Knowledge is Not Made for Understanding; It is Made for Cutting - ELE JUNKER, RUC, JULY 2006

Knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting

- a discussion of Michel Foucault’s theoretical frameworks

taking outset in the analyses of the Final Report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in

terms of archaeology and genealogy

Integrated Thesis: Philosophy and Science Studies and International Development Studies

By Ele Junker

Supervised by Adam Diderichsen (Philosophy and Science Studies)

and Steffen Jensen (International Development Studies)

Roskilde University June 2006

Abstract The French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault, inspired by Nietzsche, has questioned the

unity of the notion of truth by meditating upon the relationship between language and reality.

Foucault has formulated the methods of archaeology and genealogy in order to show how any claim

of truth has its rooting in the interpretation of reality according to specific episteme.

Contrary to Foucault’s reflections, the understanding of truth as being ‘out there’ and obtainable by

appropriate, i.e. scientific methods, is the bearing element within the development discourse. This

tendency is exemplified by the increase in the number of truth commissions worldwide. This thesis

focuses on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and its Final Report.

The TRC’s discourse and methods are analysed in terms of archaeology and genealogy by taking

outset in the Report. The analyses are carried out with the aim of putting Foucault’s tools into

practice and offering another narrative of the Report, which describes how the objects, main

concepts etc. of the TRC have emerged, as well as how these regimes of truth have been put into

practice by various techniques, thus constituting the regimes of practice. The overall narrative that

appears is that the TRC’s concepts and methods arose as the result of a complicated system of

relations and rules that render these concepts arbitrary. Further, the effects of its practices constitute

the TRC as a technique of power that aims at disciplining its subjects according to the new moral

code, based on human rights, so that the new power relations in South Africa (SA) could be

legitimised and maintained.

The overall aim of the analyses is to put Foucault’s approaches into perspective and illustrate their

strengths and weaknesses. To support this pursuit, various authors are brought in who discuss

archaeology and genealogy from different angles. The topics discussed in relation to archaeology

are: Problems related to Foucault’s definition of discourse, the relationship between discourse and

the social level, the dispersion of the subject, and archaeology as an elitist approach. The issues

discussed in relation to genealogy can be summed up as: Foucault’s normativity, the subject, power

as strategy, and resistance. The final discussion, i.e. problematisation of Foucault’s regimes of truth

and regimes of practices, takes outset in these topics combined with the author’s personal

experiences regarding the use of Foucault’s methods and is combined with personal reflections on

the consequences of the Foucaultian point of view.

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CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION 6 1.2 Problem formulation 9 1.3 Method 9

2 INTRODUCTION TO FOUCAULT’S METHODOLOGICAL FRAME 12 2.1 Nietzsche as a frame of reference of Foucault 12 2.2 Reflection on the notions of ‘method’ and ‘theory’ 14 2.3 The connection between archaeology and genealogy 15 2.4 The author and unity of text 17

3 THE SATRC 18 3.1 Introduction 18 3.2 History of the SATRC 20

3.2.1 Staff 20 3.2.2 The Mandate 21 3.2.3 Different phases of the TRC’s work 21 3.2.4 Distinctive features of the TRC 22

4 ARCHAEOLOGY - PRESENTING THE KEY CONCEPTS AND RELATING THEM TO THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SATRC 23

4.1 Introduction 23 4.1.2 The archive 23 4.1.3 The question of structuralism 25

4.2 Unity of discourse 26 4.2.1 The unity of the discourse of the SATRC 29

4.3 Formation of objects 30 4.3.1 The formation of the object of forensic truth 33

4.4 Formation of enunciative modalities 38 4.4.1 The formation of enunciative modalities through the example of Desmond Tutu 38

4.5 Formation of concepts 42 4.5.1 The formation of key concepts of the SATRC 43

4.5.1.1 Truth 43 4.5.1.2 Reconciliation 45 4.5.1.3 Justice 48

4.6 Formation of strategies 53 4.6.1 Formation of strategies of the SATRC 55

4.7 Defining the statement 60 4.7.1 The subject of the statement 61 4.7.2 Associated domain 62 4.7.3 Materiality of statement 62 4.7.4 The field of stabilisation 63 4.7.5 The field of use 63

4.8 Defining the discourse 64 4.9 Critical remarks related to archaeology 66

4.9.1 Introduction - The fallacy of interpretation 66

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4.9.2 Discourse and the social level 67 4.9.3 The problematic of autonomous discursive formation 69 4.9.4 Dispersion of the subject 70 4.9.5 Dangers of sectarianism 71

5 GENEALOGY – PRESENTING THE KEY CONCEPTS AND RELATING THEM TO THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SATRC 75

5.1 Introduction 75 5.2 The origin of things 75 5.3 The emergence of things 76 5.4 Laws and rituals 78

5.4.1 The SATRC establishing its own laws and rituals 79 5.5 Genealogy vs. traditional history 80

5.5.1 The SATRC’s understanding of history 81 5.6 The self; producing historical knowledge 82

5.6.1 The conditional nature of the SATRC’s form of truth 83 5.7 Relations of power 86

5.7.1 The SATRC as a technique of power 88 5.8 The individual/subject of power 91

5.8.1 The intrinsic modification of subjects of power by the SATRC 93 5.9 Power and truth 95 5.10 Freedom 96

5.10.1 The SATRC cultivating the practices of freedom 98 5.11 Resistance 100

5.11.1 The SATRC launching a new politics of truth 102 5.12 Critical remarks related to genealogy 105

5.12.1 Foucault’s normative stance 105 5.12.2 Strategies without projects 106 5.12.3 The impossible practices of freedom – why should one resist oneself? 107 5.12.4 Notions of truth and liberation as correlative to Foucault’s notion of power 109 5.12.5 Monolithic relativism 110 5.12.6 A champion of deviancy 112 5.12.7 Foucault’s bourgeois individualism 113 5.12.8 Foucault as a bearer of Truth and Being 115

6 FOUCAULT REVISITED, A CRITICAL VIEW 119

7 APPENDIXES 133 7.1 Bibliography 133 7.2 Abbreviations 136

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1 Introduction The French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault’s (1926-1984) methods have had a great

impact on various disciplines and they are used extensively. It has become fashionable, as well as a

necessity for various authors to relate to Foucault and everything that he represents. In many cases,

the idea prevails that post-modernism and post-structuralism have reached the ‘end of history’. The

spirit of these movements seems to be the belief that ”If we are certain of anything, it is that we are

certain of nothing. If we have knowledge, it is that there can be none” (Lawson 1989:xi). This

statement indicates recognition of the limits of contemporary culture, not to mention science. At the

core of these two approaches is the contestation of the unity of the notion of objective truth.

One of the originators of post-modernism is Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche began to meditate upon

the relationship between language and reality. Thinkers like Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida, among

others, can be seen as contemporary contributors to this discussion (Lawson 1989:xii). According to

Nietzsche, philosophers have ignored the fact that language with its semantic and syntactical

categories is a decisive factor in the way we describe the world. Language is a tool with the help of

which we construct our world, form our thoughts, and accumulate our knowledge upon which we

build our conception of reality. Reflections on language led Nietzsche to discussions on the nature

of truth. He reached the conclusion that knowledge/truth is nothing but the result of man’s ability to

put the immediately perceived world into concepts and in that way make it meaningful and

organised. Therefore, any claim to truth has a limited value since the perception of reality is built on

concepts that man has manufactured by himself, of ‘such human, all-too-human building materials’

(Nietzsche in Breazeale 1979:xxx).

Foucault also suggests that language is not just a neutral medium through which we describe the

world in objective terms, undistorted and transparent. Foucault takes outset from Nietzsche in

formulating his own methods of archaeology and genealogy in order to problemitise the regimes of

truth and regimes of practices of society. According to the conceptual frame developed in

archaeology and genealogy any claim of truth has its rooting in the interpretation of reality

according to specific episteme. As Nietzsche put it ‘...every people has a ...mathematically divided

conceptual heaven above themselves and henceforth thinks that truth demands that each conceptual

god be sought only within his own sphere (Nietzsche in Breazeale 1979:85).

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Despite of this development, ‘truth’ is still a fundamental element within the development

discourse. Truth commissions are increasing in number and attract wide attention around the world.

During the last 25 years, there have been recorded 20 truth commissions, which vary in size and

scope (Hayner 2000:33-35).

The understanding that truth is ‘out there’ and that it is for us to be found is supported by the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Organisations such as Amnesty International and Human

Rights Watch recommend in their policy statements that official truth-seeking be the obligation of

any country that is emerging from a troubled past – this view is based on the principle that there is

an inherent ‘right to truth’ as guaranteed by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights. The similar clause ‘right to receive information’ is noted in the African Charter on Human

and Peoples Rights (cited in Hayner 2002:31;183). In order to live up to these recommendations the

interest in truth commissions is still growing.

Truth commissions’ claims to objectivity have been criticised by various authors, who purport that

the truth finding process may have its limitations due to the political and social context, staffing,

mandate, resources and etc. of the commissions and that the decisions taken by the staff in each

truth commission may influence the outcome of the commission. For example, Lars Buur shows in

his dissertation how local knowledge has moved through the data processing system to transcend its

context and become a global truth. Buur shows that the methods used in the South African Truth

and Reconciliation Commission1 are arbitrary ways of classifying and rendering the past individual

events meaningful within the given context (Buur 2000:51).

Foucault’s methods of archaeology and genealogy support the idea that any classification is the

result of the rules of formation of discourse, and thus arbitrary. He rejects the idea of history writing

as a steady progress of reason and freedom, where acknowledging the past atrocities would help to

avoid such things in the future. There is no transparent form of knowledge, free from error and

illusion, or an area of life that is free from power relations. We all operate within a prevalent

discourse with its own value-system.

1 South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, also the TRC or the Commission.

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Foucault has had a fundamental impact upon many subjects and disciplines and will do so in the

future. Yet, Foucault’s radical tone has provoked many. He has been criticised on various grounds,

like rejecting reason, undermining the strive towards comprehensiveness and unity, rejecting the

existence of a continuous self and the use of universal concepts. Nor has he given us any possibility

to escape power relations, thus eliminating the possibility of individual or collective freedom.

Additionally, Foucault has been accused of not questioning his own truth claims, thus proposing an

elitist view.

Further, much has happened within the intellectual circles since Foucault wrote. Discussions on

continuity and discontinuity are no longer the issue, since numbers of theorists have moved beyond

these discussions and focus instead on how to identify these different changes within their

respective fields on the level of theories, methods, values etc. By the same token, the idea of science

as a coherent and unbiased, rational body of knowledge is no longer the prevailing point of view

among many researchers. Many see science as a culture among others, thus rendering the discussion

on objectivity and disinterestedness irrelevant (Kusch 1991:xii).

It follows that it is also necessary to abandon the idea of Foucault as The Philosopher. The idea that

we, with the appearance of post-modernism and post-structuralism, have reached the ‘end of

history’ within the field of sciences, to use Francis Fukuyama’s2 expression, has to be reconsidered.

Although, there seems to be no way back after the ‘death of God’3 as well as the ‘death of Man’4,

one cannot allow oneself to freeze time and suspend all development. Maybe the answer lies in

giving Foucault the credit he deserves, and yet place his authorship within the larger context of

philosophy, social sciences and history. To see his legacy as a contribution to the development of

these disciplines, to see it as a ‘culture’ amongst other cultures, or rather, a discourse amongst many

others; a discourse the rules of which can be mapped and the actions and effects of which can be

studied and discussed.

2 Fukuyama 1993:9. 3 Nietzsche 1956:288. 4 Foucault 1994:387.

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1.2 Problem formulation

The above reflections beget the following question:

Taking outset in the analysis of the Final Report of the SATRC, how can Foucault’s regimes

of truth and regimes of practices be problematised?

1.3 Method

In the following section I shall reflect on the procedure of my research. Firstly, as mentioned

earlier, Nietzsche can be seen as a reference frame for Foucault, especially with regards to the

notion of genealogy. Therefore, it is relevant to discuss the philosophical relationship between these

two thinkers in order to gain a deeper understanding of what the methods of archaeology and

genealogy entail.

Foucault’s ‘Archaeology of Knowledge’ and his article ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ will be key

texts in order to introduce Foucault’s conceptual universe, respectively ‘regimes of truth’ and

‘regimes of practices’. But other texts will also be drawn upon. This theoretical frame constitutes

the tools for analysing the Final Report5 of the TRC.

The analysis of the TRC takes outset mostly from Volume I. of the Report. The idea is to map out a

limited grid of study in order to make use of Foucault’s theoretical frame. I am aware that my

analysis does not represent the complete picture of the discourse of the TRC, but must be seen as a

fragment of a whole. Volume I will provide me with some key concepts and principles of the TRC,

as well as it is reflecting on the methodology of the Commission.

Since the aim of the analysis is to problematise the regimes of truth and regimes of practices of

Foucault the thesis will evolve around two axes – those of archaeology and genealogy. For clarity’s

sake I shall introduce archaeology and genealogy as separate entities in order to give the reader a

more structured picture of the main concepts of the respective approaches. In this way I hope more

clearly to illustrate both advantages and disadvantages of archaeology and genealogy by looking at

them as individual methods and applying them in my analysis.

5 The Final Report of the SATRC is further referred to as ‘the Report’.

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The first part of the analysis can be described as problematising the regimes of truth. In order to do

that I will introduce the main concepts of archaeology as described in the ‘Archaeology of

Knowledge’. Afterwards, each of these concepts is related to the Report in order to map out the

TRC’s discourse as it is expressed by using the method of archaeology. In the process I hope to map

out central issues and notions of the discourse of the TRC. This will show how the TRC is anchored

in a concrete time and space, which makes the appearance of certain objects and concepts possible

and gives them a specific meaning. In other words, abstractions such as truth are historicized, and

the functions of truth in the context of the TRC are analysed. I will look at how complex factors

affect the development of certain kinds of knowledge and the development of the institutional

frame. What epistemes govern this body of knowledge, what kind of language is used? What

sciences and disciplines come together in order to form the discourse?

Generally, the analysis, both in terms of archaeology ad genealogy, is an attempt to use Foucault’s

theoretical frame in praxis and propose my own narrative of the TRC. This exercise will show the

advantages, as well as the limits of Foucault’s approach.

After presenting the key concepts of archaeology and relating them to the Report, I shall present

various authors who have discussed the archaeological approach. This section aims at showing that

there is not one way to read Foucault and that Foucault does not illuminate all aspects equally. This

section presents the issues, which will be discussed I the final chapter, where I also reflect on my

own experiences while analysing the Report in terms of archaeology and genealogy.

The second axis of the thesis evolves around the regimes of practices. Here again, in Foucaultian

terms, the concrete function of power becomes interesting. The procedure is similar to that of the

previous chapter. I shall present the key issues and concepts of genealogy in thematically divided

sections. Afterwards, each of these themes or concepts will be related to the Report. The analysis

will show how power relations are rooted in the social networks. Power in this context is the

organization of a normative system built on a whole range of technical, administrative and juridical

apparatuses, the purpose of which is to deal with the victims and perpetrators, as well as the rest of

the society by governing them and guiding their conduct, which is linked to the legitimation of the

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new democratic regime. I shall look at the TRC as a technology of citizenship, the discourse and

actions of which have an overall effect, namely the establishment of a new regime of truth.

After the analysis of the TRC in terms of genealogy, again, I will refer to various authors that have

pointed out some issues regarding genealogy. These issues, together with the points of critic made

in the previous chapter will set the stage for the final discussion of Foucault.

The final part of the thesis will be a discussion of Foucault’s approach, where I will point out some

weaknesses and strengths of it. Some of the issues will be related to the practical use of Foucault’s

approach, some of them may include a more philosophical discussion of Foucault’s ideas.

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2 Introduction to Foucault’s methodological frame

2.1 Nietzsche as a frame of reference of Foucault

As a starting point for my discussion of the dynamics of discourse, I shall focus on Nietzsche,

since Foucault has been greatly inspired by him. Foucault said that reading Nietzsche was a

‘point of rupture’ for him (Foucault 1988b:23). It happened by chance, nevertheless, it changed

his ways of thinking about reason and rationality. It offered an alternative to the

phenomenological view on the subject, by stating that the subject, too, has a history, just as the

reason has a history.

“…everything which took place in the sixties arose from a dissatisfaction with the phenomenological theory of the

subject, and involved different escapades, subterfuges, break-throughs, according to whether we use a negative or a

positive term, in the direction of linguistics, psychoanalysis or Nietzsche” (Foucault 1988b:24).

“It was Nietzsche, in any case, who burned for us, even before we were born, the intermingled promises of

dialectics and anthropology” (Foucault 1994:263).

In the ‘Order of Things’ Foucault looks upon Nietzsche as the first philosopher who reflects

upon language. Language loses its privileged position as a unity and its dispersion is revealed.

Nietzsche asked who is speaking, in order to account for the rallying point from where the unity

is constituted, a point where the fragments of language are gathered together and form a

temporary unity (Foucault 1994:305). By focusing on the speaking subject, discourse was

detached from its representation. Nietzschean reflections on language opened up a new field of

inquiry. ‘What is language?’ became the central question (Foucault 1994:306).

Nietzsche by his philological critique provided the dividing line after which Anthropology, in

this context the view that man is a unity, must be ‘uprooted’.

“In this, Nietzsche, offering this future to us as both promise and task, marks the threshold beyond which

contemporary philosophy can begin thinking again;…” (Foucault 1994:342).

Here Foucault is referring to the ‘death of God’ and the ‘death of Man’, which have opened up a

new mode of inquiry and made it possible to ask questions in a different manner. After this

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‘sleep of Anthropology’, where scientific inquiry was concerned with the essence of man and

where empirical knowledge was to lead us to ‘the truth of all truths’, “…there is no other way

than to destroy the anthropological ‘quadrilateral’ in its very foundations” (Foucault 1994:341).

“…the end of man, for its part, is the return of the beginning of philosophy” (Foucault

1994:342). The space left behind after the ‘disappearance’ of man does not have to be filled by

some other, ‘purified ontology’ or ‘radical thought of being’, in fact it is not a vacuum, but a

new space in which things can be arranged in a different way. Anthropology has, in a way, been

necessary, because it has made this opening possible (Foucault 1994:342-343).

Foucault makes it clear that, although Nietzsche has been an important figure in launching the

‘new era’ in philosophy, he himself cannot be labelled as a ‘Nietzschean’. There is no single

way to read Nietzsche. Nietzsche represented to Foucault a means to overcome the limitations

posed by Marxism or phenomenology. When confronted with the question of ‘Which Nietzsche

do you like’6, Foucault answered: “Obviously, not the one of ‘Zarathustra’, but the one of ‘The

Birth of Tragedy’, of the ‘Genealogy of Morals’” (Foucault in Mahon 1992:2). Here it is clear

that Foucault is mostly influenced by Nietzschean genealogy. Foucault refers to Nietzsche’s

works from the 1880’s, where Nietzsche questions truth, history of truth and the will to truth, as

being relevant for his own thought. But that is all that these two thinkers have in common.

Foucault does pursue his own goals (Foucault 1988b:32). Consequently, Foucault’s work cannot

be reduced to Nietzschean genealogy. It is much more complicated than the original reflections

on truth, power and the subject. Foucault is, according to Michael Mahon, a ‘better genealogist’

(Mahon 1992:2).

As seen above, comparison between these two authors is too simplistic. My aim is to place

Foucault within a context of certain intellectual tradition in order to show that he did not

formulate his notions in vacuum.

6 This question was asked by the Italian philosopher Giulio Preti in ‘Un dibattito Foucault-Preti’ in ‘Bimestre’ 22-23 (1972), 2.

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2.2 Reflection on the notions of ‘method’ and ‘theory’

The notions method and theory cannot be taken literally when talking about Foucault’s

approach. Foucault emphasises that he has not proposed a coherent method applicable in any

context.

“... I am not developing here a theory, in the strict sense of the term: the deduction, on the basis of a number of

axioms, of an abstract model applicable to an indefinite number of empirical descriptions” (Foucault 1989a:114).

The quote indicates that Foucault does not aim at forming a universal theory in order to analyse

indefinite number of cases; it is not thought of as a new science. Instead, Foucault used his

methods and was explicit about it. The earlier period is characterised by the analysis of

discourse, i.e. archaeology. But as his works advanced, Foucault’s method also included

genealogy and analysis of power, as well as analysis of knowledge and the body. Archaeology

and genealogy can be seen as the results of Foucault’s reflection on his own works. By

correcting and modifying them Foucault formed a more or less coherent body of method

(Foucault 1989a:206).

In the foreword to the English edition of the ‘Order of Things’ Foucault made it explicit how his

works, both those that have been completed and those not yet started, were intrinsically

connected to one another.

“I should like this work to be read as an open site. Many questions are laid out on it that have not yet found

answers; and many of the gaps refer either to earlier works or to others that have not yet been completed, or even

begun” (Foucault 1994:xii).

The quote indicates that Foucault’s method should not be seen as a closed entity. Instead, it is

dynamic and in constant development. It solves some problems, which again opens up for new

ones. Foucault is hinting that each new work arises as reflections on previous analyse. As Gary

Gutting notes, Foucault’s work has been driven by the subject matter under study, rather than by

‘prior methodological commitment’. Notions of archaeology and genealogy are conceptual

constructions, rather than meticulously premeditated methods (Gutting 1994:6). In Foucault’s

words “…theory does not express, translate or serve to apply practice: it is practice” (Foucault

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in Mills 2003:110). Here Foucault questions the distinction between a theory and practical

analysis. Every attempt to theorise is a practice.

Although Foucault describes his approach as a ‘neutral’ tool, a practice and not a new science,

many read Foucault as a theorist among others. I shall reflect on some points of criticism related

to Foucault’s claim of neutrality later on. Although I attempt to present Foucault on his own

terms, I am aware that many of his views are contested by others and refined by Foucault

himself. Therefore, my presentation of Foucault has the effect of fixing the concepts as if they

were finalised. The truth is that Foucault, as mentioned above, kept on developing his methods

until his death. But in order to engage in a meaningful discussion of Foucault, one has to have

an idea of the central issues, although they are still under development.

2.3 The connection between archaeology and genealogy

Although, archaeology and genealogy are used simultaneously throughout Foucault’s authorship,

the weighting of these approaches varies. Even though these two approaches have a different point

of departure, respectively, regimes of truth and regimes of practices, they cannot be completely

separated. Archaeology and genealogy are complementary to each other, one cannot entirely

describe the one and discard the other while at the same time they can be used alternately (Dreyfus

& Rabinow 1982:105).

Foucault makes it explicit that he no longer uses the word ‘archaeology’, since it no longer

encompasses all the levels he is interested in7. Nevertheless, it does not mean that archaeology as

such is irrelevant. The term ‘archaeology’ was used instead of saying ‘history’. It served to map out

the ‘desynchronisation between ideas about madness and the constitution of madness as an object’

(Foucault 1988b:31).

Foucault connects these two levels as follows:

“If we were to characterise it [disordered and fragmentary genealogies] in two terms, then ‘archaeology’ would be the

appropriate methodology of this analysis of local discursivities, and ‘genealogy’ would be the tactics whereby, on the 7 This interview was made in 1983, so it is during the ‘advanced’ stage of his work. Therefore, a new level of inquiry is added.

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basis of the descriptions of these local discursivities, the subjected knowledges which were thus released would be

brought into play” (Foucault 1980a:85).

Here Foucault views archaeology as a method within his genealogical approach. Archaeology

denotes a distinctive level of genealogical analysis. Foucault describes the interplay between these

levels in his ‘Two lectures’. Archaeology/genealogy does not denote yet another strictly defined

discipline like a ‘naïve or primitive empiricism’. It is criticism, which is pointed towards the local

and has an autonomous nature, i.e. it does not subscribe to any ‘established regimes of thought’. It

is a mode of research that contributes to a ‘return of knowledge’. It denotes the supremacy of life

and reality over any abstract theory. The process of this criticism reveals the level of ‘subjugated

knowledge’ (Foucault 1980a:81). This means that any systematisation disguises historicity of

concepts and their ruptured nature, which will be revealed. It becomes evident that ‘grand theories’

inhibit criticism; they have to be discarded if one is to engage in meaningful criticism. Further, the

oppressed body of knowledge has not yet passed the ‘threshold of scientificy’; it denotes a popular

knowledge, which should not be confused with common sense knowledge. This form of knowledge

is in opposition, not to science as such, but to effects of power linked to scientific discourse. One

has to resist discourse that is considered to be scientific. It is a ’historical knowledge of struggles’

and maintained by virtue of this struggle.

“…a genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, to render

them [knowledges in the hierarchical order of power associated with science], that is, capable of opposition and of

struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse” (Foucault 1980a:85).

Although I shall present archaeology and genealogy separately, both methods are still important

parts of these descriptions. By looking at archaeology and genealogy as different levels of analysis

one discovers variations in them, being at the same time able to define one by referring to the other.

In my own analysis of the TRC, I intend to combine archaeology and genealogy in order to map out

various aspects of the Commission’s work, such as the language used, as well as the subscription to

a prevailing discourse through the institutional set-up of the Commission.

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2.4 The author and unity of text

As said before, my aim is not to present a ‘total Foucault’. I shall focus upon a selection of concepts

that I consider central, thus proposing my own interpretation. I let myself be inspired by Foucault’s

own view, namely that an author is not some ‘real’ entity, a persona who constitutes a ‘privileged

moment of individualization in the history of ideas’. Foucault proposed an analysis of how the

author has gained the position and status he/she has in the history of ideas (Foucault 1984b:101).

Foucault proposes the term of ‘author function’ in order to designate the subject position that a

writing subject can take. “What difference does it make who is speaking?”. Instead of trying to

account for the authenticity and originality of a text, one should account for the rules of formation

that determine the circulation of discourse, as well as one should determine who can appropriate

this discourse for him/herself (Foucault 1984b:120).

Foucault, similarly, questions the unity of a ‘work’. “The work and the unity that it designates are

probably as problematic as the status of the author’s individuality” (Foucault 1984b:104).

The situatedness in time and place is not necessarily a matter of influence from scholars that

Foucault had become acquainted with. He is generally sceptical about the unity of notions of

‘author’ and ‘æuvre’ and ‘theories’. He wants to discard the idea of tradition that gives a unified

status to various phenomena, as well as of the notion of influence that links together phenomena

distant in time, and refers to repetition. These are the bodies of “…too magical a kind to be very

amenable to analysis” (Foucault 1989a:21-22). Foucault suggests an alternative view, that of

rupture and discontinuity, and calls for re-evaluation of disciplinary unities. Instead, his aim is to

map the regularities that “…made it possible to say what I did” (Foucault 1989a:114).

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3 The SATRC

3.1 Introduction

In order to follow Foucault’s example to be a practitioner rather than a philosopher, I shall put

Foucault’s ‘tools’ into practice. Foucault was interested in the real world. His engagement in society

had to have an effect, instead of, in Alan Sheridan’s words, remaining mythical (Sheridan 1980).

Before mapping out the rules of formation of the TRC’s discourse, I shall present some general

ideas regarding truth commissions and introduce the main thesis that guides my analyses.

After the first democratic elections in South African history and the inauguration of Nelson

Mandela as the President, the government faced the task of building a democratic society and a

new nation.

“My appeal is ultimately directed to us all, black and white together, to close the chapter on our past and to strive

together for this beautiful and blessed land as the rainbow people of God” (Tutu in Report I:23).

The previous regime had created a general mistrust in state institutions, not least the state justice

system that needed to be legitimised by the new government. The aim was to distance the

present democratic human rights discourse from the previous apartheid discourse. According to

De Lange, it is important how the transitional process unfolds, since it sets the stage for the

future; it ‘defines and even limits future options’ (De Lange 2000: 14-15). It was acknowledged

that the legacy of the apartheid system had to be dealt with in order to move forward. “It is only

by accounting for the past that we can become accountable for the future” (Tutu in Report I:7).

Truth commissions are considered useful in the transitional process of lifting the country from a

troubled past. They are means to create a human rights culture, while escaping the limitations of the

conventional judicial system. Truth commissions are increasing in number and attract wide

attention around the world (Hayner 2000:33-35).

According to Richard Wilson, human rights discourse has emerged as an alternative to authoritarian

forms of government, and it is increasingly in focus when countries in transition try to establish

their own rule of law and found their institutions, which must stand out against the previous

undemocratic systems. Human rights as a model for democratic societies is widely accepted. It has

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become a common reference frame in the mid-1980s and gained dominant position, especially after

the collapse of the former Soviet system, as well as due to ethnic nationalist conflict in the Balkans

(Wilson 2001:1). Human rights, based on democracy, provide nations in transition with a unifying

ideology and an alternative to ethnic nationalism based on cultural factors, such as race, language,

ethnicity or religion. What is required is a society based on individual citizenship, common

morality, and practices that would hold the divergent groupings together and create the identity of

belonging to a nation (Ignatieff in Wilson 2001:1).

Ideology helps to establish a new morality and marks a new era in terms of political leadership. By

the same token, the creation of a new official history becomes a central tool in the process of

presenting the new regime as ‘post-authoritarian’, or in the case of South Africa, ‘post-apartheid’

(Wilson 2001:xiv).

I adopt the view proposed by Wilson, that human rights provide societies in transition with a useful

unifying narrative that contributes to the legitimation of the policies of the new government in

power. My intention in this part of the thesis is to show how the discourse of human rights is

promoted and deployed by the TRC in order to legitimise and institutionalise the ANC’s position in

a new democratic government of SA by creating the notion of ‘rainbow nation’, as well as by

constructing new officially sanctioned history. It is noteworthy that while referring to the ANC, one

is not dealing with a single party that represents its own ideas, but with a phenomenon that claims to

be on a mission to speak for all of the nation and carry out the ‘national democratic revolution’

(Jensen 2001:99). Therefore, the ANC can be seen as a representative of the new regime. With

reference to Wilson’s thesis, the idea of transcendent and unified body of human rights has to be

rejected and ‘the history and social life of rights’ has to be examined instead. As seen above, truth

commissions are considered as one of the main tools in the nation-building process. “The

Commission of Truth and Reconciliation. It is the creation of a nation” (Constitutional Court Judge

Albie Sachs in Wilson 2001:13). Therefore, the Final Report will provide me with a point of entry

into discussing the formation of the TRC’s discourse and how it contributes to cementing the new

power relations.

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3.2 History of the SATRC

In this section I shall outline some general facts about the TRC.

The concept of a truth commission was first formulated by professor Kader Asmal in his inaugural

speech as Professor of Human Rights Law at the University of the Western Cape in 1992, but it was

not until 1994 that the debates began to surface in the Parliament, NGO’s, and the media (Graybill

2002: ix). Soon after Asmal aired his view on the necessity of investigating the past atrocities, the

National Executive Committee of the ANC launched an investigation of the ANC’s camps in exile

that had been accused of violating human rights in its camps. The committee concluded that the

allegations were true, but that these incidents should be seen against the background of human

rights violations that occurred in SA over a number of years. The Committee proposed the

appointment of a nationwide truth commission that would investigate this background (Report

I:50).

After the first democratic elections, the new government introduced the ‘Promotion of National

Unity and Reconciliation Bill’ in 1994. President Nelson Mandela signed the Bill into law on 19

July 1995. This law provided the framework within which the establishment of the South African

Truth and Reconciliation Commission became a reality (Report I:52-53).

3.2.1 Staff

The next step was the search for commissioners. The legislation required the selection of seventeen

commissioners who were highly regarded in the community. Various groupings, such as NGO’s,

churches, and parties were given an opportunity to appoint their candidates who were then publicly

interviewed by a multiracial, representative selection panel (Graybill 2002:4). The list of candidates

was given to the president and his cabinet for final selection. On Nov. 29, 1995 President Mandela

made the final selection. The commission was constituted of people who possessed high moral

integrity, were impartial and committed to human rights. They could not be high-profile members

of political parties, nor could they intend to apply for amnesty. The Chairperson of the Commission

was Nobel laureate Archbishop Desmond M. Tutu (Graybill 2002:3-4).

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3.2.2 The Mandate

The Commission was mandated to hold hearings about allegations of human rights abuses

committed from March 1, 1969, through May 10, 1994, the date of Mandela’s inauguration.

The main goals of the Commission were: giving a full account on gross human rights violations

committed during that period; restoring the victims’ dignity by letting them tell their stories, as well

as making recommendations to the government regarding reparations to the victims. Additionally,

the Commission’s goal was to consider granting amnesty to perpetrators who gave full account of

their actions, committed for political reasons (Report I:56-57).

The Commission defined a gross human rights violation as ‘any killing, abduction, torture or severe

ill treatment’ carried out or commanded by individuals with a political motive (Report I:72).

To achieve these goals, the TRC worked through three committees: the Committee on Human

Rights Violations (HRV), the Committee on Amnesty, and the Committee on Reparation and

Rehabilitation.

HRV Committee had a central role where approximately 20,000 victim statements were processed

(Report I:20). The Committee on Amnesty was appointed on Jan. 24, 1996 and worked

independently of the rest of the TRC, taking applications from those seeking amnesty (Report I:55).

The Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation was responsible for deciding how each victim

should be compensated (Report I:57).

3.2.3 Different phases of the TRC’s work

The work of the Commissions can be divided into three distinct phases: the hearings phase, the

statements phase, and the amnesty phase. These phases at times overlapped each other. Distinction

between these phases point out the fact that the aim and methods of the Commission changed

during its time of existence (Report I:154).

The hearings phase focused on public hearings, but, as the public awareness increased, along with

the number of victims who wanted to make statements, the focus shifted to statement taking.

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The amnesty phase was prolonged due to the increased influx of amnesty applications, as well as

due to the complicated nature of the application process. The Parliament allowed the enlargement of

the Amnesty Committee in order to meet these increased needs. Its methods combined public

hearings, data processing, and evidence collection (Report I:156-157).

3.2.4 Distinctive features of the TRC

As mentioned before, truth commissions share some characteristics, but they vary according to the

context. The SATRC stands out from any other truth commission due to a number of reasons.

One of the most important differences between the SATRC and other truth commissions was its

power to grant individual amnesty to perpetrators, i.e. its quasi-judicial power. Before amnesty

could be granted, the applicant had to disclose the full truth of what happened. In that way the

picture drawn of human rights violations was more detailed than anywhere else, and it was possible

to identify the perpetrators and hear the testimony about crimes directly from the persons involved

(Report I:7).

Another distinctive feature of the Commission was its process of public hearings, which were

broadcasted live on TV and radio. The method of public hearings made the Commission present in

the consciousness of many; inside as well as outside the borders of SA. It created debate about the

past, and raised the general awareness about issues faced by the nation (Report I:104). Hayner notes

that the public process provided ‘a window into the truth-seeking process itself’ (Hayner 2000:38).

Likewise, without the open process of the creation of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act,

where various actors in society had their say, and without the public selection process of the

commissioners, the mandate of the Commission, as Hayner evaluates, would have been weaker.

Further, the public and political support for the Commission would have suffered without the

opportunity for debate and influence on the process (Hayner 2000:38).

The Final Report (five volumes) was published in October 1998. It presented findings about 21,298

cases of human rights violation, and named hundreds of perpetrators (Report I:56).

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4 Archaeology - Presenting the key concepts and relating them to the

Final Report of the SATRC

4.1 Introduction

In the following chapter I shall present the method of archaeology. I adopt the notions of

archaeology and genealogy as distinctive approaches for the sake of clarity. This division will help

me to locate methodological variations in Foucault’s authorship, as well as to ‘test’ archaeology and

genealogy in relation to the regimes of truth and regimes of practices of the TRC.

As mentioned above, we are not dealing with some purposely-developed body of theory, so the fact

that I choose certain concepts instead of others should be seen in this light. I shall choose the

concepts that serve the purposes of problematising the Report and presenting my own narrative of

it.

In my presentation of archaeology I take outset in the ‘Archaeology of Knowledge’. Isolation of

‘The Archaeology of Knowledge’ from previous historical researches can, according to various

authors, pose a problem. Frank Kermode directly advises against starting with the ‘Archaeology of

Knowledge’ if one is interested in Foucault. The book is meant as an elaboration on the earlier

research and is therefore, according to Kermode, quite unintelligible on its own (Kermode8 in Smart

1994b:8).

I will run the risk of taking Foucault’s archaeological method out of context, by focusing only on

the ‘Archaeology of Knowledge’. This work is Foucault’s attempt to sum up the methods used in

previous works, which makes it a valuable help to understand the central concepts of the

archaeological approach.

4.1.2 The archive

The concept of ‘archaeology’ must not be confused with the scientific method of archaeology, as

we know it. It is Foucault’s attempt to find certain regularity of statements that is valid in a given

period. In Foucault’s words:

8 Original source: The New York Review of Books, 1973, 17 May, pp.36-39.

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“By this term I do not mean the sum of all the texts that a culture has kept upon its person as documents attesting to its

own past, or as evidence of a continuing identity; nor do I mean the institutions, which, in a given society, make it

possible to record and preserve those discourses that one wishes to remember and keep in circulation” (Foucault

1989a:129).

The archive, like episteme9, which was the equivalent notion used in works preceding the

‘Archaeology of Knowledge’, denotes rules of formation, which determine what can and cannot be

spoken in a given period. It is not tied to any speaking consciousness, but it is the system that

determines the appearance of statements and the general conditions of possibility of discursive

formations. The archive is a practice, which is anchored in time and place; it is not a static ‘library

of all libraries’, but historical á priori, the rules of which are historically determined (Foucault

1989a:127;130). Consequently, it is difficult to capture in time and describe exhaustively. Since we

are situated within the archive of our time, we cannot describe it; our speech is determined by the

archive we speak from (Foucault 1989a:129).

This structure cannot be reduced to the sum of knowledge10 that is available in the given epoch, or

to the fashion that determines the style of research. It has to be seen as a system that determines the

possibility of emergence of any scientific discourse, and the manner in which these discourses

interact with each other, as well as it determines their possible statements. Foucault also calls this

level ‘a positivity’ (Foucault 1989a:125). Every period in history has its own positivity, which

constitutes the rules in accordance with which the discursive practices formulates its objects.

Positivities can be described as a limited space, which makes communication between different

actors possible, it reveals to what extent those different actors speak of the same thing (Foucault

1989a:181).

9 The notion of episteme has undergone some changes as a result of Foucault’s re-evaluation of his archaeological approach. This explains also the confusion about different terms used, which seem to point towards the same function. The aim of the archaeological analysis is mapping out the subconscious patterns of knowledge that denotes the rules of formation that determine the constitution of discourses of a given period. This unconscious knowledge is called ‘episteme’. Another term to capture this function is historical ‘a priori’. Therefore, episteme, or a priori is the condition that makes the formation of a discourse possible and that allows it to function (Foucault 1994:xxii). In the AK Foucault has replaced the notion of episteme with that of an archive. 11 The notion of knowledge in Foucault’s work can be divided into two different levels. He uses the words ‘connaissance’ and ‘savoir’ to distinguish between them. Connaissance refers to a particular knowledge, such as different disciplines within science, whereas savoir can be understood as knowledge in general. Savoir can be described as something underlying i.e. conditions, which decide what kind of objects will be given to connaissance, or decide what kind of enunciations could be formulated (Foucault 1989a:15).

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4.1.3 The question of structuralism

Archaeological approach is also called a ‘structuralist epistemology’. Yet again, the notion of

‘structuralism’ should not be understood in a strict sense, since Foucault does not limit himself to a

structural analysis of a specific field. Yet, his analyses have a common trait, namely “…to establish

an epistemological critique of the strategic practices or structures of knowledge” (Keaney

1986:284).

The claim of structuralism deserves some comment. Alan Sheridan notes that Foucault’s earlier

works caused some misconception among readers. It was assumed that Foucault aimed at

broadening the field of application of the vocabulary of the structural linguistics11. Sheridan is of

the opinion that this confusion can be explained by the way structuralist thinkers aimed at

displacing man and consciousness from the central position. In addition, most of the structuralist

thinkers elaborated on notions like language and structure. Even though Foucault has this in

common with the structuralists, his views are more complex than that. Foucault does not wish to fit

reality into a structure. Instead, his aim is to map out historical changes. Language cannot be

reduced to a structure, but it can be seen as an act or event. In his earlier works, Foucault used

notions like ‘structural’, ‘signifier’, or ‘signified’, but these terms were used loosely, without

reference to Saussure’s structuralism as such (Sheridan 1980:90).

In the ‘Order of Things’12 Foucault notes that it is inaccurate to label him as structuralist. “…I have

used none of the methods, concepts, or key terms that characterize structural analysis” (Foucault

1994:xiv). In the interview ‘Truth and Power’, Foucault points out why he cannot be considered as

a structuralist. By introducing the concepts of ‘discontinuity’ and ‘event’ as entry points into the

historical analysis, Foucault distanced himself from structuralist analysis, which ruled out the event 11 Structuralism started to develop in the 1960’s. The main idea is that all our experiences are grounded on an invisible structure. This development grew out from the works of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure proposed the view that all signs were elements of the larger system within which they functioned and were dependent of. This view places language as a system that is subordinate to a structure that determines our use of words. Saussure indicated that the analysis of structure was part of a new science – semiology, which holds that all social spheres should be treated as a system of signs. Structuralism soon became the overarching name for divergent philosophical pursuits that adopted the linguistic model. Amongst structuralists one finds thinkers like Althusser, Barthes, Lacan, Claude Lévi-Strauss, each with their own field of study. This development had demolished the centrality of man as well as the prevalence of the view on history as a continuous development. The focus became the structure that preconditions man’s activity and even unconscious thought that is seen as structured by the language. The conflicting views on man and history in the emerging structuralism, on the one hand, and the existing phenomenology on the other, constituted the complicated background for Foucault’s own thought (Bernauer 1990:9-14). 12 ‘The order of Things’ was published in 1966 when structuralism was gaining a privileged position within intellectual circles. The title of the book was originally planned ‘The Archaeology of Structuralism’ (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982:vii).

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as something inferior, trivial, or accidental. The structuralist view takes outset from nodal points in

history and sees them in the light of some orderly, intelligible and transparent structure (Foucault

1980b:114).

Yet, on several occasions Foucault explains his relation to structuralism and how it has influenced

him.

“There may well be certain similarities between the works of the structuralists and my own work. It would hardly

behove me, of all people, to claim that my discourse is independent of conditions and rules of which I am very largely

unaware, and which determine other work that is being done today” (Foucault 1994:xiv).

As seen in the quote, Foucault is aware of the fact that he is placed within the prevailing discourse

and subordinated to its rules. It follows, that Foucault’s relationship to structuralism is reduced to a

mere condition and motto of the time that might have had some effect on his unconscious.

Structuralism, one way or another, influenced many of his contemporaries. Thus his own research

cannot entirely escape structuralism and must necessarily be formulated within the stage set by it.

In the following sections I shall introduce some central concepts of archaeology and the rules of

formation of discourse as described by Foucault: The unity of discourse, formation of objects,

formation of enunciative modalities, formation of concepts and formation of strategies. After

presenting the concepts, I shall relate them to the Report. My aim is not to offer a complete picture

that involves the entire Report; instead I shall use the Report selectively in order to illustrate some

claims put forth by Foucault. My aim is to follow the guidance of Foucault’s theoretical frame and

see how useful a tool it proves to be when analysing a delimited subject. I shall follow the logic of

the ‘Archaeology of Knowledge’.

4.2 Unity of discourse

Foucault’s point of departure in analysing the archive is the formulated statements or utterances.

One has to discard the idea of a homogeneous unity of discourse. The illusion of a homogeneous

unity of discourse can be exemplified by looking at a book as a material unity that seems to

transcend its own time and remain unchanged. One just has to pick up the book and get access to

the discursive unity that this particular book supports. But Foucault’s aim is to show that the

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frontiers of a book, as well as the frontiers of discourse are never final and clear-cut. The book is

timely and its unity relative. Despite of this seeming unity, the text of the book is caught up in a

complex web of references, i.e. to other texts, situations, individuals, and etc. Once these unities are

questioned, as well as the relativity of its construction recognised, the text loses its self-evidence.

One can no longer fail to admit that this book is what it is only on the basis of this complex

discursive field that the text was a part of at the time of its coming into being; a ‘node within a

network’ (Foucault 1989a:23). Similarly, all other self-evident unities are questioned, including

sciences and ideologies. Instead of expecting to find answers to questions regarding structure,

coherence, and systematicity by referring to their tranquil locus, one should pose a cluster of

questions to reveal the arbitrariness of these established systems of meaning.

“How can they be defined or limited? What articulations are they capable of? What sub-groups can they give rise to?

What specific phenomena do they reveal in the field of discourse?” (Foucault 1989a:26).

These unities can serve as a reference system that helps to outline the dynamic within, which

determines the laws according to which they are formed. Once these unities are suspended,

statements, whether written or spoken, are set free. Foucault calls them events. Before the formation

of a book or a science, or any other unity, events, as a totality of all effective statements, exist in a

neutral state in the ’space of discourse in general’. One is therefore led to take, as a starting point,

statements as linguistic events that have already been formulated and which seem to constitute a

limited or final coherent system in order to find the unities that are formed within (Foucault

1989a:27).

But one must not believe that the field of discursive events is unlimited. No, the field of discursive

events is always limited to linguistic statements that have been formulated. Therefore, the question

to be asked is not what has been said, but rather, how precisely this amount of discursive events

exist? Why have these particular statements been articulated among many others that would also

have been correct and possible? The search for origins is therefore over. One must take these

moments in a discourse as they appear and renounce any suggestion of infinite continuities. One

must rid oneself of the belief that behind every utterance there is a point of origin that is ever out of

reach, and that every statement is never more than a repetition of the once said (Foucault 1989a:27).

27

Another false connotation that one must rid oneself of is the conviction that all that is said in a

discourse is based on another ’silent’ level that precedes it. Everything that is manifest in a

discourse is therefore marked and influenced by the presence of this ’not-said’ which is then

covered and silenced by the manifest discourse. As Foucault puts it:

“... we must grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at

least its limits, establish its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms

of statements it excludes. We do not seek below what is manifest the half silent murmur of another discourse; we must

show why it could not be other than it was, in what respect it is exclusive of any other, how it assumes, in the midst of

others and in relations to them, a place that no other could occupy. The question to such analysis might be formulated:

what is this specific existence that emerges from what is said and nowhere else?” (Foucault 1989a:28).

By dissolving unities that were claimed to be natural and universal and freeing statements as events

in the discursive field, other kind of unities emerge. These are not unities the emergence of which is

caused by the intentional individual, but are due to interactions between statements. Neither is it a

kind of ‘hidden discourse’ that is responsible for the manifest discourse from within. By analysing

the relation between statements in discourse, one discloses regularity, a complex pattern that

designates their coexistence and mutual functioning (Foucault 1989a:29). The unity of discourse is

not based on the existence and stability of a particular object, but it consist of the interplay between

the rules that make the emergence of certain objects in a given period of time possible.

Another mode of relation between statements can be determined in terms of their form and type of

connexion, for example, a certain constant manner or style of statement. It is not so much the form

of the statement but the way in which different or even opposite statements coexist within

discourse. The locus of interest in this case would be rules that govern their mutual exclusion, their

transformation and their dependence on one another (Foucault 1989a:34). Further, a discursive

unity cannot be found in its intelligibility of concepts, and their level of abstraction but, rather, in

their mode of emergence and coexistence. Nor can the unity of discourse be found in the persistence

of its themes.

To make it short, discursive formations reveal different kinds of unity, it is a group of statements

related to one another in a particular way, so that statements, that first seem to differ and be in

opposition to one another, are nevertheless, subjects to same regularities that rule over other

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correlations in discourse. Therefore, discourse analysis tries to determine the historical a priori that

constitute the web of relations that binds different utterances to one another (and not the necessary

conditions that made the statements possible). This helps to map out ‘discursive formations’, i.e.

certain amounts of utterances that disclose regularity when put in relation to one another.

“Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects,

types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and

functioning, transformations), we will say ...that we are dealing with a discursive formation...” (Foucault 1989a:38).

A discursive formation does not fix relations between different elements once and for all, but it is

the principle of temporal coexistence and mutual process between series of temporal discursive

events. But on the other hand, practices of systematisation of different elements, inversely, also alter

domains that they relate to one another. The result of these relations is not limited to the discourse

itself, but is also felt in elements that they link to one another. In that way, discourse and the system

of formation are counterproductive (Foucault 1989a:75).

Rules that put different elements of discourse in relation to one another are called rules of

formation. These rules determine the appearance of objects, concepts, the choice of particular

themes, and modes of statements. They also govern the way elements coexist in a discourse, their

maintenance, or the way elements change and transform. Systems of formation also determine the

making of enunciations, the use of concepts and formation of strategies (theoretical choices); it is a

regularity of practice (Foucault 1989a:38;74).

4.2.1 The unity of the discourse of the SATRC

One of the tasks of the Commission was to:

“…prepare a comprehensive report which sets out its activities and findings, based on factual and objective information

and evidence collected or received by it or placed at its disposal” (Report I:136).

Its overall aim was to create a history that would be acceptable to all groupings in the society and

that would serve as a reference frame in the future. “We believe we have provided enough of the

truth about past for there to be a consensus about it” (Report I:18). Although it was acknowledged

that the Report did not present the ‘whole story’ (Report I:2), its aim still was to present as

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comprehensive a history as possible, considering its only two and a half year of existence. The

Report will provide ‘a road map’ for scholars, journalists and researchers who wish to learn about

SA’s past. It’s ‘greatest legacy’ is its place in the National Archive as the authorised version of

truth about the past (Report I:2).

The report was designed to stand on its own. In Hayner’s words “…the picture painted by

thousands of victim statements speaks for itself…” (Hayner 2002:231). It was assumed that by

letting the facts ‘speak for themselves’ the Report will stand out as unbiased and objective.

Therefore, the Commission went to great lengths to guarantee the unbiased approach and objectivity

of its methods. Desmond Tutu asserts:

“I have been at great pains to demonstrate the Commission’s independence and lack of bias because we are concerned

that its work and report should gain the widest possible acceptance” (Tutu in Report I:15).

The Commission seems to present the Report as something that exceeds the time and place of its

emergence and something that will remain unchanged throughout time. The ideal is to carve out the

clear truth from the scrubby landscape of scattered facts and events. As described by Foucault, one

just has to pick up the book and get access to the discursive unity that this particular book supports.

But, the Report emerged from a concrete time and place and its unity is, therefore, relative. It

should be seen as a unity of statements, which are bound together by rules of formation that

determine the appearance of particular statements. The Report is a practice of creating a certain kind

of reality by linking together various elements in a unique way and give rise to specific utterances.

The Report with its unique statements seems to constitute a coherent unity, which makes it a useful

entry point into the discourse of the TRC.

4.3 Formation of objects

Foucault focuses on medical discourse on madness in order to analyse the formation of objects.

Firstly, one must delineate levels on which some modes of being, or states of affairs, according to

prevailing conceptual codes, types of theory and modes of rationalisation come into being and gain

a particular status. Foucault names this regulatory principle as ‘surfaces of emergence’ (Foucault

1989a:41). Once these individual differences are noted, they can be described and inquired into, i.e.

they gain the status of an object. These levels of emergence differ from society to society and from

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one historical period to other. These sites can be the family, the religious community, the

workplace, and the school and etc. Each of these sites can be characterised by their own normative

codes that differentiate between the normal and abnormal or between the ordinary and rare

(Foucault 1989a:41).

Every discourse, for example psychiatric discourse, has its own rules by which it circumscribes its

field of inquiry and defines its objects, making them manifest and describable. But, one also has to

mark authorities that have the right to define the field of inquiry and objects worth of operating

with. Foucault calls this system the ‘authorities of delimitation’ (Foucault 1989a:41). For example,

in the 19th century it was medicine that constituted the legitimate authority, which constructed the

notion of madness as an object. The medical discourse was not alone in this, different other

discourses, like the religious authority or penal system also contributed to the defining of madness.

One can draw a parallel with above-described relations between different elements of discourse.

Discursive formations too are subject to a correlative system that binds them together with one

another. Relations that are formed and operationalised give rise to a variety of new objects. To

come back to the defining authority, it is itself a whole system with its own rules, practices, a body

of knowledge, individuals who gain authority by possessing this knowledge, and an authority,

which must be acknowledged by society (Foucault 1989a:41-42).

The third aspect that one has to look at while trying to map out the rules of object formation, is the

system according to which objects, once recognised, will be segregated, categorised, and related to

one another. This system is called the ‘grids of specification’ (Foucault 1989a:42). This system

denotes prevailing views on, for example, the soul with its qualities; or the body, as a three-

dimensional entity that determine how objects or other elements of discourse are linked to one

another.

Recognition of these different phases of object formation, as described above, may leave one with

the understanding that it is levels of emergence, recognised authorities or the fashion of

categorization that provide objects. No, objects are not pre-constructed, pre-formed before their

mere ‘listing’ and ‘naming’ by discourse. The question is not what one or other thing is, but what

made the emergence of objects possible, and once they have appeared, how they have become a part

of the discourse, i.e. have become common knowledge, something that can be taken up again, and

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again, adjusted, altered, or even refuted (Foucault 1989a:43). Therefore, discourse is not

characterised by its peculiar objects, but by relations that are in force within discourse and

correlations made with other discourses, which give rise to various objects. The formation of

objects is the result of interaction between how discourse circumscribes its field, and authorities that

define and categorise objects. A discursive formation can be defined by virtue of its objects, how

these objects have emerged, and how discourse, without having to alter itself, could produce objects

that are often highly dispersed. It follows that one cannot speak of everything at any time. Objects

do not just emerge out of the blue. This requisite system of relations means that objects do not exist

in a kind of neutral zone, where they could be ‘discovered’ and moved into the field of visibility.

Objects exist only on the grounds of this complex web of relations that are established between

“... institutions, economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of

classification, modes of characterisation; and those relations are not present in the object; ...They do not define its

internal constitution, but enables it to appear, to juxtapose itself with other objects, to situate itself in relation to them, to

define its difference, its irreducibility, and even perhaps its heterogeneity, in short, to be placed in a field of exteriority”

(Foucault 1989a:45).

It follows that the idea of a discourse as a closed unity, has to be discarded and replaced with the

idea of unities that constitute a field of interplay between above-mentioned aspects that form a

structure that is not arbitrary, yet remains invisible. Structure, in this context, should not be

understood as something that is given voice in discourse, or something that can be ‘discovered’ by

interpreting facts of statements. No, it is not a ‘secret discourse’ behind the manifest discourse.

Therefore, analysing statements cannot find it. Regularity can be found by analysing the emergence,

coexistence, transformation, and the mutual functioning of statements. It becomes evident that

behind uttered statements there is regularity that gives rise to certain statements and no others, thus

forming a discursive unity.

Foucault points to the aspect of ‘exteriority’, in relation to which the emergence of object should be

looked at. Foucault calls institutions, economic and social processes, and other processes as listed

above, ‘primary relations’, and relations that are formulated within discourse, ‘secondary

relations’. Primary relations exist independently from discourse and its objects, they can be

analysed in their own right, but they are not necessarily a part of the rules of formation of objects.

Secondary relations are also independent from the ‘real dependencies’, i.e. primary relations, and

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these relations, as the primary relations do not represent relations that give rise to objects. Foucault

has identified a third system of relations that he calls ‘discursive relations’ (Foucault 1989a:45).

Foucault sees it important to map out discursive relations and their relation to these other two forms

of relations.

Discursive relations are, therefore, neither internal to discourse, i.e. they do not establish a

rhetorical structure between statements, nor are they external to discourse limiting it and forcing it

to include certain statements. They are ‘at the limit’ of discourse. They determine the formation of

certain relations within discourse, so it becomes possible to speak of and analyse certain objects. In

other words, these relations constitute discourse as a practice and not as facts stated, language used,

or its set-up. In that way one breaks the spell of things with interior essence. Things are established

in their transparency and related to the structure of rules that constitute the conditions of their

appearance as objects in a discourse. “...what we discover is neither a configuration, nor a form, but

a group of rules that are immanent in a practice, and define it in its specificity ” (Foucault

1989a:46). It follows that discourse is something more that just a language and utterances, but is

also a practice of formation of objects.

4.3.1 The formation of the object of forensic truth

To illustrate how individual statements, if linked together, constitute a unity, I shall look at the

notion of ‘truth’ as it appears in the Report.

Truth was a central element of the discourse of the TRC. The TRC operated with an understanding

of truth as something that exists ‘out there’ and which can be discovered by appropriate methods. In

Hayner’s words: “However, it [truth commission] can reveal global truth of the broad patterns of

events, and demonstrate without question the atrocities that took place…” (Hayner 2002:85). The

statement indicates that, although there may be some methodological problems in the process of

revealing truth, however, the existence of truth, as such, should not be questioned.

I am aiming at looking at the emergence of the particular understanding of truth that the TRC was

operating with. According to my methodological frame, truth cannot be seen as a stable object with

an objective and independent existence. Therefore, a particular understanding of truth should be

seen as a result of a number of aspects, such as modes of rationalisation or types of theory. These

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aspects give raise to a particular view on truth and it is according to their rules of formation that

truth gains its status; Foucault defines this principle as ‘surfaces of emergence’. I shall look at how

a particular understanding of truth emerged and gained its privileged status in the discourse of the

TRC.

The site of the emergence was the TRC, which itself was the result of rules of formation. The TRC

was characterised by its human rights discourse. Human rights discourse set the normative rules,

which defined what statements were acceptable within that frame and what were not. Similarly, its

mandate and methods further reduced the number of possible objects in discourse. It follows that

the TRC can be characterised as ‘an authority of delimitation’, it was sanctioned by the government,

and were thereby given the right to define its objects the way it saw fit. As mentioned before, the

TRC itself was a complicated system with its own rules, practices, knowledge, and staff. It gained a

prominent position and authority in society with the help of its capable staff, and objective methods,

not to mention, the help and support from the international community.

As described, the TRC came into existence because of the inclination towards human rights

discourse in the communities in transition. This view functioned as a ‘grid of specification’. The

grid of specification with its views on, among others, individual rights and intrinsic right to truth,

constituted the frame within which the TRC defined and linked objects or other elements of

discourse to one another. Everything in the TRC’s discourse was understood and defined against the

background of this view.

In the following section I shall look at how the object of truth, once recognised, was categorised and

related to other elements.

The TRC operated with four different types of truth: factual or forensic truth; personal or narrative

truth; social or ‘dialogue’ truth; and healing and restorative truth (Report I:110).

a) Factual or forensic truth denotes: “The familiar legal or scientific notion of bringing to light

factual, corroborated evidence, of obtaining accurate information through reliable

(impartial, objective) procedures…” (Report I:111).

b) Personal and narrative truth denotes personal narratives of victims and perpetrators. In

Tutu’s words: “This Commission is said to listen everyone. It is therefore important that

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everyone should be given a chance to say his or her truth as he or she sees it…” (Tutu at a

hearing of the Commission in Port Elizabeth on 21 May 1996. Report I:112). Here the

emphasis is on the healing potential of story telling.

c) Social truth can be described in Judge Albie Sachs words: “’Dialogue truth’…is social truth,

the truth of experience that is established through interaction, discussion and debate”

(Report I:113). In this context participation becomes the key element in forming truth. It

opens up for participation in the public debate about past, as well as about the Commission

itself. The process of dialogue itself is considered important.

d) Healing and restorative truth was to “…contribute to the reparation of the damage inflicted

in the past and to the prevention of the recurrence of serious abuses in the future” (Report

I:114). This form for truth served the purpose of public acknowledgement of what happened

in order to restore the dignity of victims.

The TRC operated with a multi faceted notion of truth. This is explained by the fact that the TRC

used different methods to gain acceptance and achieve its coals. The Report states:

“Truth as factual, objective information cannot be divorced from the way in which this information is acquired; nor can

such information be separated from the purposes it is required to serve” (Report I:114).

This statement indicates that objective truth is anchored in the context in which it has occurred, and

that it serves a certain purpose - to promote national unity and reconciliation.

The Report has been criticised by its lack of guidelines for how these different notions of truth are

linked to each other (Wilson 2001:37). In my opinion these notions can be related to the broad

mandate of the TRC13. They were necessary components in order to appeal to and meet the

expectations of all groupings in the society. The inclusion of the narrative forms of truth legitimised

the TRC’s discourse on the emotional level, since it appealed to people’s feelings and showed that

the Commission was not motivated by ‘technical rather than moral considerations’ (Report I:156).

In the following section I shall link each of these four facets of truth to the purpose they served.

13 Objectives and functions of the mandate are described in the Report vol. I, p.55.

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- The factual truth served the purpose of: ‘establishing as complete a picture as possible of

the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights’ during the period

noted above.

- Narrative truth relates to the objective of ‘restoring the human and civil dignity of victims

by granting them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations’.

- Social truth relates to the unique feature of SATRC, namely its ‘open and transparent

nature’. It refers to public hearings, media broadcasting, and participation of various actors

in formulating the Act. The notion of social truth served the purpose of promoting the

Commission’s process as ‘as inclusive and as non-elitist as possible’ (Report I:20).

- The last category, healing truth, is closely related to the narrative truth, but it also includes

the aspect of healing the wounds of the soul of each individual and the nation as a whole for

the sake of future. It is an attempt to ‘shut the door on the past’ and ‘move into a glorious

future’ (Report I:22).

These categories are interrelated, but as Wilson rightly notes, the Report does not reflect on how

these elements relate to one another (Wilson 2001:37).

The focus and methodology of the Commission changed as the work advanced, resulting in a shift

of the paradigm of truth – from narrative forms of truth to the forensic truth. The Report is based on

the model of forensic truth, which, as Wilson notes, is the only one given any epistemological value

(Wilson 2001:37). This move was vital in order to solidify the TRC’s version of history through the

claim of objectivity. The Report notes:

“…the Commission was a legal institution with the responsibility of making defensible findings according to

established legal principles. This was particularly important, both to safeguard the credibility of the Commission’s final

report…” (Report I:144).

As mentioned before, the mandate of the Commission also involved the therapeutic side of truth

telling, thus making it necessary to include public hearings and private interviews in the

methodology, as well as to formulate the multi-faceted notion of truth. But, in the end, the

therapeutic side of the TRC was undermined, since there were no lasting benefits to be reaped from

this method. The Report states that

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“…not all relevant information was obtained when the victim testified in public, placing an additional burden on those

attempting to corroborate the statement at a later stage” (Report I:144).

The method of hearings proved to be an impediment, which added extra strain to commissioners.

Public testimonies had no further use apart from being a ‘positive’ and ‘affirming’ experience to

those who testified. Consequently, the therapeutic side of the Commission was sacrificed on the

altar of objectivity.

“In general, the Commission sought to be both therapeutic in its process and rigorous in its findings, but sometimes the

effort to satisfy one objective made it more difficult to attain the other” (Report I:144).

Objective methods served as legitimisation of state institutions. When asked if the victims’

testimonies were included in the IMS, Janice Grobbelaar answered: “No…Hearings have to do with

legitimation and recognizing people’s experiences” (Grobbelaar in Wilson 2001:41).

The scientific ideal, which was deployed to emphasize the status of the Report, was decisive for the

way these four elements, i.e. four notions of truth appeared and coexisted in the TRC’s discourse. In

the beginning of the TRC’s work they were all considered important, because of the broad mandate.

But, as the work advanced, it became evident that the purpose of the TRC was best served by

adopting the scientific model represented by the notion of forensic truth. The other elements were

undermined in the contents of the Report.

As seen above, the notion of truth had many meanings. Truth was defined and got its meaning

according to the context in which it was deployed, as well as according to the end it served. The

above illustrates how the forensic truth emerged as an object of discourse, as well as how it became

a common knowledge. Even if the ideal was objective truth, the other forms of truth were not

entirely discarded, thus emphasising the fact that understanding of truth altered from situation to

situation. The fact that truth was discussed, adjusted, altered, or if necessary refuted, emphasises its

central position in the discourse of the TRC.

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4.4 Formation of enunciative modalities

In the following section I shall discuss the subject of discourse. The question is, who, among the

totality of subjects, has access to the discourse and the right to use that kind of language? Certainly,

statements do not have the same effect and weight from individual to individual. This indicates the

fact that the individual, while uttering the statements, cannot be set apart from the relations that give

the subject its position within the discourse. Factors that determine subject’s position are: access to

and possession of knowledge, competences, established norms and institutions, which the

individual represents, and which legitimise his discourse with its specific objects and modes of

verification and refutation. Furthermore, subject positions are determined by the judicial system that

gives him/her the legal rights, as well as the right to use a certain language. Relations that the

individual has with other individuals or groups that possess their own status and rights also

determine it. The subject’s position in a discourse may vary from situation to situation, depending

on his/her position in relation to others. In one situation he/she can be the person of authority,

asking questions, while in other situation the individual can be the person following directions and

being the listening part, i.e. he/she could be either the informer or the informed. Not all positions

are accessible to the subject, but only those permitted by the anterior body of rules that are in

operation (Foucault 1989a:51).

Therefore, the subject of discourse should not be seen as a unifying function, a permanent reference

point, the activities and speech of which is the manifestation of conscious intensions. Instead, the

individual is dispersed between different positions that discursive relations delegate to him/her. The

seeming unity of the individual, as well as links between different positions, sites and statuses is not

an indicator of an anterior consciousness, but of discursive practices. Once again, one should look

for regularity in various positions of subjectivity instead of pre-existing unities or an ‘inner realm’

of which the manifested discourse is a verbal expression (Foucault 1989a:55).

4.4.1 The formation of enunciative modalities through the example of Desmond Tutu

In the following section I shall look at the speaking subject in the TRC’s discourse. Firstly, I shall

outline some outer and inner circumstances that shaped the discourse of the TRC and made it what

it was. This will help to explain how Archbishop Desmond Tutu gained the prominent position as a

Chairperson of the TRC, as well as how he became the personification of justice, reconciliation and

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truth. I have chosen to illustrate the functioning of the rules of formation of enunciative modalities

mostly through the example of Desmond Tutu, because of his position. It gave him unlimited access

to the discourse, as well as a right to represent it to the world outside.

First of all, to understand the possibility of formation of the TRC and its discourse, one has to

understand the wider context, which contributed to the formation of this event. As mentioned

before, official truth seeking is an increasing practice in countries in transition. Further, the increase

in the number and popularity of truth commissions is in line with the development within the

international community, where the discourse of human rights has emerged as an alternative to

undemocratic forms of government. As stated in the Report, the international community has

declared apartheid to be a crime against humanity, as has the Christian community in the country

(Report I:15). As a result of the fall of the Soviet Union, ANC could no longer be seen as a

communist threat. Consequently, this reason failed as a legitimate rationale in preventing social

change, combined with the National Party (NP) realising that it had to compromise in order to

survive. All these relations contributed towards forming a favourable climate for the government to

form the TRC.

Within the country, the Judaeo-Christian tradition and African traditional values were highly

regarded “they are sources of inspiration to most South-Africans” (Report I:127). These traditions

emphasise communal healing and restoration. The traditional values can be integrated in the term

‘Ubuntu’. It is described as ‘humaneness’ – “ people are people through other people” (Report

I:127). It is an ideal of community based on ‘reciprocity, respect for human dignity, community

cohesion and solidarity’. This ‘humanitarian and caring ethos’ was closely linked, as seen earlier,

to restorative justice (Report I:127). Tutu described this ethos as follows:

“God has given us a great gift, ubuntu… Ubuntu says I am human only because you are human. If I undermine your

humanity, I dehumanise myself. You must do what you can to maintain this great harmony, which is perpetually

undermined by resentment, anger, desire for vengeance. That’s why African jurisprudence is restorative rather than

retributive” (Tutu in Wilson 2001:914). Wilson notes that Archbishop Tutu was the main advocate for ‘ubuntu’, that implied forgiveness

and restorative justice.

14 Originally from Profile in ‘Mail and Guardian’, 17 March 1996.

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The elements listed above were all part of rules of formation of the enunciative modalities. In this

light, the TRC represented the established norms within SA, as well as within the international

community. Further, Archbishop Tutu, as mentioned earlier, best personified these norms, since he

was seen as a highly regarded example of moral values – a ‘voice of conscience’ to use Arlene

Getz’s expression (Getz in Newsweek 2004). Tutu as ‘a man of immense moral authority’ (BBC

Online Network 1998) had the perfect combination of competences that gave him the prominent

position within SA’s public sphere, and made him the candidate for the chairmanship of the TRC. I

shall outline some aspects that have contributed to this status.

Desmond Tutu, winner of the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize for his demand for a non-violent end to

apartheid, has always been in the public eye. In 1975 he was appointed Dean of St. Mary’s

Cathedral in Johannesburg, the first black person to hold that position. He was the first black

General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches15 in 1978 (Norwegian Nobel

Committee 1984). He has been an active campaigner against apartheid, besides being the Anglican

Archbishop. BBC Online notes that Tutu has involved the Church of South Africa in the political

struggle (1998 BBC Online). This point is emphasised by Egil Aarvik, Chairman of the Norwegian

Nobel Committee in his Presentation Speech: “ Both through these objectives [equal civil rights for all …] and through its practical activities the South African

Council of Churches has obviously exceeded the normal scope of such an organisation. The Council has become a

trailblazer in the campaign for human rights, a central force in a liberation struggle and an increasingly wide-ranging

support organisation for the many victims of the …racial discrimination (Norwegian Nobel Committee 1984). He has declared that: “I never learnt to hate”16 (BBC Online 1989) and he ‘fought with the weapons

of the spirit and reason’ (Norwegian Nobel Committee 1984). His tireless efforts for peace in SA

had earned him a status as a symbol of freedom and hope for the future.

15 The Council of Churches is both a joint forum for the churches of South Africa and the national representative for the World Council of Churches. It includes all the major churches in the country (except the Boer Church). The Catholic Church is a so-called associate member, but is also one of the Council’s strongest supporters. As around 75% of all citizens of South Africa are members of a church, the body is a very representative organisation. Few other organisations can make the same claim to speak for the black population (Norwegian Nobel Committee 1984). 16 Here it is referring to his childhood and to the idealism of his parents as referred to by Norwegian Nobel Committee 1984.

40

“His clear standpoints and his fearless attitude have made his name a unifying symbol for all groups of freedom

campaigners in Africa” (Norwegian Nobel Committee 1984).

As claimed in the Report, the TRC was a perfect tool to create widely accepted history, because of

its claim of impartiality (Report I: 10-11). The TRC as an officially sanctioned body possessed and

had an unlimited access to knowledge, as well as it had competences in the form of scientific

methods. I will come back to the methods of the TRC under the section of Formation of Strategies.

Scientific methods legitimised its claims of objectivity and gave it access and right to use certain

language. The TRC provided its members with a subject position through which they had the

authority to speak in a certain manner.

Not everyone had an access to this position. As we have seen, individuals like Tutu were qualified

to gain access to it. Additionally, Tutu also lived up to the ideal of impartiality and objectivity by

declaring that: “I’m not a member of the ANC, and I’ve never been a member of any political

party…” (Tutu in Newsweek 2004). Although, spoken of as a ‘voice of conscience’ Tutu self

emphasised that religion is intrinsically neutral.

“I keep having to remind people that religion in and of itself is morally neutral. Religion is like a knife. When you use a

knife for cutting up bread to prepare sandwiches, a knife is good. If you use the same knife to stick into somebody’s

guts, a knife is bad. Religion in and of itself is not good or bad - it is what it makes you do… (Tutu in Newsweek

2004).

The quote indicates that being a ‘man of God’ does not imply that one adopts a certain standpoint

and looks at events in a particular way. Neutrality, in this regard means that one accepts different

standpoints as legitimate without judging them from a personal view.

The above conditions give Tutu the right to speak of reconciliation, restorative justice, healing,

harmony, morality, truth, future prospects etc. In fact, Tutu’s personality helped the TRC to

accomplish the goal of ‘reconciliation as a way of life’ (Report I:49). He set a personal example of

forgiveness and ‘generosity of spirit’ (Report I:17). Tutu personified the TRC as a ‘wounded

healer’ (Report I:22). As expressed in the Report:

“However painful the experience, the wounds of the past must not be allowed to fester. They must be opened. They

must be cleansed. And balm must be poured on them so they can heal” (Report I:7).

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Discourse of healing represented the abovementioned therapeutic side of the truth-telling process

and gave the wider public an illusion of this being the main concern of the Commission. Therefore,

a Chairman who personified these qualities was a benefit for the image of the Commission as a

whole.

The TRC, with its rhetoric legitimised the commissioners’, including Tutu’s, methods of

verification and refutation. As Foucault states, individuals’ position or relation to other groups and

individuals vary from situation to situation. This process was illustrated in public hearings, where

the commissioners were interchangeably, on the one hand, in the position of asking questions and,

on the other hand, being informed by the statement givers.

Although I used the example of Desmond Tutu to illustrate the formation of subject position, and

outlined his personal merits as preconditions for gaining access to the discourse of the TRC, one has

to bear in mind Foucault’s thesis that it is not necessarily the subject of the statement that has

produced the statements with a certain purpose in mind, but it is the complicated body of rules of

formation that give raise to certain utterances. In this light, although Tutu is seen as an author of

certain expressions and statements, one has to look at the situation as a whole to understand how

certain statements appeared instead of other possible ones. In this case I refer back to the starting

point, where I outlined the general atmosphere of human rights within the international community,

combined with the situation in SA. The peaceful transition necessitated the discourse of

reconciliation and bridge-building, instead of retaliation. Additionally, the wide appeal of the

African traditional values to the population constituted the rules that gave rise to utterances formed

by the TRC and that were best personified by Desmond Tutu.

4.5 Formation of concepts

As seen above, analysis of the formation of objects should not take as its starting point words that

describe objects, nor things with their supposed interiority. Neither can the analysis of subject

positions account for the psychological interiority of enouncing individuals. This seeming stability

and regularity that objects and enunciative individuals possess should be seen as results of

discursive practices.

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The same applies to the formation of concepts. Concepts do not exist through time ’ready made’, or

as something that one ’borrows’ from history in order to make a discourse. Nor can the formation of

concepts be related to a steady accumulation of knowledge. The formation of concepts should be

described at the discursive level, i.e. at the level of a body of rules that establishes specific forms of

coexistence between statements. The question is not how abstract are concepts, nor the scope of

their description, but which concepts are included or excluded from discourse. The focus is on rules

of ordering of different elements, disparate as they may be. How are these elements linked to one

another, thus manifesting a set of concepts that are specific to certain types of discourses?

The rules of formation of concepts do not operate only in the perception of the enunciating

individual, but are in force anonymously, thus operating similarly on all individuals who take a

position and speak from a certain discourse. However, this logic of formation varies from discourse

to discourse, and is therefore not applicable on every domain. The rules of formation of concepts

can be described only in a particular discourse. The most one can do is to compare the rules of

formation of concepts with similar processes in other discourses (Foucault 1989a:63).

4.5.1 The formation of key concepts of the SATRC

In this section I shall take a closer look at the concepts used by the TRC. Already the name of the

Commission ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ puts focus on two of the main concepts

that appear and reappear in different combinations. I shall see how the central concepts in the

TRC’s vocabulary - ‘truth’, ‘justice’, and ‘reconciliation’ are linked to one another, disparate, as

they may seem; how they get their specific meaning by being related to one another and other

elements of the TRC’s discourse. One discovers how they overlap and interweave. For the sake of

clarity I try to maintain the categorisation.

4.5.1.1 Truth

As seen above, truth telling constituted one of the pillars of the discourse of the TRC. The TRC

identified four different forms of truth, amongst which the forensic truth was given the central

position. In this section I look closer at the meaning of the concept of ‘truth’ as expressed in the

Report. As Wilson notes, the prevailing idea regarding truth commissions worldwide is that truth is

the key element in the nation-building process; truth will lead to reconciliation and national unity.

Searching for truth is regarded as a special trait of South African culture. In former ANC provincial

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minister Jessie Duarte’s words: “Let’s have the truth and use the truth to build a nation…”

(Duarte17 in Wilson 2001:13).

Truth, in this context, serves as an empty signifier that can be filled according to the situation.

Building a nation in SA’s context is a complicated matter, which requires the existence of some

specific conditions. The TRC promoted its notion of truth in order to contribute to the creation of a

favourable environment for nation-building. The collective memory of most of the population was

filled with harrowing experiences that created the feeling of resentment. Therefore, it was necessary

to link truth to the notion of ‘healing’. “There can be no healing without truth” (Report I:4). Here

truth is seen as a precondition for healing, which again is seen as a necessary step towards peaceful

co-existence of conflicting groups. As seen above, the multifaceted truth aimed at achieving wide

acceptance as well as it left room for manoeuvres as the situation required.

The notion of ‘healing truth’ served the purpose of giving the nation hope, since it promised to

‘cleanse’ the wounds and ‘pour balm on them, so they can heal’ (Rreport I:7). Healing was equalled

with speaking ‘truth in love’ (Report I:16). It was a call for impartial investigation of the past in

order to ‘make the right diagnosis’, to find a solution to existing problems, or ‘prescribe the correct

medicine’ (Report I:17). The emphasis on the Christian value of healing can be seen as an attempt

to prepare the ground for what followed, namely, the sacrifice of the possibility of retaliation, as a

result of adopting the way of restorative justice. “Truth can be tough”, as expressed in the Report

(Report I:120). Therefore, there had to be some form of reward that justified this sacrifice,

compensated for eventual disappointment, and cultivated the attitude of ‘generosity of spirit’

(Report I:17).

Truth was also linked to the future of the country, since “It is only by accounting for the past that

we can become accountable for the future” (Report I:7). The painful process of truth seeking was a

necessary step towards a new democratic society. The ‘right diagnosis’ i.e. knowledge about past,

was seen as a help to avoid the same happening in the future. Truth that emerged at hearings, in

victims’ statements, and in the amnesty process helped in formulating recommendations for the

Government, which aimed at preventing human rights violations in the future; for example, human

rights training for security forces, human rights education in schools and universities (Report I:122).

17 This quote originates from Wilson’s personal interview with Jessie Duarte.

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Truth was also linked to the notion of ‘freedom’. Freedom in this context denoted free from the

past, from the fear that accompanied the previous unjust minority rule. It was a promise to liberate

the citizens of the new SA from fear, and restore their dignity. This would unfold their creativity

and lead to full participation in the life of society (Report I:125). This rule also applied to the

perpetrators. Here ‘freedom’ was used more literally. Perpetrators were given the opportunity to

confess their crimes and freedom was granted in exchange for truth. In the light of the traditional

value of ubuntu, confession of crimes was seen as liberating for perpetrators as it was for victims,

since it helped to restore the dignity of all involved. It freed the offenders from the burden of the

guilty consciousness and involved them in resolving the conflict (Report I:126).

4.5.1.2 Reconciliation

The Commission aimed at achieving reconciliation between conflicting groups. The Report tried to

define what was meant by ‘reconciliation’, as well as it tried to identify multiple levels of the term

(Report I:107). Here too the aim was to formulate a concept as inclusive as possible. ‘True

reconciliation’ is based on full truth, nothing less would do or have a lasting effect. “…it is only on

the basis of truth that true reconciliation can take place” (Report I:18). Therefore, as truth can be

tough, so can reconciliation. Reconciliation is not about ‘being cosy’, it is not ‘easy’ nor ‘cheap’;

one has to ‘face up reality’. Consequently, is can be divisive in the beginning (Report I:18). But, the

anger and division that emerges in the process is a healthy reaction. The Report made it explicit that

suppressed anger is an impediment to reconciliation (Report I:117). Here again, the nation was

called to sacrifice, this time in the name of reconciliation. In order to achieve this, the right amount

of forgiveness was required. The victims have shown ‘an astonishing magnanimity’ and

‘willingness to forgive’, which was seen as a precondition for reconciliation. The perpetrators were

thereby called to confess ‘without qualification’, so that there would be something to forgive

(Report I:18). As a result, the process of reconciliation can go on, since, as expressed by Father

Michael Lapsley: “I need to know who to forgive in order to endeavour to do so” (Report I:107). By

the same token, offenders “…were given the opportunity to acknowledge their responsibility to

contribute to the creation of a new South African society” (Report I:110). In other words,

reconciliation was linked to ‘moral responsibility’. The above indicates the view on reconciliation

as an ongoing process, “…reconciliation is both a goal and a process” (Report I:106).

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The above denotes reconciliation in the sense of coming to terms with the truth about the past, as

well as in terms of reconciliation between victims and offenders. The latter includes reconciliation

at a personal and community level, as well as on the national level. These levels cannot be entirely

separated from each other. But in addition to the technique of confession and forgiveness, aspects

such as ‘open debate’ and ‘democratic culture’, were added, which were designed to restore trust in

institutions (Report I:106). Trust in institutions and cultivation of a human rights culture in different

state sectors could only be restored by full disclosure of methods and policies used under apartheid,

which, eventually, would lead to reconciliation. The statement made by Dr. Leslie London, at the

health sector healing in Cape Town, exemplifies the ‘will to democracy’ and open debate.

“…the real challenge that faces the health sector is for the health professions to accept human rights as a fundamental

responsibility. Real truth and reconciliation can only come from below, from within our institutions…” (Report I:115).

Here the link between truth and reconciliation is once more emphasised. In addition, reconciliation

and the rise of ‘responsible society’ (Report I:131) are possible only if perpetrators, in this case

institutions, take the full responsibility for their actions and adopt human rights as a model. In other

words, reconciliation is equalled with individual, as well as collective responsibility. It is a call for

self-examination at the individual level, as well as at the institutional level. Responsibility is

expounded as a key to reconciliation and for the ‘possibility of something new in South Africa’.

“…what is required is a moral and spiritual renaissance capable of transforming moral indifference, denial, paralysing

guilt and unacknowledged shame into personal and social responsibility” (Report I:132).

Here we can see how the term ‘responsibility’ is constructed as a broad notion that includes

basically everyone. According to this statement, everyone is guilty simply by ‘doing one’s job’ and

not questioning the apartheid system i.e. ‘permitting oneself to be intoxicated’ (Report I:131).

Statements like this open up the possibility of a fundamental reformation of society, by promoting

the technique of deep psychological soul searching, which each and every member of society must

undergo in order to contribute to the building of a new nation. By one stroke, all responsibility and

power is delegated to the population, so it can build itself on behalf of the government.

The all-inclusive nature of reconciliation is illustrated by the following quote: “ Reconciliation

means people forgiving each other and working together as one nation” (Report I:106). Here

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individual reconciliation results in national unity. The ultimate goal is to ‘create a home for all

South Africans’, especially, to help those groups that have suffered most, because of denial of

access to education, recourses, and development opportunities (Report I:109). With this goal the

aspect of ‘material reconstruction’ of victims is linked to reconciliation in addition to ‘restoration of

humanity’ at all levels. “…giving the voiceless a chance to speak, giving the excluded a chance to

be centred and giving the powerless an opportunity to empower themselves” (Report I:110). Here

the previous system is not described directly, but as being something different than including

everyone and giving all ‘a chance’ and ‘opportunity’. It is clear that this is not fair, so the previous

system stands out as ‘morally declined’, where most citizens were predisposed to ‘lemming-like

behaviour’ (Report I:132). The TRC sees itself as restoring ‘what is just and fair’ (Report I:132) by

promoting the ideal of human rights; it will set a standard against which the actions of the new

government will be measured in the future.

“This [thoughtless submission] is a tendency that needs to be addressed in ensuring that the future is different from the

past and serves as a reminder that the most penetrating enquiry into the past involves more than a witch-hunt. It

involves, rather, laying a foundation against which the present and all future governments will be judged” (Report

I:132).

The new human rights culture, promoted by the TRC, with its ‘thoughtful accountability’ (Report

I:132), is described as something ‘different from the past’. It is a society of ‘political accountability’

and ‘moral responsibility’. To achieve this it is not enough to point out ‘a few high-profile

criminals’’ (Report I:132). It requires more than a ‘witch-hunt’, in other words, it requires a new

type of citizens who recognise the ‘little perpetrator’ (Report I:133) in themselves. By launching

the moral crusade in form of the Commission, the new government has; once and for all, ‘laid a

foundation’ i.e. it has legitimised itself and guarded itself against eventual failures and critic. If the

reconciliation process should fail, it is not because of the government, but because of the population

that has not done enough soul-searching.

One must also pay attention to the little twist that the notion of ‘responsibility’ takes in the end. All

in all, it appears that those who benefited from the previous system have a decisive part in the

process of nation-building.

“Although this [those who have benefited and are benefiting from a range of unearned privileges under apartheid have a

crucial role to play] was not part of the Commission’s mandate, it was recognised as a vital dimension of national

47

reconciliation. This means that great deal of attention must be given to an altered sense of responsibility; namely the

duty or obligation of those who have benefited so much … to contribute to the present and future reconstruction of our

society” (Report I:134).

Although, the Commission set out to create an objective history by focusing on forensic truth, it is

concluded that this is not essential for nation building. Instead, the main impediment is ‘an altered

sense of responsibility’. We have seen above how the notion of ‘responsibility’ stands out as an

open concept concerning both victims and perpetrators. The burden of responsibility was laid on

each and every member of society. “We should all share in the commitment to a South Africa …”

(President Mandela in Report I:134). But no, here it is clear that the common understanding of

responsibility must be altered. Responsibility is still the crucial element of reconciliation, but some

groups are more responsible than others. The burden of reconciliation, i.e. ‘reconstruction of our

society’ is placed on ‘those who have benefited so much’. Here the division between ‘them’ and ‘us’

is emphasised. ‘Us’ denotes all those who have opposed the apartheid system, and ‘them’ are all

‘lemmings’ who now must make an effort to ‘sharpen their moral conscience’ (Report I:133) by

confessing their wrong actions and thoughts, as well as by apologising to victims, i.e.‘us’. As seen

above, reconciliation was seen as an ongoing process. Therefore, this division between ‘them’ and

‘us’ is not likely to disappear in the future, since, as seen in the quote above, ‘those who have

benefited’ will be held responsible also for ‘future reconstruction of our society’. The focus on the

moral responsibility of the members of the previous system gives a moral high ground to the

opponents of this system, i.e. the ANC. Here, the new government has again secured itself against

any criticism in case the reconciliation process should fail, since the responsibility is laid on the

perpetrators.

4.5.1.3 Justice

As mentioned earlier, the liberation struggle had no victor; therefore, the only option left after ‘the

miracle of the negotiated settlement’ was to settle for individual amnesty. Prosecution and

punishment was not an option. Therefore, the concept of ‘justice’ used by the TRC has its specific

meaning. Perpetrators had to make full disclosure of their crimes in order to receive amnesty.

Individual amnesty was seen as a middle way between punishment and blanket amnesty (Report

I:118). In other words, reconciliation and reconstruction of society was linked to amnesty, i.e.

individual accountability. Justice turned out to be a complicated concept to define. The ambivalent

nature of it is illustrated in the following quote:

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“[The granting of amnesty] is a difficult, sensitive, perhaps even agonising, balancing act between the need for justice to

victims of past abuse and the need for reconciliation and rapid transition to a new future; between encouragement to

wrongdoers to help in the discovery of the truth and the need for reparations for the victims of that truth; between a

correction in the old and the creation of the new. It is an exercise of immense difficulty interacting in a vast network of

political, emotional, ethical and logistical considerations (Report I:117).

It is recognised, on the one hand, that people had an immense need for some form of relief from

their pain; they needed justice and reparation as a compensation for their suffering, so that the old

could be ‘corrected’. On the other hand, transition to ‘a new future’ required reconciliation, truth,

and ‘creation of the new’.

Out of these conflicting issues rose the option of restorative justice. “…the need for understanding

but not vengeance, a need for reparation but not retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not

victimisation” (Report I:8). This quote sums up the issues at stake. It also links together all the

concepts discussed above. I shall look closer at each of these aspects of restorative justice and

establish the connection between restorative justice and truth and reconciliation.

Understanding, in this case, equals with knowing what happened in the past, i.e. truth. It was

important to create a common understanding of history and eliminate any alternative narrative in

order to establish national unity (Report I:103). Therefore, truth is one of the pillars of national

unity. The notion of truth is described above, but some new elements appear as truth is seen in

relation to, for example, restorative justice. Qualified, i.e. personal amnesty was an effective tool to

gain full knowledge of the past, which would have been lost if the path of punishment through the

judicial system had been chosen. “…a choice between more or less full disclosure” (Report I:122).

The fact that perpetrators confessed publicly increased the sense of justice of victims. The names of

perpetrators were published in the Government Gazette and in the Report (Report I:119) thus

establishing them in the collective memory as offenders, despite the fact that they received amnesty.

“Public disclosure results in public shaming…” (Report I:9). Qualified amnesty established the

accountability of perpetrators, thus demonstrating that it contained the criterion for justice (Report

I:119). Here amnesty is linked to restorative justice, thereby eliminating the need for retaliation, as

well as making the idea of restorative justice appeal to those who equalled justice with punishment.

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The Commission called all South Africans to build a ‘humanitarian’ and ‘caring’ ethos (Report

I:127). Answer to this call was the creation of the notion of ‘restorative justice’. Restorative justice

aimed at healing both of victims and perpetrators, as well as it aimed at communal restoration. “…a

restorative justice, which is concerned … with correcting imbalances, restoring broken

relationships – with healing, harmony and reconciliation” (Report I:9). Here again the emphasis is

on Christian values, as well as African traditional values, such as healing and restoration. The

notion of ‘healing’ is dealt with above in connection with the notion of ‘truth’. Here it reappears in

the context of restorative justice.

Restorative justice aimed at rehabilitation of perpetrators. By confessing their crimes they received

healing and freedom, on the physical, as well as on the emotional level, and were now considered

ready to be reintegrated into the new society. In judge Mahomed’s words:

“…amnesty also exposed perpetrators to opportunities to obtain relief from the burden of guilt or an anxiety they might

have been living with for years. Without this opportunity, many might remain physically free but inhibited in their

capacity to become active, full, and creative members of the new order” (Report I:130).

Here the amnesty process is described as ‘an opportunity to obtain relief’ instead of being

humiliating or in any way undesirable. It is a strong argument for perpetrators to come forward and

confess. The reward is total freedom and a membership of the ‘new order’. Confession is described

as a gain for the individual. Here we can see how restorative justice is linked to personal freedom.

But, as also stated in the Report, if one lets this opportunity pass, one automatically ‘impedes’ and

‘delays’ a ‘rapid and enthusiastic’ transition process (Report I:130). Here the personal freedom no

longer is the concern of the individual alone, but it is the concern of the whole nation. The

individual becomes responsible for the unity and the future of the nation or the government. The

individual takes over the role of the government by disciplining him/herself and governing his/her

own actions.

The notion of ‘reparation’ placed victims at the centre of attention. The key concept regarding

reparation of victims was restoring ‘the human and civil dignity of victims’ (Report I:125). But the

Commission as a whole aimed at the restoration of dignity of all South Africans. The notion of

dignity rose from the African traditional value of ubuntu. In contrast to the previous system, which

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‘tramped on the basic humanity of citizens’ (Report I:126), ubuntu put the individual in the central

position.

“…Apartheid was a denial of a common humanity. Black people were refused respect and dignity and thereby the

dignity of all South Africans was diminished. The new Constitution rejects this past and affirms the equal worth of all

South Africans. Thus recognition and protection of human dignity is the touchstone of the new political order and is

fundamental to the new Constitution” (Report I:126).

.

The quote indicates that, although the previous system denied the rights of the black population, the

dignity of all other citizens was undermined. Therefore, by taking care of the victims of apartheid,

i.e. mainly blacks, everyone is lifted. This is an argument for the moral justification of the

opposition movement’s, especially the ANC’s just war. The opposition movement did not fight for

the rights of a limited group. They fought for the whole society and each and every member of it.

By referring to ubuntu and its value of dignity the TRC contributed to the legitimisation of the new

regime and its form of justice. This move eliminated the basis of any later criticism, because the

notion of justice is very broad, including the previously dominating group. Consequently, the

opposition movement described itself as bringing justice to all in form of dignity, and thus sealed its

position as being a representative agent of democratic revolution.

In order to establish the link between reparation and restorative justice some key elements had to be

redefined. Crime could no longer be defined simply as a ‘breaking of laws’ or ‘offences against a

state’, but had to include a humane element. Therefore, crime was defined as ‘injury or wrong done

to another person’ (Report I:126). Now, when crime is seen as violation against a person, reparation

that aims at healing and restoration, both of perpetrators and victims, becomes relevant. By the

same token, all parties concerned must be actively involved in resolving conflict. For example,

perpetrators must confess and take the responsibility of their crimes. Victims are publicly

recognised as such and they are expected to forgive. It requires a ‘will to conciliation’ i.e. a decision

to end the conflict.

In this light, the amnesty process, as a part of restorative justice, played a central role in restoring

the dignity of victims. The knowledge of what happened, together with the opportunity to tell their

own stories, helped to restore the dignity of victims. Therefore, as stated in the Report, amnesty was

not only for the sake of perpetrators, but also as much for the sake of the victims (Report I:128).

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Here it is relevant to look at the value of forgiveness and its meaning as it is linked to the concept of

restorative justice. As seen above, forgiveness was linked with truth, and it was a necessary element

in keeping the reconciliation process going. Here the same holds good. Forgiveness is linked to

‘respectful remembrance’ (Report I:116) and does not mean forgetting or ‘closing the book on the

past’ (Report I:116). It is important to acknowledge and remember the history, but it is equally

important to ‘focus on the future’ (Report I:116). Therefore, a method was needed for breaking the

circle of hatred. Forgiveness became a tool for healing resentment, as well as a tool for empowering

victims, so they, once again, could become active citizens.

“It [forgiveness] is about seeking to forego bitterness, renouncing resentment, moving past old hurt, and becoming a

survivor rather than a passive victim” (Report I:116).

To describe victims, as ‘survivors’ is to hint that they are the real winners of the situation, and as a

result of forgiving, are in a better position than previously. It is to give them a moral high ground,

so their dignity could be restored. Forgiveness is described as an act of will, and by making an

effort; one becomes a ‘survivor’. One is seen as a resource and a person who contributes to the

future of the new society.

In order to encourage victims in this inevitable task, it is emphasised that forgiveness does not have

to mean reconciliation. Reconciliation requires individual and social justice (Report I:117;120). The

requirements for social justice were already fulfilled by the act of replacement of minority rule with

a democratic state, as well as by adopting the way of qualified amnesty that contributed to placing

the moral responsibility (Report I:125). The focus had to be on individual justice. As seen above,

the Commission operated with the concept of restorative justice, which was described in terms of

Christian and traditional African values. As seen above, these values emphasise among others the

element of healing that is closely linked to the element of forgiveness. Therefore, it is legitimate to

state that individual and social justice requires the act of forgiveness. It follows that reconciliation

does, among others, require ‘will to forgive’. Even if it can be difficult, there is no reconciliation

without the ‘generosity of spirit’ of victims, a sacrifice, since ‘reconciliation is profoundly costly’

(Report I:120). As expressed by a man from Bongolethu, Oudtshoorn: “Reconciliation means

people forgiving each other and working together as one nation…” (Report I:109).

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In order to live up to its title - The Reconciliation Commission, the only way open for the

Commission was to perform a number of public victim hearings in order to ‘provide victims with

the ‘space’ to ‘air their grievances and give voice to previously denied feelings’ (Report I:116).

This had to be carried out, although narrative truth, as seen above, did not qualify as an objective

truth. Since victims paid a high price, they had to be worked on, i.e. disciplined, so they would

become able to perform the act of forgiveness and contribute to the building of the new nation. In

the words of the same, unidentified man from Bongolethu:

“Reconciliation starts with building up these people who are uneducated. Employ those who are unemployed. Train

those who are not trained. Develop those who are not developed” (Report I:109).

Another reason why the element of forgiveness had to be promoted was the fact that the state had

no means to provide victims with measurable reparations to compensate for their loss. Therefore,

besides acknowledgement of victims’ suffering, a ‘more holistic’ approach to reparation was

adopted. Official respect was shown by erecting monuments, memorials, helping families with

‘dignified’ reburials of victims, as well as by introducing days of remembrance. These efforts

contributed to the promotion of restorative justice, since it was believed that victims benefited more

from the Commission’s truth finding processes than they otherwise would have done (Report

I:129).

We have seen how different concepts received their specific meaning by being linked to various

elements. The next section introduces the issue of formation of strategies as elaborated by Foucault.

4.6 Formation of strategies

All discourses have their own way of ordering concepts and objects. They all give rise to different

kind of enunciations, which, in turn, constitute its themes and lead to specific theoretical choices.

Foucault calls these themes and theories for ’strategies’ (Foucault 1989a:65). Theoretical choices

imply certain relational coexistence between statements, which in turn form certain concepts. It is

not the theoretical choice that governs the formation of concepts, since it cannot modify the rules

according to which specific concepts are formed. But it ‘mediates’ the formation process by

implementing some of these rules, while excluding others, thus giving raise to certain concepts. It

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follows that the formation of concepts is not independent of the chosen strategies (Foucault

1989a:73).

The analysis of the theoretical choices must take into account the contradictory elements of

discourse, such as conflicting concepts or objects that cannot be incorporated within the same series

of statements. At the same time, these moments constitute sites that are characterised by their

similarity of formation. Although incompatible, these elements are formed according to the same

rules of formation. Thus these conflicting elements should not be seen as a mere default within

discourse, but they represent alternatives to each other. Further, around these emerged locuses, a set

of rules of systematisation are in force forming around each of these points of diffraction a

organised body of objects, forms of statements that are appropriate and concepts that follow these

statements, which again carry within them new possible sites of incompatibility (Foucault

1989a:65-66).

However, not all these possible sites become actualised. In order to explain the crystallisation of

specific sites one has to analyse the forces that made these choices possible. One of the aspects that

influence this process is the situatedness in relation to other discourses that surround it, be it in

opposition, in correlation to them, or by the way discourses delimit one another and confine one

another to specific sites of application, which becomes their margin of differentiation. These

relations become the body of selective instance that gives rise only to certain kind of statements

while ruling out others within certain type of discourse. Although statements that become excluded

might have been possible according to the rules of statement formation on its own level, they are

not impossible, while merged within the web of relations at the broader discursive level. This

process reveals the fact that discourses are alterable, and opens up new possibilities accordingly if

placed within a different group of discourses, thus determining the actual choice of strategies

(Foucault 1989a:67).

Furthermore, the choice of theories also rests on the function of discourse, which it has on the non-

discursive level or how it gives a certain group of individuals the right to speak from and the power

to use the discourse by incorporating it in different institutions or practices. It is also significant to

whom the discourse is the place for fulfilment of their desires and interests. These aspects constitute

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the elements that in the end are the building stones of the discourse and influence its strategical

choices (Foucault 1989a:68).

The formation of strategies should not be regarded as something that lies behind the manifest

discourse and is its initial point or is indispensable for its existence. Discourse is neither borrowing

its mode of articulation in order to proclaim a certain world-view, nor is the choice of strategies

based upon the personal desires of the individuals with certain positions within the discourse.

Nevertheless, the choice of theories is not a secondary feature that exists independently of the

discourse (Foucault 1989a:70).

4.6.1 Formation of strategies of the SATRC

As noted above, the need to legitimise its institutions left the new government faced with the

difficult task of consolidating its power in the eyes of different groups with conflicting interests. As

Wilson observes, societies in transition are often best served by the promotion of constitutionalism

in form of human rights instead of ethno-nationalism, with its connotation to the symbolic of ‘blood

and land’ (Wilson 2001:28). Additionally, the negotiated settlement that made the passing of the

Act possible, dictated the measures that could be taken in building new rainbow nation. As

described before, each discourse has its specific theoretical choices. One of the main tools in the

SA’s nation building process was the TRC itself. It was constituted with the aim of creating a new

national history acceptable to all parties involved. The analysis of the theoretical choices must take

into account the contradictory elements of a discourse that cannot be incorporated within the same

series of statements. In this case there was no room for a many-faceted narrative truth. As noted

above, the main element in the discourse of the TRC was forensic truth. This necessitated the use of

scientific quantitative methods, aided by a specially designed information management system18.

This choice of method was based on the theoretical assumption that “…objective knowledge about

the social world in general, and about human rights violations in particular, is possible” (Report

I:161). The Commission made use of quantitative methods in order to gather the factual information

supplemented with some reflection of the context in each case. The overall ideal was to “…ensure

18 The Information Management System (IMS) is developed by Patrick Ball a researcher at the American Association of the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Ball is a researcher who conducted a study of techniques for documenting human rights violations, and concluded that human rights data are the “…representation of acts of violence which allows human rights researchers to make systematic, comparative analyses of patterns of violations in time, space and social structure” (Ball in Buur, Folk vol.44:123).

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that all information gathered from victims was captured, processed and corroborated according to

a uniform methodology” (Report I:140).

This approach is based on sociologist Max Weber’s sociological method, which states that “…

historical and social uniqueness results from specific combination of general factors, which when

isolated are quantifiable” (Weber in Report I:162). Weber suggests supplementing social analysis

with the background and details of each individual case. Further, it would be beneficial to develop

some ‘controlled and unambiguous conceptions’ that would aid in ‘identifying general factors in

the universe of examples’ (Report I:162). This led to an adoption of ‘ideal types’ in form of a

controlled vocabulary and a coding frame by the TRC, which guided the statement takers in

recording the interviews or statements in standard forms. A protocol was developed in order to

unify and systematise the information gathered. This protocol was further developed as the work of

the Commission advanced. It became clear that some additional information was required in order

to assist in fulfilling the mandate. “As these new requirements were identified, the protocol evolved,

with the result that the final version of the protocol, …, was the fifth version” (Report I:139).

According to Wilson, the protocol in the end resembled the database system to avoid complications

in ‘translating’ the narrative and entering it into the system. The correction resulted in moving away

from the narrative element of statement-giving to become a questionnaire in the hands of statement-

takers, who now ruled the whole process (Wilson 2001:44). In addition, statement takers received

special training, called ‘designated statement takers program’ (Report I:141) to make sure that the

information was recorded ‘as accurately as possible’ (Report I:138). Despite some adjustments

made during the work of the Commission the Report states:

“Yet, despite the number of different protocols used to take statements, and some slight variations in the kind of

information captured, the Commission was satisfied that neither the overall integrity of the information gathered nor the

quality of the findings was affected” (Report I:139).

As noted by Buur, the Commission defined its methods as scientific and used the notion of

‘positivist approach’ in order to underline its ‘independent’ and ‘objective’ nature; in order to

ensure that “…the Commission occupies a position analogous to that of the sciences in relation to

society” (Buur, Folk, vol.44:125). This ideal is expressed as follows:

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“[The] Commission, its Commissioners and every member of its staff shall function without political or other bias or

interference and shall be independent and separate from any party, government, administration or any other functionary

or body directly or indirectly representing the interests of any such entity” (Act 1995 quoted in Buur, Folk, vol.44:125).

Also Wilson reflects on the ‘mythical’ power of the positivist approach. He quotes sociologist and

Information Manager in Johannesburg Janice Grobbelaar:

“Positivism is the best way to present the truth to the majority of South Africans, for reasons that most South Africans

would not understand. Truth will be delivered by methodological rigor and scientific findings. The legitimacy of the

TRC depends on its ability to create a truth that is acceptable, and that means a scientifically valid process that people

can buy into” (Grobbelaar19 in Wilson 2001:38).

Here Grobbelaar emphasises that scientific methods are important, since people trust these methods.

At the same time, as Wilson notes, this belief is founded in the authoritative style of scientific

methods, although not understood by the majority of the population. Consequently, the above

statement indicates the fact that scientific elite controls the society (Wilson 2001:39). Here a

method is deployed that is taken at face value by the majority. Because of this ideal, the results of

the Commission are not questioned, thus giving it the status of impartial, objective, ‘officially

sanctioned’ (Hayner 2000) truth.

The weight put on the claims of a scientific approach can be explained by the need to gain

legitimacy in the eyes of the critics. The TRC has been criticised of being biased in favour of the

ANC and of supporting the ‘just war’ of the opponents of the apartheid system. The TRC had to

prove its ‘even-handedness’, since discrimination would be ‘prejudicial’ to general acceptance. The

Commission took the position of ‘critical independence’ and declared that: “A gross violation is a

cross violation, whoever commits it and for whatever reason” (Report I:12). It also included

investigations of the actions of members of the ANC outside or within the country. This should

once and for all establish the fact that “… we are politically independent and not biased in favour

of any particular party or group” (Report I:11), although, when being accused of giving different

moral judgements to the opposing parties, Tutu asserted that: “... we move in a moral universe

where right and wrong and justice and oppression matter” (Report I:13).

19 This quote comes from Wilson’s personal interview with Grobbelaar at the TRC office, Johannesburg, 16 October 1996.

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It seems that the Commission, while striving towards an image of a disinterested investigating

institution was still operating with the dichotomy of right and wrong. Consequently, since the

opposition movement and the new system rose as a counterpart to the apartheid oppression, it is

given that their struggle and means to an end were morally justified. This is despite of the fact that

the opposition movement was far from being a unified front and consisted of different, conflicting

fractions, which often used violent methods. Another fact that points towards the view that the

opposition movement had a moral high ground is that it was believed that the opposition movement

represented a majority of the population, which was a coherent body with common interests. But, in

reality the interests of different groupings within the population varied. As Steffen Jensen notes,

there was a regular civil war going on, not only against the apartheid police, but also between the

ANC and its different fractions, for example the Inkatha Freedom party (IFP) and the United

Democratic Movement (UDM) (Jensen 2001:98). The illusion of unity of the liberation movement

is, according to Jensen, the result of a deliberate campaign by the ANC to form an image of being

the ‘Leaders of the Transformation’, where the unity of the movement was one of the central issues.

Despite of the fact that the ANC experienced a clash of interests within its members, publicly the

party maintained the façade of being undivided agents of change fighting against the oppression of

the apartheid system. The rhetoric of the party left no room for discussion of its role, since it

promoted the view that those who supported the ANC were in favour of reforms, whereas those

who questioned its role were, by definition, against the ‘new order’ (Jensen 2001:106-107). It

appears that the ANC surrounded itself with the aura of being untouchable. It was taboo to think

and mean anything that would distort the created image. By the same token, the ANC had secured

its position because considering the past, who would like to come forth and declare that he or she is

against reforms?

As Buur suggests, not enough attention is paid to the functioning of the TRC on a practical level

(Buur in FOLK, vol.44:119). The Report does acknowledge that some slight problems occurred in

day-to-day practices: “There was little time for reflection (Report I:137). Or “… it is difficult to

embark on work and simultaneously develop systems to manage it“ (Report I:139). But as a whole,

the prevailing view was that “…nor the overall integrity of the information gathered nor the quality

of the findings was affected” (Report I:139). In order to maintain the scientific ideal, expressions

such as ‘uniform methodology’ became the key notions. The information management process was

generally described in unproblematic fashion: “Seven major steps were involved: statement taking,

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registration, data processing, data capture, corroboration, regional ‘pre-findings’ and national

findings” (Report I:140). Buur points out that the use of these notions is always neutral. The TRC’s

process is described as mere ‘statement taking’ or ‘data capture’, which draws a direct link between

truth out there and the methods used. The scientific ideal is a means to depoliticise some

complicated and conflicting issues. But, as Buur notes, there is no necessary link between the

normative rules that guide the work and what is actually done in this long data collection and

management process (Buur, Folk, vol.44: 120-121). The IMS, as a starting point, also ‘defines the

outlook of an extensive and elaborate bureaucratic structure’, i.e. it organised the information flow

system into these seven steps named above. Additionally the IMS defined the mode of truth

collection, as well as it defined the way in which the findings should be represented (Buur, Folk,

vol.44:121-122). By the same token, the ‘controlled vocabulary’ shaped victims’ narratives as the

statement takers coded them according to their protocol. The statement takers had a key role in

forming the victims’ narratives into the form acceptable to the IMS – ‘the facts of the case’. As

Wilson notes:

“The statement-takers were not just invisible ciphers or neutral translators: instead, they were continually prompting

and reminding deponents of events and wider histories” (Wilson 2001:43).

Weber’s approach required that each individual case were placed within the larger context in order

to gain a more adequate picture of the affairs. The statement-takers were more than helpful in

giving hints and suggesting possible connections. In addition, the constant correction of the protocol

must have left its mark on the data, as the narratives were broken down into manageable

components. The problematic nature of the move form narrative statements to the questionnaire is

captured in the following quote:

“When it was started it was a narrative. We let people tell their story. By the end of 1997, it was a short questionnaire to

direct the interview instead of letting people to talk about themselves … The questionnaire distorted the whole story

altogether … it destroyed the meaning” (Kubheka20 in Wilson 2001:45).

20 From personal interview conducted by Wilson with the chief data processor in the Johannesburg office Themba Kubheka, 9 November 1998.

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The data processing team further ‘analysed’ and ‘categorised’ the statements, in order to register

the ‘salient facts’ (Report I:142), and thus modified the information gathered and, as a result,

affected the final outcome of the TRC.

We have seen how the TRC ordered its discourse in a way that led to the adoption of scientific

methods as means to consolidate its claim of objectivity and its aim to create, not only an officially

sanctioned history, but also, history sanctioned by the population, as well as by opponents of the

TRC. The ambivalent aim of the TRC, namely, to consolidate the power of the governing party and

legitimise its state institutions, necessitated the scientific approach in order to silence opposing

voices and to win the population by its authoritative and mystical appeal. We have seen how the

narrative truth was ruled out to achieve these goals. As a result, the TRC gained the right to create

an official, uncontested version of history. But the scientific jargon, when put into action, had some

unseen consequences that, in the end, distorted the outcome of the TRC.

4.7 Defining the statement

In the previous sections we have seen how objects, statements, concepts, subject positions and

theoretical options have emerged and could be described by mapping out their rules of formation. I

have also related these notions to the Report and analysed how these rules of formation contributed

to the formation of the Commission’s discourse with its unique statements.

In order to respect Foucault’s thoroughness and give the reader a more comprehensive

understanding of archaeology I allow myself to come back to the method and see how the above

deliberations led Foucault to the description of the statement and redefinition of the notion of

discourse.

Foucault aims at giving a more explicit formulation of the statement. Statements were often referred

to as independent elements that interact with other similar isolated elements, like ‘atoms of the

discourse’ (Foucault 1989:80). But, statements cannot be equalled with an entity entirely of a

linguistic type. Therefore, statements cannot be described by grammar, logic, nor can they be

described as speech acts, because they do not always have a recognisable grammatical structure, or

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live up to the criteria of being a logical proposition, nor are statements always speech acts, or any

other acts of formulation (Foucault 1989a:83-84).

Instead, a statement should be seen as a ‘function of existence’ that cuts across entities like

sentences, propositions, series of signs, cluster of sentences and formulations. It is the function that

gives ‘meaning’ to sentences, i.e. whether sentences, propositions or speech acts are meaningful,

acceptable and legitimate. Additionally, this function decides the rules of their linkage to one

another, or what kind of formulation, either oral or written, can follow.

“…it is not itself a unit, but a function that cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals

them, with concrete contents, in time and space” (Foucault 1989a:87).

Statements are unique, because they occupy specific time and space. Two statements, even if they

have identical structure of formulation, are not necessarily the same. Statements do not have to have

a referent in a real world, but can be recognised by what is said, i.e. by its ‘theme’. Even if a

sentence is meaningless in a logical sense it still can be a statement. It is not important whether a

sentence refers to concrete reality or has correct syntactical order. What is interesting is the ‘laws of

possibility’ of a domain in which objects occur. Laws of possibility regulate what objects will or

will not appear and what is the connection between these objects. Additionally, these laws give

sentences and propositions their meaning and truth-value. Therefore, sentences are always

important because they refer to something by virtue of being stated. These laws of possibility

constitute the ‘enunciative level’ (Foucault 1989a:90-91).

4.7.1 The subject of the statement Another characteristic of the enunciative function is the ‘transmitting authority’, i.e. the subject of

the statement. Every utterance or composition of signs presupposes someone or something that have

‘produced’ that particular composition – an author. The subject of the statement is not necessarily

the one who has produced the statement with a certain intention in mind. Nor is the relation between

an author and the statement necessarily equal to the one between an enunciating subject and what

has been uttered (Foucault 1989a:92-93). Statements do not presuppose the same enunciating

subject, but can be described as a function or a subject position. This subject position is an empty

position, which can be occupied by anybody. The subject position is not fixed throughout the whole

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text, but can alter even from sentence to sentence. Therefore, the individual can occupy different

positions and take on the role of different subjects (Foucault 1989a:93-94).

Similarly, the enunciative subject is not necessarily the one who has formulated the uttered

definitions or has given ‘meaning’ to sentences. The subject uses objects or statements that have

been already composed in domains different from his own. Thus, the subject is not the original

starting point of statements who, by virtue of his/her intensions, arranges signs in a meaningful

way. Various sentences, propositions, or composition of signs become statements by virtue of an

individual, who can be given an enunciative position in series of statements (Foucault 1989a:95).

4.7.2 Associated domain

A third characteristic of the enunciative function is that it cannot operate on a sentence or

proposition when separated from its associated domain, unlike sentences that, although separated

from their context, are still recognisable and meaningful (Foucault 1989a:96-97).

“At the very outset, from the very root, the statement is divided up into an enunciative field in which it has a place and

status, which arranges for it a possible future. Every statement is specified in this way: there is no statement in general,

no free, neutral, independent statement; but a statement always belongs to a series or a whole, always plays a role

among other statements, deriving support from them and distinguishing itself from them: it is always part of a network

of statements, in which it has a role, however minimal it may be, to play” (Foucault 1989a:99).

As the quote indicates, the statement is a part of an enunciative field. There exist no neutral

statements, but statements are always set in relation to one another, i.e. a web of elements that

regulate the formulation and the meaning of statements. These elements could be other formulations

that the statement coexists with, formulations that the statement refers to or formulations that appear

as consequences of the statement. This complementary field is brought into operation by the act of

making a statement. Statements always ‘activate’ other statements. Therefore, statements should not

be seen as a linguistic description of some piece of reality or as intentional expressions of the

speaking subject, but as a function that is interdependent on an associated domain (Foucault

1989a:97).

4.7.3 Materiality of statement

The statement must have a material existence, i.e. it must have been voiced or expressed in one way

or other. This materiality is not an extra level or addition to other conditions, but it is one of its

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intrinsic characteristics (Foucault 1989a:100). As seen above, statements are unique and located in

concrete time and space. If these change the statement too changes its identity. Although,

statements enunciated in different time and space share the same grammatical, semantic or logical

structure, they are distinct statements. Foucault tries to determine the special materiality that allows

some repetition of statements despite of different enunciations in time and space. What allows one

to speak of the same statement? (Foucault 1989a:102). For example, although different prints of a

book differ from each other by their materiality, the number of statements still remains the same

from print to print. This shows that space and time do not always play a decisive role in defining the

materiality of the statement. It is its status that decides whether it is repeatable. This status is not

something absolute. It can always be disputed and altered. The status of the statement depends on

material institutions that constitute the possibility of appearance and reappearance of the statement

and not so much its time and place of location (Foucault 1989a:103).

4.7.4 The field of stabilisation

The next group of conditions that the statement is subject to is the presence of all the other

statements that constitute the field in which the statement can be used or which decide the scope of

their operation. Foucault calls this sphere the ‘field of stabilization’. This field makes it possible to

speak of identical statements despite of various enunciations. By the same token, this field also

defines the borderline beyond which statements no longer can be identified as identical and will

receive a new identity (Foucault 1989a:103).

4.7.5 The field of use

Foucault does not look at statements as individual entities, but as manifestations of rules that are in

operation according to the use of individual statements. The form of a statement may change, for

example, as a result of translation to another language. If the intended use of the statement is the

same, it can still be considered as the same statement despite of the different structure of the

sentence. The field in which the statement is situated and which decides the production and

reproduction of the statement through various enunciations or through varying materiality is called

‘the field of use’ (Foucault 1989a:104). Therefore, the statement is a complex entity the appearance

of which is not only conditioned by time and space. Nor is it an entity that can appear and reappear

in any way and in any materiality. Nevertheless, the statement is repeatable and does not disappear

soon after its enunciation. It is always placed in a domain of relations that the statement is

susceptible to. It does not remain unchanged indefinitely, yet it is constant enough to be used in

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various ways, in different contexts (Foucault 1989a:104-105). The statement has no infinite identity

but it operates in a field of correlations in which it receives its identity and status. It is a field in

which the statements are used, or when no longer identifiable, discarded (Foucault 1989a:107).

4.8 Defining the discourse

After describing the statement Foucault defines his notion of discourse. As a result of the above,

discourse must be understood as a “…group of sequences of signs, in so far as they are statements,

and more precisely, statements that belong to a single system of formation”21 (Foucault 1989a:107).

In the beginning, different discourses appeared discontinuous and their statements unique. But as

Foucault came across the principles of unification of statements, which could not be reduced to

grammatical, logical, or psychological structure, nor related to unities like sentences, propositions,

or other formulations, he turned his attention to a ‘coherent domain of description’, i.e. rules that

decide the appearance and reappearance of statements. Therefore, the analysis of discursive

formations should take as its starting point the statement with this complicated net of variabilities

that have their own laws of organisation, which form an organized and intelligible unity (Foucault

1989a:114). This coherent domain of description denotes a function that establishes correlation

between groups of signs, which are not identical with the grammatical, or logical structure of a

sentence or proposition. As seen above, in order to operate this function requires some specific

conditions. Firstly, it requires a referent, but not in the sense of a concrete object, but as a ‘principle

of differentiation’. Secondly, the statement needs a subject, not in the sense of a speaking

individual, or an identifiable author, but in the sense of a position that is offered to any individual,

who fulfils the necessary conditions from which to speak. Thirdly, the statement requires a linking

field in which it exists. This field cannot be reduced to a mere context, i.e. the place and

circumstances of the formulation of the statement. It is a field where the statement coexists with

other statements. Finally, the statement also requires materiality. This materiality does not consist

solely of letters and signs, or other physical features of the formulation, but is made up of the status

of the statement and the rules of its production and reproduction (Foucault 1989a:115).

Foucault concludes that to describe the enunciative function of the statement is equal to the

description of discursive formations. “…the discursive formation is the general enunciative system 21 We have seen earlier that the rules of this grouping are the same as in case of ‘discursive formation’. But now the discursive formation denotes the rules of ‘dispersion and redistribution’.

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that governs a group of verbal performances…” (Foucault 1989a:116). Four directions in which the

discursive formations are analysed (formation of objects, formation of the subjective positions,

formation of concepts, formation of strategic choices) correspond to the four domains in which the

enunciative function operates.

By introducing his account on statement and discourse, Foucault is not trying to make corrections in

existing theories regarding their concepts, modes of analysis or theories. Every academic tradition

has its own concepts of discourse. Nor is he proposing a new model, or a theory that can be applied

to infinite number of cases, or to describe ‘what was said’, bringing to light some hidden meaning.

Instead, Foucault wishes to open up new analytical possibilities that show the complexity of

statements and map out the rules that they yield to (Foucault 1989a:108).

Given the nature of the statement, it is neither visible nor hidden. The analysis of statements cannot

be reduced to the formulations made, it goes to the very core of these formulations and analyses

their emergence in the field of correlations. How have these particular statements come into

existence and gained their status? It is the level of their existence and not a search for hidden

intensions (Foucault 1989a:109). Neither is the analysis of statements interested in language as

such. Foucault notes that language itself is always absent in formulations. The analysis of the

enunciative level looks upon the level of existence of language, i.e. the rules that make the

emergence of certain formulations, or objects possible. It determines who among subjects have the

right to take a certain subject position, and it determines the rules that decide a statement’s relation

to other statements and their possible uses and re-uses (Foucault 1989a:111).

The following chapter aims at seeing some of Foucault’s claims through different eyes. While

reading Foucault, or any other author for that matter, one is tempted to take these points for granted.

Reading Foucault tends to give one the feeling of finally getting ‘behind’ the scenes and being able

to see the strings being pulled. But as the following chapter will show, even Foucault is not guarded

against fallacy, nor has he all the answers. In the following chapter I shall not relate these points of

criticism to my own case, nor do I relate to them in any other way. My aim is to bring in voices that

help to open up a more general discussion of Foucault that includes both archaeology and

genealogy. This discussion is taken up in the chapter of ‘Foucault revisited’. Yet, my own case is

indirectly part of the next chapter, since it has indirectly guided me in my selection of critics. I have

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chosen topics that I personally can relate to as a result of the experiences made and the thoughts

triggered during my analysis. One might argue that this ground is rather subjective, thus making my

selection arbitrary. I would answer that it is no more, and no less arbitrary than any selection is. I

shall reflect on the issue of interpretation in the introduction to the critical remarks. The main issues

that will be presented in the next section are: problems related to Foucault’s definition of discourse,

the relationship between discourse and the social level, the dispersion of the subject, and

archaeology as an elitist approach. These issues are in some cases discussed by different authors.

4.9 Critical remarks related to archaeology

4.9.1 Introduction - The fallacy of interpretation

In order to discuss Foucault’s methodological frame I have used different authors who interpret and

criticise Foucault. The fact that Foucault changed his focus throughout his authorship and did not

respect the boundaries of different disciplines22 makes it difficult to place him within the intellectual

discourse and offer an uncontested view on his work. There is always a possibility for new

interpretations according to the position of the interpreter. There are differences between American

and French readings; between French and German readings as well as differences between French

and Anglo-Saxon/Anglo-American readings (Smart 1994: Introductory essay). James Bernauer

notes that these differing positions prevent the emergence of a meaningful dialogue. Each

interpreter picks out some topics and neglects others. The priority given to some aspects reflect,

first of all, the position of the interpreter and not the actual intensions of the author. In many cases,

the differing opinions have resulted in conflicts between interpreters (Bernauer 1990:21).

It is not my aim to take up the discussion on these divisions, but the variety of interpretations shows

that Foucault’s legacy is still very mush ‘alive’ and constitutes a continuous source of inspiration, as

well as offering a challenge to the contemporary intellectual culture. Foucault himself reflects on

the unfortunate tendency to label any philosophical thought. Any labelling goes through

summarising the work or a thought thus simplifying it instead of commenting or criticising it and in

that way refining it. It is the mentality of consumerism that gives the fatal blow to a philosophical

question (Foucault 1988b:45).

22 Foucault’s inquiry crossed the fields of philosophy, history, sociology and political science, as well as literature and cultural studies.

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The above illustrates the fact that any reading of Foucault is yet another perspective. Consequently,

the points of comment and criticism that will follow do not represent ‘correct’ readings of Foucault

or propose ‘truer’ theories. The following points of criticism should be seen as reflections that

originate from and are expressions of different intellectual traditions and disciplines. We also have

to bear in mind that the following criticism is pointed towards the archaeological approach only and

therefore does not take into account works that follow, where Foucault actually reflects on some of

the issues that are discussed here. One might argue that this makes the following points irrelevant

since Foucault, to a large extent, has formulated the major critical perspectives on his work. But, the

fact that archaeology in many aspects falls through as an independent approach, confirms the view

held by many that archaeology and genealogy are supplementing approaches. The consequences of

such a view are discussed in the following chapters.

4.9.2 Discourse and the social level

McNay points out that a closer study of Foucault’s system of formation of objects within discourse

reveals that Foucault’s thesis that the discursive level has a high ground in relation to social

practices, does not hold. Mc Nay underlines his point by referring to the function of formation of

objects, with its three principles: the ‘surface of emergence’, ‘authorities of delimitation’, and ‘grids

of specification’. The principles of planes of emergence and authorities of delimitation do,

according to McNay, give more importance to the social and institutional level in the formation of

objects than to discourse (McNay 1994:72).

Matters are further complicated by the distinction between ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ relations.

McNay draws attention to the fact that Foucault fails to give a satisfactory account of the

relationship between the primary, secondary and discursive level. Further, naming the socio-

economic level as ‘primary’ or ‘real relations’, as well as describing it as something independent

form the discursive level, indicates, according to McNay, that Foucault gives it more importance

than the discursive level, which contradicts Foucault’s original claim (McNay 1994:72).

Foucault has clearly drawn the line between the discursive and non-discursive. This is illustrated as

follows:

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“I will say that clinical medicine is an autonomous discursive formation if I can define the whole of the relations which

define it and situate it among the other types of discourse (as biology, chemistry, political theory or the analysis of

society) and in the non-discursive context in which it functions (institutions, social relations, economic and political

circumstances)” (Foucault 1989b:35).

Here Foucault demarcates the medical discourse as a closed unity, with clearly identifiable rules of

formation and relations established to other discourses, as well as to non-discursive sphere within

which it is situated. According to McNay, and in connection to what was written above, Foucault

has just postponed the issue of determination by establishing a relationship between the discursive

and social level, but not making it clear how they interact with each other and what the relationship

exactly is. By building this contradictory claim into his analysis, Foucault, according to McNay,

shows inclination towards structural analysis, which he affirms to renounce23 (McNay 1994:73).

McNay points out that it is precisely through the attempt to establish connections between the

social, non-discursive, and linguistic, discursive practices that one can tell the difference between

structural analysis and archaeology (McNay 1994:69).

Dreyfus and Rabinow point out that Foucault is trying to establish not only the autonomous nature

of discursive formation, but argues that the discursive level also unifies the whole system of various

practices, as well as social, political and other factors, including institutions. These various levels

are brought together and made to function in a coherent way by discursive practices. They note that

the development of unified discursive practices would require some coherence of the institutional

practices or some other common cultural practices that are underlying both institutional and

discursive practices and that would enable both of these practices to merge with each other.

Foucault does not specify why and to what extent the discursive practices are relying on the social

practices they unify. Dreyfus and Rabinow call Foucault’s attempt to establish the priority of

discourse, a semi-structuralist claim (Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982: 66-67).

Laclau and Mouffe reject the distinction between the discursive and non-discursive level. They are

of the opinion that Foucault is inconsistent in maintaining this distinction, and maintain that

Foucault is only able to explain the regularity of dispersion in discourse as a discursive practice and

not in terms of some external elements (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:107). 23 “Nothing, you see, is more foreign to me than the quest for a constraining sovereign and unique form. […] Nor have I described either the emergence or eclipse of a formal structure which might reign for a time over all manifestations of thought: I have not written the history of a transcendental eclipse” (Foucault 1989b:36).

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According to Laclau and Mouffe, there are no objects that escape the constitutive practices of a

discourse. There exists no ‘external’ to a discourse, but all these elements from different levels are

set in relation to each other by the rules of formation of a discourse. It means that material and

linguistic objects are but different levels of a discourse. Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of discourse

includes a totality of formulations “…the entire material density of the multifarious institutions,

rituals and practices through which a discursive formation is structured” (Laclau &Mouffe

1985:109). They make it clear that this view does not mean the rejection of an objective, material

world that exists independently from the thought-world. But the ways these elements are looked

upon, and how they are linked to one another, entail some structuring within a discursive field

according to the rules that are in force within that field (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:108). It follows that

the identity of the abovementioned non-discursive complexes, are, to certain degree, altered and

adapted in the course of articulation into the discourse (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:107).

Laclau and Mouffe point out that the establishment of a distinction between discursive and non-

discursive levels is based on a conjecture of the mental nature of discourse. According to this

presupposition discourse is an expression of a thought and there exists an objective world outside

and independent of the discourse. Laclau and Mouffe want to bring the ‘materiality’ back to

discourse by referring to a totality of a discursive articulation. They point out that these two levels

denote a ‘differential and structured system of positions’ that includes a ‘dispersion of very diverse

material elements’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:108). These material elements are not always in the

consciousness of the subject, the material world does not even have to be fixed in its meaning, it is

sufficient that there is some regularity that enables diverse subject positions to appear. Therefore,

the material character of a discourse can escape the consciousness of individuals, and discourse can

be experienced as linguistic or at least not in its entirety. At that point Laclau and Mouffe share

Foucault’s view that the epistemes that govern individual’s articulations, to large extent, are

unconscious to them.

4.9.3 The problematic of autonomous discursive formation

Laclau and Mouffe further discuss the issue of determination of ‘autonomous discursive formation’

as a problematic. They point to the notion of ‘formation’, which appear ambiguous. They ask how

is it possible to determine the limits of formation if the formation is understood as regularity in

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dispersion, as it is in case of Foucault? It is quite impossible to determine the ‘exteriority’ of that

dispersion, as Foucault claims to have done. Laclau and Mouffe continue by pointing to the fact that

if one can speak of any form of formation, be it social formation24 or hegemonic formation, it must

be possible somehow to differentiate between them, as one is external to the other. It follows that a

formation takes a form on the basis of its own limits. Laclau and Mouffe are of the opinion that

according to the principle of dispersion, it would be impossible to draw the limits between

formations, since, what appears different in relation to the internal of the discourse and their

regularity of their appearance, would, according to this logic be a part of the formation itself. ”A

hegemonic formation also embraces what opposes it, …” (Laclau & Mouffe in McNay 1994:80).

“If we remain in the field of differences, we remain in the field of an infinitude which makes it impossible to think any

frontier and which, consequently, dissolves the concept of ‘formation’. That is, limits only exist insofar as a systematic

ensemble of differences can be cut out as totality with regard to something beyond them, and it is only through this

cutting out that totality constitutes itself as formation” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:143).

The logic of dispersion renders the notion of ‘formation’ meaningless and dissolves the frontiers

between them. Something can appear as a total system only in relation to some other similar, clearly

defined system.

4.9.4 Dispersion of the subject

McNay questions Foucault’s reflections on different subject positions in discourse. Here too the

relationship between the rules of formation of subject position and the social context is not clear.

Foucault fails to answer the question why is it that certain individuals can fill some positions rather

than others; what is the process by which individuals occupy their positions in discourse. According

to McNay, this lack of explanation of interplay between individuals’ social position and the rules of

formation of the subject position results in a one-dimensional view on the subject. The subject

positions have become a priory order, which, in Foucault’s terms, can by occupied by anyone. This

is problematic, according to McNay. He is of the opinion that the social context does, to a large

extent, influence how subject positions are occupied (McNay 1994:76-77).

24 In Laclau and Mouffe’s theory frame ‘social formation’ denotes empirically given agents, whereas ‘hegemonic formation’ denotes discursive moments. It is clear that Laclau and Mouffe have developed their own concepts for describing the dynamics of discourse, which differ from those of Foucault. This is not the place to go into the details of Laclau and Mouffe’s notions, unless it would benefit the understanding of a given section.

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Laclau and Mouffe, among others, discuss the same issue. In their view, the idea of different subject

positions can lead to a fallacy of ‘effective separation’ between these positions. This effective

separation presupposes that subject positions are totally fixed in a system of differences. The

unproblematic use of the different positions could lead back to a new total system as well as to a

view of a unified subject with the essence that can choose between these positions. Laclau and

Mouffe call it ‘an essentialism of the elements’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:116).

Similarly, McNay notes that Foucault’s deliberations fall through regarding the external condition

of ideology. McNay indicates that the aspect of ideology and prevalent meaning is often deployed

in order to sustain perhaps uneven relations in society. In that way individuals do not experience

their contradictory subject positions as such, because of the prevalent opinion, which accustom

these contradictions (McNay 1994:77). By discarding the idea of an author, and thereby the unity of

the subject in favour of the subject position, Foucault undermines the importance of the individual,

who occupies these subject positions. Foucault does not pay attention to the speaking subject and

the issues of power that this communication raises in addition to the abovementioned issue of how

subjects take up the places in discourse as they do. Foucault has a tendency to build a ‘rigid

taxonomy’ by describing the rules of formation, but failing to explain successfully how the social

context interacts with the systems of formation in discourse, thereby failing to account for the

functioning of discourse (McNay 1994:79).

4.9.5 Dangers of sectarianism

Michel Pécheux draws attention to the issue of elitism in archaeological analysis. The pursuit of

some unifying, fundamental level, i.e. rules of formation, as well as the replacement of the subject

by anonymous subject positions contributes to the formation of archaeology as an elite, poetic

practice. In Pécheux’s words:

“…the structuralists were giving credence to the idea that the process of transformation internal to symbolic and

ideological spaces in an exceptional process: the solitary, heroic moment of theory and poetry … as the ‘extraordinary’

work of the signifier” (Pécheux 1988:646).

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This view shifts the focus form discourse as an event and the acting subject to discursive

constructions with formal rules that do not have as its focal point the articulating, intentional

subject, but as a function, a space of articulation. By the same token, the focus is on the description

of textual discursive constructions in their relation to the material, instead of interpretation of

contents.

But this structuralist movement has been caught in the ‘narcissism of structure’. Instead of refusing

any positivist theory the structuralist movement by introducing linguistics as a model for analysis

has a tendency to form the ‘unified space of conceptual logic’.

“Thus, the suspension of interpretation […] topples over into a sort of structural overinterpretation of the montage as the

effect of the whole: this overinterpretation used the ‘theoretical’ level as a kind of metalanguage, organized in a network

of paradigms” (Pécheux 1988:644).

Here the practice of interpretation is replaced by another kind of interpretation, namely rendering

everyday language into a structure, thus transforming daily utterances into structurally organised

statements. Pécheux is of the opinion that what is left out from this already evoked, repeatable pre-

defined system of rules is ‘the real’; the real that is not reducible to this system, but a level, which is

not transmitted, learned, or thought, but nevertheless exists in the production of effects; ‘a lived

authenticity’. Structuralists’ fascination with the discourse as rules of formation without a subject

duplicates mathematical processes and offers its own form of interpretation; it is enough to bestow

it a title of a new ‘royal science’ (Pécheux 1988:643).

Gary Gutting (Gutting 1994:5) points out that, although, it seems that Foucault did not propose a

new science, his attitude to this issue is quite ambivalent. In the ’Archaeology of Knowledge’

Foucault does relate his notion of archaeology to sciences that are its principal concern. The

archaeological method is related to scientific method, especially to generative grammar.

Furthermore, archaeology takes as its object of study sciences like psychoanalysis, epistemology

and sociology and proposes that, by tracing the ’general theory of productions’, one will

eventually develop a new ’enveloping theory’ (Foucault 1989a:207). ”…it may turn out that

archaeology is the name given to a part of our contemporary theoretical conjuncture” (Foucault

1989a:208). Foucault does reflect on the possibility that his method of archaeology may hold the

germ of some new discipline or that it may have outlined some areas of problematisation that

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may be taken up by various ways in the future. Gutting is of the opinion that Foucault was

’tempted’ to found a new discipline (Gutting 1994:5).

Michel de Certeau throws into question the objectivity of the rules of formation of discourse and he

too raises the issue of normative stance of Foucault. Foucault claims that the rules of formation of

discourse are out of bounds to the consciousness of the subject; they are like ‘a bottomless sea’

(Foucault 1994:211). Certeau points out that if these rules of formation escape the consciousness of

the speaking subject, how come that Foucault is able to describe these subconscious structures, or

account for their collapse or raise? In Certeau’s words:

“Who is he to know what no one else knows, what so many thinkers have ‘forgotten’ or have yet to realize about their

own thought?” (Certeau 1986:183).

Certeau is of the opinion that by proposing an account of unifying and coherent organizing principle

of thought and culture, Foucault is putting himself in a position that is somehow privileged; a place,

from where he can describe the various cultures by the ‘lucidity of his universal gaze’. In this

context ’the laugh of Foucault’, to borrow the expression from Certeau, makes sense; “No, no, I am

not where you are lying in wait for me, but over here, laughing at you” (Foucault 1989a:17). By the

same token, Foucault claims to tell the truth about language systems, yet he does not set limit to

these systems; he gives himself a place ‘nowhere in that story’, thus renouncing engagement on his

part (Certeau 1986:183).

Hayden White is of the opinion that the ways the philosophers from the eschatologist group25 add

their own ‘poetic’ design to the positivist form of science ‘exposes them to the dangers of

sectarianism’. That is to say, their inclination toward the particular and concrete as an alternative to

25 Hayden White places Foucault among the Structuralists, but with some reservations. He points out that one should distinguish between two factions of the Structuralist movement. On the one hand there are the ‘positivists’, and on the other hand there are the eschatologists, among them Foucault. The positivist group focuses on the structures of consciousness by which we form our conception of the world and act in it. Here the structure has a functional role and denotes the unifying level of human consciousness shared by all individuals cross cultures that determine all different forms of thought and practices. White calls this approach for ‘integrative’ (White in Smart 1994b:52). The eschatological group, on the other hand, focuses on how the structure of consciousness obscures our conception of the world and by doing that, confines individuals within divergent discourses. This line of thinking enables various modes of consciousness and underlines the ‘irreducible variety of human nature’. This group has often been accused of being anti-scientific, because of the claim of diversity of modes of consciousness, and because of being ‘perversely obscurantist’ in its method. White calls the latter group for ‘dispersive’ (White in Smart 1994b:52).

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the unifying notion of structure opens up for a danger of giving these philosophers a special, higher

position.

“Each of the major representatives of the eschatological branch has attained the status of a guru, with his own particular

style and oracular tone, and with his own dedicated band of followers who receive the doctrines of their leaders as

carriers of a ‘secret wisdom’ hidden from the profane eyes of the uninitiated “(White in Smart 1994b:53).

White notes that the individual methods that these philosophers have developed appear to outsiders

mysterious and thereby attractive. The dethroning of the universal and turn to the particular creates

an illusion that this ‘new science’, although no one can see through, it is somehow able to answer

the questions that the universal approach was unable to answer. White describes the eschatological

approach by terms borrowed from ‘new age’ jargon, thus underlining the dubious nature of this

undertaking, as well as indicating that the ‘followers’ of this current are deluded and misled by

some charismatic figure.

These points of criticism refer to the fact that Foucault’s enterprise runs the risk of being understood

as an elitist view; a new science that is able to offer a truer explanation of its field of inquiry. It is

cryptic, yet, has a quality of being new and different, which can make the reader accept its

statements at face value, i.e. accepting it as a new frame of explanation or theory. This jeopardises

Foucault’s efforts to discard the idea of ideology or coherent theory, making him a theorist among

others.

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5 Genealogy – presenting the key concepts and relating them to the

Final Report of the SATRC

5.1 Introduction

In the following chapter I shall continue my journey through Foucault’s conceptual universe by

describing the key notions of genealogy. My aim is to describe the tools for analysing the regimes

of practices of the TRC. This chapter also sets the stage for a more general discussion of Foucault

that will follow later on.

I will begin by offering an overview of Foucault’s genealogical method and its bearing on his

understanding of power and knowledge. For the sake of clarity I have introduced the central themes

under thematically divided sections. Since these themes are intertwined with one another, some

repetition might occur. Each of these themes is illustrated by relating them to the Report.

As Foucault’s works advanced, the concept of ‘genealogy’ was added to his method. Genealogy

pays more attention to what conditions, limits, and institutionalises discursive formations. The focus

moved from the ‘inside’ of the discourse i.e. the arbitrariness of meaning and rules of organization

within discourse to looking at the effects of discourse. Genealogy shows how these effects affirm

discourse through various practices and strategies, as well as how discourse is connected with a

institutional frame that gives it a voice (Foucault in Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982:105).

5.2 The origin of things

Genealogy takes an outset in singular events and, instead of viewing these events in relation to a

long trajectory of evolution; it is trying to establish the circumstances under which these events

have appeared, or the role they have played, as well as it tries to determine their mechanisms of

exclusion and inclusion. Why only this or that occurrence was possible and not any other. In other

words, genealogy rejects any metahistorical level that attempts to attach things an ideal meaning,

which stays intact through history and captures the true essence of things. There is no ’origin’ to be

found, no hidden immobile forms that precede the manifest things.

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”... there behind things is not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or that their

essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms” (Foucault 1984a:78).

The metahistorical level attaches things an original, fixed truth-value that lies behind the surface,

and thus can be disclosed. According to this view, things are seen to be purest at the beginning, as

well as they are seen to possess a continuous identity. In Foucault’s view, however, things and

concepts have to be taken at their face value; they are the result of an endless struggle of different

meanings, forces or interests.

We have seen how objects, subject positions, concepts, and strategies of the TRC’ discourse were

manufactured according to the rules of formation, which rose from a specific context. I shall not

repeat it here. This illustrates the point that the TRC’s concepts did not have a pre-given truth value,

nor did they represent timeless, metahistorical values, but they emerged as a result of the struggle

between different actors for the right to define and redefine the given concepts according to their

own value system.

5.3 The emergence of things

Genealogy does not study the continuity of things. It shows that every beginning is the result of ‘an

accident’ and is not as the manifestation of things ‘true essence’. Ideas of seemingly continuous

evolution processes and underlying truths have to be rejected and replaced by the understanding of

an accidental and fragmented nature of the appearance of things that seem unified, fixed and final.

Instead, genealogy focuses on the play of dominations, or struggle between forces, which is the

force behind the appearance of things (Foucault 1984a:81-83).

It follows that any apparition marks the meeting place of struggling forces. Foucault refers to

Nietzsche who describes this place of confrontations as a ’non-place’. This place constitutes a gap,

or space between the antagonist forces that belong to different levels. Therefore, there cannot be a

single person or a single cause that can claim the responsibility for the emergence of things, but the

emergence occurs within this empty space in the course of interaction between forces of domination

(Foucault 1984a:84-85).

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In South Africa one could identify two ‘sides’ or forces of domination that met: The liberation

movement, represented by the ANC26, and the National Party (NP), which represented the apartheid

rule. These opposing groups were defined in relation to, and in opposition to one another as being

different, i.e. as being the ‘other’. Foucault suggests looking at how these groups were formed and

how individuals began to identify themselves with them, in order to understand how certain

elements of the discourse could emerge. Both systems are extensively described in the Report. This

mechanism is best illustrated by the following quote:

“Let us move into the glorious future of a new kind of society where people count… because they are persons of infinite

worth created in the image of God. Let that society be a new society – more compassionate, more caring, more gentle,

more given to sharing - because we have left ‘the past of a deeply divided society characterised by strife, conflict,

untold suffering and injustice’ and are moving to a future ‘founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and

peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or

sex” (Report I:22).

In this quote, the two poles are described as having opposite qualities. The previous regime

represents the past, whereas the new regime equals the future. The apartheid system is described by

outlining the qualities of the new system, which promises a bright future for all South Africans,

irrespective of biological traits or other ‘attributes’. The new regime is described as offering more

of everything. It is more compassionate, more caring, gentler, more given to sharing etc., therefore,

it is in any way a better system. It is a better system by virtue of being ‘new’. Concepts, such as

human rights, democracy, peaceful co-existence, and development opportunities are used in order to

illustrate the contrast between the new and the old system, which is everything that the new

condemns.

We can see how the new system presented itself in relation to the old one. As Foucault notes, these

contrasts are clearer when the struggle to power is going on. Afterwards, when the ‘victorious’

group emerges, i.e. a certain discourse gains hegemony over others, some internal struggles can

arise. In the previous chapter we saw how different elements of discourse rose and were defined.

Before the objects and meaning of concepts become fixed, many ‘internal’ struggles were going on.

For example, before the new government settled for the Commission, which promoted the concept

of ‘restorative justice’, different views on justice were circulating. One of them was the idea that it 26 To keep thing simple I do not name different parties, movements that can be included under the category of ‘liberation movement’, and which are not necessarily represented by the ANC.

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would be preferable to prosecute perpetrators in Nuremberg-type trials. But as noted earlier, the

South African judicial system did neither have the capacity, nor the resources to perform such trials.

In addition, the political context at a particular time made it impossible to adopt this view on justice.

Besides, before the reformation of the old system, the new government faced the task of reforming

the mentality of its citizens. Therefore, the idea of retribution had to be abandoned in favour of

restorative justice. In the previous chapter we saw how the meaning of restorative justice was fixed.

5.4 Laws and rituals

The relationship between forces cannot be described as a proper relationship. Since there is no

concrete place to locate the meeting of forces, the relation of forces is anchored in rituals. Rituals

are the tools through which new power-relations are established between combating forces.

Foucault emphasizes that this struggle does not end by establishing laws. He refers to Nietzsche:

“ On the contrary, the law is a calculated and relentless pleasure, delight in the promised blood, which permits the

perpetual instigation of new dominations…” (Foucault 1984a:85).

The quote indicates that the established rules and laws immediately seem to temper any ‘violence’

that might occur as a result of the meeting between forces and settle the relations of domination.

Instead, the implication of new laws or rules is that they make possible new dominations, thus

opening op for new games of domination, i.e. new round of ‘violence’.

Furthermore, the laws or rules strive to establish the state of peace or compromise, but these laws

have not grown out from a genuine, utilitarian frame of mind, nor from a certain morality or ideal of

peaceful co-existence. Laws and rituals have emerged from conflicts and combat and are thus

’saturated in blood’ (Nietzsche in Foucault 1984a:85). Therefore, the idea that mankind after

experiencing many conflicts in its past would finally mature and realise the fruitfulness of shared

values and set up rules in this spirit, would be misplaced. Every conflict gives rise to new set of

laws, thus opening op for new conflicts and new dominations.

”Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of

law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violence in a system of rules and thus proceeds from

domination to domination” (Foucault 1984a:85).

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These rules are devoid of content in themselves and can therefore be given a certain meaning

according to a particular situation or according to the will of the ruling group, whose realisation

depends on the ability to make these rules useful in securing their position against previous rulers,

i.e. the rulers are surmounted through their own rules (Foucault 1984a:86). It follows that the

development of humanity can be seen as a result of series of interpretations, where the existing rules

or laws are seizured and given new direction and content. Therefore, genealogy must focus on the

history of morals or ideals, as well as on concepts, such as liberty, ascetic life, to name some, in

order to account for the appearance of divergent readings of these rules. Different interpretations

mark the emergence of new events in history (Foucault 1984a:86).

5.4.1 The SATRC establishing its own laws and rituals

The formation of the TRC can be seen as an attempt to establish new rules and laws in the society.

The new order of SA is the culture of human rights and democracy. Opposing the new and the old

systems, and describing the new order as ‘glorious’, fixed the new power-relations. It was a promise

to temper any violence or further struggle, i.e. to prevent any oppression or domination that

characterised the old system. But, this is an illusion. The implication of these laws and rituals made

a new domination possible, a domination of a different kind. As Wilson notes,

“In a comparative perspective, the new human rights institutions of post-apartheid South Africa are impressive for their

ability to shape the public debate on truth and reconciliation. It remains to be seen whether they have altered, over the

long term, concrete social practices and discourses of violent conflict, justice and punishment” (Wilson 2001:xxi).

The TRC was, according to Wilson, an effective tool for promoting issues such as truth and

reconciliation. But, this does not necessarily mean altering concrete social practices and existing

discourses of conflict, justice and punishment. Although some new elements were added, the new

system offers ‘more of the same’, though in a new disguise. In other words, the new system offers

its own interpretation of existing rules and laws, i.e. a new ideology. The ideological needs of new

governments are often intensified after gaining power, because they are in need of legitimation;

therefore, there is a risk of setting aside individual rights in order to achieve the goals of legitimacy

and a new image of the nation (Wilson 2001:28). In Francisco Panizza’s words:

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“…the development of human rights bureaucracies is not to be universally applauded, since these agencies can serve as

a substitute for a government’s lack of commitment to the rule of law and independence of the judiciary” (Panizza in

Wilson 2001:28).

As perceived earlier, SA’s judicial system could not guarantee delivering its citizens their

constitutional and legal rights, which resulted in the emergence of the TRC that launched the

concept of restorative justice. The promotion of this specific form of justice with all its elements,

made the new government stand out as something radically new, and thus preventing it from being

criticised or held responsible for eventual failures (Panizza in Wilson 2001:28). This can be seen as

an example of how constitutionalism and promotion of certain concepts, such as restorative justice

and reconciliation resulted in unwanted effects, such as setting aside human rights and creating the

feeling of impunity among the population. The above can be summed up by a quote from Wilson:

“Yet often truth commissions are established as a substitute for prosecutions and represent the compromise made on

human rights during the peace negotiations. Nation-building and a version of justice as reconciliation then come to

inhabit the vacuum of impunity left by amnesty laws. This means that human rights function in the opposite way to

which they were intended in international conventions, and can actually undermine the rule of law, the legitimacy of

constitutionalism and the rights of citizens” (Wilson 2001:30).

Truth commissions are often established as a result of negotiations that preceded the change of

systems. The negotiated settlement entails compromises on both sides and leaves no room for

prosecutions proper, thus compromising the rights of victims. Therefore, setting up truth

commission as a tool for promoting human rights can have an opposite effect as originally intended.

It can actually result in neglecting the rights of the individual and hindering the legitimation of the

new regime, its laws, and constitutionalism.

5.5 Genealogy vs. traditional history

Genealogy opposes itself to history as a steady and continuous development. According to the

conventional viewpoint, historical events get their meaning by looking back from the ‘end of

time’. The historian sees him/herself as raised above the events, which makes him/her able to

judge history neutrally and dispassionately. This line of thinking mirrors the belief in universal

truth. It is based on the view that the consciousness and identity of individuals is unchanging

throughout time. Therefore, this universal perspective can interpret history according to its own

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rationale and motive and align itself to sciences by virtue of its claim to objectivity (Foucault

1984a:86-87).

Foucault points out the common fallacy of analysing the present as a high point in history that

marks a breaking point, or a ‘returning dawn’. The present is not a unique end point of history; yet,

one should not underestimate the importance of analysing what is going on at present. Since the

Kantian question ‘Was ist Afklärung?’, the most important task of philosophy is inquiry into the

present, but without arrogance of knowing better. This ambiguity is expressed in the following

sentence: “It is a time like any other, or rather, a time which is never quite like any other” (Foucault

1988b:36). History should be studied as a perspective or an interpretation of things. Nothing stays

the same; everything is contingent. The present is an important condition for shaping the future, not

in the sense of a linear development, but in the sense of different interpretation, a transformation to

something else.

5.5.1 The SATRC’s understanding of history

In the light of the above, the TRC was operating within the frame of conventional history

writing. There was a belief that telling truth about the past would lead to a new glorious future,

and that it would prevent the same happening again. “We also need to know about the past so

that we can renew our resolve and commitment that never again will such violations take place”

(Report I:7). Expressions like this mirror the TRC’s point of view that mankind is developing by

virtue of its experiences. The present is better than the past, because of the knowledge gained

through experiences. This indicates Enlightenment thinking, which, according to Wilson, is in

return after the end of Cold War (Wilson 2001:1). Various thinkers from different political

traditions have adopted human rights as a model, which is seen as an alternative to a nationalist

discourse of nation-building. The Commission’s aim to record the history, inform the public of

past atrocities, as well as its aim to prevent relapses into the old nationalist way of thinking

should be seen as a step towards establishing a new political order in SA.

The Report describes the present and future opportunities in relation to the past, which is

characterised as restrictive, oppressive etc. All present events get their meaning by looking back,

or by focusing on the ‘other’, which, as seen above, represents the past system. This is one of

the traits that indicate traditional history thinking. This view entails adopting a neutral position

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in relation to its subject. In order to legitimise its version of history the TRC aligned itself with

science. It is the TRC’s attempt to diminish itself in order to let timeless ideas and events ‘speak

for themselves’.

5.6 The self; producing historical knowledge

Foucault aims at decomposing the idea of man as a stable unity.

“Nothing in man – not even his body – is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for

understanding other men” (Foucault 1984a.87).

Foucault emphasises that the body is subject to vast number of methods that mould it according to

prevailing beliefs and technologies. Every regime has its own technologies that are based on its

value system, moral laws, habits, tradition etc. that exercise power over the body and mind and

form them accordingly (Foucault 1984a:87-88).

Nietzsche, as Foucault notes, criticises conventional historians for their rather naïve attempts to take

the ‘God’s point of view’ and for their denial of having any link to concrete time and place. By

virtue of this appearing disinterestedness, the claim of objectivity and authenticity of facts, the

conventional historian diminishes his own person to let timeless ideas and events ‘speak’.

Additionally, the historian claims to have overcome his own will by being committed to truth. But,

the self is subjected to manifold systems of formation that generate various forms of identities, as

well as the self is driven by the total will to knowledge. The historian is very much a part of his

field of study, simply, by being located in time and space and should therefore recognise his

involvement in forming history according to his own point of vantage (Foucault 1984a:90-91). “…

knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting” (Foucault 1984a:88). Since the

idea of the unity of man, with his ability to be an uninvolved judge is cast aside, the fact that

knowledge, including historical knowledge, is a perspective is emphasised.

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5.6.1 The conditional nature of the SATRC’s form of truth

Consequently, the members of the Commission, as well as the Commission as a whole were by

definition not neutral, despite of their claim of the opposite. Each member of the TRC represented

certain values and morals, just as each and every commissioner was a part of a certain tradition. The

same applied to the Commission as a whole, since it subscribed to certain ideals.

The Commission has been criticised for being biased, but this criticism has been rejected by

pointing to the fact that all commissioners were nominated in an open process (Report I:9). It was

assumed that public debate eliminated the fallacy of bias. But the fact that this discussion occurred

in a certain context and within a certain frame of values, was decisive of who among the possible

candidates could become the members of the Commission. Members of the TRC had to be of high

moral integrity. I have exemplified this by pointing to the Chairperson Desmond Tutu, who

possessed all the qualities and skills needed to set a personal role model and lead the Commission.

Tutu commented this as follows:

“…many of us were chosen precisely because of our role in opposing apartheid – which is how we established our

credibility and demonstrated our integrity” (Report I:9).

This utterance indicates the fact that most of the commissioners were opponents of the previous

system. Therefore, ‘high moral integrity’ denoted certain values. Commissioners had to, per

definition, condemn the apartheid system and subscribe to human rights culture; they were not

impartial observers of the conflict. Additionally, it was generally acknowledged, both within the

country and internationally, that apartheid was a crime against humanity (Report I:15). This view

constituted the background against which the Commission carried out its investigation, and it

influenced the mind frame of each commissioner27. As Tutu said: “… we move in a moral universe

where right and wrong and justice and oppression matter” (Report I:13). It follows that

“…the same kind of act attracts different moral judgements. A venerable tradition holds that those who use force to

overthrow or even to oppose an unjust system occupy the moral high ground over those who use force to sustain that

same system” (Report I:13).

27 It is not only the apartheid system that was experienced as discriminative and unfair. As well known, SA’ s history was marked by racism since 1652, when the foreigners came to the country. Therefore, apartheid system can be seen as a culmination of exploitation and injustice (Report I:16).

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Here it is clear that the Commission and its members cannot be dislocated from concrete time and

place. Their judgement was preconditioned by their experiences as citizens of SA. Since SA has,

through history, been a highly unstable and strife-torn country, where the majority of victims were

blacks, their struggle was seen as just. Despite the fact that the Commission made a distinction

between ‘justice in war’ and ‘justice of war’ (Report I:66)28, and launched an investigation of

incidents that occurred in ANC’s own camps that revealed violation of human rights, the fact

remains that the struggle against apartheid and its means to an end were seen as morally justified29.

This frame of thought conditioned the attitude of the Commissioners and the methods and outcome

of the TRC.

The Commission went to great lengths to guard itself against any claim of bias that would have

undermined its methods and version of truth. One of the occasions to demonstrate its impartiality

was to refer to the investigation of gross violations of human rights in ANC’s own camps that were

carried out before the establishment of the TRC, as mentioned before. Additionally, some of the

ANC’s leading figures were put to stand, in order to legitimise the Commission as politically

independent, which was needed in order to gain wide acceptance. Tutu emphasised that the

commissioners were not ‘ANC lackeys’:

“When the ANC suggested that its members would not apply for amnesty because they were involved in just war, I

threatened to resign from the Commission. Happily, the ANC changed its mind so I was not forced to do so. It should

be noted that I have not taken such a position about the action of any other party. Can you imagine the outcry if the

Commission had put a National Party member through the kind of nine-day gruelling hearing to which Ms Madikizela-

Mandela was subjected?” (Report I: 10).

Public scenes like this were effectual in producing the intended results, namely to secure the

legitimacy of the Commission. It was unlikely that the situation would have developed so far that it

would have been necessary for Tutu to resign. The ANC must have realised that giving Tutu a

reason to resign would have resulted in losing a person with ‘high integrity’, which would have had

a negative influence on public opinion about the Commission. The ANC could not afford that. In 28 Just war theory distinguishes between ‘justice of war’ (jus ad bellum) and ‘justice in war’ (jus in bello). It does not follow that if the cause is just, the rules of justice in war can be ignored. 29 The ANC’s moral high ground is emphasised by the fact that Oliver Tambo, the ANC leader in exile, had signed the Geneva Convention. The Geneva Convention bound the ANC to avoid killing non-combatants. It was the first time that a guerrilla organisation signed the protocol. Therefore, as Tom Lodge stated: “In comparative terms – with reference to the general conduct of liberation wars in other parts of the world - the ANC fought a clean war” (Lodge in Graybill 2002:62).

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fact, it was a win-win situation. Both the ANC and the Commission gained greater legitimacy by

this incident. The ANC could display itself as being fair and living up to the demands of

democracy, whereas, by putting some prominent ANC members through extensive hearings, the

Commission seized the opportunity to underline its even-handedness and political independence.

Similarly, the truth told by the victims and perpetrators was also an interpretation of personal

experiences, which in turn conditioned the outcome of the TRC.

“People in misdeveloped twisted lands may not be able to dominate what really happens to them; but they can at least

control the stories they tell about how they want what happened to them remembered” (Dorfman30 in Humphrey

2000:10).

The quote indicates that every attempt to tell one’s story is a result of the selection process that

precedes the actual act of speech. People can form the truth according to their personal experiences

and perception of the situation. As Kundera reflects, these narratives are the result of expressing

personal experiences, but at the same time, by telling one’s story these experiences are shaped in the

process.

“Narrative comes out of experience as well as it shapes experience, and what is generated as narrative is as much a

product of forgetting as of remembering “ (Kundera31 in Humphrey 2000:10).

Engel, who emphasises that one’s testimony is determined by what one can remember, supports this

view. Because of the way our memory functions, experiences are not recorded chronologically, nor

do these fragments of memory have a fixed meaning. He describes the process of remembering,

especially spoken memories, as a ‘conversation’ (Engel in Humphrey 2000:11). In the light of this,

Humphrey concludes:

“If remembering is an interactive process, then testimony itself is a vehicle for remembering, a means for producing the

truth rather than revealing something already known and resolved” (Humphrey 2000:11).

30 Dorfman, A.: Some Write to the Future: Essays on Contemporary Latin American Fiction. Durham, Duke University Press, 1991. 31 Kundera, M.: Testaments Betrayed. New York, Harper Collins, 1995.

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Testimony is not just an uncomplicated act of reproducing the facts of the situation, but it is a tool

for producing and shaping the knowledge. Considering the fact that those victim testimonies

constituted the most important source of information collected by the Commission32, one can

conclude that the outcome of the TRC was rather arbitrary and selective, because it was based on

the fragmented pieces of memory of the witnesses.

Additionally, the TRC recasts the violent past as ‘trauma’, which, due to its nature, resists memory

and is difficult to communicate, as well as it is difficult to comprehend by witnesses. Therefore, a

single act of testimony is not enough to bring forth these traumatic memories. When a traumatised

person goes to psychotherapy, it can take him/her years to come to terms with his/her experiences.

“The past is recovered only gradually by a process of revisiting and reinterpreting an echoing

narrative” (Greenberg33 in Humphrey 2000:11). The quote indicates that dealing with the past can

be a long process, and that the memory of traumatic experiences surfaces only as fragmentary

pieces. The process includes going over these pieces of memory with the aim of examining and

interpreting them, until they cease to have any influence over the well-being of the individual. The

point is that memory is not recovered as ‘pre-shaped jigsaw pieces’, which, if put together, form a

coherent and completed narrative (Humphrey 2000:11). It follows that truth-finding is a long

process of remembering and reinterpreting the fragments of memory. Therefore, testimony might

not be the best way to produce truth, as it was the case at the TRC’s hearings. As noted above, the

history created by the TRC relied mostly on the oral and written testimonies of traumatised victims.

There are no guarantees that all of these pieces of memory had time to surface during the single act

of testimony-giving. Therefore, the outcome of the Commission should be seen as an interpretation

of events and not as objective and complete truth.

5.7 Relations of power

An underlying pre-requisite of Foucaultian thought is the concept of ‘power relations’34.

32 The HRVC collected 21 000 statements, which contained about 38 000 allegations of gross violations of human rights (Report I:173). The Committee on Amnesty received about 7000 applications for amnesty. 33 Greenberg, J.: The Echo of Trauma and the Trauma of Echo. In ‘American Imago, 55 (3):319-47, 1997. 34 Notions of ‘power relations’ and ‘power’ are used interchangeably, since they denote same thing. In Foucault’s words: “I hardly ever use the word ‘power’ and if I do sometimes, it is always a short cut to the expression I always use: the relationships of power” (Foucault 1988a:11).

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“To begin the analysis with how is […] to suspect that an extremely complex configuration of realities is allowed to

escape when one treads endlessly in the double question: What is power? And where does power come from?”

(Foucault 1982:217).

Traditional theories of power focus mainly on the outcome and loci of power. But, as Foucault

notes, many important aspects of power will remain hidden by asking only ‘what’ and ‘where’.

Instead, Foucault proposes ‘how’ as a working question. Power, with its techniques and effects,

is complicated and, therefore, cannot be grasped by analysing it in terms of repression.

By using this method Foucault opposes himself to the ‘juridical-discursive’ understanding of

power, i.e. ‘repressive hypothesis’ (Foucault in Dreyfus & Rabinow 1982:130). According to the

repressive hypothesis, power is attached to the State and its institutions and put down into the

law. Power makes sure that citizens fulfil their duties and it punishes those who disobey.

Furthermore, power is also seen as a right, which certain individuals possess. This possession

can be confirmed or established through legal acts (Foucault 1980a:88). The repressive form of

power is practised in a ‘top down’ manner. It is seen as restrictive, suppressive and as something

negative, which one group holds and the other one lacks. Foucault is of the opinion that the

repressive hypothesis is widely accepted in present day discourse (Foucault 1980b:119;

1980a:90). “We need to cut off the King’s head: in political theory that still has to be done”

(Foucault 1980b:121). The repressive hypothesis takes an outset from royal power, which,

according to Foucault, has been the prevailing line of thinking since the Middle Ages regarding

the legal systems of Western societies.

The issue of sovereignty is still present if power is described in terms of the State and its

apparatus. Foucault notes that if power is seen as ‘relations’, the State is no longer crucial,

because the complexity of power cannot be explained in terms of State institutions. Power

relations function locally, whereas State apparatuses remain ‘super structural’ (Foucault

1980b:122).

Although power is seen as relations, one of the central themes, that of domination, remains. Not

in the sense of suppression, but in the sense of a hidden, subtle force. The subtlety of power

makes it even more ‘brutal’, since it is not traceable. It follows that rights as such are rendered to

an instrument in the service of power apparatuses, which consist of a complex web of rules,

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laws, institutions etc. Rights that are represented by this web, establish relations of domination.

Not in the sense of one central figure or institution dominating over the rest of society, but in the

sense of domination operating by virtue of mutual relations between individuals that open up the

‘multiple forms of subjugation’ (Foucault 1980a:96). It follows that power, in Foucault’s terms,

means relationships and interactions between individuals or groups. This relationship is not

reduced to a communication through language or signs, but it also involves space, regulations,

laws, activities that are carried out, and individuals with different positions in society that meet

etc. (Foucault 1982:218).

One has to investigate how power is put into action through local institutions. Although,

institutions have a role in the articulation of power relations, the main focus should be on

mechanisms of power, each with its own history, techniques and tactics. One has to identify how

these mechanisms have emerged at a given moment or in a given situation and were designed to

serve specific political interests, i.e. one has to identify systems of control. Additionally, each of

these mechanisms deploys some form of ideology that legitimises their use. The ideology itself

is not crucial, but it is the development of the instruments of power that produce knowledge.

Foucault’s analysis takes an outset from localised systems for producing knowledge, such as

methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research,

apparatuses of control etc. (Foucault 1980a: 96;101-102).

5.7.1 The SATRC as a technique of power

We have seen how the apartheid regime was described as something that held real power over all

other groups in society, i.e. in terms of repression. I shall focus on how power was put into action

through the TRC. One cannot locate power in a single institution, but by analysing the discourse of

the TRC, I hope to map out how power ‘surmounts the rules of right’, and penetrates the deepest

level of consciousness of subjects, thus shaping its field of action.

The new government introduced a new agenda, distinct from the previous system. It introduced new

‘rules of right’ that defined the formal limits of the new government’s power. But as Foucault notes,

this includes only most obvious aspects of power, and we have to move beyond this superficial

level in order to account for the concrete functioning of power. Here it is relevant what kind of truth

the new government operated with, and how this contributed to the reproduction of its power. I shall

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not repeat how the discourse of truth, i.e. ideology of the TRC was formed, and what it consisted of,

but I shall look at some practices or other aspects that became evident when the new government

put this ideology into action, i.e. exercised its power through the TRC.

As mentioned above, the TRC operated as a disciplining organ, which aimed at creating a

favourable environment for a fragile democracy. This included, first of all, disciplining all the

citizens of SA, so they would become able to exercise their constitutional rights, which is a

precondition for legitimising and cementing the new power relations. This process of ‘becoming’

can be described as a ‘liminal’ process “…during which individuals move from one status with its

incumbent rights and obligations to another” (Arnold van Gennep in Wilson 2001:19). The liminal

process entails internalising new values promoted by the TRC, which had great potential to

facilitate this process due to its ‘fleeting’ characteristics. The TRC was a temporary institution and

had no direct link to the government or the judicial system, which, in Wilson’s words, gave it

freedom to make use of unique combination of various political, religious, and legal techniques

(Wilson 2001:20).

This disciplining included both perpetrators and victims. As Wilson notes, the amnesty hearings

were a ‘theatricalisation’ of the new power relations (Wilson 2001:20). Here the elements of court

hearings were deployed, just as the hearings had legal consequences; one was either granted or

refused amnesty. These settings were ideal for encouraging perpetrators to confess in return for

amnesty. This necessitated adopting the new human rights language, which, according to Wilson

was an indication that perpetrators recognised the new government’s power to ‘admonish and to

punish’ (Wilson 2001:20).

The theatricality of the process is exemplified by the opening ceremony of the human rights

violations hearings of the TRC in East London:

“After an overture of hymn, all stood with their heads bowed while Archbishop Tutu prayed and the names of those

who had died or disappeared, who were the subject of the day’s hearings, were read out. A big white candle inscribed

with a cross was lit. It symbolised the bringing of truth. Under the glare of television lamps, the commissioners crossed

the floor to the rows of witnesses to welcome them before returning to sit behind a table covered with white linen to

watch and listen “ (Mail & Guardian 21 March 2003).

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In addition to the task of legitimising the state’s justice system, the TRC aimed at creating an

atmosphere of ‘truth, recognition and compassion’, or in Johnny de Lange’s words ‘a soft place

to deal with hard issues’ (de Lange in Graybill 2002:82). These values, as seen above, were

borrowed from Christian tradition. We have seen how Tutu, as chair of the Commission, had an

influence on the methods of the TRC. He made it explicit by saying that

“…what we were being asked to undertake was profoundly religious and spiritual, and consequently spiritual

resources were appropriately brought to bear on our task” (Tutu35 in Graybill 2002:25).

On different occasions, Tutu encouraged different religious communities to pray for the

Commission and reach deep into the ‘spiritual wells of our different religious traditions’

(Graybill 2002:27). The white candle emphasised the emergence from the past that, as seen

above, was described as repressive and secretive, to a new order, which serves a ‘higher good’ -

truth.

By using the elements of Christian liturgy, the prayer, the candle, the white tablecloth etc., the

Commission aimed at restoring the moral authority of the new regime. Here we can see how

power operated through the space, activities and rituals that were carried out. Additionally, the

fact that the Commission was chaired by a prominent religious figure had an effect on the

development of the instruments of power that were used in order to produce knowledge. These

instruments were confession and testimony.

As noted above, the personal narratives of victims were not recorded in the Report, only facts, but

still, sharing one’s story was expected to have a cathartic effect. The religious discourse was aligned

with psychoanalysis, the ‘article of faith’ of which states that all traumas can be overcome by

sharing one’s untold story, ‘remembering, telling and forgetting’ (Humphrey 2000:9). Humphrey

refers to Buruma, who notes that in this context, “…history itself becomes conveyed as a feeling

rather than as a meaning, through sharing others’ pain” (Buruma36 in Humphrey 2000:9).

The quote above describes how the commissioners greeted witnesses ‘under the glare of television

lamps’. The fact that the Commission aimed at implicating the society at large, made the presence

35 From D. Tutu “No Future without Forgiveness” 36 Buruma, I.: The Joys and Perils of Victimhood. The New York Review of Books, 1999.

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of other witnesses and media crucial. The process of truth telling is socially ‘constitutive’ only

through witnessing. “Speaking necessitates hearing if private memory is to be affirmed as social

‘reality’“ (Humphrey 2000:11). In the process of giving testimony, the individual feels respected

and is empowered by public acknowledgment. The act of giving testimony is an element in the

systems of control and serves as a means to empower victims, or as Humphrey notes, to reconnect

victims with the community (Humphrey 2000:9). Additionally, witnesses have their role to play in

creating collective memory. Spectators of testimonies ‘borrow memories’ from victims, and thereby

feel like being in touch with these experiences. The past now becomes much more personal and, as

a result, better understood. This interaction between victims and listeners is described as follows:

“In the truth commissions’ testimony is not an autonomous source of ‘truth’ upon which a broader collective ‘truth’ is

built. It is a highly mediated narrative production of meaning which has varying contributions to both self-knowledge

and a shared understanding of events” (Humphrey 2000:12).

The act of testimony does not establish direct links between individual testimony and truth. The

process of remembering is more complicated than that. During this ‘conversation’ victims

reinterpret their experiences and gain greater awareness of these traumatic events. Witnesses accept

these experiences as their own, and thus get a feeling of being part of these events. This interaction

contributes towards creating both personal and collective memory, which, as a result, becomes quite

contingent.

5.8 The individual/subject of power

A complex web of power relations is not anchored in somebody’s conscious intentions. The

question is not who has the power, but power is found in concrete practices where it produces

certain effects. The question is rather, how is power exercised? This form of on-going

domination is exercised at the level of the daily behaviour of individuals, their thoughts, desires

etc. (Foucault 1980a:98). Foucault summarises his whole enterprise as an inquiry into how

individuals are made subjects by technologies of power. “…it is precisely the historical

constitution of these different forms of subjects relating to games of truth that interest me”

(Foucault 1988a:11).

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This form of subtle domination is total. Power is not isolated to some distant locus, a sovereign

will, but is enmeshed into all levels of existence. Power constitutes its subjects.

“I believe that we must attempt to study the myriad of bodies which are constituted as peripheral subjects as a result

of the effects of power” (Foucault 1980a:98).

Individuals should not be seen as nucleus elements that are targeted and restricted by power.

Instead, it is the effects of power that make individuals perceive themselves as individuals with

certain desires, behaviour and perception of the body.

It follows that each individual has a vital role to play in keeping power circulating. On the one

hand, the individual is a target of power relations, while; on the other hand, he/she is the one

exercising power. Since the individual is the effect of power, he/she constitutes the medium

through which power works (Foucault 1980a:98).

By disposing of the subject as a nucleus unity, Foucault has opened up for a new form of power

that works through discipline and surveillance in a constant manner, instead of by means of

suppression and obligations vested in laws. Foucault calls it ‘disciplinary power’37. This form of

power is exercised over human bodies and its aim is, in Foucault’s words, ‘the minimum

expenditure for the maximum return’ (Foucault 1980a:105). The law is replaced by norms that

are provided by knowledge produced by the human-, and medical sciences The norm operates

both on the level of the individual, as well as on the level of the population as a whole (Foucault

1980a:107).

37 Foucault describes ‘disciplinary power’ as an individualising form of power. He also develops a concept of ‘totalising’ power. I shall not go into details with the latter, since it is not relevant for my analysis of the Report. Totalising power, or ‘bio-power’, is a step further in demonstrating the complicated and multi layered nature of power. ”Bio-power brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge/power an agent of transformation of human life” (Foucault 1990:143). The concept of bio-power is developed in order to analyse how human beings are made subjects as a population. It is the interplay of these two poles that characterises modern power. These two forms of power do not exist at the same level; yet, they are not exclusive of each other. Foucault shows how these two forms of power merge in sexuality that, on the one hand is ’a matter of discipline, and on the other, also a matter of regularisation. Here body and population meets’. The most important way to gain knowledge of these two levels, the body and the population with its processes, is medicine. In the science of medicine, power and knowledge become linked together, and results in an effective intervention-technique, which has both disciplinary and regulatory effects (Foucault 2003a:252).

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5.8.1 The intrinsic modification of subjects of power by the SATRC

The rituals and practices described above had an effect at the deepest level of the consciousness

of individuals, as well as at the level of their daily behaviour. The distinction between the

relations of power and the subject of power is quite artificial, since power works in a subtle way

and is enmeshed into all levels of existence; it constitutes its subjects. As Humphrey notes, the

process of the hearings officially created the victims of apartheid, meaning that, after the

submission of their stories to the Commission, they were recognised as victims of ‘gross human

rights violation’ and entitled to reparations (Humphrey 2000:9). Humphrey refers to Engel who

is of the opinion that giving testimony produces multiple effects. Apart from communicating

one’s experiences to the wider public, one also communicates something to oneself, which then

becomes a part of one’s self-identity (Engel38 in Humphrey 2000:11).

The act of testimony is an individualising technique, which focuses on victims and which aims

at raising their self-awareness, as well as it facilitates the process of creating personal memory.

Felman and Laub distinguish between testimony and confession. They point out that testimony

serves as a tool to ‘produce’ truth, whereas confession serves to ‘reveal’ truth (Felman & Laub39

in Humphrey 2000:13). Foucault on confession:

“One does not confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but

the authority who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish,

forgive, console and reconcile; a ritual in which the truth is corroborated by the obstacles and resistances it has had

to surmount in order to be formulated, and finally a ritual in which the expression alone, produces intrinsic

modifications in the person who articulates it” (Foucault40 in Humphrey 2000:13).

This quote sums up the mechanisms of power that function through the technique of confession.

This technique requires the existence of a partner to whom one confesses. The TRC had a role as

an intermediary or confessor in the process of perpetrator hearings. As seen above, perpetrators

were ‘given’ the opportunity to take moral responsibility of their wrongdoings, and in that way

contribute to the creation of a new SA. They came forth to disclose or confess the full truth in

return of amnesty. This situation created asymmetrical power relations. The TRC had a moral

38 Engel, S.: Context is Everything: the Nature of Memory. New York, W. H. Freeman & Company, 1995). 39 Felman, S. and Laub, D.: Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History. New York/London, Routledge, 1992. 40 Foucault, M.: The History of Sexuality. Vol. I. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979.

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high ground, whereas perpetrators were required to adopt the human rights language and

recognise the authority of the new regime in order to receive amnesty and be reconnected with

the society. Graybill points out that one of the main concepts in psychotherapy is the ‘couch as

confessional’ where patients are encouraged to tell the truth. Therefore, having an opportunity to

tell their side of the story can also be therapeutic for perpetrators (Graybill 2002:85).

Additionally, as theologians Russel Botman and Robin Petersen noted, the TRC’s methods were

founded on theology and supported by psychology, where the emphasis is on ‘telling one’s

story’. They see the TRC’s methods as unique, because of this combination of theories, which

gave the perpetrators an opportunity to confess. “…this theory is rarely demonstrated with as

much power as it is in the TRC hearings” (Botman & Petersen in Graybill 2002:81). The method

of confession was deployed extensively in order to implicate society at large. Therefore, the

same opportunity to confess was given to all sectors of society. The TRC set up hearings on the

role of the media, the medical profession, the judiciary, the business sector, and religious

communities in maintaining the apartheid system. The aim was to mend personal and social

‘brokenness’, not only of individuals and sectors, but also of listeners. The following quote

expresses the totality of the effects of confession.

“I need the stories of the TRC to be placed next to mine so that I can acknowledge my own part in our past and so I

may become more whole” (Gerald West in Graybill 2002:86).

The quote indicates that no one was untouched by the effects of the confessions heard. The

effect was a total ‘intrinsic modification’, not only in the person who confessed, but also in

everyone who listened. Here we can see how the law was replaced by norms.

The new order sat up the norm that one is a contributing member of society only by virtue of

being empowered or being ‘whole’. The means for becoming that were provided by knowledge

produced by psychology and theology. In the West, the psychological disciplines operate with

the concept of ‘normal’ suffering, which denotes the normal reaction when a person is affected

by some violent event and suffers grief and loss. But if the period of suffering is prolonged

beyond what is considered normal, then the condition is categorised as ‘post-traumatic stress

disorder’, which is recognisable by a specific set of symptoms. Humphrey notes that

medicalisation of trauma individualises it and anchors the suffering in the body, which makes

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the individual him/herself responsible for the ‘management’ of suffering (Humphrey 2000:12)41.

This theory sat in motion extensive systems of control that came to expression through the

TRC’s hearings.

Confession as a behaviour modification technique differs from testimony, as noted above. The

person who confesses asserts his/ her participation in a particular system, which seems entirely

plausible to him or her. The story appears as organised and reasoned, and the individual seems

to be aware of what he/she was doing. Acknowledging his/her role in the system opens up the

possibility of forgiving and forgetting (Felman & Laub in Humphrey 2000:13). Testimony, as

seen above, functions in a different fashion. Individuals or victims create their understanding of

the situation in the very act of testimony. By giving voice to a trauma, the individual re-

establishes his/her self-identity. Here the act of giving testimony goes before the awareness and

insight of the subject (Felman & Laub in Humphrey 2000:13).

Anyhow, both these techniques exemplify the functioning of disciplinary power. Power is

exercised through individuals who confess or testify. Both these acts modify the behaviour and

consciousness of subjects of power, thus producing with ‘the minimum expenditure the

maximum return’. The subject of power has become the medium of power, thus keeping the

power circulating.

5.9 Power and truth

Foucault identifies a close link between power, right and truth. His task is to identify, how these

multiple power relations are established? Foucault is of the opinion that power relations must

necessarily be anchored in a certain discourse that, by the virtue of its dynamics, produces

certain truths and is responsible for the establishment of the existing power relations.

“We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the

production of truth” (Foucault 1980a:93).

41 Humphrey further makes a point that medicalisation and individualisation of trauma has political consequences. The pain is localised in the individual body and the social context, which to large extent has caused it, is denied. This takes away the social and moral bases for healing the pain (Humphrey 2000:12).

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Foucault points out that the link between powers, right and truth exists in every society, but

modern Western society stands out from other societies regarding these three concepts.

”We are forced to produce the truth of power that our society demands, of which it has need, in order to function:

we must speak the truth; we are constrained or condemned to confess or to discover the truth. Power never ceases

its interrogation, its inquisition, its registration of truth: it institutionalises, professionalises and rewards its pursuit”

(Foucault 1980a:93).

Here Foucault emphasises that truth has a privileged position in our society. Truth is the

prerequisite for the functioning of the society as a whole. We need sciences to provide us with

the truth of how society functions, of relations of production and people in order to regulate

these aspects. Individuals must speak the truth about themselves and work upon themselves in

terms of this truth. This vast knowledge is accumulated and formulated into theories. It is

legitimised by institutions and put into practice by formulating rules and laws and establishing

institutions that, in turn, maintain this truth seeking ‘project’, which, as mentioned before, is a

necessary condition for the functioning of the society. In short, power works in a circular way.

The analysis of power should, therefore, be conducted on the basis of the model of circulating

power or on the basis of power that links truth, right and power together in a mutually

reproductive way (Foucault 1980a:98).

We have seen how truth became the keynote of the reconciliation and nation-building project.

Truth gained the privileged position and became the prerequisite for the functioning of the new

regime. We have also seen how psychology and psychiatry, as well as theology provided the

new regime with truth about human beings in order to regulate and produce responsible

individuals who would be able to act as the agents of change. Individuals were required to speak

the truth about themselves and work upon themselves in terms of this truth.

5.10 Freedom

Foucault states that power relations always presuppose ‘the other’ in order to function as such.

Yet again, it is not just a relationship between different actors, but rather a confrontation where

actions of those in question are reshaped. The effects of power are indirect. Power comes into

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existence only when actively exercised. In these terms, it is an action upon the actions of others;

it is ‘government’ of people’s ways and practices, instead of management of the State (Foucault

in Rabinow 1984:220). “To govern… is to structure the possible field of action of others”

(Foucault 1982:221). To govern is to mould the involved parties’ possible actions. This does not

imply that those who exercise power are dominating; rather, power relations presuppose that

both actors are free to act, to choose different ways of behaviour and to resist power relations.

Freedom is an integrated part of power relations. If actors are free to choose they induce new

relations of power, because their actions have an effect upon the action of others (Foucault

1982:220). It follows that power relations are productive and have no single point of departure,

but are a result of the interaction of unequal and mobile relations (Foucault 1982:219).

Consequently, power as such cannot be of metaphysical origin and constitute an extra level

above existing societal structures, which can be escaped. On the contrary, power relations are

grown out of and intertwined into social relations, they are inevitable. They can be altered and

their roles can be reversed, but there is no society without power relations (Foucault 1982:221).

The feeling of freedom that power creates is what makes it, in Foucault’s words, ‘hold good’.

The fact that power is an all-encompassing, productive force, which never says no, makes it

invisible and individuals subject to it voluntarily (Foucault 1980b:119).

Therefore, the idea of liberation from ‘something’ should be dismissed. There does not exist a

natural state or true essence of things that was free in its original state and has been deprived by

repressive means. Foucault notes that the notion of ‘liberation’ is, in most cases, used

uncritically. The historical liberation from colonisation was an act of liberation only in a

particular sense of the notion. But, it is not enough to secure the ‘practices of liberty’, i.e. the

possibility of deciding preferable ways of existence or choosing a certain political society

(Foucault 1988a:2). Therefore, the act of liberation can mostly be seen as a precondition for the

practices of freedom.

Foucault, additionally, brings in the notion of ‘ethics’. Ethics denotes the subject’s way of being,

his/her relationship to the self. It also includes the element of the individual’s relations with

others, his/her proper behaviour as a competent member of society (Foucault 1988a:6-7).

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Practices of freedom are conditioned by the individuals’ ability to ‘care for the self’42 in order to

render them a responsible members of society; it presupposes individuals, who are capable of

reflecting on and controlling their own actions according to the existing moral rules of society.

Morality applies to the ways in which individuals turn their own actions into an object of self-

regulation. The care for the self deploys knowledge derived by contemporary social and cultural

practices. For instance, power often draws upon human sciences, such as psychology, psychiatry

or medicine, in order to provide its technologies with truth about the individual. These

disciplines with their regimes of practices are infused into rationales and techniques of power.

The concept of ‘normality’ has become an accepted knowledge, which again needs the truth of

psychology and expertise of social authorities in order to be administered. This has led to the

creation of a society of normalisation. As mentioned before, norms have taken on the functions

of corrective and regulatory mechanisms instead of law (Foucault 1990:144). The exercise of

modern forms of political power has become intrinsically linked to knowledge of human

subjectivity. The above can be summed by the following quote:

“…I refuse to answer the question that I am often asked: “But if power is everywhere, then there is no liberty.” I

answer: if there are relations of power throughout every social field it is because there is freedom everywhere”

(Foucault 1988a:12).

5.10.1 The SATRC cultivating the practices of freedom

We have seen how the individual of the new democratic regime was made responsible for the

‘management’ of him/herself. The TRC was a disciplining agency designed to shape the actions

of individuals. We have seen how power became anchored in the individual body, which

resulted in deploying a set of disciplining techniques in order to keep the power circulating. This

process demonstrates the subtlety of power relations, its productivity and durability.

In this context ‘freedom’ does not mean liberating the population of SA from the repression of

the apartheid past and giving it the chance to re-establish its normal and natural way of life. The

TRC was a means to cultivate the ‘practices of freedom’ in the form of cultivating certain

42 I shall not go into deeper discussion on Foucault’s analysis of ethics. My aim is only to emphasise the aspect of freedom in power relations and the fact that individuals must work upon themselves in order to be able to act as free individuals, which makes power circulate freely. By bringing in the theme of ethics, my aim is to establish a link between knowledge and power, as well as to point out the point of entrance of techniques of power at the micro level.

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morals and ethics. The morality of the truth finding process can be summed up by the following

quote:

“The telling of a violence story repairs the moral code by establishing persons in relation to each other within the

context of a shared code for distinguishing right from wrong” (Cobb43 in Humphrey 2000:14).

Here the focus is on social healing and establishing common moral codes. Public

acknowledgement of the origins of suffering draws the line between past and future. Past, as

mentioned above, represents all that was rotten in the society, whereas future promises a new

beginning for each and every citizen of SA. This contrast establishes the new shared moral code,

which indicates that the laws of ‘human brotherhood’ were violated by the apartheid regime,

and which the new order will restore. At the same time, both victims and perpetrators were

included in the project. Both of these groups were given a chance to re-enter into the community

of responsible citizens who contribute to the establishment of democratic society - a chance to

re-enter into the all-inclusive group of ‘rainbow people of God’.

In the process, each individual’s way of being and his/her relationship to the self, as well as

his/her relations to others, were modified. Wilhelm Verwoerd calls this dimension a ‘human,

psychological dimensions of true ‘development’’ or in other words ‘a Reconstruction and

Development Programme (RDP) of the soul’44 (Verwoerd 1999:115). RDP of the soul

emphasises that aspects, such as discipline and efficiency of citizens, precondition socio-

economic change in society. Former Deputy President Thabo Mbeki expressed a similar view:

“We shall each do what we have to do to contribute to the common effort to ensure that ours is a people that has

recovered not only its freedom but its soul also…” (Mbeki in Verwoerd 1999:116).

Here Mbeki expresses the need for ‘care for the self’. It is known that the new government faced

extensive corruption and crime, which jeopardised SA’s transition to democracy45 and which

had to be overcome. The practices of freedom presupposed individuals who could control their

own actions according to newly established moral rules that had overcome the old ‘master-

43 Cobb, S.: The Domestication of Violence in Mediation. In ‘Law & Society Review, 31(3):397-440, 1997. 44 A Reconstruction and Development Programme of the soul (RDP of the soul) is a term formulated by former President Nelson Mandela in the opening of the South African parliament, on 5 February 1998. 45 See 2001 Jensen, Steffen: The Battlefield and the Prize. ANC’s Bid to Reform the South African State.

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servant’ or ‘overlord-victim’ dichotomies (expressions used by Verwoerd 1999:131). The TRC

produced knowledge and established new cultural practices that promoted truth, forgiveness and

reconciliation. These practices became norms according to which the individuals could exercise

their self-regulation, instead of law. Verwoerd states that the TRC’s truth finding process was a

‘response’ to former President Mandela’s call for an RDP of the soul (Verwoerd 1999:119). It is

another example on how power was linked to knowledge about human subjectivity. As

expressed by an unknown person at the TRC’s public hearing “…at last we have a state with a

human face” (in Verwoerd 1999:130).

5.11 Resistance

As seen above, power relations presuppose actors’ freedom of choice and resistance. Resistance

is inherently linked to power, but this link is complex and ambiguous. Power sometimes

produces the very thing that comes to resist it, i.e. power functions through the imposition of

subjectivities and this process is bound to give rise to resistance. In that way “resistance is what

eludes power and power targets resistance as its adversary” (Foucault in Pickett 1996: 445).

Resistance can serve as a good starting point in analysing power relations and its techniques. There

are different kinds of struggle. In modern times, struggles are mainly turned against regimes of

truth, which impose different forms of individualisation on people. Resistance in these terms

denotes building a strategic knowledge about the ways one is subjected to power (Foucault

1982:212). In Foucault’s words:

“We have to force it [the war] out of the silent, larval forms in which it goes on without anyone realizing it, and we

must pursue it until the decisive battle for which we have to prepare if we wish to be the victors” (Foucault

2003b:268).

Resistance, in this context, cannot be simply reduced to the negation of power. One has to build

a strategic knowledge about the body and become aware of how it is subjugated to the

technologies of power in order to point to the possibilities of resistance. This form of resistance

takes place at the same level at which power is exercised – the level of the body and its history.

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Foucault encourages us to discard the idea of discourse, operating with universal concepts,

which claims to re-establish order in form of rights or freedom. This promised order does not

bring settlement and reconciliation; instead, it brings unevenness of relations, since it is always

characterised by giving a privileged position to some over others. Therefore, we do not see the

settlement of affairs, but witness either constant attempts to maintain the given relations or

attempts to redefine them. This process has to be rendered visible. One has to gain knowledge

on how the notions of universal truth and rights are deployed, since they are nothing but a fancy,

i.e. ‘knowledge functions as a weapon’.

By taking outset from the place of confrontation of forces, Foucault proposes a reversed

understanding of the state of affairs. “The elliptical and dark god of battles must explain the

long days of order, work and peace“ (Foucault 2003b:269). One has to take the space of struggle

as a starting point in analysing the emergence of an ideal or concept. As a result, these concepts

no longer appear as unified and transcendental, but reveal a level of an independent rationality

and strategies that have given raise to them, i.e. they appear as conditional and arbitrary. Instead

of the traditional logic of explanation, where a plethora of phenomena find their order in an

underlying permanent rationality, which in its essence constitutes a development toward

something ‘just’ and ‘good’, Foucault takes outset from the level of struggle and maps out series

of accidents that result in temporary order (Foucault 2003b:269).

Political struggle, in most cases, is fuelled by the dichotomy between the State and opposing

parties. Foucault is of the opinion that the State constitutes a certain order of power relations that

make it function in the first place. The opposition movement redefines these relations, but in a

different manner. Therefore, there are numerous ways of resistance, as many as there are

different ways of redefining power relations. The process of redefinition leaves the power

relations that make the State function fundamentally intact (Foucault 1980b:123). In line with

this, Foucault suggests that instead of criticising the State or ideology, one should be engaged in

building a ‘new politics of truth’. Each society has its own politics of truth that consist of

discourses that are accepted and deployed as true; it includes institutions that are engaged in

judging between true and false statements, as well as it includes the way these institutions

themselves are validated. Further, politics of truth also support certain techniques and schemes

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that are deployed in obtaining truth. In addition, there exist certain subject positions that carry

the seal of approval. Their utterances have a high status and are considered as true.

“The problem is not changing people’s consciousness – or what’s in their heads – but the political, economic,

institutional regime of the production of truth” (Foucault 1980b:133).

Here Foucault rejects the possibility of resisting on the level of the State, or ideology, i.e. in

terms of the superstructure. Instead, he suggests resistance on a more profound level that would

result in thoroughgoing changes in the politics of truth. In Foucault’s own words: “The political

question, to sum up, is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness or ideology; it is truth itself”

(Foucault 1980b:133).

5.11.1 The SATRC launching a new politics of truth

The struggle against the apartheid regime was understood in terms of a ‘negotiated miracle’, i.e.

a peaceful revolution that overturned all that the old regime represented. In its place, the culture

of human rights was inserted that focused on each individual and his/her freedom to fulfil

his/her potentials. The old subjectivities that maintained the dichotomy of master-servant were

rejected in favour of the notion of free responsible citizen. The general idea was that, as a result

of the transition to the new democratic regime, the society would escape from suppression and

untruth.

However, power is not held by the state or any single institution, but comes to expression

through the practices exercised on the level of the body; consequently, it is not possible to

escape it. Instead, the new regime redefined existing power relations and imposed its own

regime of truth, which deployed different techniques that had certain effects, though not always

those intended. The TRC put the knowledge of human psychology into action in order to

contribute to the creation of a new society that required a new type of subjects. The new

government aimed at legitimising the state institutions by setting up the TRC, which

demonstrated an open process and involved the civil society in its work. Verwoerd notes, that

the TRC’s greatest contribution was to help overcome the alienation between state institutions

and its citizens (Verwoerd 1999:130).

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“By holding accountable not only individuals, but also the state and other institutions, and by making

recommendations aimed at preventing future violations, the Commission sought to help restore trust in these

institutions. Such trust is necessary for the functioning of a healthy democratic system” (Report I: 109).

Here it is emphasised that the functioning of a democratic system requires trust in its

institutions. The TRC process, as well as its public hearings demonstrated the ‘human face’ of

the state. In Verwoerd’s words

“…the Human Rights Violations Committee’s public hearings were of particular significance, with commissioners

appointed by the legislative arm of the state sympathetically listening to (and even weeping over) painful stories

and acknowledging victims’ sense of injustice” (Verwoerd 1999:130).

What is striking is that the emphasis is on restoring trust in existing institutions, but not on

establishing new ones. The existing institutions were merely redefined in terms of new values,

thus leaving the basis for the functioning of the state intact.

The new regime merely launched a ‘new politics of truth’ and not, as falsely claimed,

fundamentally revolutionised the existing power relations. The emphasis on truth, reconciliation,

or restorative justice shifted the focus from state institutions to new moral values with its ‘RDP

of the soul’ that legitimised the new regime and helped to keep power circulating. This

‘imaginative and fundamental route to the ‘reconstruction of society’’ (Verwoerd 1999:133) is

described in following terms.

“It is particularly important to emphasise that establishing the truth could not be divorced from the affirmation of

the dignity of human beings. Thus, not only the actual outcome or findings of an investigation counted. The process

whereby the truth was reached was itself important because it was through this process that the essential norms of

social relations between people were reflected. It was, furthermore, through dialogue and respect that a means of

promoting transparency, democracy and participation in society was suggested as a basis for affirming human

dignity and integrity” (Report I:114).

Here we can see how different forms of truth operate side by side. The link is established

between objective truth and narrative truth. Both forms serve its purpose. Trust in state

institutions is restored by the objective and just treatment of perpetrators and victims, as well as

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the goal of ‘human scale development’46 is achieved by letting people tell their stories at public

hearings. During the truth finding process some central concepts were formulated and defined

that gave rise to a new morality and norms of society.

These two forms of truth recognised both short-term and long-term development. Objective

truth established facts about gross human rights violations and facilitated reparation and

rehabilitation. Narrative truth had the potential for ‘deep’ reparation, which would take place

during a longer period of time, but at the same time involved fundamental transformation of the

self. The above quote emphasises the importance of this level. The new politics of truth set up

the norm, which required ‘care for the self’ in order to cure both individual and collective

‘pathologies’ (Verwoerd 1999:134), so that the ‘will to be’ and ‘will to do’ (Verwoerd

1999:135) of individuals could be restored. The importance of these ‘non-conventional

resources’47 cannot, according to Verwoerd, be underestimated, since they facilitate ‘better

performance of conventional resources’ (Verwoerd 1999:135). Therefore, it was vital for the

new government to promote the technique of the transformation of the self, which contributed

both to the reconstruction of the new nation and coming to terms with various problems faced by

the new government.

We have seen how the TRC’s discourse was institutionalised through various techniques that

had the effect of disciplining its subjects. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow we had moved

from the ‘inside’ of the discourse to the ‘outside’ of the discourse by focusing on the effects of

the discourse. But as seen above, the distinction between archaeology and genealogy is difficult

to maintain, since these approaches are very much supplementary to each other. The ‘inside’ and

‘outside’ seem to blend together. Most of the analysis in terms of genealogy gives meaning in

the light of the archaeological analysis. It also appears that the institutional frame had an

important role in mapping the ‘inside’ of the discourse, i.e. the rules of formation. Consequently,

46 Human scale development is a needs-based theory that focuses on people-centered development in Latin America in the 1980’s. According to Verwoerd this theory was also applied in South Africa. This theory recognises, in addition to subsistence needs of victims/individuals, also some ‘fundamental human needs’, such as understanding what happened to their loved ones, to be free from fear, to be treated with dignity etc. It Focuses on ‘non-conventional resources’, such as social awareness, popular creativity, solidarity, collective memory, and cultural identity, which, as stated by Network for Human Scale Development, have ‘a tremendous capacity to preserve and transform social energy for process of deep change’ (as quoted in Verwoerd 1999:134-135). 47 Conventional resources include money/capital, land, and labour.

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the analysis in terms of genealogy introduces some new concepts, but without invalidating the

archaeological approach.

In the following section I shall refer to various authors who have discussed some issues related

to the genealogical approach. Pointing to these issues serve the purpose of putting Foucault’s

approach into perspective and it helps to set the stage for a more general discussion of Foucault

that will follow. The issues discussed in the next section can be summed up as: Foucault’s

normativity, the subject, power as strategy and resistance.

5.12 Critical remarks related to genealogy

5.12.1 Foucault’s normative stance

Charles Taylor demystifies Foucault’s historical analyses. Taylor points out that Foucault’s analysis

does not stand out in relation to more conventional analyses. Foucault too aims towards greater

understanding of what happened in history and where we are now. In the process of critique,

Foucault formulates his own concepts of “… a good, unrealised or repressed in history, which we

therefore understand better how to rescue” (Taylor 1984:152). Contrary to Foucault’s own claims,

Taylor suggests that Foucault points towards another form of truth and offers a ‘way out’ or a new

‘good’ that would replace the existing state of affairs.

Taylor notes that Foucault’s critique does not include all aspects and remains rather one-sided. For

example, Foucault sees humanitarianism as just another technology of control and fails to account

for the new ethics of life that has developed since the 18th century. This ethic takes outset in

feelings. The fulfilling of human, emotional needs and concern for other people’s suffering has

become an issue. It praises the ‘ordinary life’ instead of higher activities, such as monastic life or

pure contemplation. But Foucault sees this concern for the ‘inner life’ as a new form of domination

(Taylor 1984:155-156). Further, Foucault’s views on disciplines, such as human sciences, likewise,

present a one-sided picture. These disciplines do not exclusively serve the systems of control, but

they open up the possibility of collective action based on more egalitarian principles. There is a

need for disciplines that promote values like ‘free citizens’; a trait without which the existence of

free institutions is questionable. Besides the moral aspect, there is also the question of efficiency.

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This is not to deny that these disciplines can, at one point, become means in the hands of

dominating groups or systems of power. Taylor illustrates his point by referring to theories that

pictured societies as unified by the idea of contract or of responsible government. These theories

meant, at the time of their development, a step towards a new level - egalitarian politics. The same

theories today can be seen as limiting our democratic rights by being irresponsible and bureaucratic.

Foucault’s analysis does not take into account this ambivalent role of these abovementioned

disciplines (Taylor 1984:164).

5.12.2 Strategies without projects

Taylor further criticises Foucault’s use of the term ‘strategy’, derived from the military vocabulary.

Foucault sees the functioning of power and coherence of history as following the ‘logic of opposing

strategies’ instead of following some conscious purpose or ‘revelation of a project’. Systems of

power have the ability to maintain themselves, to reorganize and to manifest somewhere else if met

by resistance. Taylor describes this process as ‘strategies without projects’ (Taylor 1984:168).

Taylor points out that this thesis calls for further explanation in order to be understandable. It

requires an explanation of patterns in history as an effect of purposeful action of actors. There are

examples where the logic of strategy is explained by referring to purposefulness of individuals’

actions. There is, for example, the theory of the ‘invisible hand’ where the effects of individuals’

decisions and actions form a systematic pattern; or theories that take the unintended and

unacknowledged consequences of the collective action into account (Taylor 1984:169). It is

necessary to explain these unintended consequences that follow actions that are carried out on some

purpose or other. The link between the original purpose and unintended effect has to be made

explicit. “It is certainly not the case that all patterns issue from conscious action, but all patterns

have to be made intelligible in relation to conscious action” (Taylor 1984:170). By avoiding the

notion of a conscious individual or by proposing the term ‘a will to power’, which in Foucault’s

universe remains unfounded in human action, Foucault is unable to account for the systematicity of

actions at the micro-level, i.e. at the local level were strategies meet the body.

“Power, after investing itself in the body, finds itself exposed to a counter-attack in that same body. […] But the

impression that power weakens and vacillates here is in fact mistaken; power can retreat here, re-organize its forces,

invest itself elsewhere and so the battle continues” (Foucault in Taylor 1984:168).

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As seen in the quote, power is described as a force that has a certain systematicity and that can

channel its force according to the resistances that it meets in the counter with the body. But,

according to Taylor, Foucault fails to explain the relation between the macro-level and the body.

Foucault gives the context (for example state, institutions etc.), within which the micro-level

functions, an independent status, which develops according to its own logic (Taylor 1984:167).

Taylor is looking for an explanation of how to account for the change in these contexts in history?

How to understand the rise of Foucault’s systems of control? It is not necessary to look for some

actual individual or class or some other instant that has come up with the concrete idea, but,

nevertheless, this systematicity must be seen in relation to some rationale in which it is embedded.

It would be in line with the similar question to structuralists where one would ask why a language

exists in the first place? To give priority to language, structures, systems, as it is the case with the

structuralist movement, as well as with Foucault, who gives the privileged status to discourse, is,

according to Taylor, problematic. Taylor shows that language and action have a circular relation.

Language is sustained only by its use, by action, but also abandoned or altered in the course of

action, or speech. It follows that one cannot explain the level of language or discourse without

linking it to the level of action, i.e. to the micro-level (Taylor 1984:171-172).

5.12.3 The impossible practices of freedom – why should one resist oneself?

Foucault is accused of placing the possibility for resistance within power relations. It is

considered important that he has focused on the possibility of resistance instead of only

describing oppression, but the fact that resistance is enmeshed within power relations eliminates

the possibility to resist oppressive regimes. For many, Foucault seems to focus only on

repression, despite of his claims to the opposite, and the productive mechanisms of power seem

to be neglected. This can lead to the conclusion that “…there is nothing but repression, violence,

the arbitrary, confinement, police control, segregation and exclusion” (Robert Castel in Mills

2003:124).

Honi Fern Haber also questions the usefulness of Foucault’s concept of resistance. He is of the

opinion that, although Foucault does offer some useful analyses of power that point to the direction

of possible resistances, his notion of self as a construct of power relations renders some of these

claims dubious (Haber 1994:77).

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Foucault does not give us reason for positive expectations regarding the possibility of revolution,

since resistance is meshed in power relations, as described above. Given the all-encompassing

nature of power and politics of difference, there is always the danger that the prevalent power

relations absorb the alternative, defiant voices. The defiant views and groups become normalized

and their resistance is neutralised and again meshed in power relations. Instead of altering the

existing situation, the established power relations are fortified (Haber 1994:99-100).

Further, Foucault claims that one can only resist if one is conscious of the existing power relations,

and learns how one is the result of the same. But if disciplinary power is mutually dependent on

resistance, it can take over the discourse of the resisting groups; how then can any resistance avoid

being co-opted by the dominant power regime and ultimately overthrow it? How can resistance be

organized, if these very categories and conventions to be used are always the products of

normalising power? Foucault eliminates the possibility of an alternative vocabulary. In addition,

Foucault rejects the unitary notion of the individual, and claims that individual with their desires

and identities are ‘the prime effects’ of power (Foucault 1980a :98). Haber is of the opinion that it

does not give meaning to talk about resistance if one holds on to the notion of individual as

described above. Individuals who are the effects of disciplinary power have very limited possibility

to act or speak in a manner different than the prevailing vocabulary, not to mention to “…constitute

themselves through practices of liberation, of freedom…” to use Foucault’s expression (Foucault48

in Haber 1994:102). Foucault does not explain the missing link between disciplinary power

exercised at the level of the body and practices of freedom, and Haber notes that

“…[Foucault] has given us powerful reason to suppose that practices of ‘liberation’ and ‘freedom’ – even if these are

liberations from one power regime to another – are impossible” (Haber 1994: 102).

Foucault is unable to account for the appearance of oppositional discourses. In addition to the

above, it is uncertain that after the acknowledgement of being deeply embedded in disciplinary

power, resistance will follow. Haber is of the opinion that knowledge does not help the

individual to figure out how to bring about the change and make ‘new histories’ (Haber

1994:103). Further, if the individual, hypothetically, wishes to resist his/her present identity,

he/she is left with the inevitable, psychological and personal question of who he/she might be. 48 See Foucault Live. Collected Interviews, 1961-1984. Ed. Sylvére Lotringer, Semiotext(e), New York, p. 313.

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Foucault’s analysis of power relations might, to certain degree, help the marginalized to become

aware of the nature of power, but, on the other hand, it poses more questions that it answers.

Haber reminds us that identity is not only a ‘social category’, but also equally the feeling of the

self. It follows that there is no motive to resist oneself (Haber 1994:104).

5.12.4 Notions of truth and liberation as correlative to Foucault’s notion of power

Another point of criticism that Taylor brings forth is the relationship between power - freedom and

power - truth. Taylor is sceptical about Foucault’s theory of power that does not leave room for

notions like liberation and truth. In Taylor’s opinion, the very notion of power as domination,

presupposes by definition some kind of restriction, limitation or suppression that is exercised on

somebody by someone or something.

“…the notion of power or domination requires some notion of constraint imposed on someone by a process in some

way related to human agency. Otherwise the term loses all meaning” (Taylor 1984:172).

According to Taylor, power always needs targets in order to be exercised; it cannot be a ‘victimless

crime’. In Foucault’s words, the individuals themselves are the agents of power, while also being its

targets: “The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle” (Foucault

1980a:98). But, if the individual is imposing some form for pressure on him/herself, it must, in

Taylor’s opinion, have something to do with ‘fraud, illusion and false pretences’; otherwise one

would not be able to speak of domination (Taylor 1984:172). Foucault himself establishes a mutual

dependency between power and resistance, which means that there is an element of restriction and

suppression that hinders the fulfilment of individual desires, purposes etc., and which the individual

resists. In Taylor’s words:

“But now something is only an imposition on me against a background of desires, interests, purposes, that I have. It is

only an imposition if it makes some dent in these, if it frustrates them, prevents them from fulfilment, or perhaps even

from formulation. If some external situation or agency wreaks some change in me that in no way lies athwart some such

desire/purpose/aspiration/interest, then there is no call to speak of an exercise of power/domination” (Taylor 1984:172).

Taylor shows that one cannot draw a line between power and freedom and exclude one from the

other. Power has an element of freedom built into it. Meaning that if our desires and etc. are

restrained, the situation always contains the possibility of terminating this restraint. This is exactly

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what the notion of freedom denotes. There can be situations that cannot be altered for some reason

or other, but to speak of power without an element of liberation, as Foucault does, gives no meaning

(Taylor 1984:173).

By the same token, power cannot be thought without an element of truth in it. As Foucault has

elaborated, we work upon ourselves according to the prevalent discourse that makes the claim of

truth. Further, Foucault also claims that power today can only be accepted if it is hidden, subtle and

invisible to us49. In Taylor’s words, power proceeds by ‘falsehood’. But this inherent falsehood only

gives meaning in relation to the notion of truth. Truth is linked to the element of liberation, since it

contributes to the termination of impositions. Taylor notes:

“The Foucaultian notion of power not only requires for its sense the correlative notions of truth and liberation, but even

the standard link between them, which makes truth the condition of liberation” (Taylor 1984:174).

Foucault’s understanding of power entails the existence of truth outside power relations and

liberation from existing power relations in terms of this truth. The element of domination opens up

for a direct link between truth and liberation.

5.12.5 Monolithic relativism

Further, Taylor points out that Nietzschean relativism, which Foucault has adopted, has resulted in

statements such as: “Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth…”

(Foucault50 in Taylor 1984:175). Here Foucault emphasises that it would be meaningless to speak of

truth outside power relations, and of liberation, which would just be a step into a different form for

domination. But as Taylor has shown, power masks and disguises, and thus carries the element of

untruth with it. Foucault’s notion of relative truth questions the truth produced by prevalent

discourse, which, as seen above opens up the possibility of truth ‘outside’ that space.

“The idea of a manufactured or imposed truth inescapably slips the word into inverted commas, and opens the space of

a truth outside quotes, the kind of truth, for instance, that the sentences unmasking power manifest, or that the sentences

expounding the general theory of regime relativity themselves manifest (or paradox)” (Taylor 1984:176).

49 This claim is put forth in ’The History of Sexuality’, Vol. I. 50 Originally from Prison Talk, in ‘Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977’. Ed.: Colin Gordon, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1980.

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Here Taylor emphasises that if it is the case that truth is relative, then this relativity becomes

apparent only in relation to something that is true. It follows that if one analyses the prevalent

discourse and exposes its relativity, then one is, by definition, proposing a new truth about the state

of things. This also applies to theorists who proposed a theory of relativity in the first pace.

By adopting the general relativity, Foucault’s local and specific resistance can only cause some

destabilisation of the existing power relations. Since, according to relativism, different regimes

cannot be compared with each other, there is no truth or freedom to be gained by entering a new

regime either. Therefore, Taylor concludes that Foucault’s Nietzschean theory leads to a rather one-

sided, ‘monolithic’ analysis, which allows no change.

“It [monolithism] leaves out – better, it blocks out – the possibility of a change of life form that can be understood as a

move toward a greater acceptance of truth – and hence also in certain conditions a move toward greater freedom”

(Taylor 1984:176).

Taylor cannot accept this relativist stance. He views the change, the situation ‘before’ and ‘after’ as

linked to each other and not a total ‘break’ or ‘shift’ as Foucault proposes. Many changes in our

history can be explained by looking at the development of society or civilization at large. Western

civilization with its inhabitants has become what it is by virtue of notions like ‘humanitarianism’

and ‘freedom’. These notions have formed the understandings and identity of Western societies. In

Taylor’s opinion there is a reality. There is an understanding of the human being with a continuous

identity, with ‘inner depths’, which are, of course, challenged and partially redefined, and are

incompatible at times, but, nevertheless, it does not rock the sense of self, of identity. The struggles

between different views all contribute to the definition of humanity and politics. To illustrate this

point Taylor reflects on Foucault’s examples of punishment in the 17th century and today. The

question is why has the process of punishment changed and so that we no longer punish in public?

It has to do with the advance of our civilization, where we subscribe to a scientific understanding of

natural order instead of subscribing to a cosmic order, which informed their politics, as it was the

case in the 17th century. Taylor points out that this does not mean that these two systems were

incommensurable, rather, it means that we today have the advantage of ‘a significant gain of truth’

or ‘a stronger dose of truth’ that informs our politics (Taylor 1984:178-179). Taylor does not deny

that there are some fallbacks in form of some unfortunate modes of control or suppression of some

aspects of human ‘nature’, but he states:

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“…the point is that the sense both of gain and loss depends on comparability, on our understanding of our identity, of

what we now realize more fully, or are betraying and mutilating” (Taylor 1984:179).

Further, Taylor accepts some points of incomparability, since history is a rather complicated affair,

more so than in Foucault’s theory. In Taylor’s opinion Foucault ‘tidies’ history up and forces it into

‘hermetically sealed, monolithic truth-regimes’. Foucault’s monolithic relativism is imaginable only

if one is to look from an impartial point of view – adopt ‘the view from Sirius’. It would only make

sense if we were without prior identity and could choose freely either “…to be born a Sung dynasty

Chinese, or a subject of Hammurabi of Babylon, or a 20th century American” (Taylor 1984:180).

But that is not the case. Without any prior identity, one would not be able to choose. We have a

history. This means that individuals are connected to their history and have defined their identity in

relation to that, as well as in relation to their future that again can question this identity.

5.12.6 A champion of deviancy

As seen earlier, Foucault does wish to contribute to changing people’s ways of understanding and

doing things at the local level, as well as suggesting ways to alter the effects of power. With his

notion of ubiquitous power, Foucault targets the normalizing and disciplining form of power that

comes to expression at all levels of life. This form of power is kept circulating through the practices

of social scientists, social workers, psychiatrists, doctors, teachers, as well as through the ordinary

citizens who internalise the proposed values of existing power regimes. By the same token,

Foucault erases the division between public and private spheres that open up the possibility of many

temporary truths, and thus the possibility of multiple and local power struggles (Haber 1994:83). In

Foucault’s words:

“I would like to produce some effect of truth which might be used for a possible battle, to be waged by those who wish

to wage it, in forms not yet to be formed and in organizations yet to be defined” (Foucault in Haber 1994:83).

All social practices become political and can thus be questioned. To be able to ask these questions,

to see the private as being relevant in politics constitutes the core of ‘politics of difference’. It is an

approach that gives the silenced a voice and an opportunity to identify points of resistance. Foucault

is a ‘champion of deviancy’ (Haber 1994:87). This does not mean that Foucault is taking sides, but

he is offering the possibility of power struggles for those who are different.

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“One does not have to be in solidarity with [revolutionaries]. One does not have to maintain that these confused voices

sound better that the others and express the ultimate truth. For there to be a sense in listening to them and in searching

for what to say, it is sufficient that they exist and that they have against them so much which is set up to silence them”

(Foucault in Haber51 1994:89).

In this quote Foucault refers to the silenced groups that must gain knowledge of their situation

and voice their dissatisfaction or act against the prevalent situation. But Foucault does not define

these groups, and he goes to great lengths to explain that he himself should not be seen as a

champion of any particular group or view; a viewpoint that has been criticised, for example, by

Richard Rorty52. The failure to identify with any group or community or any consensus at all,

delimits the effectiveness of Foucault’s thought. “…without some form of community there

cannot be an effective politics” (Haber 1994:89). One should differentiate between allowing

formation of some consensus or other and defining the particulars of these communities or

formations. Foucault does not propose which form these communities must take; a point that

many critics hold against him. Since he does not offer a ‘way out’, he cannot be considered an

effective critic (Haber 1994:90).

5.12.7 Foucault’s bourgeois individualism

Haber further notes that Foucault’s theory of a dispersed subject is not sufficient to account for the

possibility of resistance. Haber suggests that the autonomous, self-conscious individual is not

enough to explain how it is possible to voice alternative claims and carry out revolution. The

missing link, according to Haber, is the notion of the ‘subject-in-community’ and the possibility of

‘articulation of community’, because: “There are ties where similarity is more important than

difference” (Haber 1994:104). Foucault claims that:

“…there aren’t any immediately given subjects of the struggle … who fights against whom? We all fight each other.

And there is always within each of us something that fights something else” (Foucault53 in Haber 1994:105).

51 Originally from Michel Foucault: Language, Counter-Memory, practice: Selected Essays and Interviews. Ed. Donald F. Bouchard. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977. 52 See Richard Rorty: Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity. ‘Praxis International’ 4:32-44, p.40ff. 53 In Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Ed.: Colin Gordon, New York, Pantheon, 1980.

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Here again the notion of the dispersed subject is underlined together with the notion of power that is

ever-present, all encompassing. It draws a picture of a struggle that is coming from everywhere and

is, thus, fragmented. Arguments like these have contributed towards the disqualification of

Foucault’s theory in oppositional struggles and undermining the feasibility of postmodern politics

in general. “Without a subject there can be no locus of resistance and without subjects coherent

enough to form coalitions there can be no force to resistance” (Haber 1994:105).

Haber deliberates further on the notion of the autonomous subject, which in Haber’s view is a

‘traditional’ notion. Meaning that it carries the remnants of the viewpoint of the bourgeois male.

Foucault’s emphasis on the individual results according to Haber in: “…bourgeois individualism,

which has dominated modern patriarchal, racist, and classist power regimes” (Haber 1994:106).

This view reflects the privileges of a masculine culture, where any dependency on anything is

rejected; those who would air their views from a standpoint of ethics or who would act on behalf of

some suppressed community which he or she identifies him/herself with, are devaluated. As

mentioned above, Haber advocates for the view of subject-in-community, where one’s identity is

constantly reconstructed in community with others, instead of Foucault’s ‘always already

masculine’, individualist subject54 (Haber 1994:106). If one needs or desires to create a new

identity, it is important to share one’s experiences, voice one’s feelings and ideas. According to

Haber, the individual is an effect of various groups that influence the identity creating process, thus

the formation of an alternative identity can only happen within alternative groupings. It is not

Haber’s point to disqualify Foucault’s analysis of power relations, but he is of the opinion that

besides gaining knowledge of being embedded in disciplinary power, one also learns about one’s

connection to some form of community, because there are no subjects in isolation. Confession

practices can help the individual to identify with some group or another and form an alternative

identity, although these groupings can be temporary and the self-identity partial (Haber 1994:108-

109). Haber concludes:

“…though there are many ways in which each individual is dissimilar from the next and is oneself not a site of a single

narrative, noticing the points at which we are similar has strategic political purposes” (Haber 1994:109).

54 Haber refers to James Miller’s autobiography, where Miller suggests reading Foucault’s ‘authorship’ (to use a very ‘unfoucauldian’ concept) as a extension of a ‘Nietzschean quest’ to create oneself, and this has left Foucault feeling existentially lonely, as it, according to Haber, must have been the case of Nietzsche too. Haber points out that reading Foucault in this light would give a psychological explanation for the incoherency in Foucault’s notion of the subject. See James Miller: The passion of Michael Foucault. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1993.

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Foucault is suspicious of any kind of truth telling and self-disclosure, which he disqualifies as a

means in the hands of dominant power to increase the domination and social control. But different

authors, among others Jana Sawicki and Nancy Hartsock, and Haber, are concerned about

Foucault’s distrust of any attempt of the marginalized groups to construct a ‘new voice’. Hartsock

asks:

“Why is it that just at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand the right to name

ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of history, that just then the concept of subjecthood becomes

problematic?” (Hartsock55 in Haber 1994:108).

Haber refers to Sawicki in order to answer this question. She writes:

“While self-refusal may be an appropriate practice for a privileged white male theorist like Foucault, it is less obviously

strategic for feminist and other disempowered discourses. […] One principal aim of feminism has been to build self-

esteem – the sense of self-certainty and identity, which are necessary for developing an oppositional movement. Telling

our stories to one another has been an important part of this process. […] we may be forced to conclude that telling the

truth about oneself can indeed disrupt patriarchal power relations. This is particularly true if this truth is shared,

analysed and strategically deployed” (Sawicki56 in Haber 1994:109).

These quotes illustrate the dilemma that Foucault’s deconstruction of the subject has disclosed.

Both authors are puzzled over the fact that Foucault does not allow any consensus of formation

of community, which, according to these theorists, points towards traditionalist thinking that is

suspicious of any attempt of liberation that will threaten the privileged position of this dominant

masculine culture, or, in Haber’s words the ‘patriarchal, colonizing order’, that Foucault

participates in.

5.12.8 Foucault as a bearer of Truth and Being

Foucault has provoked some critics to disqualify his claims of objectivity and raise the issue of

Foucault’s normativity. One of such critics is Brian T. Trainor. He questions the familiar

‘mainstream’ Foucault, who opposes metaphysics and Truth. Trainor proposes a different reading of

Foucault; Foucault who is a more humanistic, normative, and Truth-oriented than generally

55 See Nanct Hartsock: Foucault On Power: A Theory For Women? In ‘Feminism/Postmodernism’. 56 Haber refers to an unpublished article by Jana Sawicki: On Using Foucault for Feminism: A Personal Reflection.

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assumed (Trainor 2003:564). In order to make his point, Trainor examines Foucault’s deliberations

on the role of the intellectual. He quotes from Foucault’s ‘Remarks on Marx’57, where Foucault

reflects on his task as an intellectual.

“My role is to address problems effectively, really: and to pose them with the greatest possible rigor, with the

maximum complexity and difficulty so that a solution does not arise all at once because of the thought of some

reformer or even in the brain of a political party. The problems that I try to address, these perplexities of crime,

madness, and sex, which involve daily life, cannot be easily resolved. It takes years, decades of work carried out at

the grass-roots level with the people directly involved: and the right to speech and political imagination must be

returned to them. Then perhaps a state of things may be renewed, whereas in the terms by which it is being posed

today, it could only lead to a dead-end. I carefully guard against making the law. Rather, I concern myself with

determining problems, unleashing them, revealing them within the framework of such complexity as to shut the

mouths of prophets and legislators: all those who speak for others and above others. It is at that moment that the

complexity of the problem will be able to appear in its connection with people’s lives; and through concrete

questions, difficult cases, revolutionary movements, reflections, and evidence. Yes, the object is to proceed a little

at a time, to introduce modifications that are capable of, it not finding solutions, then at least of changing the givens

of a problem” (Foucault in Trainor 2003:565).

Here Foucault distances himself from the privileged position that is given to intellectuals and

movements of various kinds that claim the right to speak Truth for all, and claim to offer final

solutions. Foucault sees his role as raising issues that concern the ordinary lives of ordinary

people. The issues raised serve as an eye-opener for those involved, and individuals can begin to

question some taken-for-granted convictions they possess, as well as change the situations they

find themselves in. The aim is to question well-loved grand theories and open up for the

fundamental changes at the grass-root level; approaching each situation independently as it

actualises.

In Trainor’s reading, Foucault is not so consequent in renouncing the metaphysical notion of

Truth, as well as renouncing normative criteria that support change of social politics or politics

in general. According to Trainor, Foucault proposes a new perspective, which legitimises

change of circumstances, that of a ‘just-and-true-for-all’ perspective, which originates from the

above scheme, a ’common enterprise’. This scheme entails that all changes and solutions

emerge from the dealings with the daily life by ordinary people. In Trainor’s view this level is 57 From Michel Foucault: Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccia Trombadori. Trans. R. J. Goldstein and J. Cascaito. New York: Semiotexte, 199, pp. 158-159.

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assigned a certain ‘prima-facie legitimacy’. He comments: “…he [Foucault] actually applauded

and supported open, pluralistic, flexible, ‘emergent’, ‘Truth’-enfolding ‘bottom-up’ modes of

theorizing” (Trainor 2003:566). Trainor means that beside the widely known Foucault, the one

who renounces the existence of truth, one discovers a radical activist, who may turn out to be the

‘real Foucault’, an activist who desires to alter the course of things. “…Foucault has in mind

some kind of ‘genuine’ or ‘true’ or ‘just’ common-ness which serves as a criterion of legitimacy

and even ‘Truth’” (Trainor 2003:566).

The above claim is supported by reference to Foucault’s ‘Two Lectures’, where Foucault

demonstrates his predilection for suspended and suppressed knowledges.

“What it really does [the genealogical project] is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous,

disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchies

and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its

objects”(Foucault 1980a:83).

Trainor is of the opinion that this claim coincides with the above and further illustrates

Foucault’s account of a ‘common enterprise’, as well as it illustrates the dawn of a concrete,

‘truly legitimate’ sovereign reason. Trainor further claims that Foucault’s genealogical project

serves as a weapon to legitimise reason that arises from common dealings. But this weapon can

only be actualised if it is able to successfully contest and deconstruct the illegitimate, totalistic

reason (Trainor 2003:567).

John Ransom calls these subjugated knowledges, which genealogy is designed to expose,

‘monads of knowledge’. These monads of knowledge seem, with their liberating powers, to

escape any ‘truth and power cycle’ and can thus be considered as ‘illuminative moments of

Truth’58, or as the ‘bearer of Truth and Being’, to use Trainor’s terms. Trainor concludes that

Foucault, in the end, is not opposed to a ‘grand theory’ or a normative stance if it appears in a

‘suitable, non-totalistic’ form (Trainor 2003:567). Although truth remains a ‘ghost’ that

Foucault, according to Trainor, could never quite ‘exorcize’, this was not explicitly

acknowledged by Foucault himself. Consequently, one cannot by one stroke render invalid the

anti-normative, anti-metaphysical Foucault. Trainor assumes that Foucault might have been 58 Originally from John S. Ransom: Foucault’s Discipline: The Politics of Subjectivity. London, Routledge, 1988.

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unaware of the normative side of his undertaking. Although, one can trace the normative stance,

Trainor holds that Foucault has not set out to systematically engage himself in building up a

normative ‘ethico-political’ project to support his politics of difference (Trainor 2003:576).

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6 Foucault revisited, a critical view In the following chapter I shall reflect upon Foucault’s theoretical frameworks in relation to the

analysis of the SATRC. Firstly, I shall focus on the archaeology and point out some issues

connected to using archaeology as a tool for analysis, just as I will reflect on some philosophical

issues related to that. Afterwards, the method of genealogy is discussed.

As seen above, Foucault’s method has given various authors with different background a reason to

criticise it on various points. These points of criticism will be related to my analysis of the Report.

My aim is to show how Foucault’s own regimes of truth and regimes of practices can be

problematised.

I took the ‘Archaeology of Knowledge’ out of its context and read it as an independent event, which

poses some problems, as noted earlier. We have seen that a variety of aspects remain unsolved in

the ‘Archaeology of Knowledge’. Archaeology as described in this work, fails to account for the

relationship between discourse and the social level. The analysis shows that a combination of

various external social conditions was part of the rules that gave rise to the TRC’s discourse. For

example, the scientific ideal with its institutional set up and methods supported by the information

management system contributed towards focusing on forensic truth as an object. Scientific methods

gave the TRC its authority and privileged position in relation to the rest of society to create its

version of truth. We also saw how the scientific ideal has come to expression through the set-up of

the Commission, which adopted certain methods, which, if put into action produced some unseen

consequences. Further, objective truth was anchored in the institutional context and was directed

towards a certain purpose, which again resulted in establishing various institutions and forming the

actions and lives of individuals.

Furthermore, the TRC was characterised by its human rights discourse with its laws and

institutions, which constituted the frame within which the TRC operated. It was also legitimised by

the support from the international community. Neither can it be seen as independent from the

government that sanctioned it and gave it its mandate. Furthermore, as seen above, the formation of

subject positions was closely linked with the institutional setting within which the individual was

situated. The fact that Desmond Tutu had won the Nobel Peace Prize, and was the first black

General Secretary of the South African Council, legitimised his position as ‘a man of immense

moral authority’. The recognition of his competences by these respected institutions contributed

towards the legitimation of Tutu as Chairman of the TRC. All in all, the TRC was a complicated

system that interacted with the social dimension.

These various institutions and practices appear coherent and unified and form a favourable

environment for the formation of the TRC and its discourse. These ‘external’ or ‘primary relations’

are, as Foucault notes, not necessarily a part of the relations that make discursive objects possible,

but as seen above, non-linguistic elements, such as institutions, techniques and individuals had a

decisive role in forming the TRC’s discourse as a unity. This argument is supported by Foucault’s

own claim that material institutions condition the appearance and status of statements, despite the

fact that the discursive level has a priority. Materiality is one of the intrinsic characteristics of the

statement. Additionally, the functions of ‘surfaces of emergence’, ‘authorities of delimitation’ and

‘grids of specification’ are described in a way that gives a greater role to the social and institutional

level in the formation of objects than to discourse. The above indicates that Foucault’s notion of

formation reveals contradictory elements that confuse the understanding of Foucault’s notion of

discourse. Additionally, by attempting to describe the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ relations as clearly

identifiable levels and giving the discursive level with its own rules of formation priority, and, at the

same time, failing to account for the relationship between the discursive and non-discursive levels

indicates, as pointed out by his critics, an inclination towards structural analysis.

Foucault holds that there is difference between the discursive and non-discursive levels. In the light

of Laclau and Mouffe’s argument, one is inclined to say that Foucault (as well as Dreyfus and

Rabinow) tends to take the social relations and institutions at their face value. Foucault does not go

to depths with determining the nature of their relationship. According to Laclau and Mouffe, one

cannot speak of society as such, since all social relations and institutions appear, and are constantly

altered as a result of articulation. But, since Foucault fails to demonstrate how the social level

interacts with the discourse, the explanatory value of his project of determining the modes of

existence of discourse is limited; ‘an extremely complex configuration of realities’ is still allowed to

‘escape’, to use Foucault’s own expression.

In addition to the above, the autonomous nature of discourse is also rendered ambiguous as argued

by Laclau and Mouffe who note that by describing formation as ‘regularity in dispersion’, Foucault

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undermines his claim of unity of discourse. The principle of dispersion makes it difficult to

determine what there is external to the discourse. In fact the limits of discourse are rendered invalid

and the ‘different’ becomes a part of the discursive formation. The logic of dispersion renders the

notion of ‘formation’ meaningless and dissolves the frontiers between discursive formations.

Something can appear as a total system only in relation to another similar, clearly defined system.

While trying to map out the rules of formation, Foucault seems to dissolve them in the process.

Contrary to his intentions, the clarity of the rules of formation is blurred in the process of formation

at all levels. Foucault states that a discursive formation is a temporal unity and a mutual process

between series of temporal discursive events; it is a practice. It is a practice that also dissolves the

individual, replacing it by fluctuous subject positions. This indicates that instead of unity there are

only intentionless processes and practices. This makes it difficult to notify all the levels that

Foucault speaks of, not to mention, relating them to each other in a meaningful way. The different

functions are very much intertwined with each other, thus making it difficult to analyse them as a

delimited topic. The rules of formation are diffused. The fact that discourse and the system of

formation are counterproductive further complicates the matter. There is so much going on at all

levels that, in the end, one is tempted to question the meaning of this exercise all together. Since

everything is in perpetual transition, it becomes difficult to spot any trace of any rule at all, save the

rule that everything is relative, constantly changing and that everything alters everything.

By the same token, this abstract nature of archaeology leaves it to the user of this ‘tool’ to bend it

according to the particular case. Foucault’s archaeology can be seen as a theoretical mind frame

through which one can look upon a piece of reality, but the concrete use of this ‘tool’ is up to the

creativity of each new user. The cryptical nature of archaeology tends to make it a quasi-ideology

that one accepts per se, because of its seeming novelty. Foucault’s frame of thought offers an

alternative look on societal relations that appears attractive and gives the reader the feeling of being

able to see through the prevalent discourse. By the same token, the reader is caught in the fallacy

that this is the ‘correct’ way to interpret societal relations, because it claims to go to the core and

map out the rules of formation of discourse, and thus to explain why we say what we say and think

the way we do. Foucault gives his followers the hope that by being aware of these rules of

formation, the prevalent discourse loses its hold on the individual. But, on the other hand, Foucault

states that the individual is unconscious of these rules of formation. The archive is a temporary

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constellation, which cannot be described comprehensively. Consequently, individuals, including

Foucault, will always be situated in concrete time and place and susceptible to the rules of

formation. This reduces archaeology to a reference frame, an abstract, theoretical constellation built

up by Foucault, which is out of bounds, but which one either accepts for various reasons as one’s

own view or discards as unattractive; there is no ‘in between’. There is an ambivalence built into

Foucault’s argument. On the one hand, he gives us hope that we can map out the archive and

become aware of the ‘subjugated knowledge’. On the other hand, this hope is short-lived; since we

are unconscious of the archive, and thus have no chance to describe it. Therefore, Foucault does

theoretically open up a new perspective, but is unable to describe these underlying conditions

because of the very definition of the archive. We get the illusion that we can move beyond

commonly accepted perceptions, but in reality this possibility is a mere theoretical one.

The fact that archaeology loses its explanatory value if taking out of the context of other works,

hints towards the view that it can be seen as a stepping-stone towards a more comprehensive body

of theory. Its value is increased after the aspect of power is developed in genealogy. Foucault

himself, as seen earlier, gives quite contradictory information on the subject. On the one hand, he

makes it clear that he is not engaged in forming a coherent theory, but on the other hand, he states

that his different works and concepts of archaeology and genealogy are intrinsically linked to one

another. Each new book can be seen as problematisation of a new field, which often ends with

posing questions that are elaborated further in the following work. This makes Foucault’s style

dynamic as well as fragmented.

The fragmented nature of Foucault’s work is a returning issue. While using his methods one can

easily fall into the fallacy of saying the same but with different terms. It is partially the result of the

way Foucault, again, and yet again, in his own eloquent ways, explains his intentions to himself, as

well as to his readers and listeners. As a result, the problems at hand tend to extend their limits and

develop into, if not something entirely new, then to something more complex and multi layered.

Foucault’s problematisation has a fluctuous nature; it is composed of reflections where stitch marks

still appear. These ‘conceptual constructions’, to use Gutting’s expression or practices,

nevertheless, have unseen consequences. The way Foucault kept correcting and clarifying himself

points towards the fact that Foucault’s pursuit is an attempt to settle at certain point and formulate a

coherent theory, a new mode of analysis. Sadly, this pursuit was cut short by his premature death.

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I appreciate the alternative interpretation that Foucault sets the stage for, but on the other hand, I am

inclined to adopt the view that Foucault wishes to appear as a ‘privileged moment of

individualization in the history of ideas’. I do not claim that Foucault’s enterprise can be seen as an

ideology, but I hold that he does offer his own perspective on things, instead of just describing the

rules of formation and remaining ‘faceless’. Foucault does not formulate his notions in a vacuum.

The influence of Nietzsche, and the post-structuralist movement, to name a few, set the stage for

Foucault’s own pursuit, thus linking his seemingly fragmented meditations to each other. This

shows that Foucault’s work can be seen as a ‘node within a network’. It refers to other authors and

works within certain disciplines in order to form its own discourse. It also shows that it is not a

radical shift of paradigm, but can be seen as a reinterpretation of certain notions and theories, which

results in proposing a different frame of reference and methods, leaving the criteria and relations of

a science and discipline fundamentally intact.

Genealogy, as mentioned earlier, includes the practices and strategies of discourse and its

connection to institutions. Genealogy sets the stage for a more complicated form of analysis, if

seen in relation to archaeology. We can see how Foucault has learned from the limits of his

previous approach that left out the social dimension, which is now added to his method in form

of the notion of power relations that describe the interaction between actors on various levels.

We can see how the ‘narcissism of structure’ gives way to a more dynamic approach that is

anchored in the body and its meeting with power, thus getting closer to the ‘real’ and seemingly

losing its elitist position. Yet again we are witnessing Foucault’s attempt to supplement and

refine his theoretical frame.

We have seen above that there are conflicting opinions about whether to read Foucault as a

linear development towards the end point, i.e. to the point where the notion of power relations is

presented or as presenting different, independent approaches of archaeology and genealogy. In

my opinion Foucault can be seen at the same time both as fragmented and coherent. On the one

hand, Foucault introduces a number of analyses each taking outset in a specific field and issues.

Not only does archaeology and genealogy present a ‘shift’ in Foucault’s theory, but both

approaches are also characterised by experiments on their own terms. On the other hand, one

can trace a continuity of themes. Though his work seems fragmented, its themes have an

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intrinsic connection with one another. In practical use, archaeology and genealogy supplement

each other. Without incorporating the institutional frame, an analysis in terms of archaeology

would have contributed to mapping out the discourse of the TRC, but it would not have said

much about its consequences and effects.

What are the effects of Foucault’s own pursuit? We have seen that the issues at stake both in

archaeology and genealogy are similar. Both approaches are criticised on their own terms but one

can trace the continuity of issues that are raised again and again by various authors form different

backgrounds. Although throughout this thesis I have adopted the division between archaeology and

genealogy, and I have introduced these approaches under thematically divided sections, in the end

this division cannot be maintained. Foucault’s approach as a whole tends to have an effect that point

in a certain direction. Therefore, some of the issues discussed above and below apply to Foucault’s

pursuit as a whole.

Despite of his claim of being anti-metaphysical and descriptive, Foucault does take a normative

stance. As a ‘champion of deviancy’, Foucault proposes another way in which the intellectual

pursuit can be put into the service of transforming any unwanted power relations. Foucault cannot

be entirely separated from the political dimension. He is attempting to ascertain his own ‘politics of

truth’ and propose a new form of reasoning – a bottom up theory. Foucault’s approach promises a

greater understanding of how the society functions and gives a voice to the suppressed. Some might

argue, with the arrogance of knowing better. For example, the analysis of the TRC’s discourse in

Foucault’s terms showed how its use of concepts and techniques of power created certain effects.

The TRC gave the concepts truth, reconciliation and justice a specific meaning and exercised its

power through various techniques that together had the effect of turning the TRC into a disciplining

organ. This effect was not a result of deliberate intentions of certain individuals. The TRC arose

from and acted within the prevalent frame of reference, i.e. the human rights discourse. This frame

conditioned the formation of the discourse of the TRC and its use of techniques.

Foucault gives the analyst a sense of looking at things from a vantage point where one gets the

illusion of overlooking the battlefield of power relations and seeing the rules of formation in action.

By exposing the overall effects of the discourse of the TRC as a technique of legitimising new

power relations and reforming the individual’s perception of the self in order to become active

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participants in maintaining these relations, one is tempted to take a normative stance. Foucault has

made it possible to see through how the TRC as a visionary institution with its well sounding

concepts and neutral techniques instead has taken the form of a disciplining organ in the hands of

the government. Because of the notion of subtle power relations, power works through individuals’

actions upon the actions of others as well as through the care of the self, thus giving us the

impression that power is something one should be aware of and something that secretly imposes its

own views and will on us. One might say that this suspicion is unnecessary and comes from our

innate understanding of power as suppression, and that Foucault has ‘liberated’ us from this

repressive hypothesis and shown that power is creative instead of being inhibiting. But, on a

theoretical level, Foucault does not give us a chance to escape power since he adopts the view that

every new regime with its laws and rituals is ‘saturated in blood’, i.e. is the result of power

struggles that give rise to new forms of domination. Consequently our suspicion is increased, since

no one likes the idea of being dominated and disciplined by disguised techniques of power.

Therefore, one can say that Foucault does not eliminate the repressive hypothesis, but gives it a new

form, a more ‘dangerous’ one. By the same token, Foucault replaces the unity of man with subject

positions that are enmeshed in power relations, thus denying the individual a ‘way out’ from these

relations. This further increases the understanding of power as repression, violence or domination,

as Castel rightly notes.

I am not sure how people in South Africa would react or what they would think if such a view was

presented to them. The TRC, as well as other truth commissions, is a genuine attempt to deal with

the past and bring the nation closer to peaceful coexistence. Its claims of objectivity and choice of

methods can be discussed, but its intended goals hold a promise to, one way or the other, improve

the state of affairs and bring some relief to the victims of human rights violations and their relatives.

I am sure that many involved have felt a new hope for the future as the process of truth seeking

went on and that for many the quality of life has improved. What would it change if we found out

that the neutrality of concepts and the methods of the TRC are nothing but a new form of

domination? That the effects of the TRC’s methods constitute it as a disciplining organ? Nothing

really. It is a fact that society functions by some people being elected to be in charge and others

submitting to their governance. There are different forms of government as exemplified by the case

of South Africa. The apartheid system was experienced by the majority as domination proper,

whereas the new democratic government respects human rights and gives the citizens freedoms that

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follow, thus representing a subtle and hidden form of domination. In my opinion the issue is not

whether the power is hidden or not, but the issue is what it does to us. Domination proper restricts

us in exercising our free will and from being what we are. A disciplining form of power on the other

hand, nurtures our freedom and builds us up so we are able to exercise our rights and freedom. I

agree with Foucault that we have to become aware of subjugated knowledges and become aware of

how we are made subjects, but on the other hand the subject positions we are offered are not

necessarily bad. Even becoming aware that I am being disciplined I might actually like it and ask

for more. It might give me the feeling that I actually unfold myself and my life makes sense. There

is a difference between the modes in which we are made subjects. For example, if the media

through their advertising campaigns wants us to buy something or behave in certain way, we are

well served by a Foucaultian approach, which would help us to see through this plot. But, if we

make use, for example, of the knowledge produced by psychological disciplines in order to work on

some psychological problems, we can actually benefit from these disciplines, because they help us

to dissolve the blockages that prevent us from becoming what we truly are – creative and joyful

beings. We are individuals with feelings, a sense of self and history, factors that outweigh

Foucault’s notion of subject position. We cannot choose to be born into the Sung dynasty in China

or become a subject of Hammurabi of Babylon, as Taylor rightly notes. Neither do I believe that

occupying contradictory subject positions have to be disguised by ideology. We occupy certain

positions that we choose, not accidentally, but because it means something to us, it mirrors our

abilities, feelings and possibilities at a given time.

It is evident that Foucault has touched a sensitive issue. I am sure that most of us experience

ourselves as unitary individuals with the feeling of self with a continuous memory. The view that

we have been given certain subject positions by forces that are beyond our control appears rather

unattractive. By the same token, Foucault presents the effects of discourse as something negative,

something that must be resisted, thus underlining his repressive stance, which increases our

suspicion of any system or discipline. It follows that Foucault’s theoretical frame has an inbuilt

negativity in it. His whole pursuit aims at liberating these subjugated knowledges that would

necessarily lead to resistance. But as discussed above, why should one resist oneself? We have seen

how the TRC defined victims and perpetrators and deployed certain techniques, for example

confession in public hearings that helped those who testified or confessed to adopt a human rights

vocabulary and work on themselves and modify their sense of self in line with this new value

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system. But this value system is not necessarily something bad or negative, as Foucault would like

us to believe. Foucault questions all systems and especially psychological disciplines that produce

truth about human beings, which is put into practice in order to produce certain behaviour in

individuals. The new regime of South Africa takes outset in the ideal of individual rights and

freedom, and African traditional and Christian value systems. These systems emphasise the value

and humanness of each individual, be it a victim or a perpetrator. They express the belief in the

intrinsic goodness of human beings and the belief that this goodness can be restored if the

individual has erred. Yet again, I value Foucault’s attempt to give us the benefit of doubt;

nevertheless I believe that the abovementioned values are in line with our essence, to use an

unfoucauldian expression. We all are in pursuit of a good life. We might have different ideas about

what makes us happy, but I postulate that each and every one of us values love, respect and personal

freedom. Why should we be suspicious of systems that build their value systems in accordance with

our deepest wishes? These systems and their techniques and institutions might not be perfect, but

nevertheless they hold the promise of giving us the necessary conditions to function as whole

human beings. I do not discard Foucault’s idea of resistance altogether, it is a useful tool if one

finds some practices and subject positions intolerable. Resistance and critique would refine these

technologies for the better, within the system. But I do not share Foucault’s suspicion of every value

system or discipline, because there is difference between systems and disciplines. The case of South

Africa shows that the apartheid system directly opposed the majority’s right to dignified existence,

whereas the new regime actually touches upon some of the intrinsic traits of human nature.

Consequently, there is no reason to resist the new value system as such. In fact, all groupings in

South Africa would benefit by adopting the new vocabulary and become the agents of power, since

it would lead to better life of all involved. As seen in the analyses it requires some sacrifice, because

some groups will lose their privileged position and others lose their chance of retaliation. But

nevertheless, everyone would have a chance to build a life based on mutual respect, which would

bring some satisfaction to each and every one.

This brings us to another issue, that of the possibility of consensus or community. It is difficult to

accept Foucault’s ‘bourgeois individualism’, to use Haber’s expression, a view that celebrates the

individual who acts as an element among other autonomous elements without the possibility to

form any unity. It is a view that allows the individual to move from subject position to subject

position without having a sense of self or belonging; it opens up for resistance at all levels - we all

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fight each other as well as we fight ourselves. Foucault, by questioning all systems, also questions

all consensus and communities. Every consensus, according to Foucault’s theoretical framework

must per se carry the element of will to power, which is expressed through various institutions and

practices, whereas every community is rendered an arbitrary constellation defined and redefined in

relation to other groups according to the rules of the prevalent discourse. In addition to the

fragmented struggle, Foucault denies the individual the benefit and pleasure of the company of

other individuals.

Neither we, nor South Africans belong to a world of things or subjects as empty vessels. If the

suppressed groups in South Africa had not formed a relatively united body of resistance, the

apartheid system would still exist. And if the previous regime had not formed a consensus about

polices of segregation, the apartheid regime would not have existed in the first place. Both the

liberation movement and the apartheid regime constituted themselves as a unity and defined their

identity in relation to other groups, which attracted large numbers of likeminded individuals who

too chose to identify themselves with them. This gave these systems their strength and ability to

form the reality according to their respective value systems. The supporters of these respective

systems acted according to their feelings and ideas of how society should function. These groups

elected their leaders who designed the respective plans of action. So, to sum it up, contrary to

Foucault’s unconscious and empty subjects that are moulded according to technologies of power

and whose actions have unpredictable consequences, these leaders and their followers made their

decisions and acted out of their own free will. They were active participants in their country’s

history, as well as in their own lives. As the various critics have noted, how can any change occur if

not triggered by some impulse or idea coming from a certain group or person or from some form of

intended action? To move things in a certain direction or to build a certain kind of society requires

intentional action. For example, the apartheid system was a premeditated set of laws and rules that

were designed to produce certain effects. This systematic discrimination that occurred as a

consequence was not accidental effect; it was an intentional result. I do not believe that the ANC

leader Nelson Mandela would have taken on a role as a reformer of South Africa and endured the

pain and suffering he was put through, if his ideas and sense of self were an effect of disciplining

power and not his own deep convictions. Mandela, as any leader in history, is an individual with a

strong sense of self, motivation and will. He was not put in this subject position by some

undercurrent forces, but he made a conscious choice.

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I agree with Haber that Foucault does not offer an alternative but just states that power is

everywhere and resistance can occur only within power relations; it is a view that takes us nowhere.

The premises of Foucault’s theoretical framework are that all we can do is to acknowledge that we

are tossed around and moulded by strategies without projects; there is no escape. The individual’s

ability to make decisions is undermined. It seems that Foucault’s theory is filled with paradoxes. On

the one hand he poses an approach that claims to map out the rules of formation of discourse, which

makes us able to acknowledge the ways in which we are made subjects and resist accordingly. On

the other hand, despite of including the notions of resistance and freedom, he takes back the

promise of ever getting out of these subtle dominating power relations. Whatever we do, our

resistance and the concepts we use are formulated within the prevalent discourse, thus producing

more of the same.

According to this logic, the change of regimes in South Africa does not mean a ‘new era’, but

denotes a new politics of truth or a new domination, i.e. a new round of ‘violence’. It is a temporary

settlement of power relations in favour of the new regime. Foucault’s approach tempers any feeling

of relief or joy that the victorious group might have. He does not promise peace, but ongoing

conflict and combat. In Foucault’s terms the human rights culture in South Africa is just a

temporary settlement of affairs; it is a new regime that imposes its own laws and rules and deploys

its own techniques. The liberation movement has grown out as a resistance against some intolerable

practices of the apartheid system, it formulated its concepts within and in relation to that system,

thus giving its concepts a new content, but leaving the relations of domination and its institutions

fundamentally intact. For the supporters of the new regime, the perspective that the shift from

apartheid to democracy and human rights is but an illusion, would be a bitter bill to swallow. I

imagine that it would erase any optimism and hope, which are necessary driving forces for people

who are supposed to build a new society. It would create an unnecessary suspicion that the new

government too is just waiting for its chance to seize power in order to impose its own will and

dominate, although through different means. At the emotional level it is rather provoking when

Foucault’s approach opens up for a comparison between, for example, the apartheid system and a

democratic government. Yet, on a theoretical level it is a logical consequence of Foucault’s

premises. Foucault does not give much hope for humanity. The evolution from barbaric disorder to

humanitarian ideals and forms of government that we have witnessed in history is but an illusion.

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Instead, Foucault suggests that we are dealing with a series of interpretations. Consequently, we still

live in a barbaric order, even more so, because now the domination is more sophisticated; it is

hidden and continues on the deepest level of the self.

We are faced with the dilemma of the meeting of two incommensurable aspects. On the one hand,

there is the emotional common sense reason that would not accept such consequences. On the other

hand there is the logical reason that draws conclusions out of the presented arguments. It is

characteristic of Foucault’s approach that it triggers an ongoing battle between feelings and logic.

As a human being with feelings one tends to reject Foucault’s argumentation, because it makes us

‘faceless’ actors in the ongoing struggle between forces that we are not even conscious of. On the

logical side, Foucault problematises our way of being and thinking, which shakes our perception of

the world and ourselves fundamentally. Foucault is often read in a way which forces you to either

accept his frame of thought or reject it. If one accepts Foucault’s premises, the rest will follow.

I find myself in a peculiar position. Although I do not like what Foucault does to us, I still like what

he does to us. I do not like being ‘erased’ and constructed as an empty vessel and not be given an

alternative. Yet, I find Foucault’s line of reasoning extremely illuminating and challenging.

Foucault does not have all the answers; yet reading Foucault can be experienced as a ‘point of

rupture’. He is an agent of ‘the return of the beginning of philosophy’ a proud follower of

Nietzsche’s quest to end the ‘sleep of Anthropology’. He triggers our thirst for subjugated

knowledges and shows us how we have become what we experience we are. Foucault shakes the

ground and whether one likes it or not, he cannot be ignored. We are forced one way or another to

relate to his arguments.

But, all in all, Foucault’s quest to wake us form our slumber, tends to take us back to the starting

point – to Anthropology; and to accept it on more illuminated grounds. As seen in the analyses, the

question that often arises and begs to be answered is ‘why?’ and not ‘how?’ as Foucault suggests.

Why was the TRC formed? Why were certain concepts promoted instead of others? Why were

particular techniques deployed and not others? The list of similar questions would be endless. One

might argue that my findings regarding the discourse of the TRC are far fetched or a pure

speculation. But I do not think so. It is true that I analyse the TRC’s statements from a certain

perspective, but that is not the issue. The issue is that in Foucault’s terms the analysis should have

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mapped out the strategies without projects, a pure description, but the picture that appears points

towards strategies with projects. We have seen that the concepts, strategies and techniques of the

TRC were not accidental, but they served certain purpose – they were means to an end. They were

designed by the members of the Commission and presupposed participating individuals in order to

be put into practice. Consequently, we cannot speak of accidental effects, but must refer back to

subjects with intentions who act and react according to their reason and more or less conscious

intentions. We are dealing with people with ‘an inner realm’ that possess certain convictions and

understanding of self; with policies that emerge as a result of careful deliberation. I do agree that

some of these deliberations can sometimes have some unseen consequences, but I believe that it is

not because the actions taken were without projects. Accidental effects emerge because perhaps not

all aspects were taken into account. But this does not invalidate my argument that whenever we are

dealing with strategies that involve individuals, both as decision makers and subjects of these

decisions, we are dealing with intentional projects. My point is that, although Foucault fancies

himself as an agent of the return of the beginning of philosophy, the premises of his approach, for

example, the notion of subject, actually undermine his notions of resistance or freedom, to name

some, because these concepts require individuals that form a unity in order to act and be the agents

of power. Foucault has difficulties with offering a convincing alternative to the notion of the

coherent subject.

Foucault aims at presenting a disinterested descriptive approach. He tries to map out the rules of

formation and claims that each society has its own politics of truth that mark the new event in

history that cannot be compared with other events. But, as seen above, Foucault’s relativity in this

context cannot be taken literally, nor does Foucault remain ‘faceless’. Foucault operates with the

aspect of domination, thus opening up the possibility of truth outside power relations, which

disqualifies the argument of relativism of Foucault. According to Nietzsche, true freedom must let

go of any universality that may still be the driving force. “Nothing is true, everything is permitted”

(Nietzsche 1956:287). Freedom from the restriction of values is possible only if the very notion of

‘truth’ is discarded. But, any inquiry is necessarily driven by hypotheses and beliefs that give it its

course. It always requires a set of external values in order to perform, thus rendering the

disinterested view an empty conception. If there are no certainties, all scientific and scholarly

activities are in need of defence of their existing grounds. The will to truth must be questioned,

since the value of truth itself is dubious (Nietzsche 1956:289).

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Consequently, although Foucault claims that every change of power relations can be seen as a total

break or shift and that each society has its own politics of truth, one of the consequences of this

relativist stance is that Foucault unwillingly subscribes to the will to truth, because as seen above,

relativity becomes apparent only in relation to something that is true. Foucault, in his pursuit to

propose his own politics of truth seems to overlook Nietzsche’s point that if everything is rendered

relative, his own pursuit is in need of accounting for its existing grounds. By the same token, Taylor

too has overlooked that Nietzsche in fact does distance himself from relativism as such, since he

eliminates the possibility of a disinterested view. Therefore the claim that Foucault has adopted

Nietzschean relativism is too simplistic. Anyhow, Taylor’s point that Foucault allows the element

of truth in his theory remains valid.

Foucault’s normativity can be seen as a perfect example of the inbuilt paradox of his theory.

Foucault had set out to break with the common understanding of theory and method. He

proposed a method of problematisation, which aimed at mapping out the rules of formation of

discourse, as well as seeing truth regimes as saturated with unequal relations of power and

struggle between actors. It was an attempt, once and for all, to erase the notion of ‘coherency’

from the vocabulary and replace it by the notion of shift of truth regimes. But, as it is evident,

Foucault cannot avoid operating with universal notions like theory, truth, and the right method.

It can be discussed if his normative stance is intentional or an unintentional effect of his

discourse, the fact remains that Foucault, as anybody else, can become the bearer of a new Truth

and Being. As Foucault notes, one cannot step out his time and place, as well as the individual

cannot map the unconscious rules of formation. As a consequence, Foucault cannot fully

account for the relations that make him what he is. Neither can he predict the effects of his

discourse. He too is the subject of rules of formation and power relations. Therefore, the

conclusion must be that ‘knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting’ even

if this knowledge is produced by Foucault.

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7 Appendixes

7.1 Bibliography 1990 Bernauer, James, W.: Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight: Towards an Ethics for Thought. Humanities Press International, Inc., London. 1979 Breazeale, Daniel ed. and trans.: Introduction in Friedrich Nietzsche: Philosophy and Truth. Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the early 1870’s. Humanities Press International, INC., New Jersey. Buur, Lars: Institutionalising the Past: Information Management and Other Methods of Ordering the Truth in the Work of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In Folk, vol.44, pp.117-144. 1986 Certeau, Michel de: The Black Sun of Language. Trans. Brian Massumi. In ‘Heterologies. Discourse on the other’. Manchester University Press. 2000 De Lange, Johnny: The Historical Context, Legal Origins and Philosophical Foundation of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In ‘Looking Back Reaching Forward’, eds. Charles Villa-Vincencio, Wilhelm Verwoerd, University of Cape Town Press. 1982 Dreyfus, Hubert L. & Rabinow, Paul: Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Harvester Press. 1980a Foucault, Michel: Two Lectures. Trans. Kate Soper. In ‘Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977’. Ed.: Colin Gordon, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead. 1980b Foucault, Michel: Truth and Power. Trans. Colin Gordon. In Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Ed.: Colin Gordon, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead. 1982 Foucault, Michel: Afterword. The Subject and Power. In ‘Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and hermeneutics’ by Hubert Dreyfus & Poul Rabinow. Harvester Wheatsheaf. 1984a Foucault, Michel: Nietzsche, Genealogy, History. In ‚The Foucault Reader’. Ed. Paul Rabinow. Pantheon Books, New York. 1984b Foucault, Michel: What is an Author? In ’The Foucault Reader’. Ed. Paul Rabinow. Pantheon Books, New York. 1988a Foucault, Michel: The Ethic of the Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom. An Interview with Michel Foucault on January 20, 1984. Trans. J.D. Gauthier. In ‘The Final Foucault’. Eds. James Bernauer & David Rasmussen. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1988b Foucault, Michel: Critical Theory/Intellectual History. Trans. Jeremy Harding. In

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‘Politics, Philosophy, Culture. Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984’. Ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman, Routledge, New York and London. 1989a Foucault, Michel: Archaeology of Knowledge. Routledge, London. 1989b Foucault, Michel: History, Discourse and Discontinuity. Trans. John Johnston. In ‘Foucault Live. Collected Interviews, 1961-1984’. Ed. Sylvére Lotringer, Semiotext(e), New York. 1990 Foucault, Michel: The History of Sexuality. An Introductin. Vol. I; trans. Robert, Hurley. Vintage Books. 1994 Foucault, Michel: The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Vintage Books, a Division of Random House, Inc. New York. 2003a Foucault, Michel: 17 March 1976. Trans. David Macey. In ‘Society Must Be Defended. Lectures at the Collége de France, 1975-76’. Eds. Mauro Bertani, Alessandro Fontana. Gen. eds. Francois Ewald, Alessandro Fontana. English Series Ed. Arnold I. Davidson. Allen Lane Penguin Press. 2003b Foucault, Michel: Course Summary. Trans. David Macey. In ‘Society Must Be Defended. Lectures at the Collége de France, 1975-76’. Eds. Mauro Bertani, Alessandro Fontana. Gen. eds. Francois Ewald, Alessandro Fontana. English Series Ed. Arnold I. Davidson. Allen Lane Penguin Press.

2002 Graybill, Lyn S. ’Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa. Miracle or Model?’ Lynne Rienner Publishers, London. 1994 Gutting, Gary (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. Cambridge University Press. 1994 Haber, Honi Fern: Beyond Postmodern Politics: Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault. Routledge, New York, London. 2000 Hayner, Pricilla B.: Same Species, Different Animal: How South Africa Compares to Truth Commissions Worldwide. In ‘Looking Back Reaching Forward’, eds. Charles Villa-Vincencio, Wilhelm Verwoerd, University of Cape Town Press. 2002 Hayner, Pricilla B.: “Unspeakable Truths. Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions.” Routledge, New York and London. 2000 Humphrey, Michael: From Terror to Trauma: Commissioning Truth for National Reconciliation. In ‘Social Identities’, Vol. 6, Nr. 1. 2001 Jensen Steffen: The Battlefield and the Prize. ANC’s Bid to Reform the South African State. In Thomas Blom Hansen & Finn Stepputat (eds.): ‘States of Imagination. Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State.’ Duke University Press, Durham and London. 1986 Keaney, Richard: ’Modern Movements in European Philosophy’, Manchester University Press.

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1991 Kusch, Martin: Foucault’s Strata and Fields. An Investigation into Archaeological and Genealogical Science Studies. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. 1985 Laclau, Ernesto & Mouffe, Chantal: Hegemony and socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Verso, London and New York. 1989 Lawson, Hilary & Appignanesi, Lisa eds. ’Dismantling Truth. Reality in the Post-Modern World’, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London. 2003 Mills, Sara: Michel Foucault. Routledge London & New York. 1992 Mahon, Michael: Foucault’s Nietzschean genealogy. Truth, Power, and the Subject. State University of new York Press. 1994 McNay, Lois: Foucault: a Critical Introduction. The Continuum Publishing Company, New York. 1956 Nietzsche, Friedrich: The Genealogy of Morals. Doubleday, New York. 1988 Pécheux, Michel: Discourse: Structure or Event? Trans. By Warren Montag, with Marie-Germaine Pécheux and Denise Guback. In ‘Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture’. University of Illinois Press Urbana and Chicago. 1996 Pickett, Brent: Foucault and the Politics of Resistence. Polity. Vol.28 No 4, pp. 445-466. 1984 Rabinow, Paul, ed.: The Foucault Reader. Penguin Books, London. 1980 Sheridan, Alan: Michel Foucault. The Will to Truth. Tavistock Publications, London and New York. 1994a Smart, Barry (ed.): Michel Foucault. Critical Assessments. Vol. I, Routledge, London. 1994b Smart, Barry (ed.): Michel Foucault. Critical Assessments. Vol. II, Routledge, London and New York. 1984 Taylor, Charles: Foucault on Freedom and Truth. In ‘Political Theory’. Vol. 12, Issue 2, May, pp. 152-183. 2003 Trainor, Brian T.: Foucault and the Politics of Difference. In ‘Philosophy and Social Criticism’. Vol.29, no 5. pp.563-580. 1999 Verwoerd, Wilhelm: Individual and/or Social Justice after Apartheid? The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In ‘The European Journal of Development Research’, Vol. 11, No.2, December, pp. 115-140. Published by Frank Cass, London. 2001 Wilson, Richard, A.: The Politics of Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa. Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid State. Cambridge University Press.

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Articles: 2004 Getz, Arlene: Web Exclusive, Desmond Tutu. Newsweek, December 30 www.newsweek.com 1998 World: Africa. Profile of Archbishop Desmond Tutu. BBC Online Network, Friday, July 31, Published at 00:23 GMT www.bbc.co.uk The Nobel Peace Prize 1984; Presentation Speech by Egil Aarvik, Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee www.nobelprize.org Mail& Guardian, 21 March 2003: The bringing of truth. http://archive.mg.co.za Other: Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, vol. I, Cape Town: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998, distributed by Juta & Co., Cape Town and New York: Grove’s Dictionaries, 1999). The full report can be found at www.truth.org.za.

7.2 Abbreviations AAAS - American Association of the Advancement of Science

AK - The Archaeology of Knowledge

HRVC – Human Rights Violation Commission

IFP - Inkatha Freedom party

IMS - Information Management System

NGO - Non Governmental Organisation

NP – South African National Party

RDP of the soul - a Reconstruction and Development Programme of the soul

SA - South Africa

SATRC – South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UDM - United Democratic Movement

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