosova". The last paragraph of this statement asserts aterrifying truth that follows the national joy: on the same dayof its publication, there will be people beaten at Tirana's "Skënderbej" square. Blows were given to those belonging to the"Red Front". However, the mentioned event reveals how can allthese statements on all-Albanian happiness and the all-Albanianvictory be swept with rubber batons.

If there were some 2 million and 200 thousand Albaniansparticipating in the elections, according to the official data,and if the number of those who voted for Socialists is estimatedto have been approximately 35 per cent, then, through a rathermodest statistics it could be implied that some 600.000 of peoplelost the elections. Therefore, it is difficult to speak of theall-Albanian victory. Particularly, having in mind the behaviorof the regime towards those who have lost. Therefore, anystatement regarding our collective victory is an extremedemagogy. Analogous to the statement that it was democracy thatwon through the victory of Democratic Party, which itself is anintentional mystification of elementary concepts of democracy,identifying it with merely with a party called "democratic".

There is another provocative question to ask in this: what wouldour politicians state if the Socialist Party would have won?According to the pathetic and emotional apolitical statements ofour party-leaders, there is another political element to extract.Silence! Particularly, the silence that followed the aftermath ofthe elections, following the harsh intervention of the Albanianpolice forces towards a group of Albanian voters, dissatisfiedwith the voting procedure. So far, there was no rejection of suchan act of the Albanian regime, from our political parties, exceptperhaps the one, rather delayed, of the Parliamentary Party ofKosova. The silence and the silent approval of the violenceexercised in the center of Tirana, implies in a certain way theidentification of Kosova's politicians with the subject whosevictory is being celebrated and greeted. These statements lackedonly to greet the battering of the people, so they could joincompletely "the collective happiness" of the victory of theDemocratic Party.

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KOSOVA

IGNORING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW

by BATON HAXHIU / Prishtina

It is difficult these days to pluck a single word from thejurists and constitutional experts in regard to the decision ofthe President of the Republic regarding the mandate of the MP'sto the Kosova Parliament.

One of the professors of Constitutional Law, co-author of theconstitutional amendments, refused to comment the decision madeby president Rugova. The only reason was that this decision is aflagrant violation of the Constitution and the law and it was agentlemen agreement between the compilers of this decision andthe staff of professors not to comment anything on this matter.Even though, claims the professor, he warned the author of thedecision on this severe constitutional abuse. And the silence, inthe situation we are in now, has become the best means to coverthe abuse of the constitution and the law.

The fact that the mandate of MP's failed to be verified, thepresident's demand for the adoption of such a decision,illustrates once more that decisions that do not coincide withthe Constitution of the Republic are often adopted in Kosova. Theconstitutionality and legality of decisions should be evaluatedby the Constitutional Court, another of the bodies that have notbeen constituted - and a body that does not exist. So, thepresident of Kosova can approve tens and hundreds of decisions,not bothering to give account to anyone.

In the ascertainment that regards the recent decision of thepresident (his first and only, so far) as "abuse ofconstitutionality", president Rugova replies: "We apply a softrule so we have no need to ask for responsibility from eachother... Moreover, it is because of this soft rule, we that weadopted only a decision and not a decree".

So, in the name of this "soft rule", one can compile and approvedecisions by removing everyone around, including the nationalwill expressed through the 1991 referendum and the parliamentaryelections held of 1992.

The compiler of this decision, Secretary General of the LDK,Fatmir Sejdiu, refused to state anything in this regard, however,in an interview given to the LDK weekly "ORA", he adds: "thisdecision is a result of the agreement of the political partiesthat are represented in the Parliament of the Republic of Kosovaand their groups, that have evaluated that in this very moment

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such a decision is necessary, because of the absence ofconditions for organizing the elections according to the neededstandards".

Only one day later, in a communique, the Parliamentarian Partystated: "The leadership of the party informs the public opinionand its electorate of the '92 elections that, despite the immenseinsisting, it failed to reach any agreement with the president ofthe Republic and a part of the political parties that participatein the parliament. It disapproves the extension of the mandate ofthe MPs."

Another communique was issued by the Social-Democratic Party thatregarded the mentioned conditions, states: "We consider that theimmediate constitution of the Parliament of Kosova is a necessarystep for regaining the confidence of our voters in our honestyand readiness to achieve the political will of the population,expressed in the referendum on the independence of Kosova".Naturally, the president's decision has juridical grounds, saysSejdiu, however forgetting that, facing the present situation,such a decision should be exercised through a decree. The otherpreconditions are the proclamation of the state of emergency andthe verification of the mandate of the MPs.

The fact that 13 commissions were formed, based on the Rules ofProcedures of the Parliament (sic), continues Sejdiu, illustratesthat this is not a matter of juridical decisions approved withoutany professional or constitutional criteria, however it makes nosense. Because this juridical expert himself and LDK's juridicalstaff have adopted the Rules on the Functioning of theCommissions without verifying the mandate of the MPs orconstituting the Parliament, something quite self-explanatory.Finally, due to this, the demand of a group of MPs for theimmediate constitution of the parliament as a precondition forensuring moral credit to proclaim the extension of the mandate ofthis parliamentary constituency, is absolutely natural.

Otherwise, it is stated in the demand, the hesitation on theimmediate completion of the parliament, offer grounds forsuspicion over our political objectives and determination.

KOSOVA

IS "JUL" CONQUERING KOSOVA?

by YLBER HYSA / Prishtina

The ambitious promotions of what is been named the "Joint

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Yugoslav Left", shortly - JUL, have already become a part of areality intensely followed by the Serbian statal media. JUL, inits efforts to offer "modalities" other than those of the rulingparty, seems to have, through Mirjana Markovic and the presentchairman (former play-writer and director) Ljubomir Ristic,managed to convince various people from the rows of leftists,former Communists, present managers of huge state-run enterprisesand some public celebrities to sign up - in its efforts tointegrate as much as possible within the cells of a despairedsociety facing the hopeless present that either recalls some sortof security and welfare of the Yugoslav past, either trying toescape from this reality and taking advantage of the situation.Extra-nationality promoted by this party, was the element onwhich JUL counted while expanding in Vojvodina, and recently,with an unpredictable success even in Sandzak (there are rumorsthat it damaged the SDA itself!).

Anyway, JUL remains something quite undefined. It is beensupervised by the wife of the Serbian president Milosevic wholeads the Socialist Party, while its chairman is a quite knownplay-writer. It is been presented as a left wing party, but, asanalyzed by one of the former ideologues of the Socialist Partyof Serbia, Mihajlo Markovic, (removed from the SPS presidencyafter the public confrontations with Mira Markovic) - "accordingto some ideas, they are leftists, while according to theleadership numbering a certain group of capitalists, they appeara social-democratic stream that barely regulates capitalism. Thismeans that they represent a left-liberal capitalism!"

However, so far, JUL has been an extra-parliamentarian party (andcertainly a regulator of the relations between the SPS itself andother parties within a potential governmental coalition), whichshould consider the forthcoming elections.

According to the outcome of the meeting of the leadership of thisparty with that of the SPS, the joint electoral strategy appearsas something rather expectable. While taking into account thatthe new reconstructed government is already nick-named "JULIANA",then a lot of other things become clear.

This is how one should view the penetrative efforts of JUL inKosova, although the present moment fashions the issue as multi-dimensional. It seems as if Kosova were not important onlybecause of its unsolved problem that continues to burden thepost-Dayton Serbia.

It is no longer a secret that JUL is interested to penetrate inKosova, considering its efforts to explore and find members andpossibilities to launch itself as an organized party-structure inKosova. Also, it is no longer a secret that, differing from

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Vojvodina and Sandzak, where JUL achieved a considerable success,it is hard to expect the same in Kosova. And this needn't furtherelaboration...

Maybe knowing all this, JUL (that is not looked at with sympathyfrom certain Serb political functionaries in Kosova) found itselfin a dilemma, by failing to ensure symbolical members (from bothAlbanian and Serbian sides), except those coming from the lowestlevels of former Communist bureaucracy in Kosova, or some of thefew employed in the present Serbian bureaucracy in Kosova: peopleas Istref Kelmendi, Selim Goxhufi, Murat Ajvazi, Shaqir Uka andcompany, who are said to belong to JUL - are unable to gathereven their fellow-villagers, not to mention some seriouspolitical force. The same could be said about some of the formerSerb cadres, as for the Kosova JUL leader himself, formeradministrator of the "Kosova district" Milos Simovic, or itspresent leader Nikola Sojevic who enjoys no respect even amongstlocal fellow-Serbs, and who is, according to some information,involved in confrontations of Kosova JUL regarding the newestaffair on seizing the building of the Municipal Archive inPrishtina, foreseen as the future seat of JUL.

Conscious of the situation, Kosova was recently visited by thevice-chairmen of JUL - Vladimir Stambuk and BozidarMilosavljevic, who concentrated on talks regarding the structuralexpansion of JUL with new members and cadres. According to someinformation, talks were mainly conducted with certain formerpoliticians and cadres, presently economists and bankers, andwith some public celebrities. Is it true that you are willing tojoin the JUL, was the question put to one of the accented cadres,Gani Jashari whom we met at the office of "Extra-Dragusha", aprivate enterprise and his present working place. Jashariexplains that he had talks with the JUL leadership and that heexpressed his views on the situation in Kosova, adding thatwithout the solution of the status of Kosova, there can be notalks on the JUL settling in this area.

"I do not consider active involvement in politics", emphasizesJashari, adding that he works as a university professor.Remzi Kolgeci, manager of the "Montenegro Banka" - filial inPrishtina, explains that he was visited by a business partner whoused the meeting in order to discuss the issue of JUL, and statesthat he does not yet consider his involvement in politics. As forhis potential membership in JUL, Kolgeci states that "this wouldbe an absurdity", moreover, "that would be no honor to me!".

Muharrem Ismajli is also among the mentioned bankers mentioned ascontacted by JUL. He points that two years ago he was offered thepost of the manager of cement-factory "Sharri" in Han i Elezit,following administrator Sosevic's speech that Albanians are not

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obstructed to some back to the social and economic life. Despitethe clear offer, confesses Ismajli, this never happened. I wantedto take over the responsibility of a factory whose value wasestimated by Belgrade at USD 250 million, and in which, at thattime employed only 100 Serbs left, 60 of them being managers. Itused to have 2,700 workers. I wanted to talk with Avramovic,while in Kosova, solely to reveal him the fact that he didn'tknow that United Bank of Kosova was undergoing the bankruptcyprocedure, a fact concealed to him.

However, I am ready to take over the management of "Sharri" andfor this I have clear motives - claims our interlocutor.

As we are told, last week, a group consisted of 20 Albaniansvisited the seat of JUL in Belgrade, and met with the highofficials of this party. Among those who in one way or anotherhad contacts with the "United Yugoslav Left" are some formersportsmen and public celebrities, businessmen and artists (thelatter are to be related to the profession of JUL's chairman).Something is certain: JUL is serious in its efforts to getinvolved in Kosova. And, it seems that after these tangiblecontacts, the leaders of this party have understood that theyshould step out with a concrete program and platform for Kosova,and that is illusory to coopt Albanians in any political party inKosova. However, according to some information, it is believedthat JUL is preparing a project-design for Kosova (that despiterecent rumors, does not include Kosova as a "special unit withinthe FRY"). The program for Kosova compiled in October 1995,states the situation in Kosova as the double "isolation"profitable "for national elites in both sides", having Albaniansbanned from schools and jobs, and "local Serb authorities" thathave failed. Further there is a proposal to initiate measures forthe return of a sort of normal life, where JUL sees itself as aspecific promoter of "normalization". Besides the adviceregarding the opening of the office, that seems will beestablished soon, very often contacts and promotions - (tagged:"in the field") of JUL in Kosova are also foreseen. There areplans to translate the book by Mira Markovic, "Night and Day",and a sort of the public penetration with concrete offers that,nevertheless, fail to affect the issue of solving the Kosovaproblem, its status.

Its vice-chairman, Vladimir Stambuk stated for "KOHA" that withinits program JUL does not foresee confrontations with any party,not even with the LDK. We consider that Kosova underwent hugechanges and that the life is no longer parallel, as it was fewyears ago. We plan to have even more contacts in Kosova, noticesStambuk, even with individuals members of the biggest party inKosova, but not as party representatives.

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The other vice-chairman of JUL, dealing with organization issuesof the party - Bozidar Milosavljevic, believes that the presentprogram of JUL for Kosova will be completed with separate, butnot "separatistic" programs! What can be perceived from the textis that there are ongoing preparations in regard to theeducational process in school buildings for Albanians, and thisis expected to happen the very next school year. Such a step,that can take place with no significant noise, and that can beannounced in autumn, should undoubtedly be perceived as one ofthe offers of the pre-electoral program of this party for Kosova!The fact that this party has already undergone the deep stage ofpreparations for becoming a parliamentary one, is confirmed withthe participation its people in the reconstructed government.In fact, the motive of JUL's program, aiming at "melting" thetense situation in Kosova is worth being analyzed. Althoughdisregarded by the Kosova Albanians, it is surely brave for aparty from Belgrade. But, what could be the outcome of all this?If this means a simple pre-electoral promotional trick, theneverything is clear. There is a need for new staff in Kosova, infact, for new MPs from Kosova in the Serbian Parliament. Also,there is a need to divide the Albanian political corpus.

Moreover, considering that SPS has it completely clear that ithas failed in taking in Albanians as members. If the intension isto face the solution of Kosova's problem while expecting delicateelections expected in Serbia, then logic would assert that it isalways more suitable if a less-important and unburdened subject,than the ruling party itself, takes over the responsibility. And,if possible, it would surely be more convenient for Belgrade tosolve the problem with no turmoil and the noise over "the Serb-Albanian dialogue with the presence of a third party".

This is where JUL appears, ready to reproach firstly the Serbcadres in Kosova, by stating that they will not be asked aboutanything (and this is why the recent demands of Kosova Serbs ledby Momcilo Trajkovic to talk with Milosevic in Kosova, and theirfears about the fate of the University, particularly after JUL'scriticism addressed against Rector Papovic, becomeunderstandable!). After this, the orientation of the party wouldbe clearing off the road towards the "integration" of Albaniansinto the "normal life" and the "political institutions", avoidingany political dialogue.

"The issue of normal classes in school is not a matter of LDK,but of the children' parents" - states JUL! It seems that therewill be no holiday this summer for a party able of fulfilling theambitions of many ambitious individuals, but also of those havingevident problems (education, employment, security, etc.)If this hot summer is to be followed by the pre-electoral autumn,then September could possibly reveal a new situation in the

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Albanian political corpus. Because, Albanians are people withreal problems. Who will be the first one to perceive this, JUL orAlbanian political representatives, this remains to be seen...

PROJECTS

EUROSLAVIA OR ILLYRIA

by YLBER HYSA / Belgrade

Years have passed since the formulation of the "EuroSlavia"project, which is nowadays entering the second stage of itspresentation and the search of clients and interested people.After a series of criticism from the northern republics of formerYugoslavia, ignored by official Ljubljana and blasphemed byTudjman and a part of the Croat opposition as a "Troyan horse ofYugoslavism" the compilers of this plan, staff of the geo-political journal "Limes" continued lobbying for their idea thatfound support in some Italian and French circles, as well as insome Serb and Montenegrin, and, as it was put, in some circles ofAlbania (in Durrës an ongoing engagement regarding thisinitiative continues, and it was stated that even the primeminister Meksi expressed his interest).

But, all this support or rejection is not something that could benoticed at first sight. The debate that took place these days inBelgrade, which was more of a manifestation, put forward alsosome dilemmas and different approaches.

"EuroSlavia" - conceptualized as a regionalization project notonly regarding the space of the former Yugoslavia, but also awider part of the Balkans, including Albanians - is considered bythe project co-author Korinman as a necessity that revealed theheadache Europe will suffer, since the split of former Yugoslaviais being reflected in the demands for independence in Corsica, orthe promotion of the idea of the Italian Lega Nord that insistson division. Carciolo, the other author of the "EuroSlavia"project, in his opening, grounded on the principle of "self-interest" that rests in the elaboration of this project,expressed that for many years the existence of Yugoslavia was anoptimal solution, but after its disappearance, the concept ofthis newly proposed regionalization could be an adequatesubstitution. No one is satisfied with what happened, it wasfurther stated. Serbia has not become Greater Serbia, aspretended, nor are the Croats in the position to be proud of,while Muslims are facing an extremely difficult situation. "Morewalls, more wars", said Carciolo, and this leads the regionfurther away from Europe. Polemizing with the idea that former

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Yugoslavia was an adequate geo-political solution, Predrag Simicfrom the Institute for International Politics and Economics saidthat Yugoslavia was in fact a western geopolitical concept,established by the great powers after the Conference of Paris andit was needed during the confrontations with the East. Europeallowed the destruction of this state and nowadays the idea onre-functionalization some regional community is here, inBelgrade, sometimes accepted with "mixed and misty feelings".In fact, despite the elaboration of the political, economic andsecurity objectives due to the regionalization, it was emphasizedat the very beginning that one of the key issues here is theissue of Kosova, or the Albanian issue. This was stated by IlijaDjukic, former Yugoslav foreign minister, who added that he doesnot see any reason for Albanians to join a concept that islabeled EuroSlavia. In accordance to the project proposed by AdemDemaçi (Prishtina CDHRF), this should be called "Balkania". Also,one of the co-organizers of the meeting in Belgrade, the chairmanof the "European Movement of Serbia", Dusan Janjic, accentuatedthat the Albanian issue remains one of the key segments of thisproblem and mentioned that this issue is comprehended by Europeonly as a problem of Kosova; the British consider this as an"Albanian issue", while French liberals are set aside, waiting.The question is whether the application of this project shouldstart from Serbia, but then a precondition for all this remainsthe need of internal democratization that could be followed byregionalization.

As for the Montenegrin opposition circles, the idea ofregionalization is highly supported, and there are initiativesfor the next meeting to be held in Cetinje. However, it was saidthat official Macedonia does not realize itself as integrated inEurope together with the others.

In fact, the principle "Either all or none in Europe" remains oneof the basic principles of the "EuroSlavia" project that thustends to prevent the entering of a part of the new states thatderived from this space, because of the "new appearance of theold unsolved regional problems" on European tables. In fact, thisprinciple should be the initiative for the regional states tojoin, as the only way of realizing their interest within theintegrative processes in Europe. But, it seems that such aprinciple could be kept only through international pressure, whatimplies the interest of great powers to support some sort of theregionalization project. The authors of this project state thatthey have "friends", a kind of European support. This should beconfirmed by the participation of the general Caligaris, theItalian representative chairing the European Parliamentary Groupfor Security, Defence and Foreign Policy.

However, this does not conclude the dilemma about the extent of

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the support of this project by the subjects that are mainlyregarded inside "EuroSlavia" and the extent of its influenceamong European circles. As for the first element, its internalsupport and the existence of the will of the Balkan states andpolitical forces to accept this idea, it appears rather divided.Some see this as a suitable possibility for economic and securitycooperation, some approach this with certain precaution, whileothers perceive the project as a direct threat to the nationaland statal interests.

In one of the last discussions, Veton Surroi from Prishtinaemphasized that project should firstly solve certain issues.Instead of "EuroSlavia", name that does not correspond theAlbanian demands, the project should be renamed to "Illyria" thatitself includes the majority of announced territories. One of thepreconditions should imply the solution to the Kosova problem,and finally - there is no necessary substance within the Serbianside to join in Europe.

Some of the participants pointed that "EuroSlavia" could berenamed, however this does not itself bring a solution to thewhole problem. In fact, the authors of the "EuroSlavia" projectdidn't actually aim at the solution of the problem or itsrecognition, stating only their optimism. The impression is thatthey were more interested to promote the idea to the opinion.Is "EuroSlavia" an essential geopolitical substitution after thecrisis in the Balkans, that could be equaly supported by thegreat powers, or just a mere longing that rests on a "good will"and the interesting idea - this remains to be seen in the futuremeetings. Until then, the idea of Balkan regionalization willcontinue its practice of lobbying and support.

INTERVIEW

LUIGI CALIGARIS, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs,Security and Defence Commission ofthe European Parliament

EUROPE HAS NO DEFENCE POLICY

Interviewed by YLBER HYSA / Belgrade

KOHA: In your introduction, you mentioned the fact that Italy hadno serious participation in the debate on the stability andsecurity of Yugoslavia?

CALIGARIS: I wanted to interpret what was formerly believed, thatItaly is not surrounded with enemies, which in itself was aparadox. This was a perception that only Tito knew to utilize in

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the best way possible. He excellently played various roles.Sometimes, he was close to us, sometimes pretending to be ourenemy. I remember that in 1973 he almost declared war to Italy,that was in fact a bluff. Nevertheless, we could not be sure ofthe way Yugoslavia would react in case of a NATO aggression!I agree with the opinion that some calculation should haveexisted in keeping Yugoslavia out of the Warsaw Pact. But, thiswas not the entire problem. In 1980, due to the emergedsituation, I was assigned from our ministry to investigate thepresent situation in Yugoslavia, so I came for a two-days visit.And, after the discussions with the Belgrade military officials,many things improved considerably. But, this remains only oneside of the medallion. On the other, however, NATO could notrefer to Yugoslavia as of our potential aggressor - so, Italy waspractically left with no enemies! Thus, Italy was kept out of anyserious discussion on security as far as Yugoslavia was concerned- a fact that sometimes suited our politicians claiming we didnot have problems, since we are being protected by NATO and weare spending the minimum of the state budget. I believe this hasharmed the quality of the Italian political debate.

KOHA: NATO military bases were located in Northern Italy wererecently used for air strikes on the former Yugoslavia?

CALIGARIS: Yes, this was considered a debt that Italy had to payfor its remaining within NATO, and it was rather artificial.Among the big powers, France and Great Britain were there with ahuge number of troops deployed in the field. Germany was alsopresent, not to mention the Americans.

KOHA: Somehow, the dissolution of Yugoslavia coincided with theproclamation of the unification of Europe. Is it possible forEurope to aim at having a strong political community, dealingwith such regional crisis as the one in Yugoslavia, and having nocommon European security and policy defence system?

CALIGARIS: Let us start with the second half of your question.Europe has no unified security and defence policy, therefore thedefence is to be realized within NATO. However, foreign andsecurity policies must be a part of a mutual vision, otherwisethe different opinions on peaceful missions, the presence andneutrality can be confusing. Europe has the need for a jointapproach to its foreign and security policy. This is sometimescalled the common identity - that itself doesn't mean anything.

KOHA: Does this imply something original, out of the classicalNATO? What will happen with the WEU?

CALIGARIS: The Western European Union (WEU) is not quitedeveloped, since it is the victim of these contradictions. We

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have four types of statuses inside the WEU: full participants,observers, etc. It is impossible, when facing the common issuesas integrity or interference, to order to have somebody else todeal with it. We need a unified policy and a possibility to dealwith the so-called crisis management - the control of hugecrises, and also the undertaking of the medium-range operations.If Europe were capable, Yugoslavia would have been and would beits own problem!

KOHA: You mentioned that Yugoslavia should have been an Europeanproblem, but it seems that there would hardly be a solutionwithout the involvement of the Americans?

CALIGARIS: Yes. This has shown that Europe does not really existsin the aspect of common security and foreign policy! To put itstraight: if one deals with security issues, then he must sendsomeone out there. You cannot bluff here. There can be noimprovisations... I strongly advise Europe not to make sucherrors in the future.

As for the dilemma of Europe without Balkans, I have to say thatthere are various opinions regarding the size of Europe, on howshould it expand or integrate. There are different opinions overthe concepts "Europe a la Carte", "Different Speed Europe", etc.I don't blame anyone for these approaches, because the problem isreally complex. But, it has to be said that even NATO was createdand maintained under the American leadership and it seems that itwould never exist without it. Today, we have the French proposalon the organization of a kind of European Security Council led byfive strongest countries: Great Britain, France, Germany, Italyand Spain...

KOHA: Is this proposal serious?

CALIGARIS: I don't know yet. I am leaving for Paris in a fewdays. There are indications that this idea is not very popular.But, you know how they say: if you are after something bigbecause of the popularity, then don't go for it!

KOHA: Your opinion on the expansion of NATO?

CALIGARIS: I think that NATO should remain the way it is, andthat it cannot be substituted. Of course, it is far from beingperfect, but it is surely the best in the world. NATO also hasthe need for rationalization, for opening of such a process, forcertain reductions... Nevertheless, NATO is irreplaceable.

KOHA: We have seen NATO in action during war in Bosnia. Couldthis structure play another role, a preventive one, in thesouthern parts of former Yugoslavia. I mean Kosova here, as

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well... Is NATO able to have such a role?

CALIGARIS: The preventive policy is surely the most complicatedone, because sometimes any intervention can expand the conflictand simultaneously a political consensus that is needed fordeploying the troops in the region must be reached. Preventionimplies engagement before something takes place. This implies theacceptance of the consensus by the nations in conflict. But, eventhen, why and how should be known, because intervention could bea venture that can last forever, thus the political aims of theaction should also be taken into account. To prevent something isnot itself enough, unless you have clear ideas over what you wantto achieve. It seems to me that NATO and Europe should be ableto, through political courage, realize the level of risk theywant to have.

Macedonia seems as a success of a political prevention.

Meanwhile, I see Kosova as a far more complicated case. WillSerbs accept a preventive NATO action in Kosova? Preventive, buton behalf of what body, institution? Surely within the UN, sincethe political cover should be offered by somebody else.

Therefore, NATO itself can hardly conduct such an action.Political justification is necessary. And, that politicaljustification should be supported with the clear political aim.If you achieve these, then you can count on a preventive actionof the NATO!