Know Your "Ally"

Know Your “Ally”

Pakistan Army Journal - 2011 (summer)

Zahid Mann

5/25/2011

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Know Your “Ally”

To be an enemy of the US can be dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal.—Henry

Kissinger.

Introduction

Bin-Laden’s killing by the US navy SEALS in a startling raid in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011

proves Kissinger’s point. Pakistanis have yet not contemplated the grave consequences of this

surprised raid on a garrison city of their country. This strategic victory by the US has put

Pakistan—a partner that claims of enjoying a “strategic relationship” with the US, in an

extremely awkward and vulnerable position—both at home and internationally. This US raid,

codenamed Operation Neptune Spear, is probably the only operation in the known history of

warfare where one ally conducts an operation of this nature and magnitude on the soil of another

ally—to be humiliated and discredited—at home and abroad. By launching this operation the US

has not just attempted to kill two birds with one stone but dozens.

This act of aggression by the US SEALs from a base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and

perhaps a degree of ground support from US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) and CIA

elements operating from within Pakistan has exposed serious and multifarious failures in

Pakistan’s intelligence, defense, and political functions—least expected from a country that is

armed with nuclear weapons. Successful execution of this raid, which received a muted and

sheepish response from Pakistan has not only increased the probability of more such raids but

has given confidence to the US SF to repeat them against other such suspected targets inside

Pakistan i.e., Aiman al Zawahiri, Mullah Omar (Quetta Shura) and Haqqani (NWA). It now

seems that the American list of terrorist targets in Pakistan—which is being portrayed as

epicenter of terrorism through a joint Indian and American propaganda campaign—will be

infinite.

One deficiency, in many, among our leadership that comes to the forefront after the

Abbottabad raid is their inability to assess the true potential and design of its ally, the US, so far.

The US history of “Special Operations” is full of such adventures, which dates back to the 17th

century. The Pakistani intelligence failed to pick the strategic signaling from the US about its

intent of going ahead with such an operation. President Bush and President Obama, and their

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respective teams vociferously announced that such a mission will be undertaken if they have

actionable intelligence, even during their visits to Pakistan. Why then Pakistani leaders failed to

put their heads together to carve out suitable responses if Pakistan was ever to confront such an

eventuality in future? Had our leadership been actually aware of the US thinking, history of its

special operations, the emerging roles and capabilities of the USSOF in combating the global

terrorism, and most importantly the will of US leaders, this catastrophe might have been averted.

Purpose and Scope

The purpose of this paper is to briefly learn about the history of US “Special Operations,”

understand USSOF characteristics, composition, missions and its capabilities—particularly in the

realm of their employment in Pakistan and highlight the possible dangers that these forces may

further pose to the security of Pakistan. This will be followed by analysis and recommendations

keeping in view the love / hate nature of US-Pakistan relations and a dire need of redefining our

national policies. The paper will help target readers to understand their ally in a better way, who,

as per Mao’s famous dictum emphasize on just knowing their enemy on the Eastern borders.

The History and Characteristics of USSOF

Brief History

The USSOF formally became a separate branch in the army in 1987.1 The roots of US SF

lie in the Office of the Strategic Services (OSS), established during the World War II by William

Donovan.2 Donovan believed that the US should develop a capability to carry out sabotage,

espionage, subversion, and propaganda behind enemy lines.3 Following was the Donovan’s

complicated mission statement

The coordination and use of all means, including moral and physical, by which

the end is attained—other than those of recognized military operations, but

including the psychological exploitation of the result of the organized military

actions—which tend to destroy the will of the enemy to achieve victory and to

damage his political or economic capacity to do so; which tend to deprive the

1 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces. (New York: Columbia

University Press, 2007). P.69. 2 Susan S. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces, (Washington D.C;

Brookings Institution Press, 1997). P.9. 3 Ibid.

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enemy of the support, assistance or sympathy of his allies or associates or

neutrals, or prevent to his acquisition of such support, assistance, or sympathy; or

which tend to create, maintain, or increase the will to victory of our own people

and allies and to acquire, maintain, or to increase the support, assistance and

sympathy of neutrals.4

The OSS employed the SF during the World War II mainly in European theatre in the

German controlled territories of France and Italy. Small SF teams, known as Jedburghs,

comprising French, British, Americans, Dutch, and Belgians were air dropped behind the enemy

lines to organize and coordinate resistance against the Germans.5 Against the Japanese controlled

territories in South East Asia, the US and Britain infiltrated SF to assist the Chindit raiders in

Northern Burma in 1943 to open a supply line to China.6 During the Korean War of 1950 the US

established Combined Command, Reconnaissance Activities, Korea (CCRAK) in a secret

location (Leopard Base) on the Island of Paengnyong-do, more than 125 miles behind the North

Korean lines to support a partisan movement along the West coast of North Korea.7

In 1960—at the beginning of hype in Vietnam War—the Kennedy administration asked

the military to consider Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare to be as important as

Conventional Warfare. The special operations assigned to Military Assistance Command

Vietnam-Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG) included infiltration in North Vietnam

for collecting intelligence, sabotage, limit the movement on the Ho Chi Minh trail into South

Vietnam, and to deceive the North Vietnamese into thinking that there was resistance movement

operating in the North.8 Despite all the resources and efforts these covert operations were no

more successful than the US overt operations in Vietnam.

Three US Special Operations, which reflects the US militaristic and adventurous mind

needs to be mentioned here. These operations were launched independently and not during a

conventional or a declared war:

4 Marquis, Unconventional Warfare. P.9.

5 Ibid. P.10.

6 Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces. P.75.

7 Col Ben S. Malcom and Ron Martz, White Tigers: My Secret War In Korea, (Washington D.C; Brassey’s Inc.,

2003). Pp, 2-20. 8 Ibid, P.93.

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a. Bay of Pigs Invasion.9 In 1961, the CIA plotted to remove Cuban President, Fidel

Castro. The CIA had armed and supported the Cuban exile groups in the US who

launched the Bay of Pigs invasion (Operation Trident) in April 1961. The Cuban

forces defeated the invasion within three days.

b. Raid on Koh Tang Island. 10

On May 12, 1975, just after two years of the US

defeat in Vietnam; the US SF was again operating in Southeast Asia. This time it

was to rescue a crew of US freighter, Mayaguez, which was hijacked by Khmer

Rouge, 25 miles off the coast of Cambodia. The hostages were taken to the island

of Koh Tang. Despite freeing of the hostages by Khmer Rouge before the dead

line, the information of which was deliberately not passed to the SF, the raid was

launched on May 15. Eighteen SF men were killed, forty nine wounded, and three

CH-53 helicopters were shot down by Khmer Rouge.

c. Operation Eagle Claw.11

This operation was an attempt by Delta force to rescue

63 US diplomats and embassy staff after 444 days in Tehran’s custody in 1980.

The operation was a fiasco as it had to be aborted at “Desert One,” the RV from

where the Delta force was to switch over from the C-130s to eight helicopters and

head towards the hostage compound in Tehran. However, the helicopters, which

flew from USS Nimitz aircraft career, came across a haboob (sand storm of very

fine sand) due to which one of them collided with a parked C-130 while landing,

resulting into the death of eight US servicemen.

The September 11, 2001 attacks in the US brought greater prominence to the SOF than

they enjoyed since the 1960s. Because a conventional attack against the Taliban and al-Qaida in

Afghanistan would have taken too long, the Bush administration turned to CIA and USSOF. CIA

facilitated contact between the SOF and the Northern Alliance (NA) to mount an aerial campaign

in support of the NA ground offensive against the Taliban. Roughly 500 SF personnel

participated in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which created the desired strategic

9 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy, (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1993). PP.19-50. 10

Ibid. PP. 94-114. 11

Ibid. PP. 136-151.

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effects during the initial operations in Afghanistan—removal of the Taliban regime.12

Operation

“Neptune Spear,” that killed Bin-Laden in Abbottabad is one such Special Operation that

succeeded in its mission. The credit goes to the USSOF leadership, which learnt its lessons from

their past blunders, and executed this highly risky and sensitive operation with perfection in the

heartland of Pakistan—a so called ally and strategic partner, until May 2, 2011. Of course

without the consistent policy and strategy blunders on the Pakistani side—from the time US

forces landed in Afghanistan and then secured basis in Pakistan—this could have never

materialized.

Characteristics

As per the Pentagon Policy all SOF missions are directed in “hostile, denied, and

politically sensitive areas.”13

Because SOF operates in unique environments, these have

following five special requirements:14

a. Must possess political sophistication as these are conducted in politically sensitive

context by employing clandestine, covert, or low-visibility techniques in

coordination with “like minded native political elements.”

b. Must have uncommon will to succeed.

c. Must use unorthodox techniques to achieve surprise and deceive its enemies.

d. Unorthodox approaches require unconventional equipment, resources, and

training. Night-vision devices and deep-precision strike capabilities are no longer

considered as “unconventional.” SOF has taken a quantum leap in this regard and

has developed capabilities that almost guarantee achieve surprise.

e. SOF has special intelligence requirements, which exploits the vulnerabilities of

the enemy. Two broad sets of unique characteristics are:

Special operations forces have a dual heritage. They are one the nation’s

key penetration and strike forces, able to respond to specialized

contingencies across the conflict spectrum with stealth, speed, and

12

Anotnio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2008), P.189. 13

Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces. P.147. 14

Ibid.148-49.

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precision. They are also warrior-diplomats capable of influencing,

advising, training, and conducting operations with foreign forces,

officials, and populations.15

Composition of USSOF

The SOF includes a variety of forces from all services under a unified command,

USSOCOM as under:

a. Army. There are about 30,000 active and reserve soldiers in the US Army

Special Operations Command (USASOC) as under: 16

(1) Special Forces (SF). They are known as Green Berets. These forces are

organized in five geographically oriented SF Groups (SFGs)—the 1st, 3

rd,

5th

, 7th

, and 10th

, while two others i.e. 19th

and 20th

are in the US National

Guards. These SFGs are brigade size forces with a headquarters, three

battalions and an intelligence unit. Companies in these battalions are

known as Operational Detachment Bravos (ODBs) having six Operational

Detachments Alphas (ODAs). These “A Teams” are of 12 personnel each

having a Captain as its team leader. Each team member is “cross-trained”

in at least two specialties other than his primary one. They receive

language and cultural orientation before deployment.

(2) Rangers. This is again a brigade group (3 x battalion) known as 75th

Infantry Regiment (Ranger). These are elite, airborne (parachute) light

infantry battalions.

(3) Special Operation Aviation (SOA). The principle unit is 160th

SOA

Regiment (SOAR) having different Helicopters squadrons all around.

Principle aircrafts are the MH-6, AH-6J, MH-60K, and MH-47E.

(4) Special Support Units. These include 528th

battalion for services and

112th

signal battalion for communications.

15

Tucker and Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces. P.149. 16

Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, (London: Frank CASS Publishers, 2001). PP. p.3-7

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(5) Psychological Operations (Psyops). The 4th

Psyops Group, having five

battalions, totaling about 1,300 personnel is responsible for these

operations in support of the SOF. These units assess the information

environment, develop, produce, and disseminate media products,

including leaflets, posters, newspapers, radio and TV broadcasts and other

items.

(7) Civil Affairs (CA). CA units possess requisite knowledge about

governmental functions including administration, public health, education,

agriculture and other forms of assistance. They advise the host nation

(e.g., Pakistan) in these functions and, if required, can assume limited

control of the government functions once the host government loses

control.

b. Navy.17

About 5,500 active and reserve sailors form part of Naval Special

Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), which has two groups, Group One

in California and Group Two in Virginia. The Atlantic and Pacific fleets operate

eight nuclear submarines capable of clandestine insertion and extraction of SOF.

The most popular element in the command is Sea—Air—Land Teams (SEALs),

which are six in number. Every team comprises 230 personnel having 8 platoons

of 16 men each. All SEALs are highly qualified with light weapons and

explosives, and as swimmers, divers and parachutists. They are specialists in

interdiction, reconnaissance and raiding. SEALs are the most physically fit

soldiers in the US.

c. Air force.18

About 10,000 airmen and 130 aircraft form part of Air Force

Special Operations Command (AFSOC). 160th

Special Operations Wing (SOW)

with a Special Tactics Group is located in Florida. This includes 9 active duty

fixed-wing and 5 rotary-wing SO squadrons. This fleet includes C-130 turboprop

transport, UH-60 helicopters, H-53 long-range helicopters. C-130 variants include

attack, penetration, air-to-air refueling and Psyops versions.

17

Adams, US Special Operations Forces. PP. 5-6. 18

Ibid. P.6.

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d. Special Mission Units (SMUs).19

In addition to the USSOCOM, another

multi-service headquarters, the Joint SO Command (JSOC) at Fort Bragg, has

been created to oversee the super-secret missions of the Army’s Delta force

commandos, the Navy’s SEAL team six and their supporting elements. These

units can “accomplish surgical strikes against sensitive targets” for hostage

rescue, capture of enemy leaders or recovery of classified material. The

Abbottabad raid was definitely a SMU mission.

Relative Superiority

This concept is crucial in theory of the USSOF. Relative Superiority is “a condition that

exists when an attacking force, generally small, gains a decisive advantage over a large or well-

defended enemy.20

This has three basic properties.21

a. Relative Superiority is achieved at the pivotal moment in an engagement. The

undetected entry into Pakistani airspace and then approach by the US navy

SEALs in stealth helicopters to Bin-Laden’s compound in Abbottabad is that

pivotal moment in this raid.

b. Once Relative Superiority is achieved, it must be sustained in order to guarantee

victory. The inability of Pakistani security apparatus (ground as well as air)—

because of secrecy, fog of war, deception, and surprise—to effectively intercept

the raiders led them complete their mission within forty minutes.

c. If the Relative Superiority is lost it is difficult to regain. The crash of one of the

stealth helicopters during the raid on Bin-Laden’s compound could have lost the

Relative Superiority achieved; however, the raiders had come prepared for all

possible contingencies and even with this loss at a critical stage still managed to

maintain that Relative Superiority.

19

Adams, US Special Operations Forces. P.7. 20

William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Theory and Practice, (New York: Presidio Press, 1996). P.4. 21

Ibid. PP. 4-6.

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Missions

While going through the missions of SOF it is important to relate these to their presence

in Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly after the May 2 raid.

a. Direct22

(1) Combating Terrorism (CT): Offensive measures to prevent, deter, or

respond to terrorism.

(2) Counterprolferation (CP): Actions taken to locate, seize, destroy, capture

or recover WMDs. The primary irritant that severed Pakistan’s relations

with the US in the 1990s—after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan—

was Pakistan’s unflinching pursuit of its nuclear program. In the aftermath

of the 9/11 attacks, President Musharraf expressed his fears on this count

in the following way:

The security of our strategic assets would have been jeopardized. It

is no secret that the U.S. has never been comfortable with Pakistan

acquiring nuclear weapons, and America undoubtedly would have

taken the opportunity to destroy such weapons. And India,

needless to say, would have loved to assist the U.S. to the hilt.23

(3) Direct Action (DA): Rapid, small-scale strikes and raids to seize or destroy

enemy personnel or material (Operation Neptune Spear).

(4) Strategic Reconnaissance (SR): Reconnaissance of especially difficult

objectives, often in denied areas (Abbottabad).

(5) Information Operations (IO): Actions taken to achieve Information

superiority by affecting adversary’s information system while protecting

22

McRaven, Spec Ops. PP. 14-16

23Pervez Musharraf, In the Line Of Fire: A Memoir, (New York: Free Press, 2006). P.202. For more reports on U.S.

plans about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons read Christina Lamb’s, “Elite U.S. Troops Ready to Combat Pakistani

Nuclear Hijack,” Times, January 17, 2010 , and Seymour M. Hesrh’s, “Defending the Arsenal: In an unstable

Pakistan, Can Nuclear Warheads be Kept Safe,” The New Yorker, November 16, 2009. After the May 2 raid,

Pakistani intelligence agencies needs to worry as to how many of Pakistan’s Nuclear sites—irrespective of the fact

that these are real or dummy—might have been plotted on the American map.

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own information and systems involved. Failure of Pakistani intelligence

agencies to detect CIA’s and SOF’s surveillance activities in Abbottabad

for planning purposes prior to the raid is a classic example of this IO.

Some of the raiders are reported to have even reconnoitered (SR) the

target before the operation.

b. Indirect24

(1) Unconventional Warfare (UW): Support to long-duration military or

paramilitary operations by indigenous or surrogate forces. This includes

guerilla warfare and other forms of low-visibility military activity.

USSOF is definitely engaged in UW within Pakistan’s borders not only in

the FATA but settled areas (note Raymond Davis case). Employment of

Drones in the FATA is one such mission with CIA’s help.

(2) Psychological Operations (Psyops): Operations to pass information to

foreign audiences to induce or reinforce attitudes favorable to achieve the

overall objectives. Access of VOA in Pakistan and numerous Pashto FM

channels functioning in the FATA are just two examples of the tools to

achieve this. Americans are masters in denial and deception. Separate

paper is required on this subject, but anyone who wants to glean through

US potential needs to read a book titled “The Man Who Never Was” by

Even Montagu.25

(3) Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Assistance to foreign government

threatened by lawlessness, subversion or insurgency. Presence of over 100

confirmed SOF personnel in Pakistan as trainers / advisors (SSG and FC

KPK) and other mystic missions is under this program.

24

McRaven, Spec Ops. PP. 14-16.

25 Montagu explains the Operation “Mince Meat,” which went underway for the Allied invasion of Sicily in June

1943, which was aimed at letting the German High Command believe that Allied attack is being planned against

Sardinia and Greece, and not Sicily. Mince Meat called for a dead body dressed in Royal Marine officer—carrying a

detailed plan of the impending Allied invasion—presumably killed in an airplane crash, to wash ashore near the

town of a known Nazi agent in Spain.

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(4) Civil Affairs (CA): Activities concerning the relations between military

forces and civil authorities and civilian populations to facilitate military

operations.

Analysis and Recommendations

Having discovered and then killed the most wanted terrorist—after consistent and forceful

denials of his presence by Pakistani leaders since 2002—grants the US and its allies a leverage

and reason to whip Pakistan for its alleged relations with the terrorists’ outfits. Pakistani

leadership has greater responsibility now to restore morale of its people and armed forces, and

redefine its national security policy—if there is one—to avert such like adventures by a foreign

force on its soil in future. At the same time serious thinking has to go in to rid our soil of the

extremists and terrorists—not that the US wants us to do that but as a matter of urgent necessity

for survival of this nation. Following is a brief analysis with a few broader recommendations:

National Security Policy

The May 2 raid has struck at the heart of Pakistan’s Centre of Gravity (COG) i.e.,

Pakistani armed forces, especially the army. A time has come to formulate a transparent and

comprehensive national security policy, which is not based on fear but the one best protects

Pakistan’s national interests and not those of others at Pakistan’s cost. Pakistan is in a nut-

cracker situation with India breathing over its neck from the East and world’s mightiest forces

i.e., the US and its coalition (NATO) are posturing to conduct hot pursuit and sting operations

from the West in the FATA, or even in the settled areas after the May 2 fiasco. Strengthening of

regional alliances, from now onwards, must take preference over relying on overseas alliances.

Pakistan must join the Chinese camp openly and strengthen its ties with Iran and Turkey, and

mend its relations with Afghanistan, CARs, and Russia. Beijing’s warning that “an attack on

Pakistan is attack on China”26

must be sincerely built upon by Pakistan.

Under the existing environment, the scarlet thread of Pakistan’s policy should be to lower

tensions with India—a pawn of the US that Pakistan thinks can act on a US nod, if Pakistan does

not tow the US dictates. Meanwhile, Pakistan must be prepared for a two front confrontation and

26

“The China Link,” The News, May 20, 2011.

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prepare military plans and contingencies accordingly. This is a catalyst situation for Pakistan’s

leaders who should know that the nation will stand behind them in case they stood ground on

principles and protecting Pakistan’s national honour. At home, we need to be seen fighting this

war for our own survival and not for America, or as its puppet—a perception that needs to be

unanimously addressed by taking visible and convincing measures to accrue genuine public

support. Denouncing US aid could be first such measure, which is in fact the mother of all of

Pakistan’s miseries. The others include halting the drone strikes, minimizing the strength of SOF

and other private security personnel (Black Water), and closing all US bases in Pakistan—just

like Uzbekistan, which closed the Karshi-Khanabad (K2) U.S. military base in 2005.27

Aggressive Diplomacy

As of now Pakistan’s stand has been apologetic and passive. Our diplomats need to

explain the world what sacrifices this nation and its army has offered in CT. Without Pakistan’s

active support the US could have never succeeded in containing al-Qaida and killing its leader.

Pakistan’s open ended access to the USSOF and CIA—that helped CIA create its own human

intelligence network in Pakistan—prove Pakistan’s intentions on one hand and naivety on the

other on this count. American criticism and mistrust—despite having over 30,000 Pakistanis

dead and suffering over $80 billion economic loses—only strengthens Pakistanis’ lack of trust in

the US.28

Like the American diplomats and leaders, who openly accuse the ISI and Army for

having links with al-Qaida and Taliban—even when they are in Pakistan—our leaders also needs

to remind them that the TTP, BLA, and Jundullah (a terrorist organization in Baluchistan that is

responsible for attacks in Iran and Pakistan) have their support base in Afghanistan. The

leadership of these terrorist organizations is being protected and supported by the Afghan regime

and India. Those who blame Pakistan with a double game should be told to have a look at their

own policies too.

27

Stephen Blank, “U.S. interests in Central Asia and Their Challenges,” Demokratizatsiya, Washington: Summer

2007. Vol 15, Issue 3, 314.

http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.nps.edu/pqdweb?did=1508966691&sid=3&Fmt=3&clientId=1

1969&RQT=309&VName=PQD. 28

For more on US-Pakistan relations and the regional environment read two papers by the author: “The Nature of

Insurgency in Afghanistan,” and “Challenges to Pakistan: US AfPak Strategy” being published in Pakistan Defence

Reviews 2010 and 2011, respectively.

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IO

Pakistan must wake up to the propaganda against its Armed forces and intelligence

agencies by the US—which it calls (IO) as propaganda has negative meaning. Pakistan must

make use of its media to further expose the US designs in this region under the garb of GWOT

on home front and abroad. JS HQ, GHQ, MOD, and MOI must formulate a national strategy for

an effective IO campaign that helps achieve own goals and counter the IO by Pakistan’s

adversaries.

Military and Intelligence Measures

a. Have dedicated sections of qualified officers in the JS HQ, MO, MI and ISI

directorates that study, advise, and plan contingencies to counter any US or

NATO Special Operations missions from the Western or Southern borders in

future. Officers (including PAF and PN) who have attended various courses in the

US and other Western countries must be made use of to establish these cells.

b. Study a feasibility of having a joint SSG task force under a unified headquarters

for Special Operations within our borders and beyond. Their missions, depending

upon the resources dedicated, may include CT, UW, DA and Psyops.

c. Immediate steps must be taken to improve the quality of officers in the

intelligence agencies. A time has come to have qualified, experienced and

specialist officers posted to these organizations for which promotion criteria

should be different from the one we have for officers in other streams.

d. Intelligence agencies must raise their guard against all the foreigners working in

Pakistan in any capacity, especially from the US. Our intelligence agencies must

improve their deception detection capabilities while having sound denial

measures and plans against all foreign intelligence agencies.

Political and Economic Measures

The fundamental necessity to achieve any meaningful progress on the earlier suggestions

is to have political stability and sound economic base. Presently Pakistan is in a quandary on

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both these counts. Serious and immediate steps, how unorthodox these may be, are required to

sincerely address these two most important facets of Pakistan’s national security by Pakistan’s

military and political elite.

Contain Religious Extremism

The government must regulate the Madarassah culture through legislation—the main

source of breeding extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. Either these should be nationalized or

dismantled. Similarly there should be legislation on construction, administration and financing of

mosques in the country, a practice in vogue in all the Islamic courtiers less Pakistan, India and

Bangladesh. Religion is too serious a matter to be left to un-educated and disoriented people

because of whom Pakistan is being considered to be declared as “country of particular concern

(CPC),” under the International Religious Freedom Act.29

Imparting education to every citizen of

Pakistan should become the most important function of the government.

Conclusion

There is anger and a sense of betrayal among patriotic Pakistanis against the US after the May 2

raid. The list of betrayals by the US begins from the events of 1965, 1971, 1990 (slamming of

sanctions after the Soviet withdrawal), and the recent Abbottabad raid. By trusting the US any

more, after all these setbacks and humiliating attitude since 1965, Pakistan will continue to bog

into a quagmire of its own creation. Pakistan can ill afford another betrayal, particularly the one

directed against its strategic weapons—which according to some is a legitimate target of

Pakistan’s enemies.

Pakistan must not trust Senator John Kerry’s statement during his visit to Pakistan after

the Abbottabad raid that, “he can write with his blood that US has no plans against Pakistan’s

nuclear assets.”30

Instead, had Kerry announced recognition of Pakistan’s nuclear status it would

have laid a sound foundation of trust among the two countries—a strategic and historic step

which every Pakistani would have appreciated. The so called “strategic” partnership will remain

transactional until Pakistan and the US are not on one page on Kashmir, Indian role in

Afghanistan and its involvement in a proxy war from Afghan soil in Pakistan, recognition of

29

“Call to designate Pakistan Country of Particular Concern,” The News, May 19, 2011. 30

Ansar Abbasi, “Cool it, Military Tells Media Persons,” The News, May 19, 2011.

16

Pakistan’s nuclear status—not just that of India, and fomenting trade agreements with Pakistan

rather than keeping it addicted to aid.

International relations and cooperation among nations has to be based on a sense of

reciprocity and not a cooperation that is just one way. It is, therefore, important for Pakistani

armed forces to take all necessary measures to study the capabilities of its “ally” and just not

remain focused on its traditional rival, India. 11 Corps will have to continue fighting the

terrorists and also get ready to thwart any danger of further violations and sting operations from

Afghanistan.

Pakistan is at cross roads of its history. Pakistan must convert this crisis into an

opportunity by applying serious and long-term corrections in its truncated and misplaced national

policies, so far. Pakistan’s present critical state proves that the past policies lacked the right

direction and were not the work of true statesmen and thinking leaders. Instead of forging unity,

the previous policies—particularly those of President Musharraf—have contributed in dividing

the nation. A bold, sincere, and honest leadership, which can steer the public opinion in the right

direction, is the biggest need of this bewildered nation. Pakistan needs to reset its course

according to the dreams and visions of its great founding fathers i.e., Quaid-e-Azam and Allam

Iqbal. These great men wanted Pakistan to become a progressive, strong, educated, and a modern

nation-state, which should have been a beacon of hope for the entire Muslim world, and not what

we have made it after all these years of Independence.

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