-
Kimpo Provisional Regiment, andthe Korean Marine Corps
regimentalso returned to the division's con-trol.
Once it returned to the main lineof resistance, the 1st
MarineDivision again assumed operationalcontrol over VMO-6 and
HMR-161.Cloud cover at first impeded theaerial observers from
VMO-6, butthey successfully directed fourartillery fire missions on
8 Julyagainst targets behind enemy lines.On 10 July, Marine
helicoptersfrom HMR-161 delivered some1,200 pounds of rations,
water, andother cargo to Marine outposts.
Ten Days of Patrols
taken out.
Company I, reduced to fewer thantwo-dozen effectives,
regainedcontrol of the outpost. Another pla-toon from the same
companyimmediately moved forward toreinforce the survivors.
Throughout the fighting at Berlinand East Berlin, storms had
dis-rupted the movement of suppliesby sending the Imjin out of
itsbanks and destroying a bridge. Thebad weather also created mud
thathampered movement on the battle-field and brought clouds
thatreduced visibility from the cockpitsof supporting aircraft. At
aboutnoon on 8 July, however, fourMarine F9Fs took advantage
ofground-based Marine radar toattack targets a safe distance
fromEast Berlin. Led by the commander
officer of Marine Fighter Squadron311, Lieutenant Colonel
BernardMcShane, the jets dropped five tonsof bombs on bunkers and
troopconcentrations.
The recapture of East Berlinenabled the last of the
Turkishtroops to withdraw, in effect com-pleting the relief of the
25thInfantry Division. The 11thMarines, commanded after 5 Julyby
Colonel Manly L. Curry,resumed its normal mission ofdirect support
of the 1st MarineDivision, as did the 1st TankBattalion. By 13
July, the companyof amphibian tractors that had beenguarding
prisoners of war at AscomCity rejoined the battalion underthe
control of the division. TheReconnaissance Company, the
574
Regaining Outpost East Berlinon 8 July, which coincided with
theresumption of truce negotiations atPanmunjom, did not end
theChinese pressure on the Marines.After dark on the 8th,
ColonelGlenn C. Funk, who had assumedcommand of the 7th Marines on
27March, moved a platoon from theregiment's 3d Battalion and four
M-46 tanks into position to strengthenthe main line of resistance.
Thetanks had just arrived at Hill 126,an outcropping just to the
rear ofthe battle line, when the Marinesheard the sound of trucks
frombeyond Chinese lines. From thehilltop, the M-46s directed
90mmfire against known Chinese posi-tions, and the noise of truck
motorsended. Chinese troops, who mean-while had advanced from
theassembly area on Vegas, probedOutpost Berlin and struck
astronger blow against East Berlin.Fighting raged for almost
twohours before fire from mortars,artillery, and tanks forced
theenemy to break off the action atabout 0315 on the morning of
9July.
After Lieutenant Colonel Ce-reghino's Marines ended this
latest
National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A171052
Whether on the frontlines or in reserve Marines were paid
monthly in MilitaryPay Certificates, a substitute for U.S. currency
used to curb black market activi-ties. With little to spend it on,
most Marines saved their money or had allotments
-
threat to East Berlin, the Chineseremained content to jab at the
divi-sion rather than try for a knockout.Entire days might pass
duringwhich Marine aerial or groundobservers and patrols saw few,
ifany, signs of Chinese. The enemyseemed to be improving his
tun-nels and bunkers instead of ven-turing out of them to mount
anattack. The Marines still underwentsporadic shelling, but the
bom-bardments did not approach inferocity those of 8 and 9
July.
Mines for a time proved deadlierthan artillery and mortars, as
on 12July when these weapons killedfour Marines and wounded
eight.At least one minefield contained anew type of
Russian-designedweapon that could be detonatedby pressure or with a
trip wire.Most of the fields employed minesfamiliar to the Marines,
types thatmay have been newly planted orperhaps had lain dormant
underthe frozen ground and becomedeadly when the weather grew
warmer and the earth softer.Although the enemy did not
attack on the scale of 7-8 July,Chinese patrols repeatedly
clashedall along the division's front withthose sent out by the
Marines, Onthe night of 12 July, for example, a13-man patrol from
the 5thMarines encountered a force ofChinese near Outpost Esther,
and acombat patrol from the 7thMarines, looking for the enemynear
Elko, engaged in an 18-minute firefight.
As the frequency of patrolactions increased, flooding
againinterfered with the supply effort.On the night of 14-15 July,
theImjin River reached a maximumdepth of 26 feet. Only the
solidly-built Freedom Bridge, carrying theroad to Panmunjom across
theswollen stream, could be useduntil the water subsided.
On the night of 16-17 July,patrols from the 5th Marinesengaged
in two firefights, sufferingno casualties in the first, near
Outpost Hedy, while killing threeChinese and wounding one.
Theregiment's second patrol of thenight ran into an ambush near
Hill90. The Chinese proved moreaggressive than in recent days,
pin-ning down the patrol and unleash-ing a flurry of mortar and
artilleryfire that wounded every memberof a unit Sent to help break
theambush. Another group of rein-forcements succeeded, however,
inreaching the embattled patrol.After two hours of fighting
andseveral attempts to isolate and cap-ture individual Marines,
theChinese withdrew, having suffered22 killed and wounded.
Whenseven Marines failed to return tothe main line of resistance, a
pla-toon from the 5th Marinessearched the battle site and
recov-ered six bodies.
The third firefight of the nighterupted just after midnight in
thesector of the 7th Marines, when a30-man patrol from Company
A,1st Battalion, was ambushed afterit passed through a gate in
thebarbed wire northwest of OutpostAva. Between 40 and 50
Chinese,supported by mortars, opened firewith grenades and small
arms.After a 15-minute exchange of firein which as many as 18
Chinesemay have been killed or wounded,the ambush party vanished
intothe darkness. As the Marines fromCompany A returned through
thegate, a head count revealed fourmen missing. A recovery
squadcrossed and recrossed the areauntil dawn drew near but
foundonly three bodies. One Marinefrom Company A remained miss-ing;
three had been killed and 21wounded.
The actions near Outpost Elkoand in front of the Ava gate
lentcredence to Chinese propaganda.Since the 1st Marine
Divisionreturned to the main line of resis-tance, Chinese
loudspeakers had
The never tiring doctors and coipsmen treat the wounded. At the
forward aidstations patients are examined and their wounds dressed;
few are dischargedand most prepared for further evacuation.
National Archives Photo (USMc) 127-N-A173337
575
-
gone beyond the usual appeals tosurrender, on at least one
occasionwarning of the fatal consequencesof going on nighttime
patrols. Thisthreat, however, probably reflect-ed a Chinese policy
of maintainingoverall military pressure after theresumption of
truce talks ratherthan a specific effort to demoralizethe
Marines.
Whatever the purpose of theenemy's propaganda, the Marinepatrols
continued. On the nightafter the ambush of Company A,1st Battalion,
7th Marines, a com-bat patrol from the regiment'sCom-pany C
advanced as far asthe Ungok hills to silence amachine gun that had
been harass-ing the main line of resistance and,after a successful
20-minute fire-fight, left a Marine Corps recruitingposter to mark
the point of farthestadvance. Meanwhile, the KoreanMarines had four
patrol contactswith the enemy, none lasting morethan a few
minutes.
The combat outposts like theBerlins, Esther, and Ava hadbecome
increasingly vulnerable.By mid-July, General Pate directedhis staff
to study the possibility ofthe 1st Marine Division's shiftingfrom a
linear defense—the contin-uous main line of resistance andthe
network of outlying combatoutposts in front of it—to a systemof
mutually supporting defensivestrongpoints that would result
ingreater depth and density. TheChinese attacks of 7 and 8 July
onBerlin and East Berlin served as acatalyst for the study that
GeneralPate launched. As the I Corpscommander, General Clarke,
laterexplained, these actions demon-strated that American
minefleldsand barbed wire entanglementshad channeled movement
be-tween the main line of resistanceand the combat outpost lines
intocomparatively few routes that hadbecome dangerously familiar
to
the enemy. As a result, Chinesemortars and artillery could
savagethe troops using these well-worntracks to reinforce an
embattledoutpost, withdraw from one thathad been overwhelmed, or
coun-terattack to regain a lost position.Indeed, General Maxwell
D.Taylor, in command of the EighthArmy since February 1953,
agreedthat the enemy could, if he choseto pay the price in blood
andeffort, overrun any of the existingoutposts, and endorsed the
con-cept that General Pate's staff wasstudying. The change in
tactics,however, had not yet gone intoeffect when the Chinese
nextattacked the Marine positions, butthe new assault forced 7th
Marinesto adopt, in a modified form, theprinciples of depth and
densitythat the division commander wassuggesting.
When the enemy againattacked, a ceasefire seemed immi-nent.
President Rhee agreed on 11July to accept American assurancesof
future support and enter into atruce. By the 19th, the
negotiatorsat Panmunjom seemed to haveresolved the last of the
majorissues. On this very date, however,the Chinese struck.
The Fighting Intensifies
Heavy downpours hamperedfrontline combat and grounded the1st
Marine Aircraft Wing for a totalof 12 days early in July. Rain
fellon 22 days that month, but thewing nevertheless reported
2,668combat sorties, more than half ofthem flown in close support
allalong the United Nations line. Theairmen supported their
fellowMarines on the ground with some250 missions, four-fifths of
themusing ground-based radar by nightor day.
The weather improved aftermid-month, enabling aerial
activity
576
to increase at a critical moment,for on the night of 19-20 July,
theChinese again assaulted CombatOutposts Berlin and East
Berlin—now manned by the 3d Battalion,7th Marines, which had
relievedLieutenant Colonel Cereghino's 2dBattalion—and also
menacedOutposts Dagmar and Ingrid, heldby elements of the 5th
Marines.The positions of the 5th Marinesheld firm, thanks in part
to accu-rate fire from the 11th Marines, hutBerlin and East Berlin
were in perilalmost from the outset.
After a savage bombardment ofboth Berlins and nearby segmentsof
the main line of resistance,Chinese troops at 2230 on thenight of
the 19th stormed theridgeline where the two outpostswere located,
attacking East Berlinfirst and Berlin immediately after-ward.
Company I, 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, commanded by FirstLieutenant
Kenneth E. Turner, gar-risoned both outposts, posting 37Marines at
East Berlin and 44 atBerlin. Mortars, machine guns,howitzers, and
90mm tank gunsblasted the advancing Chinese insupport of Company I.
Despite thefirepower massed against him, theenemy overran both
outpostswithin three hours.
A duel between American andChinese gunners continued afterthe
fall of the two Berlins. Theenemy fired some 3,000 roundswhile
overwhelming the outpostsand trying to neutralize the nearbymain
line of resistance and theartillery batteries behind it. OneTurkish
and two Army artillerybattalions joined three battalionsof the 11th
Marines—two of105mm and one of 155mm how-itzers—in responding to
theChinese bombardment, batteringthe assault force, its
supportingmortars and howitzers, and theassembly areas used by
reinforce-ments in exploiting the early suc-
-
cess. Barrage and counterbarragecontinued into the morning of
20July; at 0520, for example, Chineseshells were exploding at the
rate ofone per second on the main line ofresistance immediately
behindOutposts Berlin and East Berlin.
Meanwhile, at 0400 LieutenantColonel Paul M. Jones, in com-mand
of the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, alerted Companies D andE of the
regiment's 2d Battalion,already under his operational con-trol, to
counterattack Berlin andEast Berlin at 0730. Half an hourbefore the
scheduled time, Jones
received word to cancel the coun-terattack. Rather than restore
theoutpost line, General Pate shiftedelements of the division
reserve,the 1st Marines, to strengthen themain line of resistance
in the eventthe enemy should try to exploit hiscapture of the two
Berlins.
While Colonel Wallace Nelson's1st Marines reinforced the
mainline of resistance, air power andartillery tried to neutralize
the Out-posts the Chinese had captured.Since a ceasefire seemed
only daysaway and any attempt to regainthe lost ground would result
in
577
severe Marine casualties, therewould be no counterattack
torestore a position that seemedalmost certain to be abandonedwhen
a demilitarized zone tookshape after the end of
hostilities.Instead, air strikes and fire fromtanks and artillery
scourged thelost outposts to prevent Chinesefrom using them to
mount anassault on the main defenses.Especially effective were
attacksby Marine airmen against Berlinand East Berlin and
bombardmentby Army 8-inch and 240mm how-itzers, adjusted by Marine
aerialobservers, which shattered bun-kers and collapsed almost all
thetrenches on both enemy-held out-posts.
Colonel Jones' 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, estimated that the
deadlyfighting on 19-20 July had killedperhaps 75 Chinese and
woundedas many as 300, thus crippling anenemy battalion that had to
bereplaced by a fresh unit. The 7thMarines and attached units lost
sixkilled, 118 wounded, and 56 miss-ing, but 12 of the missing men
sur-vived as prisoners of war andreturned in the general
exchangewhen the fighting ended.
Once the enemy captured Berlinand East Berlin, the critical
terrainfeature on the right of the sectorheld by the 1st Marine
Divisionbecame Hill 119, nicknamedBoulder City, the segment of
themain line of resistance nearest thetwo lost outposts and
therefore thelikely objective of any deeperChinese thrust. Company
D, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines, (attached tothe regiment's 3d
Battalion) heldBoulder City itself. Company E ofthe 2d Battalion,
7th Marines, (alsoattached to the 3d Battalion) joinedCompanies H
and I of the 3dBattalion in defending the highground extending from
behindBoulder City—although withinsupporting distance—to Hill 111
at
I
XH$I 190
XJe,sey
5H11l 139
31
'31A
7th Marines SectorDivision Right
19-20 July 1953C) USMC Outposts
Enemy Hills
0 500 1000 2000
2 II
-
578
the boundary between the 1stMarine Division and the
Com-monwealth Division. The newly-arrived 2d Battalion, 1st
Marines,under Lieutenant Colonel Frank A.Long, moved into
positionbetween the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, on its right
andLieutenant Colonel Harry A.Hadd's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines,on
its left. The 2d Battalion, 7thMarines, served as
regimentalreserve.
The introduction of LieutenantColonel Long's battalion,
whichcame under control of the 7thMarines, served as the first step
ina planned relief of the 7th Marinesby the 1st Marines. For now,
thenewly arrived battalion added fur-ther depth and density to the
mainline of resistance, organizing Hill126 and the other
commandingheights in its sector. In effect, three
Department of Defense Photo (USMc) A173925
Marines of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, board armored
personnel carriers to betaken to the front. As a result of the
critical tactical situation and number ofcasualties suffered during
the Berlin operations the battalion was positioned inthe center of
the regimental main line of resistance as the first step in the
relief ofthe 7th Marines.
-
battalions, rather than the two pre-viously defending the
regimentalarea, formed a crescent of strong-points designed to
contain anddefeat any offensive launchedfrom Berlin and East
Berlin.
In the sector held by the 7thMarines, Outpost Ava, manned bya
squad from Company A of theregiment's 1st Battalion, survivedon the
far left, near the boundarybetween the 7th and 5th Marines.Boulder
City, formerly a compo-nent of a continuous main line ofresistance,
now functioned as anoutpost of the reconstituteddefenses. By 22
July, Company G,3d Battalion, 7th Marines, hadtaken over Boulder
City, from the
regiment's Company D, whichreverted to the control of its
parentbattalion, the 2d, in reserve.
The Last Battle
Signs of an imminent Chineseattack multiplied as July drew to
aclose. The probable objectivesseemed tp include Outposts Hedyand
Dagmar, hut instead of attack-ing either in force, the enemy
sentonly a token force, wearing burlapcamouflage, that appeared
nearHedy on 21 July. The defendersopened fire, killing three of
theChinese, and the survivors fled.
Marine Fighter Squadrons 115and 311, released by the Fifth
Air
579
Force to support the UnitedNations troops fighting in centraland
eastern Korea, joined MarineAttack Squadron 121 in poundingthe
Chinese threatening the 1stMarine Division. Recurring cloudcover
produced frequent down-pours that interfered with opera-tions
during the critical period of21-23 July, but the three
squadronsnevertheless flew more than 15radar-directed missions that
drop-ped some 33 tons of bombs.
As the threats to Outposts Hedyand Dagmar abated, Chineseforces
menaced Boulder City,where Company G, 3d Battalion,1st Marines,
commanded by FirstLieutenant Oral R. Swigart, Jr.,
Men of the 1st Marines move toward the jrontlines to rein-force
other Marines fighting at Hill 11, known informally
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A173715
as Boulder City. Little did they know that they would see
thelast of the war's heavy .fighting.
-
manned the defenses after reliev-ing Company D, 2d Battalion,
7thMarines. On the evening of 24July, hostile mortars and
artillerybegan hammering Swigart's pe-rimeter. Marine artillery and
4.5-inch rocket launchers immediatelyresponded against targets
thatincluded a Chinese regiment mass-ing behind Hill 139, northwest
ofenemy-held Outpost Berlin.
At 2030, Chinese troops beganprobing the right of the 1st
MarineDivision's line. After a powerfulbarrage by mortars and
artillery,the assault force hit Hill 111 at thefar right of the
positions held bythe 7th Marines, then shifted toBoulder City near
the boundarybetween the 3d Battalion, 7thMarines, and the attached
2dBattalion, 1st Marines. As he hadon 7 July, when he sought to
cap-italize on the Marine division's
Marines.When the Chinese attack began,
the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines,attached to the 7th Marines,
hadalready taken over positions thatincluded Boulder City. The
3dBattalion, 1st Marines, command-ed by Lieutenant Colonel Roy
D.Miller, was relieving the 3dBattalion, 7th Marines, as Com-pany H
took over Hill 111 andCompany G defended the criticalground at
Boulder City.
At about 1930 on 24 July theenemy attacked Hill 111 and
sooncracked the perimeter nowmanned by Company H of
Miller'sbattalion. For about 50 minutes,the Chinese clung to a
salient onthe hilltop, but then withdrew.
580
After this flurry of action, appar-ently intended to divert
attentionfrom Boulder City, the enemyignored Hill 111 until the
morningof 25 July, when artillery fire bat-tered the perimeter but
no infantryassault followed.
The two Chinese battalionsattacking on the Marine right hadtheir
greatest success at BoulderCity, seizing a portion of thetrenchline
defended by CompanyG, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. In anattempt to
exploit this foothold,the enemy attacked the Berlin andEast Berlin
gates, passagesthrough the wire that the Marineshad used to supply
and reinforcethe two outposts before both wereoverwhelmed. Cloud
cover pre-vented aerial observers from sup-porting the troops
protecting thegates, and the Chinese managed togain control of
Berlin gate and
takeover of the lines of the 25thInfantry Division, the
enemysought to take advantage of therelief of the 7th Marines by
the 1st
-
Second Lieutenant Raymond G. Murphy
An ardent athlete Wi~h a major in phy. ical e~u~ation ~Iurph
wa.' born inPueblo, oj rado, 10 1930, and wa. commissioned In the
Manne CorpsRe. elTes in 1951. In Korea. he wa:. a"'arded a ilver
tar ,\Iedal for hiactions on 22 \" mber 1952 in a saulting an enemy
str ngpoint. Th n hi heroi. magain a a plato n ommander with ompany
,1't Battalion, 'Sth larine, on 3February 19')3, reulted in a Medal
of Honor \vith a citati n, whidl read in part:
L ndeterred by the increasing intene enemy fire, he immediately
10 ared casual-ties a the} fell and made 'ieveral trip up and clo\\
n the fire-swept hill to directevacuation team' to the wounded,
personally carrying many of the 'tri kenMarine to safety. When
reinforcements were needed b th ~ assaulting I ment:.,Se ond
Lieutenant Murphy employed part of hi unit a upport and, during
theensuing battle, personally killed t\ 0 of the enemy \\ ith his
pistol. '\ ith all the wounded evacuated and tha'. aulting units
beginning to di
-
that enabled enemy artillely andmortars to wound or kill about
athird of the reinforcements.Despite the deadly barrage, muchof
Company r reached BoulderCity, joined forces with the rem-nants of
Swigart's garrison, andtook part in a counterattack led by
Captain Sartor that recaptured thehill by 0330. Further
reinforce-ments from Company E, 2dBattalion, 7th Marines,
andCompany E, 2d Battalion, 1stMarines, arrived by 0530 to
con-solidate the position. A fewChinese, however, continued to
cling to posItIons on the slopesnearest their main line of
resis-tance.
Since the enemy still controlledthe approaches to Boulder City,
hewas able to mount another attackon that position at 0820, 25
July.Fire from Marine mortars and
Hospital Corpsman Third CIa s William R. Charette
~ati\'e of Ludington, 1ichigan, harett was born in 1932 and
nlisted in the
U.,. 'avy in 19-1. For his a'tions during the earl morning
hour... of rlarch 19')3 in the Panmunjom orridor, while attached to
ompany F, 2d
Battalion, th larine., he wa. rec mmended for and later re ei\ed
the l\Jedal ofIlonor. I lis citation reads, in part:
'\ hen an enemy grenade land d within a fe\, feet of a .\larine
he was altending,he immediatel thr \\' himself upon th stricken man
and absorbed the entire con-cu.-sion of the deadly mis. i1e with
hi:> b dy. lthough su raining painful facial~ ounds, and
undergoing. hO'k from the intenity of th blast which ripped
thhelmet and medical aid kit from his person, lIospital orpsman
Third Class ,.", \1"1,,,,1uffering excnJciating painfrom a s rious
leg \\ ound, 110. pital orpsman Third Cia s hal' ne stood upright
in the trt:nch line and expos 'dhims If to a deadly hail of enemy
fire in ord I' to lend more effective aid to the \ ictim and to
allevi:1tt: hisanguish while being r m "ed to a position of
safety.
liraculously surviving his wounds. he rose to th rank of master
chief hospiLaI orpsman before retiring in 19ho. pital fa ility at
the aval ~Iedical enter, Portsmouth, Virginia, is named for
Corpsman Charette.
Sergeant Daniel ~ Matthew
Born in an uys, alifornia. in 1931. Matthew. enlisted in the
Marine Corpsin 1951. After c mpl ting r' Tuit LrJining he was
assigned to the bt Battalion.3d Jarine', (It amp Pendleton.
California. He sailed f I' K rea in Janual)1953. joining ompany F.
2d Battalion, th ,\Iarine'>. On 28 larch 1953 he was killedin a
count rattack on Vegas Ilili. Hi l\ledal of TIonaI' citation reads,
in pan:
. ergeant Malthew fearlessl advanced in the atta k until hi~
squad was pinneddown by a murderous. weep f fire from an enem
machine gun located on thepeak f the outpo. t. b 'erving that the
deadl fire pre\'ented a corp man fromremO\ing a 'ounded man I 'ing
in an open area full expos d to the brunt of thed a.'tating
gunfire. he work d hi way to the base of the hostile rna
-hine-gunemplacement, leaped onto th I' ck fortification urrounding
the gun and. takingthe enem b completl'urprise, single-handedl
charg d the ho tile emplacement with his rille. Ithough'e erely
wounded when the enem} brought a " ithering hail of fire to bear
upon him. he gallantly continuedhis valiant one-man a sault and,
firing hi~ rille with deadly effectin~ne ~. 'iucceeded in killing
t\yO of the enemy.routing a third and complet I)' ... ilencing the
enemy weapon. thereb enabling his comrad s to evacuate the·trick n
:\Iarine to aafe po. ilion. [J Ie died of) his wound. before aid
could reach him.
aptain John hapin. l. 1 R (Ret)
582
-
Staff Sergeant Ambrosio Guillen
Born in La .Junta, olorado. in 1929, uillen gre up in EI Paso.
Texa ; heenli'ted in the Marine Corps in 19 7. fter sea duty and
serving as a drillinstruct r at Marin C rps Recruit Depot. an
Diego. he ~ as aSSigned as a pla-to n sergeant with ompany F. 2d
Battalion. 7th Marine., in Korea. He died of\V und incurred n ar
onguch-on r July 19'53. Ir nically, the cea 'efire wa sign dt\VO
days later. [lis Medal of Honor itation reads. in pan:
With his unit pinned down, when the outpost was attacked under
cover of dark-nes - by an e -timated force of two enemy ballalions
supported by mortar andaltillery fire. h delib rately exposed
himself to the heavy barrage and ,macks LOdirecL his men in d
fending their po -itions and personally supel i. e th >
treatment I>"p.'rtm"m "Illdm'" Ph",,, 1I "1(,) IO-()o~and
evacuation of th wounded. Tn 'pired by his leadership, the.::
platoon qui kly rallied and e.::ngage.::d the enemyforce in fierce
hand-to-hand c mbal. Although critically wounded during Lhe course
of the banle. 'talT ,'ergeantGuillen refused medi al aid and
continued to direct his men throughouLthe remainder of the
engagement untilthe enemy \ as defeated and thrown into disorderly
retreat.
A middle seh 01 in El Paso. Texa . i named for Staff ergeant
Guill n.- aptain John C. Chapin, ICR (Ret)
Aerial view of the pockmarked terrain in front of Boulder City
taken from anHMR-161 helicopter. Although the monsoon rains ofJuly
limited normal supportmissions, when weather conditions cooperated
planes of the 1st Marine AircraftWing worked from morning to
sundown unleashing tons of ordnance onChinese positions seen just
beyond the Marine sector of the line.
National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A173886
artillery, and from the 90mmweapons of 10 tanks dug in on
theMarine positions, played the keyrole in breaking up the
newassault, although the last of theattackers did not withdraw
untilafternoon. The M-46 tanks proveddeadly against advancing
Chinesetroops, but also presented an invit-ing target for Chinese
artillery andmortar crews, who directed some2,200 rounds at the
armored vehi-cles. Aircraft also helped repulsethe 25 July attack
on Boulder City,as when Panther jets flew ninemissions, guided by
Marine radaron the ground, against hostilepositions threatening
Boulder Cityand nearby defensive strong-points.
Before midnight on 24 July, inan attack perhaps loosely
coordi-nated with the thrust at BoulderCity, Chinese forces hit the
posi-tions held by the 5th Marines. Afterprobing the defenses of
OutpostsDagmar and Esther, the enemyconcentrated against the
latter,manned by elements of CompanyH, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines.
TheChinese tried to isolate Outpost
Esther by shelling and patrollingthe routes leading there from
themain line of resistance and suc-ceeded in overrunning outer
por-tions of the perimeter. The defend-ers, commanded by Second
Lieutenant William H. Bates, pre-vailed because of the skillful
useof their own weapons, includingflamethrowers and the support
ofmortars, machine guns, tanks, andthe always-deadly artillery. The
3d
583
-
Battalion, 11th Marines, fired 3,886rounds against Chinese
troopsattacking Outpost Esther, and hos-tile gunners matched this
volumeof fire. The Marines suffered 12killed and 98 wounded in the
fight-ing that began at Dagmar and con-tinued at Esther, while
Chinesecasualties may have totaled 195killed and 250 wounded.
Dawn on 26 July brought a lullin these last battles.
Chineseattempts to revive their attack byinfiltrating
reinforcements throughthe site of Outpost Berlin failed,thanks to
accurate fire from Marineriflemen and machine gunners.The 1st
Marines completed its reliefof the 7th Marines at 1330. That
night, the enemy probed BoulderCity for the last time, sending
apatrol from captured OutpostBerlin that failed to penetrate
thedefensive wire and shortly aftermidnight dispatching another
pla-toon that prowled about beforeMarine fire repulsed it.
Although the last of the Chineseattacks seized Outposts Berlin
andEast Berlin, they failed to wrestBoulder City from its
Marinedefenders. Had the enemy cap-tured Boulder City, he might
haveexploited it and seized the highground to the south and east,
fromwhich he could have fired directlyinto the rear areas that
sustainedthe 1st Marine Division in its posi-
584
tions beyond the Imjin River. Infighting the Chinese to a
standstillduring July 1953, the division suf-fered 1,611
casualties—killed,wounded, and missing—the mostsevere losses since
October 1952when savage fighting had raged atOutposts Carson, Reno,
and Vegas,and on the Hook. Chinese lossesduring July 1953 may have
exceed-ed 3,100.
The Final Patrols
During the last few nights ofcombat in July, Marines
continuedpatrolling aggressively, eventhough a truce was fast
approach-ing. The Last Parallel—a wartime
National Archives l'hoto (USMC) 127-N-A173809
A Marine holds a wounded buddy onto an armored per- Marines aid
station during the heavy fighting in the Berlinsonnel carrier being
brought to the 3d Battalion, 1st sector.
-
memoir by Martin Russ, a corporalin Company A, 1st Battalion,
1stMarines, in July 1953—describesan action that took place
justbefore the truce, as the 1st Marineswas taking over from the
7thMarines. A Lieutenant fromCompany A, 7th Marines, led a 30-man
combat patrol, made up ofmen from Companies A of bothregiments,
that set out fromOutpost Ava near midnight and
crossed a rice paddy on the way toraid Chinese positions on the
Hill104. A reconnaissance probe,which had preceded the
raidingparty, reported the presence ofChinese on the approaches to
theobjective.
The route to Hill 104 followed atrail flanked by waist-high
rice,growth that not only impeded off-trail movement, but also
mightconceal a Chinese ambush. The
soft muck in which the rice thrivedprovided poor support for
sometypes of mines, thus reducing onethreat to the patrol, but
movingthrough the paddy would havesnapped the brittle rice stalks
andcreated noise to alert any lurkingambush party. Balancing less
noiseagainst greater danger from mines,the Marines decided to
follow thetrail.
The patrol's point man, as heapproached the far end of the
ricepaddy, found a trip wire stretchedacross the trail and followed
it to aRussian-built, antipersonnel mineattached to a stick thrust
deep intothe mud and aimed to scatterdeadly fragments low across
thesurface of the trail. The patrol halt-ed, bunching up somewhat
as themembers tried to see why the lieu-tenant was moving forward
to con-fer with the point man. At thismoment, Chinese soldiers
crouch-ing hidden in the rice opened firefrom as close as 50 feet
to theMarines.
The fusillade wounded thepatrol leader and within 10 sec-onds
killed or wounded nine ofthe first 10 men in the patrol.Dragged
into the paddy by mem-bers of the ambush party, the lieu-tenant
disappeared until he sur-faced in the exchange of prisonersafter
hostilities ended. The pointman proved luckier, however,hurling
himself to the ground assoon has he realized what washappening,
finding cover besidethe trail, and escaping injury. Fromthe rear of
the patrol, the other sur-vivors fired at the muzzle flashes ofthe
Chinese weapons. Marine fire-power prevailed, silencing theenemy
after five or so minutes,although not before six membersof the
patrol had been killed, 14wounded, and the wounded lieu-tenant
carried off as a prisoner.The survivors regrouped andmoved forward,
retrieving as many
Two members of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, quickly clean a
semi-automaticM-1 carbine with grenade launcher after firing in
support of a night patrol. Athird Marine take a break in one of the
sandbagged culverts, which providedoverhead cover along the trench
line.
National Archives Photo (usMc) 127-N-A173671
585
-
Nationsi Archives Photo (LJSN) 80-G-62573I
Flanked on the left by Gen Otto P Weyland, USAF corn- and VAdm
Joesph j. clark Seventh Fleet commandei Genmanding general of Far
East Air Forces, and on the right by Mark W Clarke, commander in
chief of United NationsVAdm Robert P Briscoe Commander, Naval
Forces Far Easi, forces, countersigns the armistice agreement at
Munsan-ni.
as they could of the dead andwounded. A half-dozen
Marinescovered the patrol's withdrawal,preventing the Chinese from
encir-cling the group. When the menwho had helped evacuate
thewounded returned from the aidstation and reinforced the
firepow-er of the hastily formed screeningforce, the Chinese
vanished intothe night.
The Marines kept up theirpatrolling until the moment thetruce
took effect. On the night of27 July, according to Martin Russ,his
company sent out a patrol
scheduled to return shortly beforethe fighting would end at
2200. Asthe Marines prepared to move Out,Chinese mortars fired on
OutpostAva, through which the patrolstaged, and nearby portions of
themain line of resistance. The bom-bardment wounded five membersof
the patrol and two of theMarines defending the outpost.
The patrol returned as planned,and at 2200, Russ, who was not
amember, watched from the mainline of resistance as white star
clus-ters and colored flares cast a pul-sating light that set the
shadows
586
dancing in ravines and paddiesand on hillsides, while the
finalshells fired in the 37-month warexploded harmlessly. As
Russdescribed the scene:
A beautiful moon hung low inthe sky like a Chinese lantern.Men
appeared along thetrench, some of them hadshed their flak jackets
andhelmets. The first sound weheard was the sound of
shrillvoices.... The Chinese weresinging. A hundred yards orso down
the trench, someone
-
was shouting the MarineCorps Hymn at the top of hislungs. Others
joined in bel-lowing the words. All alongthe battle line, matches
flaredand cigarettes glowed, but nosnipers peered through
tele-scopic sights to fire at thesetargets. The war had ended.
After the Ceasefire
The ceasefire agreement, whichwas signed on the morning of
27July and went into effect 12 hourslater, required that both the
UnitedNations forces and the Communistenemy withdraw from the
mostadvanced positions held when thefighting ended. In effect, the
aban-doned area formed the trace of aMilitary Demarcation Line, as
theopposing armies fell back 2,000yards to organize new main
battlepositions, thus creating the 4,000-yard Demilitarized Zone
betweenthem. The Marines built as theydestroyed, evacuating certain
por-tions of the old main line of resis-tance, giving up some of
its out-
posts, and dismantling fortifica-tions simultaneously with
theirconstruction of the new line and itsmutually supporting
strongpoints.
A No-Fly Line supplemented thecontrols imposed by the
Demilita-rized Zone. Restrictions on themovement of aircraft
appliedthroughout the Demilitarized Zoneand in a corridor extending
fromthe vicinity of Panmunjom toKaesong. Only helicopters couldfly
beyond the No-Fly Line, pro-vided they remained 500 yardsfrom the
Military DemarcationLine.
Establishing theDemilitarized Zone
The armistice document set atimetable for the creation of
theDemilitarized Zone. Within 72hours after the ceasefire went
intoeffect, the combatants were toremove "all military forces,
sup-plies, and equipment" and reportthe location of "demolitions,
mine-fields, wire entanglements, andother hazards" capable of
imped-
587
ing the safe movement of the orga-nizations that would oversee
thearmistice—the Military ArmisticeCommission, its Joint
ObserverTeams, and the Neutral NationsSupervisory Commission. For
45days following the initial 72 hours,the parties to the ceasefire
wouldsalvage the materials still in thedesignated Demilitarized
Zone,using only unarmed troops for thetask. Meanwhile, during the
10days after 27 July, Chinese orNorth Korean troops took over
alloffshore islands, east coast andwest, that lay north of the
38thParallel. The United Nationsretained control of
Taechong-do,Paengyong-do, Sochong-do, andYongpyong-do, along with
U-do,Tokchok-to, and Kangwha-do, allof them off the west coast
andsouth of the demarcation line.
Since the agreement of July 27called for a truce rather
thanpeace—indeed, it sought to ensurea cessation of hostilities
until "afinal peaceful settlement isachieved"—the possibility
existedthat the fighting might resume.Despite the shower of flares
andthe singing that marked themoment the truce went into
effect,some battle-tested Marines fullyexpected a Chinese attack in
thehours after the ceasef ire. As theskies lightened on the morning
of28 July, Chinese commandersobtained permission to recover
thebodies of their men killed in thefinal assaults on Marine
positions.The sight of "the enemy movingaround within a stone's
throw ofour front lines" underscored thepossibility of renewed
attacks, butnothing happened, and as themorning wore on, it became
obvi-ous that the truce was holding—atleast for the present.
Like the Chinese, the Marinesused the first morning of the
cease-fire to recover the bodies of menkilled in recent days. Most
of the
National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-626455
Marines take a well-deserved rest after word of the armistice is
passed. Less than24 hours after the signing of the armistice,
Marine units began withdrawingfrom the Demilitarized Zone to their
new battle positions.
-
Following the armistice, the commanding general of the 1stMarine
Division, MajGen Randolph McC. Pate, his chief ofstaff ('ol Lewis W
Walt; and the commanding officer of the
National Archives Photo (USMG) 127-N-A173878
1st Marines, Col Wallace M. Nelson, survey the aftermath ofthe
battle for Boulder City.
dead had fallen at Hill 111 andBoulder City. By the end of
theday, all the bodies had beenretrieved and were on the way tothe
rear.
In the three days immediatelyafter the armistice took
effect,some 50 companies of Marineinfantry, both American and
SouthKorean, began dismantling the olddefenses, with the help of
elementsof the division's engineers.Working day and night—taking
fre-quent breaks during the daytimeheat, sleeping during the
threehours after noon when the heat
portable lighting to take advantageof the comparative cool of
thenight—the Marines and the Koreanservice troops helping
themremoved supplies and ammunition,tore apart bunkers, and stacked
thetimbers for shipment to the newbattle line. Some of the work
par-ties treated the bunkers like trench-es and filled them with
earth,which then had to be shoveled outto provide access to the
salvage-able timbers.
Dismantling the old battle linerequired the removal of
somestructures on elements of both the
line of resistance, while at the sametime building the new main
battleposition and sealing off theDemilitarized Zone that the
truceestablished between the contend-ing armies. Some of the
formerMarine outposts like Bunker Hill,Esther, and Ava lay north of
theMilitary Demarcation Line. As aresult, the Marines could be sure
ofhaving access to them only duringthe 72 hours after the
ceasefirebegan. Moreover, anything sal-vaged from Bunker Hill or
nearbyOutpost Hedy had to travel over aprimitive road described as
"partic-ularly tortuous," which made thewas most enervating, and
using combat outpost line and the main
588
-
transfer "of first the ammunitionand then the fortification
materialsa physical ordeal." Further compli-cating the dismantling
of these dis-tant outposts, a horde of reporters,photographers, and
newsreel cam-eramen arrived, eager to recordthe activity of both
the Marinesand the Chinese soldiers whocould be seen tearing down
theirown defenses on nearby ridgelinesor hilltops.
Salvaging building materialsproved to be hard work,
whethertearing apart structures on thecombat outpost line or on
themain line of resistance. The picks,shovels, and steel pry bars
avail-able to the infantrymen could notremove timbers, measuring up
to12 inches square and secured by
spikes 10 to 24 inches long, thatformed the skeleton of
bunkersmeasuring perhaps 12 by 20 feet.Wherever possible bulldozers
borethe brunt, but heavy trucks fittedwith power winches and even
towtrucks helped out, as did mediumtanks, their guns removed so
theycould enter the demilitarized area.The Marines found that the
fastestmethod of dismantling a bunkerwas to uncover it, winch it
out ofits hole, and bounce it down thehill it had guarded.
Once the bunker had been dis-assembled, the Marines manhan-dled
the timbers onto vehicles,usually several two-and-one-half-ton
trucks, although heavier vehi-cles saw service during the first
72hours until the ban took effect on
dozed under, andtion points.
disarmed tanks, tank retrievers,and other vehicles that fit
thearmistice agreement's imprecisedefinition of "military
equipment."Fortunately, two-and-one-half-tontrucks could still be
used over thenext 45 days, although restricted todesignated routes
of access intothe Demilitarized Zone.
As the dismantling of the aban-doned defenses went ahead
onschedule, the 1st Marine Divisionmoved into its new positions,
atransfer completed by the morningof 1 August. The main battle
posi-tion, to the rear of the former line,consisted of a succession
ofstrongpoints. From the division'sright-hand boundary near
theSamichon River, the new lineformed a misshapen arc encom-
usable timber carried to salvage collec-
National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-626370
Marines begin the task of dismantling bunkers on the aban-doned
main line of resistance after the ceasefire went intoeffect on
27July. Trenchlines were filled in, tank slots bull-
589
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