Kiriakou DOJ Complaint

8/3/2019 Kiriakou DOJ Complaint

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTfor the

Eastern District of VirginiaUnited States of America

v.John Kiriakou Case No. 1.12MJ33

CRIMINAL COMPLAINTI, the complainant in this case, state that the following is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

On or about the date(s) of 2008 through 2009 in the county of Arlington in theEastern District of Virginia , the defendant(s) violated:

Code Section Offense DescriptionSee Attachment A. Se e A ttachment A.

This criminal complaint is based on these facts:See Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint and Arrest Warrant.

Sf Continued on the attached sheet.

Reviewed by AUSA/SAUSA: : _ _ _Complainant's signatureLisa Owinqs, AUSA Special Agent Joseph Capitano, FBIPrinted name an d title

Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.

Date: "Judge's signature

Ci ty and state: Honorable John F. AndersonPrinted name an d title


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United States District CourtEastern District of Virginia'ALEXANDRIA DIVISIONUNITED STATES OF AMERICA. v.

JOHN KIRIAKOU

Attachment A

CASE NUM BER: 1:12MJ33I, the undersigned complainant, being duly sworn on oath, state that thefollowing is true a nd correct to the best ofmy knowledge and belief:

COUNT ONEAt times in 2008 and 2009, in the E aste rn District of Virginia, Alexand ria Division, and elsewhere, JOHN KIRIAKOU,defendant herein ,

having learned the identity of a covert agent as a result of having access toclass! ied information, intentionally disclosed information identifying suchcovert agen t to an indiv idua l not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identified such covert agent andthat the United States government was taking affirmative measures toconceal such covert agent' s intelligence relationship to th e United States, inthat defendant JOHN KIRIAKOUemailed the name of Covert Officer A toJournalist A;

in violation of T itle 50, United Sta tes Code, Section 421(b); andCOUNT TWO

At times prior to June 22, 2008, in the Eastern District of Virginia, AlexandriaDivision, aijd elsewhere, JO H N KIRIAKOU, defendant here in,lawfully having ha d access to and been entrusted w ith information relating to .the national defense, namely, the association of Officer B with the CentralIntelligence Agency's Rendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program ("RDIProgram") and w ith an operation to locate and ca pture Abu Zubaydah, whichinfom ation the defendant ha d reason to believe could be used to the injury pfthe United States and to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfullycommunicated and transmitted the same to Journalist B, a person not entitled to receive it;


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in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 793(d); andC O U N T T H R E E

At times in May an d November 2008, in the Ea ste rn D istrict of Virginia, A lexandriaDivision, and elsewhere, JOHN KIRIAKOU,defendant herein,lawfully hav ing had access to and been en trus ted w ith information re latin g tothe national defense, namely, the association of Officer B with the CentralIntelligence Agency's RDI Program, which information the defendant hadreason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States and to theadvantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicated and transmitted thesame to Journalist A, a person not entitled to receive it;

in violation of Title 18, U nit ed S tate s Code, Sections 793(d); andCOUNT FOUR

On or about July 28, 2008, in the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division,and elsewhere, JO H N K IEIAKO U, defendant herein ,in a m at ter w ithin th e jurisdiction of the executive bra nc h of the Governmentof the United States, namely, the Publications Review Board of the CentralIntelligence Agency, willfully concealed and covered up by trick and scheme amaterial fact, namely, that, in connection with a manuscript he was seekingto publish, the defendant was aware that the Central Intelligence Agencyused a particular classified technique in an operation to locate and captureAbu Zubaydah, despite representing falsely to the Publications Review Boardthat the technique was fictitious;

in violation Title 18, U nite d Sta tes Code, Section 1001(a)(1),' i


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IN THE UNITED .STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE EASTERN D ISTRICT O F VIRGINIAALEXANDRIA DIVISIONUNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- v. -JOHN KIRIAKOU,

Defendant.

CRIMINAL NO :

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT O F CRIMINAL COMPLAINT AND ARREST. WARRANTI, Joseph Capitano, being duly sworn, depose and state the following:1. I am a Special Agent w ith the Federa l Bu reau of Investigation ("FBI")

and have been employed w ith the FB I since approximately 2004. I am currentlyassigned to a squad at the Washington, DC Field Office that handles nationalsecuri ty cases. Du ring my tenu re w ith the FBI, I have handled federal crim inalinvestigations a nd the execution of num erous arr est w arrants . .

2. This affidavit is submitted in support of a criminal complaint allegingthat JOHN KIRIAKOU has committed violat ions of Tit le 18, United States ' Code,Sections 793(d) and 1001(a)(1), and Title 50, United States Code, Section 421(b).Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishingprobable cause for the accompanying complaint, I have not included each and everyfact kno wn to m e concerning this investigation.


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3. This affidavit is based on my personal knowledge; informationprovided to me by other law enforcement agents and other government personnel;and my review of documents and other materials .

B a c k g r o u n dThe Matter Under Inves t igat ion

4. On or about January 19, 2009, defense counsel for certain high valuedetainees held at the United States military detention facili ty at Guantanamo Bay,Cuba, filed a motion with th e m ilitary comm ission then responsible for adjudicatingcharges brought against the detainees, seeking permission to obtain informationth at counsel contended was necessary to further the defense of the detain ees. Insup po rt of th is motion, defense counsel filed a classified docum ent und er s eal (the"classified defense filing"), which, na m ed or otherwise- identified m ultip le per son swhom defense counsel believed to be United States government personnel involvedin classified activities relev ant to th e legal defense of the deta inee s. The classifieddefense fi l ing contained both accurate and inaccurate information relating to theidentity and affiliation of the individuals described in the document, as well as toactivities in which they participated. Certa in of the accurate information containedin the classified defense filing included the names and affiliation of covert UnitedSta tes governm ent personnel, as well as information abo ut persons whose affil iationwith the United States government was not classified but whose participation incertain activities was classified.


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5. Based on consultation with, the De partm ent of Defense an d a review ofdiscovery provided to defense counsel prior to January 19, 2009, there had been no

.au tho riz ed d isclosure to defense counsel of th e classified inform ation t h at w ascontained in the classified defense filing relating to the identities and activities ofcovert government personnel.

6. In spring 2009, 32 pag es of pho togra phs were discovered in thepossession of certain high value detainees held at the United States militarydetention facili ty at Gu antan am o Bay, Cuba. Among these pho togra phs werephotographs of certain personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") and the

. FB I and federal governm ent con tractor s. .The In itiation of the Inv estigation a nd Appointm ent of Special Attor neys71 After reviewin g the Ja nu ar y 2009 classified defense filing (and prio r to

the discovery of the photographs), the CIA filed.a crimes report on March 19, 2009,wi th the. De par tm ent of Justice. The Nationa l Security Division of the De part m entof Justice , work ing with th e FBI, commenced an. investigation.

8.. By letter dated Marc h 8, 2010, Patrick J . Fitzgerald, the Un ited Stat esAttorney for the Northern District of Il l inois , was appointed Special Attorney tosupervise the inv estigation pur sua nt to Title 28, United State s Code, Section 515,subject to the supervision of the D eputy Attorney General.

9. The Ma rch 8, 2010 letter, as supplemen ted and am ended on July 14,2010 and clarified by letter dated May 27, 2011, delegates authority to conduct an


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investigation and any related prosecutions in connection with any matter arisingout of the D epa rtm ent of Defense seizures of certain photo graphs from Gu antan am oBay de ta inees .

The C onduct of the Investigation10 . The investigation focused init ia l ly on the circumstances surro und ing

th e inclusio n in the classified defense filing of inform ation concern ing covertgovernm ent personnel, and the possession of photog raphs of governm ent pers onnelby detainee s. After indepen dently exam ining the facts and circum stancessurro und ing the fi l ing of the classified do cument in Jan ua ry 2009 and th e recoveryof the ph otograp hs in spring 2009 - a process th at included obtaining informationfrom the defense team and interviewing the defense investigator under proceduresdesigne d to avoid infringem ent of th e deta inee s' ability to consu lt w ith coun sel andthe at torney-client privilege -- the inves tigative team concluded th a t no laws werebroken by the defense team. In part icular, no law prohibited defense counsel fromfiling a classified document under seal outlining for a court classified informationthe y had learne d during the course of. the ir investigation. W ith respect to thephotographs taken or obtained by the defense team in the course of theirinvestigation and provided to detainees, the investigative team found no evidencethe defense at torneys transmitt ing the photographs were aware of, much lessdisclosed, the identi t ies of the persons depicted in part icular photographs orotherwise disclosed any classified matters associated with certain of thoseindividu als to the detainees. Rath er, the investigative team lea rned from th e


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defense investigator that defense counsel , using a technique commonly known as adouble-blind photo l ineu p, 1 provided the photographs (which included photographsof non-pertinent people not affiliated with the government) to their clients todeterm ine w hethe r they recognized. person s who may have p art ic ip ated in the ,questioning of them . No law or mili tary commission order expressly prohibiteddefense counsel from providing their c l ients with the photographic spreads inquestion under these circumstances. However, the fact th at a defense investigator

had learned the classified information, including the information necessary to takeand/or assemble these photographs, suggested that the information may have beeneither deliberately or inadvertently disclosed, without authorization, in a manner

t h a t ultim ately res ulte d in the. defense team 's possess ion of th e classifiedinformation.

11. Although the investigative team determined that members of thedefense team did hot break any laws in connection with their handling of theclassified information they possessed relat ing to government personnel, the 'question remained whether government officials illegally disclosed the classifiedinformation tha t the defense tea m possessed. Fu rthe r investigation led to thediscovery tha t a former CIA. employee, defendant JO H N KIRIAK OU , repeate dlymade unauthorized and illegal disclosures of classified information to persons,

1 Photographs in a "double-blind" photo lineup are not accompanied by anyaddit ional identifying information (such as names) so that both (1) the individualswho are shown the photographs and (2) the person(s) presenting the photographsare u naw are of the ide nti t ies of the pers ons depicted.


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including reporters, not authorized to receive classified information, includinginformation identifying a covert CIA employee and disclosing the participation ofcerta in other CIA employees in classified activit ies . The investigatio n revealed t h aton multiple occasions, one of the reporters to whom KIRIAKOU illegally disclosedclassified information in tarn disclosed that information to the defense investigator,and that such information was reflected in the classified defense filing and enabledthe defense team to take or obtain surveillance photographs of government

personnel .2

12 . In particular, and as set forth in more detail below, the investigationrevealed that :

a. KIRIA KO U disclosed to a jou rna list th e na m e of a covert CIAemployee ("Covert Officer A") and the fact that this covert employee was involved ina partic ular classified operation. The journa lis t th en provided the defenseinvestigator w ith the na me of the covert CIA employee.

b . KIRIAKOU disclosed or confirmed to three different journaliststh e then-classified inform ation t h a t anot her CIA employee ("Officer B") pa rtic ipa tedin an operation to capture and question terrorism subject Abu Zubaydah, and

2 The investigative team learned from the defense investigator that thedefense team did not photograph any persons whose association with the .government was not public unless the defense team believed that the person Wasphysically prese nt for the questioning of a high value detainee and w as not covert atthe t im e of the defense investigation . Thus, for a num ber of th e persons nam ed inthe classified defense filing whose association with the government was classified,no photographs were take n.


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provided two of those journalists with, contact information for Officer B. One of thejournalis ts to whom KIRIAKOU provided information linking Officer B to the AbuZuhaydah operation, including a personal email address for Officer B, subsequentlyprovided the defense investigator with Officer B's home telephone number, whichthe investigator used to identify and photograph Officer B.

c. KIRIAKOU lied to the CIA regarding the existence and use of aclassified technique in an unsuccessful effort to trick the CIA into allowing him to

publish information regarding the classified technique in a book.J O H N K I R I A K O U

13 . At times m ate rial to the allegations contained in thi s Com plaint:a. JO HN C. KIRIAKOU, the defendant, a Un ited States citizen,

resided in Arlington, Virginia.b . From in or about 1990 through in or about 2004, KIRIAKOU

w as employed as an intelligence officer with the CIA. D ur ing his em ploym ent wi ththe CIA, KIRIAKOU served at CIA He adq uarte rs in Langley, Virginia, and invarious classified overseas a ssignm ents.

c. In his capacity as an intelligence officer at th e CIA, KIRIAKO Ureceived security clearances enabling him to access classified information, asdefined by Executive Order 12356, as superseded by Executive Order 12958 andamended by Executive Order 13292 (the "Order"). 8

3 The Order mandates that information requiring protection for nationalsecurity reasons be classified at one of three levels: "Top Secret," "Secret," or7 '


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N o n - D i s c l o s u r e A g r e e m e n t s14. As described farther below, oh multiple occasions, KIRIAKOU

executed ag reem ents with, th e Unite d Stat es gov ernm ent no t to disclose classifiedinformation to unauthorized persons.

15.. On or abou t Jan ua ry 10, 1990, in connection with th e beginning of hisemployment, KIRIAKOU executed the following two a greem ents:

a. KIRIAK OU signed a Secrecy Ag reem ent wi th the CIA, in whichhe agreed as follows:

1. I . -i . hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of mybeing employed by, or otherwise retained to performservices for, the Central Intelligence Agency . . . theobligations contained in this agreem ent.2 . 1 unders tand th a t in the course of my em pl oy m en t . . . Imay be given access to information or material that isclassified or is in the process of a classificationdetermination . . . that, if disclosed in an unauthorizedmanner would jeopardize intell igence activit ies of theUn ited States Government. I accept th at by beinggranted access to such information or material I will beplaced in a position of special confidence and trust andbecome obligated to protect the information and/ormaterial from unauthorized disclosure.

"Confidential." The designation "Top Secret" app lies to information, th eunauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to causeexceptionally grave dam age to natio nal security. The design ation "Secret" appliesto information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expectedto cause serious dama ge to natio nal security. The designa tion "Confidential"applies to inform ation, t he u nau tho rized disclosure of wh ich could be expected tocause damage to nati on al security. Finally, th e Order provides th at access toclassified information at any level may be further restricted throughcompartmentation in "Sensitive Compartmented Information" ("SCI") categories.


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3. In consideration for being employed or otherwiseretained to provide services to the Central Intell igence-Agency, I hereby agree that I will never disclose in anyform or any matter, to any person not authorized by theCentral Intelligence Agency to receive it, any informationor m ate rial . . . th at I know is classified . . . or is in th eprocess of a classification determination.

11. I und erst and t h at . . . the disclosure of informationthat I agreed herein not to disclose can, in somecircumstances, constitute a criminal offense.

15 . I unders tan d tha t nothing in th is agreem ent l imits orotherwise affects any provision of criminal or other lawthat may be applicable to the authorized disclosure ofclassified information, including . . . section!] 793 .. . . ofTi t le 18, Uni ted S ta tes Code . . . .b . At the same time, KIRIAKOU executed a Non-Disclosure

Agreem ent in order to have access to certain SCI. KIRIAKOU agreed as follows:Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept theobligation contained in this Agreem ent in consideration of. my being granted access with in Special Access. Progra ms,hereinafter referred to in this Agreement as Sensitive Com partme nted Information (SCI). I have b een advisedthat SCI involves or derives from intelligence sources ormethods and is c lass if ied . . . . I und ers ta nd and acceptthat by being granted access to SCI, special confidence; and trust shall be placed in me by the United StatesGovernment .I hereby acknowledge that I have received a securityindoctrination concerning the nature and protection ofSCI, including the procedures to be followed inascertaining whether other persons to whom Icontemplate disclosing this information have been


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approved for access to i t , and that I understand thosep r o c e d u r e s . . . . .I have b een, advised th at u nau thorize d disclosure,una utho rized retention, or negligent hand ling of classifiedinforniat ion by me could cause irreparable injury to theUnited States or could be used to advantage by a foreignnation . I hereby agree th at I wil l never divulge anyth ing .marked as SCI or that I know to be SCI to anyone who isnot authorized to receive i t without prior writ tenautho rization from the. Un ited Sta tes Gov ernment. Dep ar tme nt or agency . . . t ha t las t au thorized my accessto SCI. I und erstan d th at i t is my responsibil ity toconsult with, appropriate m ana gem ent authori t ies in [theagency] that last authorized my access to SCI, whether ornot I am still employed by or associated with [the agency]

In addit ion, I have been advised and am aware that anyunauthorized disclosure of SCI by me may consti tute aviolat ion or violat ions of United States criminal laws,including th e provisions of . . . . SectionQ 7 93 . . . [ofj T itle18, United States Code.16 . Subsequently,KIRIAKOUsigned not fewer than Beven addit ionalNon-

Disclosure Agreements in order to access addit ional SCI, including thecompartments covering certain classified information described in this Complaint .In each of thes e agree men ts,KIRIAKOUagreed never to disclose SCI to anyone notauthorized to receive i t without prior writ ten authorization from the United Statesgovernment.

U n a u t h o r i z e d D i s c l o s u r e s R e l a t i n g t o C o v e r t O ff ic er A17. Covert Officer A is currently a covert CIA employee whose relationship

to th e CIA h as bee n classified for more th a n two decades. As set forth below, bas edon emails recovered from search warrants served on two email accounts associated


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with. KIRIAKOU, EIRIAKOU disclosed Covert Officer A's identity and certainclassified information concerning his intelligence activities to Journalist A.Journal is t A was not a person authorized hy the Uni ted S ta tes government toreceive classified information.

18. On Ju ly 11, 2008, KIRIAKOU exchanged a series of em ailcommunicat ions with Jo urnal is t A.4 Journalis t A emailed KIRIAKOU to ask, "Canyou remember the name(s) of any of the [specific CIA office] branch chiefs?"KIRIAKOU replied, "Sorry, [first na m e of Jo ur na list A ]. I never m et a ny of thoseguys. And we never, ever dealt with them in [overseas city]." Journal is t Aresponded twice to th e same email . First , Journ alis t A replied, "Presumably, [firs tname of Covert Officer A]." KIRIAKOU then confirmed that "[h]e had been mybranch chief in [specific office,] [b]ut he's the only one I ever came into contactwith." Second, Jou rn alis t A asked, "Presu ma bly [first nam e of Covert Officer A]worked in that group though, right?" KIRIAKOU replied separately to this email ,statin g, "I assu m e he did. And actually, I'm no t sure he w as the chief of it. He w asthe team leader on [specific operation], though."

19. In th e afternoon of Augu st 18, 2008, Jou rnalis t A emailed KIRIAKOU,asking him to "pick out.[first name of Covert Officer A]'s last name" from a list ofnam es th at Jou rnal is t A provided in the emai l . In the same email , Journ al is t A

4 Emails quoted below are verbatim insofar as possible and preserve theoriginal langua ge an d style, including errors . Redactions are noted in brackets anddescribed based on context and the affiant's training, experience, and knowledge ofthe investigation a s a whole. The quotations are excerpts only and do notnecessarily include the en tire email or entire em ail chain.11


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stated, "I 'm not sure l ie 's s t i l l in [particular country], but maybe's he 's on this l is tI've, pulled." The following mornin g, at 9:23 am, KIRIAKOU w rote back, statin g,"[first and last name of Covert Officer A]. It came to me last night.". The last nameof Covert Officer A had not been on the list provided by Journalist A.

20. At 11:31 a.m. on August 19, 2008, approximately two hours afterKIRIAKOU disclosed Covert Officer A's last name to Journalist A, Journalist A sentan em ail to th e defense investig ator referenced above th at con tained Covert Officer .A's full na m e in th e subject line. The email furth er state d: "His na m e is [first a ndlast name of Covert Officer A]." At 1:35 p.m., Journalist A sent a final email to thedefense investigator in which he stated: "my guy came through with his memory."Neither Journalis t A nor any other journalis t to my knowledge has published thename of Covert Officer A.

21. At the time of the unauthorized disclosure, the identification of CovertOfficer A a s "the team lead er on [specific operation]" w as classified a t th e TopSecret/SCI level because it revealed both Covert Officer A's identity and hisassociation with the CIA's Eendition, Detention, and Interrogation Program (the"RDI Program"), relating to the capture, detention; and questioning of terrorismsubjects . This information h ad been closely held by the U nited Sta tes governmen t.

22. Before Journalis t A provided the defense investigator with CovertOfficer A's name, the defense investigator had been attempting to identify CovertOfficer A for some time bu t ha d been un able to do so. It wa s only after receiving


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Covert Officer A 's nam e from Jo urn alist A th at th e defense investigator w as able toidentify Covert Officer A.

23 . Both Covert Officer A's name and association with the RDI Programw ere included in the Jan ua ry 2009 classified defense filing. The defenseinvestigator has advised the government that he understood from the circumstancesth at Covert Officer A was a covert employee and, accordingly, did no t ta ke hisphoto graph. No photograph of Covert Officer A was recovered at G uan tanam o.

24. On April 8 , 2009, KIRIAKOU again exchanged email communicationsw ith Jo ur na lis t A concerning Covert Officer A. Specifically, a t 2:14 p.m ., Jo urn alis tA ema iled KIRIA KO U an d asked , "Ever know a [nam e] in [specific CIA office]?" At3:09 p.m., KIRIAKOU responded to Journalist A and stated, "Sorry, [first name ofJo u rn al is t A ]. I didn 't know th e [specific office] people by na m e except for [firstname of Covert Officer A]." At the time of this additional disclosure, the associationof Covert Officer A with the specific office remained classified at the Top Secret/SCIlev el beca use, as described above, it reveale d both C overt Officer A 's ide ntity andhis associat ion with the RDI Program.

U n a u t h o r i z e d D i s c l o s u r e s R e l a t i n g t o O f fi ce r B25. At t imes mater ial to this Com plaint:

a. Officer B w as employed at the CIA as an ana lys t assig ned to itsCounterTerror ism Center.

b . In or about Ma rch 20 02, Officer B worke d ove rseas w ithKIRIAKOU on an operation to locate and capture Abu Zubaydah, a terrorism

13


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subject then so ught by the U nited State s government (the. "Abu Z ubaydahoperation"). The partici pati on of Officer B in th e operation wa s classified.

26. According to a CIA classification review officer, both Officer B'sassociat ion with the RDI program, and the Abu Zubaydah operation in part icular,we re classified un ti l tha t information recently waB declassified in order to allow thisprosecution to go forward.

27. As described in further detail below, based on information I haveobtained from other individuals involved in this investigation, I have learned thatKIRIAKOU disclosed classified information regarding Officer B, a former employeeof the CIA w ith whom KIRIAK OU h ad worked at the CIA, to individuals who w erenot authorized by the United States government to receive the classifiedinform ation. Specifically, and as more fully described below, ba sed on em ailsrecovered from search warrants served on two email accounts associated withKIRIAKOU , I have learn ed th at K IRIAKOU disclosed or confirmed to at lea st th reejour nalis ts c lassified information regardin g Officer B . In two instan ces, thesedisclosures took the form of confirming for journalists that a specific individual withOfficer B's name w as the in dividual who part ic ipated in certain clandestine activity,nam ely the Abu Z ubaydah operation, including by providing contact information forthat individual; in the third instance, KIRIAKOU appears to have described to ajournalist Officer B's classified role in the Abu Zubaydah operation.


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Disclosures About Officer B to Journalist B28. On Ju ne 22, 2008, The New York Times publish ed an article by one of

its own reporters ("Journalist B") entitled "Inside the Interrogation of a 9/11Mastermind" (the "Article"), which publicly named and identified Officer B and.

rep ort ed abo ut Officer B's alleged role in the c aptu re a nd q uestio ning of AbuZubay dah. The fact tha t Officer B participated in the capture and q uestioning ofAb u Zub ayda h wa s th en classified. The Article sta ted th at "colleagues" haddescribed Officer B's role, that Officer B had declined to be interviewed, and thatth e CIA Director an d an atto rne y for Officer B had re que sted t h a t Officer B not benam ed. The article attrib ute d other information to KIRIAKOU as a source, bu t didnot identify the source(s) who disclosed or confirmed Officer B's identity.

29. As discussed furthe r below, the re' is probab le cause th at , at va rioustimes prior to June 22, 2008, KIRIAKOU provided Journalis t B with personalinformation reg arding Officer B knowing tha t Jour nal is t B wa s seeking to identify .and locate Officer B in light of Officer B's role in the A bu Zu bay dah operation. Indoing so, KIRIAKOU confirmed that Officer B was involved in the Abu Zubaydahope ration and therefore disclosed classified information. Jo ur na lis t B was not aperson authorized by the United States government to receive classifiedinformation.

30. For example, prior to the publication of the Article, KIRIAKOUemailed Officer B's phone nu m ber a nd email address to Journ alis t B. In an em aildated A pril 21, 2008, Jou rna lis t B informed KIRIAKOU th at he "[d]rove around Va

! 16


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yes terd ay in th e rai n and stopp ed by [first nam e of Officer B]'s hou se. I couldn 'tf igure i t out -- two big dogs in the house, bu t no one aroun d and a newsp aper datedAp ril 9 in front of th e door. Also, th e cell nu m ber on his [business] card see ms n otto work. Any further suggestions on how to find him most welcome . . . . " In anemail sent later the same day, KIRIAKOU replied: "As for [first name of Officer B],I don' t know wh at to ma ke of i t . The num bers I have are [phone number] (home)and [phone num ber] (cell) . Is tha t wha t I gave you from the busin ess card? Hisem ail is [Officer B's persona l email address]. I t ' s very odd th at th e dogs werebark ing and th a t o ld paper w as o u t . . . . P lease le t me know if I can be of any fur therhelp." The contact information was accurate , and in one or more interviewsconducted by agents, Officer B recalled Journa list B at tem pting. to r each h im.

31. Based on interviews of Officer B by other agents, I have also learnedthat , prior to the publication of the Article , Journalist B at tempted to contactOfficer B in person, by phone, a nd by email , among other m ean s:

a. Jo ur na lis t B ha d visited Officer B's hom e on a Sunday,* leavingnotes under his door and in his mailbox.and parking outside his house for a lmostfour hours.

b . On or about May 8, 2008, an individual identifying himself asJournalist B called Officer B's home and spoke with his wife.

5 As noted in Journ alist B's email to KIRIAKOU, dated Ap ril 21, 2008, an d'described in para gra ph 30 above, Jou rnalis t B had visi ted Officer B's home the daybefore the ema il wa s sent . April 20, 2008 wa s a S unday .16


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c. On or abou t April 11 , 2008, and May 8, 2008, Jou rna lis t Bem ailed Officer B at his per son al em ail add ress . Officer B ha d prov ided b ispersonal email address to KIRIAKOU, but not to Journalis t B or any otherjournalis t . .

d. At various t im es prior to th e publication of the Article,Journalist B also contacted Officer B's mother, sister, and a high school friend.

32 . Subsequ ently, KIRIAKOU also confirmed for Jou rna lis t B th at anindividual with Officer B's name who was associated with particular contactinformation that Journalis t B had found on a website was located in Pakistan inMarch 2002, which were the country and the month, respectively, in which the AbuZubay dah operation took place. In an email dated May 29, 2008, Jou rna lis t Bprovided KIRIAKOU with contact information for Officer B, who was listed on thewebsite as "[first and last name of Officer B]," and also included the web link to theinformation. The information reflected th at "3/9/02" wa s when the w ebsite receivedthe information, i . e , the ."D ate Received." KIRIAKOU replied, "What an odd linkth i s is! He was DEFINITELY in Pa kis tan wh en he did this ."6 This communicationestablishes probable cause that KIRIAKOU confirmed for Journalis t B that theindividual whom Journalis t B sought to identify was the same individual who hadworked in Pa kis tan wh en the Abu Zubaydah operation took place. In doing so,

6 Although th e website reflects tha t the inform ation w as received on Ma rch 9,2002, Officer B stated th at no entry was ma de from overseas at tha t t ime: It isunknown whether the date reflects an actual entry or, for example, an automaticupd ate on the webs i te .17


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KIRIAKOU also confirmed for Journalist B that Officer B was associated with, theAbu Zub aydah op eration, thereby revealing classified information.

33. After the publica tion of the Article, KIRIAKOU sen t several em ailsdenying that he was the source for information in the Article.regarding Officer B,

. while, at the sam e time, lying about the num ber a nd na tur e of his contacts withJour nalis t B. For example, in an email dated Jun e 30, 2008, KIRIAKOU stated toOfficer B: "I ha d a conversation over the w eekend wi th the om budsm an a t the NewYork Times regarding the article about you in last week ' s . paper . . . . I to ld theom budsm an tha t I thou ght the use of your nam e in the article wa s despicable andunnecessary, an d th at I thoug ht i t could pu t you in perso nal danger. . . . I alsowa nted to let you know . . . th at I did not cooperate with the article. My onlycontact w ith the au thor wa s three days before the article wa s published. He calledme and asked if we could talk. I declined. He th en ask ed if 1 thought he shouldmen tion you by nam e. I said absolutely not. He countered with the fact th at youhave not been un der cover. I said th at ma de no difference, a nd th at while i t m ightnot be illegal to na m e you, it would certain ly be imm oral." How ever, as reflected inthe emails described above, KIRIAKOU was in contact with Journalis t B by emailon a num ber of occasions and provided Journ alis t B with information about OfficerB-


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Disclosures About Officer B to Jour na lis t A34. From at least in or about November 2007 through in or about

November 2008, KIRIAKOU provided Journalist A with Officer B's personal contactinformation and disclosed to Journalist A classified information revealing OfficerB's association with th e RDI Program .

35 . In an email dated November 12, 2007, KIRIAKOU provided Journalis tA with Officer B's perso nal email address. Subsequently, an d on at least twooccasions, KIRIAKOU provided information to Journalist A regarding Officer B'sassociation with the RDI program:

a. . First , in an ema il dated M ay 17, 2008, Jou rnali s t A askedKIRIAKOU: "In [Country X] and then in [Country Y], was [first name of Officer Bwith two letters transposed] trained to do the techniques, or was he just asking thequestions as the heavies were doing the various techniques," referring to enhancedinterroga tion techniq ues. In an ema il dated May 20, 2008,. KIRIAKOU responde dto Jo urn ali st A an d d isclosed: Officer B's classified association wi th th e RDIProg ram , notin g: "[First nam e of Officer B] w as not tra in ed in the enh anc edtechniques. He was simply there to ask th e questions tha t the analysts had posed."

b . Subsequently, in a series of emails beginning November 12,2008, Journalis t A asked KIRIAKOU about classified information regarding thelogistics of tra ve ls by par ticip ant s in th e RDI pro gram , including Officer B . Forexample, on November 12, 2008, Journalist A asked KIRIAKOU: "[D]id [first name

. of Officer B with two letters transposed] ever tell you how he actually got to19


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[Country X] an d [Coun try Z]?" In respon se, on Novem ber 17, 2008, KIRIAKO Ustate d, a m ong oth er thin gs, "Re [first nam e of Officer B], he did not [travel in acerta in way]," ther eby confirming Officer B 's partic ipation in the RD I pro gram .

36. As referenced above at pa ra gr ap h 10, the investigative t eaminterviewed an investigator assisting the defense team representing one or morehigh value detain ees being held at Gua nta nam o (the "defense investigator")! Basedon that in terview, I have learned that Journal is t A provided informat ion about

Officer B to the defense investig ator. For exam ple, in an em ail dated Ap ril 10,2008, Journalis t A provided the defense investigator with Officer B's home phonenumber . 7 Before Jo ur na list A provided Officer B 's pho ne num be r to th e defenseinvestig ator, . the defense investigator had b een un able to accurately identify OfficerB, parti cula rly in l ight of his common sur na m e. However, after receiving thisinformation, the defense investigator was able to quickly and accurately identifyOfficer B a nd pho tograp h him .

37. Four photographs of Officer B were included in the packet ofphotographs recovered a t Guantanamo.

7 Although the emails between KIRIAKOU and Journalis t A do not reflectth at KIRIAK OU provided Jou rnalis t A wi th Officer B's home telephone nu m ber, theem ail traffic betw een KIRIAKOU a nd Jou rnalis t ' A reflects th at KIRIAKO Uprovided Jo urn alis t A with other information abou t Officer B an d bis activit ies withthe. CIA. In add ition, the home telephone nu m ber for Officer B th at Jo urn alis t Aprovided to the defense investigator was the same home phone number thatKIRIAKO U provided to Jou rnalis t B, as set forth in para gra ph 30 above.


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38. Both Officer B 's nam e an d his association with the R DI Prog ram wereincluded in the January 2009 classified defense filing.

Disclosures About Officer B to Journalist C39. A t some time prior to Ma y 22, 2007, KIRIAKOU disclosed to Jou rna lis t

C classified information regarding the association of Officer B with the AbuZub ayd ah operation. It appears th at KIRIAKOU and Journ alis t C collaborated on apre l imin ary book proposal.8 This is reflected in ah email dated May 22, 2007 fromJou rna lis t C to KIRIAKOU, attach ed to which, was a book proposal t ha t .included

. information app arently provided originally by KIRIAKOU to Jou rn alis t C,reg ard ing the role of KIRIAKOU in th e captur e of Abu Zubaydah! The bookproposal also referenced Officer B by name and described purported actions that Officer B took in Pak istan with respect to the Abu Zubaydah operation. Whileaspects of the book proposal's description of Officer B's role in the operation may,have been fictionalized, the information nevertheless disclosed classifiedinformation by'specifically linking Officer B to the Abu Zubaydah operation.

40. Jou rna l is t C was not a person authorized by the U ni ted S ta tesgovernment to receive classified information.

F a l s e S t a t e m e n t t o t h e C IA 41 . As described further below, the investigation also ha s revealed th at

KIRIAKO U lied to the CIA rega rding a classified investigative techniqu e (the

8 Jou rna lis t C is not the coauthor of the book KIRIAKOU eventu ally. pub lished tha t is referenced in pa ra gra ph 42 below. .21


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"technique") in an a ttem pt to trick the CIA into allowing him to publish informationregarding the technique in a book.

42. KIRIAKOU authored a book The Reluctant Spy: Mv Secret Life in theCIA's War on Terror, by John Kiriakou with a coauthor, which Random Housepublished in approximately 2009 (the "book").9 The book purports to describeKIRIAKOU 'S w ork on behalf of th e CIA. Prior to the pub lication of the book,KIRIAKOU submitted multiple draft manuscripts of the book to the CIA'sPublication Review Board ("PRB"),10 which reviewed the draft manuscripts for-classified information.

43. . As reflected in a tra ns cr ip t of a recorded interview condu cted in orabout Aug ust 2007 to assist KIRIAKOU's coauthor in drafting t he book, KIRIAKOUdescribed to his coauthor the techniq ue, which KIRIAKOU referred to a s the "magicbox," and informed his coauthor that the CIA had used the technique in the AbuZubaydah operation.11

9 Based on our investigation, I believe KIRIAKOU's coauthor currently is afreelance book writer, whom KIRIAKO U hired to assist KIRIAKOU w ith draftingand editing the book.10 The PRB is a CIA office responsible for conducting classification review ofm ater ials th at CIA employees an d former em ployee s.prepare for puhlication or

other u se in the public domain. PRB clearance is required prior to the pub lication orother public use of such m ater ials . .111 The transcript was sent by email from the coauthor to KIRIAKOU, andwas obtained by the government as a result of the search of one of KIRIAKOU'semail accounts . 22 '


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44. Subsequently, in the Article published in The New York Times on June22, 2008, referenced above, the technique was disclosed and referred to as a "magicbox."

45. In an email dated June 30, 2008, KIRIAKOU again described thetechnique to his coauthor and stated that he thought "at the t ime [using thetechniqu e] wa s a great idea, conceptually."

46. A few days later, in a n em ail dated July 2, 2008, KIRIAKOU 'scoauthor informed KIRIAKOU, among other things, that he had "just finished6,000-plus words over two chapters on the Abu Zubaydah episode, I 'm wonderinghow m uch of this . PRE w ill let us publish." A few hours late r, KIRIAKOUresponded to his coauthor, s tating, among other things, that "I 'm guessing they' l l letus pu blis h a good chu nk of th e Ab u Zubay dah story. They objected to some of th edeta ils of the pla nnin g for the c aptu re, but wh at I propose doing is tell ing them th atwe've fictionalized m uch of it (even if we haven 't.)."

47. Approximately one month later, by letter dated July 28, 2008 (the"Letter"), KIRIAKOU submitted a draft manuscript of the book to the PRB (the"Draft Manuscript"). (The Let ter an d Draft Manu script comprise the first submission made to the PRB since the email exchange between KIRIAKOU and hiscoautho r on July 2, 2008, described in par ag rap h 46 above.) In the L etter,KIRIAKOU sought permission from the PRB to include a description of thetechn ique in the book by falsely claiming th at th e technique wa s fictional and t ha the ha d never hear d of it before. Specifically, KIRIAK OU sta ted : "There is a


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reference early in this chapter to a device called a 'magic box. ' I read about this so-called device in a New York Times article. The inform ation in th a t article w asclearly fabricated, as we used no such device. I am un aw are of an y [such] device . . .As it is fictionalized, I believe it is unclassified." The Draft M an usc rip t described.th e use of the technique in the Abu Zubay dah o peration.

48. On August 17, 2008, KIRIAKOU sent to his coauthor a copy of theLetter, along with the Draft Manuscript, by attaching them to an email and, in thetex t of the em ail , adm itted to his coauthor th at KIRIAKOU h ad lied to the PRB inan atte m pt to include classified inform ation in the book:

He re you go, [first na m e of coauth or]. I laid it on thick .And I said some things were fictionalized when in factthey weren' t . There 's no way they're going to go th ro ug h.ye ars of cable traffic to see if it 's fictionalized, so we m igh tget some thing s thro ugh . Enjoy. John .49. By letter dated October 17, 2008, the PRB informed K IRIAKOU th at i t

ha d reviewed the Draft Man uscript and th at various pag es of the Draft Man uscript,including the pages regarding the technique, contained classified information andth a t therefore KIRIAKO U could not. include the information on those pages in thebook.

50. According to a CIA classification review officer, th e informa tionregarding the technique that KIRIAKOU included in the Draft Manuscript wasclassified until recently declassified in order to allow this prosecution to go forward.


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Jan ua ry 19 . 2012 Inter v iew of KIRIAKOU51. On Jan ua ry 19, 2012, KIRIAKOU wa s interviewe d by FBI agents . The .

interview wa s recorded. Du ring the interview, wh en the agen ts informedKIRIAKOU that Covert Officer A's name was included in the classified defensefil ing, KIRIAKOU sta ted, amo ng.other th ings, "How the heck did the y get him? . . .

("

[First nam e of Covert Officer A] w as always undercover. Hi s en tire caree r wasundercover;" KIRIAKOU further s tated tha t he (KIRIAKOU) never providedCov ert Officer A's na m e or any cither infor m ation ab ou t Cov ert Officer A to an yjourn alis t an d stated, "Once they get nam es, I mea n, this is scary."


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52. Whan asked whether he considered Officer B's association with theAbu Zubaydah operation classified, KIRIAKOU stated, "Absolutely, absolutely." .KIRIAKOU also denied providing any contact information for Officer B or OfficerB's association with the Abu Zubaydah operation to Journalis ts A and B prior to thepublication of the J un e 2 2/2 00 8 New York Times article. W hen specifically askedwhether he (KIRIAKOU) had anything to do with providing Officer B's name orother information about Officer B to Journalis t B prior to the Article, KIRIAKOUstated, "H eavens no."

Joseph OapitanoSpecial Agen tFederal Bureau of Investigation

Sworn and subscribed to before me thi s 23rd day of Jan ua ry , 2012.

Kiriakou DOJ Complaint

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