Knowing Other Minds and the Intermental Dialogue

KNOWING OTHER MINDS AND THE INTER-MENTAL DIALOGUEMariano L. Bianca

University of Siena – Italy [email protected] and Philosophy, 2014-2015

AbstractIn this paper I will analyze some ontic, epistemological

and semiotic aspects of the knowledge of other minds. Themain thesis states that as we can know our own mindthrough meta-mental processes, so we can know states,processes and contents of other minds by using differentnoetic tools, perceptive and non-perceptive. In the firstthree sections, the ontic supposition, the similarity byanalogy and the conceptual and ontic attestations ofother minds will be examined. I will claim that the onticsupposition is the ground and the starting step of anymental process devoted to knowing other minds. First ofall, a subject S1 must ascertain and state that a subjectS2 possesses a mind; this statement is an onticsupposition formulated with meta-mental processes andinferences, according to which a subject S1 supposes thata subject S2 owns a mind. This supposition is tied up withthe similarity by analogy so S1 can claim that subject S2possesses a mind analogous to the one he possesses. Thesecond step is formed by conceptual and onticattestations grounded on a shared concept of mind.Knowledge of other minds will be analyzed from epistemicand epistemological perspectives using the notions ofreliability and adequacy of the knowledge of other minds.Section 4 is devoted to an in-depth analysis of knowing

other minds within the inter-mental dialogue. It will beclaimed that knowing other minds is a complex processwhich has a biological foundation and uses different waysand tools to know states, processes and contents of otherminds. The analysis is grounded, on one side, upon the

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notions of meanings sharing and, on the other, upon thefollowing three assertions: a) in order to establish a relationshiptwo minds must share some mental characters; b) each mind isconstitutively ready to establish reciprocal relationships with other minds;and c) the reciprocal relationships amongst minds are at the same timelocal and non-local processes. Reading other minds isessentially a hermeneutic process concerning theexpressions of a subject. Finally, inferential processes,generalizations and eidetic applications will beanalyzed, and the notions of mental resonance and telenoesiswill be taken into consideration.

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Inter-mental relationships are very complex andpresently are being deeply investigated by psychologists.However, in this paper, we do not consider psychologicalrelationships amongst humans, and we limit our attentionto the modalities with which one mind ascertains and claims theexistence of another one and establishes relationships with it in order toknow and to interact with it.The foundational question is the following: in which way

does a mind ascertain and state the existence of another one? In otherwords, in which way does subject S1 hold that subject S2 possesses a mindanalogous to his own? This question will be analyzed in thefollowing section, and in the proceeding ones, we willtake into consideration knowledge of other minds,relationships amongst minds and the inter-mentaldialogue.In this paper, the term noesi (and the relative adjective

noetic) will be used to refer to mental processes whichinvolve different areas of the neocortex besides othercerebral areas; mental processes are different from othercerebral processes which do not involve the neocortex,and they are characterized by their generation and elaborationof meanings. Any mental process that generates meanings iscalled a nomiosis (the relative adjective is nomiotic). The

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word nosema indicates the result of any mental process asa thought, reasoning or an image. Amongst mentalprocesses, we make a distinction between eidetic processes,which are formulated without a direct elaboration ofperceptive or empirical data, and perceptive processes,which elaborate perceptive data. In this paper, mind is considered as the whole of the mental process-

es that involve areas of the neocortex, besides other cerebral areas, and theirresults as thoughts, different kinds of reasoning, inferences, images,perceptions, feelings, etc. In the following, the semiosis isconsidered the mental process of assigning meanings tosigns or forming signs with meanings; each nomiosis doesnot deal directly with signs but could be expressed withsigns, although not all the nomiosis could be expressedin a system of signs.

1. Ontic supposition on other minds

How does a subject S1 claim that a subject S2 has a mindanalogous to his own? The answer to this questionconsists of a long inferential process, and theinferences might be formulated only if S1 ascertains andstates the presence of a mind in himself; such a mindcould be considered in different ways, but it has topossess some characters that differentiate it from anyother part of the self. Such characters allow it toperform different mental activities, such as thinking,reasoning, perceiving, imagining, perceiving emotions orfeelings and guiding behaviors.A further step of the inferential process consists of

specifying, explicitly or not, the characters of the selfof S1. Those characters that form the identity of theself of S1, not only as a specific self but as a member ofthe human species, i.e. the characters that identify S1 as

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a man. Hence, S1 states that he is a human being on thebasis of continuous observations of his characters, aninductive process involving the different instances inwhich he has ascertained the presence of some characters,such as those which determine that he belongs to thespecies Homo (here we do not consider the ascertainmentof those characters that differentiate him from any otherhuman being). The ascertainment derives from an ex uno gen-eralization that he formulated on himself with or withoutawareness; an ex uno generalization is a generalizationformulated on different instances of the same something.For example, the same car observed in differentoccasions, such as in front of a house, in a parking areaor in some other place (for this generalization, seeM.Bianca La mente immaginale, 2.1.2).There is another process activated by S1 concerning S2.

S1, on the basis of observations and inductive processes,notices that S2 possesses those characters that he has andthey indicate that S2 belongs to the human species. HenceS1 can affirm that S2 is also a human just like him. Allthese processes are not usually formulated explicitly orverbally.The subsequent steps lead to the conclusion of the

inferential process that allows S1 to state that S2 alsohas a mind.The inferential process that let S1 to assert that S2

also has a mind analogous to that which he has can besketched in the following way:1. S1 asserts that he possesses the identificative characters

{IC} that identify a subject as a human being.2. S1, because he possesses the characters {IC}, presumes

to be a man.3. S1 asserts that subject S2 also has the identificative

characters{IC}.4. S1 asserts that if S2 possesses characters {IC} then

he is a man.

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5. Amongst characters {IC}, there is the character(pM), that is, to possess a mind.6. S1 asserts that he possesses character (pM), so he

can state that he has a mind.7. S1 asserts that, if S2 is a man and he has all the

identificative characters {IC} that he also has, then S2possesses the character (pM), which is one of thecharacters {IC}.8. S1 asserts that S2 also possesses a mind.These propositions are considered assertions, or assertive

propositions, formulated, explicitly or not, by S1. In thispaper we prefer to adopt the notions of assertion orstatement instead of that of belief which presently isadopted by many authors to refer to any kind ofsubjective thought propositionally expressed; thispreference is based on the distinction between aletheia anddoxa, that is, truth and opinion; an assertion refers tosomething considered existing or to some state of theworld and so can be proved true or false, according tospecific criteria, while a belief is neither true norfalse for it is an opinion on something; something exist-ing could be phenomenic, belonging to the natural world,or noetic, that is, formulated by human mind (asconcepts, conceptions, notions, etc.) or supposed to beexisting like god, soul and so on. Hence, for instance,‘The bottle is on the table’ is an assertion while ‘thoseflowers are beautiful’, ‘God exists’, ‘I like sportivecars’, ‘all politicians take care only of their owninterests’ are beliefs, or propositions of belief,although many times, but not always, in everyday languageis used for all cases the word belief; nevertheless,almost every men knows very well that in some cases heexpresses his opinions (beliefs) on something while inothers refers to some real something or to a state of theworld and his propositions (assertions) could be subduedto truth’s control in order to state that they are trueor false. So, we distinguish between assertive

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propositions and belief propositions although they mayshare the same formal structure formed by subject andpredicate; thus, the difference amongst them is not basedon their formal structure but on their different intention:from one side, it is claimed to assign some attribute tosomething and from the other is formulated an opinion onsomething that may be phenomenic or noetic. Here below wewill use the verbs to state, to claim and to holdreferring to assertions while we will use the term beliefor the verb believe only in the cases in which we referto subjective opinions on something including the ownmind and other minds.The steps of this process (from 1 to 8) usually are not

formulated explicitly in state of awareness but theymight be expressed awarenessly and in a propositionalway.The critical point of this process is the inference in

assertion 7. Theoretically speaking, we can say that itcould happen that S2 has all the characters {IC} exceptthe character (pM). So S1, in order to formulate theassertion 7, must make further observations differentfrom those he has made on other characters {IC}, forexample the apparent physical characters of S2. For theselast characters S1 has formulated inferences from ob-servations concerning the physical characters of S2 whichare perceptively observable: he has observed the externalphysical characters of S2 such as having a body, a head,two legs and many others. S1 has used an empirical conceptof man: a standard inductive generalization which he hasformulated relatively to many observations of humanbeings and particularly on different observations (ex unogeneralizations) of S2; so, he has attested that S2 ownthose characters {IC} that also he possesses and thatidentify him as a member of the species Homo; therefore,as he belongs to the human species, as well as S2 belongsto it.

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Let’s remark that the generalization or empiricalconcept of man do not imply that S2 possesses all thecharacters {IC}, but he must have at least a sufficientnumbers of them in order to allow S1 to classify him asbelonging to the class of men: that is, those essentialcharacters that identify a being as a human being. Thisprocess is grounded on the fact that S1 refers tocharacters that he possesses and by using the concept ofman he asserts that they are those necessary to belong tothe class of men. As the entire process is concerned,this part too is based on a comparison using the conceptof man: S1 makes a comparison between himself and S2 andhe can formulate it in an inferential way.We can accept such a comparison because is grounded on

perception, on a concept of man formulated by S1 and on anempirical comparison that S1 formulates between hischaracters and those of S2.Therefore, the inferential process of S1 relative to S2

can be accepted because it concerns the externalcharacters of S1 and S2 ascertained by perceptiveprocesses; if we accept these kind of processes holdingthat they carry information corresponding more or less tosome state of the world, then we can state that they arealso valid in the case in which a state of the world isconstituted by S1 and S2.So, we can accept the inferential process until

assertion 4, but starting from assertion 5 is necessaryto add some clarifications. If assertions 5 and 6 are notconsidered from the point of view of an externalobserver, they are acceptable and legitimated since theyare uttered by S1 referring to himself; so is assumed thatS1 can enter in his self and formulate a knowledge thatcorresponds to some characters of his self: in this case,particularly, the character is (pM); he formulates anassertion with which he assigns to himself the character(pM) or, in logical terms, he assigns the predicate (pM)

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(i.e., to possess a mind) to a propositional subjectwhich is himself.Assertions 5 and 6 are acceptable only from the point of

view of S1 and not from that of another subject S3. Inthis analysis this acceptability is considered sufficientfor S1 to formulate assertions 5 and 6 according to whathas been previously claimed: the ascertainment that somepart of his self (mind) has those characters that aredifferent from any others of his self and they are thosewhich allow him to carry out activities and functions asthinking, reasoning, imagining, perceiving, havingemotions or feelings and guiding his behaviors.Therefore, assertions 5 and 6 are legitimated andacceptable if considered from the point of view of S1.Assertion 7, on the contrary, is acceptable only from a

logical-inferential point of view but cannot have thesame empirical (perceptive) support that can haveassertions 3 and 4.How S1 can ground assertions 7 and 8 without an

empirical support or these assertions are also groundedlogically and by an empirical support? S1 can utter andaccept assertions 7 and 8 only from a logical point ofview if is accepted the relative inference: S1 uttersassertions 7 and 8 because they are derived fromassertions 1 up to 6. Nevertheless, this acceptance doesnot seem to be definitive for S1 in order to state thatalso S2 possesses a mind. Except specific instances, S1utters assertions 7 and 8 for he claims that adequateobservations can induce him to utter and support them.Which kinds of observations could S1 make in order tosupport the utterance of assertions 7 and 8? Obviously,in the case of minds there are not direct observations asthose concerning the physical characters of S2 that allowsS1 to infer that he belongs to the class of men.Theoretically, S1 cannot have observations of the mind ofS2 except those of neurophysiological researches that arenot those S1 could refer to. Thus other minds cannot be

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observed, nevertheless S1 could make observations on S2and, particularly, on his behaviors from which he caninfer that S2 possesses a mind. S1 to claim that hepossesses a mind needs no such inferences on observationsof his behaviors (self-observations); in many cases theseinferences are used by S1 to state the he possesses a mindand to attest some characters of his mind and so heformulates the concept of his mind.Once again S1 refers to himself: possess a mind means

that he expresses himself in various forms as language orbehavior, thus S1 can infer that if S2 manifests specificlanguage or behavior then his expressions indicate thathe possesses a mind analogue to his one; a mind whichpossesses analogous characters expressed with language orbehavior. However, this is a special form of inferencethat does not have any perceptive support, indeed thisinference is only suppositional; theoretically speaking, wecan say that could happen that S2 manifests itself as ifhe had a mind, but might not have it.However, the statement of S1 is reinforced not only by

these arguments (many authors state that they arearguments base on analogy) but by the fact that, withreference to other subjects, he has formulated suchinference in different occasions and it seemedacceptable; indeed, he has accepted such inference for hehas ascertained that different subjects who expressthemselves in a certain way they manifest other aspectswhich characterize the possession of a mind: for example,to dialogue, to solve logical problems, reasoning orformulate arguments.

S1 on the ground of an ontic supposition claims that subjectS2 possesses a mind. The ontic supposition, as we havealready remarked, is inferential and is formulated by S1concerning S2; this supposition seems to be sufficient toS1 to state that S2 possesses a mind: the analogue argu-ment seems acceptable theoretically and not only for S2.

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In accordance with this complex mental (and meta-mental)process, S1 holds that he can claim with sufficientsupport that S2 possesses a mind analogue to his onealthough different for many aspects; thus S1 supposes thatas happens to him manifesting oneself in a certain waymeans owing a mind so the same happens for S2 but alsofor any subject: to manifest oneself in a certain waymeans owing a mind. Thus S1 can utter the followingassertions: ‘S2 has a mind as I have one’ and ‘everysubject S* which manifests himself with a certainlanguage or behavior possesses a mind’; thus S1 can claimthat assertions 7 and 8 are acceptable. This process, grounded on the inferential ontic

supposition, allows the usual relationships amongst mindsand so the knowledge of other minds and the inter-mentaldialogue.

2. The knowledge of the other minds

From the statement of S1, according to which S2 possessesa mind, does not follow directly that S1 can claim to knowmental contents and states of S2. Nevertheless, thisstatement is a good starting step for S1 to formulateothers which are necessary to allow him to form someknowledge of the mind of S2. On the ground of the observations that allow S1 to state

that S2 is a man and as such he owns a mind, S1 canformulate the following statements:a) S2 possesses a mind analogue to my mindFrom this analogy statement can derive the following

ones formulated by S1:b) as I ascertain to possess mind so happens also for S2c) as my mind possesses contents and states so happens

also for the mind of S2

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d) if S2’s mind is analogue to my which has someessential characters, then the mind of S2 has analogueessential characterse) as I can know some contents or states of my mind so

S2 can know some contents or states of his mindThe last statement is crucial:f) I can know at least some contents or states of the

mind of S2; in third person: S1 can know at least somecontents or states of the mind of S2.In the case in which S1 claims legitimately, according

to what has been remarked up to now, that S2 possesses amind his claim is grounded on his concept of mind thatcontains the characters of his mind. If S1 adopts aconcept of mind formulated on the basis of observationsand inferences on his self, then he can apply thisconcept of mind to S2 using the inferential process wehave sketched before; if owing a mind can be attested byan inferential process and by the modalities ofexpression of a subject language, behavior or somethingelse and S2 expressed himself with these modalities, thenS2 has a mind as S1 that expressed himself in an analogueway. This analogy extended to mind allows S1 to utter thefollowing assertion: ‘S2 possesses a mind analogue to my’.This assertion by analogy is acceptable from a logical-propositional point of view, but it is necessary toclarify it.The analogy applied to assertions concerning observable

physical characters, as it has been remarked, is groundedon perceptions referred to other subjects; theseperceptions allow S1 to observe that S2 has two legs, onehead, two harms, two eyes, a nose, etc. This analogy isnot only perceptive but ontic from which does not followa statement of equality but only of similarity by analogy; thecharacters of S1 are similar but not the same of those ofS2; for example, for S1 the head of S2 is a head analogueto his, but they are not the same and both of them areheads for they share the characters to be a head; both of

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them, for example, have noses but each nose is differentfrom any others. The perceptive type (or visual perceptiveconcept) ‘head’ (formulated by a perceptivegeneralization) applies to both heads of S1 and S2;according to this perceptive type, S1 states that there isa similarity by analogy between his head and the head ofS2. In the same way, for example, S1 applies the sameperceptive type to other not humans subjects such asmonkeys, dogs, horses, crocodiles, flies, etc. So, theanalogy referred to body characters is a similarity by analogythat can be considered as part of the direct (throughperceptions) knowledge that S1 has of S2.As far as concern the mind the similarity by analogy is

not directly referred to mind because mind is notperceptively observed. So, how similarity by analogy canbe considered with regard to other minds? The analogydoes not concern directly the mind of S2 but someexpressions of S2 which are considered by S1 asexpressions of having the attributes to own a mind andthis analogy concerns the mind of S2.

S1 formulates the similarity by analogy referring bothto his expressions and to those of S2: the similarity byanalogy holds between his expressions and those of S2.This analogy holds only in the condition in which S1 isable to observe the expressions of S2 (considered asexpressions of having a mind) respect to specific stimuliof different kinds: physical, linguistic, emotional,etc.; for instance, the expressions of S2 respect to aperceptive stimulus or other expressions of him when heanswer to a specific question concerning himself.The analogy referred to mind is a similarity by analogy

but at first is not referred directly to other minds butto their expressions. This similarity by analogy holdsalso in the case in which S2 answer to a same stimulus ina way different from that of S1 and the answer of S2 isacceptable from the point of view of S1 for the expressionof S2 is an admissible answer within a range of possible

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answers that S1 could formulate although if he does not.Similarity is related to the fact that the answer of S2belongs to a range of expressions typical of a subjectthat possesses a mind. The similarity by analogy allowsS1 to formulate an ontic inference: he assigns to S2 theattribute of possessing a mind that makes him toformulate those expressions that belong to a range ofexpressions of all subjects who possesses a mind.Nevertheless, although S1 considers the expressions of S2

as similarly analogues to his ones, he cannot claim thatthese expressions necessarily correspond to analoguemental states or contents: his mental states and those ofS2 on respect to a specific expression; in some cases theexpressions of S2 similar to those of S1 might notcorrespond to analogous mental states of S1; forinstance, in the case in which S2 pretends or lies and inmany others.Furthermore the similarity by analogy and not by

sameness (equality) and the relative inference whichcorrelates expressions to mental contents, do not lead tohold that it is always possible to formulate knowledge ofother minds.

S1 can formulate the assertions underlined in theprevious section and a similarity by analogy and so aninference on the mind of S2. As has been already remarkedS1 can know (perceive) the expressions of S2 but he can besure that these expressions correspond to some specificmental content or state of S2? The inference whichcorrelates the expressions of mind to a specific mindleads to know it? To the first question S1 cannot give an answer neither

grounded nor undoubted but once again he can formulate iton the basis of an inference relative to what has beenunderlined before; in other words, some expressions of asubject S2 are such for he possesses a mind; thus theanswer of S1 to the first question states in asuppositional way that the expression of S2 are

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expressions of a mind, particularly of his mind (the mindof S2).The second question, instead, is far more complex but

also for this it you can answer in an affirmative way.If the expressions of S2 are expressions of his mind and

S1 is able to perceive them, then S1 can state that heknows something of the mind of S2: at least that part ofthe mind of S2 that has been recognizable from hisexpressions. The knowledge of S1 is a descriptive and notexplicative knowledge and of course is an indirectknowledge: is indirect on respect to the mind of S2, butis direct on respect to S2’s expressions. S1 possesses adirect knowledge of the expressions of S2 as forphenomenic events or for his expressions, because theexpressions of S2 are phenomenic events; nevertheless, S1does not have a direct knowledge of the mind of S2 for hisknowledge is grounded only on these expressions. On tothe contrary S1, through the process of entering on hismind, can directly know it also without specificexpressions as entities of the world, although theexpressions of his mind are very often useful to know it.

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Therefore, S1 although he knows that he cannot enterdirectly into the mind of S2, can assert he can know it,or at least some part of it, because he perceives theexpressions of the mind of S2 and so he can hold that hecan access indirectly to it (indirectly because hisknowledge is grounded on the receiving mind’s expressionsof S2).Nevertheless the knowledge of the mind of S2 formulated

by S1 is not restricted to the perception of theexpressions of S2 but can be enriched by other processesthat elaborate perceptive data formulating complex in-ferences which allow him to have a deeper knowledge ofthe mind of S2 including possible explications of histhought. The expressions of S2 (received by S1) do notmanifest only some specific content or mental state towhich they refer, but many others correlated with itwhich can be known by S1 through inferential processes.For example, the expression of an actual mood of S2manifested by face expression can make S1 to infer that S2is in a deep psychological bad condition as a depression.Similar examples are referred to strictly cognitivecontents: for instance, an expressed judgment on thebehavior of someone can lead S1 to infer that S2 has aspecific conception of human nature. In the same way, the inferences of S1 can be formulated

on the basis of his mental contents, assertions andbeliefs which in this case S1 considers (implicitly) asnomiotic indicators or parameters to know other minds althoughwith possible and frequent mistakes that could derivefrom the use of personal mental contents as indicatorsuseful to know other minds.Similarity by analogy is useful to assign to others some

mental states referred to a specific stimulus orinformation. Also in this case S1 can hold that S2 hasanalogue mental states referred to a stimulus orinformation and this assignment is part of the process ofknowing other minds.

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Another relevant aspect of the knowledge of another mindthrough its expressions is the, more or less deep andextended, sharing of the meanings that might be assigned to them. Inthe same way in which amongst members of the same speciesor of different species body expressions are meaningful(for example signs of aggression or challenge as usuallyhappens in humans), so the expressions of the mind(without considering pathological cases) have a meaningfulcharge that allows subject S1 to know the meaning of anexpression of S2 on the basis of a meaning sharing; so S1assigns to an expression of S2 the same meaning that hehas assigned to his analogue expression. What has been pointed out does not still allow to state

that S1 can have a reliable knowledge of the mind of S2;S1 possess a knowledge of the mind of S2 respect to theexpressions of S2 and if these are of the mind of S2, thenS1 can hold that he has a certain knowledge of the mind ofS2. However, this does not mean that S1 knows in areliable, deep and extended way the mind of S2 becausemind has a partial un-expressibility and so it is farmore wide and complex of its expressions and indeed onlya small part of its contents and states are expressibleand effectively expressed.If we limit our attention to the expressions referred to

biological conditions (or related to the mere survival)we can say that it is possible to know another mind forit expresses with signs which have specific sharedmeanings, as those of the primary emotions.On the contrary, if we exclude this knowledge of other

minds grounded on shared expressions, we can say that S1is able to know deeply not only other minds but somespecific states, contents and expressions of mind andeven those mental expressions which are not referred to anomiotic sharing?To this question we can answer in an affirmative and in

a negative ways. The affirmative answer holds that S1 isable to know the mind of S2 although not in deep and

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extensive or complete way. This knowledge of S1, aspreviously remarked, is of two kinds: expressive andinferential included the meaning sharing. The expressiveone is grounded on different kinds of perceptions of S1 ofthe expressions of the mind of S2: bodily, linguistic orof some other kinds like designs, artistic works or ofany other types. The inferential one, as we have alreadysaid, may be the result of inferences formulated by S1respect to S2 although they are not referred only toexpressions. Hence, a knowledge which is not restrictedto expressions but is extended to information which canbe inferred from them or others inferential forms whichcan be formulated from judgments of S1 on S2 in anautomatic way or of judgments of other subjects on S2;therefore, it is relevant the dialogue between S1 and S2and the information acquired by a continuity ofrelationships between them. These two conditions allow S1to know in a certain measure the mind of S2: an indirectknowledge of S2 since S1 cannot enter directly in to themind of S2 as he can do for his own mind. The negative answer is grounded on the limitations of

the first one and S1 cannot have a direct access to themind of S2: the indirect access does not allowtheoretically controlling the knowledge that S1 hasformulated on S2 because the mind of S2 might have hiddenor never expressed or not expressible contents that S1 cannever know and amongst these there are also the lies;furthermore, the mind of S2 can possesses states orcontents which are not understandable by S1 or states andcontents which are not even known by S2. Thesepossibilities, included fictions, allow us to state thatother minds can be known but not in deep and extensiveway and the knowledge is not always reliable. As usuallyhappens amongst humans, the other minds escape from theknowledge of the others; usually happens, even if after along relationship, that the contents of another mind

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become evidently different from those that have beenpreviously assigned to it.Generalizations referred to many minds and inferential

processes referred to a specific mind are necessary toenter in other minds and to know not all but at leastsome of their states and contents.

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Furthermore, we must remark that the brain of manyspecies, included humans, is the result of the neuro-evolution in which an essential aspect is making possiblerelationships amongst brains of different individuals ofthe same or of different species. In humans theserelationships, due to the presence of the neocortex andof the mind, are realized by means of mentalrelationships that usually we prefer to callpsychological. So, the negative answer is acceptable, butonly partially, for the unknowability of other mindswould be contrary to the presence of mind itself; infact, mind is firstly a result and then a device (orexpedient) of the neuro-evolution not only to bettersatisfy the needs of survival, but to establish withfellows humans relationships which are always grounded oninter-mental relationships also relatively to thesatisfaction of the needs of survival. Knowing otherminds is indeed an essential capability of mind although,as we noticed before, can be limited.The affirmative and negative answers are not alternative

and in conflict, but altogether underline that other mindsare knowable and unknowable at the same time; indeed, manycontents and states of other minds are knowable and theyare a relevant part of human inter-mental relationships,of the intersubjective dialogue and in general of humanrelationships, although it may be different the reliability ofeach specific knowledge of other minds. To the contrary,many others contents and states of other minds are notknowable for they are not expressed or they are notreachable even with inferential processes. In general, wecan state that other minds are knowable in an adequate wayuseful for the activations of inter-mental processes andto establish human relationships necessary for survivaland to satisfy needs, motivations and desires of eachhuman being.At this point it must be remarked the difference between

reliability and adequacy. Any knowledge is reliable if its19

information corresponds in a certain measure to thestructure of something or to some state of the world: forexample, a perception of a bottle is reliable if itsinformation describes the properties of the bottle as itis in the world; the same holds for purely noeticsomething; any knowledge, instead, is adequate if allows asubject to behave in a certain way which allows him tosatisfy his needs and motivations, to reach some goal orto perform an action; reliability is an epistemologicalattribute, while adequacy is a pragmatic one. Ifknowledge is reliable then it also might be adequate, butto be adequate does not mean to be reliable.Thus from the point of view of a minimal adequacy in order

to fit needs and motivations for biological andexistential survival, knowledge of other minds isadequate and might be also reliable; some states andcontents of other minds might not be knowable, but thisknowledge could be extraneous to the standard modalitiesof inter-mental dialogue; nevertheless, in specificcondition a subject S1 could require a greater knowledgeof the mind of S2 and in such a case he might activatesuitable procedures to reach a better knowledge of S2different from the standard ones and with a greaterdegree of reliability. Complexity and articulations ofinterpersonal relationships very often can lead a subjectto activate complex processes of knowledge of other mindsas happens, for example, inside a couple’s relationships,amongst friends or members of an association or withinthe psychotherapeutical settings.

3. Conceptual and ontic attestation of other minds

The claim of the presence of a mind in another subjectand the relative knowledge of its contents and states areepistemic (they are beliefs) and in the meantimeepistemological (cognitive assertions about contents andstates of another mind). These two levels, which are ac-

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tivated when a subject S1 has any kind of relation with asubject S2, are grounded on and presuppose anattestation/supposition from which derives a statement onthe existence or better an assignment of existence ofother minds. In the previous sections were analyzed thefactors that lead a subject S1 not only to believe but to statethat another subject S2 has a mind; moreover, it waspointed out that the crucial factor that allows theactivations of these processes is an attestation of existence:in other words, in order to state that a subject has amind it is necessary to suppose not just his existencebut his existence as a subject that owns a mind. Thissupposition is formulated, even un-awarenessly, beforethe formulation of the statement of assigning theattribute pM (to possess a mind) to another subject or inthe right instant in which is formulated such statement;this supposition has espistemic and ontological aspects.For the first one the supposition is referred not only toa subject but to his mind and allows activating agnoseological process; in other words, generally, inorder to formulate gnoseological propositions onsomething you must suppose or at least believe that thissomething exists. Hence a bond with the second aspect:the supposition has an ontological aspect for it statesthat this something to which we refer (in this case asubject and his mind) is considered not just existing,but to this existence is assigned a certain degree ofevidence; so, you can formulate an assertion, more orless reliable, that state this existence. Thus, the condition in which S1 assigns some attribute

to S2 and claims that pM is an attribute of S2, before theactivation of a cognitive process or simultaneously withits activation, presupposes an attestation of existence referredto S2 and on his mind. This attestation of existence can beformulated in two different and correlated levels:conceptual and ontic.

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In the conceptual level the mind of S2, on the evidenceof its existence/presence, is attested by S1 on the basisof idetic/conceptual operations such as those outlined inthe preceding sections. This means first of all useconceptual tools that lead to the formation of the self-concept, the concept of the own self, the concept of otherselves and those of the own mind and of the mind ofothers. In this condition the others and the other mindsbelong to a conceptual level and not an ontic one; theyare operational concepts which make it possible toformulate mental and meta-mental statements on others andother minds.

S1 at first does not consider a real person but theconcept of him that he has in his mind and so heformulates a correspondence between this concept and thereal subject S2 (this concept is formed by ex uno gener-alizations and various inferences). The mind of S1,before activating other processes, works with this mentalcontent: the concept of S2. Although S1 can have a realrelation with S2, the attention of his mind is not turneddirectly to the physical S2 but to the noetic S2 to which hehas assigned various attributes and among them theattribute of possessing a mind (pM). The mind of S1 workson this set of attributes assigned to S2, that is, theconcept of S2 (the noetic S2). Therefore, the conceptualattestation of the mind of S2 is formed by the assignmentof the attribute pM to the concept of S2.

S2 might not have a real brain and mind but it issufficient that his concept in the mind of S1 possessessuch attributes which allow S1 to attest conceptually thepresence of a mind in the concept of S2, that is, pM asattribute of the noetic S2. On this ground S1 canformulate existential propositions as: ‘S2 possesses amind analogue to my’. So, the conceptual process allowsS1 to formulate afterwards a direct assignment ofattributes to S2, particularly, the attribute pM; S1shifts his attributive activity from the noetic S2 to the

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real S2 which is the object of his perceptions and of hisattestation of existence.The conceptual attestation referred to S2, or better

first of all to the concept of S2, and afterwards to thereal S2, belongs to the conceptual modality of mind;according to this modality the mind of S1 referring to theworld works in two phases; the first is referred toconcepts relative to the world and the assignment ofattributes to them; the second consists in theapplication of these concepts to the world and so theassignment of attributes to the world also in thelinguistic form of predicates assignable to thepropositional subject ‘world’. This modality is appliedalso to the perceptive processes. Thus, first of all isthe ontic attestation of concepts in the mind of S1 whichallows him to formulate an ontic attestation of S2 andparticularly of his mind (you must remark that not everyprocess of survey of the world and of the self has such astructure because can be formulated in a not conceptualform).The ontic attestation referred to S2 is the

presupposition of any affirmation on the world, S2included; the ontic attestation referred to the mindproceeds from the conceptual attestation of S2 and of hismind, with the assignment of the attribute pM to thenoetic S2 and afterwards with the assignment of thisattribute to the real S2.If the concept of S2 formulated by S1 assigned the

attribute pM to S2, then S1 can formulate ontologicalstatements on the mind of S2; in other words, the conceptof S2, included the attribute pM, is ontologically ap-plied to the physical S2; thus S1, conformingly with hisconcept of mind, states not only the existence of S2 butthe existence of a mind in S2. Therefore, the processgoes from the conceptual attestation of the concept of S2to the ontological attestation of S2, particularly theexistence of his mind.

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These attestations work in a continuative way so S1 canactivate other processes which assign attributes to themind of S2 and these processes characterize the knowledgeof the mind of S2 formulated by S1. The modification ofthe concept of S2, on the ground of idetic, perceptiveand inferential processes, leads to a modification of theknowledge of S1 on S2 and from this process derives theattitudes that S1 adopts towards S2. Attestation processes, particularly the ontic one, lead

to point out the ontic sharing between S1 and S2 particularlythat ontic sharing according to which S2 has a mindanalogue to that of S1. Nevertheless, conceptual and ontic attestations do not

have only a procedural value that has been outlined, butcan be considered from a strictly ontic point of view; inthis case they are not only attestations but onticfoundational sharing because they are the foundation ofthe inter-mental processes; they are evident because canbe pointed out by S1 and by S2. The ontic sharing is primaryrespect the attestations because allows the formulationof the conceptual and ontic attestations.The observations presented let to say that the

statements of S1 relative to the existence of S2 andparticularly of his mind first of all are formulated on aconceptual level on which works the mind of S1 andafterwards are ontically applied to the real S2 and to hismind.

4. Relationships among different minds and the inter-mental dialogue

The topic of this section is relevant not only forcognitive and social psychology (interpersonalrelationships) but also for philosophical anthropologythat has analyzed inter-subjectivity. In this paper, wedo not consider the many psychological aspects of inter-

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subjectivity and of interpersonal relationships, but werestrict our attention only to the analysis of somemodalities of the relationships among different minds(two or more).Inter-subjectivity and interpersonal relationships, in

which there are many factors that guide their dynamics,work within the relationships among minds (although notalways with a proper inter-mental dialogue) that in theirdynamics give rise to conceptions of the world, values,beliefs, attitudes and behaviors.

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The analysis of inter-mental relationships, differentlyfrom intra-mental processes (within each mind), muststart with a relevant question: why and how can two or moreminds establish relationships with one another?To answer to this question we must consider the

following statements: a) two minds in order to establishrelationships with one another must share some mental characters; b)each mind is constitutively ready to establish reciprocal relationships withother minds; c) the reciprocal relationships among minds are at the sametime local and non-local processes.In the previous sections, the noetic procedures which

can be activated by a mind to ensure that a subject S1 canstate that another subject S2 owns a mind analogue to his one wereanalyzed. Nevertheless, this assertion, considered asbeliefs-supposition, is not sufficient to allow the mindM1 to establish a relationship with the mind M2. Theanalogy is fundamental, but to examine inter-mentalrelationships it is necessary to deeply analyze thenature of the analogy in order to assert the thesis:a)two minds in order to establish relationships with one another must sharesome mental characters (analogue sharing of the possession ofsome characters of mind).The analogy with which S1 justifies the presence of a

mind in S2, although in a supposition mode and notexplicitly, is based on the fact that some characters ofM1(S1) (the mind of S1) are analogously present in M2(S2).In other words, S1 and S2 not only own a mind but bothminds have analogous informative contents and analogousways of operating; thus, although with deep differences,they operate with analogous processes but can generatedifferent mental configurations and different behaviorsin S1 and S2.In order to establish mutual relationships, M1 and M2

must first of all be two minds, and this can beascertained reciprocally, M1 with regard to M2 and M2 withregard to M1. More generally, it is reproduced in two

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ways, and this process has been underlined for S1 thatattests suppositionally to the mind of S2.This step, which can be expressed in two different and

parallel assertions formulated by S1 and S2, if it isdeeply analyzed, points out that the suppositionalanalogy (of S1 and of S2) is formed by different factorsthat allow the sharing of various characters. First ofall, there must be present a parallel suppositionalanalogy: S1 and S2 must share a similar suppositionalanalogy; the suppositional analogies of S1 and S2 are suchbecause they both suppose the presence of a mind in theother subject. As has been previously underlined withreference to S1, these analogous and parallelsuppositions must be founded on a shared concept of mind;thus, S1 and S1 must share the same concept of mind or atleast an analogous one.

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This unexpressed suppositional sharing can be detectedin the standard interpersonal relationships in which asubject S1 establishes mental relationships with a subjectS2 because he believes that both share the same concept ofmind which they apply to themselves and to anothersubject.On the contrary, let’s think about the case in which we

establish relationships with young children or withbabies. The human tendency to establish inter-mentaldialogue in this situation, as we know, is different fromthe condition in which there are two human adultsubjects.The primary sharing of the concept of mind and the

assignment of a mind to another are correlated by thefact that the concept of mind is characterized by manyfactors which ground the shared suppositional analogywhich allows the inter-mental dialogue. What are thesecharacters of mind, or better of the concept of mind,shared by two subjects and thus by two minds? You can detect the most relevant characters which are

shared by a community of minds and which constitute theshared concept of mind. The first is the location of the mindin the body and particularly in the head; this characterseems obvious but in the past and still now there arecommunity of men (for example, some Amazonian groups asthe Yanomamö) for which the mind is located in the bodybut not in some specific place; the second one concernsthe substance of the mind considering it constituted bysome real and material and not spiritual stuff and insuch a sense the mind is different from soul. The thirdcharacter states that mind is different from any otherpart of the body. The fourth concerns the complexity ofmental operations: mind formulates reasoning, arguments,images and generally different kinds of thinking; themind allows us to make choices, take decisions and toactivate behaviors and complex actions; it activatesemotions, moods, passions and feelings; the mind through

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perception and reasoning allows us to know the world, toestablish and guide, also using language, interpersonalrelationships and to know other selves and other minds;furthermore the mind allows to organize humancollectivities and to do any kind of intellectual,cultural and artistic activities. The fifth one statesthat it is possible to read the contents of own mind andof the mind of others. This way to consider mind,although with many differences among cultures and people,is the shared concept of mind at least in the postmodernwestern civilization (a shared theory of mind).From the sharing of the concept of mind, and

particularly of the characters outlined, derives that S1can hold with sufficient ground that if S2 owns a mindthen possesses the characters here above outlined thus heexpects that the mind of S2 works according to thesecharacters; hence, for example S1 expects that S2 reasons,possesses emotions and feelings, that he is able tocommunicate and to understand his words and answers in anadequate way, that he responds to specific stimuli in amanner analogous to his within a spectrum of admissibleanswers for a mind, etc.

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Thus when S1 assigns a mind to S2 makes assigning to themind of S2 the characters we have outlined that he assignsalso to his own mind.The second statement, b), claims that mind is

constitutionally ready to establish relationships withothers minds; we have already analyzed this assertion andwe have hold that human mind embodied in the brain, in asimilar way of the brain of other living beings, is notonly ready to control the functions of the physicalorganism and to search the energies necessary forsurvival, but to establish relationships with any otherminds not only to improve the individual survival but tofulfil various human interests and personalsatisfactions. Relationships among minds are intrinsic to the

complexity of human mind which allows expressing them invery different forms such as the dialogue based onlinguistic or bodily exchanges. Modalities of mentalexchanges are grounded on the specific structure of eachmind, on cultural influences and on the characteristicsof the minds involved.The assertion c) derives from the way in which in this

paper mind has been considered, particularly itsgeneration of meanings (nomiosis) and its expressivity.The characters of mind make the inter-mentalrelationships to be at the same time local and not local;inter-mental relationships are local for are formulatedwithin each mind of the subjects involved, while they arenot- local because they are inside every mind involved: mymind is local for is inside of my body and self and isnot-local for when I express it in a certain system ofsigns and these signs are received by another subject mymind becomes part of his mind; furthermore each mindbecomes something in the world which can be observed andanalyzed by a mind external to any relationship; aprocess that happens very often in human condition.

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A) Expressive, signic and symbolic sharing

Within inter-mental dialogue there is not a directreading of states and contents of other minds; if thiswere possible would means that you could directly accessthe mental configurations of another mind and to detectthe information in them; this process happens in thereading of our own mind for which there is a directaccess to own mind through meta-mental processes. On thecontrary, excluding on the basis of the actual knowledgethe direct access to mental configurations of otherminds, inter-mental dialogue is grounded on the abilityof human mind to express its states and contents withdifferent kinds of signs or symbols.Inter-mental dialogue, from a communicative point of

view, is transmission and receiving information (ormessages) through the use of a system of different kindsof signs. Particularly, the transmission of informationis possible because contents and states of mind are codedin a system of signs; the mind expresses itself with thissystem of signs.

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Receiving, on the contrary, in the same way as ithappens in any processes of transmission of information(or communication process), does not include thecodification of mental states and contents, but thedecoding of the signs that have been received. In theinter-mental dialogue in which are involved two minds, M1and M2, transmission and receiving are activated by bothminds; this happens in a circular communication from asubject S1 to a subject S2 and from S2 to S1 in areiterative schema. Thus, from one side, both minds M1and M2 codify in a system of signs their states andcontents which are transmitted with these signs and, fromthe other, they decode the signs they receive one fromthe other.In this condition you must suppose that: a) both M1 and

M2 express their states and contents with an analogousmodality as it happens with the expression typical ofeach species of primary emotions: the members of aspecies express their emotions with the same signs; forexample, with phonic, pheromonic or behavioral signs; b)M1 and M2 within the process of expression, beyond theshared sign modality, must share the same system ofsigns; so in Homo, as well as in other living species,each man to express to others his emotions uses the samesigns so that they are readable by other men and in manyinstances by members of other species.So, as we know, usually the encephalic expressions in

many species use a shared system of signs which isgenetically determined; the semantic univocality in themajority of cases allows that the signs used are sharedand readable by all members of the own species and bymembers of others species with whom there arerelationships in a specific habitat. An analogous process happens for mind M1 and M2 but in

this case there is not a semantic univocality of signs whichis genetically determined, exception for the primaryemotions, because signs that are used in the inter-mental

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dialogue have conventional/cultural meanings which can besuch for two people, for many of them or for an entirecollectivity; in this case signs are culturallydetermined and specific of a culture so they might not beunderstandable by subjects belonging to another culture;this is true for the use not only of the signs of thenatural language but of other kinds of signs such assymbols or icons that possess meanings shared by themembers of a culture. For this reason, as is well known to information and

communication theory, two minds M1 and M2 in order toestablish a relation with information exchange they notonly must express themselves in analogue modalities anduse the same system of signs (or more than one), but theymust possess a shared semantic of this system of signs; inother words, the signs that are used must have the samemeanings for all subjects and so must refer, from oneside, to analogue mental states and contents and theshared semantics is grounded on the relationships betweensigns and mental contents and states; from the other,obviously, to entities and states of the world.

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Nevertheless, this condition, although is necessary forinter-mental dialogue, is only theoretical since theshared signs used to express the own mind and to transmitown states and contents to another mind do not possess astrict semantic univocality as it happens for those thatexpress primary emotions in Homo and in other livingspecies. The systems of signs are conventional and theirsemantics is not strictly univocal; we cannot state thatthere is not a shared semantics since if there was not asharing it would not be possible any mental exchange;nevertheless, from one side, signs, although with asufficient semantic univocality, possess a wide semantichalo thus they could be interpreted in many differentways; this applies to every mind when expresses itselfand for other minds that receive information codified ina conventional system of signs. From the other, thesemantic halo is made more complex by the short or longstrings of signs and their syntax as it happens for thenatural languages; therefore, a semantic plurivocality goes inparallel with a degree of univocality which is necessaryfor transmission and receiving messages between twominds. Inter-mental dialogue runs between semantic (and

syntactic too) univocality and plurivocality and both ofthem are derived from an underlined meaningfulness moreor less shared; thus, there are involved reading pro-cesses of other minds that very often activatehermeneutic processes.The observations that have been outlined are useful to

analyze the modalities of reading/interpretation of otherminds and they are called extrospective processes.

B) The extrospective processes

The extrospective processes are those mental and meta-mentalprocesses that are activated, differently from theintrospective ones which are turned to the own mind, in

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order to read, interpret and know contents and states ofother minds and so their nomiosis (their meanings) andthe related mental configurations. These processes, as wewill hereinafter underline, do not have a direct accessto other minds, but they are formed by the elaborationsof the expressions of other minds and by noeticprocesses, particularly inferential, applied to otherminds. In the following two sections will be analyzed thedifferent kinds of extrospective processes and will beoutlined their validity and their limitations.

B1) Reading/interpretation of the expressions of other minds

The reading of the external expressions of other mindsconcerns the different kinds of signs and at the sametime the process of recognition of signs with theirsemantic correlation (decoding) and a hermeneutic processwhich from signs goes to mental contents and states(configurations); indeed, the decoding of signs isformulated in order to know the mental contents andstates and the meaningful processes of other minds. Thereare different kinds of signs that a mind M1 can use in anexclusive or mixed way in order to transmit hisexpressions to a mind M2.The first system of signs, which is not always the more

relevant, is the natural language; in this case contentsand states of a mind M1, once they have been mentallyformulated, are expressed with the signs of a naturallanguage in the form of propositions (assertions orbeliefs) which, coded intentionally according to thesesigns, express mental contents and states, i.e. nomioticprocesses and configurations: propositional or quasi-propositional descriptions of contents and states of theown mind; this process brings with it some difficultiesbut is sufficiently reliable: these descriptivepropositions, or quasi-propositions, in a certain way

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correspond to the information embodied in mental contentsand states.This system of signs is the more conventional compared

to other types signs; although each man learns naturallanguage correlating signs with their semanticreferences, this correlation in many instances is notunivocal for its intrinsic semantic halo; however, as wehave already remarked, a minimal semantic univocalityallows the transmission of information from a mind toanother; nevertheless, semantic plurivocality is such that thereading of these signs transmitted from M1 to M2 isalways subject to a hermeneutic process; this processconcerns not only the meanings of single signs but also,and this is more relevant, the correlation among them andso the semantic of strings of signs or of many stringsaltogether. In other words, in the standard case M1transmits to M2 a sequence of propositions correlated oneto another in different ways: for example in logic orargumentative ways, or in one in which meaningful bondsare not always explicit and easily noticed. Moreover, theprocess of interpretation must take care of the contextin which propositions are formulated.The reading process is grounded, first of all, on the

perceptions which receive signs, for example, theauditory or visual ones. The primary involvement of theperceptual activities let the reading to be guided bysuch processes which ascertain signs in their perceptiveimmediacy and hence their recognition as signs of anatural language. These signs received are re-activated inthe mind of the receiver as they were uttered by his mindhence are activated meaningful configurations related tothose signs and perhaps (applying the theory of mirrorneurons to the receiving linguistic signs) the area ofthe cortex that allows to utter them or predisposes toutter them (the sensory-motor cortex); the observation ofhuman behavior finds that some people repeat in theirmind, and even utter, the words turned to them at the

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same time in which hear them, for instance within anintersubjective dialogue. Thus receiving from M2 the signs of M1 means to re-

activate them in his mind and more generally to form init long sequences of signs which ‘correspond’ to thosethat have been received. To share the meaning of a signfirst of all means to find inside of the own mind thissign and activate it with its semantics: the semanticsshared by M1 and M2. A similar process is activated forother kinds of signs for which is not always present asemantic plurivocality.As is well known, beside the signs of natural languages,

other minds can be read through nonverbal signs: a) bodysigns, b) proxemics and bodily postures, c) physiognomicand facial expressions and, in indirect way, d) othersigns such as writings and artistic or cultural forms ofexpressions. In the first three cases, often the reading of other

minds does not happen in an explicit mode and, relativelyto a shared semantics for these signs, has a more or lessstrong semantic univocality because they are part ofexpressive mode of the species Homo or they are shared byall member of a collectivity; thus, in most instances,reading other minds is an unaware process which does notneed interpretations. Nevertheless, the semantic sharinggrounded on culture or on human genome is based on ashared presupposition according to which these signscorresponds to specific mental contents or states. Apresupposition that once again is grounded on the analogyaccepted by a mind M1 on respect to a mind M2: thenonverbal signs used by M1 correspond to specific statesor contents of his mind in the same way the same signs orsome similar ones correspond to analogue mental statesand contents of M2 that at turn they are analogue tothose activated by the same signs used by M1; thus, inthe reading by M1 of nonverbal signs of M2 they areconsidered by M1 as corresponding to states and contents

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which are activated in his mind in the case in which heexpresses himself with these signs. Nevertheless, the process is not so linear because in

the reading of signs of other minds are not only relevantthe single signs, although in sequential mode, but themodalities in which the signs are uttered and morerelevant the bonds among different signs as happens inthe case in which reading other minds elaborate at thesame time, for example, physiognomic and proxemics signsor bodily signs together with verbal ones. Thus, theunivocality of the signs becomes weak within a semanticsharing concerning the more or less contemporary presenceof different kinds of signs. Furthermore, as is wellknown, are relevant the modalities of utterance of signsas it happens in the case in which a not verbal sign ismatched with a verbal one that can generate a differentmeaning from that in which this sign is present in anisolated way from other signs. Pragmatic linguisticsholds that not only the utterance but the context of theutterance makes it possible to generate differentmeanings in the reading of other minds. In this paper wedo not analyze this topic, but it is useful to say thatfor not verbal signs, although grounded on a sharedsemantics, their readings is a complex process in whichintervene many factors related not only to signs inthemselves but also to the type of their relationshipsand to the minds involved.

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Finally, it is necessary to analyze briefly the lastmodality which is the one more subject to a hermeneuticreading; that is, the ways in which a mind expressesitself through very complex semiotic forms such as thoseof literature, visual arts or of some other kind. Withoutconsidering the differences amongst the languages usedand their relative expressive and hermeneutic semiosis,it can be hold that the complexity of expressive literaryand artistic forms makes that their reading does notbring directly to a univocal correspondence between signsand mental states and contents of other minds. Thus, alsoin these cases the hermeneutic process is fundamental notonly in order to interpret signs but to hold acorrespondence between these sings and states andcontents of other minds. The hermeneutic process isalways active within the reading of other minds thereforeit is useful to analyze it in general without referringto the different kinds of signs.In this paper we do not analyze the different ways in

which philosophical hermeneutics is considered but werestrict our attention to the reading of other mindswhich is very often a hermeneutic process; in otherwords, the reading of other mind involves not onlyreceiving signs of different kinds with their sharedsemantics (univocal and plurivocal semantics) and thesemiotic activation of these signs in the receiving mind,but also different factors which make it different from amere signic decoding particularly because it activateshermeneutical process that are due to the presence ofsemantic plurivocality and to a relative sharedunivocality; however, the analogy with the own mind isnot a diriment parameter in order to correspond the signsof other minds to their states and contents analogue toowns relatively to some specific signs.The hermeneutic process is grounded on the shared

semantics and it does not consider only single signs andtheir inherent connections but, as it is well known to

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semiologists, the syntactic disposition and the pragmaticmeanings (beyond the semantic ones): in this case, theutterance’s modalities of signs, contexts, relationshipsamongst them and the possible effects on the receiver.The primary goal of the hermeneutic process is not to

interpret signs in themselves (that is, to clarify theirsemiosis), even if this is relevant, but to formulatehypotheses of correspondence between signs and states and contents ofother minds. Differently from a semiologist, a mind M1,which has a relation with M2, is not interested toanalyze the semiotic structures of the expressions of M2in themselves, but to notice that these semioticstructures are hypostasis of states and contents of themind of M2. The mind M1, as a semiologist, activatessemiotic processes on respect to the expressions of M2,but these processes are different and it is possible toconsider them as semiotic-correspondent processes; in otherwords, semiotic processes that analyze the semioticstructures in order to formulate correspondences withstates and contents of other minds; in a rigorous way, itmust be outlined that the correspondences are betweensigns and their referents which are nomioticconfigurations of other minds. Differently from semioticanalyses the semiotic-correspondent processes are notinteresting to notice the semantic reference of the signsconsidered in themselves. In order to formulate semiotic-correspondent hypotheses,

that we call mimetic hypotheses, the mind M1 works on thebasis of three factors: a) a model of the mind, b) asemiotic model of correspondences between signs andmental states and contents (nomiotic configurations) andc) a model of the mind M2.The first factor was analyzed earlier and was told that

it is possible to formulate it within mentalrelationships of a specific culture in which mind isconsidered as that part of the self that performsactivities as thinking, reasoning, imagining, feeling

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emotions and so on. The second one concerns, on one side,a semiotic sharing of signs; in other words, a sharing oftheir meanings in the different contexts not only thelinguistic ones; on the other, a semiotic model accordingto which signs used by a mind are uttered as expressionsof its mental states and contents; a model that has beenalready analyzed which is fundamental in order to readand interpret signs of other minds. In this model isincluded the analogy: analogous signs are referred to analogousmental states and contents, that is, to nomiotic configurations of the ownmind and of other minds. This model is considered as apresupposition accepted within inter-mental relationshipsbut it is not strongly reliable therefore hermeneuticprocesses are always necessary.The third factor is more complex than the others and is

difficult to analyze it and on this are measured theother ones. The model of other minds can be considered intwo ways: a model of the mind and of the own mind appliedto other minds and a model of a specific mind. The firstone has been considered in the previous part while thesecond must be clarified. The process that we areanalyzing allows the mind M1 to apply factors a) and b)to a mind, but their application is formulated on thebasis of a model of a specific mind M2. Thus, inter-mental relationships modify themselves on the basis ofthe relative models of the different other minds whichare involved; it often happens that the same model ofother minds is applied to different minds and thisprocess leads to difficulties in reading and then aprocess of interpretation harder.What do we mean by model of another mind? We mean that

M1 in order to read the mind M2 and to activate ahermeneutic process, must refer to considerations andjudgments of the mind M2 (the concept of the mind M2, thenoetic M2). Therefore, many processes are activated whichrefer always to the model of mind M2; this model isreferred to many, even if not all, the aspects of M2; for

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example, its ways of reasoning, its answers to stimuli,its different noetic frameworks, its ways to considersome psychological or mental characters and so on.

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The reading and particularly the interpretation of otherminds proceed starting from the model of the other mindwith which there is an actual relation and theapplication of factor a) and b) obviously could resultdifferent.The mental activation of the model of another mind is

not aware (at least it is not always so) and is the guideof the processes of interpretation of signs of otherminds. Hence, these signs are interpreted considering atthe same time the model of the own mind, M(OWNM), and themodel of other minds and in particular of a specificother mind, M(OTM). It is useful to remark that the modelof other minds within an inter-mental relation transposesor adapts itself to the model of a specific mind.M(OWNM) and M(OTM) are guides and parameters to activate

hermeneutic processes that can interpret signs of otherminds with reference to a specific mind and so to itscharacters known directly or with inferential processes.The interpretation of the signs of other minds consists

primarily in three operations: a) assignment of meaningsto single signs and their interconnections; b) assignmentof sense to the expressions of others; c) correlationsbetween signs and mental states and contents.

a) Assignment of meanings to single signs and their interconnections

The interpretation of any kind of text, included themental ones of the own or of other minds, develops withits analysis on the basis of a sign code and afterwardsformulating interpretative hypotheses; in other words,assigning to the text different meanings and acceptingone of the interpretative hypotheses. The interpretativeprocess can be considered as a meaningful re-assignmentwhich evaluates the evident or accepted significationsand formulate others which, in theory, allow you to fullycomprehend the text. The interpretation, considered ashypotheses formulation, involves directly the notion of

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comprehension: to interpret a text means to comprehend itin its wholeness. The comprehension allows to point outthat interpretation, although it considers standard orevident meanings or literal ones, has the goal ofbringing to surface, or to make evident, meanings thatcan be considered as peculiar of the text although theyare not evident. Thus, the hermeneutic analysis consistsin bringing to evidence meanings that are not evident;often this process is a fiction because meanings are notrevealed from the text but they are truly meaningfulassignment also not present in the text; in such a caseis an meaningful interpretation which cannot correspondin any way to the meanings present in the text. Thus, there are two interpretative forms: 1) the revealing

one and 2) the appositive one. The first can bring to surfaceor put on to evidence meanings present in the text; thesecond one, on the contrary, although some time couldappear in the form of the first, assigns to the textmeaning that are not present in it.

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Within the interpretative analysis, often, are activatedboth the revealing and the appositive processes and itsgoal consists in formulating a relation between text andinterpretation and a deeper relation between the text andthe mind that has formulated it. The interpretative answer to a text concerns a standard

and initial question: what does the text means?Particularly, which is the thought of who has formulatedit, that is, the author of the text? On one side, therelationships between interpretative hypotheses and thetext from which derives the arguments to support one oranother hypothesis. On the other, the correspondencerelation between the meaning of the text and the mentalcontent of who has formulated it (his nomioticconfigurations). This process applied, for example, to aliterary, philosophical or religious text intends toanalyze the relation between text and interpretation byusing linguistic and semiotic tools; at the same timethis process gives an answer to the question: which isthe ‘true’ thought of the author that has expressed himin a text? Although the notion of interpretation seemsopposite to that of truth (usually truth is notconsidered), indeed any interpretation of a text involvesthe notion of truth particularly in the case of revealingprocess but also in the appositive one. The notion oftruth in this case is considered as correspondence, onone side, between text and interpretation and on theother between the text and the thought of the subject whoformulated it; the correspondence assumes differentweight in the two revealing and appositive processes.If we do not consider all the complex aspects of

hermeneutic processes, then we can state that they aredevoted to the two goals we have underlined: the relationbetween text and its interpretation and between text andits author, or better the mind of the author. This isevident in the case in which in the interpretativeprocess is directly involved the author of the text which

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can confirm or not the result of the process. Also whenthe author is not involved at least directly, as in thecases in which the author is dead or even in that of theSupreme Being, the interpretation, although in differentways, concerns ‘what was in the mind’ of the author andwhich has been transposed in the text.This process, which is typical of hermeneutics, is

analogous to the interpretation of a text within aninter-mental dialogue which activates the operations wehave above outlined.Before proceeding to analyze the operations b) and c)

within inter-mental relationships, it is useful underlinethat in this case the primary goal is the comprehension of otherminds and this means to formulate interpretative hypotheses useful to pointout a correspondence relation between signs of another mind and its statesand contents not only to understand it but to establishrelations with it and in many cases to influence it;often the hermeneutic processes are of the appositiveform.

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b) Assignment of sense to the expressions of others

The first operation has been called ‘assignment ofmeanings to each single signs and theirinterconnections’. We have already analyzed thisoperation and at this point we are only interested tostate that the interpretation starts, although in anunaware way, with the assignment of meanings to the signsof other minds: to single signs and to sequences of signssuch as propositions and chain of propositions. Thisprocess is activated in two ways: 1) the regimented orstandard one uses meanings accepted by the users of alanguage and 2) the idiosyncratic way in which is used alanguage specific of the minds which are involved, i.e.the meanings of the mind that formulates meanings of thesigns of another mind; these last usually are theregimented ones used by the subjects involved or they areslightly different from them; in other cases the signsmight be very different from the standard ones as ithappens in many subjects and particularly those affectedby mental pathologies as neurosis or psychosis. Although this process is very complex is activated in

the usual interpersonal communications and in many mentalactivities related to the reading of texts of differentkinds, particularly those of literature and philosophy.The second operation is also typical of hermeneutic

processes which, differently from the semiotic ones, donot restrict their action to the determination ofmeanings of a text but they take into consideration whatwe call sense of a text. The sense of a text, theoretically,cannot be reducible to the semiotic meanings of signs andtheir semantic and pragmatic correlations (included thecontextual ones). How you can talk about ‘sense’ and‘textual sense’ relatively to expressive texts of anothermind?

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Such a sense is semantically and pragmatically intrinsicto the text (inherent property) or, on the contrary, isan oversegnic or anainherent property?This topic from a philosophical point of view concerns

the ‘sense of something’ and in the case we are dealingis considered as an oversegnic property for it does not belongstrictly to signs but to the modalities and contexts inwhich signs are used and uttered. Researches in pragmaticlinguistics outline that the pragmatic effects, that is,the effects that signs have on the receivers (but also onthe transmitters), is not a semiotic attribute of signsbut of their utterance and of the utterance context.Let’s think, for instance, to the proposition ‘I hateyou’ that can assume different significant tunes according thecontexts in which it is uttered. We can think, too, in anallusive way to the ‘the meaning or sense of life’ whichis not referred to specific aspects of an individual lifebut is an over-property which is possessed by thecollection of all the aspects of this life. This conception of the sense of a text is not the only

one because the texts of other minds possess an intrinsicproperty which is inherent to the text; in other words,this property derives from an explicit or implicit cor-relation between the semiosis of different signs and thesemiosis of their correlations: the texts carry with themand indicate their sense. Mental texts and texts of otherminds, with which hermeneutic relationships wereestablished in order to formulate interpretativehypotheses, have both properties: inherent or signic andthe anainherent or oversegnic ones.Nevertheless up to now we have not clarified how the

sense is different from the meaning or from a correlationof different meanings. If sense is a signic inherentproperty then the sense is the result of a semioticinference applied to the meanings of signs and of thecorrelations amongst them; as happens, for example, forthe inherent sense of a proposition which derives from

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the meanings of subject, verb and predicate; the samehappens in more complex logical processes as arguments ordeductive or inductive inferences. In these cases theinherent sense is a syntactic and semantic propertyrelatively to single terms and their syntactical andsemantic correlations. It could be stated that inherentsense is the result of mere semiotic computations even ofan artificial apparatus. This sense, although can beconsidered as merely computable, is not reducible to themeanings of the single signs and their correlations, forit involves the semiosis of the entire text considered asa whole; even if this operation is implemented in acomputational device it derives from an elaboration of asuperior level of all the semiosis involved: those ofindividual signs and those of their correlations; asuperior level computation or meta-computation on respectto those which identify meanings of signs and of theircorrelations. Although this sense may be considered notrelevant due to its computational character, is animportant aspect of the interpretation of other minds andthe sense of their expressions. This sense very often canbe the only one within the interpretative process, andthis can give rise to suitable results useful toformulate interpretative hypotheses. The second way of understanding the notion of sense,

anainherent or oversegnic, can allow us to understand in abetter way the sense and to differentiate it from thesemiosis of signs (the inherent sense). The second way toassign sense to a text or to a sequence of texts utteredby other minds points out that the sense does not deriveonly from the semiosis of signs (their semantic meanings)but from a larger and deeper consideration of the textwhich involves various mental factors of a mind M1 whichassigns a sense to a texts uttered by a mind M2 (the verbutter is used to indicate any kind of expression of amind and not only the linguistic one).

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The ana-inherent sense of a text uttered by M2 does notinvolve only the semiosis of signs but concerns therelative nomiosis and is considered as the relevancy thatM1 assigns to it within a context of utterance and in anextended way of the mental relation between M1 and M2.The term relevancy is used to indicate that a mind M1considers the text uttered by M2 as an informative andimportant content useful to read the mind of M2 within aspecific context and an inter-mental relation.

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This relevancy derives, on one side, from thecorrelations with other texts, signs and semiosis relatedor correlable with the text uttered by M2, with thesemiosis of signs and their correlations within the text;on the other, from the text placement in a double mentalhorizon: a) that of M1 in relation with M2, and b) that inwhich M1 place the mind of M2 within the inter-mentalrelation. Thus, this way of understanding the sense of atext can be called perspective sense; this is the result of ameta-mental process which works on the text and on itssemiosis and furthermore on other mental andpsychological factors which intervene in the reading ofother minds; therefore, the anainherent sense is notreduced to the semiosis of the text, but amplifies itselfto nomiotic aspects of M1 and M2, that is, their noeticprocesses, mental states and contents.The meta-mental process of assigning to a text an

anainherent or perspective sense works on differentlevels; in the first one, the process operates on signs,correlations and semiosis while in the others levelsplaces the results of the first level in larger nomiotichorizon in which the text can assume a different semiosis.The nomiotic horizon is the nomiotic mental context in whichis included the text that has been received: this is anomiotic-perspective horizon because correlates the text toothers ones and to other contents of the mind M1 thatconcern the mind M2. Hence, in the perspective nomiotichorizon there are many mental correlated contents thatgenerate an interpretation of the text and of itsanainherent sense. The mental horizon may have alreadybeen preserved in mind and could be reactivated indifferent conditions in the mind M1 concerning M2, butoften is formed on the basis of the information of thetext; in other words, the presence of the text activatesthe perspective horizon of M1 referring to the mind M2;nevertheless, at the same time, the horizon is amplified

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or even modified on the basis of receiving the text ofM2.On the basis of what has been claimed previously, the

inherent and anainherent senses allow a reading of thetexts of M2 and so of its mental contents; this readingovercomes and includes the strict semiosis of signs.Thus, the interpretative process is not computable or atleast is not reductively computable for involves alsonomiotic aspects; this last character is reinforcedbecause the interpretative perspective horizon (based onboth types of senses), although preserved in the mind M1,can change within a specific inter-mental context so cangenerate different interpretations of the same text indifferent conditions although is activated the samemental horizon relative to M2.

c) Correlations between signs and mental states and contents

Similarly to meta-mental processes referred to theknowledge of own mind in the formulation of the knowledgeof other minds, as has already been pointed out,correlations between expressions of other minds and theirnomiotic configurations (mental states, processes andcontents) are fundamental. The greatest part of theknowledge of M2 formulated by the mind M1, on the groundof receiving and interpretation of the texts of M2,correlates these texts with states and contents of mindM2. In this correlation are involved the followingfactors. The first one is the assignment of meanings andinterpretations that M1 formulates relatively to thesigns of M2 according to the modalities that havepreviously been outlined; the second one is grounded onthe knowledge that M1 has of M2: the knowledge of somecontents of the mind of M2. The third factor concerns themental analogy: a sign of M1 corresponds to one of itsnomiotic configurations and in the same way a similarsign of M2 corresponds to a mental configuration of M2

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analogue to that of M1 relative to a similar sign.Whenever M1 reads the mind M2 intends to correlate thesigns of M2 to its mental states, processes and contentsand so he may understand the mind of M2 and so he canestablish a dialogue with it. The signs of M2 works inthe mind M1 in order to formulate hypotheses on states,processes and contents of M2 and this means that M1activates a certain type of mental simulation of thesestates, processes and contents of M2.Therefore, the relationships between M1 and M2 are semiotic

relationships which become nomiotic relationships: in other words,relationships between mental states and contents of M1and states and contents of M2. Indeed, these states andcontents dialogue through semiotic relationships amongsigns and so do the minds M1 and M2 which dialogue directly.Nevertheless, M1 and M2 can dialogue only through theirsignic expressions which, very often, particularly usingnatural languages, although they are necessary for thedialogue, generate many difficulties; on one side,because of their semantic plurivocality and on the otherfor a plurivocality of correlations between states,processes and contents of our own mind and similarcorrelations inside other minds.Therefore, beside the hermeneutic processes that has

previously been outlined, you need a more complexhermeneutic process, that we can call sign/nosema correlationprocess, and this means a correlation between signs andmental meanings. This process is hermeneutic for,although the correlation can be grounded on the analogybetween the own mind and other minds and on a supposedshared correspondence between signs and nosemas, wheneverM1 activates an interpretation of signs and formulatescorrelations between signs and mental meanings in M2these correlations may have been previously determinedbut the correlation formed during an actual process maybe different from the pre-determined ones.

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B2) Inferential processes, generalizations, noetic applications, extra-cognitive inferences, resonance and telenoesi

The reading and knowledge of other minds are notformulated only through a direct receiving signicexpressions (bodily, linguistic, etc.), but also throughdifferent eidetic (not perceptive) processes, althoughsome of them can be based on perceptive information; thereading and knowledge of other minds are formed with aninterlacing between perceptive and eidetic informationand its elaboration.Amongst these eidetic tools, first of all there are

inferences and generalizations. Inferences are mental(noetic) processes which can be activated in two ways. Inthe first way, an inferential process develops startingform perceptive information from which it is possible toinfer information on other minds and behaviors. Forinstance, receiving a text or a behavior can lead toformulate inferences on mental states and contents ofother minds which are not referred merely to the meaningof signs but to many other nomiotic aspects of otherminds. In this case, inferences, differently from a meremeaning of signs, can lead to the formulation ofhypotheses on the thought of others not only with regardto the signs received but to the mental contents relatedto them. For example, receiving a proposition, such as‘men are bad’, can induce the receiving mind to inferthat this attribute is referred also to itself;furthermore, if the adjective ‘bad’ is considered by M1as formed by many attributes, then M1 can infer that M2,which has uttered this proposition, holds that theseattributes are referred to every man. As you know,inferences can be much more complex and generate aninferential sequence formed by inferences which are notdirectly derived from an initial one. In other words, aninferential sequence can concern many other mentalcontents of M2, although they are not expressed or they

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are not in a specific condition. The inferences canassume the usual forms, such as deductive, inductive,abductive or argumentative although they may not have alogical correctness.Other inferences do not refer directly to the receiving

of information but to mental contents assigned to otherminds or typical of a mind that dialogues with another.These inferences do not start from perceptive informationbut from two processes referred to one’s own mind or toother minds. We call these inferences eidetic inferences inorder to underline that they are not grounded onperceptions of the expressions of other minds althoughthey can involve them.These idetic inferences, referred to other minds, can be

derived, for example, from personal conceptions,ideologies or prejudices which play the role of noeticparameters to read other minds and to assign to themstates, processes and contents beyond the informationthat has been received. On the contrary, in the case inwhich this information is involved could be interpretedin specific ways according to personal conceptions,ideologies or prejudices.The knowledge of other minds, differently from what

happens in the ordinary knowledge concerning phenomenicentities, has a low degree of reliability with referenceto the semiosis of signs, the hermeneutic processes andthe correlations signs/nosemas (signs and mental states,processes and contents). This does not mean that M1 hasnot a knowledge of M2 (indeed he has one), but in thisknowledge are involved the processes that have beenoutlined, included the inferences we are dealing with,therefore this knowledge has a low degree of reliabilityparticularly concerning the correlation formulated by M1between expressions of M2 and mental states, processesand contents of M2.The knowledge of the mind M2 formulated by M1 often is

the projection of mental contents of M1 considered as contents of M2; in55

this case, are clearly assigned to M2 in the appositiveway contents that it could not possess; for such a reasonthere is a low reliability of the knowledge of M2 by M1.Nevertheless, although epistemologically the knowledge ofother minds is biased by different factors that intervenein its formulation generating a low reliability, thiscondition is only analytic for in usual reciprocalreadings of other minds and so in mental dialogue, it isnot necessary a high degree of reliability which usuallythere is not; indeed, a low degree of reliability issufficient although it leads to misunderstandings andwrong readings of other minds. Within the usual inter-mental dialogues the subjects involved (at least in mostcases) they do not care of theoretic reliability of theirreadings but they are interested in reading other mindsin order to fulfill their motivations an goals; thereading criteria are not epistemological but self-oriented; the self-oriented criteria are not useful toproperly and correctly understand another mind but onlyto hold or to believe to understand it on the ground oninterests, motivations, goals, etc.; obviously, there areexceptions to this interpersonal dynamics as the cases ofargumentative dialogue amongst scientists. Generally, theadequacy criterion is more relevant than the reliabilitytherefore some readings of other minds are acceptedaccording to the goals you aim to achieve in an inter-mental relation.Thus, the two kinds of inferences, and particularly the

second one, are guided by mental contents, states andprocesses of those wishing to know other minds; thisinferential knowledge, therefore, is not a knowledge de-voted only to a gnoseological goal but a relational onein which the gnoseological reliability of the knowledgeof other minds might not have any relevancy because theadequacy criterion is applied.Generalizations and idetic applications have a similar nature

generating knowledge of other minds. Generalizations are56

formulated on perceptions or on inferences concerningsome numbers of subjects and their characters and theyare applied, as happens for any kind of generalization,to new instances; thus, they are a useful tool in orderto assign different attributes to many subjects. In thecase we are analyzing there are generalization on otherminds which are used, awarenessly or not, in order toformulate knowledge of other minds; nevertheless, theapplication of these generalizations do not lead directlyto formulate reliable knowledge because, from one side,they could not be applicable to every subjects and,particularly, to a specific one; from the other, they arenot correct generalizations formulated on the basis of alarge numbers of instances but only on few cases, asusually happens in the ordinary thinking; furthermorebecause they are applied in an appositive way in order toassign mental attributes to other minds without having asuitable perceptive or inferential support. Nevertheless,although with these restrictions, the generalizationsformulated on other minds can play a gnoseological roleconcerning a specific mind and can be considered ascognitive tools to know other minds.These observations also apply to those we call idetic

applications. Idetic applications are grounded on conceptsor conceptions formulated by a mind or derived fromcommon sense (common sense is considered as the frame ofconcepts, notions and conceptions formulated by a socialgroup and shared by those who belong to it); concepts,notions and conceptions are derived from idetic processesthat do not involve, at least directly, perceptiveprocesses. Their applications as tool of knowing otherminds develop in an analogue way of the generalizations;hence, with the same modalities and restrictions thathave been outlined. Idetic applications, however, do not concern only mental

contents but processes too, thus they can be used toassign to other minds processual modalities that could

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generate specific mental states and contents. For in-stance, S1 could hold that the mind of S2 may operates ina specific modality which is similar to that of anaccepted prototype of mental operations and so S1 canexpect that S2 thinks according to this modality.Even in this case you must outline that although there

are restrictions in many cases stronger than those ofgeneralizations, idetic applications, for contents andprocess modalities, if applied to other minds can be auseful tool for knowing other minds.To conclude the topic of this section we briefly analyze

other processes useful for knowing other minds:extracognitive inferences, resonance and telenoesis.In the previous part were analyzed the inferential

processes which allow a mind M1 to formulategnoseological hypotheses on a mind M2 concerning itsexpressions or idetic processes related to it. In bothcases mind M1 works on cognitive data but the inferencesmay be grounded on extra-cognitive contents, that is,contents that cannot be cognitively formulated. Most ofthese processes work in unaware way and their results arenot expressible, or they are not completely in a specificsemiotic form as happens for the other processes thathave been analyzed.At this point it is relevant to underline that in most

cases the reading of other minds is formulated by unawareprocesses or at least processes that during theirdevelopment are only partially aware. Nevertheless, theresults of these processes, although not always, may beaware and so semiotically expressed also in the form ofpropositions or chain of propositions. The transformationof the results of the reading processes of other mindsinto specific expressive semiotic forms is a fundamentalfactor of the usual inter-mental dialogue which proceedswith repeated reciprocal readings and so on a semioticcircularity: the exchange of messages which is thefundamental character of inter-mental dialogue.

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Nevertheless, the inter-mental dialogue as you know doesnot always work within an expressed semiotic level but ona not expressed semiotic one. This unexpressed semioticlevel is formed by nomiotic processes that do not belongto the usual cognitivity, formed by cognitive processesas reasoning, arguments, inferences and ideticapplications. The extra-cognitive cognitivity in thelanguage of the ordinary and common sense thinking isconsidered in various ways adopting terms such as‘intuition’, ‘interpenetration’, ‘grasping’, etc.;generally, we refer to processes that up to now are notdefined by scientific researches and do not belong to theusual noetic processes that can be transformed insemiotic expressions: signic expressions, propositions,behaviors, etc. Nevertheless, this does not mean to statethat they are not neurophysiological and nomiotic pro-cesses indeed they are although different from others andup today not understandable or not explicable. In these cases are not understandable not only the

processes but also the receiving messages of others thatare received in an unaware way and so the subject is notable to indicate them as factors of unaware processes.Nevertheless, this does not happen in all cases since insome of them the introspection could bring to awarenessnot the unaware processes but some of their results.These processes, that we called extracognitive processes, they

could, as often it happens, develop through extracognitiveinferences; hence, these are such not only because aregrounded on extra-cognitive (or not cognitive)information but because they could be the result of notstandard information bonds such as those we have dealtpreviously. Obviously, we use the term extra-cognitivefor the only reason that today the term cognitive is usedto refer uniquely to specific noetic processes, that is,those investigated by cognitive psychology; we could usethe term cognitive widening its semantic reference, butusing the actual meaning we prefer distinguish the extra-

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cognitive processes from the cognitive ones. In anycases, extra-cognitive processes are different fromcognitive ones not only for the information processed butfor their operational modalities. On one side there arethe usual inferences that could be formulated relating toother minds such as those already indicated(generalizations, idetic applications, etc.) andfurthermore to deductions, inductions, abductions; on theother side, processes and inferences that are grounded on‘intuitive’ or ‘interpenetration’ contents which theyconnect each other with various bonds different fromthose amongst concepts and on them could be activated notstandard inferences, that is, extra-cognitive inferences.This kind of inferences are those not grounded oncognitive bonds (as the bonds amongst concepts in adeductive reasoning) and are not reducible to deductive,abductive or inductive reasoning, or to arguments,generalizations and idetic applications.We refer to extra-cognitive contents such as those of

intuition or interpenetration relative to other minds. Inother words, we state that intuition or interpenetrationare processes that allow catching at first glance amental state, process or content of another mind or evento predict it. These are complex processes in which atthe same time are involved many mental contents andinformation received in aware and unaware way thus thesubject does not awarely receive all of them but his mindreceives and uses them to formulate, for example,intuitions on other minds. These are noetic processesalthough different from all the others. These processesand their inferences elaborate a large number ofinformation such as that preserved in memory referred toown and other minds.We have claimed that extra-cognitive inferences are

formulated by the mind, in aware and unaware ways, andcorrelate mental contents in ways different from those ofarguments and logical or conceptual inferences.

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What type of bonds are extra-cognitive ones? Consider,for instance, the way in which the contents of intuitionare correlated and how from these contents inferences canbe formulated. Let’s consider the case of a mind M1 thatclaims to have known by intuition (or by interpenetra-tion) that a mind M2 is in a specific mental state or hasa specific content although M1 does not have awareinformation that can process; in this case there are twopossible conditions: in the first one M1 has elaboratedin an unaware modality expressions of M2 although M2 doesnot have intentionally formulated them. In the second,these expressions are not given to M1 or it is not ableto receive them for it doesn’t have any physical contactwith M2; for example, it is in a place different fromthat of M2 and cannot receive any information from it.The second condition introduce the so called resonance andtelenoesis which will be further on analyzed, on thecontrary in the first one the expressions of M2 arereceivable by M1 although in a unaware modality and theyare useful information to formulate extra-cognitivehypotheses on M2. A third condition is that in which inthe mind M1 are activated information on M2 stored in itsmemory. In the first and in the third condition theintuitive utterances can be reduced to the other forms ofinferences, nevertheless in them are not elaboratedcognitive contents but extracognitive ones which as suchare not expressible in a cognitive way; this is the caseof extracognitive inferences. Intuitions on other mindscan be considered as the result of complex (and sometimerandom) correlations among accessible information orpreserved in memory that generate a new information thatis not reducible to the contents have been correlated: anew content that emerges from the process correlation.Whenever you claim that you have understood by intuitionor interpenetration some content or state of another mindwe refer to such result, elaborated in an unawaremodality and later awarenessly uttered, in which many

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informational contents have been combined and arrangedgenerating an interpretative hypotheses of other minds.These correlative combinations and arrangements might bealso inferences or they can generate inferences consid-ered as mental contents derived from informationcorrelated in different and various ways. The processeswe are analyzing seem ‘obscure’ and indeed are such, butonly because up to now we do not have suitable scientificknowledge to understand and to explain these kind ofextra-cognitive inferences. The observations presented and the second and third

conditions can allow us to introduce the other two toolsto know other minds: resonance and telenoesis which are toolseven more ‘obscure’ of the extra-cognitive inferences.The resonance by some researchers, as R.Sheldrake,

concerns those conditions in which different subjectsaffect each other and so their minds operate unisonallyor even as a unique entity. In mental terms, the reso-nance is that condition in which two minds (or more thantwo) influence (or they have influenced) each other insuch a way as to activate analogous mental states orformulate analogous mental configurations particularly inspecific conditions or with regard to certain stimuli. Inthis condition, the reading of other minds is grounded onsuch resonance which is related to the notion ofsemiotic/nomiotic sharing that has been previouslyanalyzed. The difficulty of the notion of mentalresonance lies on the fact that it can be claimed that itis founded on a direct reading of other minds in theinstant in which other minds formulate mental states andcontents and at the same time this direct reading doesnot involve the expressions of other minds; that is, amind could be able to read another with processes thatenter directly into it. This way of considering resonance is not acceptable at

least because we do not have results and tools whichallow us to support it. Nevertheless, if we do not accept

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this way of considering resonance at the same time we donot claim that there may be a direct knowledge of otherminds (in the instant in which are present states andcontents of other minds) then we can accept the resonanceconsidering it as concerning the sharing of states,processes and contents and of modalities of operating ofthe minds involved in the phenomenon of resonance.Indeed, this is a condition commonly spread within thosewe can call plurimental groups; a plurimental group is a group ofminds that share analogous or similar mental states,contents and operational modalities and so they areinvolved in mental resonance processes; plurimentalgroups are the result of inter-mental relationships.These groups could be small as a man/woman couple, two ormore friends or large and very large ones such as socialgroups or even social cultures in which there are verycomplex and dynamic inter-mental relationships. Thus thenotion of mental resonance is acceptable and legitimatedbut it is not the result of ‘extra psychical’ phenomena,but of the sharing mental processes, aware or not, thatlead the minds belonging to a plurimental group to besyntonized by resonance and so they reciprocally can readthemselves.These observations allow us to claim not only the

presence but the relevancy of the mental resonance: themental resonance is that condition in which two minds influence or they havereciprocally influenced so that it can be triggered analogous or similarmental states and formulated analogous mental configurations particularlyin specific conditions or concerning some stimuli. The mental resonance is a useful tool for reading other

minds; this reading can be facilitated by resonance thatallows to grasp and to know, by intuition orinterpretation, states and contents of other minds.Very often in the ordinary language we refer to this

phenomenon with expression such as ‘to be in tuning’ orin ‘mental tuning’ with some subject and on the ground ofwhat has been previously claimed (plurimental group) this

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means that there is a strong mental sharing that allowsor facilitates the reciprocal readings amongst differentminds.From the notion of mental resonance we can switch to

analyze the telenoesis that does not have anything to dowith telepathy although Sheldrake claims that resonanceis strictly related to telepathy. If resonance is consid-ered as mental sharing and is not confused with theparapsychological notion of telepathy (a direct readingof other minds through extra-psychical processes), thenwe can analyze the transmission of thought from one mindto another. We prefer to use the word telenoesis or tele-cognition in order to avoid that this relevant processcould be discredited for is considered as part oftelepathy as an extra-sensorial process or even aparanormal one. Within inter-mental relationships and, particularly,

within the inter-mental dialogue there are processes oftelenoesis which is a particular modality of readingother minds; that is, a reading of other minds withoutreceiving any of their expressions. The processes oftelenoesis, as the other ones that we have previouslyoutlined, are the result of almost simultaneouselaborations of a large number of information preservedin neural nets. Telenoesis, considered as a tool ofreading other minds, indeed is reducible to the usualmental processes in which many information are correlatedone to the other and are subject to various elaborationsbefore forming a specific mental content that in thiscase results in a cognitive hypothesis of other minds. A mind M1 can hold to know at a certain degree the mind

M2 by telenoesis and this means that M1 elaborates allthe information that it possesses on M2; at the sametime, it activates other mental operations, for examplegeneralizations, and applies them to the mind M2 in orderto obtain cognitive results on M2, although M2 is notphysically accessible or reachable. Telenoesis is a

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useful reading tool of other minds and can also beconsidered as a true transmission of mental contents fromone mind to another but this process happens by thetransmission of mental expressions of M2 that M1 is ableto receive, read and interpret in a not aware modality;therefore, M1 can hold that has read M2 in a telenoeticmodality. Nevertheless, we can use the notion of telenoesis but

this notion must be referred to many of the readingprocesses that we have previously outlined. Theseprocesses, in most cases, are grounded on a polysignicreceiving information from other minds; in other words,M1 receives, awarenessly or not, from M2 signs ofdifferent kind (linguistic, bodily, etc.) and elaboratesthem correlating them in different ways and so he canformulate different cognitive hypotheses on M2.

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