Key Recent US Supreme Court and Federal Circuit Court Decisions That Impact Patent Law June 22, 2011 1
Key Recent US Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit Court Decisions
That Impact Patent Law
June 22, 2011
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Panelists
Monty Agarwal Robert P. Taylor Beth H. Parker Michael A. Berta
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Update: False Patent Marking
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Monty Agarwal
35 U.S.C. § 292
a) Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in
connection with any unpatented article, the word ―patent‖ or
any word or number importing that the same is patented, for
the purpose of deceiving the public . . . [s]hall be fined not
more than US$500 for every such offense.
b) Any person may sue for the penalty—one‐half shall go to
the United States.
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Opening the Floodgates
Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 1295
(Fed. Cir. 2009)
Fined not more than US$500 for every such offense
Every such offense now means ―each article‖ as
opposed to ―continuous production‖ that could
include entire product line.
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Challenge To Standing To Sue
Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., 619 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
– Any person may sue for the penalty?
– Any person can ―stand in the government’s stead, as assignees
of the government’s own claims.‖
– There is no requirement for standing under Rule that the
individual qui tam plaintiff has, itself, suffered injury from the
alleged false marking.
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Heightened Pleading Requirement
In re BP Lubricants, Misc. No. 960, slip op. at 2, (Fed.
Cir. Mar. 15, 2011).
– For the purpose of deceiving the public
– Federal Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement applies
– Insufficient when complaint only asserts conclusory allegations
that a defendant is a ―sophisticated company‖ and ―knew or
should have known‖ that the patent expired
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Challenge To Constitutionality
Unique Product Solutions v. Hy Grade Valve, Inc.
(D. Ohio, Feb. 2011).
– One‐half shall go to the United States
– The Take Care Clause: President ―shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.‖ U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
– Danger of this uncontrolled privatization of law enforcement
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Challenge to Constitutionality
Any private entity can file in the name of the United States
– Filing: No approval or notice to government
– Litigation: No control or oversight
– Intervention: No statutory right to intervene
– Participation: No right to limit plaintiff
– Dismissal: No right for government to dismiss
– Settle: Plaintiff can settle without involvement or approval
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Legislative Reform
Senate: S.23 – Passed on March 8, 2011
– United States may sue or any person competitively injured
– The amendments shall apply to all cases, without exception,
pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act
House: HR 1249 – Debate Begins
– Adds three-year safe harbor for expired patents
– Allows ―expired‖ to be added or posted on the internet
Proving Invalidity of Issued Patents
Affirmation of the “clear and convincing”
evidentiary standard
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Robert P. Taylor
Microsoft v. i4i, US Supreme Court
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i4i patent covers a method for editing XML documents.
Microsoft offered evidence that the patented process was sold by
plaintiff more than one year prior to filing.
Jury apparently did not believe Microsoft’s evidence.
Microsoft argued that jury should have been instructed to use
preponderance of evidence standard.
– Prior art presented to jury was different from prior art presented to the
Patent Office.
– Prior art based on ―on sale‖ doctrine could not have been located by the
examiner.
Based on long line of Federal Circuit precedent, trial court refused
and Federal Circuit affirmed.
History of Clear and Convincing Standard
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Most early cases held that more than a simple
―preponderance of evidence‖ is needed.
Radio Engineering Corp. v. Radio Engineering
Laboratories, 293 U.S. 1 (1934) (―there is a presumption
of validity … not to be overthrown except by clear and
cogent evidence.‖)
35 U.S.C. § 282 – patents are presumed valid.
Federal Circuit held very early that ―clear and
convincing‖ evidence was needed to overcome
presumption.
Supreme Court Affirmed
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Presumption of validity statute is silent about
evidentiary standard.
1952 statute was an effort to codify existing law.
Federal Circuit standard has been in place for many
years with no Congressional intervention.
Courts should exercise caution before disrupting settled
property rights.
Cumbersome to use separate standards of proof for
different types of evidence in same trial.
It is normally impossible to know with certainty the prior
art actually considered by examiner.
Reexamination
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Arguably, preponderance of the evidence standard
applies in reexamination proceedings.
Both ex parte and inter partes reexaminations are
available to both the patent owner and a challenger.
Reexaminations are often quicker than litigation,
though not always.
Courts have wide discretion as to stays of litigation
pending reexamination.
There are statutory limits on grounds for reexamination.
Many Forms of Prior Art Are Affected
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Dates of publications often are not clear.
Actual date of publications may not be the date shown
on the face of prior art reference.
Precise structure of products offered for sale in prior time
can be difficult to prove.
Precise point at which something has gone ―on sale‖
may be very unclear.
Pfaff requires that an invention be ―ready for patenting‖
before it can satisfy §102(b).
Conception, as proof of date of invention, must be
corroborated by tangible evidence.
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Therasense v. Becton Dickinson
The new standard of proof for inequitable conduct
and the future of unenforceability claims
Michael A. Berta
Overview
Therasense—Case Background
The Federal Circuit’s Holding on Inequitable Conduct
Looking to the Future
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Therasense – Relevant Facts
EPO prosecution of original Abbott patent—Abbott
asserts arguments about scope of patent
Later, in the PTO, where the EPO Abbott patent was
cited as prior art to a new US Abbott patent, Abbott
made inconsistent statements about the scope of
the EPO patent
US counsel reviewed and consciously decided not
to disclose EPO material to PTO
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Therasense – Relevant Procedural History
N.D. Cal. bench trial (Alsup) found for defendant on
non-infringement, invalidity and unenforceability
Fed. Cir. panel affirmed (Dyk), but with a vigorous
dissent on the issue of unenforceability (Linn)
On May 25, 2011 Fed. Cir. remanded on
unenforceability decision en banc in a 6-1-4 split
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The Therasense Standard for Inequitable Conduct
Intent and materiality are separate requirements
– Use of a ―sliding scale‖ is impermissible
– May not infer intent solely from materiality
Materiality
– Requires ―but-for materiality‖ or ―affirmative
egregious misconduct‖
Intent
– Intent to deceive must be ―the single most reasonable inference‖
– Knowledge of art and failure to disclose (alone) cannot support a
finding of deceptive intent
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Inequitable Conduct: Intent Under Therasense
Therasense confirms the prevailing trend in the Federal
Circuit on intent
– Requires evidence of specific intent (―knowing and deliberate‖)
– Makes clear that withholding of material art does not lead to an
―inference‖ of intent
– Relieves pressure to provide explanation of withholding
– Removes sliding scale shortcut
Clarifications on intent standard widely accepted
– Dissent in agreement; most of amici as well
– En banc nature of change should make a difference in frequency
of inequitable conduct cases going to trial
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Inequitable Conduct: Materiality Under Therasense
Majority standard is ―But-for +‖– But-for standard
– ―plus‖ acknowledges Supreme Court precedent by creating exception for ―affirmative egregious misconduct‖ such as false affidavits
– Standard raised to address proliferation of inequitable conduct charges
Minority position – Critical of but-for standard as inconsistent with precedent
– Advocates use of PTO Rule 56
Concurrence– But-for, plus false representations, plus offensive behavior
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Looking to the Future of Inequitable Conduct
Inequitable Conduct charges in Litigation– Changes to materiality standard may not solve the problem
presented regarding proliferation of inequitable conduct charges (but see Exergen)
– Clear articulation of intent standard and elimination of sliding scale should make a difference on summary judgment resolution of claims
– Scope of remedy changes (whole patent versus particular claims)
Patent prosecution practice– PTO rule changes?
– In the absence of harmonization, will this make a difference?
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Must the party who “actively induces infringement of
a patent” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) know that the
induced acts constitute patent infringement?
Beth H. Parker
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.,
US Supreme Court (May 31, 2011)
Patent for innovative ―cool touch‖ deep fryer designed by SEB
Pentalpha purchased SEB fryer in Hong Kong and copied it
Pentalpha retained attorney to conduct right-to-use study
Did not tell attorney it had copied SEB’s design
Attorney issued right-to-use opinion
Pentalpha sold fryers in US cheaper than SEB’s fryers
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Lower Court Proceedings
SEB sued Sunbeam, who was selling Pentalpha fryers
in US
Sunbeam notified Pentalpha of suit, who kept selling
fryers to other distributors
SEB sued Pentalpha for direct infringement and active
inducement
– Jury found for SEB on both grounds
– Also willfulness
Post trial motions: Pentalpha argued no knowledge of
SEB’s patent until notified of Sunbeam suit
– District court rejected argument
– Federal Circuit affirmed 28
Huge amici interest
– 9 amici for petitioner, including many preeminent tech
companies, law and business professors, trade associations
– 3 amici for neither party, including IPO, MPAA, RIAA and
Federal Circuit Bar Association
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US Supreme Court
Inducement: Level of intent unclear
Patent Act §271 (b): ―Whoever actively induces
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer‖
– Some intent is required
– Unclear: What level?
• Deliberate indifference
• Purposeful, culpable expression and conduct to encourage
infringement
– § 271(b) ambiguous
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Adopts same standard as US Supreme Court previously
adopted for:
– § 271(c) liability for contributory infringement Aro II (1964)
– For contributory copyright infringement Grokster (2005)
§ 271(b) conduct requires knowledge that the induced acts
constitute patent infringement
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Inducement: Actual knowledge required
Reasoning:
– Contributory infringement requires knowledge of existence of
patent that is infringed.
– Induced infringement, pre-1952 codification, was not separate
theory of indirect liability.
– Therefore, induced infringement requires knowledge that the
induced acts constitute patent infringement.
Rejects test of deliberate indifference to a known risk
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Inducement: Actual knowledge required
Yet affirms judgment of liability under doctrine of
willful blindness
– Criminal law concept
– Cannot deliberately shield oneself from clear evidence of critical
facts that are strongly suggested by circumstances
– Patent law: Actively encourages others to violate patent rights
and take deliberate steps to remain ignorant of those rights
despite high probability that they exist and are being infringed
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Inducement: Willful Blindness
Willful Blindness
Two requirements for willful blindness:
1. Defendant must subjectively believe that there is
a high probability that a fact exists.
2. Defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid
learning of that fact.
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Willful Blindness
Surpasses negligence and recklessness
– Negligence: Should have known of a similar risk but, in fact,
did not
– Reckless: Merely knows of substantial and unjustified risk
of wrongdoing
– Willful blindness: Takes deliberate actions to avoid
confirming a high probability of wrongdoing; can almost
be said that defendant actually knew
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Application here – Finding of willful blindness
– SEB’s fryer was innovative product, had growing sales
– Pentalpha did market research
– Pentalpha copied SEB’s fryer
– Pentalpha’s president had his own patents, knew overseas
products often did not include patent markings
– Chose not to tell attorney that fryer was knock off
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Willful Blindness
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Joint/Divided Infringement
When multiple actors combine
to carry out steps of a patent
Robert P. Taylor
Federal Circuit grants en banc review in two
cases of divided infringement
Akamai v. Limelight
McKesson Technologies v. Epic Systems
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Joint Infringement of Method Claims
Is Liability Based on Section
271(a), (b), (c) or None of the Above?
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When Multiple Entities Combine to Infringe
Individual entities combine to practice some but not all the
elements of a method claim.
All of the claims are implicated by the work of multiple entities.
Akamai v. Limelight – no liability.
– Rationale: undermines Section 271(b) and (c) to allow.
– Single entity must practice all the claims.
McKesson v. Epic Systems – no liability.
– No direct infringement.
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Sections 271(a), (b) and (c) not a perfect fit
Is there direct infringement? Without direct infringement, can there
be indirect?
Joint tortfeasor liability is normally vicarious – agency theory, joint
conduct
Need limits – no actual direct infringement by either party.
Without direct infringement – not inducement or contributory
Process portion of 271(c) assumes sale of material
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En banc Briefing
Outcomes in Akamai and McKesson not good
Law developed in BMC and Miniauction
BMC – one entity must ―direct or control‖
Akamai – must be agency or contract
Unclear where court will end up – is there an ambit of common
law infringement outside 271?
Many amici
Stay tuned . . . . . .
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Contact Us:
Monty Agarwal
Partner
San Francisco
tel: +1 415.356.3042
Robert P. Taylor
Senior Counsel
San Francisco
tel: +1 415.356.3084
Beth H. Parker
Partner
San Francisco
tel: +1 415.356.3051
Michael A. Berta
Partner
San Francisco
tel: +1 415.356.3079
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