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“Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” Li Zhuang, Feng Zhou, and J.D. Tygar Presenter: Daniel Liu
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“Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Jun 29, 2018

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Page 1: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

“Keyboard AcousticEmanations Revisited”Li Zhuang, Feng Zhou, and J.D. Tygar

Presenter: Daniel Liu

Page 2: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Overview

Introduction to EmanationsKeyboard Acoustic EmanationsKeyboard Acoustic Emanations RevisitedExtensionsQuestions?

Page 3: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Emanations are Everywhere

Unintended information leakage Inputs and Outputs Software Hardware Networks TEMPEST

Page 4: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

“Timing Analysis of Keystrokes and TimingAttacks on SSH”D. Song, D. Wagner, X. Tian. UC Berkeley, 2001.

Interactive mode sends every keystroke in aseparate IP packetTyping patterns can be analyzed

Page 5: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

“Information Leakage from Optical Emanations”J. Loughry, D. Umphress. 2002.

LED status indicators have been shown tocorrelate with the data being sentMany devices were shown to be vulnerable

Page 6: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

“Optical Time Domain EavesdroppingRisks of CRT Displays”M. Kuhn, 2002.

Uses a fast photosensor to deconvolve thesignal off of a reflected wallBased on phosphor decay times

Page 7: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

“Electromagnetic Eavesdropping Risks ofFlat Panel Displays”M. Kuhn, 2004.

Signals can be received with directional antennasand wideband receiversGbit/s digital signals are sent via serial transmissionsand are detectable

Page 8: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

“Keyboard Acoustic Emanations”D. Asonov, R. Agrawal, 2004.

Differentiate the sound emanated bydifferent keys to eavesdrop on what is beingtypedCan be done with a standard PC microphoneDoes not require physical intrusion Parabolic Microphones Record remotely without user knowledge

Recognition is based on using neural nets

Page 9: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Basic Notion…

Not all keys sound the sameConsider ‘q’ and ‘t’

Page 10: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Experimental Setup

IBM Keyboards, GE Power Keyboards, SiemensRP240 PhonesSimple, omni-directional, and Bionic BoosterParabolic microphonesStandard PC Sound Card and Sigview SoftwareJavaNNS Neural Network Software

http://www.sigview.com/http://www-ra.informatik.uni-tuebingen.de/SNNS/

Page 11: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Threat Analysis

Attacker must use labeled training datafor best resultsOnly looked at a few types of keyboardsNo mention of typing rate of the usersMaximum distance tested with aparabolic microphone was 15 mThere are many assumptions made!

Page 12: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)

Takes a discrete signal in the time domain and translates it tothe frequency domain

10 Hz Sine WaveAmplitude 1

200 samples/secAmplitude ~1(dispersion)

http://www.mne.psu.edu/me82/Learning/FFT/FFT.html

Page 13: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

FFT Continued…

Looks like Random noise

Components at:5.7 Hz10 Hz

Page 14: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

“Recognizing Chords with EDS”G. Cabral et al, 2005.

Compute FFTSum Frequency Bins

CMaj ChordC, E, G are peaks

Page 15: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Feature Extraction Design

RecordedSignal

TimeFFT

FFT @Push Peak

NormalizedFFT

From ADC

FourierTransform

ExtractPushPeaks

Normalize

What about key presses that overlap?

Page 16: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Feature Extraction Reality

Recorded Signal

Time FFT

FFT at Push Peak

Page 17: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Why Do We Need FFT Here?

Neural nets typically take dozens toseveral hundred inputs (all 0 to 1)This is about 1kB of inputThe keyboard click signal is 10kBFFT is used to extract features of the“touch peak” of the signal (2-3 ms)This allows the neural net to be trained

Page 18: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Neural Network

Backpropagation neural netInput nodes, one value per 20 HzUsed 6 to 10 hidden nodes“Two key” experiments had one outputMultiple key experiments had an outputfor each key

Page 19: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Training Neural Net

InputUnits

HiddenUnits

OutputUnit

DefaultValues

.5 .3 .9 .5 .7 .5 .5 .2 .1 .4

1

CorrectErrors

… 400Hz 440Hz 460Hz 480Hz …

Page 20: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Using the Trained Neural Net

InputUnits

HiddenUnits

OutputUnit

TrainedValues

.5 .3 .9 .5 .7 .5 .5 .2 .1 .4

1

But this training process can be tedious!

… 400Hz 440Hz 460Hz 480Hz …

Page 21: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Only Need up to 9 kHz

Average depth of correct symbol isbest with 0 – 9 kHz300 – 3400 Hz still gives decentaccuracy (telephone audio band)

Page 22: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

First Test: Distinguishing Two Keys

Record and extract featuresTrained the neural net to two keysRecord new features for the neural netTest the neural net and check accuracyNo decrease in recognition quality even at 15 meters

Page 23: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Testing with Multiple Keys

Trained to recognize 30 keys, 10 clicks eachCorrect identification: 79%Counting second and third guesses: 88%

Page 24: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Realistic Typing Model?

Each key is individually typed“hunt and peck” typistVery few people type like thisNot a significant threat to touch typists

Page 25: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Testing with Multiple Keyboards

Training done with another keyboard (A)Four candidate guesses (28%, 12%, 7%, 5%)Keyboard B and C are ~50% accurate (4 guesses)This test uses three different GE keyboards(?)

Page 26: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Different Typing Styles (Two Key)

Variable Force TypingComparison of Three Different Typists

Page 27: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

ROC Curves

False Positive Rate

True

Pos

itive

Rat

e

1

1

Alice

Bob

Viktor

Shows the multiple keyboards testBut we lose the exact output values

Page 28: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Why Clicks Produce Different Sounds

Three Possibilities Surrounding environment of neighboring

keys

Microscopic differences in construction ofkeys

Different parts of the keyboard plateproduce different sounds

Page 29: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Milling Out Pieces

Several pieces of the keyboard plate were removedNeural net was unable to pass the two key test

Page 30: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Notebook, ATM, and Phone Pads

Notebook keys are not quite as vulnerableATM and Phone Pads are vulnerable

Page 31: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Countermeasures

Grandtec rubber keyboard

Fingerworks Touchstream

Gaze based selection?

Page 32: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Can We Do Better?

Can this be done without recording andusing labeled training data?Are FFTs a good way to represent features?Very poor recognition with multiple keyboardsTyping styles slightly reduce accuracyAre there ways to take advantage of Englishlanguage structure?

Page 33: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

“Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited”Li Zhuang, Feng Zhou, J.D. Tygar, 2005.

“We Can Do Better!!!”

= ?

Page 34: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

High Level Overview

Page 35: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Feature Extraction: Cepstrum Features

The cepstrum can be seen as information about rateof change in the different spectrum bands

Use the signal spectrum as another signal, then lookfor periodicity in the spectrum itself

signal → FT → log → FT → cepstrum

cepstrum of signal = FT(log(FT(the signal)))

Page 36: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Cepstrum Example

http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/courses/spsci/matlab/lect10.html

Page 37: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Linear Classification

Simple examplewith only twodimensions

Output score =f((vector of weights) (feature vector))

Training process finds the bestvector of weights to use

.

Page 38: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Gaussian Mixtures

Used to model manyPDFs as a mixture

Through experimentation they decided touse five gaussian distributions

When a new feature is analyzed, use the EMalgorithm to calculate potential membership

Page 39: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Cepstrum vs FFT Linear Classification seems to be the best of

the three methods for recognition Converted to Mel-Frequency Cepstral

Coefficients (scaled to human hearing) Done with Matlab newpnn function

Page 40: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

High Level Overview

Page 41: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Unsupervised Key Recognition

Cluster each keystroke into K classesA particular key will be in each classwith a certain probabilityGiven a sequence of these keystrokes,they use standard HMM algorithms toidentify keys60% accuracy for characters and 20%for words

Page 42: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Simplified K-means

Page 43: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

HMM Design

Shaded circles are observations and unshaded circlesare unknown state variablesA is the transition matrix based on English languagen is an output matrix (probability of qi beingclustered into class yi)

Page 44: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

HMM Algorithm

Expectation Maximization (EM) is usedto refine values for the n matrixNext the Viterbi algorithm is used toinfer the sequences of keys qi

Page 45: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Viterbi Algorithm

[f] [f,o] [f,o,o] [f,o,o,d]

(1,.6) (.7,.6) (.2,0) (0,0)

(.3,.5) (.8,.6) (0,0)

(.5,.6) (.3,.2)

(.3,.1)

(.7,.7)(.5,.4)

(.7,.2)

Finds most probable state that outputs a sequenceKeeps track of only the most probable states

.6 .25

.12 .06

Page 46: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Sample of Original Text

the big money fight has drawn the supportof dozens of companies in the entertainmentindustry as well as attorneys gnneralsin states, who fear the file sharing softwarewill encourage illegal activity, stem thegrowth of small artists and lead to lostjobs and dimished sales tax revenue.

Page 47: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Detected text

the big money fight has drawn the shoporood dosens of companies in the entertainmentindustry as well as attorneys gnnerals onstates, who fear the fild shading softwatewill encourage illegal acyivitt, srem thegrosth of small arrists and lead to lostcobs and dimished sales tas revenue.

Page 48: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

High Level Overview

Page 49: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Applying Spelling and Grammar

Dictionary based spelling (Aspell)Applied a simple statistical model ofEnglish (n-gram language)70% accuracy for characters and 50%for words

Page 50: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Detected text: Language Model

the big money fight has drawn the supportof dozens of companies in the entertainmentindustry as well as attorneys generalsin states, who fear the film sharing softwarewill encourage illegal activity, stem thegrowth of small artists and lead to lostjobs and finished sales tax revenue.

Page 51: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

High Level Overview

Page 52: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Feedback Based Training

Allows for random text recognitionWords that were mostly correct areused to train the classifierAssume that we know words aremostly correct because the languagemodel only made small corrections

Page 53: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Refine the Classifier

Run the training set again and usethe language model to measureimprovementRepeat the recognition phase until noimprovement is seen (~three times)Turn off the language correction andtry random character recognitionCharacter accuracy improved to 90%

Page 54: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Testing Sets

430073223m 54sSet 4

418875321m 49sSet 3

5476100026m 56sSet 2

251440912m 17sSet 1

Numberof Keys

Numberof Words

RecordingLength

Quiet Environment

Noisy Environment

Page 55: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Results: Single Keyboard Recognition

Language model greatly improvesaccuracySeveral rounds of feedback help innoisy environments

Page 56: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Comparison of Supervised Feedback

Linear classification performs the bestAny reason why?

Page 57: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Length of Recording vs. Recognition Rate

Only need five minutes of recording datato get good recognition rates

Page 58: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Testing with Multiple Dell Keyboards

Linear classification was usedExtra cell phone noise with keyboard 3

Page 59: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Random Text Recognition (Got Root?)

Trained with Set 1 and used with randomlygenerated sequences

Page 60: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Attack Improvements

Extra keys (i.e. tab, backspace, shift)Other language modelsApplication specific (IDEs, editors)Remove backgound noiseHierarchical Hidden Markov Model

Page 61: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Defenses

Physical SecurityUse of “quieter” keyboardsIntroduce background noiseTwo-Factor authentication

Page 62: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Extensions

What about overlapping keystrokes orvery fast typists? Dvorak keymapping?

Do long fingernails play a role?

Possible for someone to snoop yourkeyboard remotely through IM or VoIP?

Page 63: “Keyboard Acoustic Emanations Revisited” - cs.jhu.educs.jhu.edu/~fabian/courses/CS600.624/slides/emanations.pdfThreat Analysis Attacker must use labeled training data ... No mention

Related Ideas

Emotive Alert: HMM-Based EmotionDetection in Voicemail Messages (Z.Inanoglu, R. Caneel)

Statistical Identification of EncryptedWeb Browsing Traffic (Q. Sun et al)

Questions?